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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11390
CIVIL PROCEDURE
the clerk's office, as the receipt purports to show that the letter
emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First
Instance; and the defendant not having appeared, judgment
was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July
3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this
decision it was recited that publication had been properly made
in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having
been given mail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the
indebtedness of the defendant amounted to P249,355. 32, with
interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that
the defendant should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver said
amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction
of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure
of the defendant to satisfy the judgment within such period, the
mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be
exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said order
was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the
sale of the property. The sale took place upon July 30, 1908,
and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of
P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the
court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the
precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion was made in this cause
by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco,
wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order
of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July
3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto.
The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself,
was that the order of default and the judgment rendered
thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the
judgment was denied, and from this action of the court Vicente
Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
has appealed. No other feature of the case is here under
consideration than such as related to the action of the court
upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be
discussed in what appears to be the sequence of most
convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we
shall, for the purpose of argument, assume that the clerk of the
Court of First Instance did not obey the order of the court in the
matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to
the defendant in Amoy; and in this connection we shall consider,
first, whether the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to
enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and,
secondly, whether those proceedings were conducted in such
manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising
judicial power, is used in several different, though related,
senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the
court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a
particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court
over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to
the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the
nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it
may entertain and the relief it may grant.
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proof that the clerk of the court failed in his duty and that,
instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail,
he relied upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that
this is by any means a necessary inference. Of course if it had
affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to
comply with this order and had directed the notification to
Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this would be
conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of
the order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the
attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the
defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very
slight basis for supposing that the clerk may not have sent
notice to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that
when the record states the evidence or makes an averment with
reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that
there was other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that
the fact was otherwise than stated. If, to give an illustration, it
appears from the return of the officer that the summons was
served at a particular place or in a particular manner, it will not
be presumed that service was also made at another place or in a
different manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a
person other than the defendant, it will not be presumed, in the
silence of the record, that it was made upon the defendant also
(Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97
U. S., 444, 449). While we believe that these propositions are
entirely correct as applied to the case where the person making
the return is the officer who is by law required to make the
return, we do not think that it is properly applicable where, as in
the present case, the affidavit was made by a person who, so far
as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere
intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is
whether a motion in the cause is admissible as a proceeding to
obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the
judgment of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be
set aside, and the litigation will be renewed, proceeding again
from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action had not
been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not ask the
favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His purpose is
merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end
that the litigation may again resume its regular course.
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(Emphasis supplied).
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was
of unsound
mind, unless such
party, after coming
to reason, freely
cohabited with the
other as husband or
wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of
the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is
proof that plaintiff continues to be without
sound reason. The charges in this very
complaint add emphasis to the findings of
the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient,
that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than
in reality, a strong indication of
schizophernia (sic). 5 (Emphasis supplied).
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo
predeceased his mother, the decedent
Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent
paternal grandmother. The decedent died on
1990 without leaving a will. 6
Suntay
Cristina
Isabel's
June 4,
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The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to dismiss at this
juncture is inappropriate." The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal
and special proceedings. 16 The Rules do not only apply to
election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided
for.
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October 2, 2001
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square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the
second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was
registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the
first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the
second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia
Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered
by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT
No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October
1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents
alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through
the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,
acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein
petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and
the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint
that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes
have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher
averred that she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March
1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a
compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that
during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private
respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or
against herein petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano
del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited
by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no
evidence that a separation of property was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements or that there has
been decreed a judicial separation of property
between them, the spouses are prohibited from
entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a
valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law
under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as
such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as
an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia
Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction
to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its
jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in
a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person. XXX
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DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for
review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated April 28, 2000, and
Resolution2 dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed
the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No.
89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and
Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero
Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
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when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.10
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of
an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of
errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is
clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are
not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a)
grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;
(c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of
which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent. 11
In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now
proceed to resolve the merits of the case.
The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the
recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is
undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned
by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime. 12 Before us
are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s)
of the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take
precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.13
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that
the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine
was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals15 where the Court
held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael
Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they
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SO ORDERED.
