!

1
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44251 May 31, 1977
FELIX MONTEMAYOR,petitioner,
vs.
ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, JUAN SALCEDO,
JR., TOMAS DAVID, MARTIN CELINO, MARCELO AMIANA,
as Members of the Panel of Investigators, Members of the
Board of Trustees, FR. ROMEO PELAYO and the
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR,respondents.
E. B. Garcia & Associates for petitioner.
Marcelo C. Amiana for private respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Assistant Solicitor
General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz
respondent Secretary of Labor.
Constitutional law; Security of tenure; Instructor or member of
a teaching staff of a university as employee entitled to the
security of [Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation, 77
SCRA 321(1977)] tenure guarantee.The present Constitution
expanded the scope of the protection to labor mandate by
specifying that the State shall assure the right of workers to
security of tenure. In Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, it
was the ruling of this Tribunal that even where disciplinary
action against an employee is warranted, where a penalty less
punitive [than dismissal] would suffice, whatever missteps may
be committed ought not to be visited with a consequence so
severe. An instructor or member of a teaching staff of a
university was held, in the leading case of Feati University vs.
Bautista, to be an employee. As such, he is entitled to that
security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Academic freedom defined.Academic freedom
is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to
pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to
make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear
that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his
conclusion are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers
that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments. For the sociologist, Robert MacIver, it is a
right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as
investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to any interference,
molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond
the institution.
Same; Same; Security of tenure the essence of academic
freedom.Tenure is of the essence of such freedom. Without
tenure that assures a faculty member against dismissal or
professional penalization on grounds other than professional
incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his colleagues
renders him unfit for membership in the faculty, the academic
right becomes non-existent.
Same; Procedural due process.To paraphrase Webster,
there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the
investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to
be rendered only after such inquiry.

Same; Academic due process.As far back as 1915, the

American Association of University Professors adopted the
principle that every university or college teacher should be
entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges
against him stated in writing, in specific terms and to have a
fair trial on these charges before a special or permanent
judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At
such trial the teacher accused should have full opportunity to
present evidence. Thus the phrase, academic due process,
has gained currency. Joughin referred to it as a system of
procedure designed to yield that best possible judgment when
an adverse decision against a professor may be the
consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of
reaching a conclusion.
FERNANDO,J.:
The protection to labor mandate is more of a reality with the
present Constitution expressly providing for security, of
tenure. 1Moreover, for a university professor, aptly referred to
as a tiller in the vineyard of the mind, there is the guarantee of
academic freedom. 2Nonetheless, for cause duly shown there
may be a forced termination of his services. It is essential
though that prior to his removal, procedural due process be
observed. The grievance alleged by petitioner in this case, a
university professor, was that there was a failure to comply with
such a requisite. When therefore respondent Secretary of
Labor granted a clearance to the private respondent, the
Araneta University Foundation,3for his dismissal for immorality
he instituted this certiorari proceeding. A thorough and
exhaustive comment, considered as the answer, filed by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza 4 with full support from
the record, negates such a contention. There is no basis for a
reversal. certiorari does not lie.
It is undisputed that petitioner Felix Montemayor was a fulltime
professor of respondent Araneta University Foundation,
serving as head of its Humanities and Psychology Department,
Previously, he was on the faculty of other educational
institutions. There was, on April 17, 1974, a complaint for
immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the Araneta
University Foundation for alleged immorality. Its then President,
Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee to investigate such
charge. The first hearing, which took place on April 24, 1974,
was attended by petitioner as well as complainant with his two
witnesses. One of them. Leonardo de Lara, submitted an
affidavit. Petitioner sought the postponement of the
investigation to May 3, 1974. It was granted. On that occasion,
he was furnished a copy of the affidavit of the other witness,
Macario Lacanilao. The accusation centered on conversations
on sex and immoral advances committed against the person of
Leonardo de Lara. There was cross-examination by petitioner
of the witnesses against him. With the assistance of counsel,
he filed on May 28, 1974 a motion to dismiss or to hold the
hearing in abeyance. He likewise filed an affidavit to sustain his
defense on June 17, 1974. The report and recommendation of
the investigating committee came on July 8, 1974. It was
adverse to petitioner, who was found morally responsible for
the act complained of. The recommendation was for his
demotion in rank by one degree. The then President Juan
S a l c e d o , J r. , o n A u g u s t 5 , 1 9 7 4 , a d o p t e d s u c h
recommendation and thereafter referred the same to the Board
of Trustees of private respondent for appropriate action.
Subsequently, on November 8, 1974, with new charges being

!2
filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime Castaneda, and
Jesus Martinez against petitioner for conduct unbecoming of a
faculty member, another committee was appointed. Then came
his preventive suspension, ordered to last until the
administrative investigation was concluded. There was a
motion by petitioner for the postponement of the hearing set for
November 18 and 19, 1974, but the same was denied. The
hearing proceeded in his absence. There was testimony by
Professor Luis Almazan and Jaime Castaneda. Thereafter, on
December 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding
the charges against petitioner to have been sufficiently
established and recommending to the President and the Board
of Trustees of the Araneta University Foundation his separation
from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351
of the Manual of Policies of the University. The Committee
found as established: "1. That immoral advances on several
occasions have been made by respondent [herein petitioner]
on Prof. Luis Almazan 2. That immoral advances have also
been made by respondent on Jaime Castaneda, a studentemployee of the university on several occasions; 3. That said
immoral advances were frustrated because both Professor
Almazan and Mr. Castaneda had refused to accept them; 4.
That both witnesses and victims of said immoral advances
have declared that the behavior of respondent was detrimental
[and] prejudicial to the moral and educational standards of the
Araneta University Foundation; 5. That because of said
behavior, respondent should not continue as Professor in the
University; and 6. That the acts of respondent complained of
are offensive to good morals [and] inimical to the welfare of
students and greatly prejudicial to [the] interest and
educational objectives of University, hence the same are highly
reprehensible." 5His dismissal was then ordered on December
10, 1974, effective November 15, 1974, the date of his
preventive suspension. The University, on December 12, 1974,
filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a report of
his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his
employment. Meanwhile, on November 21, 1974, petitioner in
turn lodged a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission against private respondents for reinstatement and
payment of back wages and salaries, with all the privileges,
benefits and increments attendant thereto. There was a motion
to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and
the National Labor Relations Commission found in favor of
petitioner. He was ordered reinstated to his former position with
back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges.
Petitioner's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however,
dismissed. Private respondents appealed to respondent
Secretary of Labor who, on July 14, 1976, set aside the
Commission's order for his reinstatement. He found petitioner's
dismissal justified, Nor was he persuaded by the plea that
there was denial of due process. He was satisfied with the
procedure followed by private respondent. Moreover, he could
not have ignored the fact that the controversy between the
parties was passed upon and the parties heard on their
respective contentions in the proceedings before the labor
agencies. Respondent University was, however, required to
pay complainant the amount of P14,480.00 representing the
latter's accrued back wages which the former voluntarily
offered to extend him. Dissatisfied with the Secretary's
decision, petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari.
1. The present Constitution, as noted, expanded the scope of
the protection to labor mandate by specifying that the State

shall assure the right of workers to security of tenure. This

Court, as stressed inPhilippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air
Lines Employees Associations 6 is called upon to manifest
realty to a constitutional command."7Subsequently, inAlmira v.
B. F. Goodrich Philippines, 8 it was the ruling of this Tribunal
that even where disciplinary action against an employee is
warranted, "where a penalty less punitive [than dismissal]
would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed ought not
to be visited with a consequence so severe." 9An instructor or
member of a teaching staff of a university was held, in the
leading case of Feati University v. Bautista, 10 to be an
employee. As such, he is entitled to that security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution. The explicit pronouncement
in Feati University v. Bautista was foreshadowed by Far
Eastern University v. Court of Industrial Relations, 11 a 1962
decision. While a faculty member such as petitioner may be
dismissed, it must be for cause. What is more, there must be
clearance from the Secretary of Labor. So it is provided in the
Labor Code.12
2. The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to
security of tenure is reinforced by the provision on academic
freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. While
reference therein is to institutions of higher learning, it was
p o i n t e d o u t i n G a r c i a v. T h e F a c u l t y A d m i s s i o n ,
Committee 13 that academic freedom "is more often Identified
with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish
the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would
be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found
distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in
the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the
sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is 'a right claimed by the
accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret
his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization
because these conclusions are unacceptable to some
constituted authority within or beyond the
institution.'" 14 Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of
such freedom. For him, without tenure that assures a faculty
member "against dismissal or professional penalization on
grounds other than professional incompetence or conduct that
in the judgment of his colleagues renders him unfit" for
membership in the faculty, the academic right becomes nonexistent, 15Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is
"the chief practical requisite for academic freedom" of a
university professor. 16 As with Maclver, he did not rule out
removal but only "for some grave cause," Identified by him as
"proved incompetence or moral delinquency."17
3. The charge leveled against petitioner, that of making
homosexual advances to certain individuals, if proved, did
amount to a sufficient cause for removal. The crucial question
therefore is whether it was shown that he was guilty of such
immoral conduct. He is thus entitled to the protection of
procedural due process. To paraphrase Webster, there must be
a hearing before condemnation, with the investigation to
proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered
only after such inquiry. As far back as 1915, the American
Association of University Professors adopted the principle that
"every university or college teacher should be entitled before
dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against him stated
in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on these

!3
charges before a special or permanent judicial committee of
the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher
accused should have full opportunity to present
evidence."18 Thus the phrase, academic due process, hag
gained currency, Joughin referred to it as a system of
procedure designed to yield the beat possible judgment when
an adverse decision against a professor may be the
consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of
reaching a conclusion.19
4. The procedure followed in the first investigation of petitioner,
conducted in June of 1974, did satisfy the procedural due
process requisite. The same cannot be said of the November,
1974 inquiry when the petitioner had to face anew a similar
charge of making homosexual advances. As admitted in the
exhaustive comment of the Solicitor General: "On November
16, 1974, Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the
postponement of the hearing set for November 18 and 19,
1974 but the same was rejected by the committee. The hearing
proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Professor
Montemayor and his counsel. In said hearing, Prof. Luis
Almazan and Jaime Castaneda testified. On December 5,
1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the charges
against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and
recommending to the President and the Board of Trustees of
the Araneta University Foundation his separation from the
University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the
Manual of Policies of the University." 20 It does appear
therefore that the members of such investigating committee
failed to show full awareness of the demands of procedural
due process. A motion by petitioner for postponement of the
hearing, apparently the first one made, was denied. What is
worse, in his absence the matter was heard with the committee
losing no time in submitting its report finding the charges
against petitioner to have been sufficiently established and
recommending his removal. If that were all, respondent
Secretary of Labor cannot be sustained. certiorari would lie.
But such deficiency was remedied, as pointed out in the same
comment of the Solicitor General, by the fact "that petitioner
was able to present his case before the Labor
Commission ." 21 Then he continued: "Thus, the record
discloses that at a mediation conference held on December 9,
1974, the parties appeared and, after all efforts at conciliation
had failed, they agreed to submit their dispute for compulsory
arbitration. Several hearings were conducted by Labor Arbiter
Atty. Daniel Lucas, Jr., wherein petitioner submitted his
evidence supported by his affidavit impugning the regularity of
the proceedings before the investigating committees and
assailing the legality of his removal. The entire record of the
administrative proceedings, including the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken therein, was elevated to the Labor
Commission for review. Petitioner herein, thru counsel, moved
for reinstatement during the pendency of the case. In another
motion, he prayed for the consolidation and joint hearing of his
complaint for unfair labor practice against herein private
respondents (NLRC Case No. R-IV-1060-74) with that of the
application for clearance filed by the University to terminate
Montemayor's employment. On the other hand, the University
moved to dismiss the complaint for unfair labor practice against
its officials on the ground that they were not complainant's
employers and that their participation in the administrative case
against the latter was official in nature. Respondent University
also presented the affidavit of Thomas P. G. Neill Dean of the

Institute of Agricultural Business Administration and Chairman

of the Committee created to investigate the charges of
immorality against petitioner attesting to the regularity of the
proceedings and the validity of the dismissal." 22 The legal
aspect as to the procedural due process having been satisfied
was then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: "All the
foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was afforded his day in
court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner
claims denial of due process in the proceeding had before the
investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the
NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest
opportunity to present his case."23
5. The comment of the Solicitor General was submitted on
January 4, 1977. The memorandum for petitioner was
submitted on April 25. What immediately calls attention is that
no attempt was made to refute specifically such recital of the
Solicitor General, of decisive significance as far as the due
process issue is concerned. Instead, the emphasis was on the
alleged commission of an unfair labor practice by private
respondent. Inasmuch as the Arbiter as well as the National
Labor Relations Commission absolved private respondent from
the charge of unfair labor practice, it would appear that the
emphasis of counsel for petitioner was misplaced. Accordingly,
there is nothing in the record that would militate against the
contention of the Solicitor General that there was an
observance of procedural due process. WHEREFORE, the
petition for certiorari is dismissed. No. costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56180 October 16, 1986
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ROMEO G.
GUANZON and TERESITA REGALADO,respondents.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Mirano, Mirano & Associates for private respondents.
RemedialLaw; Civil Procedure; Judgment; Finality ofjudgment:
General rule that factual findings of trial courts and
administrative tribunals, are accorded finality, Exceptions.
The statement regarding the finality given to factual findings of
trial courts and administrative tribunals is correct if treated as a
general principle. The general principle, however, 1s subject to
well established exceptions. We disregard the factual findings
of trial courts when(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
on speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences
made are manifestly mistaken. absurd, or iinpossible; (3) there
is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension
of facts; and (5) the court, in arriving at its findings, went
beyoiid the issues of the case and the saine are contrary to the
admis= sions of the parties or the evidence presented. (Gomez
v, Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 620; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514; Carolina Industries, Inc. v.
CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., 97 SCRA 734; and Bacayo v.
Genato, 135 SCRA 668).
Administrative Law; Judgments; Finality of judgment; General
rule that the factual findings of administrative tribunals are

!4
accorded respect if not finality, Exceptions.By reason of their
special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of
specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, we
ordinarily accord respect if not finality to factual findings of
administrative tribunals. However, there are exceptions to this
rule and judicial power asserts itself whenever the factual
findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are
vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion; where the procedure
which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable
errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. (Internationai
Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines v. Leogardo, 117
SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Comrnission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v.
Commissioner of Imrnigration, 94 SCRA 61; and Eusebio v.
Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).
Same; Constitutional Law; Due Process; No denial ofdue
process where all requirements of administrative dueprocess
were met by the school and the student given the opportunity
to be heard.Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board
of Discipline. He adniitted the slapping incident, then begged to
be excused so he could catch the bort for Bacolod City. Juan
Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he
actually appeared to present his side; the investigating board
acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative
due process were met.
Same; Same; Same; Due process in administrative proceeding
re~ quires consideration of evidence presented and existence
of evidence to support the decisiori. Due process in
administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the
evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support
the decision (Halili v. Court of IndustrialRelations, 136 SCRA
112).
Same; Same; School Discipline; Students dismissal from
college for unbecoming conduct; Violation of disciplinary
regulations, a valid ground for refusing re-enrolment ofa
student.There was unbecomirig conduct and pursuant to
the Rules of Discipline and Code of Ethics of the university,
specifically under the 19671969 Catalog containing the rules
and academic regulations (Exhibit 19), this offense constituted
a ground for dismissal from the college. The action of the
petition is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools recognizes violation of
disciplinary regulations as valid ground for refusing reenrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA 245).
Same; Same; Extiaustion of administrative remedies;
Jurisdiction; Question of recovery by parents of damages
against the school as a result of dismissal of their son, a purely
legal question; Jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil
courts.The issue raised in court was whether or not the
private respondents can recover damages as a result of the
dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a
purely legal question and nothing of an administrative nature is
to or can be done. (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230;
Tapales v. University of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 553; Limoico
v. Board of Administrators, (PVA), 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan v.
Ramonte, 129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to
the law on damages provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction
to try the case belongs to the civil courts.

Same; Same; Damages; No basis for recovery of damages as

the dismissed student was accorded due process and the
penalty of dismissal was based on reasonable rules and
regulations.This brings us to the final issue which is whether
or not the private respondents are entitled to damages. There
is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was
afforded due process of law. The penalty is based on
reasonable rules and regulations applicable to all students
guilty of the same offense. He never was out of school. Before
the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an
honorable dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at
the De la Salle University of Bacolod City and later transferred
to another Jesuit school. Moreover, his full and complete tuition
fees for the second semester were refunded through the
representation of Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramons father.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absence ofmalice, fraud and
improper or willful motives by the university in case at bar
precludes recovery of damages.lt is unfortunate if the
parents suffered some embarassment because of the incident.
However, their predicament arose from the misconduct of their
own son who, in the exuberance of youth and unfortunate loss
of self control, did something which he must have, later,
regretted. There was no bad faith on the part of the university.
In fact, the coliege authorities deferred any undue action until a
definitive decision had been rendered. The whole procedure of
the disciplinary process was set up to protect the privacy of the
student involved. There is absolutely no indication of malice,
fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of
the Ateneo de Manila University in this case.
GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:
In a letter-complaint dated December 13, 1967 addressed to
Rev. William Welsh S.J., Dean of Men, Dean of Resident
Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline, College of
Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a
waitress in the cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside the university
campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, son of private
respondents Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado, and a
boarder and first year student of the university with
unbecoming conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at
about 5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini who I think comes
from Bacolod, was asking for "siopao." I was at the
counter and I told him that the "siopao" had still to be
heated and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr.
Guanzon started mumbling bad words directed to me,
in the hearing presence of other boarders. I asked
him to stop cursing, and he told me that was none of
my business. Since he seemed impatient, I was going
to give back his money without any contempt. (sic) He
retorted that he did not like to accept the money. He
got madder and started to curse again. Then he
threatened to strike me with his fist. I tried to avoid
this. But then he actually struck me in my left temple.
Before he could strike again, his fellow boarders held
him and Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to stop; I got
hold of a bottle so I could dodge him. It was then that
Fr. Campbell arrived. The incident was hidden from
Fr. Campbell by the boarders. I could not tell him

!5
myself as I had gone into the kitchen crying because I
was hurt.
The university conducted an investigation of the slapping
incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon
was dismissed from the university.
The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a
complaint for damages by his parents against the university in
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at
Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was
expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of
his right to due process and that they are prominent and well
known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious
expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of
the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the
ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good
morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior
subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary
regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the
sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the
school a student found to be undesirable in order to preserve
and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its
existence as an institution of learning.
After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and
ordered the university to pay them P92.00 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees
and to pay the costs of the suit.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial
court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. The
complaint was dismissed.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the
Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and set it
aside through a special division of five. In the resolution issued
by the appellate court, the lower court's decision was
reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to
a special division of five in view of the failure to reach
unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the
regular division having become 2 to 1.
The petitioner now asks us to review and reverse the
resolution of the division of five on the following grounds:
ONE
THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE
COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR OF
LAW IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WERE NOT AFFORDED DUE PROCESS IN THE
DISCIPLINE CASE AGAINST THEIR SON, JUAN
RAMON GUANZON.
TWO
THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE
ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE RESORT TO
JUDICIAL REMEDY BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULE ON FINALITY OF
ADMINISTRATION ACTION OR EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
THREE

THE FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE

RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE ARE
TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
OR ARE CONFLICTING, OR CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.
In reversing its own decision, the appellate court relied heavily
on the findings of the Director of Private Schools affirmed by
the Minister of Education and the findings of the lower Court to
the effect that due process of law was not observed by the
petitioner when it dismissed the private respondents' son Juan
Ramon. The resolution invoked the rule that findings of facts by
administrative officers in matters falling within their
competence will not generally be reviewed by the courts, as
well as the principle that findings of facts of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal.
The conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its split decision are
not sustained by the facts on record.
The statement regarding the finality given to factual findings of
trial courts and administrative tribunals is correct if treated as a
general principle. The general principle, however, is subject to
well established exceptions.
We disregard the factual findings of trial courts when-(l) the
conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises,
and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of facts; and (5) the
court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of the
parties or the evidence presented. (Gomez v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 620; Republic v. Court of Appeals,
132 SCRA 514; Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc., 97 SCRA 734; and Bacayo v. Genato, 135
SCRA 668).
A similar rule applies to administrative agencies.
By reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained
from the handling of specific matters falling under their
respective jurisdictions, we ordinarily accord respect if not
finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals. However,
there are exceptions to this rule and judicial power asserts
itself whenever the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition,
or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or
when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest. (International Hardwood and
Veneer Co., of the Philippines v. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967;
Baguio Country Club Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola
de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).
The Court of Appeals ruled that Juan Ramon Guanzon was not
accorded due process. We fail to see what, in the records,
made the respondent court reverse its earlier and correct
finding that there was due process.
The original decision, penned by then Associate and now
Presiding Justice Emilio A. Gancayco reviews the facts on
record to show that the procedures in the expulsion case were
fair, open, exhaustive, and adequate.

!6
The decision states:
First, after the slapping incident which happened on
December 12, 1967, Fr. Welsh in his capacity as
Chairman of the Board of Discipline upon receipt of
the letter-complaint (Exh. 2) of Carmelita Mateo
conducted a preliminary inquiry by interviewing the
companions and friends of Juan Ramon Guanzon
who were also at the cafeteria. They confirmed the
incident in question. (Exhs. 5, 6, 7 and 9).
Second, Fr. Welsh, finding that there was probable
c a u s e a g a i n s t M r. G u a n z o n , p r e p a r e d a
memorandum to the members of the Board of
Discipline dated December 16, 1967 (Exh. 8) and
delivered a copy each to Fr. Francisco Perez, Dr.
Amada Capawan, Mr. Piccio and Dr. Reyes.
Third, on December 14, 1967, Mr. Guanzon was fully
informed of the accusation against him when Fr.
Welsh read the letter-complaint of Carmelita Mateo
and he admitted the truth of the charge. (tsn., pp.
38-39, May 9, 1970; Exh. 4).
Fourth, Fr. Welsh also sent separate letters to Rev.
Antonio Cuna, Student Counselor of the College of
Arts and Sciences dated December 18, 1967 and
Rev. James Culligan, Director of Guidance of the
College of Arts and Sciences dated December 18,
1967 seeking any information for guidance in the
action of the Board of Discipline regarding the case of
Mr. Guanzon. (Exhs. 10-11)
Fifth, notice of the meeting of the Board of Discipline
set on December 19, 1967 was posted at the Bulletin
Board of the College of Arts and Sciences and also at
Dormitory Halls (tsn., pp. 21-22, July 21, 1970) The
Secretary of the Dean of Discipline personally notified
Mr. Guanzon of the meeting of the Board on
December 19, 1967, he was told to seek the help of
his guardians, parents and friends including the
student counsellors in the residence halls and College
of Arts and Sciences. (tsn., p. 18, July 21, 1970)
Sixth, despite notice of the Board of Discipline on
December 19, 1967, Mr. Guanzon did not care to
inform his parents or guardian knowing fully well the
seriousness of the offense he had committed and
instead he spoke for himself and admitted to have
slapped Carmelita Mateo. He then asked that he be
excused as he wanted to catch the boat for Bacolod
City for the Christmas vacation.
Seventh, the decision of the Board of Discipline was
unanimous in dropping from the rolls of students Mr.
Guanzon (Exh. 12) which was elevated to the office of
the Dean of Arts and Sciences, Rev. Joseph A.
Galdon, who after a review of the case found no
ground to reverse the decision of the Board of
Discipline. (Exh. 13) The case was finally elevated to
the President of the Ateneo University who sustained
the decision of the Board of Discipline (Exh. 21-A, p.
6) A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
President of the Student Council in behalf of Mr.
Guanzon (Exh. 15) but the same was denied by the
President of the University.

