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Iconic Knowledge
The Image as a Model
Knowing or Doing?
Working with models has always been a widespread practice in artists
ateliers and in the workshops of technicians and scientists. Related finds
date back to ancient Egypt and one can assume the use of model
sketches starting in the early stages of arithmetic and geometry in
Babylon. The role of the model has intensified markedly since the Early
Modern Period and has since experienced a rich blossoming. In the
context of the evaluation of the model from the perspective of the
discourse, it has been heavily imposed upon since the 18th century by an
antagonism that, without a semblance of connection, pits cognitive
knowledge against aesthetic experience. Kant attempted to confirm that
this was the case as well as to overcome the situation in his Critiques.
All the same, he was not able to prevent models (especially of artists
and scientists) from being relegated to the vestibules and ghettos of
applied arts or the history of science by an appraisal that oriented itself
on taste and style. This was only to fundamentally change in the 20th
century. The model shifted from the periphery into the center of art; test
experiments appeared as the artworks themselves. The dynamic of
scientific knowledge and its rapid paradigm shifts increased the need for
constructing models. Some models became popular icons of knowledge,
for example the atom model or the DNA spiral. It became clear that in
doing so, they tied in to an older tradition of models that had brought
forth revered representations of the night sky with the astrolabe or the
armillary sphere. Classrooms and living rooms alike are still furnished
with globes. All of these are examples in which representing with models
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This complex history makes the question of the model seem boundless
and urgent at the same time. Two main pathways would seem useful for
discussion here: the historical case study, or a reflexive procedure that
keeps an eye out for the conditions of iconic models. We have decided
to go with the first option, well aware that it always leads back to the first.
To begin, we will relate the great variety of model types, model concepts
and practices back to a single differentiation criterion, namely the
manner in which models relate to their objects, and how their individual
reference is constituted. A spectrum emerges, on the one end of which
the full-scale simulation of an (in principle) accessible original can be
found. The evocativeness of such a simulation, for example that of the
model, consists in the minimizing of difference. It looks like a real train
and moves like one too. As many of the visible details as possible are
recreated faithfully and to scale. If the users were to liliputanize to the
same scale, they would return to an original world and the real train
would appear to them as a monumentally enlarged model. Here we have
an inkling of the dialectic that can generally be observed in the
translation of originals into secondary representations: the model can
itself function again as the original.
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Simulative models capture our interest first and foremost through the
recognition that they make possible.
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In the following, we will be dealing with heuristic models. They also allow
for a plausible transition from the sphere of artifacts to that of knowledge.
The close interaction between knowing and doing, between connatre
and construire characterizes a guideline of our argument. The following
quote from Immanuel Kant might serve as the motto for what is to come:
We cannot conceive of a line without drawing it in our thoughts; nor a
circle without first delineating it. (Kant KrV B154) We add to this: the
line, guided by the eye and hand, also wants to be drawn in actuality.
Schema Image
The model constructors career success was made possible by their
inherent ability for cognitive revelation (deixis, demonstratio). They show
something that can only be seen in this way; they have specific
evidences at their disposal. Which ones?
This does not contradict the fact that, as is the case for all scientific
construction of hypotheses, a selection of external data is constantly
flowing into the practice of models. As prosaic as models might appear,
they have a surplus of the imaginary at their command, they maintain a
difference vis--vis the real. It is precisely this difference that opens up
the space for the free play of experiment that so often accompanies
models.
Lets return to the armillary sphere: the framework of wires, the swinging
of bodies into one another, is not the sky, and yet it is. A deictic power
inherent in the model attracts us; however, we gladly allow that the
model is part of the quotidian of the scientist in disciplinary discourses, a
means of scientific explication among others. We are always dealing
with an internal and an external functional relationship in models. This
doesnt just prompt the question What? but also the others, carrying a
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distinctly historical index, namely When? For what purpose? and For
whom?
Interest in the iconic conditions of knowledge brings with it, vis--vis the
self-image of the scientist, a clear shifting of attention one on which we
must insist, since it is what allows us to occupy ourselves with the
demonstratio of the model itself. How does this shift come about?
What kind of question is this? How can we proceed with it? Who could
help us here? After all, categories like visual thought and the older
parler peinture are not questioned, and a discipline like art history
presupposes that in the space of its phenomena, concepts with images
come to the rescue. To really understand this discursivity of the pictoral
and thus to explain it or make it known through scientific means is one of
the biggest challenges before us.
