G.R. No.

127578 February 15, 1999

MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T.
HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan
City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE
ASIS represented by her
mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES,
respondents.
Ponente: PURISIMA, J.

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On October 14, 1988, private
respondent Vircel D. Andres, in her
capacity as the legal guardian of the
minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
brought an action for maintenance
and support against Manuel de Asis,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935
before the RTC of Quezon City,
alleging that the petitioner Manuel
de Asis is the father of subject minor
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the
former refused and/or failed to
provide for the maintenance of the
latter, despite repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his
paternity of the said minor and
theorized that he cannot therefore be
required to provide support for him.
After respondent sent manifestation,
both parties agreed to move for
dismissal.
Another complaint for maintenance
and support was brought against de
Asis, this time in the name of Glen
Andres de Asis, represented by her
legal guardian Vircel Andres.
RTC:
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the RoC
seeking to nullify the decision of the
CA.

ISSUE:
DECISION:

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
MANUEL MANAHAN, alias "Maning,"
defendant-appellant.
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16
years old, worked as a stay-in
waitress where she slept at the 2 nd
floor of the canteen, owned by
Josefina Espiritu.
Defendant Manahan is the brother-inlaw of Josefina. He and his family
temporarily reside at the canteen
since his wife was then pregnant.

On 5 January 1995, at about two

o'clock in the morning, Teresita who
was asleep was suddenly awakened
when she felt someone beside her.
Upon opening her eyes she saw
accused Manuel Manahan as he
immediately placed himself on top of
her. She tried to shout but the
accused covered her mouth. He then
forcibly spread her legs. She cried;
she pushed and kicked him many
times in an effort to free herself but
the accused proved too strong for
her. Soon enough she became weary

and
exhausted.
Her
condition
enabled the accused to pursue his
immoral intentions. He lifted her
skirt, removed her panty and then
inserted his penis into her vagina. He
succeeded
in
having
carnal
knowledge of her. After satisfying his
lust, the accused warned the victim
not to report the incident to anyone
and threatened her that should she
squeal he would kill her and her
family. Thereafter, he left her. She
was terribly afraid and shaken and
could do nothing but cry until dawn.
Within the month, Teresita left the
canteen and returned home to her
parents.
The sexual encounter
resulted in her pregnancy.
Teresita, as assisted by her mother,
then filed a complaint accusing
Manahan of rape.
On the other hand, defendant raised
the sweetheart theory as a
defense.
RTC found respondent guilty of rape
and sentenced to death. He was also
ordered to indemnify the victim
P50,000 as moral damages, pay the
costs, and acknowledge and support
the offspring of his indiscretion. The
case is under the automatic review of
the SC.
SC affirmed the decision of the RTC
with
modification
that
death
sentenced is reduced to reclusion
perpetua and the portion ordering
the accused to acknowledge the
child is deleted.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt since the defendant and
complainant were allegedly lovers.
2. Whether
the
sentence
to
acknowledge and support the
offspring is proper?

DECISION:
1. NO
The prosecution for rape almost always
involves
sharply
contrasting
and
irreconcilable declarations of the victim
and the accused. At the heart of almost all
rape cases is the issue of credibility of the
witnesses, to be resolved primarily by the
trial court which is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying. Accordingly, its
findings are entitled to the highest degree
of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight or substance which would
otherwise affect the result of the case. The
exception is nowhere perceivable in the
present case.

The accused banks heavily on his

"sweetheart theory," a usual defense in
rape cases, and vigorously maintains that
the sexual intercourse between him and
Teresita was but the culmination of a
mutual passion. But we find otherwise
primarily because the accused miserably
failed to prove that he and the
complaining witness indeed had a
romantic liaison as this claim was
categorically denied by her. Moreover,
there was no substantial evidence, e.g.,
love notes, mementos or pictures,
presented to support it.

