JIMENEZ VS.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority.

109 PHIL 273

A physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with
any offense . She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is
in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of

FACTS:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree annulling his marriage with
Remedios Canizares. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow the

sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.

penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. He also claimed that the condition of her
genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. The wife was summoned and

Barnuevo vs. Fuster

served with a copy of the complaint but she did not file an answer. The court entered an order

Facts:

requiring defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to

determine her physical capacity for copulation. Defendant did not submit herself to the
examination and the court entered a decree annulling the marriage. The City Attorney filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, among the grounds that the defendants impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined
because she refused to be examined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks.
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established
because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on
her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and

Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez were married in Spain. Fuster came to the
Philippines, settled, and acquire property. After several years, Yanez also went to the
Philippines to live with his husband. Subsequently, they made an agreement in a public
instrument by which they resolved to live apart and Fuster authorizing Yanez to go back to
Spain and reside therein. Fuster also undertook to gove Yanez a monthly allowance for
support. Yanez returned to the Philippines and commenced divorce proceedings against her
husband. She prayed that she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the
separation of the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date of the said
decree; that the conjugal society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal
property had been determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to
the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered
to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas. As a special preferred defense, Fuster alleged
that neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine
Islands In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant.
Both parties appealed from this judgment
Issue:
Whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree
the divorce now on appeal
Ruling:

The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised

within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the
statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private
law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of
persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other
questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are
generally submitted to the territorial principle. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of
Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the
Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in
Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain.
Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce
according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by
invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in
such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their
nation. In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not
lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they
were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.

The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estate
was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the
Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was
granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the
estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent
was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to
the Court of Appeals that the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
(1)

Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.

(2)

Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as

surviving spouse of Arturo.

Quita vs Court of Appeals

December 22, 1998
Fact of the Case:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of
them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith.
They were blessed with six children.
On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will
be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce
acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that
the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr
that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid

Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita
at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was
already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their countrys national
law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the
primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.
Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Monday, February 20, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind

according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American

Facts: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish

citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time

priest

in

Nabua,

Camarines

Sur.

she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen.
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of

Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court,

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a

Southern

petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved

District

of

New

York.

that

Alicia

be

appointed

Special

Administratrix

of

his

estate.

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted
an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to

discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous

probate

relationship

with

his

brother,

Ceferino

but

before

the

proceedings

could

be

terminated

Lorenzo

died.

Llorente.
Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the United States and

her favor contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, that such properties were

on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in

acquired during their marriage and that Lorenzos will would encroach her legitime.

and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of

Alicia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.

California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory

judgment

of

divorce.

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course

On

December

4,

1952,

the

divorce

decree

became

to

Paulas

petition.

final.
The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is

Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in

void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia

Manila.

Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F.
Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five

receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with

(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.

Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by

Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,

Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses

Lorenzo

Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his

Issue: Who

property

to

Alicia

and

their

three

Llorente.
are

entitled

to

inherit

from

the

late

Lorenzo

N.

Llorente?

children.
Held: The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in

favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the

such thing as American law for the whole nation of the US, for the country comprises of a

will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

group of States, each State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of

As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an

whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of

individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects

the

shall

Civil

Code

of

the

Philippines.

be

recognized

in

the

Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already

The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife

probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,

Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

especially

in

light

of

the

factual

and

legal

circumstances

here

obtaining.
Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are

Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce

matters

best

left

to

the

determination

of

the

trial

court.

from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
admitted

and

undisputed.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the
will

was

duly

probated.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is

situated.

The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the
cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession

will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with

and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary

instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of

provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under

the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein

said

property

may

be

found.

345 SCRA 592 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Laws Nationality Principle
Effects of Foreign Divorce

But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzos Will by calling to the fore the
RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is no

Succession Last Will and Testament of an Alien

In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and

HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in

Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.

1943. Hence, when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was
already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had

Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of

a son.

persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support.

Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status

Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if

are no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be

the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the

respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to

United States.

their national law.

In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the

represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce

effects of the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.

became final.
Anent the issue on Lorenzos last will and testament, it must be respected. He is an alien and
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three

is not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts

children.

for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be
alleged in order to prove the validity of the will.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and
their children (nothing for Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the wills probate and to have

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be

35 Phil 252

terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over

FACTS:

Lorenzos estate.