Eighth, when the decision of the Board of Discipline

was about to be carried out, Mr. Guanzon voluntarily
applied for honorable dismissal. He went around to
the officials of the university to obtain his clearance
and this was approved on January 8, 1968. (Exh. 3,
tsn., p. 58, May 6, 1970)
Ninth, Mr. Romeo Guanzon, father of Juan Ramon
Guanzon arranged for full and complete refund of his
tuition fee for the entire second semester of the
school year 1967-68. Juan Ramon was never out of
school. He was admitted at the De la Salle College of
Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit
School.
From the above proceedings that transpired it can not
be said that Juan Ramon Guanzon was denied due
proems of law. On the contrary, we find that he was
given the full opportunity to be heard to be fully
informed of the charge against him and to be
confronted of the witnesses face to face. And since he
chose to remain silent and did not bother to inform his
parents or guardian about the disciplinary action
taken against him by the defendant university, neither
he nor his parents should find reason to complain.
xxx xxx xxx
When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he
admitted the altercation with the waitress and his slapping her
on the face. Rev. Welsh did not stop with the admission. He
interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go, Roberto Beriber, and Jose
Reyes, friends of Juan Ramon who were present during the
incident.
The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished
members of the faculty-Fr. Francisco Perez, Biology
Department Chairman; Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry
professor; Assistant Dean Piccio of the College; and Dr. Reyes
of the same College. There is nothing in the records to cast
any doubt on their competence and impartiality insofar as this
disciplinary investigation is concerned.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline.
He admitted the slapping incident, then begged to be excused
so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon,
therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually
appeared to present his side; the investigating board acted
fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due
process were met.
We do not share the appellate court's view that there was no
due process because the private respondents, the parents of
Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings.
Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was
already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to
know his responsibilities. In fact, in the interview with Rev.
Welsh, he even asked if he would be expelled because of the
incident. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he
committed. When informed about the December 19, 1967
meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek
advice and assistance from his guardian and/or parents.
In the natural course of things, Juan Ramon is assumed to
have reported this serious matter to his parents. The fact that
he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his

!7
case, not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his
Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the petitioner
university.

129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to the law on
damages provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the
case belongs to the civil courts.

Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private

respondents, the university, as stated earlier, undertook a fair
and objective investigation of the slapping incident.

There was no need to await action from Malacaang.

Due process in administrative proceedings also requires

consideration of the evidence presented and the existence of
evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 136 SCRA 112).
While it may be true that Carmelita Mateo was not entirely
blameless for what happened to her because she also shouted
at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top,
this did not justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face. The
evidence clearly shows that the altercation started with Juan
Ramon's utterance of the offensive language "bilat ni bay," an
Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a woman. It was but
normal on the part of Mateo to react to the nasty remark.
Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of Juan Ramon who was
present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the
investigation of the case that Juan Ramon made threatening
gestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a cardboard box
top which she threw at Juan Ramon. The incident was in public
thus adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There was
"unbecoming conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Discipline
and Code of Ethics of the university, specifically under the
1967-1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic
regulations (Exhibit 19), this offense constituted a ground for
dismissal from the college. The action of the petitioner is
sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary
regulations as valid ground for refusing re-enrollment of a
student (Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA 245).
Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the
College of Arts and Sciences Handbook containing the general
regulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog of the
College of Arts and Sciences containing the disciplinary rules
and academic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules and
Regulations of the Cervini-Elizo Halls of the petitioner
university one of the provisions of which is as follows: under
the title "Dining Room"-"The kitchen help and server should
always be treated with civility." Miss Mateo was employed as a
waitress and precisely because of her service to boarders, not
to mention her sex, she deserved more respect and gracious
treatment.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious
error of law in the appellate court's ruling on due process.
The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative
remedies" in view of its pending appeal from the decision of the
Ministry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It
argues that the private respondents' complaint for recovery of
damages filed in the lower court was premature.
The issue raised in court was whether or not the private
respondents can recover damages as a result of the dismissal
of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legal
question and nothing of an administrative nature is to or can be
done. (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230; Tapales v.
University of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 553; Limoico v. Board of
Administrators, (PVA), 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan v. Ramonte,

This brings us to the final issue which is whether or not the

private respondents are entitled to damages. There is no basis
for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was afforded due
process of law. The penalty is based on reasonable rules and
regulations applicable to all students guilty of the same
offense. He never was out of school. Before the decision could
be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable
dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la
Salle University of Bacolod City and later transferred to another
Jesuit school Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for
the second semester were refunded through the representation
of Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.
It is unfortunate of the parents suffered some embarrassment
because of the incident. However, their predicament arose
from the misconduct of their own son who, in the exuberance
of youth and unfortunate loss of self control, did something
which he must have, later, regretted. There was no bad faith on
the part of the university. In fact, the college authorities
deferred any undue action until a definitive decision had been
rendered. The whole procedure of the disciplinary process was
set up to protect the privacy of the student involved. There is
absolutely no indication ot malice,. fraud, and improper or
willful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila
University in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
appellate court's resolution dated January 26, 1981 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appellate court's decision
dated March 15, 1979 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 76353 May 2, 1988
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU BERNADETTE
ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA, REMEDIOS BALTAZAR,
CORAZON BUNDOC JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHIELA
DIOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ET AL.,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his
capacity as President and Chairman of Board of Trustees
of PSBA, ATTY. P. PAULINO, etc., et al.,respondents.
Rosalinda L. Santos for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez Law Office for respondents.
Merly Basco-Olano for Intervenor Union.
Camilo Flores for Intervenor
Constitutional Law; Contracts; Courts; Due Process; The
charge of denial of due process is untenable since the PSBAQ.C. no longer has any existing contract either with the
students or with the intervening teachers; Courts have no
power to make contracts for the parties.It is beyond dispute

!8
that a student once admitted by the school is consid-ered
enrolled for one semester, It is provided in Paragraph 137
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college
student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the
Manual, that the written contracts required for college
teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the
close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any
existing contract either with the students or with the intervening
teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due
process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that
contracts are respected as the law between the contracting
parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R.
No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 197). The contract having been terminated, there is no
more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to
enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate
court, have no power to make contracts for the
parties. (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
supra).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mininum standards to meet the
demands of procedural due process.Under similar
circumstances where students have been refused reenrollment but without allegation of termination of contracts as
in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings
may be summary and cross-examination is not even an
essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid
down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due
process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to bear and decide
the case (Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 706707
[1986]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Academic Freedom, defined;
Right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations.
The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations
has always been recognized by this Court (Tangonan vs. Pao,
137 SCRA 246 [1985]; Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA,
145 SCRA 100 [1986]). Thus, the Court has ruled that the
schools refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid
grounds for refusing reenrollment of students. The opposite
view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by
the school and enshrined under the Constitution. More
specifically, academic freedom is defined by the Court as
follows: This institutional academic freedom includes not only
the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire,
discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field

of their competence subject to no control or authority except of

rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought
and established in their disciplines, but also the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them the grant being to institutions of
higher learningfree from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. (Tangonan vs. Pao, supra).
Same; Same; Same; Exceptions to the rule that the court
accords respect to factual findings of administrative tribunals.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters
falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily
accords respect if not finality to factual findings of
administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not
supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by
fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to
the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness,
or capriciousness is manifest. (Ateneo de Manila University vs.
Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 106 (1986); citing: International
Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines vs. Leonardo, 117
SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61 and Eusebio vs.
Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569.)
Same; Contempt, defined; Motion to cite respondents in
contempt, untenable; Reasons.Contempt of court has been
defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the
court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
(Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 57 [1985]).
In the case at bar, there appears to be no defiance of authority
by the mere filing by respondents of a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of November 12, 1986. In fact
respondent school explained that the intervenors were actually
reinstated as such faculty members after the issuance of the
temporary mandatory injunction. Thus, in the compliance
submitted by said school on November 20,1986, it manifested
that without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted by
the school authorities, x x x and in order that dislocations may
not result with respect to the academic activities of the
students and the distribution of teaching loads among the
teachers, the respondent school has created new classes for
the petitioners and the intervening teachers beginning
November 20,1986.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Freedom of expression and
assembly are rights held sacred by the Constitution and made
available to all the citizenry without distinction or discrimination.
Freedom of expression and assembly are rights held sacred
by the Constitution, and made available to all the citizenry
without distinction or discrimination. This was our holding in
Malabanan vs. Ramento. It was likewise our holding in that
case that some disruption is normal in such gatherings. I
quote: x x x If in the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely
critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident

!9
types. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in
the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any
rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord
full credence to their fiery exhortations, They take into account
the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate, the exhuberance of youth. They may give the
speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity
taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no
clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible.
Same; Same; Contempt; Respondents failure and refusal to
comply with the courts resolution directing them to re-enroll the
petitioners (students) make them liable for contempt.We
come to the charges of contempt of which the petitioners urge
that we find the respondents guilty. The majority would absolve
the respondents on the ground that the intervenors-faculty
members were in fact given teaching loads pending this
petition. What the majority is silent about, however, is the fact
that in the same resolution of November 12,1986, we directed
the respondents to re-enroll the petitioners (students). The
petitioners-students shortly filed an urgent motion to cite for
contempt directed against the respondent College arising from
its discharge of three petitioners from the students roll.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed yet another motion to reenroll. It is not controverted that despite our reinstatement
directive, the respondents failed and refused to comply
therewith as far as the students are concerned. For such an
act of defiance, it is my opinion that they are liable for
contempt.
PARAS,J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction seeking to nullify
the action taken by herein respondent Philippine School of
Business Administration, Quezon City Branch, in violation of
petitioners' constitutional rights.
The factual background of this case is as follows:
Petitioners are allbonafidestudents of the Philippine School of
Business Administration, Quezon City, while respondents, are
the Philippine School of Business Administration (hereinafter
referred to as PSBA) Quezon City Branch, a 'non-stock
institution of higher learning organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, Juan D. Lim, President and Chairman
of the Board of PSBA; Benjamin P. Paulino, Vice President for
Admission and Registration of PSBA, Q.C.; Ruben Estrella,
Officer-in-Charge; and Ramon Agapay, Director of the Office of
Student Affairs of PSBA, Q.C. and Romeo Rafer, Chief
Security of PSBA, Q.C.
As early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent
school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on
certain matters which would govern their activities within the
school (Rollo, p. 75). Among the agreements reached at that
time were:
On The exercise of student's democratic rights, it has
been agreed that protest actions can be conducted
any day as long as they meet the following
requirements:
a) that they be held at the PSBA quadrangle from
12:30 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. only;

b) that the protest action be removed to the PSBA

parking lot if it will exceed the 1:00 time limit;
c) that if the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be
limited only up to 2:30 p.m.
d) However, before any action is taken the organizers
of the protest action should secure a permit 6 days
before, or if on the same day, it still be under the "firstcome-first-serve served" basis in the use of facilities,
volume of sound system shall be adjusted so as not
to disturb classes.
It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it
will not allow the students to directly participate in the
policy-making body of the school, as this is provided
by law. However, the administration will be open to
suggestions and questions, especially those
regarding tuition fee increases and other policies that
directly affect us.
In spite of the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the
need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the
negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned
down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and
barricades of school entrances (Rollo. p. 20; 347-348).
"Subsequently dialogues proved futile." Finally, petitioners
received uniform letters from respondents dated October 8,
1986 (Rollo, p. 23) giving them 3 days to explain why the
school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction
on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the
commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on Thursday (Oct.
2), Friday (Oct. 3) and Tuesday (Oct. 7).<re||an1w> The
aforestated letter was answered by the counsel for the
students in a reply letter dated October 22, 1982 Annex
"E" (Rollo, P. 26).
During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other
students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and
denied admission for the second semester of school year
1986-1987. On October 28,1986 the President of the Student
Council filed a complaint with the Director of the MECS against
the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council
Officers and student leaders. (Annex "F" Rollo, p. 30).
Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote
the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written
statement of the school's decision regarding their enrollment
(Rollo, p. 31). Another demand letter was made by Counsel for
the students Atty. Alan Romulo Yap, also to the President,
Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within forty-eight (48)
hours (Rollo. p. 33). All these notwithstanding, no relief
appeared to be forthcoming, hence this petition.
In the resolution of November 7,1986, the Second Division of
this Court without giving due course to the petition required
respondents to comment thereon and set the hearing for
preliminary mandatory injunction on November 10, 1986
(Rollo, p. 35). In compliance therewith on November 9, 1986,
respondents filed their comment and opposition to the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction praying that the petition for the issuance of a writ be
denied not only for lack of merit but also for being barred by
res judicata (Rollo, p. 67).
Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed on November
10, 1986, by the Philippine School of Business Administration,

!10
Quezon City Faculty Union, (PSBA, QC-FU for brevity)
representing the faculty members hereinafter referred to as
intervenors, on the ground of commonality of issues and cause
of action with that of the petitioners (Rollo, p. 36).
At the hearing on the petition for preliminary mandatory
injunction, where counsel for all the parties appeared and
argued their causes, the Court Resolved to grant the motion for
intervention and to require the intervenors to comment on the
petition and the petitioners to file a reply thereto (Rollo, p. 66,
copy corrected, p. 167). On the same day respondents filed
their comment and opposition to the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (Rollo,
pp. 67-74).
On November 12, 1986, this Court resolved to issue a
temporary mandatory order directing the respondents herein
(a) to re-enroll the petitioners herein and (b) to re-admit the
intervenors to their former positions without prejudice to the
investigation to be conducted by the school authorities (Rollo,
p. 141). Said Order was issued on November 14, 1986 (Rollo,
pp. 142-143).
A supplemental comment and opposition to application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated November 11,
1986 was filed by herein respondents (Rollo, p. 150), while an
urgent motion to reiterate prayer for issuance of preliminary
mandatory injunction dated November 13, 1986 was filed by
herein petitioners (Rollo, pp. 162-163).
Instead of complying with tile resolution of November 12, 1986
an urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by herein
respondents on November 15, 1987 (Rollo, p. 194) praying
that this Court reconsider the aforesaid resolution.
On November 18, 1986 petitioners and intervenors filed a joint
urgent motin to cite respondents in contempt (Rollo, p. 199),
while respondents filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration, also on the same date (Rollo, p. 205).
In the resolution of November 19,1986, respondents' motion for
reconsideration and sumplemental motion for reconsideration
were denied for lack of merit, and the denial was dedlared
FINAL. The urgent motion of counsel for petitioners and
intervanorts to cite respondents in contempt of court was
NOTED (Rollo, p. 225).
An urgent motion for intervention and answer in intervention
was filed by Nelia M. Lat, Annalisa T. Geronimo, Leonora Q.
Bueniraje, Maria L. Araas, Eduerijes Llanto, Charita, R.
Chong, Marilou Garcia, Amelita R. Sia, Loida O. Ladines,
Dominic P. Santos, Noly R. Chong, and Arthur R. Cacdac for
themselves and on behalf of other students of the PSBA,
Quezon City, who are similarly situated, to allolw them to
intervene as respondents dated November 11, 1986 (Rollo, p.
227) which was granted by this Court in a resoulution dated
December 3, 1986 (Rollo, p. 240)
On November 20, 1986, the respondents filed their compliance
with the temporary mandatory order; Issued by this Court
pursuant to its resolution dated November 12, 1987 (Rollo, p.
237).
On November 29, 1986, respondents filed their comment on
the motion for intervention of the PSBA Quezon City Faculty
Union (Rollo, p. 252).

A consolidated reply to respondents' supplemental comment

and opposition to application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, urgent motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by herein in
intervenors on December 2,1986 (Rollo. p. 242).
In the resolution of January 21, 1987, the petition was given
due course and parties parties were required to file their
respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 266). Accordingly,
respondents filed their memorandum on February 23, 1987,
(Rollo, p. 269) while the intervenor Union filed its memorandum
on March 13, 1987 (Rollo, p. 296). Respondents filed their
reply memorandum on April 13, 1987 praying that the
intervention of the intervening teachers be dismissed (Rollo, p.
328).
Respondents filed their manifestation and motion dated April
27, 1987 stating that pursuant to this court's order dated
November 12, 1986, the school authorities created a special
investigating committee to conduct an investigation, which
submitted a report with recommendations (Rollo, p. 335), the
report reading as follows:
After due deliberation, the Committee hereby submits
the following recommendation:
STUDENT-RESPONDENTS
A. RENATO PALMA, BERNADETTE ANG, ROGELIO
TAGANAS are hereby recommended to be
EXONERATED of all charges.
B. SOPHIA ALCUAZ (up to No. 19) are hereby
recommended to be HONORABLY DISMISSED from
PSBA Q.C. roll of students without prejudice to
reenrollment on a case to case basis if found suitable
and justified.
FACULTY RESPONDENTS
A. To be EXONERATED of all charges JOSE C.
ANTONIO, DONALLY BRINGAS, DANTE CAJUCOM,
LEO LOQUELLANO SOLITA A. CRUZ, and N
TOLENTINO.
B. To be reprimanded with a WARNING that a
repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely FLORANTE BAGSIC and
ATENOGENES BONDOC.
C. MR. SEVERINO CORTES, JR. is hereby
recommended for non-renewal of his semester to
semester appointment.
D. MESSRS. ASSER (BONG) TAMAYO and RENE Q.
ENCARNACION are hereby recommended for
termination of their services as faculty members.
Respondents adopted the aforestated recommendations of the
Committee and prayed that the case be dismissed for having
become moot (Rollo, p. 341). On April 30, a second urgent
manifestation and motion was filed by respondent praying that
the recommendation of special Committee as implemented by
its President be made effective by the discontinuance of the
summer enrollment of petitioners Anna Shiela A. Dinoso, Zeny
Gudito and Ma. Shalina Pitoy upon the refund to them of all the
fees they have paid to the school (Rollo, p. 397).

!11
An urgent motion to cite for contempt herein respondents was
filed on May 5, 1987 for violating this court's temporary
mandatory order on November 12, 1986, by discharging and
striking off from the roll of students petitioners Dinoso, Gudito
and Pitoy (Rollo, p. 400) while an opposition to urgent motion
to cite for contempt was filed by herein respoddents on May
20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 413).
On May 20, 1987, Intervenor Union filed their Intervenor's
Comment on Respondents' reply memorandum and
manifestation and motion with motion to cite respondent in
contempt (Rollo, p. 417).
On June 8, 1987, petitioners filed their very urgent motion for
an order to re-enroll (Rollo, p. 620) followed by an urgent
supplemental motion and Reply to opposition dated June 9,
1987 (Rollo, p. 623).
Later on, an Opposition to "very urgent motion for order to reenroll was filed by herein respondents on June 11, 1987 (Rollo,
p. 625) while on June 15,1987, herein intervenor Union filed its
manifestation and motion with urgent motion reiterating
intervenor's motion to cite respondents in contempt (Rollo, p.
629).
On June 16,1987 respondents filed their opposition to urgent
motion to oppose petitioners' urgent motion dated June 9, 1987
(Rollo, p. 795)'. Petitioners filed their memorandum on June
17, 1987 (Rollo, p. 799).
On June 18, 1987, respondents filed their counter-comment
and opposition to motion to cite respondents in contempt
(Rollo, p. 815). Subsequently, on June 25,1987, respondents
filed their Reply Memorandum on the petitioners' memorandum
(Rollo, p. 820.).
In the resolution of June 29, 1 987 the motion of petitioners to
compel respondents to readmit or re-enroll herein petitioners
was denied except in the case of three (3) student petitioners
cleared by the investigating committee and who had been
recommended to be readmitted or re-enrolled. This court
further stated that the reason for the non-enrollment of the
others is that the results of the investigation conducted
indicate prima facie the violation by the majority of the
petitioners of the rules and regulations of respondent school
(Rollo, p. 793). The Court further resolved to require
respondent school to show cause why it should not be
adjudged in contempt for refusing to reinstate the intervenorsfaculty members in theinterim.
Respondents filed the manifestation on July 3, 1987 informing
this Court that they did not refuse to reinstate the intervenors/
faculty members; that they were in fact actually reinstated in
compliance with the Court's temporary mandatory order (Rollo,
p. 829). Hence, the motion for contempt should be dismissed.
The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not there has been
deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have
been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers
whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on
account of their participation in the demonstration or protest
charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a violation of
their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.
Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural
due process which requires that there be due notice and hear
hearing and of substantive due process which requires that the

person or body to conduct the investigation be competent to

act and decide free from bias or prejudice. They claim that
barring them from enrollment for the second semester is
equivalent to expulsion which cannot be valid and effective
without the required MEC's approval (Rollo, pp. 12-13).
Furthermore, petitioners point out that the acts of respondents
constitute a wanton and deliberate disregard of petitioners'
freedom of expression (ibid).
In the same manner, intervenors-teachers claim that their
constitutional right to due process has been violated when they
were summarily dismissed without affording them the
opportunity to be heard (Rollo, p. 301).
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school
is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in
Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that
when a college student registers in a school, it is understood
that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is
provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for
college teachers are for 'one semester." It is thus evident that
after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer
has any existing contract either with the students or with the
intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial
of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that
contracts are respected as the law between the contracting
parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R.
No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 1 00
SCRA 197).<re||an1w> The contract having been
terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school
cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said
students and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial
court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts
for the parties." (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al.,supra).
Under similar circumstances where students have been
refused re-enrollment but without allegation of termination of
contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that
due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings
may be summary and cross-examination is not even an
essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid
down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due
process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must
be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case (Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 706-707
[1986]).
Tested under said standards, the records show that the
proceedings in the case at bar, at the outset satisfied
conditions No. 1 and 2, but, without a hearing, conditions No.
3, 4 and 5 had evidently not been completed with.
It is not disputed that printed Rules and Regulations of the
PSBA-Q.C. are distributed at the beginning of each school

!12
year to the students including petitioners. The Rules, among
other things, provide:
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and
upon admission to the School, the Student is deemed
to have agreed to bind himself to all rules/regulations
promulgated by t he Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be
required to withdraw from the School at any time for
reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the School
Administration.
As previously stated, in violation of aforesaid Rules and
Regulations, sore students staged noisy demonstrations in the
premises of the school. For the settlement thereof, an
agreement was reached providing among otliers the
regulations for the conduct of protest actions. Despite said
agreement, it was alleged that petitioners, acting as the core
group of a noisy minoritv, committed tumultuous and anarchic
acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the
cooperation of the intervening teachers, causing disruption of
classes to the prejudice of the majority of the students
including the intervening ones; which acts now constitute the
subject of this controversy (Rollo, p. 217 ).
Accordingly, both students and teachers were given three (3)
days from receipts of letter to explain in writing why the school
should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on them
in view of their participation in the commission of tumultuous
and anarchic acts on the dates stated.
Respondents alleged that none of the students ever filed a
reply thereto. The records show however that a letter was sent
by Atty. Alan Rollo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA students to the
President of the School Mr. Juan D. Lim, explaining why said
students are not guilty of the charges filed against them (Rollo,
pp- 26-28). Similarly, a faculty member of the PSBA filed as
answer in a letter to the same President of the school, where
he denied the charges against him (Rollo, p. 52). It therefore
becomes readily apparent that while the students and the
teachers have been informed in writing of the charges filed
against them and they in turn filed their answers thereto, no
investigating committee or official was designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case upon the
presentation of evidence of both parties. Presumably, the
schools banking on the theory that the contracts have already
expired, said procedural steps are no longer necessary.
At any rate, this Court obviously to insure that full justice is
done both to the students and teachers on the one hand and
the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be
conducted by the school authorities, in the resolution of
November 12, 1986.
The investigating committee found among others that: there
were concerted mass assemblies conducted on October 2, 3, 7
and 8 at PSBA Quezon City, which were participated in by said
students and teachers, and which disrupted classes. The
disruption of classes and the barricades in the school
entrances constitute violations of existing MECS and PSBA
rules and regulations (Rollo, pp. 348-349). It is ironic that many
of those who claim that their human rights have been violated
are the very ones who emasculate the human rights of the
innocent majority.

