NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3301-09T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

August 13, 2013
APPELLATE DIVISION

JOSE L. NEGRETE, a/k/a BOOM BAP,

Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted March 6, 2013 - Decided August 13, 2013
Before Judges Grall, Koblitz and Accurso.
On appeal from Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County,
Indictment No. 06-01-0121.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney for appellant (Alison Perrone,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Joseph L. Bocchini, Jr., Mercer County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent
(John P. Boyle, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor,
on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRALL, J.A.D.
The first jury to try defendant Jose Negrete on charges
related to the killing of Jeri Lynn Dotson and the attempted
killing of Alex Ruiz was unable to reach a verdict.

A second

jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder,

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; attempted murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; and murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2).
After merging defendant's conspiracy conviction, the judge
sentenced him to a life term of imprisonment for murder and a
consecutive twenty-year term for attempted murder.

Both

sentences are subject to terms of parole ineligibility and

supervision required by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2.

The judge also imposed the appropriate monetary

penalties.
Defendant appeals urging reversal of his convictions on
four grounds and, in the alternative, contends that his
sentences are excessive and should be concurrent.

The most

significant question is whether Juror Number 8's (Juror 8)

participation in deliberations requires reversal of his
convictions.

Because Juror 8 disclosed information about his

relationship with a witness, in violation of the judge's

direction, and disclosed information he had heard about the
crime scene prior to trial that was not introduced in evidence,
in violation of the jury instructions, we conclude that it does.
[At the court's direction, its recitation
and discussion of Section I has been omitted
from the published opinion.]

A-3301-09T2

II
Defendant's claim of juror misconduct is based on
disclosures Juror 8 made in deliberations.

Specifically, Juror

8 told the other jurors that he went to school with Peralta and
knew him from the neighborhood; that his girlfriend Mimi was
friendly with Peralta's sisters who took care of Dotson's
children; and that Peralta's sister told Mimi that one of
Dotson's daughters said she put the candy on her mother's
stomach.

The other jurors were concerned by the fact that Juror

8 was on the jury despite knowing Dimas Peralta, the father of

Dotson's children, and by the fact that Juror 8 had disclosed
facts not in evidence.

Consequently, they sent a note to the

judge asking for guidance.

The judge and the attorneys already knew that Juror 8 knew
Peralta.

During jury selection, Juror 8 came to sidebar and

advised the judge and lawyers of his acquaintance with Peralta.

At that time, Juror 8 said they were in the same school years
before, but he also said he had not seen Peralta for a long time
and did not consider Peralta a friend.

Juror 8 was confident

that he could decide the case without being influenced by their

relationship.

The judge told Juror 8 not to disclose his

relationship with Peralta to the other jurors, and Juror 8 said

he would not.

Apparently convinced that Juror 8 could serve,

A-3301-09T2

neither the judge nor the attorneys took any action to remove
him.1
Deliberations commenced after the lunch break on May 13,
2009.

The record does not indicate whether the jury sent the

note about Juror 8 before leaving the court house on May 13 or

after resuming deliberations on May 14.

The only transcript

from May 14 we have, begins with the judge questioning the

foreperson about the note they sent.

It states, "[Juror 8] has

expressed knowing and going to school with Dimas [Peralta], the

father of Jeri Lynn Dotson['s children].

And has expressed

information about [Dotson] that was not brought up in the trial.

Between jury selection and deliberations, the judge spoke to

Juror 8 three times, none of them involving matters suggesting
misconduct on his part.
First, after the jury was sworn and prior to opening
statements, Juror 8 asked about the duration of the trial and
the hours of attendance it would require, noting that his
supervisor was not happy about the expected length of the trial.
He acknowledged, however, that service was not a hardship for
him and continued to serve.
Second, during the trial, the judge questioned all of the
jurors about an incident involving a person observing the trial
saying "God bless" as the jurors passed him on the steps while
leaving the court house. All of the jurors acknowledged they
would not be influenced by the spectator's comment.
Third, upon receiving a report from Juror 8's sister that
she had been approached by a man who inquired about her brother
being on the jury and asking what he was thinking, the judge
questioned Juror 8. He advised that the incident would not
influence him and that he had not told any other juror about it.