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married

The trial court ruled that Lorenzos marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce he
obtained abroad is void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is
not applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzos divorce abroad should be recognized.

on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed
together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint
against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner
refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid
cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed,
inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of

the lewd designs and physical assaults of the H, the W may claim support from the H for
separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the
conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from

WONG WOO YIU V VIVO

respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

26FEB

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.

G.R. No. L-21076 | March 31, 1965 | J. BAUTISTA ANGELO

HELD:
Doctrine:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill

Laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the

the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at

Philippines, even though living abroad.

his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from

Facts:

the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband,

1.

legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant,

she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home.
HELD: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,
duties, and obligations of w/c rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general
law w/c defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution,
in the maintenance of w/c in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and
the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make.
The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law
determines from time to time and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is
merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or govt
upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the
object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that the H, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either
by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However,
the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the H to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home bec. of the H's
own wrongful acts. In this case, where the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode bec. of

The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be

which was later on affirmed by the Board of Commissioners.

2.

However, the same Board, composed of a new set of members, reversed BSI No. 3
and ordered petitioner to be excluded from the country.

3.

Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was denied for lack of merit. She
then filed the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction (considered as
certiorari) before the Manila CFI.

4.

After the respondents filed their answer and the parties submitted a written
stipulation of facts, the court a quo declared valid the original decision and restrained
respondents from excluding petitioner from the country. Respondents interposed the present
appeal.

5.

It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared that she came to the
Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was
married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that their marriage was celebrated by one
Chua Tio, a village leader; that the new set of Board of Commissioners found that petitioners
claim was without basis, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on
January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in

1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an

case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign

affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and

country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then
in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned

claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed

therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioners marriage, even if

from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.

true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Issue:

Decision appealed from reversed.

W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of her marriage and can thus be
admitted as non-quota immigrant in the country?
Held:
No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged
husband in the investigations conducted by the immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in
support of petitioners claim that she is Blas wife is a mass of oral and documentary evidence
bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship.
Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is
well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it
must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of
the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the

FACTS:
In proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in June, 1961,
Wong Woo Yiu (petitioner) declared that 1) she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first
time to join her husband Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, to whom she was married in
Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929, 2) that they had several children all of whom are not
in the Philippines; 3) that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader. On
June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be
legally married to Perfecto Blas, thus declaring legal her admission into the country. This
decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on July 12, 1961 of which petitioner
was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. However,
on June 28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of
members, rendered a new decision contrary to that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and
ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country, after discrepancies were found in the
statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband during several investigations
conducted by the immigration authorities concerning the alleged marriage before a village
leader in China in 1929, thus concluding that the petitioners claim that she is the lawful wife of
Perfecto Blas was without basis in evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husbandwife relationship."

Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore,
that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the

ISSUE:

same is not one of those authorized in our country.

Whether or not WONG WOO YIUs marriage to PERFECTO BLAS is valid in the
Philippines, and her admission into the country is legal.

But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in

HELD:

Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage

The above revocation of decision cannot be disputed, it finding support in the record
and investigation. Indeed, not only is there no documentary evidence to support the alleged
marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many
inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the said marriage
in China on 1929. Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto
Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our

contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was
celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention
because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being the

country. (In order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be
solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace,
or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine
Library and Museum Public Act 3412, Section 2) Since our law only recognizes a marriage
celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of
them, it is clear that petitioner's marriage cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
1. ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEE, 43 PHIL 43
FACTS
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga and left property worth
nearly P100,000.
The estate of the deceased was claimed by Cheong Seng Gee, an alleged legitimate
child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. On the
other hand, Mora Adong, the alleged lawful wife of the deceased who married him in
1896 in Basilan, and her daughters are also claiming as heirs of the decedent.
The conflicting claims to the estate were ventilated in the CFI of Zamboanga.
The trial judge reached the conclusion that the proof of the marriage of Tan Dit to the
decedent was not sufficient.
Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child.
On the other hand, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the
Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved, but, under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; thus, the daughters
Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children.
The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a
partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children,
Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
Thus, both parties appealed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the marriage between Tan Dit and the decedent is valid.
2. W/N the marriage between Mora and the decedent is valid considering that it is a
Mohammedan marriage.
RULING
First issue:
SC ruled that to establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is
first necessary to prove before the Philippine courts the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence.
THE PROOF PRESENTED IN COURT DID NOT SUSTAIN THE VALIDITY OF THE
MARRIAGE OF TAN BIT AND THE DECEDENT.
The Court noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the
brother of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by
overstepping the limits of truthfulness. The Court also noted that reliable witnesses

stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he
was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands.
The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing
between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish
the marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
ALSO THERE IS NO COMPETENT TESTIMONY AS TO WHAT THE LAWS OF CHINA
IN THE PROVINCE OF AMOY CONCERNING MARRIAGE WERE IN 1895.
As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to
produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.
Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.
AS TO THE TESTAMENTARY RIGHTS OF CHEONG SENG GEE AS AN
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD, SUCH WAS NOT PRONOUNCED AS AN
ERROR SINCE THE OPPOSITORS FAILED TO ASSIGNED IT AS AN ERROR AND
MERELY KEPT SILENCE.

second issue:
YES. MARRIAGE MAY BE SOLEMNIZED BY EITHER A JUDGE OF ANY COURT
INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, OR PRIEST OR
MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL OF ANY DENOMINATION . . ."
"Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the
service of a divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer,
sacrifice, or other service is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing,
deliverance, etc., obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a
Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and
faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a particular name.
A MOHAMMEDAN IMAN IS A "PRIEST OR MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL," AND
MOHAMMEDANISM IS A "DENOMINATION," WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
MARRIAGE LAW.
"NO PARTICULAR FORM FOR THE CEREMONY OF MARRIAGE IS REQUIRED, BUT
THE PARTIES MUST DECLARE, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PERSON
SOLEMNIZING THE MARRIAGE, THAT THEY TAKE EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND
WIFE."
The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite
for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are
capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed,
the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance, there is no question of
capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. While it is true that
during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest were addressed more to
the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora
woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together
as husband and wife.
IT WAS SHOWN BY EVIDENCE THAT THE DECEDENT WAS MARRIED TO THE
MORA ADONG ACCORDING TO THE CEREMONIES PRESCRIBED BY THE BOOK
ON MARRIAGE OF THE KORAN, BY THE MOHAMMEDAN IMAN (PRIEST)
HABUBAKAR. THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE IS ESTABLISHED BY
ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE, THE MORA ADONG, BY THE IMAN WHO

SOLEMNIZED THE MARRIAGE, AND BY OTHER EYEWITNESSES, ONE OF WHOM

WAS THE FATHER OF THE BRIDE, AND ANOTHER, THE CHIEF OF THE
RANCHERIA, NOW A MUNICIPAL COUNCILOR.
The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money
and P250 in goods. From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three
years later, the Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them
were born five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his
relations with Mora Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated
Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public
documents. Thus, when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of
registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as
1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
THE COURT RULED THAT THE MARRIAGE WAS VALID. THE LAW OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION. VARIOUS RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS HAVE SO
OFT ANNOUNCED THE PURPOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO INTERFERE
WITH THE CUSTOMS OF THE MOROS, ESPECIALLY THEIR RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS.
Other digested version:
FACTS: Estate of Cheong Boo is claimed by two parties (1) his alleged
legitimate child from a marriage contracted in China in 1895, and (2) his
alleged legitimate spouse from a marriage in Basilan in 1896.
ISSUE: WON a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by a
matrimonial letter is valid in the Philippines
HELD: NO;
o To establish a valid foreign marriage, it is first necessary to prove
before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact,
o and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence.
There is a need for proof that is clear, strong and unequivocal so as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of such impediment (prior marriage).
FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5,
1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1)
Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriag contracted by
Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had
been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two
daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong
Boos estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to
sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo
and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child.

With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial court reached the
conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proved
but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage
and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower court
believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Islands laws this as
an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid.
Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid
HELD:
The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman
Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan
marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate
children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law. The Supreme Court
held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an
instruction in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The presumption as to
marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is
the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive
force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by
legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and
should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can
properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively
promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative
intention into effect. Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that all marriages contracted
outside the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of
the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted
marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband through
an alleged prior Chinese marriage, save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to
produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. A marriage alleged to have
been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be
valid in the Philippines.

