Taxation

YMCA v. Collector of Internal Revenue [GR 7988, 19 January 1916]

Facts: The Young Men's Christian Association came to the Philippines with
the army of occupation in 1898. The association is nonsectarian, it is
preeminently religious; and the fundamental basis and groundwork is the
Christian religion. All of the officials of the association are devoted
Christians, members of a church, and have dedicated their lives to the
spread of the Christian principles and the building of Christian character. Its
building is located in Calle Concepcion, Ermita, which was formally
dedicated on 20 October 1909. The building is composed of three parts.
The main structure is three stories high and includes a reception hall,
social hall and game rooms, lecture room, library, reading room and
rooming apartments. The small building lying to the left of the principal
structure is the kitchen and servants' quarters. The bowling alleys,
swimming pool, locker rooms and gymnasium-auditorium are located at
the large wing to the right (athletic building). The association claimed
exemption from taxation on ground that it is a religious, charitable and
educational institution combined, under Section 48 of the Charter of the
City of Manila. The city of Manila, contending that the property is taxable,
assessed it and levied a tax thereon. It was paid under protest and this
action begun to recover it on the ground that the property was exempt
from taxation under the charter of the city of Manila. The decision was
made in favor of the city, and the association appealed.
Issue: Whether the institution must be devoted exclusive for religious
purposes, or exclusively for charitable purposes, or exclusively to
educational purposes, to be entitled to tax exemption.
Held: It may be admitted that there are 64 persons occupying rooms in the
main building as lodgers or roomers and that they take their meals at the
restaurant below. These facts, however, are far from constituting a
business in the ordinary acceptation of the word; as there is no profit
realized by the association in any sense; and that the purpose of the
association is not, primarily, to obtain the money which comes from the
lodgers and boarders. The real purpose is to keep the membership
continually within the sphere of influence of the institution; and thereby to
prevent, as far as possible, the opportunities which vice presents to young
men in foreign countries who lack home or other similar influences. There
is no doubt about the correctness of the contention that an institution must
devote itself exclusively to one or the other of the purposes mentioned in
the statute before it can be exempt from taxation; but the statute does not
say that it must be devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes therein
mentioned. It may be a combination of two or three or more of those

purposes and still be entitled to exemption. The YMCA cannot be said to be

an institution used exclusively for religious purposes, or exclusively for
charitable purposes, or exclusively to educational purposes; but the Court
believed that it is an institution used exclusively for all three purposes. As
such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, Ilocos Norte [GR
27588, 31 December 1927]
Facts: The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of
Nueva Segovia, possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the
municipality of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on
public streets. On the south side is a part of the church yard, the convent
and an adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, containing an area of
1,624 square meters, in which there is a stable and a well for the use of
the convent. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the
church. On the north side is an old cemetery with two of its walls still
standing, and a portion where formerly stood a tower, the base of which
may still be seen, containing a total area of 8,955 square meters. As
required by the provincial board, the Church paid on 3 July 1925, under
protest, the land tax on the lot adjoining the convent and the lot which
formerly was the cemetery with the portion where the tower stood. The
Church filed an action for the recovery of the sum paid by it to Board by
way of land tax, alleging that the collection of this tax is illegal. The lower
court absolved the Board from the complaint in regard to the lot adjoining
the convent and declared that the tax collected on the lot, which formerly
was the cemetery and on the portion where the tower stood, was illegal.
Both parties appealed from this judgment.
Issue: Whether the churchyard, the adjacent lot used for a vegetable
garden, and the old cemetery, besides the church and the convent, are
exempt from land taxes.
Held: The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax
(sec. 344 [c] Administrative Code) refers to the home of the priest who
presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to
discharge his duties. It therefore must, in this sense, include not only the
land actually occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground
destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities
where the density of the population and the development of commerce
require the use of larger tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden
belongs to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use is limited to the
necessities of the priest, which comes under the exemption. Also, land
used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious
festivities, which constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, not for

commercial purposes, comes within the exemption. It cannot be taxed

according to its former use (cemetery).
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-19201, 16 June
1965]
Facts: Sometime in 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for theconstruction of a
new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for
the purpose intended. On 3 March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor's gift
tax return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued as assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest.
The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interest of 1%
monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15 June 1960, and the compromise for the
late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and
requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for
reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were
denied. The petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960. After
hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue except the imposition of compromise penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a donees gift tax may be assessed against the Catholic
Church.
Held: The phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the Constitution
supra should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes.
Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from
taxation cemeteries, churches and personages or convents, appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes
assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax but
an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos.
Its assessment was not on the property themselves. It does not rest upon
general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties,
upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The
imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purposes do
not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
Abra v. Hernando [GR L-49336, 31 August 1981]

Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of

the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption
from real estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief. Judge
Hernando of the CFI Abra presided over the case. The Province of Abra filed
a motion to dismiss, based on lack of jurisdiction, which was denied. It was
followed by a summary judgment granting the exemption without hearing
the side of the province
Issue: Whether the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued are
tax exempt.
Held: Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so
that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an
exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris. Herein, the
judge accepted at its face the allegation of Bishop that the certain
parcels of land owned by it, are used "actually, directly and exclusively" as
sources of support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of the
Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is compliance with the
constitutional provision that allows an exemption. There was an allegation
of lack of jurisdiction (contesting that the validity of the assessment may
be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not the
court), and of lack of cause of action (contesting that declaratory relief is
not proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of
government to assess and collect taxes on such property), which should
have compel the judge to accord a hearing to the petitioner rather than
deciding the case immediately in favor of the Bishop
Abra Valley College v. Aquino [GR L-39086, 15 June 1988]
Facts: Abra Valley College rents out the ground floor of its college building
to Northern Marketing Corporation while the second floor thereof is used by
the Director of the College for residential purposes. On 6 July 1972, the
Municipal and Provincial treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and Armin Cariaga,
respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon the petitioner for the
college lot and building (OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of said taxes
thereon. The treasurers served upon the College a Notice of Sale on 8 July
1972, the sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno Millare, then
municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on
public auction involving the sale of the college lot and building. The
certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him. The College filed a
complaint on 10 July 1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare void the
"Notice of Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building located at
Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties
amounting to P5,140.31. The trial court ruled for the government, holding

that the property is not being used exclusively for educational purposes.
Instead of perfecting an appeal, the College availed of the petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue: Whether the College is exempt from realty taxes.
Held: No. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution. While the Court allows a more
liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for
educational purposes," reasonable emphasis has always been made that
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. Herein, the lease of the first floor of the building
to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila [GR L-9637, 30 April 1957]
Facts: In the course of its ministry, American Bible Society's Philippine
agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions
thereof (since 1898, but except during the Japanese occupation)
throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine
dialects. On 29 May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila
informed the Society that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November 1945, without providing itself with the
necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance
3000, as amended, and Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the
Society to secure, within 3 days, the corresponding permit and license
fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of
1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. On 24
October 1953, the Society paid to the City Treasurer under protest the said
permit and license fees, giving at the same time notice to the City
Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the
ordinances under which the said fees were being collected, which was
done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action.
After hearing, the lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. the
Society appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in turn certified the case
to the Supreme Court for the reason that the errors assigned involved only
questions of law.
Issue: Whether the Society is required to secure municipal permit to allow
it to sell and distribute bibles and religious literature, and to pay taxes from
the sales thereof.

Held: No. Section 27 (e) of Commonwealth Act 466 (NIRC) exempts

corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes, Provided however, That the
income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under
the Code. Herein, the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely
religious and cannot be made liable for taxes or fees therein. Further,
Ordinance 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to the Society, for in
doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs. The fact that the price of the bibles and other religious pamphlets
are little higher than the actual cost of the same does not necessarily
mean that it is already engaged in the business or occupation of selling
said merchandise for profit. Furthermore, Ordinance 3000 of the City of
Manila is of general application and it does not contain any provisions
whatsoever prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the free
exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. The ordinance is not
applicable to the Society, as its business, trade or occupation is not
particularly mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does
not show that a permit is required therefor under existing laws and
ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their provisions
governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health
of the employees engaged in the business of the Society.
DUE PROCESS
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978]
Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it
unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in
any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business
or occupation within the City of Manila without first securing an
employment permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was
passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968. The Ordinance prohibits aliens from
employment and trade in the City of Manila without the requisite mayors
permit; but excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular
missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of
both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or
congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in
kind. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6
months or fine of P100-200, or both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao
Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First

Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
implementation of the ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare the
ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco Arca (CFI Manila,
Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17 September
1968, the Judge rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void,
and the preliminary injunction is made permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a
petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however economically
situated - to secure working permits from the City of Manila at a uniform
fee of P50, is reasonable.
Held: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being
applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty
and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can be
employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila, who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of
the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is
given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay
down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
powers. The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise
of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for
employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to
consider differences in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being
casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-an-file or executive.
Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March
1919]
Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted
Resolution 25 creating a reservation / permanent settlement for Mangyans
(Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on the
reservation provided that said homestead applications be previously
recommended by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the
Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the
provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all
Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917, and

penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply with the order with
imprisonment of not exceeding 60 days, in accordance with section 2759
of the Revised Administrative Code. Rubi and those living in his rancheria
have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are
prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other
hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of
the provisions of Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away
from the reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes
are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province.
Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the
Manguianes liberty, either on their confinement in reservations and/or
imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
Held: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law. The meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of
the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law,"
a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a
hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where
much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and
blind sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion
of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards
and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law. Due process of law" means simply that "first, that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be
reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is
due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subjectmatter and necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which
is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable
basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold
that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that
due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws. There exists a law; the
law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular

methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not
deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section 2145
of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Rubi and the
other Manguianes are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
Deloso vs Sandiganbayan
This petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of
theSandiganbayan which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D.
Deloso(accused in the criminal cases) from his position as provincial
governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.Deloso
was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the localelections of
November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, acertain Juan
Villanueva filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing himof having
committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act3019) for
issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased by theMunicipality of
Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of thePhilippines for lease to
local farmers at reasonable cost, without anyagreement as to the payment
of rentals for the use of tractor by the latter,thereby, causing undue injury
to the Municipality of Botolan.Deloso was, then, elected governor of the
Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely
HELD It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the
petitionerto the highest provincial office in their command if they are
deprived of hisservices for an indefinite period with the termination of his
case possiblyextending beyond his entire term. The Court rules that a
preventive suspension of an elective public officerunder Section 13 of
Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90)days under Section
42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil ServiceDecree, which period
also appears reasonable and appropriate under thecircumstances of this
case. The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed
reasonsand not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act
Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995],
Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre,
and involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian.
Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of Rape with

Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by

Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to conduct the
preliminary investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on 30
June 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde,
and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Paraaque. During the
preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria
Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a
plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner of Biong), 2 of Vizcondes
maids, Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano Gatmaitan (an
engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving Estrellita
(12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab wounds);
and the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence of
spermatozoa. The NBI submitted photocopies of the documents requested
by Webb in his Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and
Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the
preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime as he went to
the United States on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines on 27
October 1992. The others Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada,
Rodriguez and Biong submitted sworn statements, responses, and a
motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the
Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits
though they were served with subpoena in their last known address. On 8
August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable
cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information
for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the same date, it
filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with the RTC
Paraaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon,
pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against
Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his
employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case
was re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who
issued new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995,
Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo
Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with
the Supreme Court to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued
against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita
Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95- 404; (2) enjoin the respondents from
conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3)
dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused

therein. Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the

authorities after filing their petitions before the Court.
Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of
their right to fair trial.
Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however,
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors; and their
long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. At no instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias
resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. Further , on the
contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show that the
DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent
haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high
profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the
fair administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an
issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always
stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting
the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the
promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for
the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.
People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001]
Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio
"Boy" Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took
the two and loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which was parked
in front of Caf Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George
Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van
while Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were also with the
group, stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm
situated in Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez
of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought inside the
resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly
beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of
the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was
dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea her hair disheveled,

mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her

shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by
Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the
ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van
pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already
drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off
with a single gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped
away. Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of
Barangay Mabacan, Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea,
Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawits turn, Luis Corcolon
shot Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded the
ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with
Eileens remains behind. Initially, the crime was attributed to one Kit
Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio
Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further investigation, and
forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and
Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's theory. On 11 March 1995, Judge
Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City, Branch 70)
found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio
Corcolon and Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of
P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999,
the Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment
of conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama,
Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions
for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on
6 December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction
by publicity, besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan
lack credibility, that the testimony of his 13- year old daughter should have
been given full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded
have no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that
Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent
statements pertain to material and crucial points of the events at issue,
besides that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the
prosecutions version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez
retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration
was assigned to Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate
action on 18 September 2001.
Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the
judge handling the case.
Held: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused
to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given

