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11.0 Eagle Security v.

NLRC - 173 SCRA 479

FACTS: Respondents filed for unpaid wage and allowance increases under Wage Order Nos. 2,
3, 5 and 6, where they were assigned by EAGLE as security guards to PTSI pursuant to the
Contract for Security Services entered by the 2 agencies, which was granted in their favor hence
this petition. In this case, both PTSI and EAGLE point to the other as the one who should be
solely be liable for paying the increases. PTSI also alleges that it is exempt from payment under
the Wage Orders because it is a public sector while the Wage Orders cover only employers and
employees in the private sector.
HELD: The Labor Code provides used in Book Three, Title II on Wages, the term employer
includes "the Government and all its branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities, all
government-owned or controlled corporations and institutions . . .
The contractor is made Liable by being the direct employer. The principal, on the other hand, is
made the indirect employer of the contractor's employees for purposes of paying the employees
their wages should the contractor be unable to pay them. The application of the provisions of the
Labor Code on joint and several liabilities of the principal and contractor is appropriate just as
stated under the Wage Orders that payment of the increases are "to be borne" by the principal or
client. So it is only right to jointly and severally pay the wage and allowance increases as
mandated to assure compliance of the provisions including the statutory minimum wage [Article
99, Labor Code]. This joint and several liability facilitates payment of the workers'
performance of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection as
mandated by Article II Sec. 18 and Article XIII Sec. 3.

11.1 SSS Employees v. CA (supra, Right to Form Association)

FACTS: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands on
the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed action for damages for staging an illegal strike.
Contending that petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have
no right to strike.
ISSUE: Whether the SSS employees have the right to strike.
HELD: Employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary
work stoppages. The SSS is one such government-controlled corporation and therefore its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions
memorandum prohibiting strikes. The right to strike given to unions in private industry are not
applicable to public and civil service employees under Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as
implied in E.O. No. 180. The Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees
may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage
MAINPOINT: Article Art. XIII, Sec. 3 on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with

11.2 De Vera v. NLRC 200 SCRA 439

FACTS: The decision in question pertains to the NLRC for deleting the award of separation pay
granted by the labor arbiter to the petitioner when he was placed by BPI under preventive
suspension then subsequently dismissed on the ground of fraud or willful breach of trust. He
contends that while it is true that he was interviewed and later summoned by the CIS to give
sworn statements in connection with the anomalous transaction, he was not aware that he was
already being indicted and tried for an offense of which he was never informed. But the bank
argued that the Notice of Preventive Suspension received by him was sufficient notice, and that it
should have already alerted him that the investigation conducted was partly being done to
determine the extent of his involvement in the anomalies for 4 days therefore, the petitioner was
given ample opportunity to be heard.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requirements in dismissing the petitioner were substantially
HELD: Employers is mandated to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed two notices, the
written charge, and the notice of dismissal, if, after hearing, dismissal is indeed warranted as
enunciated under labor code. No written charge was furnished the petitioner in this case,
therefore, his dismissal was in violation of due process.
MAINPOINT: Aside from the rights to protection, security and wages, they shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided
by law as depicted under Art. XIII Section 3.