Consti Law Exam 1

Kristine
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM
Confesor
BILL OF RIGHTS
The study of Constitutional Law primarily hinges on the Bill of Rights, and
there are only a few provisions thereunder. So lets start with the
Fundamental Powers of the State. There are three of them. And by concept
and application they are supposed to be inherent. It means that once the
State comes into being, these can be exercised by the State. It does not
need any Constitutional or Statutory conferment for the State to exercise
them. And precisely as we understand the reason why specific provisions
in the Constitution apply to specific powers or inherent powers of the State
is because they are more of limitations rather than grants. Largely the Bill
of Rights are limitations on the power of the State but there are still
specific provisions in the Constitution like Article III Section 9 on Eminent
Domain which is a specific provision affecting Eminent Domain as an
inherent power of the State. Most of these powers are largely exercised
through legislation. And of course, by reason of legislation, their execution
or implementation maybe extended or granted to the Executive branch or
other entities if there is allowable delegation.
The first of which, in our outline, would be the discussion on the
applicability of the Bill of Rights in the study of Constitutional Law. The
basic principle is that the Bill of Rights is a limitation on State authority. It
does not apply strictly to conflict involving private rights. Perhaps the only
exceptions based on your readings would be (1) with respect to privacy of
communication and correspondence that has been applied by the
Supreme Court in the case of Zulueta, where the private matter involving
the couple who had marital problems, where the wife forcibly took
documents, pictures to prove the extra marital affair of the husband,
where these documentary evidence where presented in court, the
Supreme Court, in that lone case, which is still good law today, applied the
limitation under the Bill of Rights on privacy of communication and
correspondence saying that because of the violation of the private right of
the husband, the evidence so obtained are considered inadmissible. The
application or the ruling of the Supreme Court, well, it will largely be
questionable, but simply because it is still the decision of the Supreme
Court, it remains to be good law today. To that extent, the Bill of Rights has
been applied involving conflict of private persons involving their private
rights because again the Bill of Rights is supposed to be a limitation on the
powers of the State.
(2) To some extent, it has also been applied to schools disciplinary
tribunals. When the school exercises its authority to impose the schools
rules on discipline in the tertiary level, there have been so several cases
already stating that there is supposed to be procedural due process to be
observed and extended to the students in the tertiary level before these
students can be sanctioned, much more if they are supposed to be
expelled by reason of violation of the schools disciplinary tribunal. We
have been made to understand that with respect to academic rules,
theres not much difficulty because the due process there is always
extended when there are examinations or recitations given. You are given
the opportunity to be heard every time you are called for recitation or
every time there is an examination or a test administered on the students.
But with respect to the schools rules on discipline, starting with the case
of Ateneo de Manila, the Supreme Court has made a rule that students in
the tertiary level enjoy procedural due process. So, is that an act of the
State where due process is supposed to be imposed on the school before it

is allowed to impose sanctions? In the Constitutional context, it should not
be required because the school is not the State. But because on the other
hand, students have what we know as academic freedom. There are three
_____ in the scope of academic freedom, we have the schools, the
members of the faculty and that of the students. And so to that extent,
due process is extended to the students before they are supposed to be
sanctioned.
(3) Also by reason of law, not by the Constitution, the twin notice rule
under the Labor Code, though clearly it has been stated that it is not part
of the Constitutional due process requirement, but because of the
statutory rule that employees, before they are sanctioned, employers
must have to extend to them what the law requires under the so called
twin notice rule. Employers would be considered the State when they
impose sanctions. But because the statute has required that they must
have to be informed before they are to be penalized or sanctioned, to that
extent there is limited application of the right in the due process clause
generally in this situation.
The case of Yrasuegi v. PAL, this is a 2008 case, you have already read
this, involving a labor case, the steward of an airline was eventually
terminated for failing to meet the weight requirement. Supposedly
stewardesses and stewards have a maximum allowable weight to be able
to effectively function as attendant. But because this petitioner has failed
despite the grace period for him to lose weight, he was terminated and
filed a labor case. In the petition before the Supreme Court, without any of
those issues raised in the lower tribunal, he questioned the policy of the
airline company as being violative of the Equal Protection; that there is
undue prejudice and disadvantage to the fat people, because they would
only want to hire and continue to engage those who are macho and sexy.
The Supreme Court made it clear that this is an action by an employer as
against an employee, so the Equal Protection guarantee in the
Constitution does not apply as this is not a State action where there is a
violation of a private right by reason of the imposition of a State act.
Due process is discussed in light with regulatory powers. In the light also
of what is required under the due process clause. The due process clause
would be considered as the most pervasive. It is the least limitable of all
the powers, and so this normally comes in the form of regulatory
measures.
So when the State exercises its police power, the power to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare, it normally comes
in a form of regulation. So when a regulatory measure is enacted, there
are basically two considerations:
(1) whether the law is in substance valid and
(2) whether the applicability of the law is equally applied to everyone in
that class or category.
The regulatory functions or powers of the State can also be used through
its power to tax and or power of eminent domain. A good example with
respect to eminent domain and regulatory powers would be your
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. To regulate property ownership in
order to promote the welfare of the farm workers or tenants, property
ownership has been limited. So outside of what we know as retention
areas, the remainder of the agricultural land are distributed. Now is this in
its strict sense a regulatory measure? The answer is no. And it is not also
in its strict sense the eminent domain exercise as allowed in the
Constitution.
Now the usual test to determine a valid regulatory measure would be the
lawfulness of the subject and the lawfulness of the means. Regardless of
the further discussions with respect to ordinances, because in ordinances
we have the case of White Light Corp v. City of Manila which establishes
certain requirements for validity when it comes to ordinances; but when it
comes to general statutes, what we follow would be the two test: the
lawfulness of the subject test and the lawfulness of the means.
Theres not much difficulty in understanding what a lawful subject is
because police power being in relation to general welfare, any public
interest matter is always considered as a lawful subject for purposes of
regulation. The only discussion here is whether regulation affords only
protection to a few and not the general welfare of the many. So its not so
difficult to understand. So you talk about public health, public safety,
public morality, and all those public interest matters. The discussion is
mostly on whether the means are lawful. The rule being that the end,
which is the intention to promote the interest of the general welfare,
should not justify the means used. There must have to be reasonable
necessity to the means used to accomplish the desired end. So if the
means imposed by the law is reasonably necessary to accomplish the
intention of the law, then the means would be considered as lawful.
Eminent domain on the other hand is the highest and most exact idea of
property right remaining in the State. This is a reflection of the Regalian
Doctrine that all property belongs to the State. That if the State would
want to get back its property, what it used to own which was given up for
private ownership, it would exercise through eminent domain. But just like
in the exercise of eminent domain by a local government unit, the Local
Government Code has provided for some other conditions or
requirements. But generally, the Constitution under Section 9 Article III,
simply requires that there must have to be taking of private property for
public use upon payment of just compensation. The concepts of taking
have not changed. Well, it has changed from the old traditional
understanding but it has changed somehow to include any substantial
effect on the usual and reasonable uses of the property. Taking in eminent
domain is not physical dispossession alone. If there is substantial effect on
the usual uses of the property by the property owner, then there may be
considered as taking. Also the concept of public use has changed from the
old traditional concept of direct benefit to the many. It has changed to
include now the indirect benefit to the many. Even if those directly
benefited are only a few, but if the public is indirectly benefited as well,
then there is also taking for public use.
The property to be taken must have to be private property. So any kind of
private property (?), of course except money, will have to be exempted
from the private property requirement. Just compensation is usually made
by giving money.
Just compensation as a condition for a valid exercise of eminent domain
has not also changed. It still refers to the full and fair equivalence of the
loss of the property owner. The value is based on the loss and not on the
Train hard, endure. 1
Kristine
Confesor
gain. For which reason if there is consequential benefit or consequential
damage, if not the entire land is expropriated, the consequential benefit
shall be deducted from the value of the just compensation, while the
consequential damage shall be added to the value of the property for
purposes of computing the just compensation.
government ID with your photograph, so you have your drivers license,

SSS cards, wala pa giud school cards, government issued identification
cards lang giud, then do not serve that person any alcoholic beverage.
Magkano ba pera nung minors as compared to those adults na gustong
uminon? Kaya siguro hindi niya pinirmahan.
With respect to taxation, except for the provisions of the Constitution

regarding the uniformity in the rule of taxation and equitable rule, the
exemption from real property taxation for certain listed properties directly,
exclusively and primarily used for religious and other educational purposes
and also for tax exemption of income of non stock non profit educational
institutions as well as the tax credit for donations to these institutions, the
rest of the specifics in your taxation laws, you will have to take up in your
taxation law review.
With respect to eminent domain, what is required under the Local

Government Code is that there must have to be an ordinance. In all
eminent domain exercises, we must understand that while the
Constitution does not mention it, there is a precondition for the exercise of
eminent domain, and that is the condition of necessity. Is it necessary for
the State or the public corporation or the LGU to exercise eminent
domain? Because eminent domain again is exercised as a last resort if the
State or the expropriator would want to get that property. As it is required
in the Local Government Code, there must have to be an offer made by
the expropriator to the property owner. Firm offer to buy the property. Of
course, if the firm offer is not accepted or is rejected, then the
expropriator may opt to expropriate. Expropriation is not the first option,
because again there is a precondition or prerequisite not provided for in
the Constitution but in decisions of the Supreme Court that there is a
necessity to exercise eminent domain. So just like if you are Napocor,
Napocor would not file a petition for expropriation but would have to ask
the property owner how much would they be willing to part with their
property because Napocor would want to use it.
In relation to delegation, police power and power of eminent domain may

be delegated. But power of taxation can never be. Well, to some extent, it
has been delegated to LGUs with respect to their taxation powers under
the Local Government Code, but not to private entities unlike in eminent
domain where private entities may be granted the power to expropriate.
Normally, we refer to public utility companies; they have power to
expropriate. Police power has also been delegated to the LGUs. This is
your Section 16 of the Local Government Code, which refers to the
General Welfare clause. In that clause, the LGUs have delegated authority
either direct or general. At any given time, Congress may enact a law
delegating authority on police power to LGUs. But there is a general grant
under Section 16 as well that LGUs can legislate on these matters.
The requirement for validity of regulatory powers for purposes of the
LGUs.
First, it must have to be passed within the corporate powers of the LGUs.
Second, it must be passed in accordance with the legal procedure as
provided in the Local Government Code, and it must satisfy six substantive
requirements as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
it
it
it
it
it
it
must
must
must
must
must
must
not contravene the Constitution or the law;

not be unfair or oppressive;
not be partial or discriminatory;
not prohibit but merely regulate;
be general and consistent with public policy; and
not be unreasonable.
So in any regulatory measure, LGU, as a matter of law, cannot prohibit the

conduct of what otherwise is a legitimate business. It can only regulate.
The problem is: what should happen if the regulatory measure would
amount to a prohibition. The expanded liquor ban. Drinking now can only
be allowed up to 1. I think the Mayor has not yet signed it because he has
second thoughts whether it would pass the scrutiny of constitutionality. It
has always been discussed among, well some lawyers are discussing,
those lawyers are drunkards, but the argument is that: why should the
Mayor want an ordinance which would prevent or prohibit law abiding
drinkers of legal age to drink? If the intention of the legislation is to curb
drinking among minors, why not ID up the minors? Let the adults,
generally with money, to drink until they die in the morning. Prevent the
minors from drinking by requiring the bar or club owners to ID up
everybody. If you cannot present a what is purportedly a validation
In almost all cases though, the offer will not be accepted or is rejected
because the offer actually is very very low. Its not the same as in the
open market. Just compensation in some cases has been described as the
amount of the property which a buyer, who is not willing to buy a property,
is willing to pay and the amount a seller, who is not willing to sell a
property, is willing to part with. So thats the sole difficult to determine.
Thats why there are factors to consider to determine just compensation.
Even if you go through our Rules of Court on expropriation or eminent
domain, the court is even tasked to assign commissioners if theres a
problem with the issue of just compensation. So firm offer first, it must
have to be rejected and not accepted, before expropriation can be
exercised. In the LGU, the Local Government Code requires that firm offer
first, and if not accepted or is rejected, then the local legislative council
must have to pass an ordinance authorizing the mayor to exercise
eminent domain. And the rest of the provisions in the Local Government
Code is reflective of the constitutional requirement that there must have
to be payment of just compensation before there could be taking in
eminent domain. The only difference in the Local Government Code is that
the Constitution provides for public purpose or public use. In the Local
Government Code, the public uses are specified. So, housing, and some
other specific public purposes. Thats the only difference with respect to
public use in relation to the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Still with due process. The concept of relativity of due process. The
relativity of due process as a concept simply means that while due process
is required under Section 1 of Article III that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, the requirement of due
process is not strictly applied to all persons under all circumstances
absolutely. In different types of cases, the requirement of due process may
be different. Although due process is really required, more so in procedural
due process, it is not the same as it is in all cases, in all persons, in all
parties.
A good example would be your due process in judicial proceedings and
due process in administrative proceedings. While there may have been 4
in judicial procedural due process, there are 7 in administrative procedural
due process, your so called 7 cardinal primary rights in administrative due
process. Administrative cases do not require the strict presentation of
evidence, as it is required in the judicial proceedings. There are even
situations where there is no right to cross examine because there is no
presentation of witness. So the question is how do you dispute the claims
of the other party or the witnesses of the other party? By presenting you
own witnesses as well and more in documentary form. In the Rules of
Evidence, generally applied in court cases, affidavits are hearsay. They do
not have any evidentiary value unless they are generally testified to by
the affiant or the one who executed them. That is in judicial proceedings.
But if it is in administrative proceedings, like in labor cases, affidavits are
good as testimonies. Because the quantum of proof required is different in
judicial cases as it is in administrative cases. So, is there denial of due
process if there is no right to cross examine or if affidavits are accepted as
testimonies of witnesses to a case in administrative cases? The answer is
no, again because the principle in due process is that due process though
required is applied differently in different types of cases, in different
situations of persons affected by or in a particular case.
Even if you go through the Bill of Rights, starting with Section 14, the first
paragraph reiterate the due process in Section 1 with respect to an
accused in a criminal case. And there is a listing, in the second paragraph
of Section 14, of all the rights of the accused, and there are no rights of
the private complainant. Why is that so is because due process is more,
shall we say, necessary with respect to an accused in a criminal case
because he is up against the entire machinery of the State in a criminal
prosecution. In civil cases, no matter how big the claim is or how many
hectares of land is involved, nobodys liberty is affected, nobody goes to
jail in a civil case. So, while it is so it does not mean that the parties do not
have rights to due process, of course they have. But again, it is applied
differently in different situations. But largely, because the constitutional
grant of due process or limitation of due process is against State authority
for which reason that largely explains why the accuseds right to due
process is reemphasized in Section 14 of Article III.
In civil cases involving private rights, the State has nothing to do with it
generally. But because we all understand in judicial proceedings whether
criminal or civil cases, parties must have a right to due process in relation
to the actuations of a judge. You talk about jurisdiction. The impartiality of
a judge. If these are violated, then there may be a violation of due
process. Because here is a state agent, a judge, exercising authority over
a case which he has no right to do so. So, if that civil case decided by a
judge without jurisdiction, has taken the property of another in favor of the
other party of the case, then there may be taking of his property without
due process of law in that context. Relativity of due process simply means
that it is not absolute in all the cases, it is not the same nor hard and fast
applicable to all in any and all circumstance. There is difference in
application and it refers to certain cases and to certain parties.
[Atty.Montejo lecture]
Kristine
Confesor
1.
Fundamental principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of