Moreover, petitioners named in the report were found to be

academically deficient (Rollo, p. 273) while the intervening
teachers apart from participating in acts of illegality against the
school were found to have committed various acts of
misconduct (Rollo. p. 275). Accordingly, three students were
recommended for exoneration from all charges, and some to
be honorably dismissed. Of the faculty members eight were
recommended to be exonerated of all charges, two to be
reprimanded, one for non-renewal of his semester to semester
appointment and two to be terminated (Rollo, pp. 359-360).
The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations
has always been recognized by this Court (Tangonan vs. Paflo,
137 SCRA 246 [1985]; Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA,
145 SCRA 100 [1986]). Thus, the Court has ruled that the
school's refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as valid
grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite
view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by
the school and enshrined under the Constitution. More
specifically, academic freedom is defined by the Court as
follows:
This institutional academic freedom includes not only
the freedom of professionally qualified persons to
inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they
see it in the field of their competence subject to no
control or authority except of rational methods by
which truths and conclusions are sought and
established in their disciplines, but also the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its ms and
objectives, and how best to attain them the grant
being to institutions of higher learning-free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
(Tangonan vs. Pao,supra).
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and
expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling
under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords
respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative
tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings
is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest. (Ateneo de Manila University vs. Court of Appeals,
145 SCRA 106 (1986); citing: International Hardwood and
Veneer Co. of the Philippines vs. Leonardo, 11 7 SCRA 967;
Baguio Country Club Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 94 SCRA 61 and Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola
de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).
A careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the
Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under
any of the above exceptions. On the contrary, it is readily
apparent that the investigation conducted was fair, open,
exhaustive and adequate.
Accordingly, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb
the finding of said committee and as manifested by the

!13
respondents, the report of said committee has virtually
rendered this petition moot and academic.

Pedro A. Venida Agustin A. Ferrer and Gil F. Echaro for private

respondents.

The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite

respondents in contempt of court is likewise untenable.

Schools and Universities; Constitutional Law; Due Process;

Imposition of sanctions on students requires observance of
procedural due process.There are withal minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed
in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case. Moreover, the penalty imposed must
be proportionate to the offense committed.

Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the

authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends
to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or
their witnesses during litigation. (Hahn vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 136 SCRA 57 [1985]).
In the case at bar, there appears to be no defiance of authority
by the mere filing by respondents of a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of November 12, 1986. In fact
respondent school explained that the intervenors were actually
reinstated as such faculty members after the issuance of the
temporary mandatory injunction. Thus, in the compliance
submitted by said school on November 20, 1 986, it ma
manifested that 'without prejudice to the investigation to be
conducted by the school authorities, ... and in order that
dislocations may not result with respect to the academic
activities of the students and the distribution of teaching loads
among the teachers, the respondent school has created new
classes for the petitioners and the intervening teachers"
beginning November 20, 1986.
The school manifested that while the investigation was going
on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching and it was
only after the investigation, that the recommendations of the
Committee were adopted by the school and the latter moved
for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and
academic. Otherwise stated, respondent school has fully
complied with its duties under the temporary mandatory
injunction (Rollo, pp. 830- 832).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED,
but in the light of compassionate equity, students Who were, in
view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to
graduate during the school year when this petition was filed,
should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 89317 May 20, 1990
ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY
OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES,
BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY
MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS
SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES,petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of 5th Regional Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines
Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC., represented by its
president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the
Board of Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN,respondents.
Antonio A. Ayo Jr. and Soliman M. Santos, Jr., for petitioners

Same; Same; Contracts; Contracts between school and

students not ordinary; It is impressed with public interest.The
Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the termination of
contract theory. But it must be repeatedly emphasized that the
contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high
priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to
the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions.
Same; Same; Same; A school cannot refuse to enrol a student
on the simple ground that his contract expires every end of a
semester.Respondent school cannot justify its actions by
relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, which provides that [w]hen a student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling . . . for
the entire semester for collegiate courses, which the Court in
Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment
to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term
of one semester, has already expired. The termination of
contract theory does not even find support in the Manual.
Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls
for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein
tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e.
collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment
and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student
does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but
has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be required to
pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given
his credentials for transfer.
Same; Same; Same; Exclusion of a student for academic
deficiency where the real cause of action for doing so is related
to possible breach of disciplinestaging of a mass action and
rallyviolates tenets of fair play.On the other hand, it does
not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in
the manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused
re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that
the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing
grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what
incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass
actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or
participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students
because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken
against them undeniably related to possible breaches of

!14
discipline not only is a denial of due process but also
constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Same; Same; Same; Enrolment in another school no bar for
readmission.With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who
respondents claim has enrolled in Ago Foundation, such fact
alone, if true, will not bar him from seeking readmission in
respondent school. Same; Same; Same; Penalty to be
imposed on student for breach of discipline must be
commensurate to offense committed.But the penalty that
could have been imposed must be commensurate to the
offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be
imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process
have been complied with. This is explicit from the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph
145 that [n]o penalty shall be imposed upon any student,
except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the
schools rules and regulations duly promulgated and only after
due investigation shall have been conducted. But this matter
of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative
sanctions have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who
have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and who have
been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4)
semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized
for any breach of discipline they might have committed when
they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to
respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still
subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful
purpose and would only further aggravate the strained
relations between petitioners and the officials of respondent
school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle
here, in the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Concurring:

Schools and Universities; Contracts: The termination of
contract doctrine should be overturned.In other words, I
agree with Mme. Justice Cortes that the termination of
contract doctrine should be overturned for being a doctrinal
error. It is now clear (it was quoted out of context before) that
paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Public Schools
falls under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees and is
intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are
collected and paid on installment basis. It cannot be construed
to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.
PADILLA, J., Concurring:
Schools and Universities; The school may still refuse reenrollment on other grounds.It would indeed appear that,
consistent with this constitutional priority given to education,
par. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
should be underscored. It provides that every student has the
right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting
its specific requirements and reasonable regulations; x x x and
that the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for
the entire period he is expected to complete the course,
without prejudice to his right to transfer. It should be stressed,
however, that this right of students to enroll is not designed to
leave schools completely helpless to deny enrollment or reenrollment. For, par. 107 itself of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools still recognizes the right of the school to refuse
enrollment in case of academic deficiency or violation of
disciplinary regulations of the school.

SARMIENTO, J., Concurring:

Schools and Universities; Mere fact that student rally disrupted
classes is not a ground for imposition of disciplinary action.
To be sure, the school may punish students for breach of
discipline, as, say, for breaking chairs or window panes or for
disrupting classes in the course of a demonstration, but they
may be penalized for those actions alone and not because of
the content of their speech or the vociferousness with which it
was said. Moreover, violations of school discipline must be
judged on a case to case basis and measured depending on
gravity before school authorities may legitimately act. I do not
think that the fact that a demonstration has disrupted ongoing
classes is a ground for penalizing students taking part therein
because a demonstration, from its very nature, is likely to
disrupt classes. The school must convincingly show that the
demonstrators had deliberately turned to lawlessness, say, by
barricading the schoolgate or the classroom entrances or
otherwise prevented non-demonstrating students or members
of the faculty from attending a class or finishing one by threats
or intimidation. Only in that sense may school heads validly
invoke disruption of classes.
CORTES,J.:
Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the
doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of
Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988,
161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted
by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester
and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is
over, as the contract between the student and the school is
deemed terminated.
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges,
Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by
the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in the
preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not,
however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their
readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court
dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact
that the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on
the point at issue in this case but the authority of the
school regarding admission of students, save as a
matter of compassionate equity when any of the
petitioners would, at the least, qualify for reenrollment, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 12-A.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by
the trial court on February 24, 1989 in this wise:
Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of
Joaquin G. Bernas S.J., and that really there must be
a better way of treating students and teachers than
the manner ruled (not suggested) by the Supreme
Court, the Termination of Contract at the end of the
semester, that is.
But applicable rule in the case is that enunciated by
the Supreme Court in the case of Sophia Alcuaz, et

!15
a l . v s . P h i l i p p i n e S c h o o l o f B u s i n e s s
Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al.,
G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988; that of the termination
at the end of the semester, reason for the critical
comments of Joaquin G. Bernas and Doods Santos,
who both do not agree with the ruling.
Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot
prosper in view of their failure to specifically deny
respondent's affirmative defenses that "they were
given all the chances to air their grievances on
February 9, 10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on
February 22, 1988 during which they were
represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and that on
February 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of
classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their
rally picketing, even though without any renewal
permit, physically coercing students not to attend their
classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and
depriving a great majority of students of their right to
be present in their classes.
Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners
waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with
respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its
enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89.
Said form specifically states that:
The Mabini College reserves the right to deny
admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory and to require
withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the
institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or
interfere with the efficient operation of the college.
Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord
with the Mabini College code of conduct and
discipline.

Supreme Court rulings in the cases of Garcia vs. Faculty

[Admission Committee](G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975)
andTangonon vs.Pano, et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).
WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence
considered, and for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration of the order of this Court dated
August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollopp. 15-16.]
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the
Court, which resolved on April 10, 1989 to refer the case to the
Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition. The
Court of Appeals ordered respondents to comment on the
petition and set the application for issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for hearing. After considering
the comment and hearing the injunction application, the Court
of Appeals resolved on May 22, 1989 to certify the case back
to the Supreme Court considering that only pure questions of
law were raised.
The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court,
which then transferred it to the Court en banc on August 21,
1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional. On
September 14, 1989, the Courten bancaccepted the case and
required respondents to comment.
Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989.
Petitioners were required to reply. As reply, they filed a
pleading entitled "Counter-Comment," to which respondents
filed a rejoinder entitled "Reply to Counter-Comment To this
petitioners filed a "Rejoinder to Reply."
The issues having been joined, the case was deemed
submitted.

In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed

pledges which among others uniformly reads:

At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in

the following excerpt fromAlcuaz:

In consideration of my admission to the Mabini

College and of my privileges as student of this
institution, I hereby pledge/ promise under oath to
abide and comply with all the rules and regulations
laid down by competent authorities in the College
Department or School in which I am enrolled.
Specifically:

It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by

the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It
is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools, that when a college student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is
provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts"
required for college teachers are for "one semester."It
is thus evident that after the close of the first
semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with the
intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge
of denial of due process is untenable. It is a timehonored principle that contracts are respected as the
law between the contracting parties (Henson vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456,
February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals,
100 SCRA 197). The contract having been
terminated, there is no more contract to speak of.The
school cannot be compelled to enter into another
contract with said students and teachers. "The courts,
be they the original trial court or the appellate court,
have no power to make contracts for the

xxx xxx xxx

3. I will respect my Alma Matter the Mabini College,
which I represent and see to it that I conduct myself in
such a manner that the college wig not be put to a
bad light;
xxx xxx xxx
9. I will not release false or unauthorized
announcement which tend to cause confusion or
disrupt the normal appreciation of the college.
Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a
petition for mandamus to prosper (Sec. 3, Rule 65). It being a
mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled
or reenrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not
admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic
freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the

!16
parties.' (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al.,supra). [At 161 SCRA 17-18; Emphasis supplied.]
In Alcuaz, the Second Division of the Court dismissed the
petition filed by the students, who were barred from re-enrolling
after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it
added that "in the light of compassionate equity, students who
were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies,
scheduled to graduate during the school year when this
petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to
graduate in due time." [At 161 SCRA 22.] Mr. Justice
Sarmiento dissented from the majority opinion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed
teachers in Alcuaz. The students did not move for
reconsideration. The Court en banc, to which the case had
been transferred, denied the motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated September 29, 1989, but added as anobiter
dictum:
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We
value the right of students to complete their education
in the school or university of their choice, and while
We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and
demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and
as part of their freedom of speech and their right to
assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and
assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, and
without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence.
Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full
display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to
subvert freedom into degenerate license.
The majority's failure to expressly repudiate the "termination of
contract" doctrine enunciated in the decision provoked several
dissents on that issue. Although seven (7) members of the
Court * disagreed with the Second Division's dismissal of the
students petition, a definitive ruling on the issue could not have
been made because no timely motion for reconsideration was
filed by the students. (As stated above, the motion for
reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers.)
Be that as it may, the reassessment of the doctrine laid down
inAlcuaz, insofar as it allowed schools to bar the readmission
or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of
contract, shall be made in this case where the issue is squarely
raised by petitioners [Petition, p. 4;Rollo, p. 5].
Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective.
This is not a simple case of a school refusing readmission or
re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that
the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon
and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student
mass actions directed against the school. Petitioners are
students of respondent school who, after leading and
participating in student protests, were denied readmission or
re-enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that focuses
on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by
studentsvis-a-visthe right of school officials to discipline them.
Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by
the ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated August 8, 1988;Rollo, pp.
1212-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between
students' rights and the school's power to discipline them, to
wit:

Students should not be denied their constitutional and

statutory right to education, and there is such denial
when students are expelled or barred from enrollment
for the exercise of their right to free speech and
peaceable assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary
action without abiding with the requirements of due
process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders
to let loose extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic
language against school authorities during a student
rally.
But the right of students is no license and not without
limit . . . [Order of February 24, 1989;Rollo, p. 13.]
1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected
Rights at the Schoolgate.
Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the
recognition and protection of the rights of free speech and
assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. [Art. III.]
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A
similar provision was found in the 1973 Constitution, as
amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended
[Art. III, sec. 81, the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec.
3, para. 13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, para. 13].
Thus, as early as 1907, the Court inPeople v.Apurado, 7 Phil.
422, upheld the right to speech and assembly to overturn a
conviction for sedition. It said:
Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:
All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in
order to attain by force or outside of legal methods
any of the following objects are guilty of sedition:
xxx xxx xxx
2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any
provincial or municipal government or any public
official, from freely exercising its or his duties or the
due execution of any judicial or administrative order.
But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge "the
freedom of speech" or "the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances" guaranteed by the express provisions of section 5
of "the Philippine Bill."
xxx xxx xxx
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark
the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances
whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling
is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater
the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders
over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly
conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to
characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising
against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion
and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most

!17
righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would
expose all those who took part therein to the severest and
most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought
to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such
occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercise
in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct
and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a
tumultuous uprising. [At pp. 424, 426.]
That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and
assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available
to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the leading case
ofMalabanan v.Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129
SCRA 359, the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Fernando in anen bancdecision, declared:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so.
They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to
express their views and communicate their thoughts
to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was
held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the
opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District, "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." While therefore, the authority of
educational institutions over the conduct of students
must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be
violative of constitutional safeguards. [At pp.
367-368.]
The facts in Malabanan are only too familiar in the genre of
cases involving student mass actions:
. . . Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of respondent [Gregorio Araneta] University.
They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M.
to 12:00 P.M. on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such
permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal
Science (VMAS) the place indicated in such permit,
not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the
respond floor lobby. At such gathering they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of
Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At
10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the
Life Science building and continued their rally. It was
outside the area covered by their permit. They
continued their demonstration, giving utterance to
language severely critical of the University authorities
and using megaphones in the process. There was, as
a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also,
the non-academic employees, within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of the noise
created. They were asked to explain on the same day
why they should not be held liable for holding an
illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they
were informed through a memorandum that they were
under preventive suspension for their failure to

explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of

the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in a petition formandamuswith
damages against private respondents and before the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On
October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director
of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty
of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the
Manual for Private Schools more specifically their
holding of an illegal assembly which was
characterized by the violation of the permit granted
resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation. The penalty was suspension for one
academic year. . . . [At pp. 363-364.]
The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too
severe and reduced it to a one-week suspension.
The rule laid down inMalabananwas applied with equal force
in three other en banc decisions of the Court.
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No.
69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706, the Court reiterated that
the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis
for barring students from enrolling. It enjoined the school and
its officials from acts of surveillance, blacklisting, suspension
and refusal to re-enroll. But the Court allowed the nonenrollment of students who clearly incurred marked academic
deficiency, with the followingcaveat:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by ''institutions of higher
learning" includes the right to set academic standards to
determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for
the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that
standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized
to discriminate against those students who exercise their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If
it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students
thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being
disregarded. [At p. 711.]
InArreza v.Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No.
62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 94, a case arising from
almost the same facts as those in Malabanan, the Court
rejected "the infliction of the highly- disproportionate penalty of
denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior
students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of
free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could
be attributed to them. [At p. 98].
In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11,
1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to allow
the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with
their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary
proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their
participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.
2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of
Constitutional Rights Within the School.
While the highest regard must be afforded the
rights to free speech and assembly, this should
mean that school authorities are virtually
discipline students. This was made clear

exercise of the
not be taken to
powerless to
by the Court

!18
in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District,393 US 503, 514: "But conduct by
the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."

The Court, inAlcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination

of contract" theory. But it must be repeatedly emphasized that
the contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering
the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].

Thus, inMalabanan, the Court said:

Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on

Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, which provides that "[w]hen a student registers in a
school, it is understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire
semester for collegiate courses," which the Court
in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse
enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which
has a term of one semester, has already expired.

xxx xxx xxx

8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally
absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a
violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a
place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather
than the basketball court, of the (VMAS) building of the
University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period
allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the
"concerted activity [referring to such assembly went on until
5:30 p.m." Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary
action. . . . [ At pp. 370-371].
But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.
Thus:
. . . There are withal minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case. [At pp. 706-707].
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the
offense committed. As stated inMalabanan, "[i]f the concept of
proportionality between the offense committed and sanction
imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness
intrudes." [At p. 371].
3. Circumventing Established Doctrine.
Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then,
student mass actions have escalated not only because of
political events that unfurled but also because of the constantly
raging controversy over increases in tuition fees. But the overeager hands of some school authorities were not effectively
tied down by the ruling inMalabanan. Instead of suspending or
expelling student leaders who fell into disfavor with school
authorities, a new variation of the same stratagem was
adopted by the latter: refusing the students readmission or reenrollment on grounds not related to, their alleged misconduct
of "illegal assembly" in leading or participating in student mass
actions directed against the school. Thus, the spate of
expulsions or exclusions due to "academic deficiency."
4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its
Student.

The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support

in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college
student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect
schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an
installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the
downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before
examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the
semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for
more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition
fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials
for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed
under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its
totality provides:
137. When a student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling for the entire school
year for elementary and secondary courses, and for
the entire semester for collegiate courses. A student
who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing,
within two weeks after the beginning of classes and
who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other
school fees in full or for any length of time longer than
one month may be charged ten per cent of the total
amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first
week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the
second week of classes, regardless of whether or not
he has actually attended classes. The student may be
charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws
anytime after the second week of classes. However, if
the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable
reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent
fees only up to and including the last month of
attendance.
Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean
that the student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and
that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent
solely on the sound discretion of the school. On the contrary,
the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in
his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it.
Thus, Paragraph 107 states:
Every student has the right to enrol in any school,
college or university upon meeting its specific
requirement and reasonable regulation:Provided, that
except in the case of academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is
presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire

!19
period he is expected to complete his course without
prejudice to his right to transfer.
This "presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Act of 1982." Section 9 of
this act provides:
Sec. 9.Rights of Students in School. In addition to
other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed
by law and regulations, students and pupils in all
schools shall enjoy the following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject
to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students'
Rights.
Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989,
stated that "respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not
admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic
freedom enjoyed by the school" [Rollo, p. 16]. To support this
conclusion, he cited the cases of Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, G.R. No.
L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan
v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245,
where the Court emphasized the institutions' discretion on the
admission and enrollment of students as a major component of
the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher
learning.
These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia, the
issue was whether a female lay student has a clear legal right
to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for
theological studies leading to a degree. InTangonan, the issue
was whether a nursing student, who was admitted on probation
and who has failed in her nursing subjects, may compel her
school to readmit her for enrollment.
Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's
unequivocal statement inVillarthat the right of an institution of
higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional
rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there win be a
violation of their right to equal protection [At p. 711]
6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.
In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private
respondents cite the recent cases of Capitol Medical Center,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October 13, 1989,
and Licup v. University of San Carlos, G.R. No. 85839,
October 19, 1989, both decided by the First Division of the
Court.
We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions
dissimilar from the issues in the present case.
InCapitol Medical Center, the Court upheld the decision of the
school authorities to close down the school because of
problems emanating from a labor dispute between the school
and its faculty. The Court ruled that the students had no clear
legal right to demand the reopening of the school.

On the other hand, inLicupthe issue resolved was whether or

not the students were afforded procedural due process before
disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus, the Court
stated:
The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations
of petitioners that they were deprived of due process
of law and that the investigation conducted was far
from impartial and fair. On the contrary, what appear
from the record is that the charges against petitioners
were adequately established in an appropriate
investigation. The imputation of bias and partiality is
not supported by the record. . . .
Moreover,Licup, far from adopting the "termination of contract"
theory inAlcuaz, impliedly rejected it, to wit:
While it is true that the students are entitled to the
right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its
academic freedom and in the process has the
concommitant right to see to it that this freedom is not
jeopardized.
True, an institution of learning has a contractual
obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue. However,
when a student commits a serious breach of discipline
or fails to maintain the required academic standard,
he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should
not review the discretion of university authorities.
(Emphasis supplied.)
7. The Instant Case.
To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment
dated November 12, 1989, quoting from their answer filed in
the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight
(8) have incurred failing grades, to wit:
a) Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but
also failed to cause the submission of Form 137
which is a pre-requisite to his re- enrollment and to his
continuing as a student of Mabini;
b) Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject
but also has incomplete grades in four (4) subjects as
well as no grades in two (2) subjects;
c) Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three
(3) incomplete grades;
d) Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and
has to still take CMT 1 1 to 22. He is already enrolled
at Ago Foundation;
e) Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9)
subjects;
f) Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject;
g) George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and
has to remove the incomplete grade in one (1)
subject;
h) Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to
remove incomplete grades in five (5) more objects
and has no grade in one (1) subject. [Rollo, p. 79.]

