Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion for dismissal on July 17, 1961
supplemented it by another opposition on August 14, 1961, and by a rejoinder on
August 21, 1961. Finally, on October 22, 1962 petitioner moved to strike out the
oppositors' pleadings on two grounds, namely:

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23135

December 26, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO

SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA,
LICERIA PABELLA and ANDREA RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.
Gatchalian and Sison and J. A. Bardelosa, Jr. for petitioner-appellee.
Jose L. Desvarro Jr. for oppositors-appellants
MAKALINTAL, J.:
On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a
petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament of
Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. Said document, written in
Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner as sole heir of the
testator.
The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors appellants herein
who questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made
under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and
testament. Aside from merely opposing the petition for probate, the first set of
oppositors Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also claimed that they, instead
of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The other
oppositors representing themselves simply as next of kin, appropriately prayed only
for the disallowance of the will.
At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his evidence, and then rested his
case on February 16, 1961. Reception of oppositors' evidence was set for July 14,
1961. However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition
for probate mainly on the ground that "the court lacks jurisdiction over the subjectmatter because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really
executed by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death."
Oppositors alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner
Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so
that at the time of the testator's death the titles to said lands were no longer in his
name.

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1. That oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of
personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament of the
testators; and
2. That oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of
(the) estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right
whatsoever.
On October 18, 1963 the court a quo issued the order now subject of this appeal,
which read as follows:
Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors dated July 31, 1961,
the same is hereby denied for the allegations contained therein goes (sic)
to the very intrinsic value of the will and other grounds stated on said
motion to dismiss are without merit.itc-alf With respect to the motion to
strike out opposition and all other pleadings of oppositors filed by the
petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever
within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore the oppositors are
totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. This being
so, the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings pertinent
thereto is hereby ordered stricken out of the record.
The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into
the intrinsicvalidity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any
devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23,
1966).
To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings . . . for the probate of a will. The judgment in such
proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et al.
vs. CFI of Manila, 3 Phil. 424).
Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on the ground
that the testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the
lands disposed of therein.

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for
probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is
another.itc-alf The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of
conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed.
For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
questions of revocation become superfluous: in law, there is no such will
and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation
invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely
implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties
concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy.itc-alf (Fernandez, et al. vs.
Dimagiba, L-23638 and Reyes, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23662, October 12,
1967.)
In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that they
"have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and
therefore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to the deceased whose will is under
probate." They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate
which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true
copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, support the said court's
finding in this respect.
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate,
or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as
a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor. (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R. No.
L- 18753, March 26, 1965.)
The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not
that thereby the court may be prevented from learning facts which would
justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the
litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of
persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard
with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)
Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court appellee moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is interlocutory. We deferred
action on the motion until after the brief of both parties had been filed. The motion,

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although now practically academic in view of our resolution of the main issue
involved, must be denied, since the order of the lower court striking out appellants'
opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that they have no personality to
intervene in the case, was final and therefore appealable order insofar as they were
concerned.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositorsappellants.

The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio
Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio
Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and
Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs.
The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in
Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by
petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained
provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty.
Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the
testator's property, the will provided:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division),
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108)
ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its
Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents'
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent
Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII
(Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as
to costs.

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THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties.

house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa
Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN
Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C
Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain
pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in
Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall
be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed
Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who
are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings
No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of
tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by
the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate
Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and

ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio
Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo,
p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157);
the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy
under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring
into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it
cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted
to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be
admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of
the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the
direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are
not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not
annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will
be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code,
that suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will
would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but
there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at
bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and
should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and
standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate
of the will of Nemesio Acain and

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(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is

therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been
pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may
not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir,
there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in
the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the
other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has
not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence,
this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese
dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only
provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the
will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway
for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises
having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by
universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the
"Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as
already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the
will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as
an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a
devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any
gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive
(Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as
an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the
succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the
universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has
no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and
Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v.
Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573
[1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or
some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD
Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are,
however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in
not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de
Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by
respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the
Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy

5 | Page

of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano
v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA
206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate
of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation
will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will
in question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying
for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition
by the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to
institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the
hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's
order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge
allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared
to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its
probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will
is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals,supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January

21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters
properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the
merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the
case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as
petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled
with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or
could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before
the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid
v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of
by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de
Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy
of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a
petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford
speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30,
1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN and CARMEN MEJIA
RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, CONCEPCION MEJIA ESPINA and MARIA MEJIA
GANDIONGCO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside, for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, the following Orders of the respondent Judge in Special
Proceedings No. 3309-R of Branch VIII of the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Cebu entitled "In The Matter of the Petition for Probate of
the Last Will and Testament of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo:"

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1. The Order of 26 February 1980 setting for hearing private

respondents' Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration 1 which was filed
six (6) years, ten (10) months and eighteen (18) days after the
probate judgment was rendered and six (6) years and twenty-one
(21) days after the testate proceedings was declared closed and
terminated; and
2. The Order of 2 June 1980 finding the signature of the testatrix
in the last will and testament to be a forgery and (a) declaring the
testatrix as having died intestate; (b) declaring the testamentary
dispositions in said last will and testament as null and void; (c)
setting aside the order dated 10 September 1973 declaring the
testate proceedings closed and terminated; (d) revoking the
appointment of Jesus Fran as executor while appointing
respondent Concepcion M. Espina as administratrix; and (e)
ordering the conversion of the proceedings to one of
intestacy. 2 This Order effectively annulled and set aside the
probate judgment of 13 November 1972.
Petitioners would also have this Court nullify all other actions of respondent
Judge in said Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R; restore the status quo therein prior to
the issuance of the foregoing orders; and permanently enjoin respondent
Judge from reopening said proceedings.
The following facts are not controverted:
Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu City with
neither descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal properties located in
Cebu City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. Earlier, on 23 April 1972, she
executed a last will and testament 3 wherein she bequeathed to her collateral
relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated
Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without
bond. Instrumental witnesses to the will were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio Demerre and
Primo Miro.
On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition with the Court of First instance of Cebu
for the probate of Remedios' last will and testament. 4 The case was raffled to the
original Branch VIII thereof which was then presided over by Judge Antonio D.
Cinco. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not physically well and, therefore, will
not be assuming the position of administratrix. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Jesus
Fran on the third page of the said petition. The probate court issued an order setting
the petition for hearing on 18 September 1972. Meanwhile, on 31 July 1972, the
court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
On 10 August 1972, the private respondents, who are sisters of the deceased, filed
a manifestation 5 alleging that they needed time to study the petition because some

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heirs who are entitled to receive their respective shares have been intentionally
omitted therein, and praying that they be given ample time to file their opposition,
after which the hearing be reset to another date.
Private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed on 18 September
1972 a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will"
wherein they expressly manifested, with their "full knowledge and consent that . . .
they have no objection of (sic) the allowance of the . . . will of the late Remedios
Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo," and that they have "no objection to the issuance of letters
testamentary in favor of petitioner, Dr. Jesus Fran." 6
No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested.
During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the requisite evidence to
establish the jurisdictional facts.
Upon a determination that the court had duly acquired jurisdiction over the
uncontested petition for probate, Judge Cinco issued in open court an order
directing counsel for petitioner to present evidence proving the authenticity and due
execution of the will before the Clerk of Court who was, accordingly, so authorized
to receive the same.
The reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court immediately followed. Petitioner
Fran's first witness was Atty. Nazario R. Pacquiao, one at the subscribing witnesses
to the will. The original of the will, marked as Exhibit "F", and its English translation,
marked as Exhibit "F-Translation", were submitted to the Clerk of Court. 7 Petitioner
Fran was the second and also the last witness. He enumerated the names of the
surviving heirs of the deceased.
On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate
the will of the testatrix, Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing petitioner
Fran as executor thereof. 8 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the last will and testament of the deceased
Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo marked as Exhibit F as admitted
to probate. Dr. Jesus Fran is hereby appointed as executor of the
will. Let letters testamentary be issued in favor of Dr. Jesus Fran.
The special administrator's bond put up by Dr. Jesus Fran as
special administrator duly approved by this Court shall serve and
be considered as the executor's bond considering that the special
administrator and executor are one and the same person.
The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite the expiration of the period
therein fixed, no claim was presented against the estate.

On 4 January 1973, petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate;

were furnished each of the private respondents.

copies thereof

Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and
signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios
C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, was submitted by the executor for
the court's approval. 10 Said legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein
they admit receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of
hearing, and state that they had no objection to its approval. 11
The notice of hearing referred to in these certifications is the 6 August 1973 notice
issued by the Clerk of Court setting the hearing on the Project of Partition for 29
August 1973. 12
After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10
September 1973 13 approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only
heirs entitled to the estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the
administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and decreeing the
proceedings closed. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the signers (sic) to the project of partition are
declared the only, heirs entitled to the estate; the project of
partition submitted is ordered approved and the administrator is
ordered to deliver to each one of them their respective aliquot
parts as distributed in the said project of partition. It is
understood that if there are expenses incurred or to be incurred
as expenses of partition, Section 3 of Rule 90 shall be followed.
Let this proceedings be now declared closed.

their opposition, or of the order authorizing the clerk of court to receive the
evidence for the petitioner, or of the order closing the proceedings; (d) the reception
of evidence by the clerk of court was void per the ruling in Lim Tanhu vs.
Ramolete; 15 (e) the project of partition contains no notice of hearing and they were
not notified thereof; (f) the petitioner signed the project of partition as
administrator and not as executor, thereby proving that the decedent died intestate;
(g) the petitioner did not submit any accounting as required by law; and (h) the
petitioner never distributed the estate to the devisees and legatees.
In a detailed opposition 16 to the above Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Fran refuted all the protestations of private respondents. Among other
reasons, he stresses therein that: (a) private respondents are in estoppel to
question the will because they filed their Withdrawal Of Opposition To The Allowance
of Will which states that after thoroughly studying the petition, to which was
attached a copy of the English translation of the will, they have no objection to its
allowance; the order directing the clerk of court to receive the evidence was
dictated in open court in the presence of private respondents; private respondent
Maria M. Gandiongco signed the Project of Partition and private respondent
Concepcion M. Espina submitted a certification stating therein that she received the
notice of hearing therefor and has no objection to its approval; (b) except for some
properties, either covered by a usufruct under the will or agreed upon by the parties
to be held in common by reason of its special circumstance, there was an actual
distribution of the estate in accordance with the Project of Partition; insofar as
private respondents are concerned, they not only received their respective shares,
they even purchased the shares of the other devisees. To top it all, private
respondents' children, namely Rodrigo M. Gandiongco, Jr. and Victor Espina,
mortgaged their respective shares in favor of a bank
Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, respondent Judge issued on 26 February
1980 an Order setting for hearing the said Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration on 8
April 1980 so that "the witnesses and the exhibits (may be) properly ventilated." 17

SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu was
converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On November 1978, by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 1439, Branch XVII (Davao City) of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, presided over by herein respondent Judge, was officially
transferred to Cebu City and renumbered as Branch VIII.
On 1 October 1979, private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and the
Order of partition of 10 September 1973, in said motion, they ask the court to
declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the
will, 14 which they filed on 1 October 1979. They allege that: (a) they were not
furnished with a copy of the will; (b) the will is a forgery; (c) they were not notified
of any resolution or order on their manifestation requesting time within which to file

8 | Page

On 25 March 1980, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus and to

Reconsider the 26 February 1980 Order setting it for hearing on 17 April
1980, 18 but the respondent Judge prematurely denied it for lack of merit in his
Order of 31 March 1980. 19
Consequently, on 8 April 1980, the instant petition was filed challenging the
jurisdiction of the lower court in taking cognizance of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration considering that the probate judgment and the order approving the
Project of Partition and terminating the proceedings had long become final and had
in fact been executed. Private respondents had long lost their right to appeal
therefrom. The Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration cannot likewise be treated as a
petition for relief from judgment for under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the same must be filed within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of the

judgment/order and within six (6) months from the date of said judgment.
Therefore, this remedy can no longer be availed of.

In the Resolution dated 2 June 1980, We issued a restraining order enjoining

respondent Judge from reopening Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R. 22

On 8 April 1980, the date the instant petition was filed, respondent Judge proceeded
with the hearing of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. He received the
testimonies of private respondents and one Romeo O. Varena, an alleged
handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary, who averred that the signature
of the testatrix on the will is a forgery. The respondent Judge likewise issued an
Order on the same date stating that unless he received a restraining order from this
Court within twenty (20) days therefrom, he will reopen Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R.