Rights
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
(G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997)
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and
a Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the declaration of the winning
bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
the Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to accept. The
petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony,
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls
under the term national patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
WON selling mere 51% shares and not the land itself can be considered
part of national patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is selfexecuting which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The Constitution
mandates that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the
foreign firm, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the shares of MHC in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition

that is unfair.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of

petitioner and execute the necessary clearances for the purchase of the
subject 51% MHC shares.
3. No. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the

absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme

law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Tanada vs. Angara

(G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997)
FACTS:
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97
which resolved that the Senate concur, in the ratification by the President
of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. The instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods."
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is a justiciable controversy?
2. WON the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene with Sec.19,Art.
2 and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. 12 of the Philippine Constitution?
3. WON the provisions of WTO Unduly impair or interfere with the exercise
of judicial and legislative power by the court and congress respectively?
4. WON there is grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
1. Yes. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The
court however is limited to determine whether or not there had been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and shall not
inquire upon the wisdom of the President and Senate in ratifying the same.
2. No. The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, they do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation. Furthermore, Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other
Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, the Constitution did not intend to pursue
an isolationist policy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts

the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws. 44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law
is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in
good faith.
4. No. Grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse
of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the
part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the
dismissal of the petition.
Wherefore, Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Domino vs. Comelec

(G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999)
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be
elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a
resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement
and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in
the list of voters declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani
and not of Quezon City acquire the nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least
one year immediately preceding the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present
petition of DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can
be proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light of DOMINOs
disqualification?
Kristine
Confesor
3. WON the petitioner can invoke the equal protection clause guaranty
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not
of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be
sustained. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion
proceeding, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another
municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is
limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters
or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the
precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's
disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the
decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is
essential that there must be between the first and the second action
identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of
action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means
the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside
in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will
not be deemed lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully
effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of
obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. 41 A candidate
must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can
be considered a member of the House of Representatives. Considering
that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a
member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and
not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Pamatong vs. Comelec

(G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004)
FACTS:
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner seeks
to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his
right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
WON the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities
for public office" grants a constitutional right to run for or hold public office
RULING:
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed
by law. Also, the "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of
the Constitution. The provisions under the Article are generally considered
not self-executing.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and outlined instances
wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody
discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated.
equally
without
Reasoning: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in

the case of candidates for national positions because the election process
becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the
Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official
Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if
they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of
winning, no matter how slim. It would be then a senseless sacrifice on the
part of the State.
RULING:
1. Yes. It would fall under Article 282 of the Labor Code. A reading of the
weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the
job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable
to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
2. Yes. Though generally, employment in particular jobs may not be
limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin. However,
if the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job, the qualification is then considered
valid and referred to as bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
Applying the Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy
is justified, the following must concur: (1) the employer must show that it
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the
performance of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that workrelated purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is
reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. The most important activity
of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the
evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety
goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin
attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors,
the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the
stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules among other reasons.
3. No. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the
Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal
protection guarantee.91
YRASUEGUI VS. PAL

(G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008)
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA VS. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency"
extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five
(5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective
immediately."11
FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734
is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended
the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further
reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset
for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under the Labor
Code.
2. WON the dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational disqualification defense.
Kristine
Confesor
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In
these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153
ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of
elections with the ARMM?
HELD:
YES. While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the
terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and
for all the following elections. In this case, the ARMM elections, although
called regional elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure
of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987
Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the
ARMM elections. The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD
the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
Due Process
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[Art. III, Sec. 1]
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments. [Art. XIII, Sec. 1]
IN GENERAL
Due process of law simply states that [i]t is part of the sporting idea of
fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision
is made by those who sit in judgment. [Ynot v. IAC (1987)]
2)
Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as

their property is concerned [Smith Bell and Co. v. Natividad (1919)]
3)
The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means of

livelihood. [Villegas v. Hiu Chiong (1978)]
It covers any governmental action which constitutes a deprivation of some

person's life, liberty, or property.
DEFINITION
A law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial [Darthmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton 518]
Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free
from dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which
make life enjoyable [Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp.
320-321; See Buck v. Bell, 274 US 200]
Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude.xxx (It) includes the right of the citizen to
be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways xxx [Rubi v. Provincial Board
of Mindoro (1919)]
Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be
the subject of contract. It represents more than the things a person owns;
it includes the right to secure, use and dispose of them. [Torraco v.
Thompson, 263 US 197]
HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS
When the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these
freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society and the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions, they need breathing
space to survive, permitting government regulation only with narrow
specificity. [Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc (1973)]
If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. [ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila
(1967)]
Under the present provision, understood in the light of established
jurisprudence on the position of property in the hierarchy of constitutional
values, property stands a good chance of serving and enhancing the life
and liberty of all. Running through various provisions of the Constitution
are various provisions to protect propertybut always with the explicit or
implicit reminder that property has a social dimension and that the right to
property is weighted with a social obligation. [Bernas]
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
1)
Universal in application to all persons without regard to any
difference in race, color or nationality.
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
Due process of law guarantees:
(1) Notice and
(2) Opportunity to be heard
(3) To persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.
NOTED EXCEPTIONS TO DUE PROCESS
(1) The conclusive presumption, bars the admission of contrary evidence
as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately
presumed therefrom.
(2) There are instances when the need for expeditious action will justify
omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance
per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because
of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people.
(3) Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed.
(4) The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be
cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled.
(5) Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the
public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. [Ynot v. IAC
(1987)]
In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of:
1) the nature of the property involved; or
2) the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and
present danger.
RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS
The concept of due process is flexible for not all situations calling for
procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure. [Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion (2000)]
Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action. [Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy (1961].
To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean that
judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is
in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a
recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kind of procedure. [Morrissey v. Brewer (1972)]
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE PROCESS
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS [AGABON V. NLRC (2004)]
Kristine
Confesor
Basis: Constitution
Requirements: Procedural and Substantive
Purpose.
(1) protects individual against government; and
(2) assures him of his rights in criminal, civil and administrative
proceedings
Effect of breach: govt action void
as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. [Sarmiento v.

Raon (2002)]
(3)
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

SCOPE
(1) Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is that aspect of due process which serves as
a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the
government. It refers to the method or manner by which a law is
enforced.
Concerns with government action on established process when it
makes intrusion into the private sphere
(2) Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or property.
[City of Manila v. Laguio (2005)]
In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a
sufficient justification for the governments action.
Substantive due process is an aspect of due process which serves as
a restriction on the law-makingand rule-makingpower of the
government.
The law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be
enforced, should be fair, reasonable, and just.
It guarantees against the arbitrary power even when exercised
according to proper forms and procedure.
PDP IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
Requisites:
(1) An impartial court of tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it.
(2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant and over the property subject matter of the
proceeding [Banco Espaol v. Palanca (1918)] Note: Notice is an
essential element of due process, otherwise the Court will not
acquire jurisdiction and its judgment will not bind the defendant.
To be meaningful, it must be both as to time and place. Service
of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant but also to afford the latter the
opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus,
compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is
The defendant must be given an opportunity to be

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of,
waived or forfeited without violating the
guarantee. [Bautista v. Court of Appeals (2004)]
heard
accorded the
it is deemed
constitutional
The SC reiterated that the right to appeal is not a natural right

nor part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. [Alba v. Nitorreda (1996)]
(4)
Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing and must

clearly explain its factual and legal bases... [Sec. 14, Art. VIII;
Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca (1918)]
Note: The allowance or denial of motions for extension rests principally on

the sound discretion of the court to which it is addressed, but such
discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, with a view to
substantial justice. Poverty is recognized as a sufficient ground for
extending existing period for filing. The right to appeal is part of due
process of law. [Reyes v. CA (1977)]
PDP IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

The Ang Tibay Rules:
(1) Right to a hearing to present own case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
(2) Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) Decision rendered must have support.
(4) Evidence which supports the finding or conclusion is substantial (such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to
support a conclusion).
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The tribunal or any of its judges, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
(7) The tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
[AngTibay v. CIR (1940)]
PDP IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
See Rights of the Accused, Topic 1 Criminal Due Process
In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, it cannot be said that the State
has been denied due process unless there is an indication that the special
prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or
that other evidence could be secured. [People of the Philippines, v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), et al., (2012)].
PDP IN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Requisites :
(1) The students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them;
(2) They shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf;
(5) The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case [Non v. Judge Dames (1990)]
STATUTORY DUE PROCESS
Basis: Labor Code
Requirements.
procedural(the manner of dismissal)
and substantive (valid and authorized causes of employment termination);
and (2) notice and hearing
Purpose: protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just
cause after notice and hearing.
Effect of breach: does not void action but court provides for other
remedies
There are three reasons why violation by the employer of the notice
requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the
nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff:
(1) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on
governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of
private power, such as the termination of employment under
the Labor Code.
(2) Notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause
before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon
the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of
employment under Art. 283.
(3) The employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an
impartial judge of his own cause. [Serrano v. NLRC (2000)]
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Laws which interfere with life, liberty or property satisfy substantive due
process when there is:
(1) Lawful object i.e. the interests of the public in general (as
distinguished from those of a particular class) require the
intervention of the State, and
(2) Lawful means i.e. means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive on individuals. [US v. Toribio (1910)]
***Publication of laws is part of substantive due process. [Taada v. Tuvera
(1986)]
Kristine
Confesor
Governmental functions are classified into:
(1) Constituent constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature (i.e. public order, administration of justice
and foreign relations)
(2) Ministrant undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional on the part of the
State (i.e. public education, public charity and regulations of
trade and industry) [Concurring Opinion of Justice Fernando in
ACCFA v. CUGCO (1969)]
JUDICIAL STANDARD REVIEWThe judicial standard review of legislation

involving substantive due process were first used in equal protection
questions or issues.
The 3 tests used are: +1
(1) Strict scrutiny test or compelling state interest test
(2) Intermediate scrutiny or intermediate review test
(3) Differential or rational review test
(4) Void for Vagueness
In the level of tests or which of these tests is used, The
STRICT SCRUTINY is the most stringent. What this requires is thatthe
presumptions of validity of the regulation has a narrow application. The
state must show that there is a compelling state interest that must be
protected. You should justify that. Secondly, there must also be an analysis
of less restrictive measures to allow such regulation in order to achieve
the objective of such legislation
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TEST considers the substantiality of
government interest and the availability of less restrictive alternatives. As
compared to compelling state interest, it is more stringent because the
state must be able to show compelling state interest, and that must be
protected and that that means is the least restrictive of all measures or
alternatives. In intermediate, there is no need to show that. There is only a
need to show that the less restrictive alternatives have been considered
and that the government interest needed to be shown is merely
substantial.
The least stringent of all is the
DIFFERENTIAL OR RATIONAL REVIEW. The regulations are valid if it
rationally furthers a legitimate government interest without of course
inquiring into such interest and examining the alternatives.
Generally, when judicial review is invoked for purposes of questioning the
validity of legislation under Substantive due process, the most common is
GRAVE ABUSE as it is in judicial review. Meaning, if the legislation is fair, or
whether legislation amounts to grave abuse of discretion, then they can
be subjected to judicial review. But as to whether the court will hold that
legislation invalid, these 3 tests are used to determine whether these
legislation can be allowed or should be nullified.
In relation to judicial standards of review, the VOID FOR VAGUENESS
DOCTRINE comes into play. A statute is considered vague if it
(1) lacks comprehensible standards that

