PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN

Petition for CERTIORARI, filed by the OSG,

praying for the nullification ad setting
aside CAs decision.
Petitioner: Republic thru OSG
Private Complainant: Virginia MALOLOS
Respondent: Ma. Theresa PANGILINAN
Case: Estafa and Violation of B.P. 22
FACTS:
On Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed an
affidavit-complaint
for
Estafa
and
violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City.
Complaint alleges that Pangilinan
issued 9 checks with an aggregate
ampint of P9,658,592.00 in favor of
Malolos which were dishonored
upon presentment for payment.
On Dec. 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil
case for ACCOUNTING, RECOVERY OF
COMMERCIAL
DOCUMENTS,
ENFORCEABILITY AND EFFECTIVITY OF
CCONTRACT,
and
SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE against Malolos before
RTC of Valenzuela City.
5 days thereafter, Pangilinan filed a
Petition to suspend Proceedings on the
Ground of Prejudicial Question before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of QC, citing
as basis the pendency of the civil action
she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On March 2, 1998, Asst. City Prosecutor
RUBEN CATUBAY recommended the
suspension of the criminal proceedings
pending the outcome of the civil action.
The recommendation was approved by
the City Prosecutor of QC.
Aggrieved, Malolos raised the matter
before the DOJ. Secretary of Justice
SERAFIN
P.
CUEVAS
reversed
the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of QC
and ordered the filing of information for
violation of BP 22 against Respondent.
Consequently, 2 counts of violation of BP
22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed
against Pangilinan on February 3, 2000

before the Office of the Clerk of Court,

MeTC of QC.
The cases were raffled to MeTC,
Branch 31 on June 7, 2000.
On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an
Omnibus
Motion
to
Quash
the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch
31m QC.
Pangilinan alleged that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by
reason of prescription.
Presiding Judge of MeTC, Br. 31, QC
granted the motion.
On Oct. 26, 2000, Malolos filed a notice of
appeal and cases were raffled to RTC, Br.
218, QC. The Presiding Judge of RTC Br.
218 of QC reversed the order of the MeTC
Br. 31 of QC.
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision,
respondent filed with SC a petition for
review on certiorari.. SC referred the
petition to CA for appropriate action.
CA reversed the Decision of RTC Br.
218 of QC, thereby dismissing the
Criminal Cases for the reason that
the cases for violation of BP 22 had
already prescribed.
ARGUMENTS
According to OSG, while it admits that Act
No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585
and further amended by Act No. 3763,
governs the period of prescription for
violations of special laws, it is the
institution of criminal actions, whether
filed with the court or with the Office of
the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the
period of prescription of the offense
charged.
The filing of the complaint-affidavit
by Malolos on Sept. 16, 1997 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of
QC effectively interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period
of the subject BP22 cases,
CA erred in its decision when it relied on
the doctrine laid down by this court in the
case of Zaldivia vs Reyes, Jr. that the filing
of the complaint with the Office of the

City Prosecutor is not the judicial

proceeding that could have interrupted
the period of prescription.
In catena of cases, SC ruled that the filing
of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for
Preliminary Investigation suspends the
running of prescriptive period.
The filing of the information with
the MeTC of QC on Feb. 3, 2000
was still within the allowable period
of 4 years within which to file the
criminal cases for violation of BP 22
in accordance with Act No. 3326, as
amended.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
Respondent reiterates the ruling of CA
that the filing of the complaint before the
City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt
the running of the prescriptive period
considering that the offense charged is a
violation of a special law..
Pangilinan claims that the cases relied
upon by the petitioner involved felonies
punishable under RPC and therefore
covered by Art. 91 of RPC and Sec. 1, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Respondent pointed out that the
crime imputed against her is for
violation of BP 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as
such, is governed by Act No. 3326,
as amended.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the affidavitcomplaint for estafa and violation of BP
22 against Pangilinan with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of QC on Sept. 16,
1997
interrupted
the
period
of
prescription of such offense..
SC RULING:
ACT No. 3326, An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin, as
amended, is the law applicable to BP 22
cases.
Sec. 1 (b) after 4 years for those
punished by imprisonment for

more than 1 month, but less than 2

years.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings
for
its
investigation
and
punishment.
The
prescription
shall
be
interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
BP 22
- Special law
- Imposes a penalty of imprisonment of
not less than 30 days but not more
than 1 year or by a fine for its
violation
- Therefore prescribes in 4 years in
accordance with Act 3326, Sec 1.
Running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the
institution of proceedings against the
guilty person.
In Re Pangilinans contention that a
different rule should be applied to cases
involving special laws:
There is no more distinction
between cases under the RPC and
those covered by special laws with
respect to the interruption of the
period of prescription.
As can be averred from the facts of the
case, it was the respondents own motion
for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated
on her civil case that caused the filing in
court of the 1997 initiated proceedings
only in 2000.
As laid down in the case of Olarte, it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the
right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control. The
only thing the offended must do to initiate
the prosecution of the offender is to file
the requisite complaint.

