PENDING RICO CASE Part 1 Pages 1-100 Cheeks V Fort Myer

John Cheeks
vs.
Fort Myer Construction Company Anchor Construction Company
Capitol Paving of DC
Civil Construction LLC
CNA Financial Corp.
and selected executives
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NO. 1:14-cv-00914 (RCL)
Corrupt Practices Act (RICO)(18 U.S. C. 1961

Excerpts from Documents 88 and 101
CONTENTS
Pages
SUMMARY
Plaintiffs Reply Brief
3
SELECTED EXHIBTS
Exhibit 1 DOJ Guidance Manual Appendix III-Effect of Boyle vs. US on RICO

Exhibit A, Affidavit of Ronald J. Bonfilio, Documents Examiner:
Evidentiary Attachments to Exhibit A
Exhibit A, Attachment 1, Non Collusion Affidavits
23
36
Exhibit A, Attachment 2, Bid Bonds
42
69
Exhibit A Attachment 3 Public Documents Used to Create Exhibit F
86
Exhibit DR 1Civil Construction, LLC 2 year report Principals
104
Exhibit F, Depiction In Chart Form of RICO Activities. Created by Mr. Bonfilio,

from Public Information Documents Attachment 3, .
107
Exhibit G. Two Recent Contracts wherein CNA, Inc was low Bidder
Exhibit J Table I Factors Establishing RICO Enterprise
109
114
Exhibit K Table II-Criminal Violations by RICO enterprise
121
Exhibit L Table III Gallardo Sworn Statements-Excerpts
129
Exhibit O Defendant's Affiliation Matrix
133
Exhibit P-1 Police Reports: Mercedes Break in and Threat at DuPont Circle
134
Exhibit S-1 Fort Myer Dept. of Small and Local Business Application Excerpts
139
Exhibit S-2 Anchor Dept. of Small and Local Business Application Excerpts
154
Exhibit S-3 Capital Paving, Dept. of Small and Local Business Application Excerpts
166
Exhibit V- 1 Ball Joint Damage
178
Exhibit V-2 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 2003

Mercedes Benz C230 Report from "Safercar"
185
001
SUMMARY
This publication contains documents relevant to John Cheeks' efforts to create open competition
for District of Columbia road and infrastructure contracts, which for more than 20 years as been
controlled by bid rigging of the Rodriguez-Shrensky alleged Racketeering Families.
The families are believed to have maintained their control by influencing or contributing to
District of Columbia mayors, attorney generals, city council members, US presidents, the courts
law enforcement agencies, and the media.
When influence is not enough to maintain control the families have attempted to intimidate those
who oppose or threaten to expose their unlawful operations. There have been 3 attempts on the
life of John Cheeks and a key witness was unlawfully incarcerated. There have been at least 2
unexplained deaths of Fort Myer employees.
At this writing, no judge, law enforcement agency, government elected has stood up to the
Rodriguez-Shrensky families. One prominent high level DC Government official that did stand
up against Fort Myer, was promptly fired.
To give the image of respectability, the Rodriguez-Shrensky families have made donations to
civic organizations, religious, groups
Some say there is no harm done, the roads are built. There are several harms
When there is not competition, higher costs are incurred by the government, and poorer
quality products are delivered (observe side walk repairs) .
Afro Americans, Hispanics and women are barred from participating in government
infrastructure contracts, which are controlled by Rodriguez-Srensky family (Rodriguez is
Portuguese, not Hispanic) .
District Columbia citizens are deprived of jobs because less than 20% of the labor force,
despite DC requirements, come from the District--- most are from Maryland and
Virginia.
Afro American, Hispanics, and women have been discriminated against, treated unfairly
as documented by the US Department of Labor.
Construction laborers, who alleged wage theft or other improprieties of Fort Myer, are
"black balled". They have little recourse and limited opportunities to find employment
with other infrastructure construction companies, because other companies do not exist.
No politician or authority has been willing to recognize or admit this and take action. The
District of Columbia awaits a champion.
Purpose of this Publication