!20
Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this
allegation as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show,
among others, that:
a) Three of the 13 of them were graduating. (Admitted
in the Answer.)
b) Their academic deficiencies, if any, do not warrant
non- readmission. (The Answer indicates only 8 of the
13 as with deficiencies.)
c) Their breach of discipline, if any, was not serious.
d) The improper conduct attributed to them was
during the exercise of the cognate rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly, particularly a
February 1988 student rally. (The crux of the matter,
as shown even in the Answer.)
e) There was no due investigation that could serve as
basis for disciplinary action. (In effect, admitted in the
Answer; evenAlcuazrequired due process.)
f) Respondents admit students with worse
deficiencies a clear case of discrimination against
petitioners for their role in the student rally. (An equal
protection question.)
g) Respondent school is their choice institution near
their places of residence which they can afford to pay
for tertiary education, of which they have already lost
one-and-a-half school-years in itself punishment
enough. [Rollo, p. 86].
Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks,
namely, Normandy Occiano, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome
Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused reenrollment without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to
re-enroll.
On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were
a ff o r d e d d u e p r o c e s s , i n t h e m a n n e r e x p r e s s e d
inGuzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it
would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse
them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere
afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the
school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in
February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by
petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing
grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is
a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the
basic tenets of fair play.
Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some
have only one or two failures, namely, Rex Magana, Elvin
Agura, Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos. Certainly, their
failures cannot be considered marked academic deficiency
within the context of the Court's decision inVillar.
Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades,
namely, Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon,
and Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents'
enumeration whether the failures were incurred in only one
semester or through the course of several semesters of study

in the school. Neither are the academic standards of

respondent school, from which we can gauge whether or not
these students are academically deficient, alleged by
respondents. Thus, while the prerogative of schools to set
academic standards is recognized, we cannot affirm
respondent school's action as to petitioners Non, Villalon,
Dayaon and Torres because of insufficient information.
With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents
claim has enrolled in Ago Foundation, such fact alone, if true,
will not bar him from seeking readmission in respondent
school.
However, these should not be taken to mean that no
disciplinary action could have been taken against petitioners
for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line
with the Court's ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could have
been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with
the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could
have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense
committed and, as set forth inGuzman,it must be imposed only
after the requirements of procedural due process have been
complied with. This is explicit from the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that "[n]o
penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except for cause
as defined in this Manual and/or in the school's rules and
regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation
shall have been conducted."
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition
of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic.
Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or reenrollment and who have been effectively excluded from
respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been
more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline
they might have committed when they led and participated in
the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in
the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary
proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only
further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners
and the officials of respondent school which necessarily
resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of
Appeals and before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of
respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989
are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is
ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of
petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its
taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non,
Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it
is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to
satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards. SO
ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

!21
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC.,petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration,respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
Constitutional Law; Labor Laws: Deployment Ban of Female
Domestic Helper; Concept of Police Power.The concept of
police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defmed as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition
of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where
it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power constitutes an
implied limitation on the Bill ofRights.It constitutes an implied
limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its governxnent limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport
to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far
more overriding demands and requirements of the greater
number.
Same; Same; Same; Equality before the law under the
Constitution; Requirements ofa valid classification, satisfied.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question
that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classiflcations rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is
satisfied that the classification madethe preference for
female workersrests on substantial distinctions.
Same; Same; Same; Valid Discrimination between female and
male contract workers under Department OrderNo. l,justified.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the
first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for
isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an
identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no
argument that the Government should act similarly with respect
to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some

male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What

the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence
(that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in
massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary
yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence
capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same
thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no
evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then,
that insofar as classification are concerned, this Court is
content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
Same; Same; Same; Department Order No. 1 does not impair
the right to travel.The consequence the deployment ban has
on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to
travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of
"public safety, "as may be provided by law." Department Order
No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular,
its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the
respondent Department of Labor's rulemaking authority vested
in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is
unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to
travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute.
The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Same; Same; Same; No merit in the contention that
Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power since the Labor Code itselfvests the DOLE
with rule-making powers.Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the
domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an
authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have
mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of
Labor and Employment with rule-making powers in the
enforcement whereof.
Same; Same; Same; "Protection to Labor" does not signify the
promotion ofemployment alone.Trotection to labor" does not
signify the promotion of einployment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be
above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the
country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to
insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this
case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the
petitioner cannot seriously dispuce, of the lack or inadequacy
of auch protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely
ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
Same; Same; Same; Non-impairment clause must yield to the
demands and necessities of State's power of regulation to
provide a decent living to its citizens.The petitioner's reliance
on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy
and decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and
benefits" is not welltaken. The right granted by this provision,
again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the
State's power of regulation. The nonimpairment clause of the
Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government. Freedom of contract
and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from

!22
restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has
never been fully accepted as a controlling economic-way of
life. This Court understands the grave implications the
questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The
concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to
maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of
events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government
regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living
to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in tbis
case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order
to be tainted witb a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the
extraordinary relief prayed for.
SARMIENTO,J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held
likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of
Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." 4Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in
the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in
violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to
the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face
should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the
states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United
States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland.* In submitting
the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a
police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is
valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." 5As defined, it consists
of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides

enough room for an efficient and flexible response to

conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits."6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that
it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing
power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has
been credited, 7refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of
the State "to govern its citizens."8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with
self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men
in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare."10Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does
not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and
liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is
subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements
of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not
without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences,
it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise,
and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the
power is used to further private interests at the expense of the
citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13In
the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question
that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class.16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the
preference for female workers rests on substantial
distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working

!23
conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of
torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are
compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely
the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon
to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the
first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for
isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an
Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no
argument that the Government should act similarly with respect
to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some
male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What
the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence
(that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in
massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary
yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence
capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same
thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no
evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then,
that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is
content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations
are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it
is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the
courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the
manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the
Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its
wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for
determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns,
especially when the legislature itself has specifically given
them enough room on how the law should be effectively
enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact,
and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that
Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers
granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the
fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its
own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a
deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane
to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the
avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court
has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment
Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment
will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions.
Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those
conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say
that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a
greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a
stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability,
depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it
provides:

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of

Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers.19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be
applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it
does not apply to "all Filipina workers"20is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and
arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling
out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in
an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To
apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but
not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the
equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic
case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from
A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of
property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state,
an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is
based on such distinctions that make a real difference as
infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the
better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the
young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out
for favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for
the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of
discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it
would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal
protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly
accords protection to certain women workers, and not the
contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a
total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions
of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been
contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic
helpers and workers of similar skills defined herein to the
following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are
exempted from the suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of
Heads of State and Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other
senior government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps
and duly accredited international organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the
Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or
understanding.
xxx xxx xxx

!24
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF
SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or
workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the
POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the
same employer to finish an existing or partially served
employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to
serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and
the provision of these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift
the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers.24
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to
travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject,
among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as
may be provided by law." 25Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy
to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the
Labor Code. 27The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order
is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order
No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is
true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests
the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking
powers in the enforcement whereof.28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of
worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits"29is not well-taken. The right
granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands
and necessities of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send
its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot
satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that
our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally
and economically, while away from home. In this case, the
Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot

seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection,

and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban
on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not
indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested
that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to
certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all
other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this
jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted
as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned
Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the
Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits
that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of
the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The
Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its
intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a
grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief
prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26.July 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellants.
1.CMMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ELEMENTS OF: PENALTY.
According to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, one of
the means by which rebellion may be committed is by
"engaging in war against the forces of the government" and
"committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said war".
These expressions imply everything that war connotes,
namely: resort to arms, requisition of property and services,
collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty,
damages to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake.
Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing
serious violence", said act of resorting _to arms, with the
resulting impairment or destruction of life and propertywhen,
as alleged in the information, performed "as a necessary
means to commit rebellion, in connection therewith and in
futherance thereof" and "so as to facilitate the accomplishment
of the * * * purpose" of the rebellionconstitutes neither two or
more offenses, nor a complex crime, but one crimethat of
rebellion. plain and simple, punishable with one single penalty,
namely, that prescribed in said Article 135.
2 . I D . ; I D . ; C O M M O N C R I M E S P E R P E T R AT E D I N
FURTHERANCE OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE, NOT SUBJECT
TO EXTRADITION.National as well as international, laws
and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that
common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses
and assumes the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, could not

!25
be punished, under Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the
Philippines, separately f rom the principal oifense, or
complexed with the^ same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty.
3.ID.; ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; ARTICLE 48 APPLIES ONLY
WHEN Two CRIMES ARE COMMITTED.The language of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes the
commission of two or more crimes, and hence, does not apply
when the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRO REO" PRINCIPLE; LESS CRIMINAL
PERVERSITY IN COMPLEX CRIMES.If one act constitutes
two or more offenses, [People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil.,
515(1956)] 1.CMMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ELEMENTS OF:
PENALTY.According to Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code, one of the means by which rebellion may be committed
is by "engaging in war against the forces of the government"
and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said
war". These expressions imply everything that war connotes,
namely: resort to arms, requisition of property and services,
collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty,
damages to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake.
Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing
serious violence", said act of resorting _to arms, with the
resulting impairment or destruction of life and propertywhen,
as alleged in the information, performed "as a necessary
means to commit rebellion, in connection therewith and in
futherance thereof" and "so as to facilitate the accomplishment
of the * * * purpose" of the rebellionconstitutes neither two or
more offenses, nor a complex crime, but one crimethat of
rebellion. plain and simple, punishable with one single penalty,
namely, that prescribed in said Article 135.
2 . I D . ; I D . ; C O M M O N C R I M E S P E R P E T R AT E D I N
FURTHERANCE OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE, NOT SUBJECT
TO EXTRADITION.National as well as international, laws
and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that
common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses
and assumes the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, could not
be punished, under Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the
Philippines, separately f rom the principal oifense, or
complexed with the^ same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty.
3.ID.; ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; ARTICLE 48 APPLIES ONLY
WHEN Two CRIMES ARE COMMITTED.The language of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes the
commission of two or more crimes, and hence, does not apply
when the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRO REO" PRINCIPLE; LESS CRIMINAL
PERVERSITY IN COMPLEX CRIMES.If one act constitutes
two or more offenses, [People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil.,
515(1956)]
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION,J.:
T h i s r e f e r s t o t h e p e t i t i o n f o r b a i l fi l e d
byDefendantAppellantAmado Hernandez on June 26, 1954,
and renewed on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on

December 28, 1953, had been denied by a resolution of this

court dated February 2, 1954. Although not stated in said
resolution, the same was due mainly to these
circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The prosecution
maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been
convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and
robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may
be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to
life imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the defense contends,
among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with
murder, arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue thus raised
had not been previously settled squarely, and this court was
then unable, as yet, to reach a definite conclusion thereon, it
was deemed best not to disturb, for the time being, the course
of action taken by the lower court, which denied bail to the
movant. After mature deliberation, our considered opinion on
said issue is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this
case read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias
Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor
Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias
Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal
alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias
Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr.
alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias
Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano
Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias
Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado
Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias
Manue, of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons
and robberies committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before
the said date and continuously thereafter until the present time,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in
the different parts of the Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as
well as with the thirty-one (31)Defendantscharged in criminal
cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and
also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still
unknown, the said accused and their co-conspirators, being
then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with
the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as
the Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), an active agency,
organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.), with central offices in Manila and chapters
and affiliated or associated labor unions and other mass
organizations in different places in the Philippines, and as
such agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in,
and synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of
the Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the
complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion
against the Republic of the Philippines, as the
herein Defendants and their co-conspirators have in fact
synchronized the activities of the CLO with the rebellious
activities of the HMB and other agencies, organs and
instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and

!26
have otherwise master- minded or promoted the cooperative
efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies, organs,
and instrumentalities of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the
rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, and being
then also high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise
affiliated with, the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),
which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against
the Government of the Philippines through acts therefor
committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and
other places in the Philippines, and of which party the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), otherwise or
formerly known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), is the armed
force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or
command the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the
Hukbalahaps (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the
Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such
armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory
of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and
laws thereof as in fact the said Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
Bayan or Hukbalahaps have risen publicly and taken arms to
attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids,
sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary
and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a
necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and
there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson,
and planned destruction of private and public property to
create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as
follows, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and
robberies allegedly perpetrated by the accused as a
necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same
presupposes the commission of two (2) or more crimes, and,
hence, does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one
crime.
Article 134 of said code reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code any person, merely
participating or executing the commands of others in a
rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.

The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to

exceed P20,000 for any person who promotes, maintains or
heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any
p u b l i c o f fi c e o r e m p l o y m e n t , t a k e s p a r t
therein:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.engaging in war against the forces of the government,
2.destroying property, or
3.committing serious violence,
4.exacting contributions or
5. diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which
they have been appropriated.
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes
of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are,
altogether, subject to only one penalty prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer
who assists the rebels by turning over to them, for use in
financing the uprising, the public funds entrusted to his
custody, could neither be prosecuted for malversation of such
funds, apart from rebellion, nor accused and convicted of the
complex crime of rebellion with malversation of public funds.
The reason is that such malversation is inherent in the crime of
rebellion committed by him. In fact, he would not be guilty of
rebellion had he not so misappropriated said funds. In the
imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion
it would even be improper to consider the aggravating
circumstance of advantage taken by the offender of his public
position, this being an essential element of the crime he had
perpetrated. Now, then, if the office held by said offender and
the nature of the funds malversed by him cannot aggravate the
penalty for his offense, it is clear that neither may it worsen the
very crime committed by the culprit by giving rise, either to an
independent crime, or to a complex crime. Needless to say, a
mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer,
should not be placed at a more disadvantageous position than
the promoters, maintainers or leaders of the movement, or the
public officers who join the same, insofar as the application of
Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the
words of said Article 135, is by engaging in war against the
forces of the government and committing serious violence in
the prosecution of said war. These expressions imply
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t w a r c o n n o t e s , n a m e l y ; c h a n
roblesvirtualawlibraryresort to arms, requisition of property and
services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of
liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life,
and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its
wake except that, very often, it is worse than war in the
international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight
between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or
ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers.
Being within the purview of engaging in war and committing
serious violence, said resort to arms, with the resulting
impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not
two or more offense, but only one crime that of rebellion
plain and simple. Thus, for instance, it has been held that the
crime of treason may be committed by executing either a
single or similar intentional overt acts, different or similar but
distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one single

!27
continuous offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off.
Gaz., 909.) (People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)

Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and

sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute,

we repeat, one single crime, it follows necessarily that said
acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which
requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes.
Hence, this court has never in the past, convicted any person
of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. What is more,
it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion published
in the Philippine Reports, the Defendantswere convicted of
simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons,
sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil.,
472;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil., 509,
U. S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil., 151;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLeague
vs. People, 73 Phil., 155).

In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p.

159,
we
used
the
following
language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent

cases of treason, resulting from collaboration with the
Japanese during the war in the Pacific. In fact, said cases went
further than the aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the
theory of the prosecution to the effect that the accused in said
treason cases were guilty of the complex crime of treason with
murder and other crimes was expressly and repeatedly
rejected therein. Thus, commenting on the decision of the
Peoples Court finding the accused in People vs. Prieto (80
Phil., 138, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) guilty of cralaw the crime of
treason complexed by murder and physical injuries and
sentencing him to death, and on the contention of the Solicitor
General that Prieto had committed the complex crime of
treason with homicide, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Tuason, said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in
these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are
not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine
treason law and under the United States constitution defining
treason, after which the former was patterned, there must
concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only
be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature
partakes, of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental
operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under
another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is
charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with
the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase
the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.
Just as one cannot be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and
force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a Defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another
offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive
ingredient of treason cralaw . Where murder or physical
injuries are charged as overt acts of treason cralaw they
cannot be regarded separately under their general
denomination. (Italics supplied.)

The lower court foundAppellantguilty not only of treason, but

of murder, for the killing of Tomas Abella, and, following the
provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code sentenced
him to death, the maximum penalty provided by article 114.
The lower court erred in findingAppellantguilty of the murder
of Tomas Abella. The arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for
being a guerilla, is alleged in count 3 of the information, as one
of the elements of the crime of treason for which Appellant is
prosecuted. Such element constitute a part of the legal basis
upon whichAppellantstands convicted of the crime of treason.
The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be considered as legal
ground for convicting Appellant of any crime other than
treason. The essential elements of a given crime cannot be
disintegrated in different parts, each one stand as a separate
ground to convict the accused of a different crime or criminal
offense. The elements constituting a given crime are integral
and inseparable parts of a whole. In the contemplation of the
law, they cannot be used for double or multiple purposes. They
can only be used for the sole purpose of showing the
commission of the crime of which they form part. The factual
complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the
functional ability of worm multiplication or amoeba
reproduction. Otherwise, the accused will have to face as
many prosecutions and convictions as there are elements in
the crime of treason, in open violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy. (Italics supplied.)
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82
Phil., 164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005, despite the direct participation of
theDefendanttherein in the maltreatment and killing of several
persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Peoples Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as
treason with murder. The killing of Amado Satorre and one
Segundo is charged as an element of treason, and it therefore
becomes identified with the latter crime, and cannot be the
subject of a separate punishment or used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides. (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz.
3329. See, also People vs. Labra, L-886, 46 Off. Gaz., [Supp.
to No. 1], 159.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83
Phil., 1, 46 Off. Gaz., 4207. We stated
therein:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a
complex crime of treason with murders, with the result that the
penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be
imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the
standpoint of modifying circumstances, the court believed that
the same result obtained. It opined that the killings were
murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the
circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength,
cruelty, and an armed band.

!28
We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth in the
information are merged in and formed part of the treason. They
were in this case the overt acts which, besides traitorous
intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. (Italics
supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9, 46 Off. Gaz.,
4213, had been convicted by the Peoples Court of the crime
of treason complexed with the crime of murder and sentenced
to the extreme penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr. Justice
Montemayor, we expressed ourselves as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His
adherence to the Japanese forces of occupation and giving
them aid and comfort by acting as their spy, undercover man,
investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow and
compel the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and disclose
information about the guerrillas has been fully established. His
manner of investigation and maltreatment of some of his
victims like Tereso Sanchez and Patricio Suico, was so cruel,
brutal and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a Filipino
can commit and practice such atrocities especially on his own
countrymen. But, evidently, war, confusion and opportunism
can and do produce characters and monster unknown during
peace and normal times.
The Peoples Court found the Appellant guilty of treason
complexed with murder. The Solicitor General, however,
maintains that the offense committed is simple treason, citing
the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of People vs.
Prieto, (L-399, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) but accompanied by the
aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 21, of
the Revised Penal Code, and not compensated by any
mitigating circumstance, and he recommends the imposition of
the penalty of death. We agree with the Solicitor General that
on the basis of the ruling of this court in the case of People vs.
Prieto, supra, the Appellant may be convicted only a treason,
and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries committed
by him may not be separated from the crime of treason but
should be regarded as acts performed in the commission of
treason, although, as stated in said case, the brutality with
which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be
taken as an aggravating circumstance. (Italics supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonment and a
fine of P20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of People vs.
Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46 Off. Gaz., 4299, in which, through
Mr. Justice Reyes (A), we declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw we find merit in the contention that Appellant should
have not been convicted of the so called Complex crime of
treason with murder, robbery, and rape. The killings, robbery,
and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not
as specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of
treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being
merged in and identified with the general charged they cannot
be used in combination with the treason to increase the penalty
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,
L-399, January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz.,
3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason
only. (Italics supplied.)

In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the

language used was:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw But the Peoples Court erred in finding
the Appellant guilty of the complex crime of treason with
murder, because murder was an ingredient of the crime of
treason, as we have heretofore held in several cases. (Italics
supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 Phil., 1, 47 Off.
Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p. 252:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Solicitor General recommends that the Appellant be
sentenced for the complex crime of treason with murder. We
have already ruled, however, that where, as in the present
case, the killing is charged as an element of treason, it
becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the
subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides. (Italics supplied.)
The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of
Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (94 Phil., 477), decided on
February 26, 1954. The facts and the rule therein laid down are
set forth in our unanimous decision in said case, from which
we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE
during the last world war and at the time of the filing of the
present petition a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an information filed in
the Peoples Court. But before the accused could be brought
under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947,
indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise
known as the Articles of War, before a military court created by
authority of the Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing
three charges, two of which, the first and third, were those of
treason consisting in giving information and aid to the enemy
leaving to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other
persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members
of the USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy,
while the second was that of having certain civilians filled in
time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but
guilty of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the
military court to life imprisonment.
With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311
abolishing the Peoples Court, the criminal case in that court
against the Petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said
Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
and there the charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in
that court upon the amended information,Petitionerpresented
a motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and
pleading double jeopardy because of his previous sentence in
the military court. But the court denied the motion and,
after Petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial,
whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from
proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.
It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military
court different from that charged in the civil court and that even
granting that the offense was identical the military court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the

!29
Peoples Court had previously acquired jurisdiction over the
case with the result that the conviction in the court martial was
void. In support of the first point, it is urged that the amended
information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military
court. But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the
amended information in the Zamboanga court were not
specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are
embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a
continuous offense and one who commits it is not criminally
liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all
overt act he has done or might have done for that purpose
constitute but a single offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44. Off. Gaz.,
909; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Pacheco, L-4750,
promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense
charged in the amended information in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said
information contains an enumeration of additional ovart acts
not specifically mentioned in the indictment before the military
court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in
themselves constitute a new and distinct offense from that of
treason, and this court has repeatedly held that a person
cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also
guilty of overt acts specified in the information for treason even
if those overt acts, considered separately, are punishable by
law, for the simple reason that those overt acts are not
separate offenses distinct from that of treason but constitute
ingredients thereof. (Italics supplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court,
on the question whether said crime may be complexed with
murder, when the former was committed through the latter, and
it is so alleged in the information, had positively and clearly
crystalized itself in the negative as early as January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra
(L-1240, decided on May 12, 1949), the dispositive part of
which partly reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48,
114 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to the
offense of treason with murder. However for lack of sufficient
votes to impose the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be
sentenced to life imprisonmentcralaw..
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and the offense of treason with murder, it should be
noted that we affirmed therein the action of the Peoples Court,
which, according to the opening statement of our decision,
convicted Labra of treason aggravated with murder. Besides,
the applicability of said articles was not discussed in said
decision. It is obvious, from a mere perusal thereof, that this
court had no intention of passing upon such question.
Otherwise, it would have explained why it did not follow the
rule laid down in the previous cases of Prieto, Labra (August
10, 1948), Alibotod, Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan (supra),
in which the issue was explicitly examined and decided in the
negative. Our continued adherence to this view in the
subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo,
without even a passing reference to the second Labra case,
shows that we did not consider the same as reflecting the
opinion of the court on said question. At any rate, insofar as it
suggests otherwise, the position taken in the second Labra

case must be deemed reversed by our decisions in said cases

of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different
from each other. This does not detract, however, from the rule
that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof,
and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be
punished either separately therefrom or by the application of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more
reason to apply said rule in the crime of rebellion than in that of
treason, for the law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised
Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in war
and committing serious violence among its essential elements
thus clearly indicating that everything done in the
prosecution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is
embraced therein unlike the provision on treason (Article
114, Revised Penal Code) which is less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority may be
committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil.,
162), homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U.
S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.
S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape may be perpetrated
with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690), then
rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with murder, arson, or
robbery. The conclusion does not follow, for engaging in war,
serious violence, physical injuries and destruction of life and
property are inherent in rebellion, but not in assault upon
persons in authority or agents of persons in authority or in
rape. The word rebellion evokes, not merely a challenge to
the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a bigger or
lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it, whereas, neither
rape nor assault upon persons in authority connotes
necessarily, or even generally, either physical injuries, or
murder. 1
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of
the insurrection is guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder, our attention has been called to Article 244 of the old
Penal
Code
of
the
Philippines,
reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion,
o con motivo de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente
segun las disposiciones de este Codigo.
Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados
como tales los jefes principales de la rebelion o sedicion.
and to the following observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho
P e n a l , Vo l . I I , p . 11 0 ) , i n r e l a t i o n
thereto:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con
motivo de ellas, comete otros delitos (v.g., roba, mata o
lesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de
rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos casos en
separar los accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion de los delitos
independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen en
este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su solucion ha quedado
encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos
han sentado considera como accidentes de la rebelion o
sedicion cuya criminalidad queda embedida en la de estos
delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente los

