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The respondent spouses, as sellers, entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner,
as buyer, over a parcel of land covering 28,958 square meters. Upon payment of
the first instalment, petitioner introduced improvements and fenced off the property
with concrete walls. Later, respondents discovered that the area fenced off by
petitioner exceeded the area subject of the contract by 2,450 square meters, and
despite several demand letters to vacate the encroached area, petitioner refused to
vacate said area. A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed by respondent
spouses against petitioner, and in its Answer, petitioner admitted the encroachment
but claimed it was a builder in good faith. Respondents filed a Motion for Summary
Judgement, which was granted by the trial court and which eventually ruled in favor
of respondent spouses.
Whether or not the trial court was in error in rendering summary judgment.
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, except as to the amount of
damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be
allowed. In a reinvindicatory action, the basic issue for resolution is that of
ownership and in the present case, the determination of ownership of the subject
property is hinged on the following questions of fact first, what was the total are of
the lot sold to petitioner by respondent spouses as agreed upon; and second,
whether or not the area being occupied by the petitioner is in excess of the land
which it actually bought from respondent spouses under the said contract. In its
Answer, petitioner admitted the existence and due execution of the Contract to Sell
which contained the specific description of the property it bought from respondent
spouses and that the relocation survey conducted by geodetic engineers of both
parties disclosed that indeed there were two encroachments. With the foregoing
admissions by petitioner, clearly, there is no genuine issue of fact as to ownership
of the subject property because the said admissions are tantamount to an
admission that respondent spouses owned the property in question.

Janet Ang had liposuction surgery on her thighs at the EPG Cosmetic and Aesthetics
Surgery Clinic, attended to and operated on by Dr. Erniefel Grageda, who owned
and ran the said clinic. In the course of the operation, Janet began to have fits of
seizure which lead to her death and which prompted Janets father to file a criminal
complaint of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide against respondent before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Muntinlupa City. The doctor was acquitted,
and the private complainant appealed the decision on the civil aspect thereof to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The private complainant failed to file the required appeal
memorandum after having filed fifteen motions for extension, all of which were
granted, to file the same. The RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal for failure
of appellant to file his appeal memorandum, and instead of appealing via a petition
for review under Rule 42, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
Whether the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
the proper remedy of petitioner in the appellate court.
The order of the RTC dismissing petitioners appeal for her failure to file her
memorandum despite her successive motions for extension of time to do so was a
final order. The remedy of petitioner from said Order of the RTC, as well as the Order
denying her motion for reconsideration, was to appeal by filing a petition for review
in the CA under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It bears stressing that when the RTC
issued the aforementioned Order, it did so in the exercise of its appellate

RULE 110
Petitioner was convicted by the trial court of the crime of qualified theft. On appeal,
petitioner submits that while the information charged him for acts committed
"sometime in the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered
by the information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Whether or not there was sufficiency of the allegation of date of the commission of
the crime.
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may
be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date
of its commission. Conformably, when the date given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be
sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the
period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. In
this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft
since the information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense
through the words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner could
reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a
reading of the contents of the information, as well as gather by such reading
whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his

RULE 117
A complaint-affidavit was filed by PNB before the Office of City Prosecutor of Naga
City charging Soriano with 52 counts of violation of the Trust Receipts Law, in
relation to Estafa, which eventually lead to the filing of informations against Soriano
for 52 counts of Estafa before the RTC on August 1, 2001. Meanwhile, PNB filed a
petition for review of the Naga City Prosecutors Resolution before the Secretary of
the DOJ. Soriano was arraigned in March 2002, and pled not guilty, the criminal
cases. The DOJ, in a Resolution dated 25 June 2002, reversed and set aside the
earlier resolution of the Naga City Prosecutor. This caused the RTC to order the
withdrawal of the criminal cases against Soriano.
Whether or not the reinstatement of the 51 counts (Criminal Case No. 2001-0671
was already dismissed) of criminal cases for estafa against Soriano would violate
her constitutional right against double jeopardy.
NO. Section 7, 17 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for
double jeopardy to set in: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted,
or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In the
present case, the withdrawal of the criminal cases did not include a categorical
dismissal thereof by the RTC. Double jeopardy had not set in because Soriano was
not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the fifty
one (51) cases against her. It stands to reason therefore that the fifth requisite
which requires conviction or acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case
without the approval of the accused, was not met.