However, on the same date, before the restraining order was served on him;
respondent Judge issued the impugned order declaring the testamentary
dispositions of the will void, finding the signature of the late Remedios M. Vda. de
Tiosejo to be a forgery, decreeing the reopening of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R and
converting the same into an intestate proceeding. 23

On 14 April 1980, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to

restrain respondent Judge from reopening the case. 20
In their voluminous Comments and Opposition to the petition and Supplemental
Petition, 21 private respondents not only amplify in great detail the grounds raised in
their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, they also squarely raise for the first time
the following issues.
(a) The probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case
since petitioner Jesus Fran failed to submit to the court the
original of the will.
(b) They were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will as
petitioner Jesus Fran did not attach it to the petition; what was
attached was only the English translation of the will.
(c) Even assuming that the probate judge could validly delegate
the reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court, the proceeding
before the latter would still be void as he failed to take an oath of
office before entering upon his duties as commissioner and failed
to render a report on the matters submitted to him.
(d) Respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco was defrauded into
(sic) signing the Project of Partition and respondent Concepcion M.
Espina, her certification, when they were misled by petitioner Fran
into believing that the Agreement of Petition to be submitted to
the court is the Extra Judicial Partition they signed on 7 May 1973.
(e) Petitioner Fran is guilty of fraud in urdervaluing the estate of
the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo by reporting properties
worth only P400,000.00 when in truth and in fact the estate has
an aggregate value of P2,094,333.00.

9 | Page

Hence, on 6 June 1980, petitioners filed their Second Supplemental

Petition 24 asking this Court to declare as null and void the Order of 2 June 1980
and, pending such declaration, to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing the
same. Private respondents filed their Comment and Opposition to the Second
Supplemental Petition on 9 July 1980.
Thereafter, as mandated in the resolution of 30 June 1980, 25 this Court gave due
course to this case and required the parties to file their respective Memoranda,
which private respondents complied with on 16 August 1980; 26petitioners filed
theirs on 27 August 1980. 27 Consequently, the parties continued to file several
pleadings reiterating substantially the same allegations and arguments earlier
submitted to this Court.
On 22 March 1984, counsel for petitioners filed a manifestation informing this Court
of the death of petitioner Fran on 29 February 1984 and enumerating therein his
surviving heirs. On 2 April 1984, this Court resolved to have said heirs substitute
him in this case.
Over a year later, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco filed an
affidavit, 28 sworn to before the acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in
Cebu City, disclosing the following material facts: (a) she signed the Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration dated 1 October 1979 without knowing or reading the
contents thereof; (b) she saw the will of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo
written in the Cebuano dialect after the same was executed by the latter; the said
will bearing the authentic signature of Remedios was the very one presented to the
probate court by petitioner's counsel; (c) she received the notice of hearing of the
petition for probate and because she was convinced that the signature of the
testatrix was genuine, she, together with Concepcion M. Espina, withdrew her
opposition; (d) she received her share of the estate of the late Remedios M. Vda. de
Tiosejo which was distributed in accordance with the provisions of the latter's will;
and (e) she did not authorize Atty. Numeriano Estenzo or other lawyers to present a
motion to this Court after 25 February 1981 when Estenzo withdrew as counsel for
private respondents. She then asks this Court to consider as withdrawn her
Opposition to the Allowance of the Will, her participation in the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and her Opposition to this petition.

Due to this development, We required private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to

comment on the affidavit of private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco.
On 17 August 1985, private respondents filed a joint manifestation 29 wherein they
claim that Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco does not remember, executing the affidavit.
A few weeks before the affidavit was filed, particularly on 17 June 1985, Maria M.
Vda. de Gandiongco was confined in the hospital; she could not recall having
signed, during this period, any affidavit or recognized her sisters and other
relatives.
On 19 September 1985, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco, through special
counsel, filed a Manifestation/Motion with a second Affidavit attached
thereto 30 confessing that she signed the Joint Manifestation dated 16 August 1985
"without knowing or being informed of its contents, and only upon Mrs. Concepcion
Espina's request." She reiterated her desire to withdraw from the Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration filed in Sp. Proc. No, 3309-R as well as from the instant petition.
Despite the valiant attempt of private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to influence
and control the action of Maria Gandiongco, there is nothing in the records that
would cast any doubt on the irrevocability of the latter's decision to withdraw her
participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to this case.
That decision, however, is not a ground for dropping her as a private respondent as
the respondent Judge had already issued the abovementioned Order of 2 June
1980.
The petition and the supplemental petitions are impressed with merit.
We do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and thereafter set aside the probate judgment of 13 November
1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the subject will of the testatrix a forgery,
nullified the testamentary dispositions therein and ordered the conversion of the
testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
It is not disputed that private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of
the petition their "Withdrawal of Opposition To Allowance of Probate (sic) Will"
wherein they unequivocally state that they have no objection to the allowance of the
will. For all legal intents and purposes, they became proponents of the same.
After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there
having been no claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner
Fran submitted a Project of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de
Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which private respondent Espina expressed
her conformity through a certification filed with the probate court. Assuming for the
sake of argument that private respondents did not receive a formal notice of the
decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these acts

10 | P a g e

nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual knowledge of the

same. A formal notice would have been an idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a
decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is normally an
implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate the
proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision,
they should have desisted from performing the above acts and instead demanded
from petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the will. The
same conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the
order authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of
Court did not notify them of the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such
plea must fail because private respondents were present when the court dictated
the said order.
Neither do We give any weight to the contention that the reception of evidence by
the Clerk of Court is null and void per the doctrine laid, down in Lim Tanhu vs.
Ramolete. 31 In the first place, Lim Tanhu was decided on 29 August 1975, nearly
four (4) years after the probate court authorized the Clerk of Court to receive the
evidence for the petitioner in this case. A month prior to Lim Tanhu, or on 30 July
1975, this Court, in Laluan vs. Malpaya, 32 recognized and upheld the practice of
delegating the reception of evidence to Clerks of Court. Thus:
No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court
from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a
party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of
court constitutes but a ministerial task the taking down of the
testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of
documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This
task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of
court the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for when the
other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to
the admission of the documentary evidence proffered. 33 More
importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the
case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and
directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported. 34
But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the
concomitant result thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the
court based on the evidence presented in such limited
proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved
party, then there exists, sufficient justification to grant the latter
complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court. 35
Monserrate vs. Court of Appeals, 36 decided on 29 September 1989, reiterated this
rule. Lim Tanhu then cannot be used as authority to nullify the order of the probate
court authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for the rule is settled
that "when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the

new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof." 37 It may also be
emphasized in this connection that Lim Tanhu did not live long; it was subsequently
overruled in Gochangco vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 38 wherein
this Court, en banc, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, in
reference to what the trial court termed as "the doctrinal rule laid down in the
recent case of Lim Tan Hu (sic) vs. Ramolete," ruled:
Now, that declaration does not reflect long observed and
established judicial practice with respect to default cases. It is not
quite consistent, too, with the several explicitly authorized
instances under the Rules where the function of receiving
evidence and even of making recommendatory findings of facts on
the basis thereof may be delegated to commissioners, inclusive of
the Clerk of Court. These instances are set out in Rule 33, . . . ;
Rule 67 and 69, . . . ; Rule 86, . . . ; Rule 136, . . . . In all these
instances, the competence of the clerk of court is assumed.
Indeed, there would seem, to be sure, nothing intrinsically wrong
in allowing presentation of evidence ex parte before a Clerk of
Court. Such a procedure certainly does not foreclose relief to the
party adversely affected who, for valid cause and upon
appropriate and seasonable application, may bring about the
undoing thereof or the elimination of prejudice thereby caused to
him; and it is, after all, the Court itself which is duty bound and
has the ultimate responsibility to pass upon the evidence received
in this manner, discarding in the process such proofs as are
incompetent and then declare what facts have thereby been
established. In considering and analyzing the evidence
preparatory to rendition of judgment on the merits, it may not
unreasonably be assumed that any serious error in the expartepresentation of evidence, prejudicial to any absent party, will
be detected and duly remedied by the Court, and/or may always,
in any event, be drawn to its attention by any interested party.
xxx xxx xxx
It was therefore error for the Court a quo to have declared the
judgment by default to be fatally flawed by the fact that the
plaintiff's evidence had been received not by the Judge himself but
by the clerk of court.
The alternative claim that the proceedings before the Clerk of Court were likewise
void because said official did not take an oath is likewise untenable. The Clerk of
Court acted as such when he performed the delegated task of receiving evidence. It
was not necessary for him to take an oath for that purpose; he was bound by his
oath of office as a Clerk of Court. Private respondents are obviously of the

11 | P a g e

impression that by the delegation of the reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court,
the latter became a commissioner as defined under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court
entitled Trial by Commissioner. This is not correct; as this Court said in Laluan:
The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both
parties properly relate to the reference by a court of any or all of
the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or report
thereon. These provisions explicitly spell out the rules governing
the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties
before, during, and after the reference proceedings. Compliance
with these rules of conduct becomes imperative only when the
court formally orders a reference of the case to a commissioner.
Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no
application to the case at bar where the court a quo merely
directed the clerk of court to take down the testimony of the
witnesses presented and to mark the documentary evidence
proferred on a date previously set for hearing.
Belatedly realizing the absence of substance of the above grounds, private
respondents now claim in their Comments to the Petition and the Supplemental
Petition that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petition because only
the English translation of the will and not a copy of the same was attached to
the petition; the will was not even submitted to the court for their examination
within twenty (20) days after the death of the testatrix; and that there was fraud in
the procurement of the probate judgment principally because they were not given
any chance to examine the signature of the testatrix and were misled into signing
the withdrawal of their opposition on the assurance of petitioner Fran and their
sister, Rosario M. Tan, that the will would be shown to them during the trial. These
two grounds easily serve as the bases for the postulation that the decision is null
and void and so, therefore, their omnibus motion became all the more timely and
proper.
The contentions do not impress this Court.
In Santos vs. Castillo 39 and Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 40 decided
six (6) months apart in 1937, this Court already ruled that it is not necessary that
the original of the will be attached to the petition. In the first, it ruled: "The original
of said document [the will] must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify
the nonpresentation of said original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate
thereof." 41 In the second case, this Court was more emphatic in holding that:
The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the
jurisdictional allegations before the court, but practice and
jurisprudence have established that they should be made in the
form of an application and filed with the original of the will
attached thereto. It has been the practice in some courts to

permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the application,

without prejudice to producing the original thereof at the hearing
or when the court so requires. This precaution has been adopted
by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken
place in certain cases. 42
That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional
requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein regardless of
whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. The
section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. Any
executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost
or destroyed.
In the instant case, a copy of the original will and its English translation were
attached to the petition as Annex "A" and Annex "A-1", respectively, and made
integral parts of the same. It is to be presumed that upon the filing of the petition
the Clerk of Court, or his duly authorized subordinate, examined the petition and
found that the annexes mentioned were in fact attached thereto. If they were not,
the petition cannot be said to have been properly presented and the Clerk of Court
would not have accepted it for docketing. Under Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court, the Clerk of Court shall receive and file all pleadings and other papers
properly presented, endorsing on each such paper the time when it was filed. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty militates against private
respondents' claim that Annex "A" of the petition was not in fact attached thereto.
The certification of the Assistant Clerk of Court issued on 8 April
1980, 43 or SIX (6) months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, to the
effect that as per examination of the records of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, "the copy of
the Will mentioned in the petition as Annex "A" is not found to be attached as of this
date in the said petition; only the English Translation of said Will is attached thereof
(sic) as Annex "A-1" does not even save the day for private respondents. It is not
conclusive because it fails to state the fact that as hereafter shown, the pages of the
records which correspond to the four (4) pages of Annex "A" were missing or were
detached therefrom. As emphatically asserted by the petitioners in their Reply to
the Comments of private respondents, 44 duly supported by a certification of the
former Clerk of Court of the original Branch VIII of the court below, 45 and which
private respondents merely generally denied in their motion for reconsideration with
comments and opposition to consolidated reply, 46 the four-page xerox copy of will,
marked as Annex "A" of the petition, became, as properly marked by the personnel
of the original Branch VIII of the court below upon the filing of the petition, pages 5,

12 | P a g e

6, 7 and 8 while the translation thereof, marked as Annex "A-1", became pages 9,
10, 11 and 12 of the records. The markings were done in long hand. The records of
the case were thereafter sent to the Clerk of Court, 14th Judicial District, Cebu City
on 9 February 1978. These records, now in the possession of the respondent Judge,
show that said pages 5, 6, 7 and 8 in long are missing. As a consequence thereof,
petitioners filed with the Executive Judge of the court below an administrative
complaint.
It is not likewise disputed that the original of the will was submitted in evidence and
marked as Exhibit "F". It forms part of the records of the special proceedings a
fact which private respondents admit in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration,
thus:
9. That an examination of the alleged will of our deceased sister
has revealed that the signatures at the left hand margin of Exhibit
"F", are written by (sic) different person than the signature
appearing at the bottom of said alleged will . . . 47
The availability of the will since 18 September 1972 for their examination renders
completely baseless the private respondents' claim of fraud on petitioner Fran's part
in securing the withdrawal of their opposition to the probate of the will. If indeed
such withdrawal was conditioned upon Fran's promise that the private respondents
would be shown the will during the trial, why weren't the appropriate steps taken by
the latter to confront Fran about this promise before certifications of conformity to
the project of partition were filed?
Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of said promise
constitutes fraud, such fraud is not of the kind which provides sufficient justification
for a motion for reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 37
and Rule 38, respectively, of the Rules of Court, or even a separate action for
annulment of judgment. It is settled that for fraud to be invested with, sufficiency, it
must be extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised during the
trial which resulted in such judgment. 48
In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to
set aside or attack the validity of a final judgment:
(1) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which
must be filed within sixty (60) days after learning of the decision,
but not more than six (6) months after such decision is entered;
(2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by
collateral attack, assuming that the decision is void for want of
jurisdiction;

(3) By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil

Code, assuming that the decision was obtained through fraud and
Rule 38 can not be applied. 49
It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their right to file a petition
for relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for reconsideration
was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days after the
rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days
after the court issued the order approving the Project of Partition, to which they
voluntarily expressed their conformity through their respective certifications, and
closing the testate proceedings.
Private respondents did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack.
The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any
attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to
annul or set the same aside, by mere motion, on the ground that the will is a
forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of probate is conclusive with respect to
the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceeding. 50 We wish also to advert to the related doctrine which holds that final
judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there
would be a wavering of trust in the courts. 51 In Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen, 52 this
Court had the occasion to state the rationale of this doctrine, thus:

The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is

not a ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for
execution should have been filed. In De Jesus vs.
Daza, 57 this Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has possession of the
share to be delivered, the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same
estate proceeding to order him to transfer that possession to the person entitled
thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However,
if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a separate action
for the recovery of the shares would be in order. As We see it, the attack of 10
September 1973 on the Order was just a clever ploy to give asemblance of strength
and substance to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting therein a
probate court committing a series of fatal, substantive and procedural blunders,
which We find to be imaginary, if not deliberately fabricated.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition and supplemental petitions are GRANTED. The
Order of respondent Judge of 2 June 1980 and all other orders issued by him in Sp.
Proc. No. 3309-R, as well as all other proceedings had therein in connection with or
in relation to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.
The restraining order issued on 2 June 1980 is hereby made PERMANENT.
Costs against private respondent Concepcion M. Espina.
SO ORDERED.

Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial

time and the interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order
of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and
final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent
jurisdiction.
This is so even if the decision is incorrect
imposed is erroneous. 54

53

or, in criminal cases, the penalty

Equally baseless and unmeritorious is private respondents' contention that the order
approving the Project of Partition and closing the proceedings is null and void
because the Project of Partition did not contain a notice of hearing and that they
were not notified of the hearing thereon. In truth, in her own certification 55 dated 5
September 1973, private respondent Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she
"received a copy of the Project of Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the aboveentitled proceeding, and that she has no objection to the approval of the said
Project of Partition." The notice of hearing she referred to is the Notice of Hearing
For Approval of Project of Partition issued on 6 August 1973 by the Clerk of
Court. 56 Private respondent Espina was lying through her teeth when she claimed
otherwise.

13 | P a g e

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

May a probate court act on and/or grant motions for the appointment of a special
administrator, for the issuance of a writ of possession of alleged properties of the
deceased person, and for assistance to preserve the estate in a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate even before the court has caused notice to be
served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court?
On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings .No.
M-1436.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

The petition alleges that: (1) on March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in
Makati, Metro Manila; (2) at the time of his death, the decedent was a resident of
Makati, Metro Manila; (3) decedent left personal and real properties as part of his
estate, listed in Annexes "A," "B," "C" and "D;" (4) the properties were acquired
after the marriage of the petitioner to the decedent and therefore are included in
their conjugal partnership; (5) the estate of -the decedent has a probable net value
which may be provisionally assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less; (6) the
possible creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable. and existing claims
against the firm C. SANTOS Construction are listed in Annex "E;" (7) the
compulsory heirs of the decedent are the as the surviving spouse and their two (2)
minor children namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman 11 years and Peter Brian de
Guzman, 9 years old; (8) after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the
decedent left a last will and testament, none has been found and according to the
best knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died
intestate; and (9) the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the decedent, is
most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of administration.

G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988

PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58, MAKATI,
METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS
and ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Bautista, Picazo, Cruz, Buyco and Tan for private respondent.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Bautista, Picaso and Reyes, collaborating counsel for
private respondent.

14 | P a g e

On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over
five (5) vehicles registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be
conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at present in the possession
of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The
motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent must have the
possession of said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late husband. On
the same day, the lower court issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May
27, 1987 directing the deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the
expense of the private respondent.
The scheduled May 27, 1987 hearing was postponed on motion of petitioner's
counsel, Atty. Ricardo Fojas. The petitioner was also given three (3) days from May
27, 1987 to give his comment on the motion for a writ of possession. The hearing
was reset to June 5, 1987 at 3:00 p.m.

On May 29, 1987, the petitioner's counsel filed a notice of appearance and an
"Urgent Motion For Extension of Time to File an Opposition and for Resetting of the
Hearing."
The motion was granted and the petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt of
the order within which to file his opposition to the motion for a writ of possession.
The hearing was reset to June 15, 1987 at 2:00 in the afternoon.
In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte
Motion to Appoint Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de
Guzman."
In an order dated May 28,1987, the aforesaid motion was set for hearing on June 5,
1987. In this same order, the lower court directed that all parties in the case be
notified. However, no notice of the order was given to the petitioner.
In an order dated June 5, 1987, the lower court granted the private respondent's
motion to be appointed as special administratrix, to wit:
Finding the motion for appointment of special administratrix, on
the ground alleged therein to be well-founded, and finding further
that it is to be the best interest of the Estate of Manolito de
Guzman that petitioner-movant Elaine G. de Guzman, be
appointed as Special Administratrix in this case, said motion is
granted.
WHEREFORE, Elaine G. de Guzman, petitioner-movant, is hereby
appointed as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased
Manolito de Guzman, pending appointment of a regular
administrator. The bond for the said special administratrix is
hereby fixed in the amount of P200,000.00. (Rollo, p. 40)
On June 8, 1987, the lower court issued another order, to wit:
Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Assistance" filed by
Petitioner-Special Administratrix Elaine de Guzman for
appointment of Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora
together with some military men and/or policemen to assist her in
preserving the estate of Manolito de Guzman, the motion is
granted and the Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora
are hereby appointed for that purpose, provided that the subject
matter of the motion for writ of possession pending before this
Court shall not be affected. (Rollo, p. 41)

15 | P a g e

Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above order. The
petitioner resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos tried to
take the subject vehicles on the ground that they were his personal properties.
According to the petitioner, this resulted in a "near shoot-out between members of
the Makati Police, who were to maintain peace and order, and the CAPCOM soldiers
who were ostensibly aiding respondent sheriffs and Elaine G. de Guzman" and that
"the timely arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati defused the very volatile
situation which resulted in an agreement between the parties that the bulldozer,
sought to be taken, be temporarily placed in the custody of Mayor Binay, while the
parties seek clarification of the order from respondent Judge Zosimo Angeles the
next day, June 9, 1981 at 10:30 a.m."
In the conference held before the respondent court attended by the counsels for
both parties, the June 8, 1987 order was clarified to the effect that the order "must
be merely to take and preserve assets admittedly belonging to the estate, but not
properties, the ownership of which is claimed by third persons."
The petitioner then filed a manifestation listing properties which he claimed to be
his own.
Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's orders dated
June 5, 1987 and June 8, 1987.
In a resolution dated June 10, 1987, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondent court from enforcing the two questioned orders. In
another resolution dated October 28, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.
The petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent nullity, the
respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix
because the petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman was not
yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks, as mandated by the
Rules of Court. The petitioner also stresses that the appointment of a special
administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion for having been made without
giving petitioner and other parties an opportunity to oppose said appointment.
Anent the June 8, 1987 order, the petitioner alleges that the immediate grant of the
motion praying for the court's assistance in the preservation of the estate of the
deceased, "without notice to the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, and
its immediate implementation on the very same day by respondent Elaine G. de
Guzman with the assistance of respondents deputy sheriffs, at no other place but at
the home of the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, are eloquent proofs that all the
antecedent events were intended solely to deprive petitioner de Guzman of his
property without due process of law." He also prays that the respondent Judge be
disqualified from further continuing the case.

As stated earlier, the pivotal issue in the instant petition hinges on whether or not a
probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person even before the
probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to
section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
As early as March 18, 1937, in the case of Santos v. Castillo (64 Phil. 211) we ruled
that before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will
and the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application
must allege the residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or
circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is the
person who had custody of the will to be probated.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction
over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate
estate by the private respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional
facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court over
the proceedings for the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the
persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate of the deceased person.
The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased person but
the determination of the properties comprising that estate must follow established
rules.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition
for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and
shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and
creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to
have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections
3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through
publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to
bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment
therein becomes binding on all the world. (Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; Moran,
Comment on the Rules of Court Volume 3,1980 Edition) Where no notice as
required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given to persons
believed to have an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding
for the settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as

16 | P a g e

to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be

deprived of his right to property without due process of law. (Eusebio v. Valmores,
96 Phil. 163).
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting
other persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment. (See
Eusebio v. Valmores, supra)
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the
motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue
a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's
favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de
Guzman.
The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for his apparent haste
in issuing the questioned orders, states:
xxx xxx xxx
10. In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned acted in the honest
conviction that it would be to the best interest of the estate
without unduly prejudicing any interested party or third person.
Any delay in issuing the said Orders might have prejudiced the
estate for the properties may be lost, wasted or dissipated in the
meantime. (Rollo, p. 86)
xxx xxx xxx
This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the
disregard of the Rule. If indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both the
estate and the person who have interest in the estate, then it could have caused
notice to be given immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of Court. All
interested persons including herein petitioner who is the biggest creditor of the
estate listed in the Petition (P850,240.80) could have participated in the
proceedings especially so, because the respondent immediately filed a motion to
have herself appointed as administratrix. A special administrator has been defined
as the "representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and
preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed." (Jones
v. Minnesota Transfer R. Co. 1965 ed., at 106 cited in Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74
SCRA 189). The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the
preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be the widow
of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by
the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would
have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until the

most interested parties were given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable
delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.

notice even for the appointment of a special administrator is apparent from the
circumstances of this case.

As argued by the petitioner:

The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the preservation of the
estate was limited to properties not claimed by third parties. If certain properties
are already in the possession of the applicant for special administratrix and are not
claimed by other persons, we see no need to hurry up and take special action to
preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs took advantage of the questioned
order to seize by force, properties found in the residence of the petitioner which he
vehemently claims are owned by him and not by the estate of the deceased person.

The position of special administrator, by the very nature of the

powers granted thereby, is one of trust and confidence. It is a
fiduciary position and, therefore, requires a comprehensive
determination of the suitability of the applicant to such position.
Hence, under Philippine jurisprudence, it has been settled that the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a
regular administrator should be taken in choosing the special
administrator (Francisco, Vol. VB, page 46 citing the cases of
Ozaeta v. Pecson, Ibid. and Roxas v. Pecson, Ibid.)
In order to fully and correctly ascertain the suitability of the
applicant to the trust, a hearing is obviously necessary wherein
the applicant can prove his qualifications and at the same time
affording oppositors, given notice of such hearing and application,
the opportunity to oppose or contest such application.
The requirement of a hearing and the
notification to all the known heirs and other
interested parties as to the date thereof is
essential to the validity of the proceeding for the
appointment of an administrator "in order that
no person may be deprived of his right or
property without due process of law" (Eusebio v.
Valmores, 97 Phil. 163). Moreover, a hearing is
necessary in order to fully determine the
suitability of the applicant to the trust, by giving
him the opportunity to prove his qualifications
and affording oppositors, if any, to contest the
said application. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26
SCRA 770; emphasis supplied).
Since the position of special administrator is a very sensitive one
which requires trust and confidence, it is essential that the
suitability of the applicant be ascertained in a hearing with due
notice to all oppositors who may object precisely to the applicant's
suitability to the trust. (Rollo, pp. 103-104)
If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate justify
a court's immediately taking some kind of temporary action even without the
required notice, no such emergency is shown in this case. The need for the proper

17 | P a g e

The petitioner also asks that the respondent Judge be disqualified from continuing
with the proceedings of the case on the ground that he is partial to the private
respondent.
In view of the fact that the respondent Judge in his "Explanation" requests that he
be inhibited from further active on the case, this issue has now become academic.
We accept Judge Angeles" voluntary inhibition in line with our ruling in Pimentel v.
Salanga (21 SCRA 160). As we stated in Query of Executive Judge Estrella T.
Estrada, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan on the conflicting views of
Regional Trial CourtJudges Manalo and Elisaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954 M
Administrative Matter No. 87-9-3918-RTC, October 26, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx
... A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be
induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable
of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of
serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his
counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the
frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care
and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a
suit Where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good
grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another
judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to
others involved thereon. On the result of his decisions to sit or not
sit may depend to a great extent that all-important confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should

resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his

motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to
be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law
who forestalls miscarriage of justice.
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised in the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 of Makati are hereby set aside. The case is ordered
remanded to the lower court for the hearing of the petition with previous notice to
all interested parties as required by law. In view of the voluntary inhibition of the
respondent Judge, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati is
directed to re-raffle the case to another branch of the court. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated June 10, 1987 is made permanent. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988
JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R.
INFANTE, MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE,
TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE
DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE
CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO
MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE, respondents.
Belo, Abiera and Associates for petitioners.
Miguel J. Lagman for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals,
dated 13 January 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 09622, entitled "Joaquina R-Infante de

