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Changed variables, same equation

Updated: Apr 27, 2015 10:42 AM , By Rakesh Sood | 9 comments

Rakesh Sood.

Though no stranger to India, Ashraf Ghani will now be under scrutiny for what he says about how
he visualises India-Afghanistan relations. He will be engaging with a new Indian leadership that
has displayed no anxiety about the fact that he waited for six months before visiting New Delhi
The Afghanistan President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, will be in India this week, beginning today, on
his first official visit here. There has been speculation about the fact that he is visiting New
Delhi after having made, ever since assuming office in late September 2014, two visits in
the region, namely to China (October 2014) and also to Pakistan (November 2014), and then
to the United Kingdom (December 2014), Saudi Arabia (March 2015), and the United States
(March 2015). Therefore, this delay sends out its own message about a reprioritisation in
Afghanistans foreign policy calculus about relations with India. It marks a sharp contrast
to the kind of warmth that his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, displayed towards India and the
comfort levels that he enjoyed with the Indian leadership, cutting across party lines.
Afghanistans first Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed with India in 2011 and was
supported across the board in the Afghan Parliament at the time of ratification. While Dr.
Ghani is no stranger to India, this time around he will be under scrutiny for what he says
about how he visualises India-Afghanistan relations and, equally, what questions he
chooses to sidestep. He will do well to keep in mind that he is engaging with a new Indian
leadership which has adopted a more robust and active foreign policy posture and
displayed no anxiety about the fact that he waited for six months before visiting New Delhi.
Read: In step with Ghanis Afghanistan
Trajectory of violence
Incidentally, Mr. Karzai also had his share of ups and downs with India. In the early years,
he tried hard to build relations with Pakistan, confident that the U.S. would back him in this
effort but became disillusioned when he discovered that it had no stomach for reining
Pakistan in, even after realising that the growing Taliban insurgency had its roots across

the border. The first Presidential election in Afghanistan in 2004 passed off peacefully
because U.S. President George Bush had virtually read out the riot act to General Pervez
Musharraf, ensuring Pakistans cooperation in controlling the border. But after October
2005, when the parliamentary elections were over, it was as if a tap had been turned on
with the number of suicide attacks and improvised explosive device (IED) blasts
skyrocketing. Between 2001 and October 2005, there had been four suicide attacks in
Afghanistan; the figure jumped to 15 during the last quarter of 2005. As Gen. Musharraf
candidly acknowledged in an interview a couple of months ago, Pakistans Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) was supporting the Taliban in its efforts to destabilise Mr. Karzais
government. Such was Gen. Musharrafs paranoia about Indias role in Afghanistan that he
once told Mr. Karzai during an official meeting that India was running more than 25
consulates in Afghanistan! Gen. Musharraf, and subsequently former Chief of Army Staff
Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would demand evidence from Afghanistan every time Mr. Karzai
complained about the activities of the Quetta and Peshawar shuras or the Haqqani group
(led by Sirajuddin Haqqani); a charade that only ended after Osama bin Laden was killed in
Abbottabad in 2011.
Read: Slew of pacts under discussion ahead of Ghani visit
Internal pressures
As violence levels rose in Afghanistan, so did Western casualties. Gradually, the nature of
the Pakistan Armys double game became apparent, but by this time, Western countries
had lost the appetite for their Afghan engagement and were seeking an exit. Mr. Karzai
foresaw this as early as 2007. He also realised that this would leave Afghanistan at the
mercy of the ISIs manipulations and concluded that he had to engage the Taliban in a
peace process. Initially, the U.S. was opposed to the idea but Mr. Karzai went ahead with
the setting up of the High Peace Council in 2010. He persuaded former Afghan President
Burhanuddin Rabbani to chair it. The Council did not achieve much and the following year,
Rabbani was killed in a Taliban suicide attack. Mr. Karzai wanted to control the peace
process, and through the Council tried to wean away some of the Taliban commanders, but
the ISI stranglehold proved to be too strong. Eventually, when the U.S. put its weight behind
opening the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, to promote reconciliation, it came to the same
conclusion and the process has remained stillborn.
Read: Indias Afghan dilemma
Unlike his predecessor, Dr. Ghani is more of a technocrat rather than a politician. As
Finance Minister during President Karzais first term, Dr. Ghani conceptualised the National
Solidarity Programme (NSP), a local community-led development programme. Incidentally,
this highly successful scheme was ably implemented by Mohammad Hanif Atmar who is
now Dr. Ghanis National Security Adviser. Unlike Mr. Karzai who could spend hours
interacting closely with tribal leaders, Dr. Ghani is more at home with policy wonks, graphs
and power point displays and hardly tolerates dissent. Second, he is a man in a hurry. He
knows that his election was a contested one. His legitimacy rests on the tenuous
compromise of a National Unity Government, backed by the U.S.s heavy diplomatic lifting,
with presidential candidate Dr. Abdullah Abdullah reluctantly accepting the newly created
post of a Chief Executive Officer. On September 21, 2014, the Independent Election
Commission of Afghanistan had merely announced the end of the election process and
declared Dr. Ghani the President but voting results were withheld with no mention being
made about the internationally monitored comprehensive audit of all the ballots. Power
sharing between the President and the CEO has not happened leading to strains within the
political system and delaying cabinet formation and crucial administrative appointments.