The activities described are not new or unique. Any racketeering enterprise, gang, group or
individual seeking power uses the same tactics. When government is involved, this is
"corruption" It is the purpose and hope legal scholars, law enforcement agencies and others, will
use this as a case study and explore methods of preventing and disbanding such enterprises and
perhaps join with John Cheeks, Ms. Gallardo and others. We welcome their and your thoughts.
Another purpose is for writers and film producers to have factual evidence of alleged crime
families operate "legitimate" business.
Also it is to bring attention to the public, law enforcement officials, media, of the reality of some
business and government activities and a call for action.
What is not included.
To safeguard the privacy of John Cheeks, this publication does not include tactics against John
Cheeks personal life,
This publication includes court documents up to Civil Case. 1:14-cv-00914 (RCL) as of January
27, 2016.
Two previous Anti Trust cases, were filed by John Cheeks against Fort Myer. The first in 2009
and were dismissed. This complaint differs. It alleges "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Practices Act (RICO)(18 U.S. C. 1961 activities by the RICO Enterprise comprised of Fort
Myer Construction Company, Anchor Construction Company, Capitol Paving of DC, Civil
Construction LLC and their executives.
Most documents that follow are public records and may be found on PACER primarily
filings 88 and 101. See pages123-129 for alleged RICO criminal acts and patterns of
practice violations of law.
Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 1 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________
)
JOHN C. CHEEKS, et al
)
)
Plaintiffs
)
Case No. 14-CV-00914 (RCL)
v.
)
FORT MYER CONSTRUCTION
)
CORPORATION, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)
PLAINTIFFS REPLY BRIEF
----------------------------------------------------TO DEFENDANTS-FORT MYER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, JOSE
RODRIGUEZ, LEWIS SHRENSKY, ANCHOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
AND FLORENTINE GREGORIOS OPPOSITIONS TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED CORRECTED COMPLAINT AND
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS1
I. Preliminary Statement
In defendant Fort Myer Construction Corporations and Anchor Construction Companys
opposition to the filing of a Second Amended Complaint the five principal defendants, their
owners and managers, and the insurance carrier have taken the position that there is and has been
no conspiracy to rig bids, and the insurance carrier CNA Surety, has done nothing wrong and
simply sold insurance policies (Bonds) to the group of contractors.
The foundation for those positions is that no conspiracy to rig bids-- which amount to
hundreds of millions of dollars per year has occurred and the insurance carrier had no
knowledge of any violation of federal or state law by the contractors. This position is refuted.
Specific replies to each of these two groups of defendants follows this preliminary statement.
These individual defendants are collectively referenced herein, along with the other alleged
participants in the allegedly joint unlawful acts as the RICO enterprise defendants, or (R.E.
defs).
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The Purpose of the RICO enterprise, and the Insurance Carrier, CNA Surety:
The basic business of the RICO enterprise is to corner on the market of all infrastructure
contracting, consisting of roads, bridges, sidewalks, water and sewer, traffic signaling and related
services and construction in the District of Columbia.
The business of the insurance company in the District of Columbia is to underwrite and
issue bonds at market rates to the purportedly competing companies. Multiple bid bonds i.e. one
for each bidder are submitted for each contract. That is multiple bidders purportedly
independent one from the other each must file a Bid Bond. As a consequence, the insurance
company is presented with a sweetheart position. Multiple premiums, with only one bidder (the
conglomerate) and in reality only one risk situation. That is, for essentially zero risk, or at least a
risk reduced to a fraction of the normal risk by multiple bid bonds. The insurance company reaps
multiple profits with essentially no risk.
In their complaint, plaintiffs have alleged that the insurance companies had actual
knowledge of the collusion of the about five principal RICO entities and thus the enterprise
for over 15 years of near exclusive control over the bid bond issuance. Documents of record in
this case and prior iterations of this action demonstrate deep affiliations of all five corporations,
their principal managers and Boards of Directors (See Exhibit O).
Similarly, plaintiffs allege that this evidence of non-independence was public information,
supplemented by Bond Application information submitted over the decade long relevant period
by each of the colluding companies to the Insurance company (CNA Surety) through its
subsidiary--Western Surety. The insurance carrier should have, and certainly its management
was aware, that interrelationships by blood, marriage, ownership of facilities and property, and
management of the alleged independent companies existed as between all of these client
companies. This actual knowledge by the insurance carrier covers an extended period of time
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approximated at 15 years with 15 years of public documents and submissions by each of the
purportedly independent companies. Proof of this allegation could be established by a simple
matter of a deposition or two of CNA Surety, or Westerns key personnel during discovery from
applications for Bid Bond from each purportedly separate independent company to said insurance
carrier.
Conclusion-Fact Question Did they Collude-Completing the Cycle of Criminal Activity?
As to the insurance company then, its liability depends entirely upon whether or not the
insurance carrier, through its employee/officers had a legal duty to report violations of criminal
law to the insured, the District of Columbia Government, or alternatively to the criminal
authorities, both local and federal whose money was being wasted or stolen in fraudulent contract
situations which have existed for these 15 years. This question, plaintiffs contend, is ultimately a
question of fact for the jury. The question now, however, applying the correct standard at this
stage of the litigation, is whether plaintiffs allegations meet the Twombly/Iqbal test of
plausibility2.
The Smoking Gun:
The procedure whereby the bid rigging, collusion and false swearing of the alleged
independence of each company in bidding, is now known to be part of the deception practiced
upon the District of Columbia, the public in general and these plaintiffs is now known to
plaintiffs. That fact is provable with probative evidence now before this Court or readily
obtainable for bringing before this court in minimal discovery. (See Excerpts from sworn
statements of former employee/bookkeeper/accountant Juanita Q. Gallardo (Gallardo) (Table III
hereto).
Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 .S. 662 (2009).
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The actual procedures utilized by the RICO enterprise to collude in the joint bid rigging
for infrastructure contracts have been disclosed by a former bookkeeper, Gallardo. That
bookkeeper was employed by a daughters of Fort Myer Construction Corporation (FMCC) whose
chief executive is her father, Mr. Jos Rodriguez. This company, Hawk Enterprises is now a
defunct shell company. Gallardos salary was paid by, and the payroll reporting was by a
corporation controlled by another daughter (Cristina) of Mr. Rodriguez at the time. Cristina was
then working yet another corporation of the group, FMCC Civil construction company (Now
Civil Construction Company, LLC). Gallardos position was officially bookkeeper for Hawk
Enterprises, but in fact she also performed services incident to a centralized accounting group
headed by an accountant named Ms. Trudy Quade. Those services included whatever needed to
be done for the group of companies, at a particular moment in time. She therefore was in a
unique position, to know the interlocking and cooperative workings of the entire group of
colluding companies.
As the bookkeeper, prospective plaintiff Gallardo became privy to the most confidential
inner workings of the RICO enterprise components. Those were all financially controlled by Jos
Rodriguez. From time to time, as part of her job, it was necessary to forward individual financial
information for those companies to Mr. Rodriguez.
Colluding in Bid Preparation and Presentation (Table III):
Gallardo has stated under oath to the effect that during her tenure at Hawk the
calculations for all bids or all of the colluding companies were centrally controlled by FMCC
estimators, after which the numeric calculations were disbursed to the colluding companies by
courier for preparation of the individual bids. Thereafter, the coordinated bidding results were
submitted again by courier to the District of Columbia appropriate agency.
On information and belief private couriers were used to avoid use of the mails or
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electronic means. The use of private couriers eliminated the need for the use of mail or electronic
delivery thereby eliminating the possibility of mail or electronic fraud charges. The couriers
name at that time (2004-2005) was Antonio Bras. However, Mr. Bras pled guilty to the prior
criminal charges involving FMCC (for which FMCC was debarred from federal contracting).
Thereafter that courier needed to be replaced. On information and belief the replacement
couriers name is Raul Rodriguez (Raul) (no relation to the chief executive of FMCC). On
information and belief Raul continues to perform his function as courier for the group today.
Gallardo has stated that she observed during the time she was bookkeeper that
equipment was transferred between companies, repainted and signs changed to convey the
impression that the debarred FMCC was not performing government contracting. Most of the
contracting in process at that time was transferred to a sister company to FMCC Civil, now
Civil Construction Company (Also controlled by the Rodriguez clan).
The Frame-Up:
Gallardo has stated that she became uncomfortable with the practices of FMCC and the
associated companies and left their employee in 2005. Three years later she was charged with
embezzlement, and summarily incarcerated, and charged with grand larceny--embezzlement of
dozens of credit charge purchases and money from two Hawk Enterprise credit cards. Gallardo
has sworn under the penalties of perjury that not one of those charges was in fact an
embezzlement. Undersigned counsel has examined what purports to be the entire prosecutors file
personally, and not one of those charges is supported by the elements necessary to prove a theft
by Gallardo.
Nevertheless, because of the exigencies of her situation, and with what appears to be the
ineffective services of her counsel she had been coerced by incarceration into pleading guilty to
the felony charges as brought. Actions to exonerate Gallardo in this matter are now ongoing
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before the Circuit Court of Prince Georges County Maryland.