(2) men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its
meaning or
(3) differ as to its application.
It is not vague simply because the words or phrases are ambiguous. If the
statute can be saved by statutory construction or by saving clause, it is
not considered vague and there is not void. It is considered as violative
of due process because it fails to
(1) give fair notice to the person targeted and
(2) it gives state through its law enforcement agencies unbridled
discretion in the implementation or execution of the law.
So how vague it is means that the words or phrases must not be capable
of given meaning despite the application of statutory rules of construction.
There have been several cases by which SC has gone through
congressional records to explain or give meaning to what the provision of
the law should pertain to. If after use of these rules and aids in guiding the
court in interpreting the provision of the law as to what would be the legal
meaning and then it is considered as vague, and therefore void. But again,
if only a portion of that law is declared invalid, then the rest of the
remainder would be given meaning, then that part is not vague and not
void.
In relation to that void for vagueness doctrine, there are 3 usual traits
which make the statute vague and therefore void, have been used.
Facial invalidation
Overbreadth doctrine
As applied application
When a statute is vague and declared therefore to be void, most of the
question on cases on this will be placed as a form of facial invalidation.
Meaning, the law which on its face is vague should be declared
unconstitutional.
The FACIAL INVALIDATION THEORY to declare the law as
unconstitutional is generally allowed when it refers to cases or laws free
speech rights and not to criminal or penal statutes. The reason given is
that it will prevent the state from prosecuting lawful offenders if the
statute is declared void on its face because it is vague. So this only applies
when it involves free speech rights or expression. [People v. Siton,
2009]
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE is the reverse of facial invalidation because
Overbreadth would require that the law is not really vague on its face. The
law is clear as to what acts are covered or penalized, although the law
also penalizes what is also supposed to be protected rights. So the law has
been applied to cover acts even if these acts are protected. Thats why
they use the term Overbreadth.
Can the law be declared unconstitutional because it tends to
cover acts which are supposed to be declared protected? Again,
this is allowed if it involves FREE SPPECH RIGHTS AND FREE SPEECH
REGULATIONS. The reason for this is, even if the person is not charged
before the courts in a case, but because it affects protected rights, the
court may actually declare that law to be unconstitutional so that the
protected rights will not be impaired.
AS APPLIED DOCTRINEis the limited case or petition to declare a law

unconstitutional because it is vague if applied to a particular accused or
defendant in the case. It may not be vague to everybody but if applied to
him, it may be vague and the court may be allowed to declare a law
unconstitutional because it is vague if applied to this particular individual.
Just like this case of Siton, this would require payment of taxes for lessees,
owners of fish pens and ponds and for non-failure of which, would subject
these persons to certain criminal liability. The accused here was a fish pen
manager and so is he covered by the term owner or lessee of the farm or
fish pen?
Facial invalidation cannot be applied because it does not involve free
speech. Overbreadth doctrine could not also be applied because it is a tax
legislation but if using as applied to him doctrine, there is a possibility
that the law can be declared as unconstitutional if applied to him only. The
issue is when applied to him, is he covered in the term owner or lessee
as covered by the enumerated terms in that law?
The SC said he is covered anyway .But just to show that as applied
doctrine can be used to declare a criminal statue as unconstitutional as
against a particular defendant and not only limited to free speech rights or
regulationsbut it applies to any criminal statute for that matter.
ROMUALDEZ V. COMELEC the information directed to be filed by the
COMELEC against petitioners and filed with the RTC were based on the
same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondents
complaint-affidavit. . As such, petitioners cannot claim that they were not
able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that
the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process
because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in
private respondents Complaint-Affidavit. It likewise bears stressing that
preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them.
They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for
their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated. The
court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the
prosecution and disposition of criminal complaint.
GARCILLANO V. COMMITTEES (2008) the requisite of publication of the

rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. , the
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure . SUCH INQUIRY IF ALLOWED WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE
REQUIRED PUBLICATION WILL PUT A PERSONS LIFE, LIBERTY AND
PROPERTY AT STAKE WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Furthermore, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
Kristine
Confesor
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents, not a
valid publication.
PLACIDO V. NLRC (2009) Were the petitioners denied due process when
PLDT refused to furnish them a copy of the Investigation Report/grant
them a formal hearing in which they could be represented by counsel of
their choice? HELD: THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IS SIMPLY AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law
prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a
party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the
opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of
which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
MENDOZA V. COMELEC (2009) Did the COMELEC violate due process by
conducting proceedings without giving due notice to the petitioner? HELD:
The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the
steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the
provincial election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the
petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the
Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation
entailed.
SURNECO V. ERC (2010) WON SURNECO was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard in ordering it to refund alleged over-recoveries
arrived at by the ERC. HELD: . Administrative due process simply requires
an opportunity to explain ones side or to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. It means being given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment, and for this purpose, a formal trial-type hearing is
not even essential. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable chance to demonstrate their respective positions and to
present evidence in support thereof. the PPA confirmation necessitated a
review of the electric cooperatives monthly documentary submissions to
substantiate their PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of
the need for other required supporting documents and were allowed to
submit them accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the
ERC conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives
representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss preliminary figures and to
double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition,
after the issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives were
allowed to file their respective motions for reconsideration. It cannot
claimed, therefore, that SURNECO was denied due process
Note: in this case, the court distinguished Quasi-Legislative v. QuasiJudicial Power of Administrative Agencies.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INCvs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL petitioners assail for being intrinsically
vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with

no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
HELD:
THE OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS DOCTRINES THEN HAVE
SPECIAL APPLICATION ONLY TO FREE SPEECH CASES. A facial
invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein
certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. Why? The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established
rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, whilestatutes found vague
as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."
The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied"
challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an

examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.
Doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness cannot be made
to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. Vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution
would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge
in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial
challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative.
It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not
before it. It will impair the States ability to deal with crime.
In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted
to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire
statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit.
The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression."An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in
RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge
against them
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA vsNUWHRAIN Respondent filed with
DOLE-NCR a petition for certification election. DOLE ordered Med-Arbiter
to conduct pre-conference. Petitioner filed for delisting for respondent but
it was dismissed. On appeal to BLR, the BLR director inhibited himself for
being a former counsel of respondent. Thus, the DOLE Sec took
cognizance of the appeal who dismissed the same. Did this assumption
violate petitioners right to due process? HELD: No, Petitioner was not
denied the right to due process when it was not notified in advance of the
BLR Directors inhibition and the DOLE Secretarys assumption of the case.
Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
BOCEA V. TEVES Attrition Act of 2005, provides for the setting of
criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees
Kristine
Confesor
whose revenue collection fall short of the target. They now allege that it
violates their right to due process ad right to security of tenure since their
tenure is subject to a condition of reaching a quota. HELD: there is no
violation of due process. The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is
not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without
any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all
relevant factors that may affect the level of collection. In the same
manner, exemptions were set, contravening BOCEAs claim that its
members may be removed for unattained target collection even due to
causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an employees right to
be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of
him. In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case cannot be
arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his
constitutional right to due process. No less than R.A. No. 9335 in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.
CABALIT V. COA Upon the investigation of the COA, they found out that
the LTO employees tampered the official receipts to make it appear that
they collected lesser amounts than they actually collected from year 19982001. WON there was a violation of the right to due process when the
hearing officer at the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas adopted the
procedure under A.O. No. 17 notwithstanding the fact that the said
amendatory order took effect after the hearings had started. HELD: NO.
Petitioners were not denied due process of law when the investigating
lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the affidavits and other
evidence on record. Petitioners were not denied due process of law when
the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the
affidavits and other evidence on record. There is no merit in the
contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect
while the case was already undergoing trial before the hearing officer,
should not have been applied. The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does
not have a vested right in procedural rules.
YLAYA V. GACOTT[d]ue process, as a constitutional precept, does not

always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may
be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers,
memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be
met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude[,
provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process, for an administrative
agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
-Respondents failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient
ground to claim that he had not been afforded due process
ANY SEEMING DEFECT IN THE OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS IS
CURED BY THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. A]
[d]enial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has
had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Undoubtedly [in this case], the requirement of the law was afforded to
[the] respondent.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LAWYERS ARE SUI
GENERIS. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. The complainant in disbarment cases is
not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court. Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not
mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant
must adduce evidence. From all these, we find it clear that the
complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary proceedings and her
failure to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative
evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether,
upon due investigation, the IBP Board of Governors finds sufficient
evidence of the respondents misconduct to warrant the exercise of its
disciplinary powers.
Due Process and Police Power

Police power
Definition
It is the inherent and plenary power of the state which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
[Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of
Manila (1967)]
Scope and Limitations
General Coverage
"The police power of the State," one court has said, "is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of
overruling necessity.' [Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919)]
the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state and to this
fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. [Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust
Co. (1979)]
...has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, [Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assoc.
v. Mayor of Manila (1967) Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957)] extending as it
does "to all the great public needs."[Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S.
412]
Police Power cannot be bargained away through treaty or contract.
[Ichong v. Hernandez (1957)]
Taxation may be used as an implement of police power [Lutz v. Araneta
(1955); Tiu v. Videogram Regulatory Board (1987); Gaston v. Republic
Planters Bank (1988); Osmena v. Orbos (1993)]
Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the police
objective [Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (1989)]
Police power prevails over contracts. [PNB v. Office of the President
(1996)]
Specific Coverage
(1) Public Health
(2) Public Morals
(3) Public Safety
(4) Public Welfare
Test of Reasonability
(1) Lawful subject
(2) Lawful means
(3) Least restrictions of individual right
The limit to police power is reasonability. The Court looks at the test of
reasonability to decide whether it encroaches on the right of an individual.
So long as legitimate means can reasonably lead to create that end, it is
reasonable. [Morfe v. Mutuc (1968)]
The legislative determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
court.[US v. Toribio (1910) citing Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the
case of Lawton v. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136)]
The SC upheld the validity of Administrative Orders which converted
existing mine leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing
agreements within one year from effectivity. The subject sought to be
governed by the AOs are germane to the object and purpose of E.O. 279
and that mining leases or agreements granted by the State are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of police power of the State.
[Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran (1995)]
Illustrations on the Exercise of Police Power
General Welfare v. Property rights. RA 9257, the Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003, is a legitimate exercise of police power.
Administrative Order No. 177 issued by the Department of Health,
providing that the 20% discount privilege of senior citizens shall not be
limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicine but shall extend to
both prescription and non-prescription medicine, whether branded or
generic, is valid. [Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. DSWC et al. (2007)]
National Security v. Property Rights. Police power and national
security: SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 1180 (An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business) which sought to nationalize the retail trade business
by prohibiting aliens in general from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade.
The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger
to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business; the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power
of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future. [Ichong v. Hernandez (1957)]
Scope of the police power: Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs
and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through
which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare.
Kristine
Confesor
Public Safety. Agustin questions President Marcos Letter of Instruction
No. 229 compelling owners of motor vehicles to install specific early
warning devices to reduce road accidents.
Police power, public safety: The Court identified police power as a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in
the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare. According to the Court, a heavy burden
lies in the hands of the petitioner who questions the states police power if
it was clearly intended to promote public safety. [Agustin v. Edu, (1979)]
Public Morals v. Property rights and Right to privacy.
Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Assoc. assails the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance There is no question that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
[Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor of Manila
(1967)]
REQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE

POLICE POWER
Tests for Validity of Exercise of Police Power
1)
Lawful Subject: Interest of the general public (as distinguished from
a particular class required exercise). This means that the activity or
property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare. [Taxicab
Operators v. Board of Transportation (1982)]
2)
Lawful Means: Means employed are reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of the purpose, and are not unduly oppressive.
[Tablarin v. Gutierrez (1987)]
The SC applied strict scrutiny because the ordinance restricts patrons

right to liberty. Legitimate sexual behavior, which is constitutionally
protected, will be unduly curtailed by the ordinance. Apart from the right
to privacy, the ordinance also proscribes other legitimate activities most of
which are grounded on the convenience of having a place to stay during
the short intervals between travels. [White Light Corporation, et al v. City
of Manila (2009)]
Limitations when police power is delegated:
when police power is delegated
1)
Express grant by law [e.g. Secs. 16, 391, 447, 458 and 468, R.A.
7160, for LGUs]
2)
Limited within its territorial jurisdiction [for local government
units]
3)
Must not be contrary to law.
On the abatement of nuisance/zoning
NUISANCE PER SE
NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS
It can summarily be abated
There is a need for a judicial
WITHOUT judicial proceedings
proceedings; if without a judicial
proceeding, the police power
exercise is valid
(nuisance at all times and under all
Nuisance solely by reason of place
circumstances; kind of nuisance
and time that it becomes a
which poses danger of threat or
nuisance
immediate danger to life and
property.
DUE PROCESS NEED NOT BE OBSERVED IN THE FF
(1) Nuisance per se
(2) Preventive suspension:
LGU as Exercising Police Power
2 types of delegated authority of LGUs:
(1) General delegation (Under the Gen. Welfare clause)
(2) Specific Delegation (by grant of law)
Least Restrictions of Individual Rights: It must also be evident

that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. [White Light Corporation, et al v.
City of Manila (2009)]
The case of White Light v. City of Manila dealt with the ordinance that
prohibits two practices: the wash-up rate admission and renting out a
room more than twice per day.
TEST OF
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
This case
1.
2.
3.
4.
In the White Light Case, SC held that ORDINANCE MUST BE STRUCK

