People v.

Mahinay, 302
455 (1999)
posted
in CONLAW2
by katcobing
Facts

SCRA

lower court convicted him of the crime of

Rape and was sentenced to death.

cases

Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a

houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his
tasks was to take care of Isips house
which was under construction adjacent
to the latters residence. The victim was
a 12-year old girl who used to frequent
the residence of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995,
the victim was reported missing by her
mother. The following morning, the
Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney
and disappeared.

The case was forwarded to the

Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issues
1. WON the appellants extrajudicial confession was validly
taken and in accordance with his
rights under Section 12 of the Bill
of Rights; and
2. WON the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution
sufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling

The victims body was found, lifeless, at

around 7:30 am that same day. She was
found in the septic tank wearing her
blouse and no underwear. The autopsy
showed that the victim was raped and
was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene,
policemen found a pair of dirty white
short pants, a brown belt and a yellow
hair ribbon which was identified by the
victims mother to belong to her
daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue
slippers which Isip identified as that of
the appellant. Also found in the yard,
three armslength away from the septic
tank were an underwear, a leather
wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a
pliers positively identified by Isip as
appellants belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and
executed an extra-judicial confession
wherein he narrated how the crime was
committed. The trial ensued and the

The conviction of the appellant is

affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court ruled that the appellants
extrajudicial confession was taken within
the ambit of the law as evinced by the
records and testimony of the lawyer who
assisted, warned and explained to him
his constitutionally guaranteed preinterrogatory and custodial rights.
As to the second issue, the appellant
argues that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to warrant a conviction of his
guilt. However, the Court ruled
otherwise.
The Court recalled the Rule on
Evidence and settled jurisprudence.
Absence of direct proof does not
absolve
the
appellant
because
conviction may be had with the

concurrence of the following requisites

as stated in the Rules of Court:
1.
there is more than one
circumstance;
2. the facts from which the
inferences are derived are
proven; and
3. the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People
v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all
circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent and
with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257
SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240
SCRA 335, that facts and circumstances
consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with innocence, constitute evidence
which, in weight and probative force,
may surpass even direct evidence in its
effect upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial courts
decision in giving credence to several
circumstantial evidence, which is more
than enough to prove appellants guilt
beyond the shadow of reasonable
doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda
rights with the developments in law that
provided the rights of suspects under
custodial investigation in detail.
A person under custodial investigation
should be informed:
1. In a language known to and
understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other
warnings, information or communication

must be in a language known to and

understood by said person;
2. That he has a right to remain silent
and that any statement he makes may
be used as evidence against him;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at
all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer,
preferably of his own choice;
4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot
afford the services of a lawyer, one will
be provided for him; and that a lawyer
may also be engaged by any person in
his behalf, or may be appointed by the
court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That no custodial investigation in any
form shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid
waiver has been made;
6. That, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most
expedient means telephone, radio,
letter or messenger with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any
member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen
by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited by/confer with duly accredited
national or international non-government
organization.
It
shall
be
the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that
this is accomplished;
7. That he has the right to waive any of
said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
and ensure that he understood the
same;
8. That the waiver must be done in
writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That he may indicate in any manner
at any time or stage of the process that

he does not wish to be questioned with

warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate
him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation must
ceased if it has already begun;
10. That his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any
of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may
have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;
11. That any statement or evidence, as
the case may be, obtained in violation of
any
of
the
foregoing,
whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
CSC vs. ANDAL, G.R. No. 185749,
December 16, 2009
FACTS:
Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds
the position of Security Guard II in the
Sandiganbayan. He filed an application
to take the Career Service Professional
Examination-Computer Assisted Test
(CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the
examination, and the result showed that
he passed with the rate of 81.03%.
However, when Arlene S. Vito who
claimed to have been authorized by
respondent to secure the results of the
examination went to do so, verification
and comparison of the pictures attached
to the Picture Seat Plan and the
identification card of Andal brought by
Vito showed dissimilarity in the facial
features. Civil Service Commission
National Capital Region (CSC-NCR)
rendered
judgment
finding
the
respondent guilty of dishonesty and
imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service. Aggrieved,
the respondent appealed, however, it