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GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a
court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and
proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po
Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file
the required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed
a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177,
initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B.
Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint
sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory,
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees,
expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer
in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought
said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to
be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as
docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his
objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge
Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the
order of this Court, the records of said case together with
twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were
transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said
records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled
to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge
Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a
sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in
said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
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judgment
is
hereby
AGUSTIN, E. P. | 23
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(14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that
the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and
determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through
registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but
the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled
that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one
year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro,
this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of
intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the
required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in
Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo
warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates
which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as
provided therefor by law. 10 However, the required docket fees
were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently,
this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed
to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date
when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule
that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a
petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not
applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of
the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate action
for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the
same special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit
and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said
case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the
docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint
sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed
that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper
title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay
monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time
the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral
damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the
costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay
the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was
filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery
of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its
assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct
docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay
P3,104.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint
to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the
amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was
eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages
as the court may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and
the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the
amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
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EN BANC
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, J.:
1
three
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and
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complaints "without prejudice to private respondent Pineda's refiling a similar complaint that complies with Circular No. 7." The
joint petition (a) re-asserted the proposition that because the
complaints had failed to state the amounts being claimed as
actual, moral and nominal damages, the Trial Courts a quo had
not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in questionindeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not have accepted
the complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not
proper merely to expunge the claims for damages and allow "the
so-called cause of action for "reivindicatoria" remain for trial" by
itself. 10
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's
Circular No. 1-88 (effective January 1, 1989). The copies of the
challenged Orders thereto attached 11 were not certified by the
proper Clerk of Court or his duly authorized representative.
Certification was made by the petitioners' counsel, which is not
allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally
important reason. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent Judges in rendering the
Orders complained of or, for that matter, the existence of any
proper cause for the issuance of the writ of mandamus. On the
contrary, the orders appear to have correctly applied the law to
the admitted facts.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being
claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true,
however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery of
sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession
of real property, in the nature of an accion publiciana.
Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is
the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly
arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession,
and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an
action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an
accion plenaria de possesion) or the title thereof, 12 or for
partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage
on, said real property 13 - in other words, a real action-may be
commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for
actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an
action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts." 14 The rule applies regardless of the value of the real
property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or
not, infra. The rule also applies even where the complaint
involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the amount
of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the
Court's jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases e.g.,
actions simply for recovery of money or of personal property, 15
or actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 16 in which the
amount claimed, 17 or the value of the personal property, is
determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal
property or the amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court.
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Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus
be invoked, as the petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal
of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by the
doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v.
Court of appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987), has but limited
application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed.
Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since been clarified
and amplified by the Court's subsequent decision in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al. , G.R. Nos.
79937-38, February 13, 1989.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who
omit from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the
amount of damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no
other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing
fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the
filing fee." The following rules were therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only
in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees
in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amount sought in the amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable
time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been
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is
DISMISSED,
without
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AGUSTIN, E. P. | 29
x 43_
TOTAL ..
P69,756,000.00
(roundoff)
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151242
COURT
JDF
P 69,756,000.00
P 69.606.000.00
- 150,000.00
x .003
69,606,000.00
208,818.00
x .002
+ 450.00
139,212.00
P 209,268.00
+ 150.00
P 139,362.00
LEGAL
:
P139,362.00
+
209,268.00
P348,630.00
x 1% = P3,486.30
P 139,362.00
+
209,268.00
3,486.00
$ 844,674.07
171,120.53
529,189.80
$1,544,984.40
$ 77,249.22
TOTAL ..
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$1,622,233.62
P 352,116.30
AGUSTIN, E. P. | 30
xxx
Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff
in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time within the
expiration of applicable prescription or reglementary period. If
the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant
should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be
considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between
appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the
plaintiff will be considered a lien or (sic) any award he may
obtain in his favor.
As to the second ground relied upon by the defendants, in that a
review of all annexes to the complaint of the plaintiff reveals that
there is not a single formal demand letter for defendants to fulfill
the terms and conditions of the three (3) trust agreements.
