EVIDENCE PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION

THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE
THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff- Appellee,

- versus -

OF

G.R. No. 174472

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

BENIGNO
FETALINO
y
Promulgated:
GABALDON,
Accused-Appellant.
June 19, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31
May 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02162 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, affirming, with modification, the
Judgment[2] dated 29 July 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213, in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445, MC- 99-1446, MC-99-1447-H,
MC 99-1448-H, and MC-99-1449-H.
Appellant stood charged with two counts of acts of lasciviousness and three
counts of rape allegedly committed against the person of his own daughter, AAA.
[3]
The Informations, all signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Carlos A. Valenzuela,
state:

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445

That on or about the 21st day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design, by force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of [his]
daughter AAA, a girl sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, by
inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and consent.[4]
In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design, by force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of [his]
daughter, AAA, a girl sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, by
inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and consent.[5]
In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H
That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a
place [within] the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his] daughter AAA, a girl
sixteen years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will and
consent.[6]
In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1448-H
That on or about the 24th day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a
place [within] the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his] daughter AAA, a girl
sixteen years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will and
consent.[7]
In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1449-H
That on or about the 25th day of March 1999, in the City of XXX,
Philippines, a place [within] the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his]
daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age and subjected to sexual abuse, all
against her will and consent.[8]

On 20 April 1999, the arraignment for Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445 and
MC-99 99-1446 was held at which time appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges

of acts of lasciviousness.[9] On 10 February 2000, he entered a similar plea to the

three counts of rape in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1447-H, MC-99-1448-H, and
MC-99-1449-H.[10]Joint trial of the five cases thereafter ensued with the
prosecution presenting five witnesses, namely: AAA, the private complainant;
BBB, AAAs mother and appellants live-in partner; Dr. Winston S. Tan (Dr. Tan),
Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, Quezon City; SPO4 Julieta Espiritu (SPO4 Espiritu), Chief of the
Womens Desk of the PNP, XXX City; and POS Rolando Tejada (POS Tejada).
AAA was called to the witness stand as a hostile witness by the prosecution. The
reason behind this unusual move was explained by the prosecutor during the offer
of AAAs testimony:
Before we proceed your honor, may we manifest that we are presenting this
witness as our hostile witness in view of her declaration before this representation
that she is no longer interested in prosecuting this case against the accused your
honor, and in view likewise, of the manifestation given before this honorable
court by the counsel for the accused that the victim and the mother of the victim
came to see him to ask her (sic) to desist.[11]

AAA testified that appellant raped her on three separate instances in March
1999. She recalled that the events transpired in their house which was then
undergoing renovation.[12] Appellant allegedly undressed her and inserted his
private organ into her vagina for which she felt pain and cried. She claimed that
she tried to resist appellants bestial attack and that she struggled with him by trying
to remove his hands. She could not shout for help as appellant threatened her with
harm. After satisfying his lust, appellant told her not to report the incident to
anybody or else he would kill her and her mother. She, however, finally revealed
her sad experiences to her mother sometime in 1999. Thereafter, she was brought
to the crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a medical
examination. The physical examination was conducted by Dr. Tan whose test
confirmed that AAA was already in a non-virgin state physically. The pertinent
portion of Dr. Tans medico-legal report states:
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with
the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same
disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 7 and 9
oclock and shallow healed laceration at 6 oclock positions. External vaginal
orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index

finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugorsities. Cervix is firm and
closed.[13]

Dr. Tan confirmed having performed the medical examination on the person of
AAA. According to him, their office received a request from the XXX Police
Station for the conduct of a medico-legal/physical examination on AAA who was a
victim of an alleged sexual abuse/molestation perpetrated by her biological father.
[14]
AAA and BBB were then subjected to a brief interview after which they both
signed the consent form for the said examination. [15] Dr. Tan likewise explained
that the most common cause of a hymenal laceration is the insertion into the
vagina of an erect male genitalia or any other object of the same consistency.[16]
BBB, AAAs mother, stated that she and appellant were engaged in a
common law relationship and together they begot five children [17] including
AAA. On the evening of25 March 1999, BBB came home from Divisoria where
she earned a living as a vendor. When she reached their house, a certain Paul
Quiambao, a carpenter she hired to do some minor repairs in their abode, came to
see her and informed her that he saw appellant on top of AAA. In the vernacular,
Paul allegedly told BBB that AAA was ginagalaw by appellant. Immediately after
Paul left, BBB talked to AAA to confirm the harrowing news that she had just
received. AAA finally had the courage to reveal to her mother that her predicament
in the hands of her own father started on 22 March 1999 and it occurred everyday
thereafter until 25 March 1999. She and AAA then proceeded to the barangay hall
to report the misdeeds of appellant. After this, their barangay captain and members
of the police came to their house to look for appellant who allegedly tried to flee
after seeing the authorities. He was eventually arrested and taken to the police
station. The barangay officials then instructed her and AAA to go to the police
station in order for them to file a complaint against appellant.
In the police station, she and AAA gave their respective sworn statements to
the investigating officer.[18]
SPO4 Espiritu testified that she was the investigator assigned to the case. During
her investigation, AAA complained that in the afternoon of 21 March 1999, when
the latter arrived home from school, appellant entered her room and, at knife point,
embraced and kissed her. Unsatisfied with these initial condemnable acts, appellant
thereafter inserted his finger into AAAs vagina. This incident would be repeated
the following day, 22 March 1999.

Unfortunately for AAA, her ordeal would even take a turn for the worse for on 23
March 1999, appellant apparently became more emboldened and could no longer
contain his bestial desires; thus, he proceeded to have carnal knowledge of
AAA. AAA had to suffer such abuse on two more separate instances which
occurred on 24 and 25 March 1999.
The prosecution presented, as its last witness, POS Tejada, who was a member of
the team which responded to the complaint of AAA and BBB on 26 March
1999. His turn at the witness stand was brief, as appellants counsel admitted the
substance of POS Tejadas would-be testimony which pertained mainly to the
circumstances surrounding the arrest of appellant.
For his part, appellant offered the hackneyed defense of denial to refute the charges
brought against him. Appellant narrated that he and BBB had been live-in lovers
for almost 25 years. He admitted that AAA was indeed one of their children. [19] In
1977, he was imprisoned for murder and was ordered released from detention
on 23 February 1996.From the time he regained freedom, he allegedly stayed in
the house of one of his legitimate children located somewhere in
Paco, Manila. During the time material to the case, however, he was at the house
he used to share with BBB and their children located at No. XXX St., XXX
Drive, XXX City. Said house was undergoing renovation at that time.
Appellant claimed that the present criminal charges were brought against him in
retaliation for the physical injuries he inflicted upon BBB during one of their
heated arguments which became frequent as he wanted BBB and her new live-in
partner to move out of their house in XXX St. In fact, according to appellant, BBB
even charged him with physical injuries which was raffled off to a different branch
of the court.
To bolster appellants claim of innocence, the defense presented CCC, another one
of his children with BBB. In CCCs recollection, at the time the criminal acts
complained of took place, she was in their house together with AAA, their brother
DDD, and appellant. She, however, insisted that nothing unusual happened during
those dates. She remembered that although appellant was in their house, he spent
most of his time inside his room fixing his belongings.
As for its last witness, the defense recalled BBB to the witness stand in order to
prove that the only reason she executed her sworn statement before the police was
because she was angry with appellant for having stabbed her during one of their
fights.