This is why both leaders undertook a joint visit to the U.S. last month. Dr. Ghani also
realises that the U.S. is headed for elections in 2016 and while he was able to persuade
U.S. President Barack Obama to maintain the current U.S. troop presence of nearly 10,000
till end-2016, there is uncertainty about the U.S. and Western role and commitment, post2016.
Dr. Ghani is under pressure to conclude a peace process with the Taliban and get some
investment into the Afghan economy so that economic growth, which has declined from
nine per cent annually, during the last decade, to two per cent is resumed. He is all too
aware of Pakistans ability to play the role of spoiler and has tried hard to start on a clean
slate with Pakistan. To demonstrate his goodwill, he made it a point to call on Gen. Raheel
Sharif at the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, in 2014, in a notable departure from
protocol. In December last year, Latif Mehsud, a senior Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
commander, who was held in Bagram, Afghanistan, was handed over to the Pakistani
authorities. TTP infiltration across the Durand Line has been blocked by strengthening
Afghan Army deployments in provinces like Kunar and Nuristan. Also, for the first time, six
Afghan cadets are training at the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul. But, so far, there is
little to show for it. The Taliban has launched the spring offensive by declaring its
Operation Azm. A deadly suicide attack in Jalalabad, Pakistan, claimed more than 30
civilian lives on April 18. On April 10, an Afghan Army outpost in Badakhshan was overrun
by militants who beheaded eight soldiers. The brutality has led to speculation about
whether these incidents might be the handiwork of the Islamic State (IS) making forays into
the Afghan theatre or by yet another militant group incubated in the AfPak nursery under a
different name.
Looking to China
In addition to wooing the Pakistan Army, Dr. Ghani is also trying to get China to invest in
Afghanistans reconstruction. Given the uncertainty about sustained Western financial
support, if the Chinese can be tempted to invest as part of the One Belt, One Road
initiative, it could even generate pressure on the ISI to enable a meaningful peace process
with the Taliban to move forward. The announcements made during Chinese President Xi
Jinpings recent visit to Pakistan, in April, about projects worth $46 billion being launched
around the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, coupled with Gen. Sharifs statement that a
dedicated division could be raised to ensure security for the Chinese-aided projects would
have sounded encouraging to Dr. Ghani.
Engaging with India
India need not feel unduly concerned about Dr. Ghani testing his Pakistan-China project.
This does not diminish the wealth of goodwill built up over the past decade with all sections
of the Afghan community covering countrywide economic cooperation projects,
infrastructure, health, nutrition, institution building, human resource development and
industry. This cooperation should be expanded provided security is managed. Dr. Ghanis
desire not to purchase military hardware from India is not a rebuff, for Indias capabilities to
provide lethal military hardware are extremely limited. Instead, we should urge Dr. Ghani to
use his influence to open up transit through Pakistan for India-Afghan trade so that Afghan
farmers can rediscover their traditional markets for fruit and dry fruits. Today, the Afghan
Pakistan Transit and Trade Agreement (APTTA) is seen as a barrier because of delays at
the borders, restrictions on vehicles, and Afghan trucks having to return empty as they are
barred from picking up Indian goods! At the same time, India needs to accelerate the
expansion of the Chabahar port on the Iranian coast which provides an alternative route to
Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Even as Dr. Ghani clears the air about his agenda, India should wish him well, for as a proud
Pashtun, and as a proud Afghan, he understands that India is a strategic partner because
we share the same vision of a stable, united, independent and democratic Afghanistan
where all its ethnic groups live and prosper together.
* The article has been corrected for a factual error.
(Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat who has served as Ambassador to Afghanistan. E-mail:
rakeshsood2001@yahoo.com)

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