In this regard, the court cannot sustain the submission of
defendant. As correctly pointed out by the plaintiff, failure to
make a formal demand for the debtor to pay the plaintiff is not
among the legal grounds for the dismissal of the case. Anyway,
in the appreciation of the court, this is simply evidentiary.
xxx
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss interposed
by the defendants is hereby DENIED.13 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration14 of the denial of
their Motion to Dismiss, but it was denied by the trial court by
Order15 of October 3, 2000.
Petitioners thereupon brought the case on certiorari and
mandamus16 to the Court of Appeals which, by Decision17 of July
25, 2001, denied it in this wise:
Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court excludes
interest accruing from the principal amount being claimed in the
pleading in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. The
complaint was submitted for the computation of the filing fee to
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City which made an assessment that respondent paid
accordingly. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did and the
ruling of the respondent Judge find support in the decisions of
the Supreme Court in Ng Soon vs. Alday and Tacay vs. RTC of
Tagum, Davao del Norte. In the latter case, the Supreme Court
explicitly ruled that "where the action is purely for recovery of
money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of
the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and
costs."
Assuming arguendo that the correct filing fees was not made,
the rule is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the
payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and
upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may
properly take cognizance of the action unless in the meantime
prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of
action. Here respondent Judge did not make any finding, and
rightly so, that the filing fee paid by private respondent was
insufficient.
On the issue of the correct dollar-peso rate of exchange, the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati pegged it at P
43.21 to US$1. In the absence of any office guide of the rate of
CIVIL PROCEDURE
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CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE
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1.
Less
than
P
.
2.
48.00
1.
3.
64.00
2.
600.00
4.
80.00
3.
5.00
5.
120.00
6.
160.00
7.
200.00
8.
4.00
9.
400.00
10.
11.
5,000.00
P
32.00
64.00
40.00
If the case concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof shall
be considered in computing the fees.
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claim is
less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the
difference of fees shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.
When the complaint in this case was filed in 1998, however, as
correctly pointed out by petitioners, Rule 141 had been amended
by Administrative Circular No. 11-9429 which provides:
BY RESOLUTION OF THE COURT, DATED JUNE 28, 1994,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 5 (5) OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE
CONSTITUTION, RULE 141, SECTION 7 (a) AND (d), and
SECTION 8 (a) and (b) OF THE RULES OF COURT ARE HEREBY
AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
RULE
LEGAL FEES
xxx
Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts
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141
100,000.00
P
400.00
xxx
Sec. 8. Clerks of Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts
(a) For each civil action or proceeding,
where the value of the subject matter
involved, or the amount of the
demand,
inclusive
of
interest,
damages or whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs,
is:
1.
Not
more
than
P
...
20,000.00
P
120.00
2.
400.00
3.
850.00
AGUSTIN, E. P. | 33
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Associate Justice
CARPIO
MORALES
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pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and/or counteraffidavits submitted by the parties. On the basis of this rule
PAGCOR cannot claim that Respondent Judge was grossly
ignorant of the law and procedure when he rendered summary
judgment based on implied admissions of the material facts in
the amended complaint and not on personal knowledge of
witnesses and other affiants. PAGCOR cannot rely solely on
Section 5, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court because the provision
pertains only to cases when affidavits and supporting papers are
submitted to establish whether there is genuine issue. Such
supporting affidavits must be made on personal knowledge.
Section 1, Rule 35 is explicit that the movant of the motion for
summary judgment can support his motion with affidavits,
depositions and admissions. It is illogical to claim that a motion
for summary judgment must be resolved based on affidavits
alone, considering that the Rules are clear that the motion can
likewise be supported by depositions and admissions.