After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as charged in all the cases filed
against him. The dispositive portion of the trial courts judgment states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case
Nos. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446, finding the accused BENIGNO FETALINO
Y GABALDON, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness
defined and penalized under Article III, Section 5[b] of Republic Act 7610, and he
is hereby sentenced to suffer for each of the two (2) charges, the penalty of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as
minimum and maximum, respectively.
Decision is also hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1447-H, MC-991448-H and MC-99-1449-H finding the accused, BENIGNO FETALINO Y
GABALDON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of RAPE defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the
Republic Act 7659 and R.A. 8353. Finding the victim to be under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, and that the offender is
the father, this court imposes upon same BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON,
for EACH charge, the supreme penalty of DEATH through lethal injection, as
provided for in R.A. 8177, amending Section 24, of R.A. 7659 in the manner and
procedure therein provided.
Moreover, pursuant to [A]rticle 100 in relation to Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code, governing civil indemnity, accused is furthermore ordered to indemnify the
minor victim, AAA, the amount of Php50,000.00, by way of moral damages in
line with the reward made under the case of People vs. Bonday (222 SCRA 216)
and another Php25,000.00 for exemplary damages to deter other sexual perverts
or two legged-beast from sexually assaulting or molesting hapless and innocent
girls.
As the penalty imposed is [TRIPLE] DEATH, the City Jail Warden is directed to
immediately commit the person of BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON to the
National Prisons at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.[20]

In view of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, the cases were
automatically elevated to this Court for review. However, in our Resolution
dated 13 December 2005,[21]we ordered the remand of these cases to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to our holding in People v. Mateo.[22]
In its assailed Decision, the appellate court modified the decision of the trial court
by acquitting appellant of the two charges of rape and by downgrading the penalty
imposed in Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H from death to reclusion perpetua

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 of

Mandaluyong City convicting accused-appellant Benigno Fetalino of the crime of
two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1445 and
MC-99-1446 and for rape in Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed by the
trial court for the crime of rape should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Accusedappellant is ordered to pay complainant AAA the following amounts:
1. the total amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
3. P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
As regards Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H, accused is
hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[23]

Once again, appellants case is before us for our consideration raising the following
errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE [CRIMES] CHARGED HAS BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH AS THE
AGE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTYLY
PROVED.[24]

The appeal is partly meritorious.

At the outset, we would like to impart our observation as regards the proper charge
that should have been filed against appellant for the incidents that transpired on 21
and 22 March 1999, during which he inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA.
For these acts, which spawned Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446,

appellant was indicted merely for two counts of acts of lasciviousness when the
appropriate charges should have been two separate counts of rape under Article
266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It must be remembered that Articles 266-A
and 266-B are the amendments introduced to the Revised Penal Code by Republic
Act No. 8353 or the The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on 22 October
1997. With these amendments, rape was reclassified as a crime against person and
not merely a crime against chastity. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
states:
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1) By a man who [shall] have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

The first paragraph of Article 266-A refers to the traditional concept of rape; that
is, having sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. The second paragraph,
on the other hand, is categorized as rape by sexual assault.[25]
In the case of People v. Soriano,[26] appellant therein was charged with 13 counts of
rape by sexual assault for having inserted his finger inside the private organ of his
minor daughter. After reviewing the records of said case, we adjudged appellant
therein guilty of 12 counts rape by sexual assault, bearing in mind the expanded
definition of rape under Republic Act No. 8353.
Subsequently, in People v. Palma,[27] appellant therein was charged with six counts
of qualified rape committed between the second week of October 1997 and the
first week of November 1997. This case was brought before us on automatic

appeal in view of the death sentence imposed by the trial court. It must be noted
that two of the charges arose from appellants acts of inserting his finger into the
vagina of his victim. The first of such incidents happened during the second week
of October 1997 when appellant inserted his thumb into the victims vaginal
orifice. Then, sometime during the first week of November 1997, appellant
inserted his middle finger into the vagina of the private complainant. In disposing
said case, we declared
x x x In Criminal Case No. 8177, the first incident of insertion of appellants finger
into the victims vagina during the second week of October 1997 could only render
appellant guilty of an act of lasciviousness. The second incident of the insertion of
appellants middle finger, however, during the first week of November 1997,
constituted consummated rape through sexual assault under Republic Act No.
8353 or the The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on 22 October 1997 x
x x.[28]

With these precedents, it is clear that the insertion of ones finger into the genital or
anal orifice of another person constitutes rape by sexual assault and not merely an
act of lasciviousness like what was erroneously charged in this case. Much as we
want to punish appellant for his appalling acts toward AAA in Criminal Cases Nos.
MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446, we are enjoined by our primordial duty to observe
appellants constitutionally guaranteed right to be informed of the charges against
him. Certainly, we cannot allow ourselves to be the ones to perpetrate the denial of
appellants right to due process. He cannot be punished for an offense graver than
that with which he was charged.[29]
In his Brief, appellant invokes the settled rule that under our jurisdiction, an
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and to overcome this
presumption, the prosecution must establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. He contends that in this case, the fact that the prosecution
presented AAA as a hostile witness casts doubt as to the culpability of
appellant. He also insists that the testimony of AAA was unconvincing and vague
and points to the following portions of her statement in the witness stand:
Q.

Who was raped by Benigno Fetalino?

A.

Me, maam.

Q.

When was (sic) you raped by Benigno Fetalino?

A.

I cannot recall anymore, maam.

Q.

Could it be in the year 1999?

A.

Yes, maam.

Q.

Could it be in the month of March?

A.

Yes, maam.

Q.

Where did the alleged raping incident took place?

A.

In our house.

Q.

Where is your house located?

A.

XXX Street, XXX City.

Q.

How many times were you raped in March 1999?

A.

Three (3) times.

Q.

Is it on the same date or on different dates of March 1999?

A.

Same dates, maam.

Q.

Are you sure of that?

A.

Yes, maam.

PROS. SILAO:
I would like to remind you again Madam Witness that you are under oath and you
can be held liable for telling a lie.
Q.

What time was the first rape committed?

A.

It was then in the afternoon after my mother arrived.

Q.

What time did your mother arrived on that afternoon?

A.

5:00 p.m.

Q.

What about the second rape, what time was it?

A.

I cannot recall the time anymore.

Q.

What about the third rape?

A.

I cannot recall anymore, maam.

Q.

But all in the year 1999 of March?

A.

Yes, maam.[30]

The seeming reluctance of AAA, as punctuated by appellant, is precisely one

of the principal motivations which propelled our legislature to reclassify the crime
of rape as a crime against person. As explained by Congresswoman Luz Reyes
Bakunawa during her sponsorship speech of the House Bill No. 6265 which
eventually became Republic Act No. 8353
This reclassification is necessary because under the existing law, only the victim
can file a complaint, if she wishes, or her parents, or grandparents in that order,
which is very restrictive. The bill now prescribes that any citizen can file a
complaint, even if the complainant may not be the victim, or close relative of the
victim. This is the significance of the change that intends to bring the criminal to
the bar of justice even if the victim may not decide to complain due to fear, shame,
or for other reasons. [31]

Thus, despite the claimed disinterest of AAA in pursuing the charges against
appellant, the choice of whether the cases would prosper was no longer hers
alone. Besides, at the time AAA was presented as a witness, almost three years had
already lapsed. Events must have taken place or influence might have been exerted
upon her that could have weakened her resolve to seek justice for what was done to
her. However, the fact remains that AAA never categorically denied in open court
the charges she hurled at appellant.On the contrary, when AAA was subjected to
cross-examination, she affirmed that appellant had indeed raped her, thus:
COURT:
Q.

Do you know why you were (sic) here, Madam Witness?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Why?

A.

Because we have a hearing.