was denied. He then elevated the case

to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which
the CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
The
CSC
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration in the CA but was
denied. Hence, the present petition for
reversal of the decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
Does the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction
extend
to
court
personnel?
RULING:
The instant petition is DENIED. The
Supreme Court ruled that Section 6,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
vests
in
the
Supreme
Court
administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof, thus:
Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges
and
court
personnels
administrative compliance with all
laws, rules and regulations. No other
branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Supreme Court also emphasized
that in case of violation of the Civil
Service Law by a court personnel, the
standard procedure is for the CSC to
bring its complaint against a judicial
employee before the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court, for
the
filing
of
the
appropriate
administrative case against him.
JUDGDE MACEDA vs. OMBUDSMAN
VASQUEZ
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of
PAO filed a complaint before the Office

of the Ombudsman against petitioner

RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
Respondent
Abiera
alleged
that
petitioner Maceda has falsified his
certificate of service by certifying that
all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision for a period
of 90 days have been determined and
decided on or before January 31, 1989,
when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases
that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent
Abiera
alleged
that
petitioner
Maceda
falsified
his
certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation
made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment
into
the
SCs
constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts
Held: A judge
who falsifies his certificate of service
is administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and under Sec. 1,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious
act.
In the absence of any administrative
action taken against him by the Court
with regard to his certificates of service,
the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the
Courts
power
of
administrative
supervision over all courts and its

personnel, in violation of the doctrine of

separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
exclusively
vests
in
the
SC
administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the CA down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By
virtue of this power, it is only the SC that
can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a
judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to the SC
for determination whether said judge or
court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.
De Duzman v People (119 Scra 337)
Facts: Petitioner De Guzman work as
Traveling collector. He collected the
total amount of P 204,349.32 from
various agencies but remitted to the
General
Teller,
Cash
Division
Department of Finance, only P 127,
797.95, thus resulting in a shortage of
P76,521.37. Petitioner contends that his
accountability
was
not
proven
considering that the audit examination
was conducted in his absence and after

he signed the Report of Examination in

blank presented to him by Auditing
Examiner Maximo Pielago, thus making
the procedure irregular.
Auditing
Examiner Pielago candidly admitted that
he made the accused sign the Report
of Examination in blank even before
any examination could be conducted
because upon his first demand to the
Petitioner for the production of his cash
and cash items the latter told him that
he had nothing to account for anyone
since he ceased making collection.
Pielago proceeded with the audit
examination
of
Petitioners
accountability from the official records.
He was found guilty for Malversation of
public funds. Petitioner contends that his
accountability was not established as
the Report of Examination was
denominated
by
Pielago
as
preliminary.
Issue: Can the Petitioner be held guilty
of malversation based on a preliminary
audit report?
Holding: Yes. In malversation, all that
is necessary to prove is that the
defendant received in his possession
public funds, that he could not
account for them and did not give a
reasonable
excuse
for
the
disappearance of the same. An
accountable public officer may be
convicted of malversation even if there
is no direct evidence of misappropriation
and the only evidence is that there is a
shortage in his account which he has
not been able to explain satisfactorily. In
the case at bar, True, the report of the
audit aforesaid was denominated as
preliminary. But, this does not imply
that the same may not be taken as basis
for the date of said audit. If there was
anything tentative about the finding

made, it was only because collections of

the accused under official receipts
known to be still in his possessions and
the stubs of which had not yet been
submitted, were not yet accounted for.
Hence, the only meaning that the term
preliminary had in the premises was
that the amount of shortage could still
be increased if all receipts are
eventually found and taken into account.
But, on the basis of the records
available to the auditor, the amount of
shortage established could not but be
considered final.