18 | P a g e

Aranz, et al., petitioners vs. Hon. Nicolas Galing, etc., et al., respondents,"
dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and prohibition as-, sailing the
orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, dated 12 May 1986 and 30
May 1986, respectively, in Sp. Proc. No. 9995, entitled, "In the Matter of Petition for
Approval of the Last Will and Testament of Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola Joaquin R.
Infante, Petitioner."
On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament
of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees, as follows:

On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing
on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the
"Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared.
The hearing was then reset to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court
issued the following order:
There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the
oner to-receive Branch Clerk of Court is hereby designated Co
evidence ex-parte of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Joaquina R-Infante Roxas de Aranz residing at No. 86 10th St.,

New Manila, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Antonio R-Infante Roxas residing at #91 Cambridge, North Forbes,
Makati, Metro Manila;
Carlos R-Infante Roxas residing at #46 Washington St., Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila;
Mercedes R-Infante Roxas de Lednicky residing at #386 P.
Guevarra St., San Juan, Metro Manila;
Alfredo R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 A Scout Tobias St.,
Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Teresita R-Infante Roxas residing at #121 9th Street, New Manila,
Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Ramon R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 B Scout Tobias St.,
Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Florencia R-Infante Roxas de Diaz residing at Calle Sancho Davila,
13-19-D, Madrid, 28028 Spain;
Martin R-Infante Roxas residing at #2 Bongavilla St., Cubao,
Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Jose R-Infante Link residing at 174R-Pascual St., San Juan, Metro
Manila;

On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence exparte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness
stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12
May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as
required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given
a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the
will.
On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent
and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition. 5Hence, the instant
petition.
It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal
notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a
jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will. Contrary to the holding of the
Court of Appeals that the requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and
devisees is merely a matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy in some
instances the requirements of due process, petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, said requirement of the law is mandatory and its
omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of
discretion. 6
We grant the petition:

Joaquin R-Infante Campbell C/O Pilar Campbell, 15 Briones,

Makati, Metro Marta. 3

19 | P a g e

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by

mail or personally. The court shag also cause copies of the
notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places
of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage
thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if
such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in
like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be
not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not
petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service
of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence,
if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of
herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The
petition for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate
court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of
the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the
notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
The case of Joson vs. Nable 8 cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision to
support its theory is not applicable in the present case. In that case, petitioners
Purificacion Joson and Erotica Joson failed to contest the will of Tomas Joson
because they had not been notified of the hearing of the petition for probate. he the
petition included the residence of petitioners as Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila,
petitioners claimed that their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila.
There the Court said:
Petitioners maintain that no notice was received by them partly
because their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83 as alleged
in the petition for probate. If the allegation of the petition was
wrong and the true residence of petitioners was not known, then
notice upon them individually was not necessary. Under the
provision abovequoted, individual notice upon heirs, legatees and
devisees is necessary only when they are known or when their
places of residence are known. In other instances, such notice is
not necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction
simply upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of
general circulation. ... 9

20 | P a g e

In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay,

Padilla, said:

10

the Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino

... It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such

proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the
case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows
that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing
in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t.s.n., hearing of 24
February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal district
court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not
measure or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the
Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the
proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.
xxx xxx xxx
... In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot
be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic
and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate
and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript
of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to
therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent
court of court. 11
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23225. February 27, 1971.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DIGNA
MARAVILLA, HERMINIO MARAVILLA, petitioner-appellant, and ADELINA
SAJO, legatee-appellant, v. PEDRO MARAVILLA, ASUNCION MARAVILLA and
REGINA MARAVILLA, oppositors-appellees, CONCEPCION KOHLHAAS and
ROSE MARY KOHLHAAS, intervenors.
Felino A. Garcia for legatee-appellant.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat & Associates and Paredes, Poblador, Cruz &
Nazareno forPetitioner-Appellant.

Jose Gutierrez David, Placido C. Ramos, Augurio Abeto, Alex Mirasol and
Alex Umadhay, for oppositors-appellees.
Jose M. Luison for intervenors.

"d) That the alleged will, now being offered for probate had already been revoked
by the deceased, Digna Maravilla." 6

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

These are appeals (before Republic Act 5440) from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, in its Special Proceeding No. 4977, denying the
probate of the will of the deceased, Digna Maravilla. These appeals were brought to
the Court of Appeals, but said court certified the same to this Supreme Court on 26
May 1964, in accord with the latters prior decision in Fernandez, etc., Et. Al. v.
Maravilla, L-18799, 31 March 1964, 1 which settled the question of appellate
jurisdiction in favor of the Supreme Court over that of the Court of Appeals, on the
appeal from the appointment of a special co-administrator in the same Special
Proceeding No. 4977 in view of the value of the estate.
Appellant Herminio Maravilla, probate petitioner and husband of the decedent, died
on 16 July 1966, after the case was submitted for decision. Upon motion for
intervention filed by Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and Rose Mary Kohlhaas, this
Supreme Court allowed their intervention on 24 July 1967, upon showing that their
interest as substitute heirs was vested definitely upon the death of Herminio
Maravilla, and that said movants for intervention merely adopt the pleadings and
briefs filed in behalf of the deceased Herminio Maravilla so that the intervention will
not delay the disposition of the case. 2
Appellees Pedro, 3 Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed "Maravilla," who are allegedly
the brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla and oppositors to the
probate, had moved to require the P. C. Laboratory to submit explanations of the
photographs of the will and the signatures thereon previously filed, 4 but this Court,
considering that such explanation would amount to new evidence not heard at the
trial, denied the motion on 3 August 1967. 5
Herminio Maravillas petition for probate was opposed by the appellees in an
amended opposition filed in the course of the trial in the court below and admitted
without objection. The opposition alleged the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses did not sign the alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the presence
of each other;
"b) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged testatrix, affixed her signature
to her alleged will under undue and improper pressure and influence and/or duress
brought to bear upon her by the petitioner, for his own personal benefit and
advantage and that of his nieces, Adelina Sajo and Rose Marie Kohlhaas and his
half-sister Conchita Maravilla Kohlhaas;

21 | P a g e

"c) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, at the time she affixed her signature to her
alleged will was not of sound and disposing mind;

After trial, the court below rendered judgment, holding as unsubstantiated the last
three (3) grounds above-enumerated, but sustaining the first, that is, that the will
was not executed in accordance with Section 618 of Act 190, and, therefore, denied
the probate of the will.
The petitioner and one Adelina Sajro, who was named a devisee under the
questioned will, appealed the judgment, as aforesaid, assigning errors of fact and
law. The oppositors-appellees did not appeal but counter-assigned errors their brief.
There is no controversy that the late Digna Maravilla died in Manapla, Negros
Occidental, on 12 August 1958, leaving an extensive estate. Prior to her death, she
was a resident of Saravia, same province. It is, likewise, undisputed that, at the
time of the probate proceedings, only one (1) (Aquilino Mansueto) of the three (3)
attesting witnesses to the will had survived, the two (2) others (Timoteo Hernaez
and Mariano Buenaflor) having died previously.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "A," which is typewritten in the Spanish
language, purports to have been executed in Manila on the 7th day of October,
1944; it consists of five (5) pages, including the page on which the attestation
clause was completed. The purported signatures of the testatrix appear at the
logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the other pages. The
attestation clause reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"CLAUSULA DE ATESTIGUAMIENTO
"Nosotros, TIMOTEO HERNAEZ, AQUILINO MANSUETO y MARIANO BUENAFLOR los
abajo firmantes todos mayores de edad y sin impedimento alguno para ser testigo
de este testamento, certificamos y atestiguamos: Que en la fecha y lugar arriba
mencionados Da. DIGNA MARAVILLA ha otorgado el presente documento como su
testamento y ultima voluntad que consta de cinco paginas utiles incluyendo esta
pagina de atestiguamiento, escrito a maquinilla en una sola cara de cada hoja,
todas paginadas correlativamente en letras de puo y letra de la testadora,
habiendo dicha testadora, despues de leido el mismo en nuestra presencia, firmado
por triplicado al pie de este testamento y al margen izquierdo de cada una de las
cinco paginas de que se compone en presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros que
tambien firmamos en el margen izquierdo de cada pagina y al pie de este
atestiguamiento los unos en presencia de los otros y todos en presencia de lo
testadora, quien en el acto del otorgamiento y firma de este documento se halla en
plena capacidad intelectual, amenazada ni enganada par otorgar y firmar este
testamento.
"Asi lo atestiguamos y firmamos por triplicado de nuestro puo y letra en Manila hoy
a siete de Octubre de mil novecientos cuarenta y cuatro."cralaw virtua1aw library
At the bottom thereof appear the purported signatures of Timoteo Hernaez, Aquilino
Mansueto and Mariano Buenaflor, attesting witnesses. Their signatures appear also
on the left margin of all the five (5) pages. The paging of the will is by handwritten
words, such as "Pagina Primera," "Pagina Segunda," etc., written at the top of each

page. On the lower half of the third page, before the name "CONCEPCION P.
MARAVILLA," is the typewritten word "hermana," which was crossed out, and over it
was handwritten the word "cuada," bearing, at the left hereof, the initials "D.
M."cralaw virtua1aw library
After the legacies in favor of herein appellant Adelina Sajo, a niece of Digna
Maravilla, the latters sister-in-law, Concepcion P. Maravilla de Kohlhaas, and
Concepcions daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, the will named appellant Herminio
Maravilla as universal heir and executor. In case of the heirs death, or if he should
not become heir for any reason, he is to be substituted by the legatee Adelina Sajo
in one-half of the properties bequeathed, the other half to pass collectively to
legatees Concepcion P. Maravilla and the daughter of the latter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas.
All previous wills are declared revoked.
In view of the trial courts decision of 8 February 1960 (Record on Appeal, pages 2551) refusing probate of the will, the instituted heir, Herminio Maravilla, and the
legatee, Adelina Sajo, perfected their appeal, assigning as errors the findings of the
trial court that (a) instrumental witness Aquilino Mansueto did not actually see
Digna Maravilla sign the will; (b) that Digna Maravilla was not present when
Mansueto signed the will as witness; (c) that Mansueto "most probably" did not see
Mariano Buenaflor sign as witness to the will; (d) the testimony of attorney Manuel
Villanueva on the due execution of Digna Maravillas testament was biased and not
deserving of credit; and (e) in refusing probate to the alleged will for not having
been executed with the requisites prescribed by Section 618 of Act 190.
At the hearing before the court a quo, only one of the three instrumental witnesses,
Col. (ret.) Aquilino Mansueto, appeared and testified, inasmuch as the other two
witnesses (Timoteo Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor) concededly died prior to the
trial of the case. Col. Mansueto identified his own signature and those of Dr. Timoteo
Hernaez and of Digna Maravilla, and asserted that the latter did sign in the presence
of all three witnesses and attorney Villanueva; 7 that Hernaez signed in his
presence and in the presence of the other witnesses and of Digna Maravilla and that
present at the signing were "Dr. Timoteo Hernaez, Mr. Mariano Buenaflor, attorney
Manuel Villanueva and both Herminio Maravilla and Mrs. Digna Maravilla, (the
testatrix) and identified his signature and those of Digna and Hernaez 8 although,
subsequently, the witness admitted that he could not remember very well whether
Mr. Maravilla was there at the time he signed the will. The witness explained that he
could not remember some details because fourteen years had elapsed, and when he
signed as a witness, he did not give it any importance and because of the time he
(Col. Mansueto) was very worried because of rumours that the Japanese Kempeitai
would arrest officers of the USAFFE who did not want to collaborate. 9
Colonel Mansuetos testimony was supported by that of the husband of the testatrix,
Herminio Maravilla, and of attorney Manuel Villanueva. Herminio Maravillas
evidence is that a week before 7 October 1944 his wife, Digna Maravilla, told him of
her desire to "renew" her will because of the critical period in Manila before the
liberation; 10 he invited Buenaflor, Hernaez and Mansueto to attest to the will; 11
sent his messenger, Mariano Buenaflor, to ask attorney Manuel Villanueva to come
to his house at Mabini, Ermita, Manila, in order to prepare the will; 12 at his wifes
request, he gave the list of properties to Villanueva; 13 he knew that the will was
executed in the dining room while he remained in the sala; 14 and Villanueva,
Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor were in his house in the morning of 7 October
1944 and sat with his wife around the table in the dining room, with Villanueva at
one end, Digna beside him and the witnesses facing each other; 15 and after the