Accordingly, it appears from all available evidence that components of the RICO
enterprise acted feloniously to cause the incarceration of prospective plaintiff Gallardo to prevent
her from testifying against the RICO enterprise and its components. Such testimony would have
been in the very matters herein directly related to the allegations of this RICO action. It is
noteworthy that allegations herein were directly related to cases previously brought by Cheeks et
al, the federal government, in another private lawsuit pending at that time, Stephen P. Amos v.
District of Columbia, 08-CV-554).
II. SUPPLEMENTAL FACTUAL STATEMENT

The factual supplement as contained in the Reply to Dora Rodriguez and Cristina R.
Minton is adopted by this reference in the interest of brevity.
III. THE STANDARDS APPLICABLE FOR TWOMBLY/IQBAL
The standards as applicable to the facts of this case as stated in the reply to Dora
Rodriguez and Cristina R. Minton are adopted by this reference.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Response to Defendants Factual Statements:
Defendant's Statement: (FMCC Opp. page 1 para 1, sentence 2 )
"The Court specifically directed the Plaintiffs to provide "a complete list of statutory
violations" alleged and which defendants engaged in each violation, in an orderly, clear, and nonrepetitive arrangement", to identify "each of the named plaintiffs and individuals involved in the
purported violations."
Plaintiff's Reply: Plaintiffs attempted to do exactly that in their proposed Second
Amended Complaint, as Corrected. Apparently, defendants believe that the specificity contained
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in the corrected Second Amended Complaint still is deficient, presumably in meeting the
Twombly/Iqbal standard. Taking the defendants at their word, plaintiffs hereby have submitted
additional detail recently obtained from additional sources and investigations. Those details are
submitted herewith Table 1, as a supplement to previous Exhibit F. That exhibit was contained
in the original complaint as a pictorial display of the known and provable interrelationships as
between the RICO entities, and its individual members.
In Table 1, each presently known entity is listed in relation to the three existing
requirements for establishment of a RICO enterprise3 pursuant to the most recent standard
applicable to this situation. That standard is based upon a pattern of criminal activities, at least
two acts defined as racketeering within a 10 year period, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter (1984) (18 U.S.C. 1961 (5)).
It is true that not all of the details of the alleged RICO violations were listed in previous
editions of this complaint. This is because of two reasons. (1) the fear by the principals to this
lawsuit of reprisals, including fear for their lives and the lives of their family (taking previous
death threats and actions in reprisal as mere examples of the power of this RICO enterprise to do
harm), and (2) some of the new factual allegations were simply not previously known (for
example the existence of a centralized accounting group which kept track of the RICO
enterprises component parts financial status, managed by an independent accountant (Ms. Trudy
Quade). As stated elsewhere in this reply, the facts in this complex action continue to expand in
scope. But the pattern remains remarkably consistent.
Boyle v United States, 556 U.S. 938, 129, S. Ct 2237 (2009)(Cited in about 344 cases
favorably, with no unfavorable citations found as of February 24, 2015).
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If the Honorable Court deems the Corrected Second Amended Complaint still deficient
when applying the Twombly/Iqbal standard, then in that event plaintiffs respectfully request
leave to file a Third Amended Complaint incorporating all of these new facts.
2. Defendant's Statement: (FMCC Opp. Page 2 para. 2).
" Plaintiffs continued failure to plead any cause of action "above a speculative level"
while offering only "unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusations" with
"naked assertions" devoid of "further factual enhancement."
Plaintiff's Response.
This assertion by defendant is demonstrably incorrect. See Table 1 submitted herewith
based upon the latest available factual information.
3. Defendant's statement: " (FMCC Opp. Page 2 Last para.)
"Fort Myer Defendants also wish to place on the record their continued
outrage that their good names are being slandered"
Plaintiff's Response
The documents referenced in Table I, all of which are now a part of the evidentiary record
of this case demonstrate fact, not slander. Truth is an absolute defense to the claim of slander.
Further, all of the charges have been made as allegations in this case. Court filings are also
immune from such frivolous defenses. On the contrary, Defendant FMCC was previously
convicted of bribery and debarred from DC Government contracts. Those criminal actions were
duly publicized in the City Paper and Washington Post. Facts exposed herein are to the effect
that witnesses are available to testify that FMCC, with the aid and assistance of the other RICO
entities and their managers and owners evaded that debarment by fraudulent activities in hiding
behind the other allegedly independent members of the RICO enterprise. And summarily acting
to incarcerate under what are now demonstrably false charges a witness applicant intervenor
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Gallardo who had been named as a witness in federal litigation and could single handedly
exposed the several frauds.
If any party should feel outrage, it is these plaintiffs and the Court itself for what occurred
in the prior litigation and this attempt at blatant misstatements of truth by defendants.
4. Defendant's statement: (FMCC Opp. pg 4, para 3 )
Apparently taking Plaintiffs at face value, this Honorable Court did not believe such
"threats" were sufficient to overhaul the time-tested pleadings and service procedures in
federal court.
Plaintiff's Response:
FMCC and Anchor apparently fail to understand the Twombly/Iqbal standard, that at this
time, these action, in the absence of discovery only need to be specific and plausible (plaintiffs at
this time are NOT required to prove their entire case). And further, new RICO enterprise
standards were resolved by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 173 L.
Ed.2d 1265, 556 U.S. 938, 77 USLW 4474 (2009). In that case, the Supreme Court confirmed
the intent of Congress to lower the pleadings threshold for RICO enterprise proof, utilizing a
relaxed standard. Plaintiffs submit that Tables I and II, in light the sworn factual statements
excerpted in Table III will meet the threshold standard for establishment of a RICO enterprise.
At this time, plaintiffs submit it is for the Judge to decide if it is plausible if John Cheeks
has been threatened with death and murder attempts 3 times by vehicle tampering (a technique
used by criminals, to make murder appear as an accident), with the ultimate decision a question
for the jury subsequent to discovery. Moreover, Cheeks has sworn that he received such threats,
and physical evidence is available to demonstrate the sabotage of his automobile and other
vehicles upon multiple occasions (Exhibits V 1, V 2). Since Mr. Cheeks has no other enemies of
which he is aware, the circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs submit would be sufficient to carry at
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least the civil burdens in argument to a jury including all of the exigent circumstances of these
allegations. Additionally, there is the likelihood that additional evidence will become available
during the normal discovery process in this case.
The pattern of criminal events therefore, includes dozens of instances of criminal acts,
from perjury and uttering with regard to the non-collusion affidavits, to false swearing and
submission of false documents to the grand jury in the Gallardo criminal conviction. Viewed as a
series beginning with the two criminal convictions of FMCC (a pattern of operation outside of
the law by the RICO enterprise to obtain bids, and to preserve the existence of the RICO
enterprise) is not only entirely plausible but patently obvious and indefensible. The motivation is
likewise clear: to maintain exclusive control and monopoly for District of Columbia
infrastructure contracts.
As mentioned above, witnesses and documentation submitted to law enforcement
authorities are available as to the great bulk of the allegations herein (Again see Table I).
Accordingly, the Court should conclude that the RICO enterprise believes it was and is above the
law, or are protected by campaign contributions to city council members and others for political
reasons. No other conclusion is reasonable. Therefore, plaintiffs allegations are plausible.
5. Defendant's statement: References to Sealed Exhibits (FMCC Opp. pg 5 para. 2)
In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have brazenly ignored the directives of
this Honorable Court, once again refusing to disclose exhibits to the Defendants.
Paragraphs 122 and 123 state:
122. On information and belief -- at least one act of murder has occurred
(Sec Redacted Materials contained in Exhibits C and D, affidavit and declaration
testimony flied under oath herein) (for which filing under seal is requested).
123. Exhibit C and D disclose details of other matters which are in the
public interest to remain under seal of the Court at this time.
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This Court has not Ordered plaintiffs to produce the information filed under seal with the
permission and order of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. On the contrary, that
Order is Res Judicata on that subject.
To the contrary, this Court DID order details to be submitted and as explained in point I
hereto, plaintiffs have completely complied (see Tables I, II, III, and all of the other evidentiary
attachments hereto, and all produced in the absence of any subpoena or discovery being approved
by the Court, but simply to attempt to conform to the Courts directives).
6. Defendant's statement (pg 10 para 3 of FMCC Opp.):
"Plaintiffs also failed to identify which individuals were engaged in these purported civil
rights violations"
This is an incorrect statement. See Tables I, II, and III. The individuals involved were
Dora Rodriguez, in conjunction with her sister Cristina R. Minton, Hawk Enterprises, and FMCC
through its agents and attorneys. In the event these individual were insufficiently identified in the
Second Amended Complaint, as corrected, plaintiffs request leave to file a third amended
compliant to allege the additional facts recently disclosed regarding the persons responsible for
the false charges and incarceration of witness and prospective plaintiff Gallardo.
7. Defendant's statement (Page 13 para 3, last of FMCC Opp.)