AGUSTIN, E. P. | 39
The Court also finds that respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law when he admitted the amended complaint
despite the non-payment by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE of
additional docket fees on the amended complaint. In Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion,19 the Court laid down the
rules on the payment of docket fees as follows:
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July 9, 2008
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x x x x27
By Decision of June 3, 2004,28 the Court of Appeals partially
granted petitioners petition for certiorari by setting aside the
trial judges assailed orders and ordering Pyramid to file the
correct docket fees within a reasonable time, it holding that
while the complaint was denominated as one for specific
performance, it sought to recover from petitioners Pyramids
"claims arising from the subject losses." The appellate court
ratiocinated:
xxxx
Indeed, it has been held that "it is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action." To determine
the docket fees, it is necessary to determine the true nature of
the action by examining the allegations of the complaint. x x x
xxxx
While the captions of the complaint and 1st amended complaint
denominated the case as one for "Specific Performance and
Damages", the allegations and prayer therein show that the
specific performance sought by private respondent was for
petitioners to "comply with their obligation under their respective
Insurance Policies by paying to plaintiff jointly and severally, the
claims arising from the subject losses" as well as the attorneys
fees and costs of suit. Obviously, what constitutes specific
performance is the payment itself by petitioners of private
respondents claims arising from the losses it allegedly incurred.
x x x29
xxxx
Public respondent should have ordered private respondent to
pay the correct docket fees on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint. x x x
xxxx
While it has been held in Manchester Development Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals x x x that "any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement of specifying the amount of damages not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer shall not
be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record," this rule was relaxed in subsequent cases, wherein
payment of the correct docket fees was allowed within a
reasonable time. . .
x x x x30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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fails to impress.
As the salient allegations of Pyramids complaint show and as
priorly stated, they constitute, in the main, an action for
collection of its claims it admittedly "knew."
Assuming arguendo that Pyramid has other claims the amounts
of which are yet to be determined by the trial court, the rule
established in Manchester which was embodied in this Courts
Circular No. 7-88 issued on March 24, 1988, as modified by the
Sun Insurance ruling, still applies. Consider this Courts
pronouncement bearing on the matter in Ayala Corporation v.
Madayag:501awphil
xxxx
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Atty.
Gonzales
154
Cebu City
Fidel
V.
Law
C.
Urgello
Gonzales
Office
St.
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we had occasion to
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DECISION
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II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING
DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE LATE FILING OF
APPEAL, THE LATE PAYMENT OF APPEAL DOCKET
FEE
AND
NON-APPEALABILITY
OF
THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The petitioners assert that the CA committed a grave abuse of
its discretion in reinstating the appeal of the private respondents
despite the fact that they failed to perfect their appeal by
remitting to the Clerk of Court of the trial court the appellate
court docket fee and other legal fees. They contend that the
Court of Appeals did not acquire any appellate jurisdiction over
the assailed order which had become final and executory for
their failure to perfect their appeal within the period and in the
manner provided for in the Rules of Civil Procedure.
We are not persuaded.
Although the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, it
is an essential part of the judicial system and courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this
prerogative, but instead afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause,
freed from the constraints of technicalities. 11
The failure of a party to perfect the appeal in the manner and
within the period fixed by law carries with it the result that no
court can exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case. A party's
appeal by notice of appeal as in this case is perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. 12 Together
with this notice of appeal is the payment of docket and other
legal fees which should be paid within the prescribed period. 13
Such payment is mandatory and jurisdictional and the failure of
the appellant to conform with the rules on appeal renders the
judgment final and executory.14
However, in several cases, it has been held that the delay in the
payment of the docket fees confers a discretionary, and not
mandatory, power to dismiss the proposed appeal. 15 In
Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals,16 the Court had the occasion to
explain that:
The established rule is that the payment in full of the
docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified,
to wit: First, the failure to pay appellate court docket
fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretional dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of the
appeal; Second, such power should be used in the
exercise of the Courts' sound discretion in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great
deal of circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances.
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTON IN ISSUING THE
RESOLUTIONS DATED AUGUST 26, 1998 AND
DECEMBER 18, 1998.
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fee and other lawful fees with the Clerk of Court of the trial court
within the period for taking the appeal. When the petitioners
filed their notice of appeal in the trial court, on July 11, 1997,
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was in effect for only ten
days. It appears that the counsel of the private respondents had
yet to familiarize himself with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and consequently the petitioners failed to pay the requisite
appellate court docket fee and other lawful fees with the Clerk of
Court of the trial court within the period for appeal. It was only
when the private respondents were required by the Court of
Appeals to comment on the motion to dismiss appeal filed by the
petitioners on the ground that the private respondents failed to
pay the required appellate docket fee did the private
respondents realize their lapse and forthwith paid the requisite
amount due. There is no showing in the record that the private
respondents deliberately refused to pay the requisite fee within
the period therefor and abandon their appeal.