22 | P a g e

signing they had lunch, at his invitation, and when they were eating, petitioner
Maravilla saw the three (3) copies of the will on the dining table. 16 However, he did
not see there sign. 17
Attorney Manuel Villanueva, as third witness for the proponent asserted that he had
been the lawyer of the Maravillas; that 5 or 6 days before 7 October 1944 he had
been summoned through Mariano Buenaflor to the house of the Maravillas at 222
Mabini, Ermita, Manila, and there met Digna who requested him to draft a new will,
revoking her old one, to include as additional beneficiaries Adelina Sajo, Concepcion
Maravilla, and the latters youngest daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, who lived with
her (Digna) and whom she considered as her real children, having cared for them
since childhood. Digna gave Villanueva instructions concerning the will, and handed
him her old will and a handwritten list of the certificates of title of her properties,
which list she asked and obtained from her husband. Before leaving, Villanueva
asked Digna to look for three witnesses; their names were furnished him two or
three days later and he sent word that the will could be executed on 7 October 1944
(as it actually was); on that day he brought one original and 2 copies with him, and
handed them to Digna; she read the document and while doing so the witnesses
Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor came. Villanueva talked with them and satisfied
himself that they were competent, whereupon all proceeded to the dining room
table. Attorney Villanueva sat at the head thereof, Digna at his right, and Hernaez at
the right of Digna; at his left was first Mansueto and then Buenaflor. At the lawyers
behest Digna Maravilla read the will in the presence of the witnesses; after reading
she called his attention to a clerical error on page 3, at the second to the last line of
paragraph 9, where Concepcion Maravilla was designated as "hermana" ; the word
was cancelled by the testatrix who wrote "cuada" above the cancelled word, and
placed her initials "D. M." beside it. She also wrote on top of each page the words
"Pagina primera," "Pagina Segunda" and so on, upon Villanuevas instructions, and
then Digna and the witnesses signed in the presence of one another and of attorney
Villanueva. 18 The latter did not ask the husband (Herminio) to join the group when
the will was executed, and Herminio remained near the window in the sala. 19
Digna appeared to the witness very healthy and spoke in Spanish intelligently. The
signing ended around 12:30 p.m., and after it all ate lunch. 20
Upon the evidence, the trial judge concluded that Mansueto did not actually see
Digna Maravilla sign the will in question, basing such conclusion upon the fact that
while Mansueto positively identified his own signature ("I identify this as my
signature") but not that of the testatrix, his five answers to the questions of
counsel, in reference thereto, being "this must be the signature of Mrs. Digna
Maravilla."cralaw virtua1aw library
In our opinion, the trial courts conclusion is far fetched, fanciful and unwarranted.
It was but natural that witness Mansueto should be positive about his own
signature, since he was familiar with it. He had to be less positive about Digna
Maravillas signature since he could not be closely acquainted with the same: for
aught the record shows, the signing of the will was the only occasion he saw her
sign; he had no opportunity to study her signature before or after the execution of
Exhibit "A." Furthermore, he witnessed Dignas signing not less than fourteen years
previously. To demand that in identifying Dignas signature Mansueto should display
a positiveness equal to the certainty shown by him in recognizing his own, exceeds
the bounds of the reasonable. The variation in the expressions used by the witness
is the best evidence that he was being candid and careful, and it is a clear badge of
truthfulness rather than the reverse.

The trial courts error gains no support from Mansuetos statement on crossexamination that "I remember and (I) signed the will in the presence of all the
witnesses and in the presence of attorney Villanueva" (page 29, Volume 1, T.s.n.,
Amago). In the absence of an assurance that no one else was present, this
assertion does not really contradict Mansuetos testimony in chief that "I have read
the entire document before I signed it in the presence of the other witnesses, Digna
Maravilla and Attorney Villanueva" (t.s.n., Amago, Volume 1, pages 18-19). It is well
to note that the cross examiner did not ask Mansueto if no one else besides those
mentioned by him had seen him sign. Any contradiction inferred from both
statements is purely conjectural; it did not come from the witness and is insufficient
to impeach his veracity, the difference in the answers being due to no more than an
accidental lapse of memory. A will may be allowed even if some witnesses not
remember having attested it, if other evidence satisfactorily show due execution (V.
Act 190, Section 632), and that failure of witness to identify his signature does not
bar probate. 21
That Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor, together with the testatrix and the lawyer,
sat next to one another around one table when the will was signed is clearly
established by the uncontradicted testimony of both attorney Villanueva and
Herminio Maravilla; and that detail proves beyond doubt that each one of the
parties concerned did sign in the presence of all the others. It should be
remembered, in this connection, that the test is not whether a witness did see the
signing of the will but whether he was in a position to see if he chose to do so. 22
The trial court rejected the evidence of both Herminio Maravilla and Manuel
Villanueva, giving as a reason that they were biased and interested in having the
probate succeed. The reasoning is not warranted: for Herminio Maravilla certainly
stood to gain more under the previous will of his wife (Exhibit "G") where he was
made the sole beneficiary, As to attorney Villanueva, while he had been a friend of
Herminio from boyhood, he also had been the family lawyer, and his intervention in
the execution of the will of one of his clients became inevitable, for it is not to be
expected that the testatrix should call upon a stranger for the purpose. If Villanueva
wished to perjure in favor of Herminio, all he needed was to color his testimony
against the due execution of the will (Exhibit "A") and not in favor thereof, since, as
previously observed, Dignas first will (Exhibit "G") was more advantageous to the
widower.
We find it difficult to understand the trial courts distrust of a lawyer who did no
more than discharge his professional duty, or its readiness to attribute improper
motives to proponents witnesses. This Court, in Sotelo v. Luzan, 59 Phil. 908, has
remarked that
"It is hardly conceivable that any attorney of any standing would risk his
professional reputation by falsifying a will and then go before a court and give false
testimony."cralaw virtua1aw library
And in the Fernandez v. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380, 385, We ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a
competent attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the
proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony
of a person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course that no
motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that
the mind of the attorney, being conversant with the requisites of proper execution of

23 | P a g e

the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than
other persons to retain those incidents in his memory." (Italics supplied)
Appellees endeavoured to sustain the courts refusal to probate the will by referring
to the evidence of their witness Marino Tupas, a man of "no permanent job", 23 who
narrated that on the last week of September, 1944 one Mariano Buenaflor had been
introduced to him by one Lt. Garaton at his guerrilla outpost in Montalban and
described as a man wanted by the Japanese. Tupas patently exaggerated testimony
is that this Buenaflor stayed with him at his outpost camp until January, 1945, living
and sleeping with him, and was never for a single moment out of his sight. 24 Why
a civilian refugee should remain at a guerrilla outpost for four months; without
engaging in any particular helpful activity on his part, was not explained. Shown
photographs and asked to identify Buenaflor, Tupas hedged by pleading that the
Buenaflor who stayed with him had a long beard. Thus, oppositor-appellees reverse
alibi for the instrumental witness, Mariano Buenaflor, was not only patently
mendacious but did not establish any reliable connection between the instrumental
witness of Dignas will and the Buenaflor who, according to Tupas, stuck to him as a
burr in 1944. No wonder the trial court gave no credit to such evidence.
Oppositors attempts to establish that the testatrix Digna Maravilla was mentally
incompetent to validly execute the will in question met no better fate in the court
below. They introduced one Eufrocina Berja who qualified Digna Maravilla as insane
because she saw Digna Maravilla acting strangely one morning in 1921 (23 years
before the will was executed). In Berjas own words
"Would you not call a person insane who is waving a bunch of flowers and singing
along a road, especially taking into consideration their reputation in the
Community?" (t.s.n., 21 May 1959, page 19)
Even if to this ridiculous appraisal were to be added the fact that (according to this
witness) Digna saw her in 1946, but would not answer her questions and "was in a
deep thought (sic) and her tongue was coming out of her mouth" (Do., pages 1415), her evidence would certainly not justify a finding that Digna Maravilla was not
competent to execute the testament in 1944. By Berjas standards, any one could
be held insane.
Nor is the case for the oppositors improved by the evidence of their witness Eleazar
Lopez, who asserted having visited his aunt, Digna Maravilla (whom he had not
seen since he was four years old), two days after the first bombing of Manila by the
American planes in September, 1944. Lopez claimed to have seen Digna on that
occasion laughing and crying and then staring blankly at the ceiling, without
recognizing the witness; and that he visited her again toward mid-October of the
same year and she had worsened. 25 Coming from a nephew who expected to
succeed if the will in question * were denied probate, and who sought to become
administrator of the estate, even offering to resign from his position in the
government if appointed, 26 this testimony of Lopez was evidently colored by his
monetary interest, thus leading to its correct discrediting by the trial court. His
recollection after 15 years of the alleged symptoms of his aunt is very suspicious, as
it does not even appear that Lopez at the time bothered to inquire from other
persons what caused his aunts alleged abnormal condition. Moreover, the courts
duty to reconcile conflicts of evidence should lead it to hold that the symptoms
described by Lopez were due to a temporary disturbance of the nerves caused by
the unsettling effect of a bombardment not previously experienced, compatible with
the due execution of the will on 7 October 1944. As between the testimony of Lopez

and that of attorney Villanueva, who repeatedly visited and talked to the testatrix
around the time her will was executed, We have no hesitation in accepting the
latters view that Digna Maravilla was competent to make the will when it was
signed. The law itself declares that
"To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause." (Civil Code, Article 799; Bugnao v.
Ubag, 14 Phil. 163.)
We are satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to the effect that the
testament, Exhibit "A," was duly executed by a qualified testatrix and competent
witnesses, in conformity with the statutory requirements.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of the
1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said testament is
hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to law. Costs against oppositors-appellees.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 83843-44

April 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO

LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA
LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR,petitionersappellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS
LABRADOR, respondents-appellees.

24 | P a g e

Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.

Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.

the probate of the will for being undated and reversing the order of reimbursement.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by the
Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by respondent court, to wit:
I

PARAS, J.:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one
Melecio Labrador is dated, as provided for in Article 8102 of the New Civil Code.
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio
Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was
residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica,
Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed
Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs),
Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the
probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will of
the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but
substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition
on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law,
alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the
consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and
Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been
cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said
parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio
and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel
of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father
Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the
complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on the
fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court
rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the
holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The court a
quo had also directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I) to
reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the redemption
price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest
thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March
10, 1988 modified said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of

25 | P a g e

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE

PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO
LABRADOR; and
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE
LOWER COURT DIRECTING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS REPRESENTING THE REDEMPTION PRICE WAS ERRONEOUS.
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, is
quoted as follows:
ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THE
LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANO
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ
I First Page
This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and
shared or the partition in favor of SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the
fishpond located and known place as Tagale.
And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a measurement of
more or less one hectare, and the boundary at the South is the property
and assignment share of ENRICA LABRADOR, also their sister, and the
boundary in the West is the sea, known as the SEA as it is, and the
boundary on the NORTH is assignment belonging to CRISTOBAL
LABRADOR, who likewise is also their brother. That because it is now the
time for me being now ninety three (93) years, then I feel it is the right
time for me to partition the fishponds which were and had been bought or
acquired by us, meaning with their two mothers, hence there shall be no
differences among themselves, those among brothers and sisters, for it is I
myself their father who am making the apportionment and delivering to
each and everyone of them the said portion and assignment so that there
shall not be any cause of troubles or differences among the brothers and
sisters.
II Second Page

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning
and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this
being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision
and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who
made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is this
that should be followed and complied with in order that any differences or
troubles may be forestalled and nothing will happen along these troubles
among my children, and that they will be in good relations among
themselves, brothers and sisters;
And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos and all
coconut trees and all others like the other kind of bamboo by name of
Bayog, it is their right to get if they so need, in order that there shall be
nothing that anyone of them shall complain against the other, and against
anyone of the brothers and sisters.
III THIRD PAGE
And that referring to the other places of property, where the said property
is located, the same being the fruits of our earnings of the two mothers of
my children, there shall be equal portion of each share among themselves,
and or to be benefitted with all those property, which property we have
been able to acquire.
That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing (WILL)
which I am here hereof manifesting of the truth and of the fruits of our
labor which their two mothers, I am signing my signature below hereof,
and that this is what should be complied with, by all the brothers and
sisters, the children of their two mothers JULIANA QUINTERO PILARISA
and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your father who made this writing
(WILL), and he is, MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)
The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated,
although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance
with Article 810.1wphi1 It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the
second page of the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning
and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this
being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision
and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who
made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
(emphasis supplied) (p. 46, Rollo)

26 | P a g e

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the
hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator
and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was
not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an
"agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of
other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with
Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the
execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral
act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The
act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's
instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of
the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the
testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing the
redemption price as erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect. When
private respondents sold the property (fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat
for P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to another and which they
had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void. Petitioners, thus
"redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession
of the property for its disposition in accordance with the will. Petitioners therefore
deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988
is hereby REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and
ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the
petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND
BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE
JESUS, petitioners,

vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.
Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.
Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.
Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C.
Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing
the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special
Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de
Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the
brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After
Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the
lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the
hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he
found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages
21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and entirely
written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was
found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be
respected although it is not written by a lawyer. ...
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro
Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter
dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de
Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her
signature. They further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the
language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was
the date when said Will was executed by their mother.

