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FLORO V LLENADO

Facts:
Simeon Floro owned a piece of land known as Floro Park Subdivision situated in Barangay
Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It has its own egress and ingress to and from the McArthur
Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. Orlando A. Llenado, on the
other hand, was the registered owner of two parcels of land known as the Llenado Homes.
Prior to its purchase by Llenado from Francisco de Castro, the land was known as the
Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, duly licensed and registered subdivision in the name of Soledad
Ortega. Bounded on the South by Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park
subdivision, and on the west by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo, Montaos and Guevarra,
the Llenado Homes does not have existing road or passage to McArthur Highway. However, a
proposed access road traversing the idle Riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically
provided in the subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes, which was duly approved by the defunct
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission.
Llenados were permitted by Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park as a passage to
and from McArthur Highway. However, Floro later barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks,
wooden posts and adobe stones, preventing its use by Llenado. Llenado filed a complaint for
easement of Right of Way. During pendency of case, Orlando Llenado died and was substituted
by his wife, Wenifreda. Trial court dismissed the case for lack of merit. CA set aside the decision
of trial court.
Issues:
1. ) Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?
Held: It is not disputed that Floro granted the Llenados verbal permission to pass through Floro
Park. No such contract of easement of right of way was perfected. Citing Dionisio v Ortiz, the
use of Road Lot 4 and 5 by Llenados during the month of March was by mere tolerance of Floro
pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right of way. Although such use was
in anticipation of a voluntary easement of right of way, no such contract as validly entered into
by reason of the failure of the parties to agree on its terms and conditions. Thus, Llenados
cannot claim entitlement to a right of way through Floro Park on the basis of voluntary
easement.
2.) W/N they are entitled to compulsory servitude of right of way?
Preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of NCC:
a. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway
b. After payment of proper indemnity
c. That the isolation was not due to acts of proprietor of the dominant estate

d. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate
The burden of proving these pre-conditions lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
First precondition is not met since there is an existing right of way over the Ipapo Property.
Payment of proper indemnity was also not proven since there the complaint by Llenado did not
contain fixing of amount that he must pay to Floro in the event the easement of right of way be
constituted. Also, third requisite has not been met.
Moreover, in order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real,
not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what
is required by lawas the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same should not be imposed.
This easement can also be established foe the benefit of tenement with an inadequate outlet,
but not when outlet is merely inconvenient.

QUIMEN V CA
Facts:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property
equally among themselves with the share of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the
municipal road. Anastacias was located at the extreme left, bounded on the right by property of
Sotero. Adjoining Soteros were Rufinas and Suplicios, but latter was acquired by certain
Catalina Santos. Behind lots of Anastacia and Sotero is Antonios which was later divided into
two. One of these was purchased by Yolanda from her uncle Antonio through her aunt
Anastacia, who was then acting as his administratix. At first Yolanda was hesitant to buy the
same because it had no access to public road but Anastacia prevailed upon her to but the lot,
with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200 per
square meter. Yolanda constructed a house on the lot using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of Anastacias. But when finally Yolanda offered to pay for the use of pathway,
Anastacia refused to accept the payment and barred Yolanda from passing through her
property.
Yolanda later purchased other lot of Antonio located directly behind the property of her parents
who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about 19 m from
Yolandas lot behind the sari-sari store of Satero, and Anastacias perimeter fence. Although the
pathway leads to municipal road, it is not adequate for ingress and egress because the store
obstructs the pathway. Yolanda filed an action for right of way. Trial court dismissed the
complaint but it was reversed by CA.
Issue: Which right of way should be granted?
Held: The conditions sine qua non for the grant of the easement of right of way are:
a. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway
b. After payment of proper indemnity
c. That the isolation was not due to acts of proprietor of the dominant estate
d. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate
Applying Art 650 of NCC, the proposed right of way of Yolanda was the least prejudicial as
compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolandas father which would mean
destroying the sari-sari store of strong materials.