"District of Columbia procurement regulations clearly state that bid security must be a
bond, a certified check or irrevocable letter of credit issued "
This statement is not correct. Official document forms relating to the Bid Bond, clearly
state the option of "other" in addition to those contained in the above statement. The above
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statement omits that fact. In addition, the clear intent of the procedures, regulations and
procedures are to give the contracting officials the flexibility and options to work-out any
immaterial errors or omissions with the lowest bidder. Cheeks was not afforded any part of that
policy or practice. Checks has sworn under oath that he had arranged bank financing to back his
initial expense checks contingent upon an award. His checks, therefore the equivalent of a cash
bond were in fact submitted with each bid with his bank. But, Cheeks alleges, that because of the
history of bid rigging and bought and paid for political favoritism, the Contracting Officials took
no such steps as they were obligated to do. Moreover, as a matter of obvious fact, if the criminal
actions of FMCC et al were known, a disqualification would have occurred for all relevant bids.
In that event CNA/Cheeks, as the low bidder would have been profoundly acceptable to any
reasonable banker as his own bank recognized. The reason follows:
When the RICO Enterprise bidders are disqualified (for whatever reason) , the award,
would go to the renaming bidder: CNA Corp.
As a matter of normal practice the contracting officers of the Department of
Transportation have the discretion to accomplish the work on the RFB, and can give any bidder
time, if necessary to cure what might appear as a deficiency including to cure, clarify and accept,
"other" as a cash bond, give time to obtain an insurance policy or bond or other solution to the
discrepancy as to the Bid Bond, which after all is merely a bond for showing up as a responsive
bidder. Further, as to the final contracts in this series, Cheeks had arranged partnering contracts
with at least two very substantial competitor contractors (of FMCC) to accomplish the work.
8. (Defendant's Statement: (Page 1 para # of FM Motion).
"The Court specifically directed the Plaintiffs to provide a complete list of statutory
violations alleged and which defendants engaged in each violation, in an orderly, clear, and nonrepetitive arrangement", to identify "each of the named plaintiffs and individuals involved in the
purported violations.
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Plaintiffs Response:
See Tables I, II, III for the factual specificity contained therein as to which defendant
committed the alleged RICO violations. For applicable standards see last 11 pages (Appendix
III) to Criminal Rico: 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, A Manual for Federal Prosecutors, Fifth Revised
Edition October 2009" (551 pages)(Important effects of Boyle v. United States upon RICO crime
standards)(Exhibit # 1 hereto).
B. Supplemental Response to Crimes In Addition to RICO Criminal Acts