DOWN AS AN ARBITRARY INTRUSION. That the Ordinance prevents the
lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It
must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights
and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
3)
churned out three standards for judicial review: the

strict scrutiny test :laws dealing w/ freed
om of the mind and curtailment of political process ;
rational basis standard of review for economic legislation; &
immediate scrutiny for evaluating standards based on gender
and legitimacy.
VALID ORDINANCE
It must not contravene the Constitution or any Statute -C
It must not be Unfair or Oppressive U
It must not be partial or discriminatory - P
It must not prohibit but may regulate trade - T
It must be general and consistent with public policy - CPP
It must be reasonable. -R
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. SC also said that
it was prohibiting what is already prohibited. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
MAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT MAY
FAIRLY BE REQUIRED BY THE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS OF PUBLIC
INTEREST OR WELFARE. It rashly equates wash rates and renting out a
room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR VS. AYALA STATE WOULD BE ACTING
BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF POLICE POWER IN PROHIBITING THE
COLLECTION OF PARKING FEES. Police power is the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however,
does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate
does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting
the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use,
the State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent
powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. Normally, of course, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said
power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. 36 It is a settled
rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is
essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the
private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the
impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a
compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the
profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to
compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the
regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police
regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property
for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the
owner may recover therefor.
BSP MB VS. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA W/N BSP violated the right of
the Banks to due process? No. RESPONDENT BANKS CANNOT CLAIM
VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE
NOT FURNISHED WITH COPIES OF THE ROEs. The banks are already aware
of the contents of the ROEs, they cannot say that fairness and
transparency are not present. If sanctions are to be imposed upon the
Kristine
Confesor
respondent banks, they are already well aware of the reasons for the
sanctions, having been informed via the lists of findings/exceptions,
demolishing that particular argument. The ROEs would then be
superfluities to the respondent banks, and should not be the basis for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC DECISION WHICH ALLOWED THE RESPONDENT BANKS TO
VIEW THE ROE AND ACT UPON THEM TO FORESTALL ANY
SANCTIONS THE MONETARY BOARD MIGHT IMPOSE VIOLATES THE
CLOSE NOW, HEAR LATER DOCTRINE It is well-settled that the
closure of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. The
action of the MB on this matter is final and executory. Such exercise may
nonetheless be subject to judicial inquiry and can be set aside if found to
be in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Judicial review enters the picture
only after the MB has taken action; it cannot prevent such action by the
MB. The threat of the imposition of sanctions, even that of closure, does
not violate their right to due process, and cannot be the basis for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for
on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless
adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against
distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is
certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not
to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and
stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.
ROXAS & CO. VS. DAMBA-NFSW AGRARIAN REFORM IS AN
EXERCISE OF BOTH POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN. Police
power because it prescribed retention limits for landowners. Eminent
domain because it provides for the compulsory acquisition of private
agricultural lands for redistribution. Private rights must yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
justification. . . that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
CHEVRON VS. BCDA TAX VS. REGULATION AS A FORM OF POLICE
POWER. In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power,
the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the
purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even
though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand,
if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and
an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally,
revenue is generated.
THE ROYALTY FEE WAS IMPOSED PRIMARILY FOR REGULATORY
PURPOSES AND NOT FOR THE GENERATION OF INCOME OR
PROFITS. The questioned royalty fees form part of the regulatory
framework to ensure free flow or movement of petroleum fuel to and
from the CSEZ. The fact that respondents have the exclusive right to
distribute and market petroleum products within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA
with SBMA and CSBTI does not diminish the regulatory purpose of the
royalty fee for fuel products supplied by petitioner to its client at the CSEZ.
ESPINA VS. ZAMORA President Erap enacted RA 8762 (Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000.) It expressly repealed RA 1180 which prohibited
foreign nationals from engaging in retail trade business. RA 8762 allows

foreign nationals to engage in retail trade business. Its constitutionality
was questioned. HELD: RA 8762 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS IT IS A VALID
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. The control and regulation of trade in the
interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of
the State. A persons right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or
foreign national, cannot be taken from him without due process of law. In
1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180
that restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition
assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigners right to
substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law
constituted a valid exercise of police power. 11 The State had an interest in
preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably
related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act,
lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to property or to engage in an
ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a
denial of the Filipinos right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos
continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Application
When is there taking in the constitutional case?
When the owner is deprived of his proprietary rights there is taking of
private property. It may include
1)
diminution in value;
2)
prevention of ordinary use;
3)
deprivation of beneficial use.
In Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association (DESAMA) v. Gozun
(2006),
examples
1)
trespass without actual eviction;
2)
material impairment of the value
3)
prevention of the ordinary uses (e.g. easement).
But anything taken by virtue of police power is not compensable (e.g.
abatement of a nuisance), as usually property condemned under police
power is noxious [DESAMA v. Gozun (2006)]
Examples from Jurisprudence:
(1) The imposition of an aerial easement of right-of-way was held to be
taking. The exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always
result in the taking or appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it
may also result in the imposition of a burden upon the owner of the
condemned property, without loss of title or possession. [NPC v. Gutierrez
(1991)]
Due Process and Eminent Domain

EMINENT DOMAIN/ EXPROPRIATION
Definition and Scope
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to
condemn private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation. It is also known as the power of expropriation.
Private property shall not be
compensation [Art. III, Sec. 9]
taken
for
public use without
(2) May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material
impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses
for which the property was intended. [Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila
(1907)]
just
(3) A municipal ordinance prohibiting a building which would impair the

view of the plaza from the highway was likewise considered taking.
[People v. Fajardo (1958)]
It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the state

that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Sec. 9, Art. III
merely imposes a limit on the governments exercise of this power.
[Republic v Tagle (1998)].
Who may exercise the power?
1)
Congress and,
2)
by delegation, the President,
3)
administrative bodies,
4)
local government units, and even
a.
valid delegation
b.
w/n within the delegated power
i. local ordinance authorizing local chief
executive to exercise PED
ii. public use/welfare for the benefit of the
poor /landless
iii. just compensation
iv. valid and definite offer to the owner that
has not been accepted
5)
private enterprises performing public services
When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the

implementation of its agrarian reform program, the constitutional
provision which governs is Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution.
Notably, this provision also imposes upon the State the obligation of
paying the landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the
governments agrarian reform purposes. [Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Honeycomb Farms Corporation (2012)]
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
EMINENT DOMAIN
Requisites
Private property
Genuine necessity - inherent/presumed in legislation, but when the power
is delegated (e.g. local government units), necessity must be proven.
For public use - Court has adopted a broad definition of public use,
following the U.S. trend
Payment of just compensation
Due process [Manapat v. CA (2007)]
Kristine
Confesor
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
(1) LAWFUL TAKING
a.
Entry under color of authority
b.
Period of entry is more or less permanent
c.
There may be actual expropriation by expediency, if
momentarily
d.
If permanent, there must be a proper exercise of eminent
domain
e.
There is taking when
i. The expropriator must enter a private property
ii. The entrance must be for a momentary period
iii. The entry into the property should be under warrant or
color of legal authority
iv. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
v. The utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or

appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but
no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only
to impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss
of title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title
nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases
where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to
determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or
amounts to a compensable taking. Although in the present case, title to
and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the
prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the
use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of
their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a
portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free.
Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of
respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion
of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting
from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the
maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.
What time should the valuation for compensation be computed?
AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION. After that, if the

deposit has been made, the expropriator is allowed entry.
Basis: Nature and Character of the property
Ortega v. City of Cebu.: It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the

determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative. TWO STAGES
OF EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS
What if there is actual taking before the expropriation is filed?
NO INCREASE IN VALUE filing of petition
INCREASE IN VALUE FOR OWNERS BENEFITtaking

(2) PRIVATE PROPERTY
Any kinds of private property except money. All others, real or
personal, tangible or not are covered. There is no need to
exercise the PED if the property to be taken is public property.
(3) PUBLIC USE
Encompasses direct and indirect advantages to the public.
(4) JUST COMPENSATION
Full and fair equivalent of the property considering
o
Basic value of the property
o
Fair market value
o
If not the entire property, the consequential damages
as well as the consequential benefits shall be
considered
TWO STAGES OF EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS
(1) Determination of the validity of the expropriation
(2) Determination of just compensation
Solicitor General v. Ayala When there is a taking or confiscation of
private property for public use, the State is no longer exercising police
power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain.
Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power

of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. This ends with an order, if not of dismissal of
the action, of condemnation or order of expropriation declaring that the
plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint; and
2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.
Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment, much less,
withdraw itscomplaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the
expropriation proceedings.
LBP v. Rufino W/N RTC can resort to any other means of determining just
compensation aside from Sec. 17 of RA 6557 9or CARL and formula
prescribed by DAR AO 6-92, as amended. HELD: Generally, no. But, it can.
These laws however are mandatory and not mere guides that the RTC may
disregard. In determining just compensation due owners of lands taken for
CARP coverage, the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, should
take into account the factors enumerated under Sec. 17, RA 6557.
-
Cost of the acquisition of the land

Current value of like properties
Nature, actual use, income
Sworn valuation of the owner

Tax declarations
Assessment made by govt assessors
Social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
Nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from the govt financing
institution
LBP v. Jocson What law governs in the determination of the value of the
property? HELD: R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining just
compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it
more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the
propertyat the time of payment. This was a clear departure from the
Courts earlier stance in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines where it
declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just
compensation is the time when the land was takenapplying P.D. No. 27
and E.O. No. 228.
Eusebio v. Luis. W/N respondents are entitled to regain possession of
their property taken by the city government in the 1980s and, in the event
that said property can no longer be returned, how should just
compensation to respondents be determined ? HELD: even if there are no
expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the
trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure
provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and
disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the subject property.
Controlling factor: the value of the property at the time of the
taking. With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be
fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for
recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling.
CITY OF ILOILO vs. HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA When is an

order for expropriation final? And when is the correct reckoning point for
the determination of just compensation? HELD: Expropriation proceedings
have two stages both final but appealable.
(1) The first phase ends with an order of dismissal, or a
determination that the property is to be acquired for a public
purpose.
(2) The second phase consists of the determination of just
compensation. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be
paid to the landowner. Both orders, being final, are appealable.
Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
Kristine
Confesor
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure,
under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation
is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here,
there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of
reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the
filing of the complaint for expropriation.
Republic v. Mangorata Proper Parties in the Expropriation Proceedings:
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of
the property condemned. They include all other persons owning,
occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by
eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is
entitled to compensation.
Republic v. Mendoza(2010) the failure for a long time of the owner to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that
the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back
possession. The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment. The Court affirmed the RTCs power to
award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation
proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation based
on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery
of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when
just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was
taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed
an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of
taking that is controlling.
LBP v LIVIOCO (2010) VALUE OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY. For
purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.
There are three important concepts in this definition:
1) the character of the property,
2) its price, and
3) the time of actual taking.
APO FRUITS v LBP ( 2010 ) JUST COMPENSATION:CONCEPT. The concept
of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just inasmuch as the property
owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed
by this Court that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss.
The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for

the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
THE POWER OF EXPROPRIATION IS BY NO MEANS ABSOLUTE. The limitation
is found in the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
ABAD V. FILHOMES REALTY In the exercise of the power of eminent

domain, the State expropriates private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the
ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions
on social justice.
VDA. DE OUANO v REPUBLIC (2011) 1) whether abandonment of the
public use for which the subject properties were expropriated entitles
petitioners ouanos, et al. and respondents inocian, et al. to reacquire
them.
The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always
conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary
corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its
reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the
just compensation received.
2) whether petitioners ouanos, et al. and respondents inocian, et al. are
entitled to reconveyance of the subject properties simply on the basis of
an alleged verbal promise or assurance of some nac officials that the
subject properties will be retunred if the airport project would be
abandoned.
equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated
lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice
and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA
what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their
respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default,
which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation. They must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary
expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and the
monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the
extent that they, as private owners, were benefited thereby.
NPC vs HEIRS OF SANGKAY ( 2011)
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating
agency differs from the action for damages. .Just compensation is the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owner's loss. The
word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in
order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the
other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through
damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or
exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with

the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in
the Civil Code,and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal
wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.
The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former
does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse
condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional
prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation. It
would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to
bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a
public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have
first moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by
voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings.
In either case, NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair
market value of the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395
expressly requires NPC to pay NPCs construction of the tunnel
constituted taking of the land, and entitled owners to just
compensation. the fair market value of such property at the time
of the taking
Reckoning point of just compensation on the value at the time the owners
commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely
warranted. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing
at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as
NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross
unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the
intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior
knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit.
EQUAL PROTECTION
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws. [Art. III, sec.1]
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things should be
treated alike both as to rights conferred and as to responsibilities imposed.
It does not require absolute equality but only SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
based on a valid classification. And for there to be a valid classification,
Persons or things are similar in some particulars of which they are not
similar to the rest. It is not required that they are similar in all these
particulars but only that in some particulars, they are similar which in
others do not hold any similarity.
The requisites for valid classification would be:
1.
Classification must be based on a substantial distinction
2.
It must be germane to the purpose of the law
3.
must not be limited to existing or present conditions
4.
it must be applied equally to all those who belong to the same
class
Kristine
Confesor
The law does not require absolute equality to all provided there must be
absolute equality to all those who belong to the same class.
Substantial distinction means REASONABLE CONNECTION TO THE