Q. Do you know for a fact that you filed a rape case against the accused in this
case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell us the reason why you filed this case?
A. Because he raped me.
Q. Did anyone forced (sic) you to file a case against the accused herein?
A. None, sir.
Q. In what part of your house were you raped?
A. Inside my fathers bedroom.
Q. How many bedrooms do you have in your house?
A. Two only, sir.
Q. So, at the time you were rape you were inside your fathers bedroom?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will agree with me that the door of the room has a lock, Madam Witness?
A. None sir, it was open because our house was under renovation then.
Q. When the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, you did not resisted
(sic)?
A. I resisted.
Q. How did you resisted (sic), Madam Witness?
A. I struggled.
Q. In what way?
A. I remove (sic) his hands.
Q. Did the accused likewise, undress himself?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. He was totally naked then?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have a neighbor, Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It happened at about 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon, Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You did not shout for help, Madam Witness?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. I was afraid because he threatened me.
Q. How did he threaten you?
A. He told me not to report the matter to anybody.
Q. When did you finally decide to disclose what happened to you to anyone,
Madam Witness?
A. It was on (sic) 1999, to my mother, but I cannot recall the date.
Q. Why did you disclose the same to your mother?
A. I was afraid of my father.
Q. When you stated in your statement that a certain Paul witnessed the incident,
when was that?
A. March 1999.
Q. While your father was raping you?
A. He saw the incident because he was then working at our house.

Q. You stated in your affidavit that your father was on top of you when Paul see
(sic) you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But at the time when Paul saw your father on top of you, his penis was not yet
inserted in to your vagina?
A. Not yet, sir.[32]

Complementary to AAAs oral testimony, she confirmed the sworn statement which
she executed before SPO4 Espiritu on 26 March 1999 upon redirect examination
by the prosecutor. As we had elucidated in the case of People v. Servano,[33] the
evidence which should be considered by the court in criminal cases need not be
limited to the statements made in open court; rather, it should include all
documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other supporting
evidence. We explained
x x x [W]hen a sworn statement has been formally offered as evidence, it forms
an integral part of the prosecution evidence which should not be ignored for it
complements and completes the testimony on the witness stand. A sworn
statement is a written declaration of facts to which the declarant has sworn before
an officer authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests credibility and
trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate, during
trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and
render the sworn statement useless and insignificant, as long as it is presented as
evidence in open court. This is not to say, however, that the sworn statement
should be given more probative value than the actual testimony. Rather, the sworn
statement and the open court declarations must be evaluated and examined
together in toto so that a full and thorough determination of the merits of the case
may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness oral testimony during the trial
should not mean being oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as
the sworn statement. In like manner, the court cannot give probative value to the
sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral testimony. In every case, the court
should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the
parties. x x x.[34]

In this case, AAAs sworn statement which forms part of the records of this case
supplied the details of the incidents she experienced during those fateful days in
March 1999, thus:
T : Ano ang dahilan at narito ka ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng
isang malayang salaysay?
S : Para po isumbong at ipakulong ang tatay ko na tatlong beses akong ni-rape at
dalawang beses na ipinasok and daliri niya sa ari ko.
T : Sino ba ang tatay mo na sinasabi mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng tatlong beses?
S : Siya po si Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 taong gulang, walang trabaho at
nakatira din po sa XXX St., XXX City.
T : Kailan, saan at anong oras nangyari ang sinasabi mong pangre-rape na
ginawa sa iyo ng tatay mo?
S : Noon pong March 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 1999, lahat po ay mga ala-una
hanggang alas dos ng hapon, sa mismo pong bahay namin sa XXX
St., XXX City.
T : Tunay mo bang ama ang sinasasabi mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng
maraming beses?
S : Opo.
T : Maari mo bang ituro sa akin ang sinasabi mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo?
S : Siya po. (Affiant pointing to ne Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 years old,
jobless of XXX St., XXX City.)
T : Maari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari?
S : Noon nga pong March 21, 1999, pagdating ko po galing sa eskwela at nasa
loob ako ng kwarto at gumagawa po ako ng assignment ng bigla pong pumasok
ang tatay ko at agad akong tinutukan ng balisong at sinabing huwag akong
maingay, niyakap po ako at hinalikan, tapos po ay ipinasok ang kamay niya sa
loob ng short ko at ipinasok ang daliri niya sa ari ko, umiiyak po ako at
nakikiusap ng huwag niyang gawin, pero ang sabi lang po niya HUWAG KANG
MAINGAY, PAPATAYIN KITA at pagkatapos po ay sinabihan din niya ako ng
HUWAG KANG MAGSUSUMBONG, PAPATAYIN KITA, PATI NA ANG NANAY
MO. Noon pong March 22, 1999, pagdating ko po uli galing eskwela, ay ganon
po ulit ang ginawa niya, ipinasok po uli ang daliri niya sa ari ko, natatakot po

ako kaya hindi po ako sumisigaw at hindi rin po ako nagsusumbong, kasi baka
nga patayin niya kaming lahat. Ng pangatlong araw po, March 23, 1999 ay
ganon po uli ang ginawa niya, pinasok po niya ako sa kwarto at tinutukan ng
balisong, pero hinubad na po niya ang short ko at inihiga ako sa papag at
naghubad din po siya at pumatong sa akin at ipinasok ang ari niya sa ari ko,
hindi po ako pumapalag dahil natatakot po ako dahil may hawak siyang balisong
habang gumagalaw siya sa ibabaw ko. Wala po akong nagawa kundi ang umiyak,
hindi po ako makapagsumbong dahil sa pananakot niya na papatayin
kami. Tapos po ng March 24, 1999 uli ng hapon ay pinasok ulit niya ako at ganon
po ulit, inalis niya ang short ko at pumatong sa akin, ng nakapatong po siya ay
biglang pumasok si Kuya Pol, iyon po yong karpintero na gumagawa ng bahay
naming at nakita kami, kaya po biglang tumigil ang tatay ko, at lumabas na siya
pero sinabihan ako ulit na huwag magsusumbong dahil papatayin kami. Hindi pa
rin po ako nagsumbong, kaya kahapon po, March 25, 1999 ay inulit na naman
niya ang ginagawa niyang pangre-rape sa akin. Tapos kagabi nga po ng wala
ang tatay ko ay nagpunta sa amin si Kuya Pol at kinausap ang nanay ko at
narinig ko ng sabihin niya sa nanay ko na nakita niya ang tatay ko na
nakapatong sa akin sa kwarto. Pag-alis po ni Kuya Pol ay agad akong kinausap
ng nanay ko at tinanong, kaya po sinabi ko na sa kanya, pero ang sinabi ko po ay
daliri lang ang ginagamit ng tatay ko, natatakot po kasi ako na baka patayin
kami ng tatay ko. Agad pong pumunta ang nanay ko sa Barangay at nagsumbong,
kaya po hinuli siya ng Barangay at dinala kami dito sa pulis.[35]

Against the categorical statements of AAA, appellant could only offer the
defense of denial and point to BBB as the brains behind the institution of these
criminal charges against him. Such bare-faced defense is obviously insufficient to
overcome AAAs categorical claim of being raped and sexually molested by
appellant. The rule is settled that against the positive identification by the private
complainant, the mere denials of an accused cannot prevail to overcome conviction
by the trial court.[36]
Indeed, appellant could not offer any plausible reason which could have
impelled AAA to bring these serious charges against him. All he could muster was
to claim in the trial court that BBB was furious at him and that the two of them
engaged in frequent fights. To our mind, such contention is unavailing. Although
BBB admitted that she was mad at appellant for the physical injuries he inflicted
upon her, still, she stated that what drove her to issue her sworn statement on 26
March 1999 was appellants rape of AAA.Furthermore, a mother like BBB

certainly would not expose her own daughter to the ignominy of a rape trial simply
to retaliate against her husband for the transgressions, knowing fully well the lifelong stigma and scars that such a public trial could bring. [37] Such selfish motive on
the part of a mother runs counter to her natural instinct to protect her offspring
from all kinds of harm and to safeguard the latters well-being.
We, however, sustain the appellate courts acquittal of appellant in Criminal
Cases No. MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H. It must be remembered that each
and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of the other
rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[38] Thus, it is incumbent
on the prosecution to present the quantum of proof necessary for the conviction of
an accused.
In this case, we have gone over the testimony of AAA and her sworn
statement and cannot agree in the trial courts conclusion that appellants guilt had
been sufficiently established. AAAs testimony pertaining to the second and third
incidents of rape merely consists of the following:
Q. What about the second rape, what did he do to you?
A. The same.
Q. Meaning he undressed you and he inserted his private organ to your private
organ?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. What about the third rape, how did he did (sic) it to you?
A. The same procedure, maam.[39]