Under District of Columbia and/or Maryland Codes
The Honorable Court has ordered that plaintiffs submit with specificity the crimes and
who committed them as alleged by plaintiffs. The factual statements specifying what occurred
are contained above and in Tables I, II, and III hereto. As to Table III, Gallardo continues to
allege that she is completely innocent of all thefts for which she was charged. She avers that she
shall prove that fact based upon the false documents of record in her criminal case in Maryland.
Those documents were placed there by Hawk Enterprises, Dora Rodriguez and others of the
RICO enterprise to obstruct justice in the criminal investigations then ongoing in the District of
Columbia, as well as related matters.
The intentional false charging against her in order to accomplish witness tampering, the
obstruction of justice, and related RICO violations are alleged to have been performed by the
RICO enterprise. Specifics of law violated are contained in 18 U.S.C. 1961 at (1)
subparagraphs, (1) bribery, (3) bribery (4) mail fraud (5) wire fraud (6) obstruction of justice (7)
relating to obstruction of criminal investigations (8) relating to the obstruction of state or local
law enforcement, section 1512 (9) relating to tampering with a witness victim or informant,
section 1513 (10) relating to retaliating against a witness victim or informant. Many if not all of
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the foregoing specified crimes codified in 18 U.S.C. section 1961 are allegedly applicable to the
RICO enterprise in this case.
However, in addition as counsel understands the RICO statute requirements, upon reading
the United States Department of Justice Manual in RICO enforcement as referenced above, state
or local crimes also qualify to demonstrate the pattern and practice of RICO activity. Here, the
District of Code and common law also qualify to support RICO classification. Here, the District
of Columbia is the primary center of all such activities with the exception of the allegations in
either the District of Columbia and Maryland for obstruction of Justice.
As to specific crimes plaintiffs allege that the RICO enterprise itself is chargeable based at
the present time upon existing documentary evidence, motive and means and circumstantial
evidence each of the RICO code sections mentioned above. As to specific individuals, the
persons guilty of the crimes of perjury DC Code 22-2402 and/or uttering of false instruments
intended to be used as official sworn documents including presentation of false documents (DC
Code 22-1510 (1)) non-collusion affidavits and false credit care drafts or charges) are listed and
specified in Tables I and II. In addition, on information and belief the persons who have
committed the common law crimes of perjury and/or present patient of false documents to the
grand jury which is alleged to be a form of common-law uttering are: Dora Rodriguez aided and
abetted by Christina Rodriguez Minton, aided and abetted by and FMCC and its officers, and in
particular those officers who used their positions to document the alleged but false criminal acts
of plaintiff Gallardo.
As to the alleged crimes and respect to the wrongful incarceration and conviction of
Juanita Q Gallardo in Maryland, plaintiffs allege that these acts were directly related to criminal
prosecutions in the District of Columbia. Gallardo was the only viable witness to the myriad of
abuses amounting to RICO crimes by a RICO enterprise. Among the persons who were the
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victims of these particular RICO crimes are this District Court itself --in that the debarment
penalty ordered in a prior US District Court case was evaded. Gallardo was a potential witness to
those further violations of law. See her testimony in this matter (Attachment III in part below).
The specific code sections applicable to those events, are criminal matters described in the RICO
statute above, 18 U.S.C. 1961, (1) Sub (6), (7) (8) and (9).
C. Pleadings Standards:
Plaintiffs Maintain They Have Met Standard of Pleadings Required by this
Evolving Factual Situation; However, this Reply Nevertheless Supplements Those
Allegations:
Plaintiffs understand the Honorable Courts previous admonition to plaintiffs to be
specific as to actions of the named parties defendant to this case, and as to the specific criminal
code sections allegedly violated by each RICO entity, both corporate and personal, thereby
creating the prerequisites to the Courts finding of the Existence of a RICO enterprise. To
accomplish this daunting objective, plaintiffs counsel have re-examined available facts,
accumulated covering the past 10 relevant years of alleged RICO enterprise activities and
reexamined the applicable authority, which is also voluminous.
These facts continue to evolve. To the extent possible within the tight time frame, the
following materials have been cast in light of the latest case authority applicable to the alleged
RICO sub-entities and the RICO enterprise itself. In this regard, particular attention has been
given to the United States Department of Justice Manual for Federal Prosecutors4 and what
remains the leading Supreme Court authority resolving the many unique legal questions created
See last 11 pages (Appendix III) to Criminal Rico: 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, A Manual for
Federal Prosecutors, Fifth Revised Edition October 2009" (551 pages)(Important effects of Boyle
v. United States upon RICO crime standards)(Exhibit # 1 hereto).
-15017
by the RICO statute Boyle v. United States5. That case has been cited in over 300 more recent
cases without substantial dissent located by undersigned counsel for plaintiffs. In addition,
because the known facts of this case continue to evolve, these two replies to allegations made by
perhaps the largest and most powerful of the alleged RICO entities contain facts not previously
known which have material relevance to the RICO charges.
Accordingly, in the interests of caution, in the event that the Court determines plaintiffs
proposed second amended complaint is inadequate for any of the myriad of reasons applicable
detailed in Tables 1 and 2 hereto plaintiffs hereby request leave to incorporate these new facts
into yet another complaint, the Third Amended Complaint.
The Court has Ordered that plaintiffs present the facts in a clear and concise manner. To
this end, plaintiffs have prepared two Tables. Table 1 is a listing of all present information
attempting to meet the requirements of Boyle, supra in defining the known limits of the RICO
enterprise activities. Those activities include the alleged violation of an affirmative duty by the
insurance company issuing the bulk of the bid bonds which allegedly has known or should
have known of the bid rigging for about 15 years. By ignoring and failing to report the wellknown collusion and inter-relationships patent on the face of the facts, the insurance company
CNA Surety (reputed to be the largest insurance company in North America) is alleged to be a
de-facto participant in the RICO activities.
Table 2 is a listing of the numerous unlawful activity transactions, to the extent known
and the particular code section of RICO, or other federal, state or common law constituting the
allegations of violations of criminal law (two or more within 10 years of bringing lawsuit under
Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 173 L. Ed.2d 1265, 556 U.S. 938, 77 USLW 4474
(2009).
-16018
RICO) supporting the jurisdictional application of the RICO statute by the Court (as plaintiffs
understand the Court has Ordered to be done).
In order to address these complex matters in the simplest fashion possible, plaintiffs first
list in this reply the section entitled Statement of Facts each of the defendants allegations with
which plaintiffs do not agree and a refuting statement. Then, plaintiffs refers the court to the
applicable Table (1 or 2) consisting of a matrix which lists each specific alleged RICO entity
along the left-hand side of the matrix, and each allegation of a RICO violation with associated
code section of criminal law across the top of the matrix. In this fashion factual matters related to
specific acts and allegedly applicable RICO violation, statutory or common law violation is
related to the particular entity alleged to have committed that violation.
Plaintiffs have also relied upon for recent applicable pleadings standards Twombly/Iqbal6,
Federal Rules Handbook, 2015 edition7.
V. Conclusion
For All the Above-Stated Reasons, Defendants Fort Myer Construction Corporation, Jose
Rodriguez, Lewis Shrensky, Anchor Construction Corporation, Florentine Gregorios Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Corrected Complaint and Opposition to
Defendants Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
Plaintiffs Motion for leave to file a Second Errata and Corrections to Second
Amended Complaint Should Be Granted. Plaintiffs further request leave to file a Third Amended
Complaint to incorporate additional facts now available.
Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 .S. 662 (2009).
Publisher, Thomson Reuters, by Baiker-McKee, Janssen, Corr.

-17019
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ CharltonW2428
Walter T. Charlton, D.C. Bar # 186940
Counsel for Plaintiffs
11213 Angus Way, Woodsboro, Md. 21798
Telephone 410 571 8764,
Email, charltonwt@comcast.net
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby Certify that I filed, in the ECF system of the Court, the foregoing Reply Brief,
with the expectation that it would be served by automatic ECF delivery upon all defendants
and/or their counsel of record on March 9 , 2015.
Charlton W 2428
Walter T. Charlton, DC. Bar # 186940
-18020
Index of Exhibits-Civil Construction LLC

Exhibit
Pages
Exhibit 1 Appendix III Guidance Memorandum Regarding Boyle VS US
11
Exhibit DR1 Civil Construction, LLC 2 year report dated 2000
Exhibit F Color Depiction of Racketeering Enterprise (Landscape)
Exhibit NC Non Collusion Affidavits
13
Exhibit O Defendants Affiliation Matrix (In Color)
Exhibit P1 Police Reports
Exhibit S1 Fort Myer Application Small Business Excerpts
14
Exhibit S2 Anchor Construction Small Business Excerpts
11
Exhibit S3 Capital Paving Small Business Excerpts
11
Table I Factors Establishing Existence of a RICO Enterprise per Boyle
Table II Criminal Violations by the RICO Enterprise (Landscape)
Table III Excerpts Sworn Statements of Gallardo
Exhibit VI Vehicle Damage
Exhibit V2 National Highway Traffic Administration Report on Mercedes Benz
-19021
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________
)
JOHN C. CHEEKS, et al
)
)
Plaintiffs
)
Case No. 14-CV-00914 (RCL)
v.
)
FORT MYER CONSTRUCTION
)
CORPORATION, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)
Order
Fort Myer Construction Corporation, Jose Rodriguez, Lewis Shrensky, Anchor
Construction Corporation, Florentine Gregorios Motion to deny leave to file a second Errata,
and Corrections to plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is HEREBY DENIED. The Second
Amended Complaint, as Corrected to date shall be received into the Court Record as the pleading
of the plaintiffs. The newly identified necessary party, Juanita Q. Gallardo is hereby granted
leave to intervene.
And it is further ORDERED THAT Defendants, Fort Myer Construction
Corporation, Jose Rodriguez, Lewis Shrensky, Anchor Construction Corporation, Florentine
Gregorios without prejudice to renew its motion upon the completion of discovery herein.
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to file a second errata and corrections to their second
amended complaint is granted.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________________________
United States District Judge Royce C. Lamberth
______
Date
-1022
Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101-1 Filed 03/09/15 Page 1 of 13
Exhibit 1
Criminal RICO 18 U.S.c. 1961-1968