INTENT OF THE LAW because classification must have to be germane to
the purpose of the law. Agemay or may not be substantial depending on
the objective/intent of the legislation. Genderwhen used on maternity or
paternity laws, it would be substantial. But when used for purposes of
minimum wage that should not be substantial distinction because in labor
law, we know that is a fair days wage for a fair days labor. So it largely
depends on the intent of the law to make the classification based on
substantial distinctions.
For so long as the matter or issue sought to be addressed by the

legislation where the classification is made is existing or will
continue to exist, that classification must continue to exist. It cannot be
made applicable to existing conditions only because it will amount to
CLASS LEGISLATION. Or anything or Any person which is supposed to be
covered by the legislation but because of the classification becoming
applicable to present conditions only, it will be violative of equal protection
of those who may be similarly situated in the future who will no longer be
covered by the legislation. There must have to be symmetrical
applicability of the legislation based on the classification of all those falling
in the same class. Symmetrical because our common example there for
easy reference is our income tax base whereby classification in
legislation--- there are several amounts of money as your net income will
belong to the same class. You may not earn the same amount but the law
would put you in the same category because that is the intent. They are
capable of paying the same tax worth.
The STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLASSIFICATION would
still follow the 3 tests
(1) The strict scrutiny- there must be compelling state interest as
to why that law has been made and the intent of that legislation
subject of classification is the less restrictive means of achieving
that purpose of the legislation
(2) Intermediate- the classification must have to be substantially
related to a government interest. and
(3) rational basis testthere must have to be a rational
relationship of this classification to a legitimate government
purpose.
ECONOMIC EQUALITY , POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL EQUALITY.

ECONOMIC EQUALITYfundamental equality for the law, reduction of
inequality by reducing wealth in political power, nationalization, mining,
land ownership of public utilities, mass media, advertising and
preservation of marine wealth and protection to labor and social justice
provision.
Article II, Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies

and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: xxx Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Article XII, Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture,
or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish- workers
in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution.
Article XII, Sec. 10 The Congress shall, upon recommendation of

the economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress
may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall
enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation
of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
Article XIII, Sec. 1-2 The Congress shall give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good.To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.
The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative
and self-reliance.
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local

and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It
shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
POLITICAL EQUALITYwe have policy that our candidates must be free

from harassment and discrimination, reduction of political inequality by
reducing wealth in political power, reduction of acquisition, use, ownership
of property for purposes of political equality and also guarantees the
power of the peoples initiative in government decision making. Then
there is equal access to government service, prohibition on political
dynasties, sectoral reps in congress and LGUS. I think the best way to
address political dynasties is to prevent the inclusion of PDAF in the
Budget or even in the local Budget. If the pork barrel system is abolished,
nobody will run. Wala may kwarta.
ARTICLE IX-C, Sec. 10
Article XIII, sec. 1
Dumlao v. Comelec The guarantee of equal protection is subject to
rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the
present case, employees 65 years of age have been classified differently
from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement
while the latter are not.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
Kristine
Confesor
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated,
a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribed is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. There is
reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for
office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance.
When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work.
The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid.
Quinto v. Comelec Facts: R.A. 8676 provides that all elective officials are
not deemed resigned upon filing of their certificate of candidacy, however,
appointive officials are considered deemed resigned upon filing of the
COCs. HELD:
2009 Decision
Yes. Persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned upon filing
of CoCs, but not considering resigned all other civil servants, specifically
elective ones, the law duly discriminates against the first class (appointive
officials). Applying the four requisites of valid classification, the Court finds
that treatment of persons holding appointive officers as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of law (Requisite No.
2). There is no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently
from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that
it should be germane to the purposes of law.
2010 Decision
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is not violative of the equal
protection clause.
There is substantial distinction. Elective officials are elected by his
constituents, if they are deemed resigned, the constituents will be
affected. On the other hand, in the case of appointive officials, they do not
have ordinary succession, thus, there will be vacancy during resignation.
Ang Ladlad v. Comelec Whether or not denying the application of Ang
Ladlad is violative of the equal protection clause. HELD: Yes. COMELEC
made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case. According to COMELEC, the majority of Filipinos
considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable. Such reason
is sufficient to disqualify the petitioner. Homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of equal protection clause. Moral disapproval
of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient
to satisfy the rational basis review under the equal protection clause. LGBT
has the same interest in participating in the party-list system. Laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs.
The latter is the same with SOCIAL EQUALITY provision except that in
addition to those, we have free access to courts and legal aid.
Article XIII, Sec. 1
Trillanes vs. Pimentel Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to
attend the Senate sessions.HELD: No. The distinctions cited by petitioner
were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to

Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as
the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. The Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
The cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both
being punishable by reclusion perpetua. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged.
ABAKADA v. Purisima Whether or not the limitation of the scope of the

system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of BIR
and BOC is violative of the equal protection clause. HELD: No. The
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A.
9335 does not violate the equal protection clause. The subject of the law
is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically
pertain to the said agencies. The law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus
under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great
inherent functions - taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is
germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law.
Soriano v. Laguardia The MTRCB gave a 20-day preventive suspension

to Sorianos And Dating Daan TV program for defamatory utterances
against an INC minister. Soriano was later imposed with a three-month
suspension from his TV program Whether or not the preventive suspension
order by the MTRCB denied him his right to the equal protection clause.
HELD: No Petitioner next faults MTRCBs preventive suspension order
which made him unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC
ministers. Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal protection
clause demands that "all persons subject to legislation should be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed." It guards against undue favor and
individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner
cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC
ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before
the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their
TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own,
necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the immediate result of
the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily
gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a
deprivation of the equal protection guarantee.
League of Cities vs. COMELEC

2008 Ruling
Cityhood laws are violative of the equal protection clause. Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by R.A. 9009, does not contain
any exemption to theP100 million annual income requirement. Even if the
exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely
states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No.
9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from
those that are not exempted.
The classification in the present case must be based on substantial
distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which
is the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to
prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
2009 Ruling
Petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the
equal protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of
property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws.
The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially
reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs
would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee. The favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16)
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial
distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the
erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income
requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other
municipalities desirous to be cities. The exemption of respondent
LGUs/municipalities from the P100M income requirement was meant to
reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA
9009 and also to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded
respondent LGUs making the classification is also germane to the purpose
of the law. The non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in
application only to conditions existing at the time of its enactment
because it is intended to apply for all time. The uniform exemption clause
would apply to all municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the
passage of R.A. 9009 and were compliant with the LGC of 1991.
2010 Ruling
2008 ruling is reinstated. No substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere
Kristine
Confesor
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. Pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at
the time of passage of RA 9009therefore violating the requirement that a
valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only
(pendency of the cityhood bills adverted to can no longer be repeated).
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
2011 Ruling
There was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate
the equal protection clause. The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009
was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities" and the apprehension that before long the country
will be a country of cities and without municipalities. Substantial
distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondents to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the
Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of the respondents to
become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly,
the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th
Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of
PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
Chamber of Real vs. Romulo:Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and

Builders Associations, Inc. is questioning the constitutionality of Section 27
(E) of Republic Act 8424 and the revenue regulations issued by the BIR to
implement said provision and those involving creditable withholding taxes.
HELD: The equal protection clause under the Constitution as applied in this
case means that all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed
alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of
taxation. Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The
real estate industry is a class and can be validly treated differently from
other business enterprises.
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission Whether or not the Truth

Commission is violative of the equal protection clause.
Held: YES
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the
assailed executive order. The Arroyo administration is but just a member
of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification.
BOCEA v. TEVES EQUAL PROTECTION simply provides that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
Not violative of Equal Protection; The equal protection clause
recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to
RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since
the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the
law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law
concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally
perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which
the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related
to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
Pursuant to a confidential
information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and
test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant
from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13,
1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City
to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation ISSUE:
Whether or not CMO 27-2003 should be declared unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause RULING: The equal
protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the
equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable

classification. HELD: Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet
these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is affected
by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003
have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as
feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the
other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have
imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff,
thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does
not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely
wheat importations and thus prevent their misclassification." A careful
study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but
results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the
possibility that other corporations that are excluded from the list import
food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an assumption that those
who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case,
importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their
wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.
Manotok vs Heirs of Barque The land subject of this case is the Piedad
Estate. This involves the transfer of friar lands. As can be gleaned from the
records, the transfer of such friar lands was declared invalid due to the
fact that there was no signature of the Director of Lands and approval by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate.
ISSUE: W/N not application of RA 9344 in this instant case is violative of
the equal protection clause- NO. RULING: We are of the opinion that the
provisions of RA 9443 may not be applied to the present case as to cure
the lack of signature of the Director of Lands and approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No.
1054.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not
Kristine
Confesor
This confirmation and declaration of validity shall in all respects be entitled
to like effect and credit as a decree of registration, binding the land and
quieting the title thereto and shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the national government and al1 branches thereof;
except when, in a given case involving a certificate of title or are
constituted certificate of title, there is clear evidence that such certificate
of title or reconstituted certificate of title was obtained through fraud, in
which case the solicitor general or his duly designated representative shall
institute the necessary judicial proceeding to cancel the certificate of title
or reconstituted certificate of title as the case may be, obtained through
such fraud.(Emphasis supplied.)
Without ruling on the issue of violation of equal protection guarantee if the
curative effect of RA 9443 is not made applicable to all titled lands of the
Piedad Estate, it is clear that the Manotoks cannot invoke this law to
"confirm" and validate their alleged title over Lot 823. It must be stressed
that the existence and due issuance of TCT No. 22813 in the name of
Severino Manotok was not established by the evidence on record. There is
likewise no copy of a "duly executed certificate of sale" "on file" with the
DENR regional office. In the absence of an existing certificate of title in the
name of the predecessor-in-interest of the Manotoks and certificate of sale
on file with the DENR/CENRO, there is nothing to confirm and validate
through the application of RA 9443.
Moreover, RA 9443 expressly excludes from its coverage those cases
involving certificates of title which were shown to have been fraudulently
or irregularly issued. As the reconstitution and remand proceedings in
these cases revealed, the Manotoks title to the subject friar land, just like
the Barques and Manahans, is seriously flawed. The Court cannot allow
them now to invoke the benefit of confirmation and validation of
ownership of friar lands under duly executed documents, which they never
had in the first place. Strict application by the courts of the mandatory
provisions of the Friar Lands Act is justified by the laudable policy behind
its enactment -- to ensure that the lands acquired by the government
would go to the actual occupants and settlers who were given preference
in their distribution.
REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE

2.
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF

COMMUNICATIONS
PRE-ARREST
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.[Art. III, Sec.2]
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [Art. III, Sec. 3]
1.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS [Rule 126, RROCP]
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People

of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property described therein and
bring it before the court.
Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal
action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending.
Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for
the search and seizure of personal property
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue except upon
(1) probable cause in connection with one specific offense
(2) to be determined personally by the judge
(3) after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witness he may produce, and
(4) particularly describing the place to be searched and
(5) the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing
the warrant,
(1) personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
(2) in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce
(3) on facts personally known to them and
(4) attach to the record their sworn statements,
(5) together with the affidavits submitted.
Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the

existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant,
which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer,
(1) if refused admittance to the place of directed search
(2) after giving notice of his purpose and authority,
(3) may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any
part of a house or anything therein
(4) to execute the warrant to liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be
made except in
(1) the presence of the lawful occupant thereof; or
(2) any member of his family; or
(3) in the absence of the latter,
a.
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
b.
residing in the same locality.
Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in
the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction
may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.
Validity of search warrant. A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10)
days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void.
Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing the property
under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful
occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were
made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at
least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge
who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly
verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge
shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall
summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him
to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the
judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been
complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered
to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the
custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein
the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used
Kristine
Confesor
or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where
to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence
obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where
the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted,
the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search
warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal
case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved
by the latter court.
(3)
POST-ARREST
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the
(1)
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
(2)
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families.
[Art III, Sec. 12]
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
[Art III, Sec. 13]
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
[Art III, Sec. 17]
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment

against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. [Art
III, Sec. 19]
DURING TRIAL
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process
of
law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable. [Art. III, Sec. 14]
Right to appeal in criminal cases
Not part of constitutional due process
The only reason why it is part of it is that the Rules allow it
AFTER TRIAL
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. [Art. III, Sec. 16]
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. [Art. III, sec. 19]
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. [Art. III, sec. 21]
*Probable cause
Which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that the
things subject to crime are in the possession of the person to be
searched on in the place sought to be searched
*Warrant
Order issued by a judge of competent jurisdiction directing an
officer or agent to search a place or seize things described in
the warrant
*Valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches
Right exists
That the person involved had knowledge either actual or
constructive of the existence of a right
Said person had an intention to relinquish such right
Cases
In re Morales Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal
computer admissible in the present administrative case against him? NO.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. The burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given lies with the State.
ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LOSS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IS NOT TO
BE PRESUMED AND COURTS INDULGE EVERY REASONABLE
PRESUMPTION
AGAINST
WAIVER
OF
FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that
(1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual
intention to relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the opening
of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the
presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the
March 16, 2005 spot investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales
immediately filed an administrative case against said persons questioning
the validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards
required of every court employee, unfortunately, the Court cannot use the
evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated
his constitutional right.
People v. Nunez The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the
articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit
the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly
described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is
not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not
specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant.
Kristine
Confesor
Del Rosario V. Donato A JUDICIALLY ORDERED SEARCH THAT FAILS TO
YIELD THE DESCRIBED ILLICIT ARTICLE DOES NOT OF ITSELF RENDER THE
COURTS ORDER UNLAWFUL. The Del Rosarios did not allege that
respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating testimonies to
convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their
allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant
is a mere conclusion of law. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other
related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere
conclusions of law. As such, it exposes the complaint to a motion to
dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.
People v. Tuan CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF DEFINITENESS.A
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at
bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search
Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the
stated address, which was accused-appellants residence, consisting of a
structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
People v. Mamaril W/N there is a probable cause in issuing the search
warrant? Yes.PROBABLE CAUSE means such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Based on the records, the Court is convinced that the questioned search
warrant was based on a probable cause. A portion of the direct testimony
of SPO4 Gotidoc where he said that there were many persons who were
going to her place and theyve been hearing news that she is selling
prohibited drugs and some of them were even identified. Furthermore, the
authorities already conducted surveillance prior to the application for
search warrant.
THERE IS NO GENERAL FORMULA OR FIXED RULE FOR THE
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE since the same must be decided in
light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence
depends to a large degree upon the findings or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination.
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY It is presumed that a
judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the
contrary. A magistrates determination of a probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing court, as
long as there was substantial basis for that determination
TAN vs SY TIONG GUE Whether or not the items seized in the previously
conducted search warrant issued by the court for robbery be included and
used for the filing of for an information for qualified theft. HELD: NO! Thus,
a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in
connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the
basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or her witnesses.

Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the
search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a
separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the
same incident.
Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based
on the findings of the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there was no
probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the
essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential
element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily
included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed, much more,
prosper.
TY v DE JEMIL The law does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrants is
directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient
that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized.
POLLO vs CONSTANTINO-DAVID The constitutional guarantee is not a
prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches
and seizures. SC said that the search Pollo's files were conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letter-complaint. A search by a government employer of an
employees office is justified at inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct. The delay in correcting the
employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause
rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible
and often irreparable damage to the agencys work, and ultimately
to the public interest. x x x
2.
VALID INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURES
TWO PRECONDITIONS
(1) Lack of reasonable opportunity to secure a warrant
(2) Minimum requirement that they must have probable cause to
effect warrantless search and seizure
a.
The probable cause is determined by the seizing and
searching officer
By reason of Jurisprudence
1. Search of moving vehicles
o
Allowed by reason of the nature moving vehicles that
it can be easily moved away from its present location
o
Besides, it would be difficult to describe moving
vehicles. Mostly, it is via rough information
o
There must be a Reasonable Suspicion on the
part of the searching officer that an offense has just
been committed.
CASES:
ANIAG V. COMELEC The car driven by Arellano was flagged down as it

approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms
neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the
car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he
was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return
them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives. HELD:
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the
officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or
that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. Consequently, the
firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless
search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
EPIE VS. ULAT-MARREDO The only requirement in these exceptions is
the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched. In People vs. Artuta, the court ruled that in warrantless
searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of
suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed.
where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to
dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists
probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law
enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or
that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some
offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present case. Thus, the
warrantless search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in
evidence against petitioners.
PEOPLE V. TUAZON In this case, we hold that the police had probable
cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by
appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going
to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo
City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The
information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed,
the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing
shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellants
waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of
said firearm which all the more strengthened the polices suspicion. After
he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic
sachets containing white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken
together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless
search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the
plastic packets against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the
evidence against him on the ground that the same was obtained through a
warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the
legality of the search and the admissiblilty of the evidence obtained by the
police. It was only proper for the trial court to admit said evidence.
Kristine
Confesor
PEOPLE VS MARIACOS THE SEARCH IN THIS CASE IS VALID. The vehicle
that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2
Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the
search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had
enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
1.
2.
2. Search incident to a Valid Arrest

Two things to remember
There must be a valid arrest
The search must be limited to
a.
Space(made on the person arrested or the immediate
vicinity where he has effective control to: Cart away
evidence or Get weapons); and
b.
Time (made at the earliest possible opportunity after
the arrest; there must be no considerable lapse of
time)
CASES:
DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE It must be remembered that the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness. Incidentally, the items were
seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of the Del Castillo. HELD: the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. The
confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation
of Del Castillos constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizure.
LUZ VS PEOPLE There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an
intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of
the drivers license of the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty,
or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized

merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza
himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station
was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant
of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an
offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to
deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the
former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was
deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and
while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid
arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest
and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could be used against them.14 It
may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements
were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and
frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes
suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a
criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons.
AMBRE VS PEOPLE in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police
officers to his house; that inside the house, he police operatives found
Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre in
particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected to be a shabu in a
rolled up alumni foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi
and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of
shabu. HELD:
Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the
fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and
rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception established by
jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest. In this exception, the

law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and
his belongings. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with
a valid warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a

penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest

may be lawfully effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
1.
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
2.
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
(b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
(c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the
subsequent search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful.
After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting
police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense.
PEOPLE VS BELOCURA CI Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the
contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspaper. Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto
violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation and
Traffic Code). In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the
crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive
identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such
identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact
in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption." Even by his
own admission, he was actually committing a crime in the presence or
within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which
Belocura was apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule
Kristine
Confesor
113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the
arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly
search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he might
use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him
and the area within his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such
weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search
was to protect the arresting policemen from being harmed by him
with the use of a concealed weapon.
3.
When things seized are within the Plain view of a Searching

Party
Requirements:
(1) Justification for the prior intrusion
(2) Discovery of the evidence in advertent
(3) Evidence is open to the eye and hand of the police
(4) Evident illegality or that the evidence of illegality is immediately
apparent
CASES:
Abenes v. CA The production of a mission order is not necessary in view
of the fact that the checkpoint was established three days before the May
11, 1998 elections; and the circumstances under which the policemen
found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant (plainview). The law
enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which
they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion,
the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
Abenes where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in
plain view and discovered inadvertently when Abenes alighted from the
vehicle. However, there is insufficient evidence that the firearm Abenes
carried had no license. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Abenes was carrying a firearm without prior
authority, license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal
liability under the illegal possession of firearms law. However, Abenes is
still convicted for violation of the Comelec Gun Ban. Under the plain view
doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.
Esquillo v. People the circumstances under which petitioner was
arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her was warranted.
Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of
their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner
placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as
a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to
curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to
flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the
contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
People v. Martinez This case would appear to fall under either a

warrantless search INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST OR A PLAIN
VIEW SEARCH, BOTH OF WHICH REQUIRE A LAWFUL ARREST IN
ORDER TO BE CONSIDERED VALID EXCEPTIONS TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a
warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
The arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were
confiscated as an incident thereof. According to PO1 Azardon and his Joint
Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of
accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a
pot session was going on in said house.
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs
(a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require
probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid.
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases that tipped
information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search,
such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases
involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically,
circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest.
NONE OF THESE DRUG CASES INVOLVE POLICE OFFICERS
ENTERING A HOUSE WITHOUT WARRANT TO EFFECT ARREST AND
SEIZURE BASED SOLELY ON AN INFORMERS TIP.
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they
had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in
order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to
believe that the accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in
the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip ORIGINATED FROM A
CONCERNED CITIZEN WHO HIMSELF HAD NO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFORMATION THAT WAS REPORTED TO THE
POLICE.
4. Stop and Frisk (Terry Search)

The stop-and-frisk situation is based in the US case of Terry v. Ohio, a
1968 case. This was based on the discussion of the SC in the US that in a
stop-and frisk situation, there is actually no intent to search a person, to
seek evidence, other than to protect the safety of the police officer
in an appropriate circumstance while hes investigating possible
criminal activity. In this old case of Terry v. Ohio, a police officer was on
duty and he had observed two persons upon the casing a store and he
suspected that there might be a robbery to be committed. So, he stopped
these two persons and frisked them, one of the accused is John Terry, and
where he bodily topped them, they were found to have concealed
weapons with them. So, they were charged with concealment of a deadly
weapon under Ohio statute and they were convicted. On appeal to the US
SC, the SC affirmed conviction. The appeal was supposed to be on the
violation of their 4th amendment right. The 4th amendment right is similar
to our search and seizure clause. The US SC affirmed the conviction by a
majority saying that in that situation, in an appropriate circumstance, what
was to frisk a person for possible concealed deadly weapons to ensure the
safety of police officer while investigating possible criminal activity.
CASES:
Posadas v. CA At the time the peace officers in this case identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they
did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing The the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now
know what its contents were. said circumstances did not justify an arrest
without a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure
can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search
warrant at military or police checkpoints. Where, for example, the
officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light
therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
As between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or
police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no
question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike
in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause
that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a " stop
and frisk" situation whose object is either
(a) to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or
(b) to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information.
This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio. In this case, two men
repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they
apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion of a
police officer. To the experienced officer, the behaviour of the men
indicated that they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When
Kristine
Confesor
the police officer approached the men and asked them for their names,
they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun
him around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did
the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution
for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal
search and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that
"a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than
simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain
the status quo while obtaining more information.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
People v. Mengote At the time of the arrest in question, the accusedappellant was MERELY "LOOKING FROM SIDE TO SIDE" AND
"HOLDING HIS ABDOMEN," ACCORDING TO THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS THEMSELVES. There was apparently no offense that had just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence. What offense? What offense
could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to
side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made
them less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote bad been
apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to
be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested
at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting
from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the
shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing
clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of
the noonday sun.
Manilili v. CA The questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid
stop-and-frisk operation. the search was valid, being akin to a stop-andfrisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a STOP-AND-FRISK WAS
DEFINED AS THE VERNACULAR DESIGNATION OF THE RIGHT OF A
POLICE OFFICER TO STOP A CITIZEN ON THE STREET,
INTERROGATE HIM, AND PAT HIM FOR WEAPON(S): x (W)here a
police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom
they were taken. In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his
companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes
and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts.
From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug
addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to
stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioners possession.
ESQUILLO V. PEOPLE Dual Purpose of stop-and-frisk. What is,
therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk"
practice serves a dual purpose:
the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,

which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and
the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which

permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police
officers constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure
of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioners possession - later
voluntarily exhibited to the police operative - was undertaken after she
was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1
Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time
of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact
attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
5.
Express Waiver
CASES:
Veroy v. Layague The reason for searching the house of herein
petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter
the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a
search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he
himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not
persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek
permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa
Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel
soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers
had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, warrantless searches were
declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every
opportunity to secure a search Warrant. The objects seized, being products
of illegal searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions
subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants.
People v. Nuevas the arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the arrest.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling
did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons
to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the
plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags
that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or
transparent to the police officers. In Nuevass case, the dried marijuana
leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. In
Dins case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was
"packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."It cannot be therefore said
the items were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the
articles without further search.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevass
case was made with his consent. In Dins case, there was none.
VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH. Indeed, the constitutional
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the
search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention
and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. THE
CONSENT TO A SEARCH IS NOT TO BE LIGHTLY INFERRED, BUT
MUST BE SHOWN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
People v. Dequina The evidence in this case shows that at the time of
their
arrest,
accused-appellants
were
caught
in
flagrante
carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3
Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag
to determine its content because when the latter noticed the police
officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally
dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the
dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being
committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally
justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was
allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.
People v. Uybuco
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 5. Arrest without
Kristine
Confesor
warrant; when lawful and Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The
police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to
witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of
kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers
stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient
for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number
of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant,
who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on
probable cause. Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of
appellant was legal because the latter consented to such.
Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to
search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to
a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrest, it becomes
both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but
expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it
when he was arrested.
6. Search of Warehouse in violation of the Customs and Tariff Code
BUCOR V. OGARIO RTCs are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by
the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these
proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions
touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial
Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even
through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The actions of
the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs,
whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
The rule that RTCs have no review powers over such proceedings is
anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the
government's drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon
Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the
collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the
government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet
to be proven, we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of
Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
Under the law, the question of whether probable cause exists for the
seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not for the RTC to determine. The
customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are
intended to be shipped abroad before they may exercise the power to
effect customs' searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and
continue with the administrative hearings. . The proceeding before the

Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner
of Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even
reach this Court through the appropriate petition for review. The proper
ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus indicated. Certainly a court of
first instance is not therein included. It is devoid of jurisdiction.
RIETA V. PEOPLE RE: CHICOT DOCTRINE. The Chicot doctrine cited in
Taada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an
imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an
operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the
executive act was in operation should be duly recognized and presumed to
be valid in all respects. The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General
Order No. 60 -- long before our Decision in Taada and the arrest of
petitioner -- is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply
ignored.
Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been
introduced into the country in violation of customs laws, is one of the
seven doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional provision
where it mandates that no search or seizure shall be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge who has personally determined the
existence of probable cause.
SALVADOR V. PEOPLE Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as are
unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where
searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant.
These recognized exceptions include:
1.
search of moving vehicles;
2.
search in plain view;
3.
customs searches;
4.
waiver or consented searches;
5.
stop-and-frisk situations; and
6.
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
During the incident, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to
conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and
smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other
words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused
was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected
the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police
authority under the customs law.
In Papa vs. Mago involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers
who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws
are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article,
cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to
suspect that the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in
violation of the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a
warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or
conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.
7.
Exigency: applies during extraordinary time wherein warrantless

search are allowed such as coup d etats, wherein the courts are
not open
PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA The raid was actually caused by intelligence

reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior
to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein
the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to
do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar
Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory
or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition.
It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence
of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not
be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general
chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing
within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which
was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas
were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses
therein were deserted.
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground
to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently
more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Also, under
the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply
for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his
court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
8.
Search and Seizure by Private Persons: searches done in

cargoes and shipping boards where there is no participation of
the State or its agents.
PEOPLE V. MARTI The constitutional proscription against unlawful

searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus it can only be invoked against the state to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the power imposed.
WATEROUS DRUG CORP V. NLRC People v. Marti upheld. Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals.
PEOPLE V. MENDOZA The constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to immunity of ones person
from interference from the government and it cannot be extended to acts
committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. In this case, the articles were
discovered by Cecilias father.
PEOPLE V. BONGCARAWAN searched by vessel security personnel;
private personal.
Kristine
Confesor
9. Airport Security
MARTINEZ V. PEOPLE
10. Jail Safety
PEOPLE V. CONDE On the other hand, we find in order the search of the
bag of Felicidad Macabare, at the time she was visiting her husband who
was a detainee. PO3 Sevillano testified, this search is part of police
standard operating procedure, and is recognized as part of precautionary
measures by the police to safeguard the safety of the detainees as well as
the over-all security of the jail premises. However, the weapons
confiscated from Felicidad Maccabare, were not formally offered as
evidence by the prosecution, hence probatively valueless.
3.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHECKPOINTS AND AREAL TARGET

ZONINGS
VALMONTE V. DE VILLA - The routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a
certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without interruption",
but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a
brief question or two. 1 For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a
routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies
a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist
is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been
instruments of some offense.
The Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor
condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The
Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government
employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that
power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies
the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular
situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the constitutional
arena.
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has
become aware of how some checkpoints have been used as points of
thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the
increased prices of foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the
Metro Manila area and other urban centers, are largely blamed on the
checkpoints, because the men manning them have reportedly become
"experts" in mulcting travelling traders. This, of course, is a national
tragedy .
But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the
men in uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume that the
men in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are assigned to
the checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The

checkpoint is a military "concoction." It behooves the military to improve
the QUALITY of their men assigned to these checkpoints. For no system or
institution will succeed unless the men behind it are honest, noble and
dedicated.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the
citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law.
And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including
those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the
scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for
their abusive acts; 7 This tenet should be ingrained in the soldiery in the
clearest of terms by higher military authorities.
PEOPLE V. EXALA- Yes. Since the search was conducted prior to the
arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue
was never raised in the proceedings. Bocalan never objected to the
admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the same was obtained in
a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of such waiver, the court
is bound to admit the evidence. But even assuming arguendo that there
was no waiver, still appellant's contention deserves scant consideration.
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. The instant case is an
incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or
police checkpoint. The checkpoint in the instant case was established in
line with "Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to search for
unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of
unauthorized persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the
occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang
noticed a black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked
what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that
moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became
suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from
Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being
discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of
the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable cause
justifying a more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and
the discovery of the prohibited stuff. Significantly, there was no sign of any
protest or objection to the search. The accused remained silent even after
their arrest. Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of
marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part when
arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed innocence but
also confirms their acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was
waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
GUANZON V. DE VILLA- Members of the Metro Manila police flushed all
males in the Muslim Community of Quiapo. This was about the saturation
drive conducted by them in connection w/ anti-drug campaign where they
were able to apprehend the small time pushers.
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police
action of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and
blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the
military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out
and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with the
constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such
actions. According to the court, Saturation drives and other police
measures are not illegal, the problem only arises in the manner on which
the police action is executed.
ABENES V. CA - This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal.
Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For,
admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be
denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during
which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or
two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to
a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement
the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of
pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was
instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know
that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious
designs.
4. WIRE TAPPING
RA 4200
GAANAN V. IAC The petitioner was acquitted of the crime of violation of
Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act. The law
refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement"
for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order
to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA
No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose
5.
WHAT MAY BE SEIZED RULE 126, SEC. 2 An application for

search warrant shall be filed with the following:
a.
Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
b.
For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
Kristine
Confesor
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending.
6.
REMEDIES IN CASES OF VIOLATION

(a) Exclusionary Rule: (2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
ART. III SEC. 3 (2)
STONEHILL V. DIOKNO The constitution protects the peoples right

against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides;
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be

determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from
mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a
matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there
is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
***IMPORTANT!!! (Remedies are commutative, avail all at the
same time, ok)
1.
If evidence is illegally obtained, it is excluded
2.
You must object as to its admissibility, otherwise, deemed
waived
3.
Now a constitutional mandate
4.
Civil action for damages is also allowed (Art. 32, CC)
5.
RPC,
a.
128 violation of domicile
b.
129 search warrant maliciously obtained
c.
130 searching domicile w/o witness
WAIVER-
PASTRANO V. CA Rule 126, 4 indeed requires the examination of the

complainant and his witnesses to be put in writing and under oath. But
although this is a ground for quashing a search warrant in this case,
petitioner did nothing to this end. He did not move to quash the
information before the trial court. Nor did he object to the presentation of
the evidence obtained as being the product of an illegal search.
Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the search.
As held in People v. Omaweng, the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly.
The Court find that the prosecution clearly established the elements of the
crime charged and that the Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.
(b) Civil Action for damages (Art. 32, NCC)

ABERCA V. VER It may be that the AFP were merely responding to their
duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Marcos order, this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the
Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to
which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does
not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded
from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
No master-servant relationship exists between superior officers of the
military and their subordinates. Be that as it may, however, the decisive
factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under
the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger
dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate
his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does
not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against
the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the
factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not
actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it
would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would

easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil
Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
FORBES V. CHUOCO TIACO deporting of the plaintiffs was not depriving
them of liberty without due process of law unless, on other grounds, the
local government was acting beyond its powers. But the local government
has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the Islands.
(c) Criminal Cases under RPC
ART. 128, 129, 130
7.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF

ARREST
SEC. 6, RULE 112 REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) RTC
1.
w/I 10 days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
a.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
b.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue
i. a warrant of arrest, or
ii. a commitment order
if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who
conducted
the
preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7
of this Rule.
c.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
the judge may
i. order the prosecutor to present + evidence
within five (5) days from notice, and
ii. the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.
(b) MTC When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1
of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the
original jurisdiction of the MetTC, MTCC, MTC, or MCTC may be conducted
by either the judge or the prosecutor.
1.
When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the
issuance of a warrant or arrest by the judge shall be
governed by paragraph (a) of this section.
2.
When the investigation is conducted by the judge himself,
he shall follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this
Rule.
a.
If the findings and recommendations are affirmed by
the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the
Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding
information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.
Kristine
Confesor
b.
However, without waiting for the conclusion of the

investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest
if he finds after an examination in writing and under
oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form
of searching question and answers, that a probable
cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice.
(c) N/A. A warrant of arrest shall not issue
1.
if the accused is already under detention pursuant to a
warrant issued by the MTC in accordance with paragraph
(b) of this section, or
2.
if the complaint or information was filed pursuant to
section 7 of this Rule or is for an offense penalized by fine
only.
The court shall then proceed in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. (6a)
PEOPLE V. MARTINEZ Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs
(a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require
probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid.
Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief
or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they
had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in
order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to
believe that the accused had just committed an offense. They merely
relied on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on
in said house. The apprehending officers should have conducted first a

surveillance.
LUZ V. PEOPLE There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an
intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation
is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license
of the latter.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless
search is allowed: xxxNone of the above-mentioned instances, especially a
search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.It must be
noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a
metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent
PEOPLE V. MARIANO Appellants insistence on the illegality of their
warrantless arrest equally lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court allows a warrantless arrest In the instant case, the warrantless
arrest was effected under the first mode or aptly termed as in flagrante
delicto. PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo personally witnessed and were in fact
participants to the buy-bust operation. After laboratory examination, the
white crystalline substances placed inside the four (4) separate plastic
sachets were found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug. Under these circumstances, it is beyond doubt
that appellants were arrested in flagrante delicto while committing a
crime, in full view of the arresting team. In fine, it has been established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellants sold shabu.
***IMPORTANT!!!
(1) Here, case is already filed, unlike search warrants
(2) Personal determination by the judge is determined and limited
by the documents, ie. Records of case, affidavits, PI records,
prosecutors cert.
(3) No need to personally examine under oath and affirmation the
witnesses and the complainant, that is not required under
warrants of arrest
(4) It is personal. The judge cannot delegate it. It is for the judge to
view them.
(5) Once the records are there, the warrants may be issued.
(6) If in the RTC, the warrant is issued after the judge goes over the
records.
8. WHEN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT
Rule 113, Sec. 5
a)
Strict enforcement rule
ESQUILLO V. PEOPLE The circumstances under which petitioner was
arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her was warranted.
Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of
their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette
case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement
officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to
approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he
introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of
the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of
a valid search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of
exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches
of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug
laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at
borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in
"plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire,
sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
or seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into
account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.
LUMANOG V. PEOPLE The police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on
19 June 1996 or six days after the killing. Six days is definitely more than
enough to secure an arrest warrant, and yet the police opted to arrest Joel
and the other accused, without any warrant, claiming that it was
conducted in "hot pursuit." In law enforcement, "hot pursuit" can refer to
an immediate pursuit by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the
warrantless arrest of Joel, made six days after the murder, does not fall
within the ambit of "hot pursuit." The question now is whether the
successive warrantless arrests of the accused are legal. The police
investigation work in this case, which led to the unlawful warrantless
arrest of the accused, is nothing but sloppy: (1) they chose to rely solely
on the sworn statement of one eyewitness (Alejo); (2) they failed to obtain
any description of the suspects from other eyewitnesses, including the
owner of the Kia Pride which was forcefully obtained by the suspects as a
get-away car; (3) they showed Alejo a picture of Joel to assist him in
identifying the "suspect"; and (4) they arrested the other accused based
entirely on the illegally extracted extrajudicial confession of Joel.
PEOPLE V. ARANETA. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this
jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
Kristine
Confesor
PEOPLE V. UYBOCO The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section
5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court [ When an offense has in
fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it] In this section, two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and
(2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Records show that both requirements are present in the instant
case.
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;

and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful
arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient
for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number
of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant,
who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on
probable cause. Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant
was legal because the latter consented to such.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful

intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto. Thus, even
granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be
present in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of
Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot
session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were
not only authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together
with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to
search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to
a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrest, it becomes
both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but
expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it
when he was arrested.
b)
Exceptions to Strict Enforcement
PEOPLE V. PENAFLORIDA The police was tipped off at around 1:00pm
that appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they
had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit
and already committing a crime. The arrest as effected after appellant as
caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying
with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then
already being committed. Under the circumstances, the police had
probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus,
the warrantless arrest is justified
AMBRE V. PEOPLE Section 2, Article III13 of the Constitution mandates

that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength
of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription.
One of the recognized exception established by jurisprudence is search
incident to a lawful arrest. In this exception, the law requires that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. As a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however,
recognizes permissible warrantless arrests:
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed
an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a
valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the
police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested
without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing
suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro.17 Ambre,
however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in
the residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the