!30
hechos de escasa gravedad (v.g., atentados, desacatos,
lesiones menos graves); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypor el
contrario, las infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las
lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos independientes
de la rebelion o de la sedicion.
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old
Penal Code of the Philippines has not been included in our
Revised Penal Code. If the applicability of Article 48 to
rebellion was determined by the existence of said Article 244,
then the elimination of the latter would be indicative of the
contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon,
was that punished in the Spanish Penal Code, Article 243 of
which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en
abierta hostilidad contra el Gobierno para cualquiera de los
objetossiguientes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del
Reino, o privarles de su libertad personal u obligarles a
ejecutar un acto contrario a su voluntad.
2. Impedir la celebracion dc las elecciones para Diputados a
Cortes o Senadores en todo el Reino, o la reunion legitima de
las mismas.
3. Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de
los Cuerpos Colegisladores o arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4. Ejecutar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo
165.
5.Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de
tierra o de mar, o cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la
obediencia del Supremo Gobierno.
6. Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la
Corona de sus facultades constitucionales, o impedirles o
coartarles su libre ejercicio. (Articulo 167, Codigo Penal de
1850. Veanse las demas concordancias del articulo 181.)
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that
rebellion includes the act of engaging in war against the forces
of the Government and of using serious violence for the
purposes stated in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. In
view of this express statutory inclusion of the acts of war and
serious violence among the ingredients of rebellion in the
Philippines, it is clear that the distinction made by Cuello Calon
between grave and less grave offenses committed in the
course of an insurrection cannot be accepted in this
jurisdiction. Again, if both classes of offenses are part and
parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor, neither law
nor logic justifies the exclusion of the one and the inclusion of
the other. In fact, Cuello Calon admits that the difficulty lies in
separating the accidents of rebellion or sedition from the
offenses independent therefrom. Ergo, offenses that are not
independent therefrom, but constituting an integral part thereof
committed, precisely, to carry out the uprising to its successful
conclusion are beyond the purview of Article 244. Indeed,
the above quoted statement of Cuello Calon to the effect
that grave felonies committed in the course of an insurrection
are independent therefrom was based upon a decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find

reported in the Codigo Penal de Filipinas, by Jose Perez

Rubio, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero
de 1872, tiene declarado:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que
segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del
reformado (1870), los delitos particulares cometidos en una
rebelion o sedicion o con motivo de ellas se castigan
respectivamente segun las disposiciones de los mismos
Codigos;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy con arreglo al decreto de
amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan solo comprendidos en
aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas, procesadas o
sujatas a responsabilidad por delitos politicos de cualquiera
especie -cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre de 1868;chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryQue el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de
Burgos no fue resultado de movimiento alguno politico, sino de
un mero tumulto que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya unica
aparente tendencia era impedir que aquel funcionario
inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos que se decian existentes
en la Catedral:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que esto lo
demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los
asesinos contra la persona del Gobernador; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarysin que al ejecutar en el mismo recinto
del templo los horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa,
alzasen bandera politica alguna ni dieran otro grito que el, en
aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de Viva la
religion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que la apreciar la Sala
sentenciadora los hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de
delito de asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y declarar
inaplicable el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha cometido el
error de derecho sealado en los casos 1. 3. del articulo 4.
de la ley sobre establecimiento de la casacion criminal, ni
infringido los articulos 250 y 259 del Codigo Penal de
1870. (Page 239; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryItalics supplied.)
(See, also, El Codigo Penal, by Hidalgo Garcia, Vol. I, p.
623.)
It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue
therein on whether murder may be complexed with rebellion or
sedition. The question for determination was whether the killers
of the victim were guilty of the common crime of murder, or
should have been convicted only of rebellion or sedition. The
court adopted the first alternative, not because of the gravity of
the acts performed by the accused, but because they had no
political
motivation.
Moreover,
theEndnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary to said quotation
from Cuello Calon reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros
delitos contra el orden publico cometidos en la sedicion o con
motivo de ella, no son delitos distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre
1903, 19 noviembre 1906; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryla
resistencia o acometimiento a la fuerza publica por los
sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.
El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un
tumulto debe penarse como un delito comun de asesinato, 5
febrero 1872. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia, tratandose de
ciertos delitos, es vacilante; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryasi, v.
g., el acometimiento al teniente de alcalde se ha declarado en
un fallo independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria
promovida para impedir al alcalde el cumplimiento de sus
providencias, 16 marzo 1885, mientras que un hecho analogo
se ha considerado en otra sentenda ya citada como accidente

!31
de la rebelion, 3 Octubre 1903. El acometimiento de los
sediciosos a la fuerza publica es accidente de la sedicion y no
uno de los delitos particulares a que se refiere este articulo, 23
de mayo 1890. Entre estos delitos a que alude el precepto se
hallan las lesiones que puedan causar los sediciosos, 19
noviembre 1906. (Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 21,
II Cuelo Calon, Derecho Penal, pp. 110-111.) (Italics supplied.)
Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of
Spain held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de
rebelion y sedicion, de una parte, y el de atentado, esta
constituida por la circunstancia de alzamiento publico que
caracteriza a los primeros, los cuales, por su indole generica,
absorben a los de atentado y demas infracciones que durante
su comision y con su motivo se cometan, y afirmandose como
hecho en la sentencia recurrida que el procesado Mariano
Esteban Martinez realizo, en union de otros, el atendado que
se le imputa sin alzarse publicamente, cae por su base el
recurso fundado en supuesto distinto. (Jurisprudencia
Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.) (Italics supplied.)
To t h e s a m e e f f e c t a r e ,
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

likewise,

the

La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos

alzadoz tumultuariamente para impedir al Delegado de un
Gobernador civil el cumplimiento de sus providencias, no
pueden estimarse constitutivos de un delito distinto del de
sedicion, ni ser, por tanto, perseguidos y penados
separadamente.
La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la
fuerza publica constituye, en su caso, una circunstancia o
accidente de la sedicion y no es delito de los que el Codigo
Penal en este articulo (formerly Article 244, now Article 227)
supone que pueden cometerse en ella o con su motivo, los
cuales denomina delitos particulares, y manda que se penen
conforme a las disposiciones del propio Codigo. (S.
23-5-890; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryG. 23-6-890; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryt. 44; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypagina
671) (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, p. 2411.) (Italics
supplied.)
La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los
amotinados que agredieron al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso
de casacion contra la sentencia, el Tribunal Supremo la casa y
anula, teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250
(numero 3.) del Codigo Penal;
Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo
constituye una verdadera sedicion, sin que sea licito el dividir
este hecho y calificarlo de atentado respecto a las personas
que agredieron a dicho alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue
un accidente de la sedicion, de la cual eran todos
responsables, ya se efectuara por los agrupados en conjunto o
por uno solo, por ser comun el objeto que se proponian y no
individual;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy al calificar y penar este
hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de atentado cralaw, ha
incurrido en error de derecho e infringido los articulos 250 y
siguientes del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el
263, numero 2., en relacion con el 264, numeros 1. y 3., por
su aplicacion cralaw (Sent. 3 octubre 1903. Gac. 12

Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, Tomo xxviii p.

250).
These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244,
which refers, not to all offenses committed in the course of a
rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only to delitos
particulares or common crimes. Now, what are delitos
particulares as the phrase is used in said article 244? We
quote from Viada:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Las disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede
ser mas justa;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycon arreglo a ella, los
delitos particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebelion er
sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a
estas, sino como delitos especiales, a dicha rebelion y
sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser respectivamente
castigados con las penas que en este Codigo se las sealan.
Pero, que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y
cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o sedicion? En
cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta cuestion dificultad alguna,
pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno y otro de
los objetos especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243
sera extrao a la rebelion, y si se hallare definido en algun otro
articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a este debera ser castigado
como delito particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion,
comprendiendose como objetos de la misma, en los numeros
3., 4. y 5. del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros
tantos ataques a las personas o a la propiedad, cuales se
consideran como accidentes inherentes a la propria sedicion, y
cuales deberan reputarse como delitos particulares o
comunes? En cuanto a los casos de los numeros 4. y 5.,
estimanos que el objeto politico y social que se requiera para
la realizacion de los actos en aquellos comprendidos es el que
debe servirnos de norma y guia para distinguir lo inherente a la
sedicion de lo que es ajeno o extrao a ella. Cuando no exista
ese objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o venganza ejercido
contra los particulares o cualquiera clase del Estado, y el
atentado contra las propiedades de los ciudadanos o
corporaciones mentados en el numero 5. del articulo 250, no
seran constitutivos del delito de sedicion, sino que deberan ser
apreciados y castigados como delitos comunes, segun las
disposiciones respectivas de este Codigo y por lo que toca
a los actos de odio o venganza ejercidos en la persona o
bienes de alguna Autoridad o sus agentes, estimamos que
deberan reputarse como delitos comunes todos aquellos
hechos innecesarios 2 para la consecucion del fin particular
que se propusieran los sediciosos y como esenciales,
constitutivos de la propia sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio
o venganza que sean medio racionalmente necesario para el
logro del objeto especial a que se encaminaran los esfuerzos
de los sublevados. Asi, en el caso de la Cuestion 1 expuesta
en el comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se
propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el impuesto a cuya
c o b r a n z a i b a a p r o c e d e r e l c o m i s i o n a d o ; c h a n
roblesvirtualawlibrarypero para lograr este objeto, como lo
lograron, fue preciso hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este
efecto, lo amenazaron, lo persiguieron y llegaron hasta
lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse,
ni las aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito
comun, sino como accidente inherente a la misma sedicion,
por cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente necesario para la
consecucion del fin determinado que se propusieron los
culpables.

!32
Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por
herir, cuando se mata por matar, el hecho ya, no puede ser
considerado como un accidente propio de la sedicion, sino
como un delito especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al
mismo correspondiente. (III Viada, pp. 311-312.) (Italics
supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos
como infracciones de un caracter especial distintas de los
denominados delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido
la division de los delitos, desde el punto de vista de su
naturaleza intrinseca, en delitos politicos y delitos comunes o
de derecho comun.
Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes
juridicos individuales (v. gr., los delitos contra la vida, contra la
honestidad, contra la propiedad, etc.)
La nocion del delito politico no parece tan clara. Desde luego
revisten este caracter los que atentan contra el orden politico
del Estado, contra su orden externo (independencia de la
nacion, integridad del territorio, etc.), o contra el interno
(delitos contra el Jefe del Estado, contra la forma de Gobierno,
etc.). Pero tambien pueden ser considerados como politicos
todos los delitos, cualesquiera que sean incluso los de
derecho comun, cuando fueron cometidos por moviles
politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse como infracciones de
esta clase, no solo las que objetivamente tengan tal caracter
por el interes politico que lesionan, sino tambien las que,
apreciadas subjetivamente, manifiestan una motivacion de
caracter politico.
Asi
podria
formulares
esta
definicion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary es delito politico el
cometido contra el orden politico del Estado, asi como todo
delito de cualquiera otra clase determinado por moviles
politicos. (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is
the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common
like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from
the allegiance to the Government the territory of the
Philippines Islands or any part thereof, then said offense
becomes stripped of its common complexion, inasmuch as,
being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former
acquires the political character of the latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against
the Defendant in U. S. vs. Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729) an
insurgent who killed a prisoner of war because he was too
weak to march with the retreating rebel forces, and could not
be left behind without endangering the safety of the latter
was dismissed upon the ground that the execution of said
prisoner of war formed part of, and was included in, the crime
of sedition, which, in turn, was covered by an amnesty, to the
benefits of which saidDefendantwas entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an
unorganized group of insurgents was, pursuant to Article 244
of our old Penal Code, convicted of homicide for having shot
and killed a woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex

crime of rebellion with homicide was not considered in that

case. Apart from this, the accused failed to established the
relation between her death and the insurrection. What is more,
it was neither proved nor alleged that he had been prompted
by political reasons. In other words, his offense was
independent from the rebellion. The latter was merely the
occasion for the commission of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court
and the Supreme Court of Spain in cases of treason, rebellion
and sedition, are in line with the trend in other countries, as
well as in the field of international relations. Referring to the
question as to what offenses are political in nature, it was said
in In re Ezeta (62 Fed. Rep., 972):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet
been determined by judicial authority. Sir James Stephens, in
his work, History of the Criminal Law of England (Volume 2, p.
71), thinks that it should be interpreted to mean that fugitive
criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes if
those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political
disturbances. Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the house of commons,
in 1866, while discussing an amendment to the act of
extradition, on which the treaty between England and France
was
founded,
gave
this
definition:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Any offense committed in
the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political
commotion. Hansards Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115. In the
Castioni Case, supra, decided in 1891, the question was
discussed by the most eminent counsel at the English bar, and
considered by distinguished judges, without a definition being
framed that would draw a fixed and certain line between a
municipal or common crime and one of political character. I do
not think, said Denman, J., it is necessary or desirable that we
should attempt to put into language, in the shape of an
exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of things, or every
state of things, which might bring a particular case within the
description of an offense of a political character. In that case,
Castioni was charged with the murder of one Rossi, by
shooting him with a revolver, in the town of Bellinzona, in the
canton of Ticino, in Switzerland. The deceased, Rossi, was a
member of the state council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni
was a citizen of the same canton. For some time previous to
the murder, much dissatisfaction had been felt and expressed
by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino at the mode in which
the political party then in power were conducting the
government of the canton. A request was presented to the
government for a revision of the constitution of the canton and,
the government having declined to take a popular vote on that
question, a number of the citizens of Bellinzona, among whom
was Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from which they
took rifles and ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes, arrested
and bound or handcuffed several persons connected with the
government, and forced them to march in front of the armed
crowd to the municipal palace. Admission to the palace was
demanded in the name of the people, and was refused by
Rossi and another member of the government, who were in the
palace. The crowd then broke open the outer gate of the
palace, and rushed in, pushing before them the government
officials whom they had arrested and bound. Castioni, who was
armed with a revolver, was among the first to enter. A second
door, which was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or
immediately after, Rossi, who was in the passage, was shot

!33
through the body with a revolver, and died, very soon
afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but no one else was
injured. Castioni fled to England. His extradition was requested
by the federal council of Switzerland. He was arrested and
taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the statute,
who held him for extradition. Application was made by the
accused to the high court of justice of England for a writ of
habeas corpus. He was represented by Sir Charles Russell,
now lord chief justice. The attorney general, Sir Richard
Webster, appeared for the crown, and the solicitor general, Sir
Edward Clarke, and Robert Woodfal, for the federal council of
Switzerland. This array of distinguished counsel, and the high
character of the court, commends the case as one of the
highest authority. It appeared from an admission by one of the
parties engaged in the disturbances that the death of Rossi
was a misfortune, and not necessary for the rising. The
opinions of the judges as to the political character of the crime
charged against Castioni, upon the facts stated, is exceedingly
interesting, but I need only refer to the following passages.
Judge Denman says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that
the man was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in
acts of violence of a political character with a political object,
and as part of the political movement and rising in which he
was taking part.
Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political
offenses, said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many
acts of a political character done without reason, done against
all reason;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut at the same time one
cannot look too hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of
men hot in their political excitement. We know that in heat, and
in heated blood, men often do things which are against and
contrary to reason; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut none the
less an act of this description may be done for the purpose of
furthering and in furtherance of a political rising, even though it
is an act which may be deplored and lamented, as even cruel
and against all reason, by those who can calmly reflect upon it
after the battle is over.
Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has
already been cited, was one of the judges, and joined in the
views taken as to the political character of the crime charged
against Castioni. The prisoner was discharged. Applying, by
analogy, the action of the English court in that case to the four
cases now before me, under consideration, the conclusion
follows that the crimes charged here, associated as they are
with the actual conflict of armed forces, are of a political
character.
The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by
the congress of Montevideo in 1888, and recommended by the
International American Conference to the governments of the
Latin-American nations in 1890, contains the following
provisions (Article 23):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and
external safety of a state or common offenses connected with
these, shall not warrant extradition. The determination of the
character of the offense is incumbent upon the nations upon
w h i c h t h e d e m a n d f o r e x t r a d i t i o n i s m a d e ; c h a n
roblesvirtualawlibraryand its decision shall be made under and

according to the provisions of the law which shall prove to be

most favorable to the accused:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the
basis of treaty stipulations between any of the American
nations, but the article cited may be at least accepted as
expressing the wisdom of leading jurists and diplomats. The
article is important with respect to two of its
features:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) provides that a fugitive
shall not be extradited for an offense connected with a political
offense, or with an offense subversive of the internal or
external safety of the state; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2)
the decision as to the character of the offense shall be made
under and according to the provisions of the law which shall
prove most favorable to the accused. The first provision is
sanctioned by Calvo, who, speaking of the exemption from
extradition of persons charged with political offenses,
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The exemption even extends to acts connected with political
crimes or offenses, and it is enough, as says Mr. Fuastin
Helio; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a common crime be
connected with a political act, that it be the outcome of or be in
the outcome of or be in the execution of such, to be covered by
the privilege which protects the latter Calvo, Droit Int. (3me
ed.) p. 413, section 1262.
The second provision of the article is founded on the broad
principles of humanity found everywhere in the criminal law,
distinguishing its administration with respect to even the worst
features of our civilization from the cruelties of barbarism.
When this article was under discussion in the international
American conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia,
submitted some observations upon the difficulty of drawing a
line between an offense of a political character and a common
crime, and incidentally referred to the crime of robbery, in terms
worthy of some consideration here. He
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the
common offenses are necessarily mixed up with the political in
many cases. A colleague General Caamao (of Ecuador)
knows how we carry on wars. A revolutionist needs horses for
m o v i n g , b e e f t o f e e d h i s t r o o p s , e t c . ; c h a n
roblesvirtualawlibraryand since he does not go into the public
markets to purchase these horses and that beef, nor the arms
and saddles to mount and equip his forces, he takes them from
the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is called robbery
everywhere, and is a common offense in time of peace, but in
time of war it is a circumstance closely allied to the manner of
waging it. International American Conference, Vol. 2, p.
615. (Italics supplied.)
We
quote
the
following
from Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (23) on pages
249-250, Vol. I, of Cuello Calons aforesaid work on Derecho
Penal.
En algunos Codigo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una
definicion de estos delitos. El Codigo penal ruso, en el articulo
58, define como delitos contra revolucionarios los hechos
encaminados a derrocar o debilitar el poder de los Consejos
de trabajadores y campesinos y de los gobiernos de la Union
de Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir o debilitar la
seguridad exterior de la Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las

!34
conquistas economicas, politicas y nacionales fundamentales
de la revolucion proletaria. El Codigo Penal italiano de 1930
considera en eu articulo 8. como delito politico todo delito que
ofenda un interes politico del Estado o un derecho politico del
ciudadano. Tambien se reputa politico el delito comun
deteminado, en todo o en parte por motivos politicos. En la ley
alemana de extradicion de 25 diciembre 1929 se definen
asi:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Son delitos politicos los
atentados punibles directamente ejecutados contra la
existencia o la seguridad del Estado, contra el jefe o contra un
miembro del gobierno del Estado como tal, contra una
corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos politicos las
buenas relaciones con el extranjero. parrafo 3., 2.

penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the

several acts performed by him were punished separately. In
the word of Rodriguez Navarro:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a
que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta
basado francamente en el principio pro reo. (II Doctrina Penal
del Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, p. 2168.) 3
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article
71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our
Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932,
reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal

(Copenhague, 31 agosto 3 septiembre 1935) adopto la
siguiente nocion del delito politico:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el

caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o
cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.

1. Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la

organizacion y funcionamiento del Estado o contra los
derechos que de esta organizacion y funcionamiento
provienen para el culpable.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al

delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que
represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.

2.Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de

derecho comun que constituyen hechos conexos con la
ejecucion de los delitos previstos en seccion
1.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary como los hechos dirigidos a
favorecer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a permitir al autor
de este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion de la ley penal.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se

sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrino Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163.)

3. No se consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que su

autor sea inducido por un motivo egoista y vil.
4.No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la
comunidad o un estado de terror. (Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as common offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately
from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that
why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case
at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the
two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could
be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the
movant, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in
the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of
prision mayor;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) for the crime
of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to
him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory
of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification

inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the
penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the
case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties
imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The
absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our
mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no
reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for
each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the
penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason
for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing
him for each crime independently from the other, he must
suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on
the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing
therein with an offense which is a means necessary for the
commission of another? To begin with, the culprit cannot, then,
be considered as displaying a greater degree of malice than
when the two offenses are independent of each other. On the
contrary, since one offense is a necessary means for the
commission of the other, the evil intent is one, which, at least,
quantitatively, is lesser than when the two offenses are
unrelated to each other, because, in such event, he is twice
guilty of having harbored criminal designs and of carrying the
same into execution. Furthermore, it must be presumed that
the object of Article 48, in its entirety, is only one. We cannot
assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of
the single sentence of which said article consists, was to favor

!35
the accused, and that, before the sentence ended, the former
had a change of heart and turned about face against the latter.
If the second part of Article 48 had been meant to be
unfavorable to the accused and, hence, the exact opposite
of the first part each would have been placed in, separate
provisions, instead of in one single article. If the first part
sought to impose, upon the culprit, a penalty less grave than
that which he would deserve if the two or more offenses
resulting from his single act were punished separately, then
this, also, must be the purpose of the second part, in dealing
with an offense which is a necessary means for the
commission of another.
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that,
since 1850, when the counterpart of our Article 48 was inserted
in the Penal Code of Spain, or for over a century, it does not
appear to have been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to
crimes of murder committed in furtherance of an insurrection.
Incidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes
committed as a means necessary for the success of a rebellion
had to be prosecuted separately under the provisions of Article
259 of the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of
Article 244 of our old Penal Code. To begin with, these articles
are part of a substantive law. They do not govern the manner
or method of prosecution of the culprits. Then again, said
precepts ordain that common crimes committed during a
rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion thereof, shall be
respectively punished according to the provisions of this
Code. Among such provisions was Article 90 (later Article 71,
then Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89 of
our old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines is a substantial reproduction. Hence,
had the Supreme Court of Spain or the Philippines believed
that murders committed as a means necessary to attain the
aims of an uprising were common crimes, the same would
have been complexed with the rebellion or sedition, as the
case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and People vs.
Cabrera (43 Phil., 82) have not escaped our attention. Those
cases involved members of the constabulary who rose publicly,
for the purpose of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon
the police force of Manila, and in an encounter with the latter,
killed some members thereof. Charged with and convicted of
sedition in the first case, they were accused of murder in the
second case. They pleaded double jeopardy in the second
case, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the information
were those set forth in the charge in the first case, in which
they had been convicted. This plea was rejected upon the
ground that the organic law prohibited double jeopardy for the
same offense, and that the offense of sedition is distinct and
different from that of murder, although both were the result of
the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified
with, the other was not discussed or even considered in said
cases. Besides, the lower court applied, in the murder case
Article 89 of the old Penal Code which is the counterpart of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code but this Court refused
to do so. Again, simply because one act may constitute two or
more offenses, it does not follow necessarily that a person may
be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, without
violating the injunction against double jeopardy. For instance, if

a man fires a shotgun at another, who suffers thereby several

injuries, one of which produced his death, may he, after
conviction for murder or homicide, based upon said fatal injury,
be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the non-fatal
injuries sustained by the victim? Or may the former be
convicted of the complex crime of murder or homicide with
serious and/or less serious physical injuries? The mere
formulation of these questions suffices to show that the
limitation of the rule on double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense does not constitute a license
for the separate prosecution of two offenses resulting from the
same act, if one offense is an essential element of the other. At
any rate, as regards this phase of the issue, which was not
touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down must
necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the
cases of People vs. Labra (46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159)
and Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (supra), insofar as
inconsistent therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to
complex rebellion with murder and other offenses is that war
within the purview of the laws on rebellion and sedition
may be waged or levied without killing. This premise does
not warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom
that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is
independent therefrom, and may be complexed therewith,
upon the ground that destruction of human life is not
indispensable to the waging or levying of war. A person may kill
another without inflicting physical injuries upon the latter, such,
for instance, as by poisoning, drowning, suffocation or shock.
Yet it is admitted that he who fatally stabs another cannot be
convicted of homicide with physical injuries. So too, it is
undeniable that treason may be committed without torturing or
murdering anybody. Yet, it is well-settled that a citizen who
gives aid and comfort to the enemy by taking direct part in the
maltreatment and assassination of his (citizens) countrymen,
in furtherance of the wishes of said enemy, is guilty of plain
treason, not complexed with murder or physical injuries, the
later being as charged and proven mere ingredients of
the former. Now then, if homicide may be an ingredient of
treason, why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion? The
proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with homicide,.
etc., have not even tried to answer this question. Neither have
they assailed the wisdom of our aforementioned decisions in
treason cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the
considerable efforts exerted, by the Executive Department in
the apprehension and prosecution of those believed to be
guilty of crimes against public order, of the lives lost, and the
time and money spent in connection therewith, as well as of
the possible implications or repercussions in the security of the
State. The careful consideration given to said policy of a
coordinate and co-equal branch of the Government is reflected
in the time consumed, the extensive and intensive research
work undertaken, and the many meetings held by the members
of the court for the purpose of elucidating on the question
under discussion and of settling the same.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is,
however, clear to settle justiceable controversies by the
application of the law. And the latter must be enforced as it is
with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity not
as the judges would have it. In other words, the courts must