a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that

publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial.
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure
to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the
barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of
the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Mayor
Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
Anzaldo v. Clave [GR L-54597, 15 December 1982]
Facts: In 1974, the position of Science Research Supervisor II (Medical
Research Department) became vacant when the incumbent, Dr. Kintanar,
became Director of the Biological Research Center of the National Institute
of Science and Technology (NIST). Dr. Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both
next-in-rank to the vacant position, both holding positions of Scientist
Research Associate IV. Dr. Anzaldo finished BS Pharmacy (1950, College of
Pharmacy, UP), and MS Pharmacy (1962, CEU), Doctor of Pharmacy (1965,
CEU). Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a
registered medical technologist and supervisor (unassembled). She started
working in the NIST in 1954 and has served for 28 years. On the other
hand, Dr. Venzon finished Medicine (1957, UST). She started working in the
NIST in 1960 and has served for 21 years. Dr. Anzaldo is senior to her in
point of service. Dr. Quintin Kintanar recommended Dr. Venzon for the
position. Dr. Anzaldo protested against such recommendation, to which the
NIST Reorganization Committee found such protest to be valid and
meritorious. Due to the impasse, the NIST Commissioner, however, did not
resolve the issue. The position was not filled up. Dr. Pedro Afable, Vice
Chairman, later became OIC of the NIST. He appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the
position effective 4 January 1978, after thorough study and screening of
the qualifications of both doctors and upon recommendation of the NIST
Staff Evaluation (88-61 votes). The Civil Service Commission approved the
appointment. Dr. Venzon appealed to the Office of the President of the

Philippines (addressed to Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave,

who was concurrently the Chairman of the CSC). The appeal was forwarded
to the NIS OIC Jose P. Planas, who reiterated Dr. Afables decision. The
appeal-protest was later sent to the CSC. CSC Chairman Clave and
Commissioner Jose A. Melo recommended In Resolution 1178 dated 23
August 1979 that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the position, in conflict with
the 1978 appointment of Dr. Anzaldo which was duly attested and
approved by the CSC. The Resolution was made in pursuance to Section
19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (PD 807, 6 October
1975), which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the
Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission." On 5
January 1980, after denial of her motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution, Dr. Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. Presidential Executive Assistant Clave in his decision of 20
March 1980 revoked Dr. Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as
recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave
himself and Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be appointed to the
contested position but that Dr. Anzaldo's appointment to the said position
should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Dr.
Venzon's protest. In a resolution dated 14 August 1980, Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave denied Dr. Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration.
On 25 August 1980, Dr. Anzaldo filed in the Supreme Court the special civil
action of certiorari
Issue: Whether CSC Commissioner Jacobo Clave can concur with the
recommendation of the Presidential Executive Assistant, who is himself, in
the appointment of Dr. Venzon.
Held: The 20 March 1980 decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
implemented the 23 August 1979 Resolution (1178) of Clave (as CSC
Chairman), concurred with by Commissioner Melo, recommending the
appointment of Dr. Venzon as Science Research Supervisor II in place of Dr.
Anzaldo. When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision
that he was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service
Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman
Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with himself . It is evident that
Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of
the Civil Service Commission (See also Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs.
Court of Appeals). Common sense and propriety dictate that the
commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by
the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in
the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant
in a contested appointment.

People v. Medenilla [GR 131638-39, 26 March 2001]

Facts: On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught for illegal
possession and unlawfully selling 5.08g of shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D),
was in unlawful possession of 4 transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing
200.45g (Criminal Case 3619-D) in Mandaluyong City. Versions of facts
leading to the arrest are conflicting; the prosecution alleging buy-bust
operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search and seizure.
Arraigned on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge therein,
for the purpose of clarification, propounded a question upon a witness
during the trial. On 26 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
(Branch 262) found Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, as
amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory questions.
Held: A single noted instance of questioning cannot justify a claim that the
trial judge was biased. The Court have exhaustively examined the
transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial judge was
more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover,
a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a
witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just
determination of the case. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable
leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. It cannot be taken
against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
Marcos vs Sandiganbayan
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light

issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue
be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores
manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imeldas favor. The SB
en banc ruled against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong
showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of
due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such
procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of
its decision convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special
Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in
the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five
(5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del
Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and
agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive
petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It
may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an
informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that
opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was
denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1 stDivision of the Sandiganbayan. The
division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as
associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas

Equitable Banking Corporation vs. Calderon

FACTS

dissent in favor of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special

division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores
then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the

Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and

abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is

date of Amores request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating

also a stockholder of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He

that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then

is a seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe

and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable Banking Corporation is one of the leading
commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking,
such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among
others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable
International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar
transactions within and outside the Philippines.
The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum
deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In
April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates
went to Hongkong for business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986,
Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store
located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and then, Calderon
purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his
total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of
paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment thereof on
credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly
referred it to the store cashier for verification.
Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other
shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted.
Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady,
but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the
use of a pair of scissors.Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid
further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought.
ISSUE

Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.

RULING

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such
cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which
he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000]
Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13
November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The
Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon
certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested
state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department
of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note
Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to
the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern

District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.

Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371
(Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts),
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC
1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions
in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued
Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to
take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the
aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999) requested
copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well
as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given
ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies
of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August
1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice
Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access
thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially,
fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretarys letter
dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in
court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the
United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled
in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant
him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. Held:
Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of
the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the
filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is
of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition
which will be answered by the extraditee. There is no provision in the
Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from
the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while

the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as
the US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant
the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a
potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the extradition process evaluation
stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and
the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a
preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a
given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest
that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due
process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards
call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's
privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to
resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due
process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

Government Of The USA V. Hon. Purganan (2002)

FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary
was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of
Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18,
2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an
order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the
flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it
an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The
court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash
bond,
Jimenez
was
granted
provisional
liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take
cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under
Section
6
of
PD
No.
1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer
for
bail
iii.
Whether
or
NOT
there
is
a
violation
of
due
process
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court
of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
i.

YES.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima
facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that
there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the
request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them
ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the
Law
could
have
intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does
not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To
determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the
witnesses
they
may
produce.
The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases

Upon receipt of a petition for extradition

must study them and make, as soon as
a)
they
are
sufficient
b)
they show compliance with
c)
the
person

and its supporting documents, the judge

possible, a prima facie finding whether
in
form
and
substance
the Extradition Treaty and Law
sought
is
extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or
may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a
prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the
petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of
the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings.
ii.

Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as

well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not
at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds
application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly
connected
with
invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him,
not
before
the
extradition
court.
Exceptions
to
the
No
Bail
Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in
the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as
an
exception,
only
upon
a
clear
and
convincing
showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community;
and

2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as

a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants
provisional
liberty
in
extradition
cases
therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic
forcefulness.

1)

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of

bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would
also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding
basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities
that
may
negate
that
purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will
stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters;
that
is,
upon
the
resolution
of
the
Petition
for
Extradition.
iii.

NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard
is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already
had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Other
Five

Doctrines:
Postulates

of

Extradition

Is

Major

Instrument

for

the

Suppression

of

Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding
ring
of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We
need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing
crime
in
our
own
country.
2)

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United
States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court
ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason
to
grant
him
bail.

Extradition

The

Requesting

State

Will

Accord

Due

Process

to

the

Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its
trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as
well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused
in
the
pending
criminal
case
therein.
3)

The

Proceedings

Are

Sui

Generis

An
extradition
proceeding
is
sui
generis:
a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court
of
the
state
where
he
will
be
extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings
involve
a
full-blown
trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered
extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being
rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a
person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best
claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is
only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and
whether
the
person
sought
is
extraditable.
4)

Compliance

Shall

Be

in

Good

Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver
the
accused,
should
it
be
found
proper

5)

There

Is

an

Underlying

Risk

of

Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings
there;
and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable
Extradition
is
Essentially
Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.
Tan vs. Barrios [GRs 85481-82, 18 October 1990]
Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27 September
1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try
and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972, the
military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with
jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other
crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the
preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. In General Order
12-b dated 7 November 1972, "crimes against persons as defined and
penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of
military tribunals/commissions. Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11
October 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The
enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes
against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such
offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49, Section 2 of the same
general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest, refer
to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
civil courts" and vice versa. On 17 April 1975, William Tan (@ Go Bon Ho),
Joaquin Tan Leh (@ Go Bon Huat, @ Taowie) and Vicente Tan (@ Go Bon
Beng, @ Donge), with 12 others (Luis Tan [@ Tata, @ Go Bon Hoc], Ang Tiat
Chuan [@ Chuana], Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, Leopoldo
Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar Yaun, Eusebio Tan [@ Go Bon Ping], Alfonso
Tan [@ Go Bon Tiak], Go E Kuan [@ Kunga], Marciano Benemerito [@
Marcing, @ Dodong], Manuel Beleta, and John Doe), were arrested and
charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1, for the
crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-

possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49, for the killing on 25
August 1973 of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan
de Oro City; and (2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol,
caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders 6
and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree 9. Because the case was a "cause
celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the
recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his
earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was
retained in the military court. All the accused were detained without bail in
the PC Stockade in Camp Crame. Upon arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the
accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as
a state witness. He was released from detention on 5 May 1975. Almost
daily trials were held for more than 13 months. The testimonies of 45
prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up 21 volumes of
transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages. On 10 June 1976, a decision
entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military
Commission finding 5 of the accused namely: Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan,
Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of
murder, where each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days, to 20 years. A sixth
accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both murder and illegal
possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
electrocution. 8 of the accused, namely: Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita,
Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh, and
Vicente Tan were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11 June 1976.
On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished
the military tribunals and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme
Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission 34, et al.
(150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December 1984 by
Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military
commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of
martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly
cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning
as they did during the period of martial law. In October 1986, 6 habeas
corpus petitions were filed in the Supreme Court by some 217 prisoners in
the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and
convicted by the military commissions during the 9-year span of official
martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077,79599-79600, 79862 and 80565
consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce
Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, the
Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings
leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been
brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally unrelated

