Risk ID/Assess

ID & ASSESS

Risk No A18 Rating No RMB No Risk Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed

Status
Risk Issue CASA 235 bubble window crew ergonomics
Description The bubble windows on the Casa aircraft are too small and are awkwardly located making the ergonomics not conducive to long-term
visual searches.
Approval ACCEPTED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Company Assessment Date 2/19/2003
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Bulkley, Melissa Team* Aviation

Originator Bulkley, Melissa RMB Member Lee, Gary
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 02/19/03 Action items 1,2,3,& 4 of Mitigation A18-1 updated and closed. No change in assessment values. 01/21/03 Entered Mitigation
Comment Plan developed during MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. No change in assessment values. 1/7/03 Reviewed Occurrence and
Impact Values. Revised Manufacturing, Engineering, Management, Requirement and Cost values. GLL 1/3/03: Unable to quantify risk.
Need to define "too small" and "awkward". For example, "Bubble Window must be X inches wide by Y inches tall and should be located
so the center of the window is Z inches above the height of the scanner seat cushion for optimal viewing", etc.
Risk
Closure
Rationale
ASSESSMENT

First Current First Current

Date Assessed 12/18/2002 2/19/2003 Risk Factor 0.12 0.21
Probability of Occurrence 0.4 0.7 Severity of Consequence 0.3 0.3
Reassessed Risk No
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence 0.3
Probability Performance Consequence 0.3
Engineering Probability 0.4 Schedule Consequence 0.1
Management Probability 0.3 TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability 0.7 TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability n/a
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability n/a
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk $350,000 Potential Cost Impact for this Risk $500,000
Schedule Exposure for this Risk 0.7Mo. Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk 1Mo.
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A18 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed

RISK
Issue CASA 235 bubble window crew ergonomics
Description The bubble windows on the Casa aircraft are too small and are awkwardly located making the ergonomics not conducive to long-term
visual searches.
Assessment Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment

Assumptions for this Risk

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description

Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A18 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed
Risk Factor 0.21 Probability 0.7 Consequence 0.3 Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Risk Issue CASA 235 bubble window crew ergonomics
Risk Description
Team Aviation Actionee Melissa Bulkley Risk Lead Gary Lee
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete
A18-1 Test Event 0 0 1/17/2003 1/17/2003
Activity 01/15/03 - 01/17/03 MPA Risk Review Meeting with CASA.
Result Mitigation Plan: 1. CG review Fixed Wing legacy data for field of vision and areas of coverage to compare to CASA data.
(Set requirements no lower than legacy system). 2. CASA to evaluate increasing window height or moving location down.
Changes to location along the fuselage are not an option. Actions: 1. CG remove location along fuselage of window as a
risk from the database. COMPLETED. 2. CG check with legal to see if digital photography is acceptable in court or do we
need to remove windows for photographs. DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHY ACCEPTABLE. 3. CASA provide information on
feasibility to increase window height, move location down, or change window size. INFORMATION PROVIDED ON
1/22/03. CG TO REVIEW. 4. CASA provide data on area of coverage based on defined field of vision. DATA PROVIDED
ON 1/27/03. CG TO REVIEW. 5. CG work with NAVAIR to provide HFE data on FW legacy system in C&TD. 6. CG talk to
R&D center for data on visual search effectiveness (standards/impacts of current solution) in C&TD.
IMS 21 No
 Risk ID/Assess
ID & ASSESS

Risk No A24 Rating No RMB Yes Risk Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed
Status
Risk Issue MPA Growth Margin
Description The MPA aircraft must have sufficient growth margins (aircraft grow weight certification and engine power) to meet the MPA
Performance Specification for the life- cycle of the assets. Historically, CG aircraft have experienced a 6% empty weight growth over 20
years (based on the CG C130 and HU25). CASA shall develop a growth plan over 35 years with no degradation in performance for the
MPA aircraft.
Approval ACCEPTED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Company Lockheed Martin Assessment Date 2/19/2003
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Bulkley, Melissa Team* Aviation

