ON THE ISSUE OF CONCEALMENT

Section 20(E) of the POEA-SEC is clearly states that a seafarer who knowingly
conceals and does not disclose past medical condition, disability and history in the
pre-employment medical examination constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation and
shall disqualify him from any compensation and benefits. This may also be a valid
ground for termination of employment and imposition of the appropriate
administrative and legal sanctions. Thus, for knowingly concealing his diabetes
during the PEME, petitioner committed fraudulent misrepresentation which under
the POEA-SEC unconditionally barred his right to receive any disability
compensation or illness benefit. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, MS. LOMA
B. AGUIMAN, FAIRDEAL GROUP MANAGEMENT S.A., and MT FAIR JOLLY vs.
SPOUSES MARGARITO B. DELALAMON and PRISCILA A. DELALAMO., G.R.
No. 198097, July 30, 2014, J. Reyes

As in Dumadag, Gepanaga failed to observe the prescribed procedure of having the

conflicting assessments on his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding
opinion. Consequently, the Court applies the following pronouncements laid down
in Vergara: The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide
that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the
vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the companydesignated physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
company-designated physicians assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and
binding on them. Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a
third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done
in accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail
of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the companydesignated doctors certification is the final determination that must prevail.
VERITAS MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR ERICKSON MARQUEZ vs.
RAMON A. GEPANAGA JR., G.R. No. 206285, February 04, 2015, J. Mendoza

A seafarer may have basis to pursue an action for total and permanent disability
benefits only if any of the following conditions are present: (a) The companydesignated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea
duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no
indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total
disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days had
lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician; (c)
The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the
120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the
doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion; (d)
The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently

disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his
employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well; (e) The
company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently
disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading; (f) The company-designated
physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related
under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under
Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work; (g)
The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled
but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and (h) The
company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled
within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his
usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods. Furthermore, the onus probandi falls
on the seafarer to establish or substantiate his claim that he is entitled to disability
benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence. He has to prove causation between
the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the
illness was increased by his working condition. Otherwise, for lack of factual and
legal basis, he will not be entitled to any claim. ALONE AMAR P. TAGLE vs.
ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT, PHILS., INC., ANGLO-EASTERN
CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA) and CAPT. GREGORIO B. SIALSA, G.R. No.
209302, July 9, 2014, J. Mendoza
Under the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who declares the
fitness to work of a seafarer who sustains a work-related injury/illness or the degree
of the seafarers disability. While a seafarer is not precluded from seeking a second
opinion on his medical condition or disability, a finding by his doctor of choice in
contrast with that made of the company-designated physician, necessitates the
appointment of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding. Such
disagreement should have been referred to a third doctor jointly by the employer
and the seafarer. In the case at bar, the non-referral cannot be blamed on the
employer. Since it was the seafarer who consulted another doctor without informing
his employer, he should have actively requested that the disagreement be referred
to a final and binding third opinion. In the absence of any request from him, the
employer-company cannot be expected to respond. As such, in the absence of a
third doctor resolution of the conflicting assessments between the doctors, the
assessment of the company-designated physician as to the seafarers health should
stand. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINES
LIMITED vs. CRISANTE C. CONSTANTINO, G.R. No. 180343, July 9, 2014, J.
Brion

In Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc., this Court categorically

declared that the petitioner cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption
provision mentioned in Section 20(B)(4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. As he did so without
solid proof of work-relation and work-causation or work-aggravation of his illness,
the Court cannot provide him relief. The disputable presumption provision in Section
20(B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to
present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of
the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to
be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered
was work-related and that it must have existed during the term of his employment
contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to respondent
company. On that note, we emphasize that making factual findings based only on
presumptions and absent the quantum of evidence required in labor cases is an
erroneous application of the law on compensation proceedings. This Court has ruled
in Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., citing Government Service
Insurance System v. Cuntapay, that claimants in compensation proceedings must
show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and
the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required otherwise, the resulting
conclusion would proceed from deficient proof. JORAINA DRAGON TALOSIG vs.
UNITED PHILIPPINES LINES, INC, ET AL, G.R. No. 198388, July 28, 2014, CJ.
Sereno