Not to be forgotten is the fact that the trial court dismissed the
case solely because of its perception that, by amending their
complaint, the private respondents thereby conferred jurisdiction
to the trial court over the subject matter of their action. It is
imperative for the appellate court to review the ruling of the trial
court to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we see no
cogent reason to reverse the resolutions of the respondent
court. It is the policy of the court to encourage hearing of
appeals on their merits. To resort to technicalities which the
petitioner capitalizes on in the instant petition would only tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.18
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE
COURSE for lack of merit. The respondent court is directed to
continue with the proceedings before it with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
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February 6, 2007
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I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMPLETELY
VIOLATED PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS TOTALLY
DISREGARDED THE MANDATORY PROVISION OF RULE 71 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
MANIFEST ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING ITS AUTHORITY TO
ENTERTAIN THE CONTEMPT CHARGES AGAINST HER.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO EFFECT THAT
PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY CONTUMACIOUS
CONDUCT.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A GROSS
MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IN FINDING THE PETITIONER
GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT ON THE BASIS OF THE
CONFLICTING,
UNCORROBORATED,
AND
UNVERIFIED
ASSERTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT.
Considering that the issues raised herein are both questions of
law and fact, and consistent with our policy that this Court is not
a trier of facts, we shall address only the pure questions of law
and leave the factual issues, which are supported by evidence,
as found by the appellate court. It is an oft-repeated principle
that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals, if supported by evidence, are
conclusive and binding upon this Court.1awphi1.net22
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with
or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. 23
It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition
to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct
as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to
impede the due administration of justice.24
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and
to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.25
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Procedure, however,
countenanced.
such
practice
can
no
longer
be
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Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly
acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable.
Petitioners point to private respondents petition in the
proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation
estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion
that what private respondents paid as docket fees was
insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially involves two
aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the
docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the
correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the
correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a
deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court. 41 In
such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically
lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of
courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees. 42 As "every
citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer
charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and
performs them in accordance with law," the party filing the case
cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient
assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required to
pay the deficiency.44
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts
assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not
include this assessment. There can be no determination of
whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees
without the clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion
for reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective
for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique
circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this
requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set
for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing
to all parties concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no
written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of service thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a
liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the]
objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has
upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of
hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the
Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in
technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.49
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia
District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent
power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with
the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because
of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a
miscarriage of justice.
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11
12
14
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20
is
AGUSTIN, E. P. | 69
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Viewed from the aforesaid law, there is no question that the law
allows the continued use of an apparent easement should the
owner alienate the property to different persons. It is
noteworthy to emphasize that the lot in question was provided
by the previous owner (Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) as a road lot
because of its intention to convert it into a subdivision project.
The previous owner even applied for a development permit over
the subject property. However, when the twenty-two (22) lots
were sold to appellant Aneco, it was very clear from the sellers
deed of sale that the lots sold ceased to be subdivision lots. The
seller even warranted that it shall undertake to extend all the
necessary assistance for the consolidation of the subdivided lots,
including the execution of the requisite manifestation before the
appropriate government agencies that the seller is no longer
interested in pursuing the subdivision project. In fine, appellant
Aneco knew from the very start that at the time of the sale, the
22 lots sold to it were not intended as subdivision units,
although the titles to the different lots have yet to be
consolidated. Consequently, the easement that used to exist on
the subject lot ceased when appellant Aneco and the former
owner agreed that the lots would be consolidated and would no
longer be intended as a subdivision project.
A.
D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER THAT MADE
NO PRONOUNCEMENTS AS TO COSTS, AND IN
DISREGARDING THE MERIT OF THE PETITIONERS
CAUSE OF ACTION.22
Our Ruling
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additional time to
reconsideration.30
file
comment
on
the
motion
for
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T.
REYES
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