mmDEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs. PRISCILLA G.

CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and IMELDA Q.

AGUSTIN
FACTS
Respondents Camposano, Perez, and Agustin are
former employees of the Department Of Health
National Capital Region (DOH-NCR). Some concerned
DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the DOH
Resident Ombudsman Ringpis against Dir. Majarais,
Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and
respondents, arising out of an alleged anomalous
purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous
Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid
capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical
Laboratory.
Thereafter, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an
investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative
charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against
respondents and their co-respondents. Subsequently,
the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the
respondents and their co-respondents for Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019.
Afterwards, then Executive Secretary Torres issued A.O
No. 298 creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the
administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR
employees. The said AO was indorsed to the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC). Consequently, the PCAGC took over the
investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it
issued a resolution finding respondents guilty as
charged. Then President Ramos issued AO No. 390
dismissing the respondents from service as
recommended by the PCAGC in their resolution.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Health issued an Order
disposing of the case against respondents and Cabrera
dismissing them from service.
Respondents and Cabrera filed their separate appeal
with the CSC which was both denied. Respondents
motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30,
1999. While Cabreras motion for reconsideration was
denied on January 27, 2000. Respondents, however,
received the resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration on November 2001 which was
promulgated on . Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to
appeal to the CA the CSCs resolutions ahead of
respondents. The petition of Cabrera was granted by the
CA setting aside the resolutions of the CSC and
exonerated Cabrera of the administrative charged
against him. Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC of

their appeal, respondents brought the matter to the CA

which nonetheless used the same legal bases for
annulling the CSCs Resolution against respondents and
held that the PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative
complaints pertained only to presidential appointees.
Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the
charges against respondents. Moreover, in simply and
completely relying on the PCAGCs findings, the
secretary of health failed to comply with administrative
due process. Hence, the Petition.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the PCAGC have jurisdiction to
investigate the anomalous transaction involving
respondents
b) Whether or not the health secretary had disciplinary
authority over respondents
c) Whether or not a Department Secretary may utilize
other officials and report facts from which a decision may
be based
d) Whether or not the Health Secretary has the
competence and authority to decide what action should
be taken against officials and employees who have been
administratively charged and investigated
e) Whether or not the Order of Health Secretary is valid
a) YES. The health secretary has the competence
and the authority to decide what action should
be taken against officials and employees who
have been administratively charged and
investigated. However, the actual exercise of the
disciplining authoritys prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and
the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement
results in an invalid decision. The disciplining
authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigators recommendation, but must
personally weigh and assess the evidence
gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at
stake are the honor, the reputation, and the
livelihood of the person administratively
charged. In the present case, the health
secretarys two-page Order dismissing
respondents pales in comparison with the
presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais.
Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision,
President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy
of the doctors case. He even noted a violation
that had not been considered by the PCAGC.
On the other hand, Health Secretary Reodica
simply and blindly relied on the dispositive

portion of the Commissions Resolution. She

even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the
recommendation with regard to Respondents
Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
b) NO. While the Health Secretary has the power
as mentioned above, Due process in
administrative proceedings requires compliance
with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents right to a hearing, which includes
the right to present ones case and submit
supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial
evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision,
the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the
controversy and must not have simply accepted
the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision
must be rendered in such manner that
respondents would know the reasons for it and
the various issues involved. The CA correctly
ruled that administrative due process had not
been observed in the present factual milieu.
Furthermore, The Order of Secretary Reodica
denying respondents Motion for
Reconsideration also failed to correct the
deficiency in the initial Order. She improperly
relied on the Presidents findings in AO 390
which, however, pertained only to the
administrative charge against Dr. Majarais, not
against respondents. To repeat, the Chief
Executive recognized that the disciplinary
jurisdiction over respondents belonged to the
health secretary who should have followed the
manner in which the President had rendered his
action on the recommendation. The Presidents
endorsement of the records of the case for the
appropriate action of the health secretary did
not constitute a directive for the immediate
dismissal of respondents. Like that of President
Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica
should have contained a factual finding and a
legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their
dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal
intelligently, if they so desired. Inasmuch as the
health secretarys twin Orders were patently void
for want of due process, the CA did not err in
refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGCs or
the Ad Hoc Committees recommendations.

Such a discussion should have been made by

the health secretary before it could be passed
upon by the CA. In representation of petitioner,
the Office of the Solicitor General insists that
respondents are guilty of the charges and, like
Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service.
Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is
not the guilt of respondents, but solely due
process.
ADJUDICATION
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted. the
assailed decision of the court of appeals is modified in
the sense that the authority of the ad hoc investigating
committee created under administrative order 298 is
sustained. Being violative of administrative due process,
the orders of the health secretary are annulled and set
aside.

Padua v. Ranada [G.R. No. 141949.