2. Compulsory acknowledgment
NO; Support - YES

On the matter of acknowledgment and

support of the child, a correction of the
view of the court a quo is in order. Article
345 of The Revised Penal Code provides
that persons guilty of rape shall also be
sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring,
unless the law should prevent him from
doing so," and "in every case to support
the offspring." In the case before us,
compulsory acknowledgment of the
child Melanie Tibigar is not proper
there being a legal impediment in
doing so as it appears that the
accused is a married man. As
pronounced by this Court in People v.
Guerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a
married man, he cannot be compelled to
recognize the offspring of the crime,
should there be any, as his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently,
that portion of the judgment under review
is accordingly deleted. In any case, we
sustain
that
part
ordering
the
accused to support the child as it is in
accordance with law.

G.R. No. 163209

2009

October 30,

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA

LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on
behalf of her minor children LESTER
EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE GRACE S.
LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III,
Respondents.
Ponente: CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim
married
Edward
Lim,
son
of

petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three

children, respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III.
Cheryl, Edward and their children
resided at the house of petitioners in
Forbes Park, Makati City, together
with Edwards ailing grandmother,
Chua Giak and her husband Mariano
Lim. Edwards family business, which
provided him with a monthly salary
of P6,000, shouldered the family
expenses. Cheryl had no steady
source of income.
On
14
October
1990,
Cheryl
abandoned
the
Forbes
Park
residence, bringing the children with
her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she
caught with the in-house midwife of
Chua Giak in what the trial court
described "a very compromising
situation."
Cheryl, for herself and her children,
sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak
and Mariano in the RTC of Makati
City for support. The trial court
ordered Edward to provide monthly
support of P6,000 pendente lite.
On 31 January 1996, RTC ordered
Edward and petitioners to jointly
provide P40,000 monthly support to
respondents,
with
Edward
shouldering P6,000 and petitioners
the balance of P34,000 subject to
Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.
CA affirmed the trial court. On the
issue material to this appeal, that is,
whether there is basis to hold
petitioners, as Edwards parents,
liable
with
him
to
support
respondents, the Court of Appeals
held:
The law on support under
Article 195 of the Family Code
is clear on this matter. Parents
and their legitimate children
are
obliged
to
mutually
support one another and this

obligation extends down to

the legitimate grandchildren
and great grandchildren.
In
connection
with
this
provision,
Article
200
paragraph (3) of the Family
Code clearly provides that
should the person obliged to
give support does not have
sufficient means to satisfy all
claims, the other persons
enumerated in Article 199 in
its order shall provide the
necessary support. This is
because
the
closer
the
relationship of the relatives,
the stronger the tie that binds
them. Thus, the obligation to
support is imposed first upon
the shoulders of the closer
relatives and only in their
default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer
relatives and so on.
SC denied the petition and affirmed
the decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are

concurrently liable with Edward to provide
support respondents.
DECISION: YES
We rule in the affirmative. However, we
modify the appealed judgment by
limiting petitioners liability to the
amount of monthly support needed
by
respondents
Lester
Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III only.
Petitioners Liable To Provide Support But
Only To Their Grandchildren

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate,

the liability of ascendants to provide legal
support to their descendants is beyond

cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as

much they limit their petition to the
narrow question of when their liability is
triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil
Code, as amended, on Parental Authority,
petitioners theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental
authority, conceivably either by its
termination or suspension during the
childrens minority. Because at the time
respondents sued for support, Cheryl and
Edward exercised parental authority over
their children, petitioners submit that the
obligation to support the latters offspring
ends with them.

Neither the text of the law nor the

teaching of jurisprudence supports this
severe constriction of the scope of familial
obligation to give support. In the first
place, the governing text are the relevant
provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Support, not the provisions
in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both
areas share a common ground in that
parental authority encompasses the
obligation to provide legal support, they
differ in other concerns including the
duration of the obligation and its
concurrence among relatives of differing
degrees. Thus, although the obligation to
provide support arising from parental
authority ends upon the emancipation of
the child, the same obligation arising from
spousal and general familial ties ideally
lasts during the obligee's lifetime. Also,
while parental authority under Title IX (and
the correlative parental rights) pertains to
parents, passing to ascendants only upon
its
termination or
suspension,
the
obligation to provide legal support passes
on to ascendants not only upon default of
the parents but also for the latters
inability to provide sufficient support. As
we observed in another case raising the

ancillary
issue
of
an
ascendants
obligation to give support in light of the
fathers sufficient means:

Professor Pineda is of the view that

grandchildren
cannot
demand
support
directly
from
their
grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree)
who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have
to follow the order of support under
Art. 199. We agree with this view.

x x x x There is no showing that

private respondent is without
means to support his son;
neither is there any evidence to
prove that petitioner, as the
paternal grandmother, was willing
to voluntarily provide for her
grandson's legal support. x x x

one degree removed are more than able

to fill the void.

However,
petitioners
partial
concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to
relatives, by blood of lower degree.
As petitioners grandchildren by
blood,
only
respondents
Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryls right to receive support from
the Lim family extends only to her
husband Edward, arising from their
marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryls
share from the amount of monthly support
the trial court awarded cannot be
determined from the records. Thus, we are
constrained to remand the case to the trial
court for this limited purpose.

Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the

Alternative Option Under Article 204 of the
Civil Code, as Amended
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is
unable to discharge her obligation to
provide sufficient legal support to her
children, then all school-bound. It is also
undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents,
P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
respondents basic needs. This inability of
Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide
for their children shifts a portion of their
obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, both in the paternal (petitioners)
and maternal lines, following the ordering
in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus
subscribe to petitioners theory, is to
sanction the anomalous scenario of
tolerating extreme material deprivation of
children because of parental inability to
give adequate support even if ascendants

As an alternative proposition, petitioners

wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of
the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that
they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by
maintaining respondents at petitioners
Makati
residence.
The
option
is
unavailable to petitioners.

The application of Article 204 which

provides that The person obliged to
give support shall have the option to fulfill
the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the

person who has a right to receive support.

The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto. -- is subject to
its exception clause. Here, the persons
entitled to receive support are petitioners
grandchildren
and
daughter-in-law.
Granting petitioners the option in Article
204 will secure to the grandchildren a
well-provided future; however, it will also
force Cheryl to return to the house which,
for her, is the scene of her husbands
infidelity. While not rising to the level of a
legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge
against Edward for concubinage did not
prosper for insufficient evidence, her
steadfast insistence on its occurrence
amounts to a moral impediment bringing
the case within the ambit of the exception
clause of Article 204, precluding its
application.

G.R. No. 165166

2012

August 15,

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR.,
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
September 6, 1995 respondent
Divina Buling filed a complaint with
the RTC Maasin for compulsory
recognition and support pendent lite,
claiming that the petitioner is the
father of her child Gliffze.

Respondent gave birth to their son

Gliffze on March 1995. When
petitioner did not show up and failed
to provide support to Gliffze,
respondent sent him a letter
demanding
recognition
of
and
support for their child. When
petitioner
did
not
answer,
respondent
filed
the
subject
complaint.
During the pendency of the case,
RTC, on the respondents motion,
granted a P2,000 monthly child
support, retroactive from March
1995.
RTC: dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence proving
Gliffzes filiation. It ordered the
respondent to return the amount of
support pendent lite erroneously
awarded and to pay attorneys fees.
CA: set aside the RTCs decision and
ordered petitioner to recognize his
minor son Glifze. It also reinstated
the P2,000 monthly support.
Petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari in the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the CA committed

reversible error when it set aside the RTCs
findings and ordered the petitioner to
recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son Gliffze.
DECISION: NO
Since filiation is beyond question, support
follows as a matter of obligation; a parent
is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists
of
everything
indispensable
for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation,
in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.Thus, the amount of support is
variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is
made as the amount shall be in proportion

to the resources or means of the giver and

the necessities of the recipient. It may be
reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged
to support.
In this case, we sustain the award of P
2,000.00 monthly child support, without
prejudice to the filing of the proper motion
in the RTC for the determination of any
support in arrears, considering the needs
of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency
of this case.

G.R. Nos. 175279-80

2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR.,
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
RTC:
CA:
ISSUE:
DECISION:

June 5,