A-3301-09T2

Please advise us as to how to proceed."

While the jurors' had differing recollections of what Juror
8 said and not all of them heard everything, Juror 8's
recollection was precise, and he did not omit anything the
others attributed to him.

The judge started her colloquy with

Juror 8 by reading the note and reminding him that he had said
he would keep that information to himself.

Acknowledging his

vow, Juror 8 said he told the others "about how the candy got in
[sic] her stomach," which he said was "what we were discussing."
Asked about how and when he acquired information about the
candy, Juror 8 said, "I believe I told you that my kids'
mother[ Mimi ]was friends with Dimas' sisters.

And when the

murder happened [Mimi] came to me and told me, you know, this
happened to Dimas you know."

As Juror 8 recalled what Mimi told

him, it was that "[Peralta's sister] had talked to the little

girl or whatever, and the little girl told her that she had
placed the candy on her."
Juror 8 admitted, "I told [the other jurors] that Mimi knew
the, the kids' aunt[s], and that they had told her that the
little girl placed the candy, and then everybody said, well,
that wasn't in the trial.
Can we proceed[?]"

We should ask the judge the question.

Juror 8 said he told the other jurors about

going to school with Dimas because they asked how he knew "the

A-3301-09T2

aunt and stuff."

After speaking with Juror 8, the judge interviewed each
juror individually, in the presence of counsel.

The judge's

questions were properly phrased to avoid eliciting information

about the deliberative process and discover any information
disclosed by Juror 8 that was not presented at trial.

Indeed,

through a first round of questioning on May 14, the judge

learned that someone had mentioned hearing that defendant's bail
was set at two million dollars during deliberations.

That

disclosure prompted a second round of individual questioning on

the next day the jury convened, May 18.

During their individual

interviews, six jurors recalled hearing about the bail and four
said Juror 8 was the person who mentioned it.

All of the jurors

maintained that they remained able to decide the case fairly and
impartially on the evidence adduced at trial.

Juror 8 denied

hearing about or mentioning the bail.

The judge stated her findings and conclusions on the errant
juror's disclosures on May 18.

Crediting Juror 8's account of

the context in which he discussed the candy with the other

jurors, she found that none of his disclosures were malicious or
driven by personal agenda, and she determined that Juror 8
understood that he could not make any further disclosures and
must decide the case based solely on the evidence.

A-3301-09T2

Findings based upon a judge's assessment of a juror's

testimony and feel of the case generally are entitled to
deference.

State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 560 (2001).

In this

case, however, it was error to rely upon Juror 8's profession of

his ability to decide the case solely on the evidence adduced at
trial and the judge's instructions on the law, which is what a
juror must do.

Id. at 557-59.

Juror 8 had demonstrated his

inability or unwillingness to do either.

In disregard of

personal direction from the judge and the jury instructions at

the close of case, during deliberations Juror 8 had disclosed
his relationship with Peralta and what he heard about the candy,
thereby supplementing the evidence introduced at trial and
contradicting defense counsel's closing argument.

Moreover,

Juror 8 had failed to disclose Mimi's link with Peralta's

sisters and Dotson's children during jury selection.

Had he

done so, his dismissal for cause before the jury was sworn would
have been required.
A trial judge "should see to it that the jury is as nearly
impartial as the lot of humanity will admit."

State v. Deatore,

70 N.J. 100, 106 (1976) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Performance of that obligation requires

distinguishing "potential jurors who are able to put their

opinions or prior knowledge aside from those who are unable to,"

A-3301-09T2

in order to select a jury consisting of twelve jurors who are

each able to decide the case based on the evidence and the law.
State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 429 (1988).
Juror 8's mid-deliberation disclosures made it apparent
that he was not qualified to sit.