Originator Bulkley, Melissa RMB Member Lee, Gary
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 01/21/03 Entered Mitigation Plan developed during MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. Revised Requirement probability value.
Comment 1/3/03: CG has decided to proceed with CLIN 0040A with the understanding that the aircraft will be a CN-235-300M vice the proposed
CN-235-300M-ER. Planned growth margin has been quantified. 1/7/03 Reviewed Occurrence and Impact values. Revised Requirement
and Cost values. Cost increased dramatically due to possibility of re-engining aircraft during life of program. GLL Accordingly, margin
requirements as called for by the CG are 12% increase over the MPA Mission ZFW. ZFW for the CN-235-300M is 25425 lbs vice the
proposed CN- 235-300M-ER ZFW of 26025 lbs. Thus, the CN-235-300M margin is for 3051 lbs of growth.
Risk
Closure
Rationale
ASSESSMENT

First Current First Current

Date Assessed 12/18/2002 2/19/2003 Risk Factor 0.2 0.18
Probability of Occurrence 0.4 0.2 Severity of Consequence 0.5 0.9
Reassessed Risk No
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence 0.9
Probability Performance Consequence n/a
Engineering Probability n/a Schedule Consequence n/a
Management Probability n/a TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability 0.2 TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability n/a
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability n/a
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk $4,000,000 Potential Cost Impact for this Risk $20,000,000
Schedule Exposure for this Risk Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A24 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB Yes Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed

RISK
Issue MPA Growth Margin
Description The MPA aircraft must have sufficient growth margins (aircraft grow weight certification and engine power) to meet the MPA Performance
Specification for the life- cycle of the assets. Historically, CG aircraft have experienced a 6% empty weight growth over 20 years (based
on the CG C130 and HU25). CASA shall develop a growth plan over 35 years with no degradation in performance for the MPA aircraft.
Assessment Harris, Charles Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment
CG has decided to proceed with CLIN 0040A with the understanding that the aircraft will be a CN-235-300M vice the proposed CN-235-300M-ER.
Assuming that the Pacific patrol regions will be serviced by C-130 aircraft, the Extended Range version of the CASA aircraft was not considered
necessary by the CG.
Assumptions for this Risk

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description

Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A24 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB Yes Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed
Risk Factor 0.18 Probability 0.2 Consequence 0.9 Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Risk Issue MPA Growth Margin
Risk Description
Team Aviation Actionee Melissa Bulkley Risk Lead Gary Lee
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete
A24-2 Test Event 0 0
Activity 01/15/03 - 01/17/03 MPA Risk Review Meeting with CASA.
Result Mitigation Plan: 1. CG and CASA review weights and mission profiles to verify weight growth from current configuration.
2. Plan for weight growth (P3I program): 2.a. Evaluate Engine mods – work with GE 2.b. Evaluate weight growth over time
(set-up P3I program) 2.c. Determine point in time for fatigue, dynamic loads and damage and tolerance analysis. 2.d.
Rolling and braking equipment changes Actions: 1. CG and ICGS correlate reference mission in CASA pitch to SRR
reference mission. 2. CG and CASA verify weights used to calculate ZFW and max mission take off weight. 3. CG provide
weights of additional equipment based on SRR requirements.
IMS 21 No
A24-1 Test Event 0.2 0.2 1/6/2003 5/1/2003
Activity Concept and Technology Development Phase of MPA acquisition will develop POA&M for margin capture.
Result POA&M will be outlined at PDR.
IMS 21 No
 Risk ID/Assess
ID & ASSESS

Risk No A17 Rating No RMB No Risk Current Created 12/12/2002 Closed

Status
Risk Issue MPA Commercial Parts Pool vs Closed Parts Pool
Description The Coast Guard presently maintains a closed loop serial number tracking process. This process tracks flight critical and non flight
critical (where high maintenance parts and high availability degraders are issues) spare parts for fleet wide support, serial number
tracking serve the following: a. Allows for parts integrity and safety of flight in support of Coast Guard unique Mission's b. Reduces
greatly the chance of bogus parts getting installed on aircraft which reduces chance of catastrophic failure. c. No downing of the fleet
during OEM ordered inspection and service bulletins, there by decreasing non-availability and increasing aircraft availability. d. Pin point
maintenance/repair efforts and processes (changes?) for un- anticipated failure solutions. e. Allows Coast Guard to perform trend
analysis for repeated parts/ components/ system failures f. Limits trouble shooting down time at Air Stations g. Allows non A&P licensed
mechanics to perform any/all (O,I,D level) maintenance on CG airframes. h. Could be a $4-5M cost increase.
Approval ACCEPTED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Company Assessment Date 2/19/2003
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Taraborelli, Frank Team* Aviation