We will employ in this matter an elementary tool of the trade, but one
that seems to be appropriate for images, namely the simple means of
precise observation and of description, which will then prove capable of
being implemented in further arguments and in particular theoretical
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didactic plays. In any case, our premise is simple and hopefully stable:
when concepts combine with images, this interlacing should also be
detectable in the images themselves in one way or another.
On the one hand, with the reality of the concept: We can come up with
any number of concepts, and we use them constantly, for example right
this very minute.
On the other hand, there are concretions in images that involve the
conceptual at least to the extent that they can be named. We
ceaselessly identify sky, clouds, mountain, tree, house, table, and chair
in images and call them by names.
What we are missing is a joint that flexibly interweaves the abstractinvisible with the concrete-sensory, a missing link. How can it be tracked
down? Is the thing that combines the invisible with the visible itself
visible? In what way?
In order to shed light on this matter, we will take a look at a drawing that
Paul Klee published for didactic purposes in his pedagogical
sketchbook from 1925. We will detach it from its context and transfer it
to that of our argument. We see a strange concretion of the concept
house, or more precisely, the facade of a house. Contrary to our
expectation, this house lies flat on the ground, but yet does not show its
floor plan. Put plainly: it is lying in the horizontal and attempts with all its
might to raise itself from it. This effort is supported by a perspectival
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shortening, but one that disregards its own laws at a critical juncture.
Klee himself highlights this section in his monosyllabic commentary: the
animal and by that he most likely means the observer (wants), for
the benefit of his balance, to see all of the verticals of reality also
projected as verticals... He says it, but he doesnt follow through.
Technically speaking, he undermines perspectival convention by not
combining the floor plan and vertical section together at a right angle.
Klees offensive exposes first and foremost simply the fact that
representations follow rules that guide them. Apparently, there are quite
different rules than just the traditional ones of perspective. A glance at
Klees work in the twenties, which shows him occupied with, among
other things, using the house to question a classic paradigm of
perspective, also teaches one to discover other rules of possible houses.
The L-Platz under Construction (1923), the Houses-Projection (1923),
or House-Inside (1919), all of them water-colors, confirm this activity.
Klees very different houses contort and stretch, play out their ground
lines to all sides, overlay inner and outer, allow the focal point to wander,
operate with paradoxes, and so forth.
Thus, Klee shows that a plethora of rules can be devised with the means
of the image: rules that represent the same thing, that allow themselves
to shape ways of worldmaking (Goodman), and that lead to quite
unseen houses. These rules, like maps, complete a projection onto a
plane it is not just by coincidence that we find the word PLAN written
into the picture field of the L-Platz ; but frontal projections also appear
abruptly, one encounters the overlay of color onto a squared ground with
a linear frame, and so forth.
The concept of the rule, which encompasses the most varied modi of
representation, has involuntarily crept into our description. Could it
perhaps be that it is trying to alert us to that ominous joint that conveys
the invisible concept (house) with its manifold manifestations?
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In order to pursue this suspicion, we will now take up the drawing pencil
ourselves, keeping in mind our motto and the expansion that KIee
granted it. He doesnt want to think the line drawn, but rather to let it
promenade, to activate it as an agent, as a point that shifts itself (6).
First, the line itself appears, along with the distances to the edges. The
numerical comes into play, which would allow itself to be checked, but
which as it stands remains under the threshold of attention.
The third line branches off of the first one diagonally to the upper right.
Since we are on our way to a concept of the house, it now begins to ring
a bell. It is at this point that we can finally say something more: This is
not simply a third line, but at the same time also half of a roof. The
factualness of the lines changes into something meaning-bearing. We
are close to our goal.
And voil: the fourth line, which turns off to the left from the second line,
meets up with the first slant: and the house is complete! An elementary
viewness built itself up step by step and became optically discernible in
the fourth move. One can imagine that children explore the possibilities
of drawing in a similar way once they have left the phase of spontaneous
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actions behind them. We are dealing here with forms of what one could
call the arch, the beginning, the ur-scene of the iconic: the emergence
of meaning from out of material substrates.
Our kindergarten visit has allowed us an insight into how the rule
functions. It is, one can now say, itself invisible, but guides the formation
of the visible, of a view in a fundamental manner. It is also for this reason
that Kant, falling back on rhetorical conceptuality, called it a schema and
assigned it to the image. In doing so, he also employs the rhetorical
concept of the hypotypose, which literally means: draft, outline, essential
trait, also: what lies beneath. In short: the schema rule is not itself a
picture, but it serves, steering, as its basis. The verb to steer is not
unimportant here, since it implies that we are dealing with a process.