CA Decision is reversed and set aside.

DOJ is ordered to re-file the information
for violation of BP 22 against the
respondent.

absent spouse has been declared

presumptively dead by means of a
judgment
rendered
in
the
proper
proceedings.
~ Carries with it the imposable penalty of
prision mayor (afflictive penalty)
~ Prescribes in 15 years.
~ The 15 year prescriptive period
commences to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents.
FACTS:
On May 26, 1992, Sermonia was charged
with Bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City,
Br. 151, for contracting marriage with
Unson on Feb. 15, 1975 while his prior
marriage to Niviera remained valid and
subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information
on the ground that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been extinguished by
prescription.
Respondent judge denied the
motion to quash and likewise
denied the motion to reconsider his
order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the orders before
CA but his petition was dismissed.
COURT OF APPEALS

SERMONIA VS COURT OF APPELAS

Petitioner: Jose C. Sermonia
First Wife: Virginia C. Niviera
Second Wife: Ma. Lourdes Unson
Case: Bigamy
BIGAMY
~ an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the

The principle of constructive notice

should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into by the
offender in secrecy from the spouse of
the previous subsisting marriage, Also, a
bigamous marriage is generally entered
into in a place where the offender is not
known to be still a married person, in
order to conceal his legal impediment to
contract another marriage.
Considering such concealment of the
bigamous marriage by the offender, if the
prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy were to be counted from the date
of registration thereof, the prosecution of
the violators of the said offense would

almost be impossible. The interpretation

urged by the petitioner would encourage
fearless violations of a social institution
cherished and protected by law.
ARGUMENTS
1. His criminal liability for bigamy has
been obliterated by prescription.
He avers that since the 2 nd
marriage contract was duly
registered with the Office of the
Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact
of registration makes it a matter
of public record and thus
constitutes notice to the whole
world.
The
offended
party
therefore is considered to have
had constructive notice of the
subsequent marriage as of 1975;
hence, prescription commenced
to run on the day the marriage
contract was registered. For this
reason,
the
corresponding
information for bigamy should
have been filed on or before 1990
and not only in 1992.
2. The second marriage was publicly
held at Our Lady of Nativity Church
in Marikina on Feb. 15, 1975, and
adding for good measure that from
the moment of registration the
marriage contract was open to
inspection
by
any
interested
person.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
1. Maintains that the prescriptive
period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from
the
time
of
discovery
by
complainant which was in July
1991.
SC RULING:
Agree with the view expounded by CA
that constructive notice cannot apply in
the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the
possibility of its being more favorable to
the accused.
The rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or
verification of the marriages listed in the

National Census Office and in various

local civil registries all over the country to
make certain that no second or even third
marriage has been contracted without the
knowledge of the legitimate spouse.
In re no concealment: The Court cannot
go along his argument because why did
he indicate in the marriage contract that
he was single thus obviously hiding his
true status as a married man? Or for that
matter, why did he not simply tell his first
wife about the subsequent marriage in
Marikina so that everything would be out
in the open. The answer is obvious: He
knew that no priest or minister would
knowingly perform or authorize a
bigamous marriage as this would subject
him to punishment under the Marriage
Law.
Obviously, petitioner has no intention of
revealing his duplicity to his first spouse
and gambled instead on the probability
that she or any third party would ever go
to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the
meantime, though the simple expedience
of having the 2nd marriage recorded in the
local civil registry, he has set into motion
the running of the 15 year prescriptive
period against the unwary and the
unsuspecting victims of philandering.
To adhere to the contentions of petitioner
would amount to equating the contract of
marriage
with
ordinary
deeds
of
conveyance and other similar documents
without due regard for the stability of
marriage
as
an
inviolable
social
institution, the preservation of which is a
primary concern of our society.
Decision of CA is affirmed.

PEOPLE VS TAGANNA
Respondent: Remegio TAGANNA
Private complainant: Maria C TAGANNA
(daughter)
CASE: 2 counts of crime
RTC, Br. 30, Basey Samar convicted
of 2 counts of rape and meted 2 death
sentences.
FACTS:
At midnight of June 15, 1997, Maria
Taganna, a 28y/o widow, was in bed
beside her
children and a younger
brother who were sound asleep.
Without prior notice, respondent Taganna
went up their house and entered the
room where they were sleeping, forthwith
lasciviously embraced Maria who could
not bear the loathsome of her fathers
advances. It did not take to long for his
fathers organ to enter her vagina. After
gratifying his lust, accused-appellant
walked away as if nothing happened.
Did not report it immediately because she
became pregnant. She also testified that
she had a miscarriage 3 months into her
pregnancy.
According to Maria, that incident was not
the first time she was molested by her
father, She was in her early teens when
her father first shattered her innocence.
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