Such laconic responses on the part of AAA to the prosecutors queries are
grossly inadequate to sustain appellants conviction. Her answers during the
prosecutors examination are utterly lacking in material details that would warrant a

finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[40] As we have held in the case of People
v. Marahay
When prodded to specify the acts done to her, she stated that her father used
her. No other detail was evoked from her to show the attendant elements that
constitute rape, the crime charged.Such bare statements cannot suffice to establish
accused-appellants guilt with the required quantum of evidence.[41]

In this regard, we cannot overemphasize the need for the prosecution to ask
the necessary probing questions in order to elicit from a witness crucial details to
establish the elements of the crime charged.
Likewise, AAAs sworn statement cannot be the basis for appellants conviction for
the second and third incidents of rape. To recall, AAA declared in said statement
that the rape which allegedly occurred on 24 March 1999 was the one witnessed by
their carpenter Quiambao. However, on the witness stand, she declared that when
Quiambao saw appellant on top of her, appellant had not yet inserted his penis into
her vagina. In fact, her testimony does not even state whether appellants penis even
touched her vagina at all. In the absence of a statement that appellants penis
touched even just her labia majora, we have to acquit him for the 24 March
1999 incident.
As regards the rape purportedly committed on 25 March 1999, AAAs sworn
statement, like her testimony, contained a mere conclusion that she was raped by
appellant on that day which we find insufficient to support a finding of appellants
guilt.
We now turn to the appropriate penalties that should be imposed upon
appellant for the two counts of acts of lasciviousness and one count of
rape. Appellant contends, and the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor
General agree with him, that the trial court erred in appreciating AAAs minority in
determining the imposable penalties on him. We find merit in this contention.

While it is alleged in the Informations that AAA was only 16 years old at the
time the crimes charged were committed, nevertheless, the prosecution failed to
substantiate said allegation. In establishing the minority of the alleged victim, the
courts are to be guided by our pronouncement in the case of People v. Pruna,[42] to
wit:
1.
The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove age.
3.
If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of
the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a.
If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b.
If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c.
If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him.[43]

In the case at bar, we cannot simply rely on BBBs unsubstantiated claim

with regard to AAAs age, particularly since the loss of her birth certificate was not

sufficiently established. We cannot overemphasize the importance of fixing with

exactitude AAAs age, for under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape by
sexual intercourse is punishable by the supreme penalty of death in case the victim
is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The severity, permanence and
irreversible nature of the penalty prescribed by law makes the decision-making
process in capital offenses, such as qualified rape, subject to the most exacting
rules of procedure and evidence.[44]
On the other hand, the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article
15 of the Revised Penal Code should be considered against appellant since in
crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness, relationship is considered
aggravating.[45] In this case, as it was clearly mentioned in the Informations and
admitted by appellant that AAA is his daughter, their relationship aggravated the
two charges of acts of lasciviousness.
Acts of lasciviousness is punished under the Revised Penal Code by prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and taking into
consideration the aggravating circumstance of relationship, appellant should be
made to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to six (6) years ofprision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
appellant is to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages for each count of
acts of lasciviousness.[46]
With respect to Criminal Case No. M-99-1447-H, because of the
prosecutions failure to establish with certainty that AAA was still a minor at the
time the incestuous rape was committed by appellant, the appropriate penalty
should only be reclusion perpetua in accordance with the first sentence of Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code which states that rape under paragraph 1 of
Article 266-A, or rape by sexual intercourse, shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua. In addition to this, and consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence,
[47]
appellant is also held liable to AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2006 of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
A. Appellant Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon is hereby found GUILTY:

1. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445, of acts of lasciviousness and he is sentenced

to suffer the indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA
the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446, of acts of lasciviousness and he is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA
the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as moral damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H, of rape through sexual intercourse, and
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity, FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, and TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages.
B. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the charges in MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449H on grounds of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127240

March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato 2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines

where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom
he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in 3 of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of
petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in
the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines.And for this reason, we do not wish to
present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner,
as well as the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all
the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of
2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6The state also annexed income
tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly
support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present
his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977
marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show

that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had
been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

10

petitioner

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in
the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which
name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and
pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same
militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those
persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the
authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply
with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give
the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of
the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and
said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he
lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of
clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper
and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies
him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income
tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It
is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's

becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age,
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children.
The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said
pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN
KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER
STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF
RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because
under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which
provides that
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and
convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered

by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are
not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity
of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his
objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case
number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the
petition actually filed by the appellee is031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted
for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of
which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation
Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No.
031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under
oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle
all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with 7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of
information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by

the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the
petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application
of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought
to be denied.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y

DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the decision[1] promulgated on February 18, 1997,

by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in
Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as
follows:"That on or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay
Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
who was caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did then and
there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos,
from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the
damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were
planted, cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the
government.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member
of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around
10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed
informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by
appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.[3] The prohibited
plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then
formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was
composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S.
Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector
Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and
arrest the cultivator of same.[4]
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants
were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their
informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw
seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately
25 meters from appellant's hut.[5]PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
his.[6] The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms.[7] The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants.[8] Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.[9] Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the
Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination
of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a
positive indication for marijuana.[10] She next conducted a chemical
examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found
as follows:

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana

plant placed inside a white sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE
result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."[11]

The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant, on
which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland
Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.[12] This lot was part of the public domain. Appellant
was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no
Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.[13]
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at
around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his
vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity
he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see
something."[14] This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where
the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his
nipa hut.[15] Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in
front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2
Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
[16]
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.
[17]

The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the
marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and
bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to
a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants.[18] The police team then brought him to
the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay
peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua,
who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the
former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the
marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation." [19] At the police

headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana

plants seized by the police.[20]
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other
houses around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters
away.[21] The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the
barangay peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the
marijuana plants were found was located between his house and Carlito
Pascua's.[22]
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His
testimony was offered to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana plants
were not planted in the lot he was cultivating. [23] Tipay presented a sketch he
made,[24] which showed the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old
and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the closest neighbor.According to
Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of
Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua. [25] Tipay
admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied him when he
made the measurements.[26] He further stated that his basis for claiming that
appellant was the owner or planter of the seized plants was the information
given him by the police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the
location of said plants.[27]
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as
charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating
marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs against the
accused.
"SO ORDERED."[28]
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE

SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY
BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF

VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUSDELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF

DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THAT THE LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A
PUBLIC LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED THE
SUBJECT MARIJUANA.[29]

Simply stated, the issues are:

(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?