People vs Dumpo

FACTS:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites and
practice of the Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is alleged that
Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived together as
husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a
maximum of eight years, and one day of prision mayor and minimum of two years, four
months and twenty one days of prision correccional, with costs. From this judgment the
accused interposed an appeal. The records of the case disclose that it has been established
by the defense, without the prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to the
contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void according to
Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his consent thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Hassan and Dupo is valid.

Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, cannot be considered as
such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the information.
Wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is acquitted of the
charges and if she should be in detention her immediate release is ordered, with the costs of
both instances de oficio. So ordered.

Facts:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally married according to the rites and practices
of the Mohammedan religion. Without the marriage being dissolved, it has been alleged that
Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which they lived together as
husband and wife.
Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy in the CFI Zamboanga. Dumpo appealed.
It has been established by the defense, without the prosecution having presented objection or
evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage was null and void according to
Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father (Moro Jalmani) had not given his consent.

HELD:
We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the
validity of a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact of which
no judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every particular case. In the
case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari, an Iman or Mohammedan priest
authorized to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans, to the effect that the consent of
the bride's father or. in the absence thereof, that of the chief of the tribe to which she belongs
in an indipensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. If the absence of this requisite
did not make the marriage contract between Mohammedans void, it was easy for the
prosecution to show it by refuting Iman Tahari's testimony inasmuch as for lack of one there
were two other Imans among the State witnesses in this case. It failed to do so, however, and
from such failure we infer that the Iman's testimony for the defense is in accordance with truth.
It is contended that, granting the absolute necessity of the requisite in question, tacit
compliance therewith may be presumed because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has
signified his opposition to this alleged marriage after he had been informed of its celebration.
But this presumption should not be established over the categorical affirmation of Moro
Jalmani, Dumpo's father, that he did not give his consent to his daughter's alleged second
marriage for the reason that he was not informed thereof and that, at all events, he would not
have given it, knowing that Dumpo's first marriage was not dissolved.
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to first been contracted by the accused with

Issue: Whether or not Dumpo was guilty of bigamy.

Held: No. Dumpo was acquitted.
The court formulated that there is no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for
the validity of a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact which
must be subject to proof in every particular case.
In the case, the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari (Iman or Mohammedans priest authorized
to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans) was that the effect of the consent of the
father's bride is an indispensable requirement for the validity of such contracts.
It was easy for the prosecution to show that the marriage was void by refuting Tahari's
testimony because there were 2 other Imans among the State witnesses in the case, but it
failed to do so.
Granting the absolute necessity of the father's consent, tacit compliance may be presumed
because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his opposition to the 2nd
marriage after he had been informed of its celebration. But this presumption should not be
established over the affirmation of Dumpo's father saying that he did not give his consent to
the 2nd marriage.

It is an essential element in bigamy that the 2nd marriage have all the essential requisites of a
valid marriage. It appearing that the 2nd marriage cannot be considered as such, there is no
justification to hold her guilty of bigamy.

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the
Philippines.

Dissent:
There is no quotation from the Koran regarding the essentials of a marriage ceremony. Justice
Hull agrees that the evidence relied upon is not worthy of serious consideration. If consent
were in fact necessary, it can well be presumed from the subsequent actions of the girl.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 786

FACTS: Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where
he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines
worth about P300,000. Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration and alleged that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion
Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's
marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him. The petition was opposed by Yao
Kee et al who alleged that she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19,
1931 in China and the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao
Kee. Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and the other oppositors
were legitimate children of Sy Mat. On appeal, CA simply modified probate courts judgment
and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales et al are natural children of Sy Mat. They filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.

In this case, for failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage,

alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was
opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he
married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of Yao Kee. On appeal, the Court
Yao Kee as not proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Both parties moved for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.
HELD: No. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To
establish the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the
alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts.

HELD: For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the existence of foreign law as a question of
fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In the case at
bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of
China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more
importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For
failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.

HELD: For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the
marriage in accordance w/ said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any
competent evidence relative to the law and customs of China on marriage. The testimonies of
Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not
only bec. they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they
are competent to testify on the subject matter.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence." On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of

justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact."
The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondents petition for authority to
remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Republic vs. Orbecido

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an,
Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U.
S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named
Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a
divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition
for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in
the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed
a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur
granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed
this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein
petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence
showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where
at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.
S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be
applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party

were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.