27 | P a g e

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate"

assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not
executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation
and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged
testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said
Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the
probate of the holographic Will which he found to have been duly executed in
accordance with law.
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia
that the alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated
as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that
the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should
be strictly complied with.
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order
and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word
"dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year. The dispositive
portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will
of Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for not having
been executed as required by the law. The order of August 24,
1973 is hereby set aside.
The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic
Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article
810 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out
of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article
688 of the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the
"year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase
Ao mes y dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The
petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic
Will is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the
date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent

contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the
California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme Courts had
consistently ruled that the required date includes the year, month, and day, and that
if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further
contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the
Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the
execution of holographic Wills are strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We
should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of
Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the
provisions of the law on wigs in this Project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view
of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes,
but with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator.
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect
to the formalities in the execution of wills. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 103)
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v.
Bustos (27 SCRA 327) he emphasized that:
xxx xxx xxx
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator
expressed in his last will and testament on the ground that any
disposition made by the testator is better than that which the law
can make. For this reason, intestate succession is nothing more
than a disposition based upon the presumed will of the decedent.
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in
order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of testamentary privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will
has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the
possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should
be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,

28 | P a g e

xxx xxx xxx

... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record
are to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the
surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the wilt
and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination
should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or
fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the
document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or
other non-essential defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites,
although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought
to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the
testator.
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been
expounded by this Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as
that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming
insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720).
There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad
faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and
Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and
in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the
holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositorrespondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the
date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month,
and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of
the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61"

appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic
Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City.
In accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter
named provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to
perpetuate my memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix
as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed
probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of
the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas,
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.
Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the
sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her
holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City,
being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my
last will and testament.

29 | P a g e

Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or

alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the
same by his full signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect
and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3,
reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for examination. The NBI reported that the
handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the
initial were made by one and the same person. Consequently,
Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K.
Kalaw. The only question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be
admitted to probate although the alterations and/or insertions or
additions above-mentioned were not authenticated by the full
signature of the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code.
The petitioner contends that the oppositors are estopped to assert
the provision of Art. 814 on the ground that they themselves
agreed thru their counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR
EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties did not agree, nor
was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be in
estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the
Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions,
alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated
by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court
will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".

WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the

holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.

contenga palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no

salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo
tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal omision solo puede
afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al
testamento mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo aparte
de aquel que determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez
del testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se
Ilegaria al absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que
en nada afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva del testamento,
vinieran a anular este, y ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho
parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia con
el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones
apostillas entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las
escrituras matrices, siempre que no se salven en la forma
prevenida, paro no el documento que las contenga, y con mayor
motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o
entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni susciten duda alguna
acerca del pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros
accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia
alguna(l).

SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the
alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her
holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition.
Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground
that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no
necessity for interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated
November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on
certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not theoriginal unaltered text
after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with
her as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is
not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical commentary
when he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de
jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with
another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the
full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could
remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required
by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations,
erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the
altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is,
with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her
real intention cannot be determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his
commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new
Civil Code was derived:
... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la
sentencia que no declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo que

30 | P a g e

Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en

este ultimo fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o
entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4
alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la express voluntad del
testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la sentencia
de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento
olografo por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del
guarismo ultimo del ao en que fue extendido 3(Emphasis ours).
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent
Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CRUZ, J.:
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio
Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving
legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was
opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent.
Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact
left two holographic wills. 1
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, a petition for the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed as SP No.
1091, this petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was
the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate. 2
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was
later appointed special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found
that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera
who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question
was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido.
Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father. The
holographic wills were also admitted to probate. 3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
JOSE RIVERA petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.
Regalado P. Morales for private respondent.

31 | P a g e

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate
Appellate Court. 4 Its decision is now the subject of this petition, which urges the
reversal of the respondent court.
In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose
sought to show that the said person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his
mother. He submitted for this purpose Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the
couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate where the couple was indicated
as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who testified that
Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together
several times. 5 Jose himself stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-brother
and kissed his hand as a sign of respect whenever they met. He insisted that
Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were illegitimate children, sired by Venancio
with Maria Jocson. 6
Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born to
Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, who were legally married and lived as such for
many years. He explained that he could not present his parents' marriage certificate
because the record of marriages for 1942 in Mabalacat were destroyed when the
town was burned during the war, as certified by Exhibit 6. 7 He also submitted his
own birth certificate and those of his sisters Zenaida and Yolanda Rivera, who were

each described therein as the legimitate children of Venancio Rivera and Maria
Jocson. 8 Atty. Regalado P. Morales, then 71 years of age, affirmed that he knew the
deceased and his parents, Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, and it was
during the Japanese occupation that Venancio introduced to him Maria Jocson as his
wife. 9 To prove that there were in fact two persons by the same name of Venancio
Rivera, Adelaido offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate showing that his
parents were Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, 10as contrasted with the
marriage certificate submitted by Jose, which indicated that the Venancio Rivera
subject thereof was the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. 11 He also
denied kissing Jose's hand or recognizing him as a brother. 12
We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate because,
as he explained it, the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were
burned during the war. Even so, he could still rely on the presumption of marriage,
since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson lived together as
husband and wife for many years, begetting seven children in all during that time.
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of children, ... .
The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio
was described therein as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he was not the
same Venancio Rivera described in Exhibit 4, his baptismal certificate, as the son of
Magno Rivera. While we realize that such baptismal certificate is not conclusive
evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue here) it may nonetheless be
considered to determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are
one and the same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be called
by different names. The Court is not convinced. There is no evidence that Venancio's

32 | P a g e

father was called either Magno or Florencio. What is more likely is that two or more
persons may live at the same time and bear the same name, even in the same
community. That is what the courts below found in the cases at bar.
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the
legitimate son of Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his
father was still alive. By his own account, Jose supported himself and presumably
also his mother Maria Vital as a gasoline attendant and driver for many years. All
the time, his father was residing in the same town and obviously prospering
and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with another woman
and raising another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without
protest, taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status. If, as he insists, he and
Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, there is no reason why the father did not
help the son and instead left Jose to fend for himself as a humble worker while his
other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life. Such paternal
discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is considered assuming the
claims to be true that Jose was the oldest and, by his own account, the only
legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As
Venancio's legitimate wife if indeed she was she should have objected when
her husband abandoned her and founded another family by another woman, and in
the same town at that. Seeing that the children of Maria Jocson were being raised
well while her own son Jose was practically ignored and neglected, she nevertheless
did not demand for him at least support, if not better treatment, from his legitimate
father. It is unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in favor of
another woman and for a caring mother not to protect her son's interests from his
wayward father's neglect. The fact is that this forsaken wife never demanded
support from her wealthy if errant husband. She did not file a complaint for bigamy
or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, the alleged partners in
crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and complaisant.
Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even presented
at the trial to support her son's allegations that she was the decedent's lawful wife.
Jose says this was not done because she was already old and bedridden then. But
there was no impediment to the taking of her deposition in her own house. No effort
was made toward this end although her testimony was vital to the petitioner's
cause. Jose dismisses such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this Court does
not agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to Venancio Rivera was null
and void, Jose had the burden of proving that serious allegation.
We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding
that the Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same
person who married Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to
a humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with the family of Venancio
Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and prominent. Except for the

curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is no evidence linking the two
families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.
Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because
it found them to have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in
accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of
presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the authenticity
of the wills had not been questioned.
The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were
questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that
Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the
holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings,
Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed
that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court
should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three
of such witnesses shall be required.
The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not
the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a
mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto
did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of
Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written
and signed by their father, was sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999]

EUGENIA
RAMONAL
CODOY,
and
MANUEL
RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE
SALCEDO, and EUFEMIA PATIGAS,respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde
Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been established
and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate
said will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic
will in question be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed
presentation of his evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on
demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has
shown no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf
(Sec. 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for
appellant in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing
the probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal. [2]
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a
petition[3] for probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January
16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August
30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the
person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedents property, including all real and personal
property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.[4]

FIRST DIVISION

33 | P a g e

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
opposition[5] to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a
forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a third
hand of an interested party other than the true hand of Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the
will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who
executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at
the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every
disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the
deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary
evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer [6] to
evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal
basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence
having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for probate of the
document (Exhibit S) on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits. [7]
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, [8] and in support
of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following
witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal
Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an
account of their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
where the special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased was filed. He produced and identified the. records of the case. The
documents presented bear the signature of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the handwriting of
the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered.

Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to

produce and identify the voters affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters
affidavit was not produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer
available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of Matildes husband, the latter lived
with her in her parents house for eleven (11) years, from 1958 to 1969. During
those eleven (11) years of close association with the deceased, she acquired
familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her
(deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various
tenants of commercial buildings, and the deceased always issued receipts. In
addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting the
records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the deceased to her
creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of
Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which
was personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all
the dispositions therein, the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the
deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and
documents signed by the deceased in connection with the intestate proceedings of
her late husband, as a result of which he is familiar with the handwriting of the
latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will was similar to
that of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that
she processed the application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar
with the signature of the deceased, since the deceased signed documents in her
presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had
lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after
a long period of time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She
testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine
signature of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as
follows:
Instruction

34 | P a g e

August 30, 1978

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.

"August 30,1978

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikitan Street.

Gene and Manuel:

"Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.
Mama

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision [9] ruling that the
appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109
Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law,
the Court of Appeals held:

3. My jewelrys shall be divided among:

1. Eufemia Patigas
2. Josefina Salcedo
3. Evangeline Calugay
(Sgd)Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R.
Calugay
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
"August 30, 1978
5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline
R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no longer around.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

x x x even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are

of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may
have been present at the execution of the holographic will, none being required by
law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three
witnesses; they must be witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of the
testator and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not
express) that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. There
may be no available witness acquainted with the testators hand; or even if so
familiarized, the witness may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance
with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is
evidently the reason why the second paragraph of article 811 prescribes that
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph,
and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be
found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be
willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert
evidence to supply the deficiency.

August 30, 1978

6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.

35 | P a g e

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be
presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from
the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 PHIL 291;
Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement

can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because

the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made
by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no
witness need be present (art.10), and the rule requiring production of
three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to
be avoided.
Again, under Art.811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words if
the court deem it necessary, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that
the court should be convinced of the wills authenticity.Where the prescribed number
of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will
is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other
hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing,
the court may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of
the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much
interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into
effect.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will
were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be
present in the execution of the holographic will. And the rule requiring the
production of three witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems
essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to
exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. And because
the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no
unfavorable inference can be drawn from a partys failure to offer expert evidence,
until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay
witnesses.[10]
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal
Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the
handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and
witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of
the holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will
to probate.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners raise the following issues:

36 | P a g e

(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil.
102, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable
to the case.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private
respondents had been able to present credible evidence to prove that
the date, text, and signature on the holographic will were written
entirely in the hand of the testatrix.
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the
signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the
Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for
the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly
declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil
Code is mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that
shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when
used in a statute is mandatory.[11]
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or
mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect
to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the
wishes of the testator.
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to
determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective
consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the
testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents
testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the
case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he
merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He
was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic was that of the deceased.
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was
presented to identify the signature of the deceased in the voters affidavit, which
was not even produced as it was no longer available.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

Q. Why do you say so?

Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your
parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the court what
was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy
that time?

A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De

Ramonal.

A. Collecting rentals.

A. In handwritten.[14]

Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?

Q. From where?

xxx

A. From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets. [12]
xxx

Q. In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and

deed of sale which you said what else did you do to acquire familiarity of
the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?

Q. Who sometime accompany her?

A. Posting records.

A. I sometimes accompany her

Q. Aside from that?

Q. In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?

A. Carrying letters.

A. Yes, sir.[13]

Q. Letters of whom?
xxx

Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are
referring to as one of the receipts which she issued to them?

A. Matilde
Q. To whom?
A. To her creditors.[15]

A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose
signature is that Mrs. Binanay?

Q. You testified that at the time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you
a document with its title tugon is this the document you are referring to?

A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you say that that is a signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal?
A. I am familiar with her signature.
Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de
Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her tenants?

Q. Showing to you this exhibit S, there is that handwritten tugon, whose

handwriting is this?
A. My aunt.
Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?

A. Yes, sir.

37 | P a g e

A. Because I am familiar with her signature.[16]

Q. For what purpose?

What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased,
which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw
the deceased sign a document or write a note.

A. Just to seek advice.

Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the
fact that the will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was
in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:

A. About the will.[18]

Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late
Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Advice of what?

In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the
will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put
in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only
after the death of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:

Q. Who was in possession of that will?

Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is
that correct?

A. I.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?
A. It was in my mothers possession.

Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and
she could go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct?

Q. So, it was not in your possession?

A. Yes, sir.[19]

A. Sorry, yes.

xxx

Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally
in the possession of your mother?

Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that
there are retracings in the word Vda.?

A. 1985.[17]

A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.

xxx

Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that
will to you and therefore you have that in your possession?
A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she
died.

Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is
continued towards letter D.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. After taking that document you kept it with you?

Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
A. I presented it to the fiscal.

38 | P a g e

A. Yes, sir.[20]

A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to the market and then to
her transactions.
xxx
Q. What else? What services that you rendered?

Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic
will. Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated
January 8,1978 which is only about eight months from August 30,1978. Do
you notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully written
and legible?

A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to
her lawyer.
Q. What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?

A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.

A. I used to be her personal driver.

Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy
was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was exhausted?

Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the
handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A. In writing.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and
you just tried to explain yourself out because of the apparent
inconsistencies?

Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?