!36
apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws, regardless
of the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is
to consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof as
s p e c i fi e d i n A r t i c l e s 1 3 4 a n d 1 3 5 o f t h e
Revised:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Penal Code as
constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty
namely, that prescribed in said Article 135. It is interesting to
note, in this connection, that the penalties provided in our old
Penal Code (Articles 230 to 232) were much stiffer,
namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Life imprisonment to death for the promoters,
maintainers and leaders of the rebellion, and, also, for
subordinate officers who held positions of authority, either civil
or ecclesiastical, if the purpose of the movement was to
proclaim the independence of any portion of the Philippine
territory;
2. Reclusion temporal in its maximum period for said
promoters, maintainers and leaders of the insurrection, and for
its subordinate officers, if the purpose of the rebellion was any
of those enumerated in Article 229, except that mentioned in
the preceding paragraph;
3. Reclusion temporal:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) for
subordinate officers other than those already adverted to;chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (b) for mere participants in the
rebellion falling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of Article
174;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
4. Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period for participants not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the
rigors of the old Penal Code were tempered. Its
aforementioned provisions were superseded by section 3 of
Act No. 292, which reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not
more than ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or
P20,000, for every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or
engages in any rebellion or insurrection cralaw or who gives
aid and comfort to any one so engaging in such rebellion or
insurrection. Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the
authors of the Revised Penal Code. The penalties therein are
substantially identical to those prescribed in Act 292. Although
the Revised Penal Code increased slightly the penalty of
imprisonment for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the
uprising, as well as for public officers joining the same, to a
maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of prision mayor, it
reduced the penalty of imprisonment for mere participants to
not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor, and eliminated
the fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more
significant when we bear in mind it was approved on
December 8, 1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932.
At that time the communists in the Philippines had already
given ample proof of their widespread activities and of their
designs and potentialities. Prior thereto, they had been under
surveillance by the agents of the law, who gathered evidence
of their subversive movements, culminating in the prosecution
o f E v a n g e l i s t a , M a n a h a n ( 5 7 P h i l . , 3 5 4 ; c h a n
roblesvirtualawlibrary57 Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364),
Feleo (57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and others. In

fact, the first information against the first two alleged that they
committed the crime of inciting to sedition on and during the
month of November, 1930, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto.
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in
1935, incorporated a formal and solemn declaration (Article II,
section 5) committing the Commonwealth, and, then the
Republic of the Philippines, to the promotion of social justice.
Soon later, Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of
Industrial Relations, was passed. Then followed a number of
other statutes implementing said constitutional mandate. It is
not necessary to go into the details of said legislative
enactments. Suffice it to say that the same are predicated
upon a recognition of the fact that a good many of the
problems confronting the State are due to social and economic
evils, and that, unless the latter are removed or, least
minimized, the former will keep on harassing the community
and affecting the well-being of its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the
beginning of the century, has been one of decided leniency, in
comparison with the laws enforce during the Spanish regime.
Such policy has not suffered the slightest alteration. Although
the Government has, for the past five or six years, adopted a
more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators
of said law and in their prosecution the established policy of
the State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has
remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us to consider the
merits and demerits of such policy. This falls within the
province of the policy-making branch of the government the
Congress of the Philippines. However, the following quotation
from Cuello Calon indicates the schools of thought on this
subject and the reason that may have influenced our
lawmakers in making their choice:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente
cercanos, se reputaban los hechos que hoy llamamos delitos
politicos como mas graves y peligrosos que los crimenes
comunes. Se consideraba que mientras estos solo causan un
dao individual, aquellos producen profundas perturbaciones
en la vida collectiva llegando a poner en peligro la misma vida
del Estado. En consonancia con estas ideas fueron reprimidos
con extraordinaria severidad y designados con la
denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad se
catalogaron en las leyes penales como los crimenes mas
temibles.
Pero desde hace poco mas de un siglo se ha realizado en
este punto una transformacion profunda merced a la cual la
delincuencia politica dejo de apreciarse con los severos
criterios de antao quedando sometida a un regimen penal,
por regla general suave y benevolo.
El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy
difundida, a la revolucion que tuvo lugar en Francia en el ao
1830. El gobierno de Luis Felipe establecio una honda
separacion entre los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo
estos sometidos a una penalidad mas suave y sus autores
exceptuados de la extradicion. Irradiando a otros paises
tuvieron estas tan gran difusion que en casi todos los de
regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado a crear un
tratamiento desprovisto de severidad para la represion de
estos hechos. No solo las penas con que se conminaron
perdieron gran parte de su antigua dureza, sino qua en

!37
algunos paises se creo un regimen penal mas suave para
estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para ellos la pena de
muerte. Tan profundo contraste entre el antiguo y el actual
tratamiento de la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los
paises solo puede ser explicado por las ideas nacidas y
difundidas bajo los regimenes politicos liberalesacerca de
estos delitos y delincuentes. Por una parte se ha afirmado que
la criminalidad da estos hechos no contiene la misma
inmoralidad que la delincuencia comun, que es tan solo
relativa, qua depende del tiempo, del lugar, da las
circumstancias, de las instituciones del pais. Otros invocan la
elevacion de los moviles y sentimientos determinantes de
estos hechos, el amor a la patria, la adhesion ferviente a
determinadas ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio por el
triunfo de un ideal.
Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han
beneficiado peligrosos malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun
tiempo una fuerte reaccion (vease Cap. XV, 3., b), que llego a
alcanzar considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo
autoritario, y que tambien ha hallado eco, en forma mas suave,
en las de otros paises de constitucion democratica en los que,
especialmente en los ultimos aos, la frecuencia de
agitaciones politicas y sociales ha originado la publicacion de
numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccion penal del
Estado. (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law
punishing the offense to dovetail with the policy of the law
enforcing agencies in the apprehension and prosecution of the
offenders are matters which may be brought to the attention of
the departments concerned. The judicial branch cannot amend
the former in order to suit the latter. The Court cannot indulge
in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation
of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our
republican system. In, short, we cannot accept the theory of
the prosecution without causing much bigger harm than that
which would allegedly result from the adoption of the opposite
view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the
amended information against Defendant-Appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by saidDefendants, as means necessary 4 for the
p e r p e t r a t i o n o f s a i d o f f e n s e o f r e b e l l i o n ; c h a n
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot
exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of
P20,000; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, in conformity
with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons
amenable to a similar punishment, said Defendant may be
allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court
should deny the motion under consideration, because the
security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of
conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of
Amado V. Hernandez is strong. However, as held in a
resolution of this court, dated January 29, 1953, in the case of
Montano vs. Ocampo (G.R. L-6352):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawto deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt

is strong;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit must also appear that in
case of conviction the Defendants criminal liability would
probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive
showing before this Court has been made.
In fact, in the case at bar,DefendantAmado V. Hernandez was
sentenced by the lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but to
life imprisonment. Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic,
too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to
be denied upon mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of
liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system
that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very
first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of
our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8),
(11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said
section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.
Thus, in line with the letter and spirit of the fundamental law,
we said in the aforementioned case of Montano vs.
Ocampo:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to
the otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the
natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and
liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in
the determination of the degree of proof and presumption of
guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.
x x xx x xx x x
In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one
other important factor to be taken into account. The sole
purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has
been observed, is to secure his presence at the trial. In other
words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only
on the theory that the proof being strong, theDefendantwould
flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the
jury. Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed
should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability
of evasion of prosecution.
The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind
the Defendants official and social standing and his other
personal circumstances, seem remote if not nil.
This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the
particularity that there is an additional circumstance in his favor
he has been detained since January 1951, or for more than
five (5) years, and it may still take some time to dispose of the
case, for the same has not been, and is not in a position to be,
included, as yet, in our calendar, inasmuch as the briefs for
some Appellants other than Hernandez as well as the
brief for the Government, are pending submission. It should be
noted, also, that the decision appealed from the opposition to
the motion in question do not reveal satisfactorily and concrete,
positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his
provincial release, during the pendency of the appeal, would
jeopardize the security of the State.
Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of Defendant Appellant Amado V. Hernandez is hereby granted and, upon
the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of
P30,000, and its approval by the court, let said DefendantAppellantbe provisionally released. It isSO ORDERED.

!38
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,respondents.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; The equal
protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operateso long as the classification is not
unreasonable.It is settled in constitutional law that the equal
protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operateso long as the classification is not
unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union, and reiterated in a long line of cases: The guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child
should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
Same; In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative
deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above)
from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
executivesit was not intended to discriminate against the
rank-and-file, and the resulting discrimination or distinction has
a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely
arbitrary in the legislative sense.Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class. In the case at bar, it is clear in the
legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20
and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs
lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent
officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate
against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a
disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-andfile in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or
distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and
entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.

Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; As early as 1947 and reiterated in

subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a
provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it
originated contained no such provision and was merely
inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses.That the provision was a product of amendments
introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not
detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in
subsequent cases, this Court has subscribed to the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a
provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it
originated contained no such provision and was merely
inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses.
Same; Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality; A statute valid at
one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances.The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in
every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since
the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set
of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid
at one time may become void at another time because of
altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical
operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even
though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions.
Same; Same; Government Financial Institutions (GFIs); Salary
Standardization Law (R.A. No. 6758); It is noteworthy that the
subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share the
common proviso of a blanket exemption of all their employees
from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly.We take
judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in
1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters
of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from
1995 to 2004, viz.: 1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP); 2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social
Security System (SSS); 3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small
Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC); 4.
R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS); 5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP); 6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC); and 7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). It is
noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent
charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a
blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of
the SSL, expressly or impliedly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards of Review; Strict
Scrutiny; Two-Tier Analysis; While the prior view on the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation
of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of
the BSP, which was found reasonable because there were
substantial distinctions that made real differences between the
two classes, subsequent enactments involving the exemption
of all rank and file employees of other GFIs constitute
significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the
reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby
exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny.The prior view
on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an

!39
evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and
the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were
substantial distinctions that made real differences between the
two classes. The above-mentioned subsequent enactments,
however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation
of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious
scrutiny. The scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the
classificationalbeit made indirectly as a consequence of the
passage of eight other lawsbetween the rank-and-file of the
BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only
be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of
the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its
operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between
persons who are without differences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The second
level of inquiry deals with the following questionsGiven that
Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from
the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file
employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light
of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file
employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress power to classify so
unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment,
simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly
through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively,
through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal
protection of the law bounded in time and space?Stated
differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following
questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs
(aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the
exclusion of the rankand-file employees of the BSP stand
constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did
not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is
Congress power to classify so unbridled as to sanction
unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the
inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt
act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate
acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law
bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be
invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately,
as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a
consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis
confined to determining the validity within the parameters of
the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is
articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the
grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar
enactments made over a period of time?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation
of Powers; In the second level of scrutiny, the inequality of
treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each
exemption rests on a policy consideration by the legislature
there is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination
by Congress or by the Executive as it cannot run riot and
overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution; The
policy determination argument may support the inequality of
treatment between the rank-and-file and the offices of the BSP,
but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP
rank-and-file and other GFIs who are similarly situated; In the
field of equal protection, the guarantee includes the prohibition

against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination

directly or indirectly.In this second level of scrutiny, the
inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere
assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other
GFIs) rests on a policy determination by the legislature. All
legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy
determinationeven those that have been declared to
contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a
magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due
process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper.
There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination
made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and
overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution. In fine,
the policy determination argument may support the inequality
of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the
BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between
BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs who are similarly situated. It
fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the second level of
scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the
oppressive results of Congress inconsistent and unequal
policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven
other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No.
7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory
policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons
similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee
that no person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the
laws includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow
invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the
effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits
such denial, it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As regards
the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exists no
substantial distinctions so as to differentiate the BSP rank-andfile from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIsour legal
history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as
comprising one distinct class, separate from other government
entities.It is against this standard that the disparate
treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot
stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the
coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so
as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rankand-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history
shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one
distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The argument that
the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted
because of the importance of their institutions mandate cannot
stand any more than an empty sack can stand.It has been
proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or
withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived
need to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned
considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is
essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in
direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private
sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services,
but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel;
and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing
difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel
and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of
exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances

!40
of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the
benefits received by the employees is merely incidental. The
fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the
central monetary authority, and the banker of the government
and all its political subdivisions. It has the sole power and
authority to issue currency; provide policy directions in the
areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks and
regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions
performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted
GFIs. Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of
the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of
their institutions mandate cannot stand any more than an
empty sack can stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is patent that the
classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those
of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and not intended, i.e.,
it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the
particular circumstances of each GFI.It is certainly
misleading to say that the need for the scope of exemption
necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each
institution. Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent
basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the
exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other
GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven
GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it
necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL.
True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was
granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted
separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis
that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from
that of another, the deliberations show that the raison dtre of
the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most
part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the
pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring
and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the
GFIs mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation
package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially
below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP
was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the
subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish
between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the
classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those
of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended,
i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the
particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption
granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance
and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently
enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs,
underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm
of government entities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is precisely the
unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of
the BSPmade manifest and glaring with each and every
consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the
other GFIsthat cannot be rationalized or justified. If Congress
had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight
GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP
rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any
substantial or material basis.It is precisely this
unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of
the BSPmade manifest and glaring with each and every

consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the

other GFIsthat cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more
so, when the SECwhich is not a GFIwas given leave to
have a compensation plan that shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],
then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rankand-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rankand-file of the BSP. The violation to the equal protection clause
becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this
undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the
sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of
the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees
would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It
bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination
was not a direct result arising from one law. Nemo potest
facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum. No one
is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As regards the
exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar
only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the
exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied
the distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also
arbitrary.In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as
regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rankand-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file
employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the
SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rankand-file and the seven other GFIs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of
Powers; While the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of
policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of
Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this
prerogative is subject to judicial review; The disparity in
treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of
the other seven GFIs definitely bear the unmistakable badge of
invidious discrimination.It bears stressing that the exemption
from the SSL is a privilege fully within the legislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to
the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial
to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latters right
to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a
privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the
domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of
the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review. So
when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between
those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to
correct. As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v.
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, once the State has
chosen to confer benefits, discrimination contrary to law may
occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group
is refused to another, even though the State is under no
obligation to provide that favorable treatment. The disparity of
treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of
the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge
of invidious discriminationno one can, with candor and
fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent

!41
blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the
SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being
treated as unalikes without any rational basis.

irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice

imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status
and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.

Same; Standards of Review; In our jurisdiction, the standard

and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have
followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications.In our jurisdiction, the
standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the
main have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The deference to

Congressional discretion stops where the classification violates
a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution, and when these violations arise,
the Supreme Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter
and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations
rational basis should not suffice.Congress retains its wide
discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies
should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The
deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.

Same; Same; International Law; The equality provisions in the

international instruments do not merely function as traditional
first generation rights, commonly viewed as concerned only
with constraining rather than requiring State actionthey
imposed a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to
take steps to eradicate discrimination.Most, if not all,
international human rights instruments include some
prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about equality.
The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination
and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC). In the broader international context, equality is also
enshrined in regional instruments such as the American
Convention on Human Rights; the African Charter on Human
and Peoples Rights; the European Convention on Human
Rights; the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised
Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of
Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the
Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab
Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be
ratified by the Member States of the League. The equality
provisions in these instruments do not merely function as
traditional first generation rights, commonly viewed as
concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State
action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires guarantee[s] of
equal and effective protection against discrimination while
Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions
oblige States Parties to ensure . . . the full and free exercise of
[the rights guaranteed] . . . without any discrimination and to
secure without discrimination the enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed. These provisions impose a measure of positive
obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate
discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; Two-Tier Analysis; The two-tier analysis
made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its
conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are
in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of
other jurisdictions and in international law.Thus, the two-tier
analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision,
and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent
operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the
progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law.
There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection
clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable

Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Foreign Jurisprudence;

Foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in
this jurisdictionat best, they are persuasive and have been
used to support many of our decisionsand we should not
place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them
as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot
come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments.Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a
stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and
authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best,
they are persuasive and have been used to support many of
our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning
reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions
through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the
light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and
even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own
concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in
accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such
intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the
context of other local legislation related thereto. More
importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public
interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it
need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and
different from others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Activism; The quest for a
better and more equal world calls for the use of equal
protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.Further,
the quest for a better and more equal world calls for the use
of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and
action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims equality
as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in
Article II, Section 10, in all phases of national development,
further explicated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the
State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater

!42
equality . . . . [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no
lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort
towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Same; Same; Social Justice; Under the policy of social justice,
the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of
the working class on the humane justification that those with
less privilege in life should have more in law.Our present
Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including
labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working class
on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life
should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection
to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.
Same; Same; Same; Under most circumstances, the Court will
exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to
Congress in exercising its legislative power.Concerns have
been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the
challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of
petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone
has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No.
7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank
and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed. Under most
circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in
deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad
discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational basis test,
and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
treatment. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the
denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and
watered down view would call for the abdication of this Courts
solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the
actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or
the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive
acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature
of the actor.
Same; Same; Same; Considering that majority, if not all, the
rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and
rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is theyand not the officerswho have the
real economic and financial need for the adjustment.In the
case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of
the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a
distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the
lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry,
while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the
rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite
disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank
possessing higher and better education and opportunities for

career advancementare given higher compensation

packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if
not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose
status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms
of job marketability, it is theyand not the officerswho have
the real economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is
in accord with the policy of the Constitution to free the people
from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them
a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for
all. Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional
desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can
pass muster.
DECISION
PUNO,J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid,
become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that
its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of
the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws
amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the2,994
rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas(BSP).
I.
The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act)
took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines,
and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP
and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain respondents from further implementing the
lastprovisoin Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its
authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) establish a human resource management system
which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment,
transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel.
Such system shall aim to establish professionalism
and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in
accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's
approval, shall be instituted as an integral component
of theBangko Sentral'shuman resource development
program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall
make its own system conform as closely as possible
with the principles provided for under Republic Act
No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].Provided,
however, That compensation and wage structure

!43
of employees whose positions fall under salary
grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with
the rates prescribed under Republic Act No.
6758.[emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the
above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two
classes of employees in the BSP,viz: (1) the BSPofficersor
those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rankand-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It
is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class
legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not
germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No.
7653, the most important of which is to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.
1Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that
the questionedprovisodoes not appear in the original
and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in
the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235;2
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-andfile employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL
actually defeats the purpose of the law 3 of
establishing professionalism and excellence at all
levelsin the BSP;4(emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of
amendments introduced during the deliberation of
Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to
the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one
senator as discriminatory against low-salaried
employees of the BSP;5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all
exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within
the class of rank-and-file personnel of government
financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are
also discriminated upon;6and
e. the assailedprovisohas caused the demoralization
among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the
gross disparity between their compensation and that
of the BSP officers'.7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not
reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.8Petitioner also stresses:
(a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will
allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of theprovisoin
question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the
urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP
rank-and-file employeeshave been prejudiced since
1994when theprovisowas implemented. Petitioner concludes
that: (1) since the inequitableprovisohas no force and effect of
law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of
jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except
through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should
take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance
of the legal issue involved.9

RespondentBSP, in its comment,10contends that the provision

does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the
constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with
other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and
administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the
Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence
at all levels in accordance with sound principles of
management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive
Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the
enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism
and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and
policies of the national government.11
II.
Issue
Thus, thesole- albeit significant -issueto be resolved in this
case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of
R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that
"No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the
laws."12
III.
Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges
indubitably show that the classification created by the
questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection"
clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As
held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,13 and
reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such,
but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice,

!44
is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for
the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide
range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it
necessary that the classification be made with
mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification
may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does
not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees
of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as
they may appear. (citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification.15The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class.16 If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another.17 The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law
and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that
the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was
intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms
of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not
intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the endresult did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the
officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits,
the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not
palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative
sense.19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced
during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from
its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent
cases,20this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the
ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such
provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference
committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute.21 An act of the legislature,
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within

constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a law,

there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS
-
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the
legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of
subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of
other GFIs leeched all validity out of the
challengedproviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may
be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and
invalid in its application to another.24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its
practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open
to inquiry and investigation in the light ofchanged conditions.
26

Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City

of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of New York
declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance
which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district,
although it was located in the center of a business area. Later
amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the
property except for parking and storage of automobiles, and
service station within a parking area. The Court found the
ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which
was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right
to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in
accordance with a well-considered and
comprehensive plan designed to promote public
health, safety and general welfare, such power is
subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not
be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so
whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of
the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably
adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid
when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down
as invalid when, at a later time, its operation
under changed conditions proves
confiscatorysuch, for instance, as when the greater
part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will
afford relief in an appropriate case.28 (citations
omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued
enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a
consequence ofsignificant changesin circumstances. Rutter
v. Esteban29upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law
- its enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the
State of its police power30- but also ruled that thecontinued

!45
enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be
unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent
changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture.
Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation
would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of
the creditors. The landmark ruling states:31
The question now to be determined is, is the period
ofeight (8) yearswhich Republic Act No. 342 grants
to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before
the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a
claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage
Commission reasonable under the present
circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only
extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who
suffered from the ravages of the last war and who
filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War
Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said
obligation shall not be due and demandable for a
period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of
the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission.
The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors
an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving
them a reasonable time within which to pay their
prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in
said law that since liberation conditions have
gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard
to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so
it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the
debt moratorium should be continued in force
(Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these
obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result
of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32
and at present their enforcement is still inhibited
because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342
and would continue to be unenforceable during the
eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford
them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which
in plain language means that the creditors would have
to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before
they could effect a liquidation of their investment
dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to us
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of
Congress is plausible, and should be commended,
the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who
are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their
hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote,
more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice
is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not
even required to pay interest during the operation of
the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
xxx xxx xxx
In the face of the foregoing observations, and
consistent with what we believe to be as the only
course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us
underthe present circumstances is to declare that
the continued operation and enforcement of

Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is

unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the
same should be declared null and void and
without effect.(emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32is illuminating. The Supreme Court
of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes
authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's
fees against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced
railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive
motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not
subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in
existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled
that the statutes became invalid as denying "equal protection
of the law," in view of changed conditions since their
enactment.
In another U.S. case,Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a
provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad
company of proving that it was free from negligence in the
killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This,
notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute,
enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the
Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained
because it applied to all similar corporations and had
for its object the safety of persons on a train and the
protection of property. Of course, there were no
automobiles
in
those
days.
The subsequent inauguration and development of
transportation by motor vehicles on the public
highways by common carriers of freight and
passengers created even greater risks to the safety of
occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and
death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the
operators of that mode of competitive transportation
are not subject to the same extraordinary legal
responsibility for killing such animals on the public
roads as are railroad companies for killing them on
their private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters,
294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated,
"A statute valid when enacted may become invalid
by change in the conditions to which it is
applied. The police power is subject to the
constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted
arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior
opinions of that court are cited in support of the
statement. The State of Florida for many years had a
statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing
extraordinary and special duties upon railroad
companies, among which was that a railroad
company was liable for double damages and an
attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the
owner having to prove any act of negligence on the
part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held

!46
that the changed conditions brought about by motor
vehicle transportation rendered the statute
unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor
vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would
have been required to prove negligence in the
operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This
certainly is not equal protection of the
law."34(emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law,viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the
statute under challenge in determining whether that
statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation. Though the law
itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.35 (emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which
denies equal protection and a law which permits
of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes
may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their
effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying
the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
.36(emphasis supplied, citations omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 +
8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of
challengedproviso.
According to petitioner, the lastprovisoof Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection
clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS,
LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of
the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the
SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of
GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter
was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the
amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS,
and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004,viz:
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System
(SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business
Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP);