The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are
interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show
that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search
warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does
not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme Court
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the
effect that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion protects
people, not places.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records
clearly show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first
place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in
an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible
from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when
they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of
the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a
warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by
the police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site
merely to make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them
to apply for a search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk
for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed overnight, they
had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any search
warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and
there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was,
therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search warrant was required."[30]

The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search
and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of
an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.[32]Such evidence
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[33]
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of probable cause. From the
declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least
one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had
revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted
was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have
convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended
the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against

illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific
instances are searches allowed without warrants.[34] The mantle of protection
extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against
any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we
apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following
elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[35]

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the
marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant.[36] Hence,
there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to
appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The
seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object.[37] Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants
was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could
spot the illegal plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not
"immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the
marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and
hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the
marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the
protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents
of the State. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the

immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions.[39] The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" [40] of the
individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected
against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. [41] To conclude
otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also
lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable
searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard
or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the
street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated
plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the
second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of
an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.They
are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error
on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized
marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the
seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must
now address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the
prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of
the police officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the
marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following
observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the
marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and competent
counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial
investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of
the constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not
admissible if given without any counsel." [42]

Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana

plants in question cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to
counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to
have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the
investigation conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but
was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana
plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to
him, competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the
police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited
plants. Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot
be made to apply to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the
marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during
investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that
appellant was not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the
police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and
independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellants
failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him
indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and
(3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. [43] An investigation begins when it is no
longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. [44] The
moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he
should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in
writing and in the presence of counsel.[45]
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the
police appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the

marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was
supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had
likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana
cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter
was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police
was no longer a general inquiry.[46]
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he
is the cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no
need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking
him..."[47] In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already
investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under
custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been
arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way."[48] As a suspect, two armed
policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay
peace officer and three other armed policemen.[49] All had been dispatched to
arrest him.[50] From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had
already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even
before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police
made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect
to its admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.[51] The records show that the admission by appellant
was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by
an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the
time of his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only
inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal
investigations, it is also hearsay.[52] Even if the confession or admission were
"gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid
waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
[53]

It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be

convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the
author thereof.[54] The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must
not only stand the test of reason,[55] it must likewise be credible and competent.
[56]
Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence. [57] Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is
bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial."[58]
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter
to convict appellant of the offense charged. These were the seized marijuana
plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of said
marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other
evidence presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these
proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict
him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been
conducted without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own
evidence clearly establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain a
warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the
warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of
this case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove
appellant's guilt without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against
illegal searches and the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an
unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which
appellant allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not only hearsay
but also violative of the Bill of Rights.The purported confession was made
without the assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated
by the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict appellant
without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a

criminal investigation must have the services of competent and independent

counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to
appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied
upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional
competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..." [59] To justify the
conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of
evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. [60] Absent
the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
[61]
In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime
charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render
these inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." [62] Nor can the
confession obtained during the uncounselled investigation be used against
appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against him.[63] Without these
proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining
evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to
warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his
favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as
driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the
prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For
that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then his
"acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."[64]
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and
imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE

for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered

RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful
cause.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT

ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

OF

APPEALS

and

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming

the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered
petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.
On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and
took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized
for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from
the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and
papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment
for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive
owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering

Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages;
P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined
from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife,
the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the
trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground
is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use
by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or
gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondents complaint.
1

Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was
for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence,
Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty.
Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it
found to be impressed with merit:
2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso

Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx

4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial
Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September
6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for
certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order
temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of
this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and
authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably,
petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned
annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioners admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by
Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit,
and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound
by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to
no more than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the
purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their genuiness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial
court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility
of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the
charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it
was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this
Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and,
therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers
became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in

evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication
and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from
a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
3

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
6

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150224

May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting
to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a
certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with
use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death
of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D.
Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in
Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar,
to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their
farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn
told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave,
she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania.
Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of
Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back
door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he
replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants,
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his
wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang. 7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting

the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were
"reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to
tell him. Judilyns husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of
the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house
were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was
open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still
empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She
found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. 9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A
daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in
Isabel Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found
the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder
of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her
naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylynss
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar
Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station.
They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (Hes running away!). Police
Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running
away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21,
1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the AntiRape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his
Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Well-entrenched
is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of
the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. 14 Absent any showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would
affect the result of the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts
highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 16
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5)
incised, were found on the victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to
spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortisof the vicitms body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the
victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from
between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion ofrigor mortis.19 In other words, the
estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was
within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel
Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej
Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the
victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his
testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the victim.21In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by
the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling
in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellants assault on her virtue. 22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A persons DNA is
the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms
in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been
left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory
and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent,
and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. 26 Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could
also be transferred to the victims body during the assault. 27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in
proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from
the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the
suspect at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case,
used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR)
analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially
within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of
the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed
in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of
new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal canal, the
trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house because of
their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania
and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang,
acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30
p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a
was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the
ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay
naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood;
(12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical;
and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from
him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his
right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the
use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately
after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel,
we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which
he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post
facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of
Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawangs house
during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two
places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and
requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens
his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible
error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable
doubt.

Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a
minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus
value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus
value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial
court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from
its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the
court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is
that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else,
committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that
the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the
culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw
the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She witnessed the
appellant running down the stairs of Isabels house and proceeding to the back of the same
house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed
to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school." 47 The victim told
Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and
violated body was found dead in her grandmothers house on June 25, 1998. 48 In addition, Judilyn
also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband,
"this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present
during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his
wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x
x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a
rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses
on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense,
deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or

on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victims lips by
stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as
the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary
that actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victims hymen is intact does not negate a finding that
rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even
without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. 55 The strength and
dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the
victim is of tender age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is seven years older than the
victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-inlaw, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his
parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-laws house. Being a relative
by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral
ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or
on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court
maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00, 57 actual damages incurred by the family of
the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00, 58 and moral damages of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary
damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch
25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he
be ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of
P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA y
GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto M. Maiquez for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINGERPRINTS; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT ELIMINATE
POSSIBILITY THAT ACCUSED COULD HAVE BEEN AT SCENE OF THE CRIME. Although We
agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, We
cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in
the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not have
been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for
there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not
being present at the scene of the crime. Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful
for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in
dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot
be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substance
adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily
substances easily spread such that when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no
identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the
nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for
fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the
successful lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the
absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the accused-appellants could
have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any identifiable latent
fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this
particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in their
finding of guilt for the crime charged.
2. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; POLICE LINE-UP NOT REQUIRED BY LAW FOR
PROPER IDENTIFICATION; FACE AND BODY MOVEMENT OF ASSAILANT CREATE LASTING
IMPRESSION ON VICTIM. Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that
they were positively identified at the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a
proper identification. The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers
cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men