He could not segregate what

he had heard about the crime prior to trial from the evidence
presented at trial and could not follow the judge's direction
for him to refrain from disclosing his relationship with Peralta
or the general instructions directing all jurors to consider
nothing but the evidence.
In this circumstance, reliance on Juror 8's representation
was an abuse of discretion.

Indeed, reliance on Juror 8's

representation would have been ill-advised even if he disclosed

nothing other than the relationship between Mimi and the aunts
of Dotson's surviving children who cared for them.

Disclaimers

of partiality by one who has a relationship with the victim or

the victim's family members are inadequate because they are
contrary to human nature.

See State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540,

629 (2004) (noting, on that reasoning, that it is "ill-advised,

as a general rule, to seat any juror who is acquainted with a
murder victim's loved ones"); Deatore, supra, 70 N.J. at 106 (on
the same reasoning, suggesting that judges excuse, with consent
of the attorneys, a prospective juror acquainted with a victim

A-3301-09T2

or a witness without questioning about partiality).

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
judge erred in allowing Juror 8 to continue participation after
learning about his misconduct.
With respect to the impact of Juror 8's disclosures on the
other jurors, the judge found that their concern about Juror 8
being on the panel and knowing Peralta was eliminated when they
were informed that he had told the judge and the lawyers about
their acquaintance before the jury was impaneled.

The judge

also determined that the information about defendant's bail had

no capacity to prejudice the jury because she had instructed
them to disregard any evidence concerning defendant's ability to
make bail.
Our disagreement is not with findings, the problem is that
it was error to rely on the jurors' professions of ability to
serve no matter how sincere.

"When a jury is exposed to

extraneous information after deliberations have begun, a

mistrial will almost always be required."

State v. Hightower,

146 N.J. 239, 264 (1996); see, e.g., State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J.
92, 96-97 (1955) (reversing a conviction returned by jurors who
learned about the defendant's prior indictment for assault and
battery despite the fact that the trial court directed them to
render a verdict based only upon the trial evidence).

Moreover,

A-3301-09T2

where the jury is exposed to information not in evidence, the

first question is whether the information "could have a tendency
to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner
inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's charge."
Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61 (1951).

If the

information has that tendency, a mistrial is required regardless

of the jurors' opinions on their ability to proceed.
supra, 146 N.J. at 266-67.

Hightower,

In that circumstance, "'[t]he test

is not whether the irregular matter actually influenced the

result . . . .'"

R.D., supra, 169 N.J. at 558 (quoting Panko,

supra, 7 N.J. at 61).

Juror 8's disclosures had the capacity to influence.

When

the jury presented the note, defense counsel argued that Juror
8's account of how the candy came to be on Dotson's body was
problematic because it contradicted his closing argument with
information not in evidence.

The judge discounted that

argument, noting there was ample evidence establishing that one

of Dotson's children found her body.
In our view, the potential impact of a juror disclosing
information about the candy, while the jurors were discussing
that candy during deliberations, cannot be overstated.2

The

As previously noted, the judge credited Juror 8's account of

the context in which he told the others what he heard about the
(continued)
10

A-3301-09T2

disclosure did even more than provide a new explanation for the
candy being on Dotson's body and thereby undermine defense
counsel's closing.

It conveyed a picture of a three-year-old

child putting candy on her mother's body and thinking enough

about her gesture to tell her aunt about it a truly disturbing
image.

The tendency of Juror 8's misconduct to preclude the

other jurors from considering nothing but the evidence and the
law in deciding whether the State proved defendant's guilt was
too apparent to permit them to decide that issue.

"'In any

sound judicial system it is essential not only that justice be

done but also that it appear to be done.'"

Fortin, supra, 178

N.J. at 630 (quoting State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 160-61

(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S. Ct. 690, 13 L. Ed. 2d
572 (1965)).
[At the court's direction, its recitation
and discussion of Section III has been
omitted from the published opinion.]
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

(continued)
candy, and he did that while the jurors were discussing the
candy.

11

A-3301-09T2