October 14, 2002]
FACTS
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No.
2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments on
Metro Manila Skyway. It was thereafter published in
newspapers of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks. However, there was no hearing
conducted for the matter. Deliberations were not even
attended by Board Members except TRB Executive
Director Jaime Dumlao, Jr. Petitioners assail the validity
of the resolution.
ISSUES
Whether or not Resolution No. 2001-89 is invalid on the
ground that:

(a) it was in violation of due process;

(b) the provisional toll rate adjustments are
exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable;
and,

(c) TRB Executive Director Jaime Dumlao, Jr.

alone authorized the provisional increase.
RULING
(a) No. TRB clearly complied with the publication
requirements. Also, the TRB may grant and issue exparte to any petitioner, without need of notice,
publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect,
pending hearing and decision on the merits of the
petition, the increase in rates prayed for or such lesser

amount as the TRB may in its discretion provisionally

grant.
(b) No. This is obviously a question of fact requiring
knowledge of the formula used and the factors
considered in determining the assailed rates. Definitely,
this task is within the province of the TRB. The SC takes
cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on the
doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this era of
clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in
case
of
grave
abuse
of
discretion,
is
indispensable. Between the power lodged in an
administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend
is to refer it to the former.
(c) No. It is not true that it was TRB Executive Director
Dumlao, Jr. alone who issued Resolution No. 200189. The Resolution itself contains the signature of the
four TRB Directors. Petitioner Padua would argue that
while these Directors signed the Resolution, none of
them personally attended the hearing. This argument is
misplaced. Under our jurisprudence, an administrative
agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing
officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidence,
conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which
the agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure
is a practical necessity. Corollarily, in a catena of cases,
the Supreme Court laid down the cardinal requirements
of due process in administrative proceedings, one of
which is that the tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate. Thus, it is logical to
say that this mandate was rendered precisely to ensure
that in cases where the hearing or reception of evidence
is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall
not merely rely on his recommendation but instead shall
personally weigh and assess the evidence which the
said subordinate has gathered.

MALINAO VS REYES
FACTS:
Malinao filed an administrative case against
Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial of
due process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Marinduque. On August 12, 1994, members of
the Sanggunian, by a vote of 5 to 3, found Red
guilty, vote signed only by presiding chairman.
On September 5, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2,
acquitted Red of the charges against him. This
vote was embodied in a Decision which was
signed by all the members. Malinao argued that
the First Sanggunian decision had already
become final and executory for failure of Red to
appeal.

In order to render a decision in administrative

cases involving elective local officials, the
decision of the Sanggunian must thus be in
writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts
and the reasons for such decision. What the
Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12,
1994 was not to render a decision. Neither may
the so-called Decision prepared by
Sanggunian Member Rodrigo V. Sotto on
September 5, 1994 be regarded as the
decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the
signatures of the requisite majority. Like the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting
following the deliberation of the members of
the Sanggunian did not necessarily constitute
their decision unless this was embodied in an
opinion prepared by one of them and
concurred in by the others, in the same way
that the voting following the deliberation on a
case in the Supreme Court becomes its
decision only after the opinion prepared by a
Justice is concurred in by others composing

the majority. Until they have signed the opinion

proceedings against the local elective official.

and the decision is promulgated, the Justices

[Under Sec. 66 (b) of the LGC, the penalty of

are free to change their votes. Indeed, in his

suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of

comment in this case, Member Sotto admits

the official and any administrative disciplinary

that the draft decision he prepared had only his

proceeding against said official is abated if in the

signature due to the reluctance of some

meantime he is re-elected because such re-

Kagawads to affix their signatures.

election is a condonation of whatever misconduct

Consequently the draft never became a

he might have committed during his previous

decision. It is noteworthy that the draft was

term. In order to render a decision in an

signed by Member Sotto in his capacity as

administrative case involving elected local

Presiding Chairman of the Blue Ribbon

officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be

Committee of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

in writing, stating clearly the facts and the

and that it did not provide spaces for the

reasons for such a decision.

signatures of other members of the

Sanggunian had it been intended that it be
signed by them. This fact led the DILG to
conclude that the draft was simply the report
and recommendation of the Blue Ribbon
Committee to the Sanggunian. Now, as already
stated, the Sanggunian, at its session
on October 21, 1994, took another vote and, 7 to
2, decided to dismiss the case against
respondent Mayor. This time its decision was
made in writing, stating the facts and the law
on which it was based, and it was signed by
the members taking part in the decision. This,
and not the so-called decision of September 5,
1994, is the decision of the Sanggunian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second Decision is valid.
HELD:
Yes, the second decision of acquittal is valid. In
any case, this issue is already moot and
academic as a result of the expiration of Reds
term during which the act complained of was
allegedly committed, and further proceedings are
barred by his reelection. [Sec 66(b) LGC].
Reelection abates any administrative disciplinary