Originator Taraborelli, Frank RMB Member Lee, Gary
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 01/21/03 Entered Mitigation Plan developed during MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. Revised Management Probability and Cost
Comment consequence values. 1/7/03 Reviewed Occurrence and Impact values. Revised Logistics and Cost values. GLL
Risk Closure
Rationale
ASSESSMENT

First Current First Current

Date Assessed 12/12/2002 2/19/2003 Risk Factor 0.25 0.15
Probability of Occurrence 0.5 0.3 Severity of Consequence 0.5 0.5
Reassessed Risk No
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence 0.5
Probability Performance Consequence n/a
Engineering Probability n/a Schedule Consequence n/a
Management Probability 0.3 TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability n/a TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability 0.2
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability n/a
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk $750,000 Potential Cost Impact for this Risk $2,500,000
Schedule Exposure for this Risk Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A17 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/12/2002 Closed

RISK
Issue MPA Commercial Parts Pool vs Closed Parts Pool
Description The Coast Guard presently maintains a closed loop serial number tracking process. This process tracks flight critical and non flight critical
(where high maintenance parts and high availability degraders are issues) spare parts for fleet wide support, serial number tracking serve
the following: a. Allows for parts integrity and safety of flight in support of Coast Guard unique Mission's b. Reduces greatly the chance of
bogus parts getting installed on aircraft which reduces chance of catastrophic failure. c. No downing of the fleet during OEM ordered
inspection and service bulletins, there by decreasing non-availability and increasing aircraft availability. d. Pin point maintenance/repair
efforts and processes (changes?) for un- anticipated failure solutions. e. Allows Coast Guard to perform trend analysis for repeated parts/
components/ system failures f. Limits trouble shooting down time at Air Stations g. Allows non A&P licensed mechanics to perform any/all
(O,I,D level) maintenance on CG airframes. h. Could be a $4-5M cost increase.
Assessment Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment

Assumptions for this Risk

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description

Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A17 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/12/2002 Closed
Risk Factor 0.15 Probability 0.3 Consequence 0.5 Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Risk Issue MPA Commercial Parts Pool vs Closed Parts Pool
Risk Description
Team Aviation Actionee Frank Taraborelli Risk Lead Gary Lee
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete
A17-1 Test Event 0 0
Activity 01/15/03 - 01/17/03 MPA Risk Review Meeting with CASA.
Result Mitigation Plan: 1. Increase of 10% (AC&I) of initial spares cost (~$5M). Cost will be reviewed annually over
implementation plan to access if needed – money not used will be rolled over to following year. There will be no recurring
annual OE cost. 2. Review content of ISP and deliver draft by MPA PDR. 3. CASA to provide periodic reliability reports on
spare parts. Actions: 1. Review ISP for PBTH definition and process to provide periodic reliability reports on spare parts -
during C&TD. (ICGS & CG)
IMS 21 No
 Risk ID/Assess
ID & ASSESS

Risk No A25 Rating No RMB No Risk Current Created 1/6/2003 Closed

Status
Risk Issue CASA 235 Self-Contained Ground Power Generation
Description The existing CASA 235 self-contained ground power generation design (Propeller brake) may not provide sufficient availability/reliability
to adequately support regular forward deployed operations. The aircraft uses the right (Nbr 2) engine with the propeller held stationary by
a propeller brake to provide a self-contained means of supplying ground electrical and pneumatic power. The Irish Air Corps (IAC) has
reported that the propeller brake arrangement is unreliable and maintenance intensive, and has removed the system, opting to transport
a standard towed ground power unit (rolling stock) when an aircraft is going to operate from a remote location (which is very
infrequently). The propeller brake ground power system of the CN-235 as designed cannot be used in icing conditions. This will
necessitate having a propeller turning while personnel operate in close proximity to the aircraft. There is the potential for a decrease from
current (legacy) level of operational safety associated with MPA ground operations in remote locations Given that the IDS CONOPS calls
for regular forward deployed MPA operations from austere locations, a highly reliable self-contained ground power generating capability
is essential. The existing design’s robustness and availability/reliability must be assessed, and if found insufficient, suitable alternatives
developed.
Approval ACCEPTED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Company Assessment Date 2/19/2003
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Bulkley, Melissa Team* Aviation

Originator Maine, Thurman RMB Member Lee, Gary
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 02/19/03 Updated Action Items for Mitigation A25-1. No change in assessment values. 01/21/03 Entered Mitigation Plan developed
Comment during MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. No change in assessment values. 1/7/03 Reviewed Occurrence and Impact Values.
Revised Engineering, Requirement and Performance values. GLL
Risk
Closure
Rationale
ASSESSMENT