6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty

Corporation (HGC);38and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out,that the subsequent
charters of the seven other GFIs share this
common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their
employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or
impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 90.Personnel.xxx xxx xxx
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a
compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board
of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis
and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private sector
and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board
no more than once every two (2) years without
prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based
on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall
therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. It shall
however endeavor to make its system conform as
closely as possible with the principles under Republic
Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)
Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the
SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such
other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix
their reasonable compensation, allowances and other
benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such
methods and procedures as may be necessary to
insure the efficient, honest and economical
administration of the provisions and purposes of this
Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the
SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be
appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further,
That the personnel appointed by the SSS President,
except those below the rank of assistant manager,
shall be subject to the confirmation by the
Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of
the SSS shall be selected only from civil service
eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and
regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be
exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No.
6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis
supplied)

!47
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx xxx xxx
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(e)notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10,
series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget
and Management,the Board of Directors of SBGFC
shall have the authority to extend to the
employees and personnel thereof the allowance
and fringe benefits similar to those extended to
and currently enjoyed by the employees and
personnel of other government financial
institutions.(emphases supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of
Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and
G e n e r a l M a n a g e r, t o a p p r o v e t h e G S I S '
organizational and administrative structures and
staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise
and adjust the appropriate compensation package for
the officers and employees of the GSIS with
reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses,
privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or
proper for the effective management, operation and
administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt
from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as
the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act
No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition
Law.(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The
Board of Directors shall provide for an organization
and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and
upon recommendation of the President of the Bank,
fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All
positions in the Bank shall be governed by the
compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Board of
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of
actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation
plan shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plans in the private sector and shall be
subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors
once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly
merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity

and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be

exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations
on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. The Bank shall however,
endeavor to make its system conform as closely
as possible with the principles under
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as
amended).(emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of
Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the
efficient management, operation and administration of
the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the
Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed
by a compensation and position classification system
and qualifications standards approved by the
Corporation's Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties
and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the
compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private
sector and which shall be exempt from Republic
Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules
and regulations on salaries and
compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund
and determine the Corporation's and the employee's
contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is
hereby further amended to read:
xxx xxx xxx
3.
xxx xxx xxx
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's
approval, shall be instituted as an integral component
of the Corporation's human resource development
program: Provided, That all positions in the
Corporation shall be governed by a compensation,
position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Board based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties
and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall
be comparable with the prevailing compensation
p l a n s o f o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t fi n a n c i a l
institutions and shall be subject to review by the
Board no more than once every two (2) years without
prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based
on productivity and profitability. The Corporation
shall therefore be exempt from existing laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, position

!48
classification and qualification standards. It shall
however endeavor to make its system conform as
closely as possible with the principles under Republic
Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP
charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted
the exemption that was specifically denied to the rankand-file of the BSP.And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury,
even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was
granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653
wasconfined to an evaluation of its classification between
the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found
reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that
made real differences between the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments,
h o w e v e r , c o n s t i t u t e s i g n i fi c a n t c h a n g e s i n
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of
the continued operation of the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing
theprovisoto more serious scrutiny.This time, the scrutiny
relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made
indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws
-between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other
GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but
must also apply equally to all members of the
class. Theproviso may be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its
operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions
between persons who are without differences.40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the
following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt
other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can
the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand
constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did
not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs?Is
Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction
unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the
inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt
act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate
acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law
bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be
invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately,
as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a
consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis
confined to determining the validity within the parameters of
the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is
articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the
grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar
enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment
cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption
(granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy
determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments
necessarily rest on a policy determination- even those that
have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if
this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a
statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges
would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a
policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it

cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the

Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the
inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the
officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of
treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are
similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in
thesecond level of scrutinyis not thedeclaredpolicy of each
law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress'
inconsistent and unequal policytowards the BSP rank-andfile and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second
challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the
irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its
treatment of persons similarly situated.In the field of equal
protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition
against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination,directly or indirectly.If a law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial,
it is unconstitutional.41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the
BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial
scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of
the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to
differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file
of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows
that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one
distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985
(1976)declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was
passed to address disparities in pay among similar or
comparable positions which had given rise to dissension
among government employees. But even then, GFIs and
government-owned and/or controlled corporations
(GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among
government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided,
"[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system
established for all employees, additional financial incentives
may be established by government corporation and financial
institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their
corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be
approved by the President in critical government agencies."42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the
GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the
principles governing the Compensation and Position
Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic
compensation for all personnel in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the
private sector doing comparable work, and must be in
accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the
unified Compensation and Position Classification System of
the SSL,43but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on
the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private
sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and

!49
Position Classification System was to be governed by the
following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio
of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at
equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally
comparable with the private sector, in accordance with
prevailing laws on minimum wages.45Also, the Department of
Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for
preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark
Position Schedule, and the following factors:46
(1) the education and experience required to perform
the duties and responsibilities of the positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be
performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the
completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external
relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment;
and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in
the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position
titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were
similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation and
position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IXB of the 1997 Constitution.47
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the
BSP,implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL by
giving it express authority to determine and institute its own
compensation and wage structure. However, employees
whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were specifically
limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs
followed. Significantly, each government financial institution
(GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and
institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also
explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary grade
or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the
grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the
perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution
concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or
GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or
GFI is in direct competition with their [sic]counterparts in the
private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or
services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent
personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or
were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions
with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel.
The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with

the particular circumstances of each institution, and the

corresponding variance in the benefits received by the
employees is merely incidental."
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is
the central monetary authority,48 and the banker of the
government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the
sole power and authority to issue currency;50provide policy
directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and
supervise banks and regulate finance companies and nonbank financial institutions performing quasi-banking
functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the
argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs
were exempted because of the importance of their institution's
mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can
stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the
scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular
circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the
deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the
BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to the
rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact,
the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as
Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be
exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP
and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of
each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it
bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different
and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that
theraison d'tre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably
linkedtoandfor the most part basedon factors common to the
eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy;
(2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective
personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the
recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is
not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards.
Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted
SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other
GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-andfile; it is patent thatthe classification made between the BSP
rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was
inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any
substantial distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of
each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes
express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to
those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and
personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a
particular class within the realm of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of
the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring with
each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from
the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or
justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is not a GFI was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be
comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP]
and other [GFIs],"53then granted a blanket exemption from the
SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment
than the rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even
more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable
truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose

!50
of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the
exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been
devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no
moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a
direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per
alium quod non potest facere per directum."No one is allowed
to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not
sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file
employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar
employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation,
position classification and qualification standards. The fact that
certain persons have some attributes in common does not
automatically make them members of the same class with
respect to a legislative classification." Cited is the ruling
in Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores
that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute
when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally
explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US
Court sustained the validity of the classification as there
were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly
recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for
the classification limiting educational benefits to military
service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to
civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as
follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is
quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative
civilian service. A conscientious objector performing
alternative service is obligated to work for two years.
Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand,
involves a six-year commitment
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans
and alternative service performers are qualitatively
different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of
personal freedom during their service careers.
Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran
becomes part of the military establishment, subject to
its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress
was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused
by military service, in consequence of which military
servicemen have a special need for readjustment
benefits55(citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the
exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics
peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as
to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file
employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the
SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rankand-file and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting
opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it - whether
"being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and
sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is

Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other

government agencies, not once but eight times, through the
enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523,
8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a "preferred
sub-class within government employees," but the present
challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it
is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative
power, the validity of which must be measured not only by
looking at the specific exercisein and by itself(R.A. No. 7653),
but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven
separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change
in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, position
classification and qualification standards of the employees of
the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file)
since the enactment of the new Central Bank Act" is of no
moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57this Court resolved the
issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had
manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the
case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision
was not squarely raised as an issue, because the issue
involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated
and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the
challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and
public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality
of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the
case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is
a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give or
deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the
seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-andfile employees breached the latter's right to equal protection. In
other words, while the granting of a privilegeper seis a matter
of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of
Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this
prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the
distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between those included
and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this
Court has the duty and the power to correct.59 As held in the
United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer
benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where
favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to
another, even though the State is under no obligation to
provide that favorable treatment.61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the
rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the
unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can,
with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of
the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other
GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the
BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any
rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause
does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot
be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and

!51
security shall be given to every person under circumstances
which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should
be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would
justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP
from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the
seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued
application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal
protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an
outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal
protection challenges in the main have followed the"rational
basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless
there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.64
A. Equal Protection in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the
static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther highlights the
development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to
wit:65
Traditionally, equal protection supported only
minimal judicial intervention in most contexts.
Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only
that government must not impose differences in
treatment "except upon some reasonable
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation."
Theold varietyof equal protection scrutinyfocused
solely on the means used by the legislature: it
insisted merely that the classification in the
statute reasonably relates to the legislative
purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal
protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with
identifying "fundamental values" and restraining
legislative ends. And usually the rational
classification requirement was readily satisfied: the
courts did not demand a tight fit between classification
and purpose; perfect congruence between means and
ends was not required.

to the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal

protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The
intensive review associated with the new equal
protection imposed two demands - a demand not
only as to means but also one as to ends.
Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far
closer fit between classification and statutory purpose
than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally
tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to
be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends,
not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover,
equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as
well: legislation in the areas of the new equal
protection had to be justified by "compelling" state
interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate"
state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate
f o r s t r i c t s c r u t i n y b y s e a r c h i n g f o r t w o
characteristics: the presence of a "suspect"
classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or
interests. In the category of "suspect classifications,"
the Warren Court's major contribution was to intensify
the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist
area of racial classifications. But other cases also
suggested that there might be more other suspect
categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for
example. But it was the 'fundamental interests"
ingredient of the new equal protection that proved
particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous..
[Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal
appeals, and the right of interstate travel .]
xxx xxx xxx
The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the
scope of the new equal protection, although its
best established ingredient retains vitality. There
was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier
formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection
doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an
interventionist tool without resorting to the strict
language of the new equal protection. [Among the
fundamental interests identified during this time were
voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect"
classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

[From marginal intervention to major cutting

edge:The Warren Court's "new equal protection" and
the two-tier approach.]

Even while the two-tier scheme has often been

adhered to in form, there has also been an
increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp
difference between deferential "old" and
interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of
justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp
distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would
narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential
review. The most elaborate attack came from Justice
Marshall, whose frequently stated position was
developed most elaborately in his dissent in
theRodriguezcase:66

F r o m i t s t r a d i t i o n a l m o d e s t r o l e , e q u a l
protection burgeoned into a major intervention
tool during the Warren era,especially in the 1960s.
The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential
ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas
of economic and social legislation, the demands
imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as
everBut the Court launched an equal protection
revolution by finding large new areas for strict rather
than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiatedtwotier approachevolved by the late 1960s: in addition

The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal

protection cases fall into one of two neat categories

!52
which dictate the appropriate standard of review strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic)
Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A
principled reading of what this Court has done reveals
that it has applied a spectrum of standards in
reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the
equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly
comprehends variations in the degree of care with
which Court will scrutinize particular classification,
depending, I believe, on the constitutional and
societal importance of the interests adversely affected
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon
which the particular classification is drawn.
Justice
M a r s h a l l ' s
"sliding
scale" approach describes many of the modern
decisions, although it is a formulation that the majority
refused to embrace.But the Burger Court's results
indicate at least two significant changes in equal
protection law: First, invocation of the "old" equal
protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the
Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative
classifications and a virtually automatic validation of
challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even
while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off"
standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find
the statute unconstitutional.Second, in some areas
the modern Court has put forth standards for equal
protection review that, while clearly more intensive
than the deference of the "old" equal protection, are
less demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal
protection. Sex discrimination is the best established
example of an"intermediate" level of review. Thus,
in one case, the Court said that "classifications by
gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." That standard is
"intermediate" with respect to both ends and means:
where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict
scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under the "old" mode,
"important" objectives are required here; and where
means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal
protection, and merely "rationally related" under the
"old" equal protection, they must be "substantially
related" to survive the "intermediate" level of review.
(emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
B. Equal Protection in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European
Community have also gone forward in discriminatory
legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom
domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can
be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on
Human Rights(ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds
such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative
and not exhaustive.Discrimination on the basis of race, sex
and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict
scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of
discrimination are regarded asparticularly suspectunder the
Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing
states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of

national emergency, prohibits derogation by measures that

discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language,
religion or social origin."67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has
developed a test of justification which varies with the ground of
discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case 68 the
European Court set the standard of justification at a low level:
discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had
no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised.69 But over the years, the European
Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by
Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification
being required in respect of those regarded as
"suspect" (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual
orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the
European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is
today a major goal in the member States of the
Council of Europe. This means that very weighty
reasons would have to be advanced before a
difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be
regarded as compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held
that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward
before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based
exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the
Convention."72 The European Court will then permit States
avery much narrower margin of appreciationin relation to
discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application
of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions
drawn by states between, for example, large and small landowners.73
C. Equality under International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under
international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination,
together with equality before the law and equal protection of
the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles
in the protection of human rights.74
M o s t , i f n o t a l l , i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n r i g h t s
instrumentsinclude some prohibition on discrimination and/or
provisions about equality. 75 The general international
provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
76the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);77the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also
enshrined in regional instruments such as the American
Convention on Human Rights;78the African Charter on Human
and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Human
Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised
Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of
Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the

!53
Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab
Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be
ratified by the Member States of the League.81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not
merely function as traditional "first generation" rights,
commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining
rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR
requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective protection
against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American
and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ...
the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without
any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.82These provisions impose
a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take
steps to eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards
ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are laid
down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number of
Conventions administered by the International Labour
Organisation, a United Nations body. 84 Additionally, many of
the other international and regional human rights instruments
have specific provisions relating to employment.85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also
gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition
against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR
rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before
the Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in the
Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope
of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that
discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within
the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the
ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26
could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other
civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of
taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the
social, economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The
Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26
applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in
other international treaties such as the right to social security
found in ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should
prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any
obligation with respect to the matters that may be
provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for
example, require any state to enact legislation to
provide for social security. However, when such
legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply
with Article 26 of the Covenant.89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or
indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has
thepurpose or effectof violating the right to equal protection.
International law recognizes that discrimination may occur
indirectly,as the Human Rights Committee90took into account
the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW
in declaring that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be
understood to imply any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference which is based on any
ground such asrace, colour, sex, language, religion,

political or other opinion, national or social origin,

property, birth or other status, and which has
thepurpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons,
on an equal footing, of all rights and
freedoms.91(emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the
challenged provision, and its conclusion of
unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in
cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of
other jurisdictions and in international law.There should be
no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major
cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational
discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice
imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status
and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our
Constitution and international law, we held in International
School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing:93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination
is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws
reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution
in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general
principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in
Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody
the general principle against discrimination, the very
antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines,
through its Constitution, has incorporated this
principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital
and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all
the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is
entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace
- the factory, the office or the field - but include as well
the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote
"equality of employment opportunities for all."

!54
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit
and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its
primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal
and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof,
provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
[favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in
particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers,
as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal
remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any kind,
in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not
inferior to those enjoyed by men,
with equal pay for equal work;

be deduced from the language of each law and the context of

other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they
must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the
be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be
stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from
others.97
In the 2003 case ofFrancisco v. House of Representatives, this
Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and
authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar
as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional
settings and needs."98 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States,
their paths of development have long since diverged.99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for
the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial
intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention
and action in the Constitution. The Preamble
proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest
against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The
command to promote social justice in Article II,
Section 10, in "all phases of national development,"
further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands
to the State to take affirmative action in the direction
of greater equality. [T]here is thus in the Philippine
Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable
measure of equality.100

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize
in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid
classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition
and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul
of the Constitution.94 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial
scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are
not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our
decisions.95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance
upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches
without which we cannot come to our own decisions through
the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different
ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our
own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even
idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept
of law and justice.96Our laws must be construed in accordance
with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital

social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law
bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the
working class on the humane justification that those with less
privilege in life should have more in law.102And the obligation
to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to
translate this pledge into a living reality.103 Social justice calls
for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
104

V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a
ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered
that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with
Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity
perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the
exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has
supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing
the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its
legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the

!55
"rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be
given deferential treatment.105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the
denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more
strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the
abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law
repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is
true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a
private person or the government itself or one of its
instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of
the problem being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly
those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial
inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are
the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935
Constitution, and the system of checks and balances,
one of its basic predicates. As a consequence,We
have neither the authority nor the discretion to
decline passing upon said issue, but are under
the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more
exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to
support and defend the Constitution - to settle
it.This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held
that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to
determine whether another branch of the government
has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied
with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed
that, if the Constitution provides how it may be
amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then,
unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that constitution, will declare the
amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking
through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on
Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the
highly respected and foremost leaders of the
Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments" of the government.
107(citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the
basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status.It is akin
to a distinction based on economic class and status,with
the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld

from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry,
while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the
rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite
disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank possessing higher and better education and opportunities for
career advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay.Considering that majority, if
not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited,
especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not
the officers - who have the real economic and
financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty,
provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all."108Any
act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutionaldesideratumdeserves strict scrutiny by this
Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater
concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent
rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in
the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a
collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and
conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to
protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a
labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil
as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI
rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file
employees represent the politically powerless and they
should not be compelled to seek a political solution to
their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have
waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be
asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given
any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save
them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF,we hold that the continued operation and
implementation of the lastprovisoof Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its
President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for
Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES,
and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and
166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its

!56
President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL
CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President,
TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all
the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout
the Country,petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications,
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster
General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP.,respondents.
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of separation of powers; Under
the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress.Under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers
of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill.)
The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs.
Pons, where we explained the reason thus: To inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and indepen dent department of the Government,
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall decline to look
into the petitioners charges that an amendment was made
upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A.
No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2)
of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances
from a coordinate department of the government, to which we
owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless
been embodied in a separate clause in Article III, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any
form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the
due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
to cut it down is the equal protection clause. According to a
long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does
not require the universal application of the laws on all persons

or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result

in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting
mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit
the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
CRUZ,J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of
the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark
of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they
are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by
these measures and is thus an interested party that should
ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our
system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the
authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not
with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through
its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government
offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that
their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
above-named measures. The National Land Registration
Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its
own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in
registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it
has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on
the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject
and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind,
to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The
theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it
was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is
constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be
rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l),
of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."

!57
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or
"log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation
that is being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if
they shall so desire.1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A.
No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it
reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
C o r p o r a t i o n , D e fi n i n g i t s P o w e r s , F u n c t i o n s a n d
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and
for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

conditions as may obviate abuse or

unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that
the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of
the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly
indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.2
To require every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would
actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly
explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be
specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the
title, and adopted to the accomplishment of
the object in view, may properly be included
in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the
same act the machinery by which the act is
to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for
its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the
way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as
expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that
they should also have special mention in the
title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725).

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which

provides:
The State shall pursue the following
objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy
transfer of mail and other postal matters,
from sender to addressee, with full
recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange,
cooperation and understanding through the
unhampered flow or exchange of postal
matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal
services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to,
philately, transfer of monies and valuables,
and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are
generated by and within the industry to
finance the overall cost of providing the
varied range of postal delivery and
messengerial services as well as the
expansion and continuous upgrading of
service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the
petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts,
decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are
hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic
Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and
5059. The Corporation may continue the
franking privilege under Circular No. 35
dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice
President, under such arrangements and

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which

Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is
properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on
the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new
statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more
germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished
thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected
therewith."4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such
repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is
the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be
briefly expressed in its title.5As observed in one case,6if the
title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by
implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any
such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege
from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the
principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35
covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners

!58
and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not
included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House
Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before
its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in
the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when
the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may
be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They
stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement
between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not
have been validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism
for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally
with the subject matter or it may be limited to
resolving the precise differences between
the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits
the freedom with which new subject matter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee
produces unexpected results, results beyond
its mandate, These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.
81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report
on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter,
the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President
Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House
of Representatives as having been duly passed by both
Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved
by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress.Casco Philippine Chemical Co.
v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is

conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to

be entered in the journals like the yeas and nayson the final
reading of the
bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the
Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case
ofU.S. vs. Pons,9where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to
violate both the, letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354
and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and
the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is
based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while
withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains
the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice
President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of
complaints against public offices and officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination
because the law is based on a valid classification in
accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the
franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the
Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of
National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National
Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the
Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang
Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the
Welfare of Disabled Persons.11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the
Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the
due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes

!59
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the
first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the President
of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former
Presidents of the Philippines purely as acourtesy from the
lawmaking body? Is it offered because of
the importance or status of the grantee or because of
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen
pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that
the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, by the
political departments before it was finally enacted. There is
reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention
was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was
mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political
departments would have intended this serious slight to the
Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the
government. The same observations are made if the
importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for
the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the
National Census and Statistics Office and even some private
individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the
franking privilege was the perceivedneedof the grantee for the
accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial
revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a
smoother flow of communication between the government and
the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the
departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has
been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if
there is any major branch of the government that needs the
privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify
the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this
basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending
it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data
from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to

June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to

P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary
and other agencies whose functions include the service of
judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of
Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to
P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted
to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners
reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents'
conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail
from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn
from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect
saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to
those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of
former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly
(especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person
may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really
necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from
the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved
by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between
those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved
by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed
the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If
it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and
the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no
reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we
may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court
should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we
may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics
Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if
not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable
need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former
Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as
much frank mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as
a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain
functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter.14Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain
offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is
capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by
the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from

!60
the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the
exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in
the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the
franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem.
The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents
themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of
justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers
and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has
the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the
Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion
budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for
the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased
difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp
to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial
functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35
of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by
the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find
its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies
the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by
the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions
that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the
Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this
Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its
subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul
Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the
equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the
criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of
similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate
power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial
conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political
system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot
debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases
before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own
conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE
insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the
Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration
Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the
said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining
order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
(ISAE),petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the
Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO
B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of
Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his
capacity as the Superintendent of International SchoolManila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.,respondents.
Labor Law; Constitutional Law; That public policy abhors
inequality and discrimination is beyond contention.That
public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights exhorts Congress to give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities. The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Same; Same; International law, which springs from general
principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.
International law, which springs from general principles of law,
likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law
include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupationall embody the
general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of
fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution,
has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
Same; Same; State directed to promote equality of
employment opportunities for all.The Constitution also
directs the State to promote equality of employment
opportunities for all. Similarly, the Labor Code provides that
the State shall ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed. It would be an affront to both the spirit and
letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial
obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory
terms and conditions of employment.
Same; Same; Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is
frowned upon by the Labor Code.Discrimination, particularly
in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article
135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of
lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male
employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard
to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.
Same; Same; If an employer accords employees the same
position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work.The School contends that petitioner has
not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to

!61
that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little
cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position
and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the
rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less
or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to
injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee;
it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated
unfairly.
Same; Same; The State has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital.The Constitution enjoins
the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare, to afford labor full protection. The State, therefore,
has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor
and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are
so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common
good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are
contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down
these stipulations.
KAPUNAN,J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad,
the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos,
cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid
more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course,
beside the point. The point is that employees should be given
equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long
honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on
fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold
today.1wphi1.nt
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for
short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
1To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of
the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own
teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such
personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have
been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers
as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests
to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as
a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic
allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work
in the School and was the School responsible for
bringing that individual to the Philippines?2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the
Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire;
otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded

local-hires.1avvphi1 These include housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance.
Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference
on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have
to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot
himself from his home country, leave his family and
friends, and take the risk of deviating from a
promising career path all for the purpose of
pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time
in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with
economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or
for one's family, effective means of transportation,
allowance for the education of one's children,
adequate insurance against illness and death, and of
course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement
compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is
confronted again with the same economic reality after
his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return
to his home country where he will have to confront the
uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after
along period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's
adaptive measure to remain competitive on an
international level in terms of attracting competent
professionals in the field of international education.3
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement
were held on June 1995, petitioner International School
Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"4of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The
failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to
bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the
dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary,
Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity
and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE
Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March
19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed
by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its
faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other
than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as
local hires.5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these
non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the
Filipino local-hires.