Francisco I. Chavez vs. Judicial Bar

Council (JBC)
GR no. 202242 April 16 2013
Facts: The case is a motion for
reconsideration filed by the JBC in a
prior decision rendered July 17, 2012
that JBCs action of allowing more
than one member of the congress to
represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional Respondent contends
that the phrase a representative of
congress refers that both houses of
congress should have one
representative each, and that these two
houses are permanent and mandatory
components of congress as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both
houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec
8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members
only with only one representative from
congress.

Issue: W/N the JBCs practice of having

members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII
Sec 8 of the constitution.
Held: The practice is unconstitutional;
the court held that the phrase a
representative of congress should be
construed as to having only one
representative that would come from
either house, not both. That the framers
of the constitution only intended for one
seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative. The motion was denied.

Officer of the Supreme Court, from

making

any

deduction

of withholding taxes from their salaries.

With the filing of the petition, the Court
deemed it best to settle the issue
through judicial pronouncement, even if
it

had

dealt

with

the

matter

administratively.
Issue: Whether or not members of the
Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
Held: NO. Intent to delete express grant
of

exemption

of income

taxes to

Nitafan vs. CIR [GR L-78780, 23 July

1987]

members

Facts: The Chief Justice has previously

The salaries of

issued

Fiscal

Judiciary are subject to the general

Management and Budget Office to

income tax applied to all taxpayers. This

continue

of

intent was somehow and inadvertently

withholding taxes from salaries of the

not clearly set forth in the final text of the

Justices of the Supreme Court and

Constitutionas approved and ratified in

other members of the judiciary. This

February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although

was affirmed by the Supreme Court en

the intent may have been obscured by

banc

the failure to include in the General

directive
the

on

to

the

deduction

December

1987.

Provisions

of

Judiciary

members

proscription

of

the

against

Petitioners are the duly appointed and

exemption of any public officer or

qualified

employee,

Judges

over Branches 52,

respectively,

of

presiding

19
the

and

RTC,

including

constitutional

53,

officers, from payment of income tax,

National

the Court since then has authorized the

Capital Judicial Region, all with stations

continuation

in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or

the withholding tax from the salaries of

perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of

the members of the Supreme Court, as

Internal Revenue and the Financial

of

the

deduction

of

well as from the salaries of all other

the three branches in the government. A

members of the Judiciary. The Court

period (.) after decreased was made

hereby makes of record that it had then

on the understanding that the salary of

discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer

justices is subject to tax. With the

and Endencia vs. David.

period, the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer

and Endencia vs. David is understood

The 1973 Constitution has provided that

not to

applyanymore.

Justices

no salary or any form of emolument of

judges are not only the citizens whose

any public officer or employee, including

income have been reduced in accepting

constitutional officers, shall be exempt

service in government and yet subjected

from payment of income tax (Section 6,

to income tax. Such is true also

Article XV) which was not present in the

of Cabinet

1987 Constitution. The deliberations of

employees.

membersand

all

and

other

the 1986 Constitutional Commission

relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The

Constitutional construction adopts the

salary of the Chief Justice and of the

intent

Associate Justices of the Supreme

adopting the law.

of

the

framers

and

people

Court, and of judges of lower courts

shall be fixed by law. During their

The ascertainment of the intent is but in

continuance in office, their salary shall

keeping with the fundamental principle

not

the

of constitutional construction that the

contention that the intent of the framers

intent of the framers of the organic law

is to revert to the original concept of

and of the people adopting it should be

non-diminution

given

be

decreased),

negate

of salaries of

judicial

officers.

effect.