who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the
looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most
often the face of the assailant and body movement thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot
easily be erased from their memory.
3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. They claim that the fact
that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, even when they had all the opportunities to
do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them
during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were
again required to appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect
posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity
to do so, is a sign of innocence. We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight
indicates guilt, it does not necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so
when there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.
4. ID.; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT;
EXCEPTION. this Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in
convicting the three accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the
evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus: "There is need to stress anew that this
Court has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a trial judge who could
weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts fully proved is entitled to the highest respect,
unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence
sufficient to call for a different finding."
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY;
INDEMNITY TO VICTIM FOR MULTIPLE RAPE ATTENDED BY CONSPIRACY; ACCUSED
SOLIDARILY LIABLE THEREFOR. With regard to the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple
rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all, each must be
liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held solidarily liable for said indemnity which
the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of P90,000.00.
6. ID.; ID.; IN MULTIPLE RAPE ACCUSED NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE OFFSPRING.
This Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the
offspring if there by any." In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of the
offended woman. In a case where three persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither of the
accuse was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was impossible to determine the
paternity thereof.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna convicted all three
accused-appellants in its decision ** dated November 7, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Joel Sartagoda y Bocanegra, Jimmy Bascoa
(sic) y Lazarte and Vicente Sta. Ana y Gutierrez all guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals
of the crime of Robbery With Rape, defined and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code; there being two aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance to
offset the same, hereby sentences each of the said accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with the accessories provided for by the law.
Each of the three accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party Vilma de Belen the sum of
P30,000.00, and each of them shall recognize the offspring if there be any.
The said accused are likewise ordered to return the personal properties stolen or pay its equivalent
amount of P17,490.00 to Rogelio de Belen, the lawful owner thereof.
SO ORDERED." 1
The facts of the case may be summarized as follows:
It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and his sister Vilma de
Belen were sleeping in their house at Calamba, Laguna, when appellant broke in and woke him up,
poking a knife at him. They tied up his hands and made him lie flat on his stomach and asked for the
key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life and that of his companions, he reluctantly told them where the
key was kept.
Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum. When
the three saw her on the bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth as another poked a
knife at her neck. They threatened to kill her if she should make an outcry.
They raised her blouse and removed her underwear. They tied both her hands so that she could
offer no resistance. She was at such a pitiful state when the accused Jimmy Bascua went on top of
her, kissing her on different parts of her body, while Vicente Sta. Ana held her legs apart. Jimmy
finally inserted his sex organ inside her and satisfied his bestial desire. After Jimmy was over,
Vicente took his turn and then Joel. After the three of them had successfully deflowered Vilma, they
left, carrying with them the money and other personal belongings of the de Belen family.
After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from the bed and
switched the lights on and called to his neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost
consciousness due to shock.
Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law who lives right next to his house responded to his cry for
help. She went to their house and untied Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her upper body naked and
sobbing so she covered Vilma with a blanket. Soon after, his other sister-in-law also arrived. They
reported the incident to the Barangay Captain.
They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A. Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital at about
10:00 that same morning. He conducted external and internal examinations. His external
examination showed no physical injuries except that he noted several abrasions at the genital area.

His internal examination showed fresh lacerations of the hymen at 9:00 and 4:00 positions. The
vagina admitted two fingers with ease.
In the present appeal the lone assigned error is:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT HENCE, THEIR ACQUITTAL IS INEVITABLE.
This appeal has no merit.
The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination report submitted
by the Crime Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent
fingerprints were found to be positive. It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found
in the objects found in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great
significance, We cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint
examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded
that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to
a valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints
other than their not being present at the scene of the crime.
Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime
laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of
complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint
examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substances adhering to the surfaces of objects
that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that
when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges
instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided
accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the
interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper latent
fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the
possibility that the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be
there yet they had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten
latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not
sufficient to cast even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
The accused-appellants likewise contend that the police line-up had been irregularly conducted
revealing suggestibility to their prejudice. They accused Pat. Reyes of coaching complainant Vilma
de Belen when she identified her three assailants. They claim that it was Pat. Reyes' fault that "they
were not allowed to select their positions at the line-up; that they were not placed in line under a
numeral against a wall marked to indicate their respective height in feet and inches; that there was
no record made of their descriptions and physical characteristics; that the witness/victim was not out
of view of the three (3) accused lined-up for identification purposes." 2

We find these claims of irregularities of little if not, of no significance at all when considered in the
light of the natural desire in the victim to seek retribution not simply from anybody who may be put
before her but from the very same offenders who actually did violence against her. It would be most
illogical for an outraged victim to direct her anger against anyone other than her three offenders. We
cannot accept the accused-appellants' claim that it was on Pat. Reyes' suggestion that the victim
pointed to the accused-appellants as her assailants. No amount of coaching will be sufficient to
counter the natural outrage of a rape victim against her abuser when said abuser is presented
before her in a police line-up. The outrage displayed by the rape victim was a spontaneous reaction.
She identified her assailants because of no other reason except to let people know who hurt her.
Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at
the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. 3 The
complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she had
during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is the most
natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants
and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and
body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their
memory. 4
The accused-appellants further claim that "the Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez concludes
that the alleged victim of rape, Vilma de Belen must have had sexual experienced (sic) five (5) to six
(6) days before the alleged incident happened on July 2, 1988 at about 3 to 4 o'clock in the
morning". 5 There is no truth to this claim. In fact, there was no categorical or positive assertion on
the part of Dr. Ramirez that the sexual intercourse with Vilma was committed on the very date when
the alleged "robbery with rape" took place on July 2, 1988.
This is a clear distortion of the testimony of Dr. Ramirez who on cross-examination testified as
follows:
"ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
Q You cannot also determine when was the first and when was the last intercourse as per your
examination?
FISCAL
Objection, witness is incompetent.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A The findings suggest that because of hymenal laceration the injuries was (sic) recent not more
than one week, sir.
Q When you say it is not more than one week, could it be 6 or 5 days?

A Possible, sir.
Q When you say it is possible that the victim could have experienced sexual intercourse 6 to 5 days
that was indicated in your examination marked as Exh. A, can you determine as per your finding?
A Well, yes, sir, I placed fresh hymenal laceration because laceration will determine whether it is
fresh or old because of the characteristice (sic) of the laceration, sir.
Q At the time you examined the patient in your medical opinion it could have been 5 or 6 days had
elapsed?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
That will be all." 6
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion to seek clarification in witness' testimony proceeded
as follows:
"COURT:
Q Doctor, in your findings you noted that there was an abrasion?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Is that more than one abrasion?
A I found 3 mm., your Honor.
WITNESS (continuing):
and on the lower opening of the vagina on the right side, that is the only place, sir.
COURT:
Q Aside from that injury or rater (sic) that portion there is no other injury which you found?
A None, your Honor.
Q Because laceration stated in your medicolegal certificate that there was fresh hymenal laceration
noted at 9 and 4 o'clock on the face of the clock?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Do we gather it right when you stated in your medicolegal certificate fresh it is not yet healed?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q From that finding of yours regarding the existence of fresh hymenal laceration you said that it least
one or 2 days had elapsed before you have conducted the physical examination?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q In other words from one to 5 days?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q But it is possible that it could be more than one or two days?.
WITNESS:
A Yes, your Honor." 7
It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never categorically concluded that the sexual intercourse causing the
fresh hymenal lacerations took place five to six days before the date of her examination. The
accused-appellants' claim that the sexual intercourse took place on June 26 or 27, 1988 is
conjectural and without factual basis.
The claim of the accused-appellants that the prosecution failed to present rebuttal evidence to refute
the averments of Joel Sartagoda that they tried in vain to persuade him to admit the charge against
him and to implicate his two (2) co-accused did not deserve the attention of the trial court nor does it
deserve Ours, being per se unacceptable and unbelievable in the light of human experience.
Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, even when
they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home
after Vilma failed to identify them during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home
and did not flee until they were again required to appear at the police station for the second time.
The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision
not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.
We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not necessarily
follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to
establish their guilt.
This Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three
accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the evidence presented at
the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus:

"There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been committed to the principle that the
determination by a trial judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts duly
proved is entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded
circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a different finding." 8
We are for the affirmance of the conviction of the three accused-appellants. With regard to the
indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of
one being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held
solidarily liable 9 for said indemnity which the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a
total of P90,000.00. 10
However, this Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize
the offspring if there be any". In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of
the offended woman. In a case 11 where three persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither
of the accused was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was impossible to
determine the paternity thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the accused-appellants are held jointly and severally liable to indemnify Vilma de Belen for
multiple rape in the amount of P90,000.00, and that none of the accused is required to recognize the
offspring.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150949

June 21, 2007

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmarias, Cavite,petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 12, 2001
and Resolution dated November 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.
The facts are:
On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales
a piece of land consisting of 33,130 square meters in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite. The property is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in her name by the Register of
Deeds of Trece Martires City.

Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswindas name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when the latters workers tried to fence and
take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta
Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified
the status of the title and found that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of
spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.
On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias,
Cavite a complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded as
defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires
City.
In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by
Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Espaol, petitioner, issued an
Order stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and
its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax
declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently,
petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for
ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.
Petitioners Order is partly reproduced as follows:
From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds that the instant
case is a callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent
manipulations, through the extensive use of falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation
and its former counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C. Morales and
even the Geodetic Engineer who connived with this private group on one hand, and some
officials and employees of the government agencies responsible for the processing and
issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the other. Unless these fraudulent operations are
put to a complete and drastic halt, the Courts are at the mercy of these unscrupulous people
for their own personal gain.
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified document is the
forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate
falsification charges be filed against Benito See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C.
Morales. Thus, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation
and the Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S.
Formoso, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidants Office, Supreme Court.
Manila.
Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc.,
respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are
declared and held in contempt for foisting falsehoods and using falsified and spurious
documents in the pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the instant case filed before

this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid
respondents who should serve ten (10) days of detention at the Dasmarias Municipal Jail,
Cavite.
Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT No. T-511462
allegedly issued on November 11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been
derived from another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C.
Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise
hereby cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Registry of
Deeds for its implementation with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the
Assessors Office of the Municipality of Dasmarias, Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of
these spurious instruments.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,
whereas, the private defendants counterclaims, which need further substantiation, are
likewise dismissed. However, the said private defendants are not precluded from pursuing
their rightful course(s) of action in the interest of justice.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of title, she
"stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.2 Petitioner then took judicial
notice of the judges Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are
falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor.
On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents. They were confined in
the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a
motion to lift the order of arrest. But they were denied outright by petitioner.
Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.
On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant petition to be meritorious, the
same is hereby GRANTED. Respondent judges July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared
herein petitioners in direct contempt and ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as well
as the Warrant of Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of Commitment, dated July 13,
2001, which the respondent judge issued against the persons of the herein petitioners, are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Espaol erred in taking cognizance of the Decision rendered
by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No.
2035-00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner
should have conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether respondents are guilty
as charged.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its
Resolution of November 15, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct
contempt of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.
The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as "some act or conduct which tends to
interfere with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some
act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the
orderly proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also
been described as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends
to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation."4 Simply put, it is despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of the court.5
The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in the realm were but
divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an
affront to the sovereign.6This concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with
modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to
punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of
the judicial institution.7 Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and,
consequently, to the very administration of justice.8
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a
fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or
both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a
lower court.
In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one done "in the presence of or so
near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act

done facie curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing.10 In other words, one may be
summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission
of the act of contumely.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in
writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property
by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process
to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and
may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful
interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any
improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice.11

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act.
However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such
act is an improper conduct which degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch VI,12we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where
the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and
as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus,
following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel.13 Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a
separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction. 14 Thus, the
modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as
practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. 15 Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring
summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should
have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.
Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took judicial notice of the Decision
in Civil Case No. 623-92, assigned to another RTC branch, presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government, and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive andjudicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
In Gener v. De Leon,16 we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence,
we reiterate that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and
on the basis thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and
tax declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err
in ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the writ
of habeas corpusin favor of respondents has become moot. We recall that respondents were
released after posting the required bail as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas
corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person
discharged on bail is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.17
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 97626. March 14, 1997]

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE

COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, ROGELIO LACSON,
DIGNA
DE
LEON,
MARIA
ANGELITA
PASCUAL, et
al., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S
MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO LIPANA, its
President & General Manager, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Challenged in this petition for review is the Decision dated February 28,
1991 rendered by public respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Decision dated November 15, 1985 of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch CLX (160), Pasig City, in Civil Case No.
27288 entitled Rommel's Marketing Corporation, etc. v. Philippine Bank of
Commerce, now absorbed by Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
[1]

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the private respondent

Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity), represented by its
President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the
Philippine Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74
representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said
bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited
to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and
inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.
RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos.
53-01980-3 and 53-01748-7, with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with
its business of selling appliances.
In the ordinary and usual course of banking operations, current account
deposits are accepted by the bank on the basis of deposit slips prepared and
signed by the depositor, or the latter's agent or representative, who indicates
therein the current account number to which the deposit is to be credited, the
name of the depositor or current account holder, the date of the deposit, and

the amount of the deposit either in cash or checks. The deposit slip has an
upper portion or stub, which is detached and given to the depositor or his
agent; the lower portion is retained by the bank. In some instances, however,
the deposit slips are prepared in duplicate by the depositor. The original of the
deposit slip is retained by the bank, while the duplicate copy is returned or
given to the depositor.
From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to
have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his
secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current
accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all
occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to
Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise
maintains an account with the same bank. During this period, petitioner bank
had, however, been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly
statements showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had never
been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of
account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.
Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would
accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current
account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her
husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller,
Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and
the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the
lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene
Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up
the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the
account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it
appear to be RMC's account number, i.e., C.A. No. 53-01980-3. With the daily
remittance records also prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private
respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's
name and account number, she made her company believe that all the while
the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth
and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner

bank in the account of Cotas. This went on in a span of more than one (1)
year without private respondent's knowledge.
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner
bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a
collection suit before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160. The trial
court found petitioner bank negligent and ruled as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant Philippine Bank
of Commerce, now absorbed by defendant Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank,
and defendant Azucena Mabayad to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, and
without prejudice to any criminal action which may be instituted if found warranted:
1. The sum of P304,979.72, representing plaintiff's lost deposit, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint;
2. A sum equivalent to 14% thereof, as exemplary damages;
3. A sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due, as and for attorney's fees;
and
4. Costs.
Defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit."

[2]

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the foregoing decision with

modifications, viz:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is MODIFIED in the sense that
the awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees specified therein are eliminated
and instead, appellants are ordered to pay plaintiff, in addition to the principal sum
of P304,979.74 representing plaintiff's lost deposit plus legal interest thereon from the
filing of the complaint, P25,000.00 attorney's fees and costs in the lower court as well
as in this Court."
[3]

Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:

1) The proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent Rommel Marketing
Corporation and Romeo Lipana in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee.

2) The failure of respondent Rommel Marketing Corporation to cross-check the bank's

statements of account with its own records during the entire period of more than one
(1) year is the proximate cause of the commission of subsequent frauds and
misappropriation committed by Ms. Irene Yabut.
3) The duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by respondent Rommel
Marketing Corporation are falsified and are not proof that the amounts appearing
thereon were deposited to respondent Rommel Marketing Corporation's account
with the bank.
4) The duplicate copies of the deposit slips were used by Ms. Irene Yabut to cover up
her fraudulent acts against respondent Rommel Marketing Corporation, and not as
records of deposits she made with the bank.[4]

The petition has no merit.

Simply put, the main issue posited before us is: What is the proximate
cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the private
respondent RMC -- petitioner bank's negligence or that of private
respondent's?
Petitioners submit that the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of
respondent RMC and Romeo Lipana in entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee in the person of Ms. Irene Yabut. According to them, it was
impossible for the bank to know that the money deposited by Ms. Irene Yabut
belong to RMC; neither was the bank forewarned by RMC that Yabut will be
depositing cash to its account. Thus, it was impossible for the bank to know
the fraudulent design of Yabut considering that her husband, Bienvenido
Cotas, also maintained an account with the bank For the bank to inquire into
the ownership of the cash deposited by Ms. Irene Yabut would be irregular.
Otherwise stated, it was RMC's negligence in entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee which provided Ms. Irene Yabut the opportunity to defraud RMC.
[5]

[6]

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the proximate cause
of the loss was the negligent act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena
Mabayad, in validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate, presented
by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad, notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit
slips was not completely accomplished.
We sustain the private respondent.