A Manual For Federal Prosecutors
FITH REVISED EDITION OCTOER 2009
Appendix
III Guidance Memorandum
Boyle vs. United States, 556 U.S.
Regarding
129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009)
023
APPENDIX III
Guidance Memorandum
Regarding
Boyle v. United States.,
556 u.s.
, 129 s. Ct. 2237 (2009)
024

U.S. Department of Justice
Criminal Division
Washington, D.C. 20530
23 September 2009
MEMORANDUM
All Strike Force Chiefs and
OCRS Attorneys
To:
.... /i!;~;'
>:;.(~,:..
From:
Bruce G. Ohr, Chief;

Douglas E. Crow, Deput1Chier"'
Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section
Re:
Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. _,
C_"~~.c".::==-~)~
.---~".~."-
129 S. Ct. 2237, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1265 (2009)
Please distribute this memorandum regarding the impact of the Boyle decision to all of
your attorneys.
A.
Introduction
In Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. _,
129 S. Ct. 2237, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1265 (2009), the
United States Supreme COUliprovided further elaboration on the definition of, and what proof is
necessary to establish the existence of, a RICO "enterprise" within the meaning of 18 V.S.C.
1961(4).1
At trial, the government proved that Petitioner Edmund Boyle and others engaged in a
series of bank thefts (occasionally robberies, but more often burglaries) in several states and
transported the stolen monies from these thefts across state lines. Although the group had a
1 Boyle was issued immediately prior to publication of the 2009 version of OCRS'
Criminal RICO Manual. Therefore, this memorandum is supplied as Appendix C to that ManuaL
025
"core" membership, others were "recruited from time to time." 129 S. Ct. at 2241. To plan the
thefts, the group would meet beforehand to gather instruments (such as walkie-talkies and
crowbars) and assign roles, and afterwards the participants in the thefts would usually divide the
proceeds. Jd. As the Court noted, the organization was far from formal: "[t]he group was
loosely and informally organized. It does not appear to have had a leader or hierarchy; nor does
it appear that the participants ever formulated any long-term master plan or agreement." Id.
After trial, the district court instructed the jury as follows:
The term "enterprise" as used in these instructions may also include a group of
people associated in fact, even though this association is not recognized as a legal
entity. Indeed, an enterprise need not have a name. Thus, an enterprise need not
be a fonn[ a1] business entity such as a corporation, but may be merely an informal
association of individuals. A group or association of people can be an
"enterprise" if, among other requirements, these individuals "associate" together
for a purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. Common sense suggests that
the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what it
does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.
Moreover, you may find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without
structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattem of
racketeering acts. Such an association of persons may be established by evidence
showing an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and ... by evidence that the
people making up the association functioned as a continuing unit. Therefore, in
order to establish the existence of such an enterprise, the government must prove
that: (1) There is an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or
informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various members and
associates of the association function as a continuing unit to achieve a common
purpose.
Regarding "organization," it is not necessary that the enterprise have any
particular or formal structure, but it must have sufficient organization that its
members functioned and operated in a coordinated manner in order to carry out
the alleged common purpose or purposes of the enterprise.
Id. at 2242 n.l (emphases and ellipsis in Boyle). In addition, the district court rejected Boyle's
proposed instruction that the government was required to prove that an enterprise "'had an
026
ongoing organization, a core membership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an

ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts."
ld. at 2242. Boyle
was convicted on most ofthe counts, including the substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy
charges. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an unpublished disposition,
affirmed Boyle's conviction and did not specifically address his claims that the instructions were
erroneous. See United States v. Boyle, 283 Fed. Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether an association-in-fact enterprise must have '''an ascertainable
structure beyond that inherent in the pattern ofracketeering
activity in which it engages."
129 S.
Ct. at 2244; see also 129 S. Ct. 29 (2008) (granting certiorari).

B.
The Holding
In a 7-2 decision reaffirming its previous holding and analysis from United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,580-83
(1981), the Supreme Court affirmed Boyle's conviction, holding
that the district court's instructions properly conveyed the meaning of a RICO enterprise and
what proof was necessary to establish such an enterprise. 129 S. Ct. at 2247. Justice Alito,
writing for the majority, noted that the statutory definition of "enterprise" in 1961 (4) "does not
specifically define the outer boundaries of the 'enterprise' concept," and that the definition has a
"wide reach," consistent with the statutory command that RICO should be "'liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes.'"
ld. at 2243 (citing 904(a), 84 Stat. 947, note following 18
U.S.C. 1961). The Court also compared RICO with other statutes, such as the illegal gambling
business statute, 18 U.S.C. 1955, and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C.
848, noting that Congress did not impose the same strict structural requirements within RICO
027
as it had with the other statutes. Jd. at 2246.2