to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule. On 15 September

1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez issued Department Order 226
designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of
Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case
in the court of competent jurisdiction." On 15 November 1988, State
Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan
de Oro City in lieu of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself. Without
conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9
December 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2)
informations for (1) Illegal Possession of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824];
and (2) Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15 original
defendants in Criminal Case MC- 1-67 including those who had already
died. Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City,
were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo.
Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo
issued an order on 26 October 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to
submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases
wherever they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the
basis of filing the cases, within 5 days from receipt" of his said order. The
State Prosecutor has not complied with that order. On 7 November 1988,
William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and
88-825, and the order of Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled, among
others. Issue: Whether the reprosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their
right to protection against double jeopardy. Held: The trial of thousands of
civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions
during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created
under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The
belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of
those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which
occurred long before the Court's decision in Olaguer was promulgated and
which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. The
doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan, et. al.
and their co-accused before the Military Commission. The principle of
absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians
should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the
particular case of Tan, et. al., the proceedings were fair, that there were no
serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the
jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges
against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years
before the Olaguer case arose and came before the Supreme Court.

Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information

against Tan, et. al. would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not
in constitutional logic. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the
accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State: "The
constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for
any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment,
enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life,
either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is
imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming
and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res
judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only
once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so."
Mejia vs. Pamaran [GRs L-56741-42, 15 April 1988]
Facts: 6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila
by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico
Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All cases were
decided by the City Court of Manila against Endangan, et. al., all of whom
appealed in due time to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, where
the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over by the Honorable Jose
P. Alejandro (Civil Case 122794 to 122799). On 12 August 1979, Endangan,
Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor entered into a compromise
agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al. individually received
from Lu the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which Endangan, et. al.
agreed to vacate the premises in question and remove their houses
therefrom within 60 days from the date of the execution of the agreement,
failing which the appellee shall have the authority to demolish Endangan,
et. al.'s houses with costs thereof chargeable against them. The
compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban did
not join her co-defendants in entering into the compromise agreement. Up
to that stage of the cases, the counsel of record of the defendants was
Atty. S. G. Doron. On 22 August 1979, Atty. Modesto R. Espano of the
Citizens Legal Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty. Doron to inform him that
Mrs. Meimban has sought the assistance of the CLAO regarding her case,
and asked that the records of the case be sent to him. As a consequence,
Atty. Doron filed on 30 August 1979 his motion to withdraw appearance as
counsel for Meimban in Civil Case 122795. While Endangan, Bontia,
Antillon, Mabalot and Villamor, have decided to settle with Lu through
compromise agreement that they signed, Meimban resolved to prosecute
her appeal in her own case, Civil Case 122795. When Meimban followed up
her case in Branch XXVI of the CFI of Manila and had occasion to talk to
Danilo Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case was already
submitted for decision. She sought assistance from the CLAO where she
was instructed by Atty. Espano to find out the real status of the case. She

returned to the court sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first
came to know Atty. Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet
been decided because there was still one party who has not signed the
compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked
that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a
certain Atty. Lu, a brother of Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the
presiding judge; and then told her she would help them provided they give
P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to which she replied she would broach
the matter to her companions. From the court, she went to Atty. Modesto
Espano and told the lawyer the case was not yet submitted. Atty. Espano
instructed her to get her papers from Atty. Doron, which she did.
Thereafter, she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of Jose Mabalot, and Gloria
Antonio, daughter of Vicente Villamor, about the help offered by Atty.
Mejia. The two said they would think it over as they had already signed
something. When she went to the court to deposit her rentals Atty. Mejia
asked her if her companions were agreeable to the suggestion and she
replied she had already told them and that they would consider the matter.
On 20 November 1979, Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion who loaned Meimban
P500 accompanied the latter to the court. She was seated at the corridor
near the door of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open, and she saw
Meimban handed an envelope to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her desk
drawer. On 7 December 1979, the date set for the hearing of the motion to
withdraw the compromise and to file memoranda filed by Pilar Bautista and
Gloria Antonio in behalf of their fathers, Atty. Mejia approached Meimban
and said no oppositor might arrive, and asked her if Bautista had brought
1/2 of the P1,000.00. Bautista placed P600 in an envelope and the two of
them, Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista handed
the envelope containing the money to Atty. Mejia who received it. On 3
September 1980, Atty. Mejia attempted to bribe the Tanodbayan
Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno), through intricate gold chain with a
pendant hearing an inscription of letter "C," (which the investigator
returned through an employee, Dante Ramos). CorallPaterno investigated
the complaints of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora
Mejia y Rodriguez for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On 23 April 1981, the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case 1988, found Aurora
Mejia y Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph
(b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and sentenced her to an indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as
maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to
indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing
the money given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal
Case 1989, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b),
Section 3 of RA 3019 and likewise sentenced her to an indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as

maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to

indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500 representing the
money given to her. Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the
proceedings. Mejia filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whetehr Presidential Decree is an ex-post facto law. Held: The
contention that Presidential Decree 1606 is contrary to the ex post facto
provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that
"petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise." Mejia
alleged that the procedure provided for by the Sandiganbayan are ex post
facto and hence all proceedings taken against her are void ab initio being
in violation of the Constitution. It is further argued that only one stage of
appeal is available to Mejia under PD 1606 which effectively deprives her
of the intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in said
appeal to the Supreme Court only issues of law may be raised and worse
still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of
right. A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack
of persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami decision,
promulgated in 1970, supplies the most recent and binding
pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice
Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act
done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters
the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done
was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty." Even the
most careful scrutiny of the said definition fails to sustain Mejia's claim.
The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is
qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode
of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein
embraced.
People v. Estrada [GR 130487, 19 June 2000]
Facts: On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the
bishops chair while the sacrament of confirmation was being performed at
the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City. Rogelio Mararac, the security guard
at the cathedral, was summoned by some churchgoers. Mararac went near
Estrada and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac twice tapped
Estradas hand with his nightstick. When Mararac was about to strike

again, Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed
him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded and bleeding,
Mararac slowly dragged himself down the altar. SP01 Conrado Francisco
received a report of the commotion inside the cathedral, went inside the
cathedral, approached Estrada who was sitting on the chair, and advised
the latter to drop his knife. Estrada obeyed. However, when Chief Inspector
Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, who was also at the confirmation rites,
went near Estrada, Estrada embraced Rosario and two wrestled with each
other. Rosario was able to subdue Estrada. Estrada was brought to the
police station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a few minutes after
arrival at the hospital. On 29 December 1994, Estrada was charged with
the crime of murder for the killing of Mararac. On 6 January 1995, at the
arraignment, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to
Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at
Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that Estrada could not properly
and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental
defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the
psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. The motion
was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio,
propounded several questions on Estrada. Finding that the questions were
understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the
motion that same day. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty
was entered by the court on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June 1997, the trial
court (RTC Dagupan City, Branch 44, Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered
a decision upholding the prosecution evidence and found Estrada guilty of
the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him
to pay P50,000 for indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000
as moral damages. Estradas counsel appealed. Issue: Whether a mental
examination of the accused should be made before the accused may be
subjected to trial. Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane
person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public. It has
been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God
to make a just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent
person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law. Section 12, Rule
116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental
examination." An intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for
rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive
diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through
observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis
is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by
the trial court. By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial
court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial court's

negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and

for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified.
Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]
Facts: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89
laborers, who were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to
alleged shortages of leather materials. The National Labor Union filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging therein,
among others, that Toribio dominates the National Workers Brotherhood
(NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio
discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he
allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU,
due to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs
and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove
NLUs allegation that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to
discharge NLU members. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89 workers were
dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor
General, in behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for
reconsideration, while the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the
case be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations. Issue: Whether the
CIRs freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe
special requirements of due process in administrative cases. Held: The
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character, to
wit: a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play. b. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented, after the party is given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on
the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously
futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration. c. Wile the duty to

deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something
to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the
more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant
and a limitation upon power. d. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial."
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate
the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a
basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. e. The decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively
to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized
legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material
and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but
their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR
may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal,
a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such
board or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court
itself of any of its powers (Section 10) f. The CIR or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is
such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally
to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no statutory
authority to authorize examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to solve the
difficulty. g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its

decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan [GR 148560, 19 November 2001]

Facts: On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case
26558, for violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3,
paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Criminal
Case 26563, for violation of Section 7, paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth
Act 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed
an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in
the Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for reconsideration /
reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give
the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported
ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they
are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the
explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001,
the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June
2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001, Estrada moved to quash the Information
in Criminal Case 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. Issue: Whether the
Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform Estrada of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense. Held: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to

determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its

description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently
guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged
with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the
realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public
officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in
Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder Law. Herein, the amended
Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which Estrada is
alleged to have committed. There was nothing that is vague or ambiguous
that will confuse Estrada in his defense. Factual assertions clearly show
that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. There is
no basis for Estrada's claim that the Supreme Court review the AntiPlunder Law on its face and in its entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to
be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity." This rationale does not apply to penal
statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances
as in the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that
"a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical

tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases.
"On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and
is generally disfavored.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee
vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA

Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment

inl a r g e s c a l e a n d a s s a i l s , a s w e l l , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e
l a w d e f i n i n g a n d penalizing said crime.
First,
a c c u s e d s u b m i t s t h a t A r t i c l e 1 3 ( b ) o f t h e L a b o r Code defining
recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the
due process clause. The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.
(a) x x x.
(b)
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canva
s s i n g , enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includesreferrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad,w h e t h e r f o r p r o f i t o r n o t :
Provided,
That any person
o r e n t i t y w h i c h , i n a n y manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shallbe deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
ISSUES: (1)
W h e t h e r o r n o t s e c . 1 3 ( b ) o f P.D . 4 4 2 , a s a m e n d e d ,
o t h e r w i s e known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it
violates the due process clause.
(2)
W hether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should
be exculpated
HELD:
(1)
For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of
theLabor Code defining
recruitment and
placement is void forvagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause.
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must
b e sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct ontheir part
will render them liable to its penalties.In support of her submission, dela Piedra
invokes People vs. Panis,where the Supreme Court criticized the definition of
recruitment andplacement. The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on
the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of
Article 13 (b), thecrime of illegal recruitment could be committed only

whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment fora fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records
thatw o u l d h e l p s h e d l i g h t o n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e p r o v i s o . T h e
absence
of s u c h r e c o r d s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e C o u r t w a s a b
l e t o a r r i v e a t a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying
principles in criminallaw and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself.
Section 13(b), theref ore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is
evidenton its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in
imprecise
language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not
v o i d f o r vagueness.
Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that c
o n s t i t u t e recruitment
and
placement
suffer
from
overbreadth since bymerely referring a person for
employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considersas
customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment
referral(ref erring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment
to
aprospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently,Del
a Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.A statute may be said to be
overbroad
where
it
operates
to
inhibit
thee x e r c i s e o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m s a f f i r m a t i v e l y g u
a r a n t e e d b y t h e Constitution, such as the freedom of speec
h or religion. A generallyworded statute, when construed to pu
n i s h c o n d u c t w h i c h c a n n o t b e constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally
vague
to
the
extent
that
itf a i l s t o g i v e a d e q u a t e w a r n i n g o f t h e b o
u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e constitutionally permissible a
n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e applications of the statute.
(2)
A n e n t t h e s e c o n d i s s u e , D e l a P i e d r a i n
v o k e s t h e e q u a l protection clause in her defens
e.
S h e p o i n t s o u t t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e evidence purportedly sho
w s t h a t J a s m i n e A l e j a n d r o h a n d e d o u t a p p l i c a t i o n forms
and
even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the
onlyo n e c r i m i n a l l y c h a r g e d . A l e j a n d r o , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e m a
ined scot-free.From this, she concludes that the prosecution
discriminated
against
her
ongrounds
of
regional
origins. Appellant
is
a Cebuana
while
Alejandro
i s a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City. The
Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one
guilty person while others equally guiltyare not prosecuted, is not, by
itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful
administration by officers of a statute fair on itsface, resulting in its
unequal application to those who are entitled to betreated alike, is not a
denial of equal protection unless there is shown tobe present in it an element of

intentional or purposeful discrimination.But a discriminatory purpose is

not presumed,
there
must be
a showingof clear and intentional
discrimination.In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in chargingher,
there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of theprosecuting
officials.
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i n g o f f i c e r s re
gularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcomeonly by proof
to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier,accused has not presented
any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela
Piedra,
a
Cebuana,
was
charged
with
thec o m m i s s i o n o f a c r i m e , w h i l e a Z a m b o a n g u e a , t h e g
u i l t y p a r t y i n appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion
that theprosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws

DAVID VS ARROYO
I. THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article
7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O.

No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist

insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over
the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on
February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the
newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was
searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006.
Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily
Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials
for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP
officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless
search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional
power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or
suppress lawless violence.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to
PP 1017, valid?
2. Was
the
warrantless
search
and
seizure
on
the Daily
Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al.,
made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of

arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit

warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During
the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that
some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria
Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader
of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate
release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was
wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal.
Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the
steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a
search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a
house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion

residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must
direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction

may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these
rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.