The

primary

task

in

constitutional construction is to ascertain

and thereafter assure the realization of

Equality

of branches of

government

effected by modifications in provision.

the purpose of the framers and of the

people

in

the

adoption

of

the

Constitution. It may also be safely

The term diminished be changed to

assumed that the people in ratifying the

decreased and that the words nor

Constitution were guided mainly by the

subjected to income tax be deleted so

explanation offered by the framers. In

as to give substance to equality among

the case at bar, Section 10, Article VIII is

plain that the Constitution authorizes

Congress to pass a law fixing another
rate of compensation of Justices and
Judges but such rate must be higher
than that which they are receiving at the
time of enactment, or if lower, it would
be applicable only to those appointed
after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision
an exemption from taxation in the light
of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
PERFECTO VS. MEER (FULL)
ENDENCIA vs. DAVID
Separation of Powers
Saturnino David, the then Collector of
Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice
Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec
13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC.
13. No salary wherever received by
any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of
which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by
the Constitution or by law. According to
the brief of the Solicitor General on
behalf of appellant Collector of Internal
Revenue, our decision in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not
received
favorably
by Congress,
because
immediately
after
its
promulgation,
Congress
enacted
Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his
point, the Solicitor General reproduces
what he considers the pertinent

discussion in the Lower House of House

Bill No. 1127 which became Republic
Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA
590 is constitutional.
HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated
in section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
Congress says that taxing the salary of
a judicial officer is not a decrease of
compensation. This is a clear example
of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase which shall not
be diminished during their continuance
in office, found in section 9, Article VIII
of the Constitution, referring to the
salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion
of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that
the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of
what the law was before its passage, so
as to give it any binding weight with the
courts. A legislative definition of a word
as used in a statute is not conclusive of
its meaning as used elsewhere;
otherwise, the legislature would be
usurping a judicial function in defining a
term. ** The reason behind the
exemption in the Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Federal
Supreme Court and this Court, is to
preserve the independence of the
Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal
but of the other courts, whose present
membership number more than 990
judicial officials. The independence of
the judges is of far greater importance
than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries.

The doctrine laid down in the case of

Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of
a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. The
interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the
judicial department, and that in enacting
a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in
such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of
later interpreting said statute, especially
when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to
a previous interpretation already given
in a case by the highest court of the
land.

DE LA LLANA vs. ALBA

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled

An
Act
Reorganizing
the
Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its
validity because, first of all, he would be one
of the judges that would be removed because
of the reorganization and second, he said
such law would contravene the constitutional
provision which provides the security of tenure
of judges of the courts. He averred that only
the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT
the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De
La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following
way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to

discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a

vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence
to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it
was the President who was vested with such
power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of
the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of
the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of
the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear
need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its
say prior to the action taken by either of the
two departments. Even then, it could do so
but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there
any intrusion into who shall be appointed to
the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of
the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried
and tested ways of judicial power. Rather
what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to
the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present

incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored

or disregarded. The challenged Act would
thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to
those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the
choice of alternatives between one which
would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.

violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said

that Macaraig has not submitted the progress
of his Courts as required by law. And that
Macaraig has received salaries as a judge
while he is fully aware that he has not been
performing the duties of a judge. Also
questioned was the fact that a member of the
judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department
of the executive oi charge of prosecution of
cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted
with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.

GARCIA vs. MACARAIG

39 SCRA 106 Political Law Separation of
Powers
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as
Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo
City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of
the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to
be organized from scratch. From July 1,
1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not
able to assume the duties and functions of a
judge due to the fact that his Court Room can
not be properly established due to problems
as to location and as to appropriations to
make his Court up and running. When
Macaraig realized that it would be some time
before he could actually preside over his
court, he applied for an extended leave
(during the 16 years he had worked in the
Department of Justice, he had, due to
pressure of duties, never gone on extended
leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave
benefits he had earned beyond the maximum
ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary
of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to
forego his leave and instead to assist the
Secretary, without being extended a formal
detail, whenever he was not busy attending to
the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a
complaint
alleging
that
Macaraig
is
incompetent, dishonest and has acted in

HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his

judicial duties under the circumstances
mentioned above does not constitute
incompetence. Macaraig was, like every
lawyer who gets his first appointment to the
bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and
rid himself of the stigma of being a judge
without
a
sala,
but
forces
and
circumstances
beyond
his
control
prevented him from discharging his
judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be
taken as meaning that the Court looks with
favor at the practice of long standing, to be
sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to
assist the Secretary even if it were only in
connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts. The
line between what a judge may do and what
he may not do in collaborating or working with
other offices or officers under the other great
departments of the government must always
be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the
principle of separation of powers on which our
government rests by mandate of the people
thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by
practices purportedly motivated by good
intentions in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the
necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by

the specific constitutional precepts on check

and balance between and among them, have
long been acknowledged as more paramount
than the serving of any temporary or passing
governmental conveniences or exigencies. It
is thus of grave importance to the judiciary
under our present constitutional scheme of
government that no judge of even the lowest
court in this Republic should place himself in a
position where his actuations on matters
submitted to him for action or resolution would
be subject to review and prior approval and,
worst still, reversal, before they can have legal
effect, by any authority other than the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case
may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very
strongly that it is best that this practice is
discontinued.

MANILA ELECTRIC vs. PASAY

TRANSPORTATION (see SCRIBD)
LOPEZ vs. ROXAS
17 SCRA 756 Political Law Constitutional
Law Judicial Power Defined
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the
candidates for Vice President in the 1965
elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas
appealed his loss before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was
created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law
that:
There shall be an independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the presidentelect and the Vice-president elect of the
Philippines.
In effect, a losing candidate would have the
right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the
law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the

PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez

averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it
was not provided for in the constitution. Also,
since the PET is composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten members of the SC
any decision of the PET cannot be validly
appealed before the SC or that there may be
conflict that may arise once a PET decision is
appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid
body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the
Congress merely conferred a new function to
the Supreme Court. Such is within its power,
the Constitution allowed Congress to
determine which body should decide
controversies relating to the election of the
President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did
not create another court within the SC for
pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial
power shall be vested in one SC and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize
that the fundamental law vests in the judicial
branch of the government, not merely some
specified or limited judicial power, but the
judicial power under our political system, and,
accordingly, the entirety or all of said power,
except, only, so much as the Constitution
confers upon some other agency, such as the
power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of
members of the Senate and those of the
House of Representatives, which is vested by
the fundamental law solely in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle
justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable
before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights. The
proper exercise of said authority requires

legislative
action:
(1)
defining
such
enforceable and demandable rights and/or
prescribing remedies for violations thereof;
and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction
to hear and decide said controversies or
disputes, in the first instance and/or on
appeal. For this reason, the Constitution
ordains that Congress shall have the power
to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.

Ruling:

The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict

with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added
the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly
legislated by Congress. It merely conferred
upon the SC additional functions i.e., the
functions of the PET. This is valid because the
determining of election contests is essentially
judicial.

refrain from participating in the work of

The petition is denied. The Constitution

prohibits the designation of members of
the Judiciary to any agency performing
Quasi-Judicial or Administrative
functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987
Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear
meaning and Judges can confidently
any Administrative Agency which
adjudicates disputes & controversies
involving the rights of parties within its
jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those
which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct & affairs of

IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO

Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing
him to accept the appointment by Ilocos
Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the
member of Ilocos Norte provincial
Committee on Justice created pursuant
to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that
his membership in the Committee will not
in any way amount to an abandonment
to his present position as Executive
Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial
region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where
does it draw the line insofar as
administrative functions are concerned?

individuals for their own welfare and

the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the
policy of the Legislature or such as
are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence.
Administrative functions as used in Sec.
12 refers to the Governments executive
machinery and its performance of
governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and
orders of executive officials as they
administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element
of positive action, of supervision or
control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice

Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which
involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules
and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency
by the organic law of its existence we can
readily see that membership in the
Provincial or City Committee on Justice
would not involve any regulation or control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals.
Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor
exercise any quasi-legislative functions.
Its work is purely advisory. A member of
the judiciary joining any study group which
concentrates on the administration of
justice as long as the group merely
deliberates on problems involving the
speedy disposition of cases particularly
those involving the poor and needy
litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise
and experiences of the members, and
limits itself to recommendations which
may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer
the particular function involved in their
implementation.

AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO

Civil Law Torts and Damages Negligence
Malfeasance Quasi-Delict
Remedial Law Evidence Hearsay Rule
Res Gestae Startling Event
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and
several other Filipinos were tourists en route
to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued
a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But
during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked
by the plane manager of Air France to vacate
his seat because a white man allegedly has a
better right than him. Carrascoso protested
but when things got heated and upon advise
of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave
up his seat and was transferred to the planes
tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was
already in the Philippines, he sued Air France
for damages for the embarrassment he
suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso
testified, among others, that he when he was
forced to take the tourist class, he went to the
planes pantry where he was approached by a
plane purser who told him that he noted in the
planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of
Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial
court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of
a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an
assurance that he will be seated in first class
because allegedly in truth and in fact, that
was not the true intent between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of

Carrascosos testimony regarding the note
made by the purser because the said note
was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable
for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of
Carrasoso regarding the note which was not
presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances
liability is based on culpa-contractual and on
culpa aquiliana.

contract merely for transportation. They have

a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the
carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso
is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascosos action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the Air France a case of quasidelict. Damages are proper.

Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between
Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class
passage; Second, That said contract was
breached when Air France failed to furnish
first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air
Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation
berth after he was already, seated and to
take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which
he
suffered
inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby
causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to
Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first
class ticket to a passenger is not an
assurance that he will be given a first class
seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a
contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based
on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not

HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso

must be admitted based on res gestae. The
subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the
ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does
not come within the proscription of the best
evidence
rule.
Such
testimony
is
admissible. Besides, when the dialogue
between Carrascoso and the purser
happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be
felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in
the notebook was spontaneous, and related to
the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It
forms part of the res gestae.

VDA DE ESPIRITU vs. CFI

BUSCAYNO vs. ENRILE
MANGCA vs. COMELEC
VALLADOLID vs. INCIONG (SCRIBD)
NAPOLCOM vs. LOOD (FULL)

NUNAL vs. CA (SCRIBD)

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had

resolved the case within the allotted period.

MANGELEN vs. CA (FULL)

BEDRUZ vs. OFFICE
OMBUDSMAN (FULL)

OF

THE

GERMAN MACHINERIES vs. ENDAYA

CORPUS vs. CA
MALACORA vs. CA (FULL)

MARCELINO vs. CRUZ

121 SCRA 51 Political Law Constitutional
Law Period to Resolve a Case from Date of
Submission Promulgation vs Rendition of
Judgment - Constitutional Period to Decide
not Mandatory
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the
crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence
against Marcelino and rested its case. On the
same date, the attorneys of both parties in the
criminal case moved for time within which to
submit their respective memoranda. The
presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave
them 30 days or until September 4, 1975.
Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with
the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision, his
decision bears the same date of November
28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions
was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is
now contending that the court can no longer
promulgate judgment because by January
1976, the 3-month period (90 day period)
within which lower courts must decide on
cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower
court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for

decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last
day of filing of the memoranda by the
respective parties). From that day, the 3month period begins to run so Judge Cruz
had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the
case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his
decision on November 28, 1975. The date of
rendition is the date of filing of the decision
with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz
was able to rule on the case within the 3month period because November 28, 1975
was merely the 85th day from September 4,
1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this
case it was set in January 1976, could not
serve as the reckoning date because the
same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the
Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that upon the effectivity of this
constitution, the maximum period within which
case or matter shall be decided or resolved
from the date of its submission shall be; 18
months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for
the inferior courts and 3 months for lower
courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is
liberal when it comes to this provision. The
provision is NOT mandatory, it is merely
directive. Extensions can be granted in
meritorious cases. To interpret such provision
as mandatory will only be detrimental to the
justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned
lower court judges to resolve cases within the
prescribed period and not take this liberal
construction as an excuse to dispose of cases
at later periods.

DE ROMA vs. CA