Our law on quasi-delicts states:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff.
[7]

In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the

private respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,
979.74. It is in ascribing fault or negligence which caused the damage where
the parties point to each other as the culprit.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do. The seventy-eight (78)-year-old, yet still relevant,
case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence
of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.
[8]

Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena
Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact

that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit
slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself, thus:
"Q: Now, as teller of PCIB, Pasig Branch, will you please tell us Mrs. Mabayad your
important duties and functions?
A: I accept current and savings deposits from depositors and encashments.
Q: Now in the handling of current account deposits of bank clients, could you tell us the
procedure you follow?
A: The client or depositor or the authorized representative prepares a deposit slip by
filling up the deposit slip with the name, the account number, the date, the
cash breakdown, if it is deposited for cash, and the check number, the amount and
then he signs the deposit slip.
Q: Now, how many deposit slips do you normally require in accomplishing current
account deposit, Mrs. Mabayad?
A: The bank requires only one copy of the deposit although some of our clients prepare
the deposit slip in duplicate.
Q: Now in accomplishing current account deposits from your clients, what do you issue
to the depositor to evidence the deposit made?
A: We issue or we give to the clients the depositor's stub as a receipt of the deposit.
Q: And who prepares the deposit slip?
A: The depositor or the authorized representative sir.
Q: Where does the depositor's stub comes (sic) from Mrs. Mabayad, is it with the
deposit slip?
A: The depositor's stub is connected with the deposit slip or the bank's copy. In a
deposit slip, the upper portion is the depositor's stub and the lower portion is the
bank's copy, and you can detach the bank's copy from the depositor's stub by
tearing it sir.
Q: Now what do you do upon presentment of the deposit slip by the depositor or the
depositor's authorized representative?

A: We see to it that the deposit slip [9] is properly accomplished and then we count the
money and then we tally it with the deposit slip sir.
Q: Now is the depositor's stub which you issued to your clients validated?
A: Yes, sir. "[10] [Emphasis ours.]

Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very important procedure. The fact
that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting
deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd
circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information -that of the name of the account holder -- should have already put Ms.
Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate
copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as
to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip
was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have
been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of
Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her
personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on. A
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would not have given credence to
such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up
as a condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller
Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent.
[11]

[12]

Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the
part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms.
Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then
Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its VicePresident, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident,
he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total
disregard of the bank's validation procedures, viz:
"Q: Did he ever tell you that one of your cashiers affixed the stamp mark of the bank on
the deposit slips and they validated the same with the machine, the fact that those
deposit slips were unfilled up, is there any report similar to that?
A: No, it was not the cashier but the teller.
Q: The teller validated the blank deposit slip?

A: No it was not reported.

Q: You did not know that any one in the bank tellers or cashiers validated the blank
deposit slip?
A: I am not aware of that.
Q: It is only now that you are aware of that?
A: Yes, sir."[13]

Prescinding from the above, public respondent Court of Appeals aptly

observed:
xxx xxx xxx
It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February, 1983, or after the lapse of
more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were
deposited in plaintiffs accounts (May, 1975 to July, 1976) that bank manager
Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller Mabayad of validating
blank deposit slips. Undoubtedly, this is gross, wanton, and inexcusable negligence in
the appellant bank's supervision of its employees."
[14]

It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the

negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank
teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Vda. de
Bataclan v. Medina, reiterated in the case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v.
Court of Appeals, defines proximate cause as "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. x x
x." In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the
incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have
the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
[15]

[16]

[17]

Apropos, once again, is the pronouncement made by the respondent

appellate court, to wit:
" x x x. Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds
entrusted to her by plaintiff, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in
her husband's current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter's
accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not been for bank teller Mabayad's
aforesaid gross and reckless negligence. The latter's negligence was thus the
proximate, immediate and efficient cause that brought about the loss claimed by
plaintiff in this case, and the failure of plaintiff to discover the same soon enough by
failing to scrutinize the monthly statements of account being sent to it by appellant
bank could not have prevented the fraud and misappropriation which Irene Yabut had
already completed when she deposited plaintiff's money to the account of her husband
instead of to the latter's accounts."
[18]

Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at
times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank
was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where
both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with
the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that
an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have
avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud
the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the
petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury
incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure.
[19]

[20]

At this juncture, it is worth to discuss the degree of diligence ought to be

exercised by banks in dealing with their clients.

The New Civil Code provides:

"ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
(1104a)"
In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more
than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their
relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts
of their clients with the highest degree of care.
[21]

As elucidated in Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, in

every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the
utmost fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or
of millions. The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to
the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the
account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can
dispose as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to
whomever he directs. A blunder on the part of the bank, such as the failure to
duly credit him his deposits as soon as they are made, can cause the
depositor not a little embarrassment if not financial loss and perhaps even civil
and criminal litigation.
[22]

The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of
the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of
its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature
of their relationship. In the case before us, it is apparent that the petitioner
bank was remiss in that duty and violated that relationship.
Petitioners nevertheless aver that the failure of respondent RMC to crosscheck the bank's statements of account with its own records during the entire

period of more than one (1) year is the proximate cause of the commission of
subsequent frauds and misappropriation committed by Ms. Irene Yabut.
We do not agree.
While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly
statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would
have discovered the loss early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to
escape liability. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not
change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the
petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete duplicate deposit slips
presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred. Considering,
however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year
covering various deposits, common human experience dictates that the same
would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms.
Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Ms. Mabayad was negligent in the
performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. Thus, the petitioners are
entitled to claim reimbursement from her for whatever they shall be ordered to
pay in this case.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private
respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of
account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series
of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would
definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly
Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs.
This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall
mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
[23]

"x x x. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded."

In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied
by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded
by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's
fees, shall be borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60%
needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be
borne exclusively by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is
entitled to by 40%. Petitioners may recover from Ms. Azucena Mabayad the
amount they would pay the private respondent. Private respondent shall have
recourse against Ms. Irene Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate court's
decision is AFFIRMED.
Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 85423

May 6, 1991

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
Ramon Dimen for petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of
basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted
by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and
situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed
in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the
herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was
required to vacate the disputed lot.
1

As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla
while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa
Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the

same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her
life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do,
and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and
half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was
made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from
his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and
until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and
Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the
Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the
trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the
plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the
ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921
addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that
the amount of P600.00the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since
October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; Exh.
"C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh.
"C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the
appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript
of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. The challenged decision also upheld the use by
the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.
2

We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described
documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of
Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not
include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by
plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems
to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the
quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were
marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that
time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit,
Inc. vs. Aviles, "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it
believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter
3

event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary
value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and
his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the trial.
4

We did say in People vs. Napat-a that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be
admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could
be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs
witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by
the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the
documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.
5

Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:

LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo
Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed.

She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial
notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with
the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the
same judge. Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
7

. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into
the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part
of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the
consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
8

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the
knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is
clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the
archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not
been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in

Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As
the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him,
leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of
the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because
"the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What
"other evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to
wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the
complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its
allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan
Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming
it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only
the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the
land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed
title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner.
No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many
cases. However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception.
In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact,
the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's
ownership. As this Court has held:
1wphi1

While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property.
9

It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered
by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of
ownership.
10

The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject parcels of
land by the respondents and their parents before them for more than 30 years qualify them
to register title to the said subject parcels of land.
11

The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and magnanimously
allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes
in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned
with the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America.
That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is
curious that he should have acquired the property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He
would have demanded another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the
land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not
have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why
he did not object when the payments were made in her own name.

In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the
owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession
thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. She paid the
realty taxes thereon in her own name. Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the
lot. He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private
persons who acknowledged him as the owner. These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere
possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
12

13

14

15

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below and
even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached
arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and
appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not
been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably
to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case
No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in
violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built
upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim
of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative
laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that
should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.