A. Because I lived with her since birth.[22]

A. That was I think. (sic)

Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the
alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no
retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid
movement. x x x And in fact , the name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to
one of the petitioners?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned
signature appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but
in the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and
tremors, do you notice that?
A. Yes, sir.[21]
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and
signed in the handwriting of the testator. She testified that:

xxx
Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned tugon dated Agosto
30, 1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this court
whose signature is this?
A. Yes, sir, that is her signature.
Q. Why do you say that is her signature?
A. I am familiar with her signature.[23]
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with
the handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She
never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:
Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo
Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the services if
any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?

39 | P a g e

A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my

godfather. Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity.

Q. Can you tell the name of the husband?

A. The late husband is Justo Ramonal.[24]
xxx

Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what
were the other assistance wherein you were rendering professional service
to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are
documents to show that I have assisted then I can recall.[28]

Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde
Ramonal have legitimate children?
A. As far as I know they have no legitimate children.[25]
xxx
Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?

Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled tugon, kindly go over this
document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar with the
handwriting contained in that document marked as exhibit S?
A. I am not familiar with the handwriting.
Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.

Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in
what case is that, Fiscal?
A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under
the court before.[26]
xxx
Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is
marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there appears a
signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose
signature is this?
A. That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?
A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal. [27]
xxx

40 | P a g e

xxx

A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de
Ramonal.
Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal,
can you tell the court whose signature is this?
A. Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.
Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you
tell the court whose signature is that?
A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de
Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature
is this?
A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are
similar.[29]
xxx

Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda
de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of Matilde
vda de Ramonal?

A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The
signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable.There were
uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.

A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.

Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de
Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be her
signature because it is similar to the signature of the project of
partition which you have made?
A. That is true.[30]
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will
to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested
holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, [31] ruling that the
requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, [32] we said that the object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested,
that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of
the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one
of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the
testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early
as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the
handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her
during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the crossexamination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to
compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of
the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of
the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.

41 | P a g e

Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, [33] and
the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit
dated December 30, 1980,[34] and a letter dated June 16, 1978,[35] the strokes are
different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that
there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore,
cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to
adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will
of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of

Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of
which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19,
1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is
the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25,
1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and
Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia
Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was
of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence,
and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and,
the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as
she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic
will to probate. It found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide
only the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no
reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to
comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

Montilla Law Office for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

42 | P a g e

For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in

question is different from the will actually executed by the
testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that
the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which

properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the
question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been
executed by the testatrix other than the will herein presented.
Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity of the will
presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in
Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the
testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners,
however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic
will in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in
the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have
convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix
have been presented and have explicitly and categorically
identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in
question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature
of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the
requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely
written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has
been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix,
(private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court
that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he
visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around
which time the holographic will in question was executed by the
testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at
the time of making the will, knew the value of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and thecharacter of
the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix
even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even
identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had
conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise
identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a
nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will
and succession, there is more than sufficient showing that she
knows the character of the testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution
and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved
in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.

43 | P a g e

Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for

the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged
that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other
person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where
improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix.
(Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the
testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the will, i.e.,
at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981.
It was also established that she is a very intelligent person and
has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to
some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified to
in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced
or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be
noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in question
herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific
testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of
another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court
cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will
herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on
succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be
preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no
convincing grounds were presented and proven for the
disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the
aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to
probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's
will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to
meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply
with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a
holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in
a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his
full signature.

It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated,
or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any
of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to
make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person
for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick,
and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the
time of fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not
been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise
mentally incapable of making a will, at the time
of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under
duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;

44 | P a g e

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured

by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not
intend that the instrument he signed should be
his will at the time of affixing his signature
thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a
petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:
(1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the
will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand
was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that
Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it
disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But,
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it
is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of
the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include
the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805
and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator
himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:

A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely

written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It
is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper

corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety
by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement
of the year, month and day of its execution.

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the

disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the
testator.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the

testator must identify them over his signature.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If
the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132
SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not
been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical
commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el
testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made
on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does
not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and
signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)
separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the
holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688
of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic
wills are taken. They read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it
himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of
full age.

45 | P a g e

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles
813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly
dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its
entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional
instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do,
and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent
herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in
the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to
question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by
respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she
shares with her father's other heirs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house
and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988,
admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby
REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

RULE 77
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
Bulacan, respondent.
Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No.
1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans

46 | P a g e

lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children,
Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.

The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special
administration.

On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing
to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his
death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife,
he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and
testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his
will states:

As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the
Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount
of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr.
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court
granted the motion.

If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such

circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine
the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I
predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption
(Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article
VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine
the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he
predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.
(Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were
trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the
probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On
April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were
issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan,
and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the
two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she
be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple
consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by
Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of
special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond.

47 | P a g e

Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that
said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing
the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be
ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in
savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total
amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista,
Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion
(Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of
May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and
therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the
proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the
motions of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1)
that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and
"no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the
solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this
jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3)
that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband
predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees,
legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a
will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983.
However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and
to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix
of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion
stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the

probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the
Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such
"misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due process in violation of
Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.,
the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the
hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment
committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized
his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan,
Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate
in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and
void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside;
and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the
estate of the deceased spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an
inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of
her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan
collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not
entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in
the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the
rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance
of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is
there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision,
should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even
if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed
all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan
heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the
estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).

York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are
payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanans executor to be then distributed pursuant to
EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming
that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted
that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors,
devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that
the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special
administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels
and monies which she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4)
that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of
the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements
from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner
moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the
settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York
(Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a
manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the
Surrogates Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of November
24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate
of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix,
requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by
her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic.
Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York
on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the
wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such
evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the
same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two
witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three
witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement
of the Philippine law.

In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner
and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to
settle and divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the
"court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given
as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).

On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New
York governing the execution of last wills and testaments.

Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for
failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of
the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the
agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New

On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of
petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival
in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day.
Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the
discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the

48 | P a g e

reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would

conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that
"(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was
terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The
same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn
over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all
intents and purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the
final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later,
petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30,
1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15
days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the
wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion
and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad,
filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A.
and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel)
should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of
the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the
significant probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and
admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all
procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate"
(Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of
August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the
motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner
proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed,
genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters
testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and
proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances
and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in
question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the
law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).

49 | P a g e

On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence
on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent
Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove
the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional
evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence,
respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no
compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to
"file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p.
391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for
reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law
obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the
opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on
the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of
two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and
established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed
out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for
probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of
July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no
party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out
that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the
same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective
wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of
the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for
reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Pea, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time
and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her
compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the
counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her
supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills
of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be
undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).

Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at
the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York
on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need
not be probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before
respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:

(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters
testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and
"I-2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge
Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been
issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor
(Exhs. "H-3" and
"I-10");

(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of

Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs.
"F" and "G");

(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that

proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I5");

(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and
Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L.
Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a
court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine,
and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the
respective wills of Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");

(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were
properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said
instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills
valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5");
and

(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E.

Moore stating that they have in their records and files the said
wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G2");

(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the

genuineness and authenticity of each others signatures in the
exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary
and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo,
pp. 13-16).

(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and
Exh. "G-3" "G-6");

Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Courts
Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November
29, 1984.

(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to

the genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the
two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only
be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil
Code of the Philippines:

(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of

the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is
duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of
probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs
duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of
the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws
or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will

50 | P a g e

in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of
a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on
the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954];
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the
petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in
the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56
SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to
submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request
respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special
proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive
the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is
probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393
[1978]).
There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judges view that the Rules on
allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted
to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the
rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the
delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155
SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills.
Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property
which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their
joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact
petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of

51 | P a g e

Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or
formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance"
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the
will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and
4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the
"known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and
to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are
entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of
Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the
notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint
probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and
sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings
pertinent to the probate proceedings. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 18600 March 9, 1922
B. E. JOHANNES, husband of Carmen Theodora Johannes, deceased, as a
administrator;
CARLOS D'ALMEIDA and IDA JOHANNES, with her husband, J. E.
JOHANNES,relators, vs. Honorable GEORGE R. HARVEY, as judge of First
Instance of Manila, ALFREDO D'ALMEIDA, brother of Carmen Johannes, as
administrator, and PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, as late guardian for a
certain cash deposit of Carmen Johannes, Respondent.
Amzi B. Kelly for relators.
Fisher & Dewitt and Francis B. Mahoney for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:

The relevant facts disclosed by this petition for certiorari and the return thereto may
be stated as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee Carmen D'Almeida, died intestate in
Singapore, Straits Settlements, on August 31, 1921. Of her immediate family there
remained the husband, B. E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida
and Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the
husband, the brother Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of Singapore,
while the brother Alfred was in Manila. The Singapore heirs apparently joined in
asking that letters of administration be granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits
Settlements to B. E. Johannes, the lawful husband of the deceased. At least, on
September 19, 1921, the husband of the deceased. At least, on September 19,
1921, the husband was named the administrator of the property of the deceased
wife, which was locally situate within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
Straits Settlements. (Under the British law [22 & 23 Charles II c 10, 29 Charles II c
3, and James II c 17], it would seem that the husband is entitled to the whole of the
estate of his wife if she die intestate to the exclusive of any other next of kin.) On
October 1, 1921, the brother Alfred D' Almeida was, on his petition, appointed
administrator of the Manila estate of the deceased consisting of P109,732.55. This
sum it appears, was on deposit in the Manila banks under and by virtue of
guardianship proceedings for the late Carmen Theodora Johannes, which were
finally terminated by the discharge of the guardian, the Philippine Trust Company,
on January 16, 1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The burden of the relator's contention is that the Honorable George R. Harvey, as
judge of First Instance of the City of Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
appointing Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on deposit in
the Philippines, and that an administration in the jurisdiction is unnecessary.
Accordingly, relators pray the court to annul the appointment of Alfred D'Almeida
and to issue an order directing the Judge of First Instance to have placed to the
credit of B. E. Johannes as administrator of the estate of Carmen Theodora
Johannes all of the funds of the late Carmen D'Almeida Johannes, now on deposit
and subject to the order of the court, with P5,000 as damages. The respondents,
Judge Harvey, and the administrator Alfred D'Almeida, in compliance with the order
to show cause why the writ should not issue, contend that the respondent judge has
not in any manner acted in excess of the jurisdiction duly conferred upon and
exercised by him in the manner provided by law, and that an order appointing an
administrator is a final and appealable order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Certain general observations may possibly serve to clarify the
situation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a
person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a
foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the

52 | P a g e

jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while

any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the
latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any
effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the United States. The
ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country
other than that of his las domicile, property to be administered in the nature of
assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his
heirs. (23 C. J., 1010, et seq.; 24 C. J., 1109, et seq.; Wilkins vs. Ellett [1882], 108
U. S., 256; Perez vs. Aguerria [1901], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 443; Vaughn vs. Barret
[1833], 5 Vt., 333.)chanrobles virtual law library
The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the late
Carmen Theodora Johannes in Singapore, Straits Settlements. What is sought in the
Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary
administration, conformable to the provisions of sections 601, 602, and 603 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary
administrator to pay the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and
remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of
kin. Such administration appears to be required in this jurisdiction since the
provisions of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permit of the
settlement of certain estates without legal proceedings, have not been met. The
decision of this court in Baldemor vs. Malangyaon ([1916]), 34 Phil., 368), on which
relators rely, is then not in point because predicated directly on the provisions of the
section last cited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an
administrator is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to
name someone else. This preference has particular force under Spanish law
precedents. (4 Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, 1085.)
However, the Code of Civil Procedure, in section 642, while naming the surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, as one to whom administration can be
granted, leaves this to the discretion of the court to determine, for it may be found
that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility. Moreover, nonresidence
is a factor to be considered in determining the propriety of the appointment, and in
this connection, it is to be noted that the husband of the deceased, the
administrator of the principal administration, resides in Singapore. Undoubtedly, if
the husband should come into this jurisdiction, the court would give consideration to
this petition that he be named the ancillary administrator for local purposes.
Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the domicilliary representative, if he
applies therefor, or to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of express
statutory requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other person.
(24 C. J., 1114.)chanrobles virtual law library
There is still another aspect to the case. This is that pursuant to section 783 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance appointing an
administration of the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination

of the rights of the parties thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is
appealable. (Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Lioc Suy [1907], 8 Phil., 594.)chanrobles virtual
law library
As we reach the conclusion that the Court of First Instance has not acted in excess
of its jurisdiction, and as there in an appeal, certiorari will not lie. Accordingly, the
writ prayed for cannot be granted. Costs against the relators. So ordered.

Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary administrator,

the County Trust Company of New York, United States of America, of the estate of
the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on March 27, 1960,
to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines the stock certificates
owned by her in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the
legitimate claims of local creditors, the lower court, then presided by the Honorable
Arsenio Santos, now retired, issued on May 18, 1964, an order of this tenor: "After
considering the motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as
well as the opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1)
considers as lost for all purposes in connection with the administration and
liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates
covering the 33,002 shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said certificates cancelled, and (3) directs
said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by
said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate
Division of this Court."1
From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary
administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, but by the Philippine
corporation, the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot possibly prosper. The
challenged order represents a response and expresses a policy, to paraphrase
Frankfurter, arising out of a specific problem, addressed to the attainment of specific
ends by the use of specific remedies, with full and ample support from legal
doctrines of weight and significance.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23145

November 29, 1968

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D.

TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.
Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-appellant.

The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet
Consolidated, Inc., Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York
City, left among others, two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant,
the certificates being in the possession of the County Trust Company of New York,
which as noted, is the domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased. 2 Then
came this portion of the appellant's brief: "On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad
instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator, and on January
22, 1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose
between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in
the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock
certificates in question. On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila
ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust Company, to "produce and
deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The
domiciliary administrator did not comply with the order, and on February 11, 1964,
the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the
certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of
Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or] considered as
lost."3

FERNANDO, J.:
It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is
immaterial" as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession of the

53 | P a g e

stock certificates in question; appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary

administrator because the said stock certificates are in existence, they are today in
the possession of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company, in New
York, U.S.A...."4
It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot
be declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure
to observe certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be
issued. Hence, its appeal.
As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The
challenged order constitutes an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought to
be emasculated by the wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing to
accord obedience to a court decree. How, then, can this order be stigmatized as
illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called
for by the realities of the situation. What cannot be ignored is that conduct
bordering on wilful defiance, if it had not actually reached it, cannot without undue
loss of judicial prestige, be condoned or tolerated. For the law is not so lacking in
flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such a solution, the more so as deeper
reflection would make clear its being buttressed by indisputable principles and
supported by the strongest policy considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor
of the judiciary no less than that of the country. Through this challenged order,
there is thus dispelled the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by
the persistence of the domiciliary administrator to hold on to the stock certificates
after it had, as admitted, voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower
court by entering its appearance through counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a
petition for relief from a previous order of March 15, 1963.
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and
effectiveness to what was decreed. For without it, what it had been decided would
be set at naught and nullified. Unless such a blatant disregard by the domiciliary
administrator, with residence abroad, of what was previously ordained by a court
order could be thus remedied, it would have entailed, insofar as this matter was
concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete paralysis of judicial authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee
ancillary administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent
within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his
duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors. 5 As Justice Tuason
speaking for this Court made clear, it is a "general rule universally recognized" that
administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a
decedent found within the state or country where it was granted," the corollary

54 | P a g e

being "that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property in another state or country." 6
It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in
an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have
more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning
property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration
is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last
domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is
termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of
administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the
country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state
has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper,
whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile,
property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his
individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs." 7
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ...
standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be
respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing
full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares
of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court
orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue 8 finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor
could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather conclusive
fashion for the legality of the challenged order, how does appellant, Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. propose to carry the extremely heavy burden of persuasion of
precisely demonstrating the contrary? It would assign as the basic error allegedly
committed by the lower court its "considering as lost the stock certificates covering
33,002 shares of Benguet belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade
Perkins, ..."9 More specifically, appellant would stress that the "lower court could not
"consider as lost" the stock certificates in question when, as a matter of fact, his
Honor the trial Judge knew, and does know, and it is admitted by the appellee, that
the said stock certificates are in existence and are today in the possession of the
domiciliary administrator in New York." 10
There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court. That
certainly does not suffice to call for the reversal of the appealed order. Since there is
a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to

deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the
ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or
arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new
certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the
ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.
Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made
to depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the party or entity, in this case domiciled
abroad, which thus far has shown the utmost persistence in refusing to yield
obedience. Certainly, appellant would not be heard to contend in all seriousness that
a judicial decree could be treated as a mere scrap of paper, the court issuing it
being powerless to remedy its flagrant disregard.
It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower court did
not correspond exactly with the facts. To be more blunt, the quality of truth may be
lacking in such a conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered however, again to
borrow from Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of
legitimate ends have played an important part in its development." 11
Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state fictions "were
devices to advance the ends of justice, [even if] clumsy and at times
offensive."12 Some of them have persisted even to the present, that eminent jurist,
noting "the quasi contract, the adopted child, the constructive trust, all of
flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of "as if" today." 13 He likewise noted "a class
of fictions of another order, the fiction which is a working tool of thought, but which
at times hides itself from view till reflection and analysis have brought it to the
light."14
What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that fictions
as such played in the law. There should be then on the part of the appellant a
further refinement in the catholicity of its condemnation of such judicial technique.
If ever an occasion did call for the employment of a legal fiction to put an end to the
anomalous situation of a valid judicial order being disregarded with apparent
impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that this particular alleged error
does not carry persuasion.
3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention
by its invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the
procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it
would stress that in the event of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding
ownership of such certificate or certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or
destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or certificates would await the "final
decision by [a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]." 15
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such
by-law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from

55 | P a g e

the order now in question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of
appellant that as far as it is concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled to the
possession of the stock certificates ..." Even if such were not the case, it would be a
legal absurdity to impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming
that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command of a court
decree, the latter is to be followed.
It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution overrides a
statute, to which, however, the judiciary must yield deference, when appropriately
invoked and deemed applicable. It would be most highly unorthodox, however, if a
corporate by-law would be accorded such a high estate in the jural order that a
court must not only take note of it but yield to its alleged controlling force.
The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled unless
the appealed order be set aside for its inconsistency with one of its by-laws does not
impress us. Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid
defense, assuming that such apprehension of a possible court action against it could
possibly materialize. Thus far, nothing in the circumstances as they have developed
gives substance to such a fear. Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to
appellant do not suffice to nullify the lawful exercise of judicial authority.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught
with implications at war with the basic postulates of corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being
created by operation of law...."16 It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely
dependent on its will. As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was
conceived as an artificial person, owing its existence through creation by a
sovereign power."17As a matter of fact, the statutory language employed owes much
to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth College decision defined a
corporation precisely as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law."18
The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A corporation
is not in fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as though it were a person
by process of fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person distinct and separate
from its individual stockholders.... It owes its existence to law. It is an artificial
person created by law for certain specific purposes, the extent of whose existence,
powers and liberties is fixed by its charter."19 Dean Pound's terse summary, a juristic
person, resulting from an association of human beings granted legal personality by
the state, puts the matter neatly.20
There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which
to quote from Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social and legal entity,
independent of state recognition and concession." 21 A corporation as known to
Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received the

imprimatur of the state according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that

it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator. More
than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs,
certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law
still of persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of
the judiciary than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the appropriate
court action to enforce its right. Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control
in those instances, where a duty under the law as ascertained in an appropriate
legal proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to
confer upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but license which cannot be
tolerated. It is to argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the source
of its very existence; it is to contend that what any of its governmental organs may
lawfully require could be ignored at will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly
merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 22 it was shown that
in a guardianship proceedings then pending in a lower court, the United States
Veterans Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum of money paid
to the minor under guardianship, alleging that the lower court had previously
granted its petition to consider the deceased father as not entitled to guerilla
benefits according to a determination arrived at by its main office in the United
States. The motion was denied. In seeking a reconsideration of such order, the
Administrator relied on an American federal statute making his decisions "final and
conclusive on all questions of law or fact" precluding any other American official to
examine the matter anew, "except a judge or judges of the United States
court."23 Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator appealed.
In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus: "We are
of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code,
invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veterans' Administrator
final and conclusive when made on claims property submitted to him for resolution;
but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not
acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions
against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the
conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by
United States courts), and those actions where the Veterans' Administrator seeks a
remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein.
Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings
of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our
courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and render
them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator."

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It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as
final and conclusive, determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is
infinitely worse if through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over
juridical persons within our jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their orders could
be made to depend on the whim or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine
of a situation more offensive to the dignity of the bench or the honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which
appellant Benguet Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by its
failure to accept the validity of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal.
Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does not succeed. The deplorable
consequences attendant on appellant prevailing attest to the necessity of negative
response from us. That is what appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed.
It is always easy to conjure extreme and even oppressive possibilities. That is not
decisive. It does not settle the issue. What carries weight and conviction is the
result arrived at, the just solution obtained, grounded in the soundest of legal
doctrines and distinguished by its correspondence with what a sense of realism
requires. For through the appealed order, the imperative requirement of justice
according to law is satisfied and national dignity and honor maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the
Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against
oppositor-appelant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which
admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C.
Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia,
Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes

57 | P a g e

Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication

under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself
the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly
executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time
of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while
temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during
her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on July 10, 1975,
according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was
presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who
was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as
executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein
petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the
will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void;
and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the
same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco
Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests)
stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence,
an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was
made.

the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila

(Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the
United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the
late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by
the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in
favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of
the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills
(Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from
any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix
of the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the
Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81
of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the
withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and
deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the
order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his
opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him,
the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed
in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also
alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his
counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He
made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.

On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:

At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that
Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United
States of America with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive,
Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the
county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws
thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in

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On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or
Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29,
1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration
and resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is

resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the case for
hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the
case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his
motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief.
Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for
failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will,
which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced
heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly
Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a
motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by
the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and
her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12,
1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the
Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss
opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of
deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the
hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not
made in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a
petition presented to the court but by way of a motion presented
prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law
especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be
presented, within 30 days after it has issued an order for the
distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be
divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law
of Succession

4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no

evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no
Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit
of his petition a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that
the Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of
Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance
has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R.
No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the
withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof
was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was
secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel
of record. The records show that after the firing of the contested motion, the
petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion
to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the
motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long
withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in
turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old
man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since
the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the
probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed
the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus,
the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private

59 | P a g e

respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the
records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on
separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his
motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the
petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished
the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly
set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for
the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next
hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the
petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and
not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly
devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given
away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law
should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will,
as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case ofBellis v. Bellis (20
SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen
of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there

60 | P a g e

are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic

validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the

decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged
and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of
Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a
settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon.
Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit.

(1) Thoroughly researched and studied the law on probate and

succession;

SO ORDERED.

(2) Looked for and interviewed witnesses, and took their

affidavits;
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

(3) Filed the petition for. probate is Special Proceeding No. 58325;
(4) Made the proper publications;

FIRST DIVISION
(5) Presented at the trial the following witnesses:
G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989
a) Eleuterio de Jesus
BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE
GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN,
JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Benedicto Leviste for and in his own behalf.
Gatchalian, Ignacio & Associates for respondents de Guzman.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a
contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite
his client's refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.
On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written
agreement with the private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in
a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under
the will, a piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to
Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contigent fee would be thirty-five per
cent (35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will
(Annex "A", p. 59, Rollo).
In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed the following services as Del
Rosario's counsel:

61 | P a g e

b) Lucita de Jesus
c) Purita L. Llanes
d) Rita Banu
e) Jesus Lulod.
On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him
that she was terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest."
This consisted, according to the letter, in petitioner's moral obligation to protect the
interest of his brother-in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other
parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as lessee of the property which
was bequeathed to Del Rosario under the will (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo).
On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights
to Fees for Professional Services." (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.)
In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court denied his motion on the
ground that he had "not filed a claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's
lien." (p. 3, Rollo.)
On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim for Attorney's
Fees and Recording of Attorney's Lien,' which was noted in the court's order of
December 20, 1965 (Annexes "D" and "E", pp. 63 & 64, Rollo).
Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner
continued to receive copies of the court's orders, as well the pleadings of the other
parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. The case was submitted for
decision without the respondents' evidence.

On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrixlegatee, filed a "Motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosario
waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the De Guzman
brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the
properties left by the decedent. (Annex "F", p. 65, Rollo.)
In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the
petition for being contrary to public policy (Annex "G", pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the
legal requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified
that the will and the testatrix's signature were in the handwriting of Maxima
Reselva.
The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The
private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
petitioner was not a party in interest.
The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a
direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked
that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del
Rosario.
On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's
motion for substitution.
The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. No.
41248) praying that the trial court be ordered to give due course to his appeal and
to grant his motion for substitution.
On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient
in form and substance as the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to
appeal the decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325 (Annex 1, p. 77, Rollo).
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by certiorari
to this Court, assigning the following errors against the Court of Appeals' resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner
appears not to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Sp.
Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
2. Assuming the petitioner's right of appeal is doubtful, the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for mandamus; and

62 | P a g e

3. The Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision in Sp.

Proc. No. 58325 denying the probate of the holographic will of the
late Maxima C. Reselva, said decision being patently erroneous.
Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of
services with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052
of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice
of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize
them to accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent
sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should
there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall
be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the
rules established in this Code, it may belong.
he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the
devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent
attorney's fees.
The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to
this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is
not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and
dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for
probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney
Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario
is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition
for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's
estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name.
This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the
contract (for contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the
appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs.
Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply
a basis for thecomputation of said fees."
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while
it is true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a
will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate,
should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and
requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures

and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the
will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was
inconsequential.
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no
direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect
interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244,
We had occassion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not
interfere in its probate. Thus:
... the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the
will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning
facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but
rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by
the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in
the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation
thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.)

63 | P a g e

Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held:

We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding
that notice of an attorney's lien did not entitle the attorneyappellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It only gives
him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case
his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.