First Current First Current

Date Assessed 1/6/2003 2/19/2003 Risk Factor 0 0.15
Probability of Occurrence 0.5 Severity of Consequence 0.3
Reassessed Risk No
 PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence n/a
Probability Performance Consequence 0.3
Engineering Probability 0.4 Schedule Consequence n/a
Management Probability n/a TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability 0.5 TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability n/a
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability n/a
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk Potential Cost Impact for this Risk
Schedule Exposure for this Risk Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A25 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 1/6/2003 Closed

RISK
Issue CASA 235 Self-Contained Ground Power Generation
Description The existing CASA 235 self-contained ground power generation design (Propeller brake) may not provide sufficient availability/reliability to
adequately support regular forward deployed operations. The aircraft uses the right (Nbr 2) engine with the propeller held stationary by a
propeller brake to provide a self-contained means of supplying ground electrical and pneumatic power. The Irish Air Corps (IAC) has
reported that the propeller brake arrangement is unreliable and maintenance intensive, and has removed the system, opting to transport a
standard towed ground power unit (rolling stock) when an aircraft is going to operate from a remote location (which is very infrequently).
The propeller brake ground power system of the CN-235 as designed cannot be used in icing conditions. This will necessitate having a
propeller turning while personnel operate in close proximity to the aircraft. There is the potential for a decrease from current (legacy) level
of operational safety associated with MPA ground operations in remote locations Given that the IDS CONOPS calls for regular forward
deployed MPA operations from austere locations, a highly reliable self-contained ground power generating capability is essential. The
existing design’s robustness and availability/reliability must be assessed, and if found insufficient, suitable alternatives developed.
Assessment Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment

Assumptions for this Risk

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description

Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A25 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 1/6/2003 Closed
Risk Factor 0.15 Probability 0.5 Consequence 0.3 Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Risk Issue CASA 235 Self-Contained Ground Power Generation
Risk Description
Team Aviation Actionee Melissa Bulkley Risk Lead Gary Lee
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete
A25-1 Test Event 0 0 1/17/2003 1/17/2003
Activity 01/15/03 - 01/17/03 MPA Risk Review Meeting with CASA.
Result Possible Mitigation Plan: 1. Add static inverter for AC power to anti-ice with prop brake on 2. Flight manual change for
loading A/C in concerns to safety area requirements 3. Add an APU. Actions: 1. CASA provide Prop brake reliability data
and maintenance intervals (use in-service data). CASA PROVIDED DATA ON 1/29/03. CG TO REVIEW. 2. CG provide
APU reliability data. DATA PROVIDED. 3. CG review/evaluate mission risk with icing on ground. COMPLETED BY LCDR
MAINE ON 1/25/03. 4. CASA provide ROM for adding an APU. CASA PROVIDED COST IMPACT AND TECHNICAL
DATA ON 1/22/03.
IMS 21 No
 Risk ID/Assess
ID & ASSESS

Risk No A23 Rating No RMB No Risk Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed

Status
Risk Issue Crew Egress and survivability upon Ditching
Description The CN-235 aircraft have no overhead escape hatches or wing rafts (as recommended in Air Force Design Handbook). CASA has
stated that their variants will float high enough to allow egress through side exits. This is a vital crew survivability concern and will be
tested and verified during Concept and Technology Development.
Approval ACCEPTED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Company
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements CASA CN-235-300M aircraft will meet the FAA Part 25 Appendix C certification requirement for crew egress after ditching. CG
provide any additional requirements.
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Bulkley, Melissa Team* Aviation

Originator Maine, Thurman RMB Member Lee, Gary
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 01/21/03 Entered Mitigation Plan developed during MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. No change in assessment values. 1/7/03
Comment Deleted - "If the ditching tests do not support Casa's view, the CG will require overhead escape hatches be installed." from risk
description. Reviewed Occurrence and Impact Values. Revised Requirement, Test, Cost, Performance, and Schedule values. GLL
Risk
Closure
Rationale
ASSESSMENT

First Current First Current

Date Assessed 12/18/2002 2/19/2003 Risk Factor 0.06 0.12
Probability of Occurrence 0.2 0.4 Severity of Consequence 0.3 0.3
Reassessed Risk No
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence
Probability Performance Consequence 0.3
Engineering Probability n/a Schedule Consequence
Management Probability n/a TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability n/a
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability 0.4
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk Potential Cost Impact for this Risk
Schedule Exposure for this Risk Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A23 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed

RISK
Issue Crew Egress and survivability upon Ditching
Description The CN-235 aircraft have no overhead escape hatches or wing rafts (as recommended in Air Force Design Handbook). CASA has stated
that their variants will float high enough to allow egress through side exits. This is a vital crew survivability concern and will be tested and
verified during Concept and Technology Development.
Assessment Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment

Assumptions for this Risk

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description

Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A23 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed
Risk Factor 0.12 Probability 0.4 Consequence 0.3 Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Risk Issue Crew Egress and survivability upon Ditching
Risk Description
Team Aviation Actionee Melissa Bulkley Risk Lead Gary Lee
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete
A23-1 Test Event 0 0
Activity 01/15/03 - 01/17/03 MPA Risk Review Meeting with CASA.
Result Mitigation Plan: 1. MPA Aircraft will be certified to FAR 25.801 requirements. 2. Ditching analysis will be completed in
C&TD and SDD. 3. Preliminary analysis – PDR 4. Test – end of 2003 5. Final flotation analysis report – 2nd qtr 2004 6.
Ditching certification – 3rd qtr 2004 5. Life rafts will be included (2 in cabin and 1 in wing fuselage rear fairing) Actions: 1.
CG provide MIL-STD for raft and survivability equipment in raft. 2. CG talk to FAA about ditching requirements and risk
with exemptions. 3. CG provide any egress/ditching requirements in excess of FAR 25 by SRR.
IMS 21 No
 Risk ID/Assess
ID & ASSESS

Risk No A22 Rating No RMB No Risk Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed

Status
Risk Issue Extended Range Twin Engine Operations (ETOP's)
Description ETOP's is an FAA certification requirement used to reduce the operational risk of commercial dual engine passenger aircraft flying for
extended periods over water. Although CG Aircraft are not required to be ETOPs certified, using it as a guide to reduce the inherent risk
of operating over water for long periods of time as required by the current CONOPS is appropriate. Items considered part of ETOP's
certification are exceptional engine reliability, redundant aircraft systems, and maintenance and operational policies and procedures. An
initial analysis of the Casa product design indicates that the electrical system lacks ETOP's redundancy. Casa contends that the
aircraft's electrical system is "militarized" and therefore meets the ETOP's standards.
Approval ACCEPTED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Company
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements The MPA has the capability of operating up to six hours from a suitable recovery airfield. In the event of an in-flight incident causing
an engine shutdown, this extended single engine return time increases the risk of loss of the aircraft and its crew. The FAA has
recognized this risk in their regulation of US airlines. The FAA requires airlines that operate more than one hour (single engine
speed) from a 'suitable' recovery airfield, to be certified under ETOP's (Extended Range Twin Engine Operations). ETOPS are FAA
safety related requirements above and beyond those of normal airline operations. ETOPS has two goals: 1) reduce the probability of
an in-flight incident causing termination of normal operations (in particular engine shutdown) and 2) in the event of such an incident,
high probability of successful diversion to a suitable landing location. ETOPS analysis is a comprehensive safety analysis of the
following: • Type Design • In- service experience • Operations Upon considering these factors, the FAA grants approval for 75
minute, 120 minute or 180 minute ETOPS operations. ETOPS compliance is not a Deepwater requirement. However, G-OCA and
G-SEA plan to use ETOPS analysis to assess MPA offshore operational risk. Neither MPA candidate aircraft nor the USCG has
undergone a thorough ETOPS analysis.
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Dehnel, Gary Team* Aviation

Originator Dehnel, Gary RMB Member Lee, Gary
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 02/19/03 Action Item 1 of Mitigation A22-2 closed. No change in assessment values. 01/21/03 Entered Mitigation Plan developed
Comment during MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. No change in assessment values. 1/7/03 Reviewed Occurrence and Impact values:
Revised Performance value. GLL
Risk
Closure
Rationale
 ASSESSMENT

First Current First Current

Date Assessed 12/18/2002 2/19/2003 Risk Factor 0.04 0.03
Probability of Occurrence 0.1 0.1 Severity of Consequence 0.4 0.3
Reassessed Risk No
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence n/a
Probability Performance Consequence 0.3
Engineering Probability n/a Schedule Consequence n/a
Management Probability 0.1 TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability n/a TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability n/a
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability n/a
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk Potential Cost Impact for this Risk
Schedule Exposure for this Risk Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A22 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed

RISK
Issue Extended Range Twin Engine Operations (ETOP's)
Description ETOP's is an FAA certification requirement used to reduce the operational risk of commercial dual engine passenger aircraft flying for
extended periods over water. Although CG Aircraft are not required to be ETOPs certified, using it as a guide to reduce the inherent risk of
operating over water for long periods of time as required by the current CONOPS is appropriate. Items considered part of ETOP's
certification are exceptional engine reliability, redundant aircraft systems, and maintenance and operational policies and procedures. An
initial analysis of the Casa product design indicates that the electrical system lacks ETOP's redundancy. Casa contends that the aircraft's
electrical system is "militarized" and therefore meets the ETOP's standards.
Assessment Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment

Assumptions for this Risk

 ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description

Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A22 Current Risk Rating LOW RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed
Risk Factor 0.03 Probability 0.1 Consequence 0.3 Assessment Date 2/19/2003
Risk Issue Extended Range Twin Engine Operations (ETOP's)
Risk Description
Team Aviation Actionee Gary Dehnel Risk Lead Gary Lee
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete
A22-1 Test Event 0 0 1/2/2003
Activity Request the FAA to analyze the CASA CN-235 electrical system for compliance with ETOPS.
Result
IMS 21 No
A22-2 Test Event 0 0 1/17/2003 1/17/2003
Activity 01/15/03 - 01/17/03 MPA Risk Review Meeting with CASA.
Result Mitigation Plan: 1. Pending FAA review (of electrical system in regards to ETOPS), the CG recommends use of the MPA
for offshore operations. Actions: 1. Define worst case scenarion- require use of APU (or other source of electrical power)
onboard A/C - include cost, schedule and performance impacts. CASA PROVIDED COST AND TECHNICAL IMPACT ON
01/22/03. 2. Send electrical system schematic and pitch to "O" to review prior to FAA Feedback. Obtain "O" feedback by
Wed 1/22. 3. Review request to FAA for review of electrical system to define what is required of them and request debrief.
4. CG define any requirements (tailored ETOPS) in excess of FAR 25 by SRR.
IMS 21 No
 Risk ID/Assess
ID & ASSESS

Risk No A19 Rating No RMB No Risk Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003
Status
Risk Issue CASA 235 operations in icing
Description There has been one Casa 235 accident where icing may have been a causal factor. The Irish Air Corps have stated that the aircraft
does not fly well in icing conditions and that their SOP is to fly out of icing conditions as soon as possible. Chilean officials have also
indicated their dissatisfaction with CN-235 performance in icing conditions.
Approval CLOSED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Assessment Date 2/4/2003
Company
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements Air Operations Manual COMDTINST M3710.1D, Severe Weather - Icing Conditions, page 3-25 states: "Fixed Wing aircraft,
equipped with fully operable anti-icing and de- icing equipment, may be flown through areas of known or forecast moderate icing.
Except where mission urgency dictates otherwise, flights shall be planned to avoid areas of known or forecast heavy icing."
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Team* Aviation

Originator RMB Member
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 01/21/03 MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. Operations in icing conditions and accident causal factors briefed. Responses from
Comment Irish and Chileans to CASA inquiries concerning flight in icing conditions reviewed. Recommendation for closure under review. 1/7/03
Reviewed Occurrence and Impact values. Revised Management, Requirement, and Performance values. GLL
Risk CASA 235-300M meets FAR requirements for flight in icing conditions.
Closure
Rationale
ASSESSMENT

First Current First Current

Date Assessed 12/18/2002 2/4/2003 Risk Factor 0 0
Probability of Occurrence 0 Severity of Consequence 0
Reassessed Risk Yes
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence n/a
Probability Performance Consequence 0
Engineering Probability n/a Schedule Consequence n/a
Management Probability n/a TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability 0 TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability n/a
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability n/a
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk Potential Cost Impact for this Risk
Schedule Exposure for this Risk Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A19 Current Risk Rating CLOSED RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003

RISK
Issue CASA 235 operations in icing
Description There has been one Casa 235 accident where icing may have been a causal factor. The Irish Air Corps have stated that the aircraft does
not fly well in icing conditions and that their SOP is to fly out of icing conditions as soon as possible. Chilean officials have also indicated
their dissatisfaction with CN-235 performance in icing conditions.
Assessment Assessment Date 2/4/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment

Assumptions for this Risk

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description

Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A19 Current Risk Rating CLOSED RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003
Risk Factor 0 Probability 0 Consequence 0 Assessment Date 2/4/2003
Risk Issue CASA 235 operations in icing
Risk Description
Team Aviation Actionee Risk Lead
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete
A19-1 Test Event 0 0
Activity 01/15/03 - 01/17/03 MPA Risk Review Meeting with CASA.
Result Actions: 1. CASA provide information on visibility of wing from inside the aircraft. 2. CASA provide cost and weight for
addition of doubler kit to minimize propeller ice shedding damage.
IMS 21 No
 Risk ID/Assess
ID & ASSESS

Risk No A20 Rating No RMB No Risk Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003
Status
Risk Issue CASA 235 routine operations at maximum Gross Weight. [235-300M ER 38,140 lbs - +2.25 to -1.00 G maneuver load limit; 235-300M
36,300 lbs - +2.50 to -1.00 G load limit}
Description The proposed CONOPs has the aircraft flying routinely at or near max gross weight. This could increase the maintenance cost
significantly over time.
Approval CLOSED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Company Assessment Date 2/4/2003
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Team* Aviation

Originator RMB Member
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 01/21/03 Recommendation for closure during MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. Revised Management Probability value. 1/7/03
Comment Reviewed Occurrence and Impact values. Revised Management value. Cost value is dependent upon Risk A24 MPA Growth Margin
mitigation and may increase. GLL
Risk Original risk based on CN-235-300M ER airframe. Current candidate is CN-235- 300M airframe and continuous operations are not
Closure expected to be at or near Max gross weight. Recommendation for closure under review.
Rationale
ASSESSMENT

First Current First Current

Date Assessed 12/18/2002 2/4/2003 Risk Factor 0.02 0
Probability of Occurrence 0.2 0 Severity of Consequence 0.1 0
Reassessed Risk Yes
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence 0
Probability Performance Consequence n/a
Engineering Probability n/a Schedule Consequence n/a
Management Probability 0 TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability n/a TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability n/a
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability n/a
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk $0 Potential Cost Impact for this Risk $0
Schedule Exposure for this Risk Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A20 Current Risk Rating CLOSED RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003

RISK
Issue CASA 235 routine operations at maximum Gross Weight. [235-300M ER 38,140 lbs - +2.25 to -1.00 G maneuver load limit; 235-300M
36,300 lbs - +2.50 to -1.00 G load limit}
Description The proposed CONOPs has the aircraft flying routinely at or near max gross weight. This could increase the maintenance cost
significantly over time.
Assessment Assessment Date 2/4/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment

Assumptions for this Risk

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description

Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A20 Current Risk Rating CLOSED RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003
Risk Factor 0 Probability 0 Consequence 0 Assessment Date 2/4/2003
Risk Issue CASA 235 routine operations at maximum Gross Weight. [235-300M ER 38,140 lbs - +2.25 to -1.00 G maneuver load limit; 235-300M
36,300 lbs - +2.50 to -1.00 G load limit}
Risk
Description
Team Aviation Actionee Risk
Lead
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete
A20-1 Test Event 0 0
Activity 01/15/03 - 01/17/03 MPA Risk Review Meeting with CASA.
Result Actions: 1. CG requests 4 profiles (description, assumptions, etc.)- (CASA) 2. Review mission profiles with CASA and CG
to do analysis (during C&TD. 3. Touch and go landings – Landing to Flight hour ratio is 1:1. 4. CG and ICGS determine
what we will be tracking (engine cycles, pressure cycles, etc.) Review any legacy data. 5. ICGS and CG review options for
HUMS use onboard A/C. CG provide information on current CG evaluation data collection.
IMS 21 No
 Risk ID/Assess
ID & ASSESS