Turning to the question granted for certiorari-whether
an association-in-fact enterprise
must have an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in
which it engages-the
Court divided the question into three: (1) whether an association in fact
enterprise must have a "structure"; (2) whether such structure must be "ascertainable"; and (3)
whether the structure must "go 'beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity."? ld.
at 2244.
Regarding the first question, the Court agreed that an association-in-fact enterprise must
have a structure and must have "at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among
those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue
the enterprise's purpose." ld. However, because a district court retains "considerable discretion"
in choosing the language of its instructions, those particular words are not required. ld.
The Petitioner had also requested that the trial court instruct the jury that it must find an
"ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts." ld. at 2242.
Regarding whether structure must be"ascertainable," the Court acknowledged the truism that by
telling a jury that it must find an element, therefore the element must be '''ascertainable'
or else
the jury could not find that it was proved." Jd. at 2244. However, the Court reasoned, instructing
the jury that they needed to "ascertain the existence of an 'ascertainable structure' would have
been redundant and potentially misleading." ld. at 2245.
The Court noted that the statutory definition of "enterprise" in18 u.S.C. 1961(4)
"does not purport to set out an exhaustive definition of the term 'enterprise'" and that
"[ajccordingly, this provision does not foreclose the possibility that the term might include, in
addition to the specifically enumerated entities, others that fall within the ordinary meaning of
the term 'enterprise." ld. at 2243 n.2.
2
028
Finally, the Court addressed the third question, and the crux of the Petitioner's complaint:
whether an enterprise's structure must be "'beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering
activity.'"
Id. On this point, the COUl1turned to (and reiterated) its analysis previously made in
Turkette: the existence of an enterprise is a distinct element that must be proved, and '''proof of
one does not necessarily establish the other."? ld. (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). As an
example, if "several individuals, independently and without coordination," engaged in a pattern
of RICO predicate offenses, "[p ]roof of these patterns would not be enough to show that the
individuals were members of an enterprise." ld. at 2245 n.4.
However, the COUl1stressed that although the pattern does not necessarily establish the
enterprise, this does not mean that "the existence of an enterprise may never be inferred from the
evidence showing that persons associated with the enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering
activity". ld. at 2245 (emphasis added)." Moreover, the Court noted that although "the same
evidence may prove two separate elements, this does not mean that the two elements collapse
into one." Id. at 2246 n.5. Again turning to Turkette, the Court stated: "We recognized in
Turkette that the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the evidence
establishing an enterprise 'may in particular cases coalesce.'"
ld. at 2245 (quoting 452 U.S. at
583).4 Because this may be a permissible inference in certain cases, the Court reasoned, the
On this point, the Court reiterated its conclusion that it "made in Turkette that proof of
a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the
existence of an association-in-fact enterprise." ld. at 2247.
3
Importantly, the Court also rejected the dissent's assertion that a RICO enterprise must
be limited to "business-like entities." Id. at 2243. The majority reasoned that such an
"extratextual requirement" can be divined neither from the text nor the purpose of the statute, and
does not flow from the Court's prior cases. ld. at 2243 & n.3. Moreover, the Court concluded,
(continued ...)
4
029
judge did not err in instructing the jury that "'the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes
more readily proven by what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.'"
Id. at 2247
(quoting district court's instruction).

In essence, the C0U11'sopinion in Boyle reiterated its holding in Turkette, and resisted the
arguments of the Petitioner and the dissent to engraft additional, extratextual requirements into
the meaning of a RICO "enterprise":
As we said in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing
unit that functions with a common purpose. Such a group need not have a
hierarchical structure or a "chain of command"; decisions may be made on an ad
hoc basis and by any number of methods-by majority vote, consensus, a show of
strength, etc. Members of the group need not have fixed roles; different members
may perform different roles at different times. The group need not have a name,
regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures,
or induction or initiation ceremonies. While the group must function as a
continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a course of
conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in
spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence.
Id. at 2245.5
C.
Impact of the Boyle Decision

1.
Reiteration of the Import of Turkette
As explained above, the most significant source of the Court's analysis in Boyle was its
decision made 28 years previously in Turkette. Indeed, while the Court's holding that an
4( ... continued)
"[n]or is the statute limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or
unique; for example, a group that does nothing but engage in extortion through old fashioned,
unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely within the statute's reach." ld. at 2245-46.
Because the language ofthe statute was clear, and noting the "clear but expansive text
of the statute," the Court rejected the Petitioner's arguments based on the purposes of the statute,
the legislative history, and lenity principles. Jd. at 2246-47.
5
030
association-in-fact
enterprise must have "three structural features: a purpose, relationships among
those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue
the enterprise's purpose," id. at 2244, may initially seem like a marked shift from the Court's
previous description of an "enterprise," this is in fact quite consistent with Turkette, in which the
Court held that the enterprise is comprised of "a group of persons associated together for a
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct," and which "is proved by evidence of an
ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as
a continuing unit." 452 U.S. at 583. Moreover, in Boyle, as in Turkette, the Court noted that
while the enterprise and pattern are distinct elements which must be separately proven, the
evidence used to prove these separate elements may sometimes "coalesce."
129 S. Ct. at 2245
(quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).

Additionally, it is important to note what the Court stated was not required to establish an
enterprise:
a structural "hierarchy," "role differentiation," a "unique modus operandi," a
"chain of command," "professionalism and sophistication of organization,"
"diversity and complexity of crimes," "membership dues, rules and regulations,"
"uncharged or additional crimes aside from predicate acts," an "internal discipline
mechanism," "regular meetings regarding enterprise affairs," an "enterprise
'name, '" and "induction or initiation ceremonies and rituals."
129 S. Ct. at 2245 (quoting Petitioner's Briefs and Oral Argument Transcript). Furthermore, the
Court indicated that although a RICO enterprise must have some longevity "long enough to
pursue a course of conduct, nothing in RlCO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in
spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence."
Id. Additionally, the Court reasoned
that RlCO is not "limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or unique;
031
for example, a group that does nothing but engage in extortion through old-fashioned,
and brutal means may fall squarely within the statute's reach." Jd. at 2245-46.
unsophisticated,
Finally, notwithstanding the dissent's insistence that an enterprise must be a "business-like"

entity whose "separate existence will generally require evidence of rules, routines, or processes
through which the entity maintains its continuing operations and seeks to conceal its illegal acts"
or other "organizational elements more comprehensive than those necessary to perform a pattern
of predicate acts," id. at 2250 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the majority explicitly disavowed the need
for such proof.
ld. at 2243 & n.3.
In essence, the Court in Boyle stressed that district courts need look no further than
Turkette for an explanation of what is required for an association-in-fact enterprise, and that the
district court's Turkette-based instructions were "correct and adequate." ld. at 2247.6
2.
Rejection of More Restrictive Tests from Some Circuits
As described in the 2009 Criminal RICO Manual, since the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the circuit courts have had varying interpretations
on what constitutes and what is necessary to prove the existence of an "enterprise" within the
meaning of 18 U.S.c. 1961(4). See OCRS Criminal RICO Manual (2009) at 61-79. The most
restrictive of those interpretations came from United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th
6 Because Boyle turned on an issue of statutory construction, its construction of the