!62
The compensation package given to local-hires has
been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth
to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired
locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local
hires.6
The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for
the distinction in salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find
applications in the present case. The international
character of the School requires the hiring of foreign
personnel to deal with different nationalities and
different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system
of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired
personnel which system is universally recognized. We
agree that certain amenities have to be provided to
these people in order to entice them to render their
services in the Philippines and in the process remain
competitive in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign
hires have limited contract of employment unlike the
local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply
parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would
also require parity in other terms and conditions of
employment which include the employment which
include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to
the conditions and provisions for salary and
professional compensation wherein the parties agree
as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be
compensated only in accordance with
Appendix C hereof provided that the
Superintendent of the School has the
discretion to recruit and hire expatriate
teachers from abroad, under terms and
conditions that are consistent with accepted
international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at
equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff
(OSRS) salary schedule. The 25%
differential is reflective of the agreed value of
system displacement and contracted status
of the OSRS as differentiated from the
tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff
(LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties'
recognition of the difference in the status of two types
of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection
clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established
principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is not violated by
legislation or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is
based on substantial distinctions and apply to all
members of the same class. Verily, there is a

substantial distinction between foreign hires and local

hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure,
having no amenities of their own in the Philippines
and have to be given a good compensation package
in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of
the School.7
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is
beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy
against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19
of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
International law, which springs from general principles of law,
9 likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law
include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 12the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, 13 the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 15 the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general
principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness
and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor
are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution 17specifically provides that labor is entitled to
"humane conditions of work." These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or
the field but include as well the manner by which employers
treat their employees.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality
of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the
State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.20
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon
by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female
employee as against a male employee for work of equal value.
Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights,supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:

!63
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in
particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers,
as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal
remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any kind,
in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not
inferior to those enjoyed by men,
with equal pay for equal work;
x x x x x x x x x
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22This rule applies
to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence
that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreignhires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an
employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This
presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for
that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden.
There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to
leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates
without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation

factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately
compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not
enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full
protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital.27 These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common
good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are
contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down
these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the
School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the
sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the
same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to
be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an
asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.31

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made

to a person for his pains or industry in another man's
business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or
more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman
soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis
supplied.)

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their

intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes
of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy
security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar
functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to localhires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably
related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion
of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a
bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group
the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreignhires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the
prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same
services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation
factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The

petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and
March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of
according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a

reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the
"[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of
services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations
Commission,24we said that:

!64
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3708 May 18, 1953
ROYAL L. RUTTER,plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PLACIDO J. ESTEBAN,defendant-appellee.
Susano A. Velasquez for appellant.
Teodoro R. Dominguez for appellee.
1.Constitutional Law; Obligations and Contracts; Moratorium;
Limitations upon the police Power of the State.,A1though
conceding that the obligations of the mortgage contract were
impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an
impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the
Federal. Constitution, within the police power of the State as
that power was called into exercise by the public economic
emergency which the legislature had found to exist." (Home
Building & Loan Association vs. Bleisdell, 290 U. S., 398.) But
the ruling in the Bleisdell case has its limitations which should
not be overlooked in the determination of the extent to be given
to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon the
enforcement of a monetary obligation; if these bounds are
transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of the power,
for the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of
contracts would assert itself. Here are instances by which
these bounds may be transgressed. (1) The impairment should
only: refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right
(Worthen Co. vs. Kavanaugh, 79 L. ed., 1298, 1301-1303;
Bronson vs. Kinsie, 1 How., 311, 317, 46 Har. Law Review, p.
1070) ; (2) The protective power of tho state, the police power,
may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary
in nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable
conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional
provision against impairment of contracts (First Trust Co. of
Lincoln vs. Smith, 27 N. W., pp. 762, 769) ; (3) "A different
situation is presented when 'extensions are so piled up as to
make the remedy A shadow . ." 295 U. S., 56, 62) ; (4) The
decision in the Bleisdell case is predicated on the ground that
the laws altering existing contracts will constitute an
impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if
they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances
occasioning their enactment (47 Harvard Law Review, p. 660).
2.Id. ; Id.; Id.; When Extensions of Period of moratorium
Become Unreasonable.The obligations covered by Republic
Act No. 342 and Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 had been
pending since 1945 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford
them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain
language means that the creditors would have to observe a
vigil of at least twelve years before they could effect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This
period seems unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the
purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended,
the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect
collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the
credits .are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when,

under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest
during the operation of the relief. There are at least three cases
where the Supreme Court of the United States declared the
moratorium laws violative of the contract clause of the
Constitution because the period granted to debtors as a relief
was found unwarranted by the contemplated emergency
(Worthen Co. vs. Thomas, 292 U. S., 426-435, 78 L. ed., 1344,
1347; Worthen vs. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S., 56; Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S., 555, 79 L. ed.,
1593).
3.Id.; Id.; Id.; Republic Act No. 342 and Executive Orders Nos.
25 and 32 are Unreasonable.The continued operation and
enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a
minute longer, and, therefore, the same is declared null and
void and without effect. And what is said here with respect to
said Act holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and
32, perhaps with greater force and reason as to the latter,
considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever
in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement
and effectivity of monetary obligations. And there is need to
make this pronouncement in view of the revival clause
embodied in said Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional
or invalid.
BAUTISTA ANGELO,J.:
On August 20, 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J.Esteban
two parcels of land situated in the city of Manila for the sum of
P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance of
P4,800 was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before
August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with
interest at the rate of 7 percentper annum.
To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first
mortgage over the same parcels of land has been constituted
in favor of the plaintiff. The deed of sale having been
registered, a new title was issued in favor of Placido J.Esteban
with a mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof.
Placido J. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed
upon, as well as the interest that had accrued there-on, and so
on August 2, 1949, Royal L. Rutter instituted this action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the balance due,
the interest due thereon, and the attorney's fees stipulated in
the contract. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of
the properties mortgaged in accordance with law.
Placido J. Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint,
but set up a defense the moratorium clause embodied in
Republic Act No. 342. He claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted on August 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer,
having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage
Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence
of the last war; and that under section 2 of said Republic Act
No. 342, payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until
after the lapse of eight years from the settlement of his claim
by the Philippine War Damage Commission, and this period
has not yet expired.
After a motion for summary judgment has been presented by
the defendant, and the requisite evidence submitted covering
the relevant facts, the court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint holding that the obligation which plaintiff seeks to
enforce is not yet demandable under the moratorium law.

!65
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised for
the first time the constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the
motion was denied. Hence this appeal.
The only question to be determined hinges on the validity of
Republic Act No. 342 which was approved by Congress on
July 26, 1948. It is claimed that this act if declared applicable to
the present case is unconstitutional being violative of the
constitutional provision forbidding the impairement of the
obligation of contracts (Article III, section 1, Constitution of the
Philippines).
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that all debts and
other monetary obligations contracted before December 8,
1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or any
subsequent aggreement affecting such obligation to the
contrary notwithstanding, shall not due and demandable for a
period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war
damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage
Commission; and section 3 of said Act provides that should the
provision of section 2 be declared void and unenforceable,
then as regards the obligation affected thereby, the provisions
of Executive Order No. 25 dated November 18, 1944, as
amended by Executive Order No. 32, dated March 10, 1945,
relative to debt moratorium, shall continue to be in force and
effect, any contract affecting the same to the contrary
notwithstanding, until subsequently repealed or amended by a
legislative enactment. It thus clearly appears in said Act that
the nullification of its provisions will have the effect of reviving
the previous moratorium orders issued by the President of the
Philippines.
Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of
monetary obligations are not of recent enactment. These
moratorium laws are not new. "For some 1,400 years western
civilization has made use of extraordinary devices for saving
the credit structure, devices generally known as moratoria. The
moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations
decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the
legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign
power" (58 C.J. S., p. 1208 footnote 87). In the United States,
may state legislatures have adopted moratorium laws "during
times of financial distress, especially when incident to, or
caused by, a war" (41 C.J., p.213). Thus, such laws "were
passed by many state legislatures at the time of the civil war
suspending the rights of creditors for a definite and reasonable
time, . . . whether they suspend the right of action or make
dilatory the remedy" (12 C.J., p 1078). The laws were declared
constitutional. However, some courts have also declared that
"such statutes are void as to contracts made before their
passage where the suspension of remedied prescribed is
indefinite or unreasonable in duration" (12C.J., 1078). The true
test, therefore, of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute
lies in the determination of the period of a suspension of the
remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.
One of the arguments advanced against the validity of the
moratorium law is the fact that it impairs the obligation of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. This
argument, however does not now hold water. While this may
be conceded, it is however justified as a valid exercise by the
State of its police power. The leading case on the matter is
Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.,

398, decide by the Supreme Court of the United States on

January 8, 1934. Here appellant contested the validity of
charter 339 of the laws of Minnesota of 1993, approved April
13, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as
being repugnant to the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution. The statute was sustained by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota as an emergency measure. "Although coceding
that the obligations of the mortgage contract was impaired, the
court decided that what it thus described as an impairment
was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution, within the police power of the State as that power
was called into exercise by the public economic emergency
which the legislative had found to exist". This theory was upheld by the Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice
Hughes, the court made the following pronouncements:
Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the
measure of control which the State retains over
remedial processes, but the State also continues to
possess authority to safeguard the vital interest of its
people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate
to that end "has the result of modifying or abrogating
contracts already in effect." . . . . Not only are existing
laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy
of protecting contracts against impairement
presupposes the maintenance of a government by
virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a
government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society. This
principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition
with the necessary residuum of state power has had
progressive recognition in the decision of this Court.
xxxxxxxxx
The economic interests of the State may justify the
exercise of its continuing and dominant protective
power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .
xxxxxxxxx
Similarly, where the protective power of the State is
exercised in a manner otherwise appropriate in the
regulation of a business it is no objection that the
performance of existing contracts may be frustrated
by the prohibition of injurious practices. . . .
. . . . The question is not whether the legislative action
affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly,
but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are
reasonable and appropriate to that end.
xxxxxxxxx
Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power
must be consistent with the fair intent of the
constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved
power cannot be construed to destroy the limitation to
be construed so as to destroy the reserved power in
its essential aspects. They must be construed to
harmony with each other. This principle precludes a
construction which would permit the State to adopt as
its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of

!66
contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. But
it does not follow that conditions may not arise in
which a temporary restraint of enforcement may be
consistent with the spirit and purpose of the
constitutional provision and thus be found to be within
the range of the reserved power of the state to protect
the vital interests of the community. It cannot be
maintained that the constitutional prohibition should
be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary
interpositions with respect to the enforcement of
contracts if made necessary by great public calamity
such as fire, flood, or earthquake. See American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 55 L. ed. 82, 31 S. Ct.
200. The reservation of state power appropriate to
such extraordinary conditions may be deemed to be
as much a part of all contracts, as is the reservation of
state power to protect the public interest in the other
situation to which we have referred. And if state power
exists to give temporary relief from the enforcement of
contracts in the present of disasters due to physical
causes such as fire, flood or earthquake, that power
cannot be said to be nonexistent when the urgent
public need demanding such relief is produced by
other and economic causes (78 L.ed. 426, 428-429.)
This decision elicited several comments. One came from the
Harvard Law Review. It said: "Forsaking its well-trodden of the
new mortgage moratory laws meet its scrutiny, and in so doing
announced an elastic concept of the contract clause which, if
not newly formulated, at least received such unequivocal
expression that it bids fair to revolutionize a tradition of
constitutional interpretation. . . . The court rested its decision
on the ground that laws altering existing contracts constitute an
impairment within the meaning of the contract clause only if
they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances
occasioning their enactment. Application of this 'rule of reason
was justified on the theory that all contracts are made subject
to an implied reservation of the protective power of the state,
and that therefore statutes which validly exercise this reserved
power, rather than impairing the obligations of an existing
contract, are comprehended within them" (47 Harvard Law
Review, pp. 660, 661-662).
But the ruling in the Blaisdell case has its limitations which
should not be overlooked in the determination of the extent to
be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon the
enforcement of a monetary obligation. It must be noted that the
application of the reserved power of the State to protect the
integrity of the government and the security of the people
should be limited to its proper bounds and must be addressed
to a legitimate purpose. If these bounds are transgressed,
there is no room for the exercise of the power, for the
constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts
would assert itself. We can cite instances by which these
bounds may be transgressed. One of them is that the
impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a
substantive right. The State may postpone the enforcement of
the obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy futile
(W.B. Worthen Co.vs. Kavanaugh, 79 L.ed. 1298, 1301-1303).
Another limitation refers to the propriety of the remedy. The
rule requires that the alteration or change that the new
legislation desires to write into an existing contract must not be
burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the

remedy hardly pursuing (Bronsonvs.Kinziel, I How, 311, 317;

46 Har. Law Review, p. 1070). In other words, the Blaisdell
case postulates that the protective power of the State, the
police power, may only be invoked and justified by an
emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be exercised
upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the
constitutional provision against impairment of contracts (First
Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith 277 N.W., pp. 762, 769). As
justice Cardozo aptly said, "A different situation is presented
when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a
shadow . . . The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid
are to be viewed in combination, with the cumulative
significance that each imparts to all. So viewed they are seen
to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all
the incidents that give attractiveness and value to collateral
security (W.B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 62). In
fine, the decision in the Blaisdell case is predicated on the
ground that the laws altering existing contracts will constitute
an impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if
they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances
occasioning their enactment (47 Harvard Law Review, p. 660).
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8)
years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a
monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and
who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the
Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the
present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief
to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages
of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the
Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that
said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of
eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by
the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to
afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves by giving them a reasonabled time within which to
pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized buy their creditors. While it is admitted in said law
that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to
normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered
the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy
that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in
force (section 1).
But we should not lost sight of the fact that these obligations
had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of
Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford
them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain
languaged means that the creditors would have to observe a
vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This
period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. while the
purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended,
the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect
collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits
are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under
the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during
the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United

!67
States (Home Building and Loan Association vs.
Blaisdell,supra).
There are at least three cases where the Supreme Court of the
United States declared the moratorium laws violative of the
contract clause of the constitution because the period granted
to debtors as a relief was found unwarranted by the
contemplated emergency. One of them is W. B. Worthen
Co. vs. Thomas, 292 U. S., 426-435; 78 L. ed., 1344, 1347.
Here the Legislature of Arkansas passed na act providing for
an exemption, "without limitation as to amount or restriction
with respect to particular circumstances or relations, of all
moneys paid or payable to any resident of the state under any
life, sick, accident or disability insurance policy, from liability for
the payment of the debts of the recipient", and an attempt was
made to apply the statute to debts owing before its approval.
The court held that "such an exemption, applied in the case of
debts owing before the exemption was created by the
legislature, constitutes an unwarranted interference with the
obligation of contracts in violation of the constitutional
provision", and cannot be sustained even as emergency
legislation, because it contains no limitation as to time, amount,
circumstances or need (supra, 292 U. S., pp. 426-432).
The other case is W. B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh (supra). Here
certain Municipal Improvement Districts organized under the
laws of Arkansas were empowered to issue bonds and to
mortgage benefit assessments as security therefor. One of
these districts acted upon the powers thus conferred. Some of
the bonds were in default for nonpayment of principal and
interest. So an action was brought by the bond-holders to
foreclose the assessment upon the lots of delinquent owners.
These bonds and mortgages were executed under the statutes
then in force. Later the legislature of Arkansas passed three
acts making changes in the remedies available under the
former statutes, which changes were attacked as an
unconstitutional impairment of contracts. The court sustained
this view holding that the "changes in the remedies available
for the enforcement of a mortgage may not, even when the
public welfare is invoked as an excuse, be pressed so far as to
cut down the security of a mortgage without moderation or
reason or in a spirit of oppression. . . . A State is free to
regulate the procedure in its courts even with reference to
contracts already made, and moderate extensions of the time
for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall within the power so
reversed; by a different situation is presented when extensions
are so piled up to make the remedy a shadow."
The third case is Louisville joint Stock Land Bank vs. Radford,
295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed 1593. This case presented for decision
the question whether subsection (s) added to section 75 of the
Bankruptcy Act by the Frazier-Lemke Act, June 28, 1934, chap.
869, 48 Stat. at L. 1289 U. S. C. title 11, sec. 203, is consistent
with the Federal Constitution. The court said that it is
unconstitutional if applied to farm mortgages already existing,
holding that "property rights of holders of farm mortgages are
unconstitutionally taken, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, by
a statute (Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75(s) Frazier-Lemke Act of
June 28, 1934, chap. 869, 48 Stat. at L. 1286) applicable only
to debts existing at the time of its enactment which provides
that a farmer whose farm is mortgaged, and who has failed to
obtain the consents necessary to a composition under the
Bankruptcy Act, may, upon being adjudged a bankrupt, if the
mortgagee assents, purchase the mortgaged property at its

them appraised value by agreeing to make deferred payments

of stated percentages of the appraised value over a period of
six years, with interests at 1 per cent per annum, or, if the
mortgagee refuses his assent to such purchase, may obtain a
stay of all proceedings for a period of five years, during which
he shall retain possession of all or any part of his property,
under the control of the court, provided he pays a reasonable
rental therefor, and that at the end of five years he may pay
into court the appraised price thereof, or, if a lien holder shall
request a reappraisal by the court, the reappraised price,
whereupon the court shall, by an order, turn over full
possession and title of the property to the debtor, and he may
apply for his discharge."
In addition, we may cite leading state court decisions which
practically involved the same ruling and which reflect the
tendency of the courts towards legislation involving
modification of mortgage or monetary contracts which contains
provisions that are deemed unreasonable or oppressive. Some
of those which may be deemed representative follows:
1. Pouquettevs. O'Brien, 100 Pac. 2nd series, 979 (1940). The
Supreme Court of Arizona held unconstitutional a 1937 statute
authorizing courts to extend for a period of not longer than two
years all actions or foreclosures of real estate mortgages, and
a 1939 statutes authorizing the courts to extend foreclosure
proceedings not later than March 4, 1941.
2. First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicagovs. Adolph Arp
et al., 283 N.W. 441, 120 A.L.R. 932 (1939). The Supreme
Court of Iowa declared unconstitutional the Moratorium Acts
enacted in 1933, 1935 and 1937, providing for extension of the
1933 Moratorium Act covering a period of six years.
3. First Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith et al., 227 N.W. 762
(1938). The Supreme Court of Nebraska declared
unconstitutional the Nebraska Moratorium Law as reenacted,
extending the benefit of the remedy to a period of six years, as
being repugnant to the contract clause of the Constitution.
4. Milkint vs. McNeely, Clerk of court, et al., 169 S.E. 790
(1933). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
declared unconstitutional certain acts of legislature enacted in
1932, extending the period of redemption three years beyond
the one-year period then allowed by statute, being an
impairment of contract as to sales made prior to enactment
thereof.
5. Haynes vs. Treadway, 65 Pac. 892 (1901). The Supreme
Court of California declared unconstitutional a statute which
extends the right of redemption from six months twelve months
being a substantial impairment of the obligation contracts if
applied to a mortgage already executed.
6. Swinburne vs. Mills, 50 Pac. 489 (1879). The Supreme
Court of Washington declared a statute unconstitutional in so
far as it provides that, on a decree for foreclosure of a
mortgage executed before the act was passed, the debtor shall
be entitled to have the order of sale stayed for one year, as
being an impairment of the obligation of contract.
These cases apply with added force in this jurisdiction
considering the conditions no prevailing in our country. We do
not need to go far to appreciate this situation. We can see it
and feel it as we gaze around to observe the wave of
reconstruction and rehabilitation that has swept the country
since liberation thanks to the aid of America and the innate

!68
progressive spirit of our people. This aid and this spirit have
worked wonders in so short a time that it can now be safely
stated that in the main the financial condition of our country
and our people, individually and collectively, has practically
returned to normal notwithstanding occasional reverses
caused by local dissidence and the sporadic disturbance of
peace and order in our midst. Business, industry and
agriculture have picked up and developed at such stride that
we can say that we are now well on the road to recovery and
progress. This is so not only as far as our observation and
knowledge are capable to take note and comprehend but also
because of the official pronouncements made by our Chief
Executive in public addresses and in several messages he
submitted to Congress on the general state of the nation. To
bear this out, it would suffice for us to state some of those
public statements which we deem to be most expressive and
representative of the general situation. We quote:
We have balanced our national budget. We shall
again have at the end of the current fiscal year a
sizeable surplus. . . .
We have greatly improved the economic and financial
conditions of the country. Through the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, loans amounting to
P90,480,136 have been granted for the recontruction
and rehabilitation purposes. . . .
We have set up the Central bank to expand our credit,
stabilize our currency and provide a new source of
financing for the agricultural and industrial
development of the nation.
xxxxxxxxx
. . . The commitment thus far made is not only a
favorable sign ushering in finally the implementation
of our plans of economic development, but a
significantly successful test of the solvency of our
foreign credit, for it was accepted only after a
thorough examination of our resources and
development plans by a board of economists of
international authority (Pres. Quirino's "State-of-theNation" Message of the Joint Session of Congress on
Jan. 24, 1949, 45 Off. Gaz., Ja., 1949).
We have strengthened, . . . our internal and external
finances. Six years ago, we were a country prostrate
from the destruction of war. . . . today, we can say that
our people not only have returned to their prewar
activities, but . . . have progressed and prospered far
beyond what they ever dreamed of before the war.
. . . Three years ago the national income stood at four
billion pesos; today it is over seven billion pesos. . . .
The government income has been steadily rising from
60 million pesos in 1946 to approximately 600 million
pesos today, also a progress in six years.
xxxxxxxxx
. . . The ravages of war are fast disappearing, and
instead, what beautiful vistas unfold themselves
before our eyes at this moment in our immediate
surroundings. Compare this beautiful view with that of
the past and all that we have accomplished in
scarcely six years of struggle, sacrifice, determination,

and bold decision. (Applause.) We have brought this

nation out of the paralysis of destruction into
economic normalcy and financial stability. . . .
. . . Our external finances have greatly improved,
and . . . our pesos is one of the most stable
currencies in the world today. (Applause.)I repeat, our
pesos is one of the most stable currencies in the
world today.
All these find grateful reflection in a better-sheltered,
better-clothed, better-fed, and healthier population
that has grown from 18 million to 20 million in a half
dozen years, in a school enrollment that has doubled
since the outbreak of the last war from less than 2
million to over 4 million young students in the public
schools, and in democratic processes that are gaining
in vigor and permanence with each passing
year" (Address of his Excellency Quirino, President of
the Philippines, on the occasion of the celebration of
the sixth anniversary of the independence of the
Philippines, July 4, 1952, Luneta, Manila, 48 Off.
Gaz., pp. 3287-3289).
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with
what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice,
fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to
us under the present circumstances is to declare that the
continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342
at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the
same should be declared null and void and without effect. And
what we say here with respect to said Act also holds true as
regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps with
greater force and reason as to the latter, considering that said
Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as
regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of
monetary obligations. And there is need to make this
pronouncement in view of the revival clause embodied in said
Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional or invalid.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from will be reversed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P4,800 with interest thereon at the rate
of 7 per cent annum from August 27, 1942, until its full
payment, plus 12 per cent as attorney's fees. Failure to pay
this judgment as stated, the properties mortgaged will be sold
at public auction and the proceeds applied to its payment in
accordance with law. So ordered.