It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from

the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country,
a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the
right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including
his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to
protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and
freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of
which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate
to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as
those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art.
II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig, which refer to the issuance of
passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of
this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between
executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel
and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence. Cdpr
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not
there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is
rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the
methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach.
We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to
the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or
not the President acted arbitrarily or