Indeed: without this transfer, without the transition from the factual to the
effect, without this act, viewness, that is, the image, would never
appear. In its structure it is not reality, but a condensate of the real. The
joint of the schema that opens the way from the factual to representation
is itself of a temporal nature. Images must build themselves up if they
are to appear. They imply an act of showing, through which they still
and mute as they are visibly come before us as an event, as their
coming-to-be. But the schema doesnt just sort out what belongs to the
perimeter of possible houses a boundary that may not be overstepped
but also the How, the form of possible appearance that only unveils
itself when a real hand draws a real pencil over a real page.
Lets keep in mind that the schema rule articulates iconic difference and
determines its moments reciprocally. Itself invisible, it makes decisions
that become visible. It allows an infinite amount to disappear into the
abyss of the simply possible, thereby precisely making visible. When this
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The simplicity of our examples should not lead astray. We find ourselves
in an area that structures the entire appearance of representation, as
complex as it may be. A schema already exists when we bring a sign
into a material field and activate a boundary against the Outer, thereby
making it into representation. A schema exists when as in this case
the lines appear in front of, that is, on the ground. The in- and on-, the
upper- and lower-schema and so forth, fall into place as a motoric
schema of an overview, that as our drawing showed activates the
visual forces of the field. Let us now move the lower left line to the upper
right it then appears optically lighter, it appears elevated, making
something like gravity indirectly noticeable, and brings our bodily
experience into play. Even the simplest pictorial relationships thus
implicate the eye, the force of seeing. The approaching observer is a
methodical fictional character who has always come too late.
At the same time, it becomes clear that the iconic has been governed by
the number from the start; that a mapping of the gaze arises, especially
when its a matter of simultaneously honoring the field. Incidentally,
cognitive science has begun using strong arguments to derive the
inherence of mathematics as an episteme from the visual field.
Viewness or aspectation thus proves itself to be a key to
understanding number, as does language (because in linguistics, aspect
also refers to temporal changes of the same verb: it transports it into
very different viewnesses of reality, for example: to go, I go, I had
gone, I will go, etc...). We have now arrived at the point at which images
emerge. Their origin is puzzling, since it consists of the process of an
immemorial transfer through which the perceptual can be experienced
as something conceptual, the material as a spatial or logical
determination. The schematism is thereby only circumscribed in passing,
and we can only point out here that the ability to pre-conceive the
perimeter of possible images corresponds with an inner pictorial ability
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To conclude this line of thought, lets take a look once again the L-Platz
with its houses. How do things really stand with the relationship between
the concept and a house; in other words, one of the houses in the
variety of the possible?
What do we see?
We see the difference between houses in art and those on the real LPlatz
In other words, this image opens up a room for play of the possible that
is just as distinct as it is broad, and within which certain decisions have
been made. So in the image, what is revealed is not the concept of a
house in the sense of a repraesentatio singularis, but rather: something
like a house. Something like this is a linguistic turn of phrase with quite
a bit of freedom as it were, it states what opens the perimeter of the
schema rule. The invisible unity of the concept reveals itself in different
sensory views. The room for play must not be damaged in the process.
There is also a tower on the L-Platz. A tower is not a house. Here, one
schema is transgressed in order to make room for another one.
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But this inner rule-boundness and its play of reflection isnt a means in
itself, but rather it establishes a relationship of analogy to the
represented circumstances.
Both paths, the quantitative as well as the reflexive, cross one another,
and differentiating the two does not necessarily imply completely
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There are any number of examples of this, such as the medieval T-Omaps, which divest the structure of the three continents known then,
Europe, Africa und Asia, of their individual geographic characteristics, in
order to insert it into the form of a cross, which functions as the scale of
the terrestrial world, within the circle.
Other premodern models of the world are based on a mare nostrum, i.e.
on a relatively common living world, around whose central basin the
neighboring and the distant lands, peninsulas, islands, and
subcontinents accumulate far removed from a continuous or metric
adherence to scale. It was only the practice of complete surveying,
initiated by military strategists of the 19th and 20th centuries, which
make exact maps possible despite the projection, introduced by
Mercator in the 16th century, of the spherical surface of the earth onto a
plane. These maps, to which one can ascribe model quality, distinguish
themselves precisely due to very selective choosing from the total data.