"enterprise" element applies to all RICO cases, past, pending and future. See generally Bousley
v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,620-21 (1998); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
Therefore, we can expect to see habeas corpus petitions from some defendants convicted of
RICO violations before Boyle was decided. However, because the Boyle Court sided with the
government and affirmed the district court's instructions (which were based on Turkette), we find
it highly unlikely that any such cases will be difficult to defend. As always, please contact OCRS
if any difficult Boyle or other RICO-related issues arise in your cases.
032
Cir. 1983), in which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit construed Turkette to require
that the enterprise exhibit three basic characteristics: (1) a common or shared purpose which
animates those associated with the enterprise, (2) some continuity of structure and personality,
and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of
racketeering activity.
advocated in Boyle-the
Id. at 665. As to this third part of the test-and
like the Petitioner
court stated that "an enterprise must have an 'ascertainable structure'
distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity," and noted that the
"distinct structure might be demonstrated by proof that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of
crimes or that it has an organizational pattern or system of authority beyond what was necessary
to perpetrate the predicate crimes." Id. at 665. Thus, in the view of the Eighth Circuit,"the
enterprise element requires proof of some structure separate from the racketeering activity and
distinct from the organization which is a necessary incident to the racketeering."
Jd. at 664. This
aspect of the test is clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle. See 129 S.
Ct. at 2245-46.
Boyle also rejected the restrictive interpretation of the meaning of "enterprise" described
by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214 (3rd
Cir. 1983). In Riccobene, the court held that to determine the existence of an enterprise, the jury
must find: (1) that there was an '''ongoing organization'";
(2) "'that the various associates
function as a continuing unit'''; and (3) that the enterprise has "an existence 'separate and apart
from the pattern of activity in which it engages.'"
709 F.2d at 221 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at
583). In explaining these requirements, the Riccobene court stated that "[t]here must be some
mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an on-going, rather than an ad
9
033
hoc, basis" and it is necessary "that each person perform a role in the group consistent with the
organizational structure established ... and which furthers the activities of the organization."
at 222-23.
Id.
By contrast, the Boyle COUliexplicitly stated that an enterprise "need not have a
hierarchical structure or a 'chain of command,"

basis and by any number of methods."
and that "decisions may be made on an ad hoc
129 S. Ct. at 2245 (emphasis added). Moreover, whereas
in Riccobene the court suggested that the members of the enterprise must "occupy continuing
positions within the group," 709 F.2d at 223, the Supreme Court in Boyle noted that in an
enterprise "[m [embers of the group need not have fixed roles; different members may perform
different roles at different times." 129 S. Ct. at 2245. Additionally, in Riccobene, the court of
appeals insisted that the enterprise must have "an existence beyond that which is necessary
merely to commit each of the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses." 709 F.2d at 224.
By contrast, the Boyle Court stressed that although the existence of an enterprise was a distinct
element that must be separately proven, "the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering
activity and the evidence establishing an enterprise 'may in particular cases coalesce,'" 129 S. Ct.
at 2245 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583), and that in some circumstances the proof of a pattern
might be sufficient to "permit a jury to infer the existence of an association-in- fact enterprise."
ld. at 2247. Accordingly, as with Bledsoe, this restrictive test put forth in Riccobene is
incongruous with the holding in Boyle. Indeed, the Boyle Court noted that the enterprise
members in Boyle itself never "formulated any long-term master plan or agreement," id. at 2241,
and went on to state that "a group that does nothing but engage in extortion through oldfashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely within the statute's reach," id. at
2246.
10
034
While neither Bledsoe nor Riccobene are discussed (or even mentioned) by the Supreme
Court, it is clear that these heightened standards and "extratextual" requirements do not survive
Boyle. Prosecutors should, of course, consider whether the Supreme Court's decision changes
the continuing viability of pre-Boyle circuit precedents."
Conclusion
Of course, we will not know the nature or scope of Boyle's impact until the district and
circuit courts have actually applied the decision." However, OCRS obviously welcomes this
decision, because it (1) reiterates the importance of the Turkette standard, affirming the
government's
arguments that this standard sufficiently describes the RICO "enterprise"; (2)
makes clear that the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity may also be used
to demonstrate the existence of the enterprise; (3) reaffirms the principle that, in certain cases, the
proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient to infer the existence of an enterprise;
and (4) rejects the arguments for the additional "enterprise" requirements proposed by the
Petitioner, the dissenting opinion, and other cases such as Bledsoe and Riccobene.
As described in the 2009 Criminal RICO Manual, pp. 67-68, the Fourth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits had previously adopted some variation of the Bledsoel Riccobene tests.
?
OCRS is currently considering revisions to its model RICO instructions in light of
Boyle.
11
035
EXHIBIT A
Affidavit of Ronald J. Bonfilio, Documents Examiner:
036
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PENDING RICO CASE Part 1 Pages 1-100 Cheeks V Fort Myer

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PENDING RICO CASE Part 1 Pages 1-100 Cheeks V Fort Myer

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John Cheeks

Civil Construction LLC

CNA Financial Corp.

and selected executives

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Corrupt Practices Act (RICO)(18 U.S. C. 1961

Plaintiffs Reply Brief

Exhibit 1 DOJ Guidance Manual Appendix III-Effect of Boyle vs. US on RICO

Exhibit A, Attachment 2, Bid Bonds

Exhibit A Attachment 3 Public Documents Used to Create Exhibit F

Exhibit DR 1Civil Construction, LLC 2 year report Principals

Exhibit F, Depiction In Chart Form of RICO Activities. Created by Mr. Bonfilio,

Exhibit K Table II-Criminal Violations by RICO enterprise

Exhibit L Table III Gallardo Sworn Statements-Excerpts

Exhibit O Defendant's Affiliation Matrix

Exhibit V- 1 Ball Joint Damage

Exhibit V-2 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 2003

Purpose of this Publication

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 2 of 20

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 3 of 20

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 4 of 20

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 5 of 20

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 6 of 20

before the Circuit Court of Prince Georges County Maryland.

II. SUPPLEMENTAL FACTUAL STATEMENT

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7. Defendant's statement (Page 13 para 3, last of FMCC Opp.)

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Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 13 of 20

B. Supplemental Response to Crimes In Addition to RICO Criminal Acts

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Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 17 of 20

Publisher, Thomson Reuters, by Baiker-McKee, Janssen, Corr.

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 18 of 20

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 19 of 20

Index of Exhibits-Civil Construction LLC

Exhibit 1 Appendix III Guidance Memorandum Regarding Boyle VS US

Exhibit DR1 Civil Construction, LLC 2 year report dated 2000

Exhibit F Color Depiction of Racketeering Enterprise (Landscape)

Exhibit NC Non Collusion Affidavits

Exhibit O Defendants Affiliation Matrix (In Color)

Exhibit P1 Police Reports

Exhibit S1 Fort Myer Application Small Business Excerpts

Exhibit S2 Anchor Construction Small Business Excerpts

Exhibit S3 Capital Paving Small Business Excerpts

Table I Factors Establishing Existence of a RICO Enterprise per Boyle

Table II Criminal Violations by the RICO Enterprise (Landscape)

Table III Excerpts Sworn Statements of Gallardo

Exhibit VI Vehicle Damage

Exhibit V2 National Highway Traffic Administration Report on Mercedes Benz

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101 Filed 03/09/15 Page 20 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 1:14-cv-00914-RCL Document 101-1 Filed 03/09/15 Page 1 of 13

Criminal RICO 18 U.S.c. 1961-1968

III Guidance Memorandum