Risk No A21 Rating No RMB No Risk Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003
Status
Risk Issue CASA 235 single engine climb limitations.
Description FAA airworthiness certification requires a 2.4% single engine climb-out gradient. Although CG Aircraft are not required to comply with
this requirement, using it as a guide to reduce the risk of operations in these conditions as required by the current CONOPS is
appropriate. Note: In order to meet this climb-out gradient, the Casa 235- 300M-ER was required to defuel from its proposed maximum
fuel load, resulting in the reduction of its on-scene time to approximately that of the Casa 235-300M.
Approval CLOSED Approval
Status Comment
RISK DETAIL
Actionee Assessment Date 2/4/2003
Company
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA
DOORS
Requirements The FAA has two forms of engine out climb requirements: 1) Operational - avoiding obstacles during instrument departures, and 2)
Airworthiness certification. 1. Operational climb: Basically, FAA instrument departure procedure obstacle clearance is based on the
pilot climbing at least 200 feet per nautical mile (3.33% gradient) until reaching IFR enroute structure. The pilot is responsible for
considering the effect of degraded climb performance and the actions to take in event of an engine loss during departure. 2.
Airworthiness climb: FAR 25 is concerned with whether the aircraft can climb safely above level ground with no obstacle
considerations. FAR 25 engine out climb path requirements are broken into three segments. The second segment climb requirement
(landing gear retracted to 400' AGL with take off flaps set) of 2.4% is typically the most difficult to achieve. G-OCA is strongly
considering using FAR 25 single engine climb requirements for future MPA normal operations. Note that FAR 25 single engine climb
requirements are less restrictive than the FAA's instrument departure climb requirements of 3.33%.
MOE/MOP
ACTIONEE/ORIGINATOR

Actionee Team* Aviation

Originator Lee, Gary RMB Member
STATUS/CLOSURE RATIONALE
Status 01/21/03 Risk recommended for closure during MPA Risk Review meeting with CASA. 1/6/03: Adjustment to MPA acquisition is
Comment resulting in a CN-235-300M vice a CN- 235-300M ER. The assumption is that C-130's will handle Pacific Area operations, thus negating
the need for an Extended Range (ER) MPA aircraft. Accordingly, the climb gradient risk should be significantly reduced as the CN- 235-
300M aircraft are FAA-certified (to include 2.4% climb gradients) at lower gross weights. In addition, CASA is planning on outlining a
growth strategy that will accommodate FAA-certification to higher future gross weights.
Risk MPA candidate aircraft is now CN-235-300M instead of -300M ER. The -300M exceeds FAA airworthiness certification requirements;
Closure therefore single engine climb limitations are not a factor. Recommendation for closure under review.
Rationale
ASSESSMENT
 First Current First Current
Date Assessed 12/18/2002 2/4/2003 Risk Factor 0.1 0
Probability of Occurrence 0.2 0 Severity of Consequence 0.5 0
Reassessed Risk Yes
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE

First Current First Current

Manufacturing n/a Cost Consequence n/a
Probability Performance Consequence 0
Engineering Probability n/a Schedule Consequence n/a
Management Probability 0 TBD Consequence
Requirement Probability n/a TBD Consequence
Software Probability n/a
Logistics Probability n/a
Technology Probability n/a
Testing Probability n/a
EXPOSURE

Cost Exposure for this Risk Potential Cost Impact for this Risk
Schedule Exposure for this Risk Potential Schedule Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk
TBD Exposure for this Risk Potential TBD Impact for this Risk

Risk Rationale and Assumptions

RISK RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risk No A21 Current Risk Rating CLOSED RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003

RISK
Issue CASA 235 single engine climb limitations.
Description FAA airworthiness certification requires a 2.4% single engine climb-out gradient. Although CG Aircraft are not required to comply with this
requirement, using it as a guide to reduce the risk of operations in these conditions as required by the current CONOPS is appropriate.
Note: In order to meet this climb-out gradient, the Casa 235- 300M-ER was required to defuel from its proposed maximum fuel load,
resulting in the reduction of its on-scene time to approximately that of the Casa 235-300M.
Assessment Assessment Date 2/4/2003
Submitter

RATIONALE/ASSUMPTIONS
Rationale for Assessment / Reassessment

Assumptions for this Risk

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Alternative Approach Description
Alternative Approach Costs

NRE $0 O&S $0 Unit $0 Decision Point Date

Risk Mitigation Plan Activities
Risk No A21 Current Risk Rating CLOSED RMB No Risk Status Current Created 12/18/2002 Closed 2/4/2003
Risk Factor 0 Probability 0 Consequence 0 Assessment Date 2/4/2003
Risk Issue CASA 235 single engine climb limitations.
Risk Description
Team Aviation Actionee Risk Lead
CWBS 1.3.8.0 - MPA Total Mitigation Cost
Activity No. New PF New CF Planned Actual Planned Actual Percent Activity Cost
Start Start Complete Complete Complete