And vice versa: any observer of detailed travel maps knows that he or
she could easily miss the forest for the trees. Those attempting to travel,
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for example, with the aid of the Ebstorfer map of the world, would most
certainly not have arrived at their destination. The marching maps of the
Romans or those of coastal shipping or of the Periplous offer a flow of
significant characteristics, but practically no model-like valence.
One final example involves models of the cosmos under the augury of
the harmony of the spheres. The Pythagorean one could also say the
historical discovery that the fleetingness and affectivity of the tones
could be traced back to a rational order of number relationships also left
behind deep traces in certain model designs. We see the orbits of the
planets, whose relationships constitute the harmonia mundi, represented
in a precisely calculated proportional order.
The role of the number in the iconic model, along with its increasing
precision, become clear when we observe their allocation to empirical
reality. We again follow an argument that was already contained in our
line motto. But its not enough that the line has to be drawn; if one
wishes to imagine it, the act of drawing itself can be subjected to a
continuous rationality. This thought also plays a fundamental role in what
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And yet: the guiding of the gaze in the model along a mathematically
conceived order of images does not mean that the result can be seen or
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The second way to incorporate the specific possibilities of the modelimage is that of an indirect representation based on reflection. As a
reminder: Classical architectural models offer structure and scale at the
same time, as well as the direct view of what they stand for. Heuristic
models are much more open; they generally dont achieve a direct
reproduction of their circumstances structure and dimensional
accuracy provided for the sake of visualizing, as shown by the models of
the heavens, are able to cope with substantial deviations. Nevertheless
they also achieve the purposes for which they were created, namely
setting up analogies between the construction and reality. Of course, the
concept of analogy circumscribes references of a very particular kind,
namely correspondences without similarity. This concept of
representation can easily be explained with the help of an example. One
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Our example involves Mondrian, who between 1915 and 1919, the years
during which he approached and crossed the threshold of abstraction,
developed strikingly model-oriented picture forms. The first work that
comes to mind is Pier and Ocean (also more cautiously referred to by
the technical title of composition), in which perspectival projection fuses
together with the horizontal of a map. The perception changes
accordingly between a frontal view and the overview or glance of an
unfixed eye. The artist, incidentally, has done much not to place the
simple pattern of lines coordinated at right angles on the surface, but
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rather to allow them to emerge out of the chromatic white which also
fundamentally changes the meaning of the representation. On a
symbolic level, the picture resembles a visually eventful world-egg, and a
cursory glance at the chessboard-images that follow it or the worldsquares of abstraction that came afterwards clarify Mondrians adoption
of the model into his artistic representational practice. We add to these
few hints the fact that Mondrian also annuls the rationality of calculation
by using it. Constructs are so saturated with visual agitation that the
observer is confronted with paradoxical experiences of suspension that
take possession of the apparent explicitness.
In the case of other artists of his time, the drawing-out of the figureground-relationship emerges even more clearly, including the emphasis
of the pictorial underside or reverse. A plethora of alternative world
models developed in the context of modernity, which plumb beyond
mimesis, the unfixed-complex and energetic character of reality, and
avail themselves of an aesthetic heuristic. For Mondrian, it is not a
matter of pictorially constituting a specific object driven by scale, but
rather, with recourse to elementary conditions of the image or of
painting, of discovering reality, not reconstructing it. Art, especially that
of the 20th century, thus offers in its own way models for interpreting the
world, for understanding it. The key used here is, as already mentioned,
not mimetic, but formed according to the pattern of symbolic reflexivity,
i.e. of analogy. It should be possible to overcome in this way the
widespread opinion that the practices of art, science or mathematics
mutually and essentially exclude one another. Not because their
individual specificity which could be referred to as an indispensable
increase in the differentiation of cultural development should be
leveled; the level of the relationship between the various areas of
knowing (including mathematics) and of doing seems a given in the
context of their exemplarity. The mixed image-form of the model is the
prime example of the crossing of epistemic with artistic methods a
crossing that, as we have shown, is enacted on iconic terrain.
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The power of model-images lies in the fact that most of their visual roots,
for example the tree, the body, the wheel, the spiral, proportional
relationships, the circle or sphere, etc. were pre-shaped in the sphere of
the living world and the everyday, and have been saturated with
evidences. The vehicle of the imagination, of which the model-images
avail themselves, thus come from metaphors that have deeply engrained
themselves in the observers and their worlds of experience.
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Put to the test, used thoughtfully and in reflection, the model mobilizes
the most potent resource humans possess and the only one that holds
up against reality in the long run: their imagination.