subsequent search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful.
PEOPLE V. SEMBRANO On the legality of the warrantless arrest, We

reiterate that appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation
where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is
made during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be
secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised
Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests, to wit: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has
been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one involving appellant,
deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure conducted on the person of appellant were
allowed under the circumstances. The search, incident to his lawful arrest,
needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the
sachets of shabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation, are
admissible and were properly admitted in evidence against him.
c)
Waiver of Illegality of Arrest
PEOPLE V. RACHO appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot,
in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us
to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The 1987 Constitution states that a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Obviously, this is an
instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding." Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction
cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal
is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the
trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an
illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
d)
Effects of Declaration of Illegal Arrest
PEOPLE V. BIYOC TC ruled that appellant is guilty for the crime of rape. In
his brief, appellant raised the issue that the trial court failed to consider
the fact that the accuseds arrest was legally objectionable. He claims that
his arrest was illegal because a warrantless arrest was effected even
before the statement of the private complainant was taken. Objections to
the legality of arrests must, however, be made prior to the entry of plea at
arraignment; otherwise, they are considered waived. an accused may be
stopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since
the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured
when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court as what
was done by the appellants in the instant case. Not only did they enter
their pleas during arraignment, but they also actively participated during
the trial which constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in their arrest. In the
present case, appellant failed to question the illegality of his arrest before
entering his please, hence, he is deemed to waive the same.
VALDEZ V. PEOPLE He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the
warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was
unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed was
likewise contrary to law.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any
objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the
Kristine
Confesor
case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal.
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search
cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful.29 As we pronounced in People v.
Bacla-an
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by
jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3)
customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners.30
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot
pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
.
PEOPLE V. SANTOS The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests
were illegal lacks merit. The Court notes that nowhere in the records did
we find any objection by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior
to their arraignment. We have held in a number of cases that the illegal
arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error;
such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. It
is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after
a valid information ha been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced
and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.
9. IMMUNITY FROM ARREST OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Art. VI, sec. 11, 1987 Constitution
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in

all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.
10. PRIVACY (ART. III, SEC. 2)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
OPLE V. TORRES AO No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed
for unequivocally specified purposes. That lack of proper safeguards in this
regard od AO No. 308 may interfere with individuals liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read
or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the date encoded.
They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing AO No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that AO No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens.
IN RE: CAMILO SABIO Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in
our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless
excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a constitutional right and the right
most valued by civilized men, but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, no one shall
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at
least two guarantees that explicitly create zone of privacy. It highlights a
persons right to be let alone or the right to determine what, how much,
to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed. Section
2 guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. Section 3 renders inviolable the
privacy of communication and correspondence and further cautions that
any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion. Applying this determination to these
cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation; and
second, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senates
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly on the
anomalous
losses
incurred
by
the
Philippines
Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippines Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operation by their respective
board of directors. Obviously, the inquiry focuses on petitioners acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the
said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over
matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has
interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the
people have the right to information.This goes to show that THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY IS NOT ABSOLUTE WHERE THERE IS AN OVERRIDING
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST. The right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy
of financial transactions.
SJS V. DDBTo the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social economic lines Taking
into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy
on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with
six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
LEE V. CA Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the
subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was
unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be
badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory
that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee
children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and
oppressiveare proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production
of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that
has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section
4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
Kristine
Confesor
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena
duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before
the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the
relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the
person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the
reasonable cost of the production thereof.
MANILA ELECTRIC V. LIM Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to
the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario
that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support
of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is
inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To
argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly
received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes
these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlierquoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or
are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And she even suspects that her
transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of
management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
CONCEPT OF PRIVACY- ZONES OF PRIVACY
11. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS
Art. III, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution

ZULUETA V. CA The documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them
in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them
for any tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouse
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent if the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
OPLE V. TORRES Petitioner Ople prays that this Court invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of a National
Computerized Indentification Reference System on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenrys protected
zone of privacy. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of
man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources
governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at
bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by
issuing AO No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the
computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that AO No. 308
gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take not of the well-worded warning of
Kalvin, Jr., the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened
by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat
is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign
capacity to forget.
IN RE ALEJANO The opening and reading of the detainees letters in the
present case did not violate the detainees right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in sealed envelope. The inspection of
the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the
opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. That a law is
required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy
rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to
persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detainees is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.
KMU V. DIRECTOR All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and
other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance
of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from
citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to
privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these
government entities in the collection and recording of personal
identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since
petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain
against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored
for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific
data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data
collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require
less data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems
prior to EO 420.
IN RE SABIO In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion. Applying this
determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a
reasonable expectation; and second, did the government violate such
expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senates
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly on the
anomalous
losses
incurred
by
the
Philippines
Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippines Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operation by their respective
board of directors. Obviously, the inquiry focuses on petitioners acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the
said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over
matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has
interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the
people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is
an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v Mutuc, the Court, in line
with Whalen v Roe, employed the rational basis relationship test when it
held
that there was no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail
and minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard
Kristine
Confesor
of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration.
In Valmonte v Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public figures, the
Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject
to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the
right of the people to access information on matters of public concern
prevails over the right to privacy of financial transaction
III.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art. III, sec. 4
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances.
Id., sec. 18 (1)
A.
Philosophic Basic of Guarantee
1)
For the discovery of political truth
2)
For self-government
3)
For individual perfection
B.
Prior restraints- official govtal restrictions on the

press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination; curtailment of the
freedom of expression made through restrictions in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. This
means that the exercise of such freedom depends
upon the prior approval of the government.
a.
Movie censorship
b.
Judicial prior restraint injunction
c.
License taxes based on gross receipts for
the privilege of engaging in the business of
advertising in any newspaper
d.
Flat license fees for the privilege of selling
religious books
***In
prior
restraints,
the
presumption
of
constitutionality is not applicable. The govt has the
burden of proof in claiming the constitutionality of the
law.
**Exception: when prior restraint is unconstitutional,
and burden of proof is on the person restrained.
a.
In times of war
b.
When Comelec exercises its power to
regulate mass media for election purposes
c.
Obscene publications
d.
Content-Neutral- does not restrict the
content of the speech, or the content of
publication, but the TIME, MANNER, or the
PLACE. There is no presumption of
unconstitutionality.
What is only required is substantial
government interest for the restriction to be
accepted. There is no need for the clear and
present danger test.
***As opposed to Content- based:

restriction of the content of speech, what
the person is going to say or write
C.
Subsequent Punishment- punishing the expression

that has already come out. What the Constitution
protects is the right to be able to express ones ideas
without being punished of it, However, it doesnt
mean that anything that one says, one can escape
punishment for that by invoking the freedom of
expression since this freedom is not absolute.
***Doctrine of Freedom of Speech only protects
political, social, or religious ideas, and does not apply
to commercial speech.
Commercial Speech1.
A communication which no more than
proposes a commercial transaction
2.
To enjoy protection:
a.
It
must
not
be
false
or
misleading; and
b.
It should not propose an illegal
transaction
3.
Even truthful and lawful commercial speech
may be regulated if:
a.
Government has a substantial
interest to protect;
b.
Regulation directly advances that
interest; and
c.
It is not more extensive than is
necessary to protect that interest
Four aspects of the Freedom of the Press

1.
Freedom of Prior Restraint;
2.
Freedom from punishment subsequent to publication;
3.
Freedom of access to Information;
4.
Freedom of Circulation
CHAVEZ V. GONZALES Hello Garci is a content-based restriction: hence,
clear and present danger rule must be used as a test: It appears that the
great evil which the government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. NOT EVERY
VIOLATION OF THE LAW JUSTIFY STRAITJACKETING THE EXERCISE OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. There is no showing that the
feared violation of said law clearly endangers the national security of the
State.
NEWSOUND BROADCASTING V. DY Acts of preventing the operation of
radio station is an act of prior restraint. Without taking into account any
extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents, we can
identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their
operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the
press. While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy
burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid.
The actions taken by respondents are colored with legal authority, under
the powers of local governments vested in the Local Government Code,or
more generally, the police powers of the State. We do not doubt that LGUs
are capacitated to enact ordinances requiring the obtention of licenses or
permits by businesses, a term defined elsewhere in the LGC as trade or
commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a
view to profit.
The circumstances of this case dictate that respondents closure of
petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. It
must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo
was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities
in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members
of the Dy political dynasty. Bombo Radyo is a rival station of DWDY who is
also owned by the family DY. Also, in an article found in the Philippine Daily
inquirer dated February 2004, respondent Dy was quoted as saying
that he will "disenfranchise the radio station." Such statement
manifests and confirms that respondents denial of petitioners renewal
applications on the ground that the Property is commercial is merely a
pretext and that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan
City and suppress the latters voice. This is a blatant violation of the
petitioners constitutional right to press freedom.
SORIANO V. LAGUARDIA The MTRCB gave a 20-day preventive
suspension to Sorianos And Dating Daan TV program for defamatory
utterances against an INC minister. Soriano was later imposed with a
three-month suspension from his TV program. The three months
suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to
continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already
issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in
the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment
for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered. It is a sanction that the
MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the
free speech clause.
ANG LADLAD V. COMELEC Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies
not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere
with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political
association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Kristine
Confesor
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have
not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has
been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG
fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the
moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by
law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded,
because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a
political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process
with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has,
indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
GARCIA V. MANRIQUE The clear and present danger rule means that
the evil consequence of the comment must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before an utterance can be
punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance
will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be
impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless
there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an
imminent, not merely a likely, threat..
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents comments
reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate
amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action
from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the
Court either.A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it
concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory
that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and
fair administration of justice. By no stretch of the imagination could the
respondents comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments
of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence pending cases.13 The power to
punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should
not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. 14 In the
present case, such necessity is wanting.
D. Consent-based Restrictions
1)
Some Tests of Validity of Content-based restrictions
Dangerous Tendency: When the legislative body has determined
generally that the utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of
substantive evil that may be punished, the question whether any specific
utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to
bring about the substantive evil is not open to consideration. In such
cases the general provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied
to the specific utterance if its natural and probable effect was to bring
about the substantive evil that the legislative body might prohibit.
Clear and Present Danger: The question in every case is w/n the words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent.
Balancing of Interest: the court must undertake the delicate and
difficult task of weighing the circumstances and appraising the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the
free enjoyment of rights.
Direct Incitement: the guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a state to forbid or prescribe the advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.
Grave but improbable Danger whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability justifies such an invasion of speech as its
necessary to avoid the danger.
2)
Application of tests in various contexts
Freedom of Expression and National security
Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: Test of Actual
Malice
SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR If one can claim to announce the judgment of
legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent
with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards
evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
a)
b)
BELTRAN V. MAKASIAR
BORJAL V. CA we stated that the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. We
stated that the doctrine of fair commentaries means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition
VASQUEZ V. CA Do the accused has the burden of showing the truth of
allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends
for making such allegations?
No. Under Art. 361 of the RPC, if the defamatory statement is made
against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties
and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be
entitled to acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false,

no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that the statement
was made with actual malice, that is, w/ knowledge that it was
false or w/ reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges
made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them w/
knowledge of their falsity with reckless disregard of w/n they are false.
TULFO V. PEOPLE The freedom of the press is one of the cherished
hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to protect and respect
the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with
responsibility. There is a fine line between freedom of expression and libel,
and it falls on the courts to determine whether or not that line has been
crossed.
Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press
The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the
same when it came to commentaries made on public figures and matters
of public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was
given greater weight over the rights of individuals, the Court, however,
has stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The
exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed,
comes with an equal burden of responsible exercise of that right. The
recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run
roughshod over the rights of others.
The Journalists Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists
of the Philippines shows that the press recognizes that it has standards to
follow in the exercise of press freedom; that this freedom carries duties
and responsibilities. Art. I of said code states that journalists recognize the
duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors
promptly. Art. VIII states that journalists shall presume persons accused of
crime of being innocent until proven otherwise.
In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalists
Code of Ethics and exercised his journalistic freedom responsibly.
In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So,
and had neither met nor known him prior to the publication of the subject
articles. He also admitted that he did not conduct a more in-depth
research of his allegations before he published them, and relied only on
his source at the Bureau of Customs.
Neither did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their
publications. It cannot be said that a false article accusing a public figure
would always be covered by the mantle of qualified privileged
communication. The portion of Borjal cited by Tulfo must be scrutinized
further: Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom
must be done consistent with good faith and reasonable care. This was
clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no
case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating
his responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the
Kristine
Confesor
public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the
exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand to cover
every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the
furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total
abandonment of responsibility.
Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged
communication beyond the instances given in Art. 354 of the RPC, but this
expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of qualified
privileged communications is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine
of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be
a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. [
The expansion speaks of fair commentaries on matters of public
interest. While Borjal places fair commentaries within the scope of
qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject of the
article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not
automatically exclude the author from liability. Borjal allows that for a
discreditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a
false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. As
previously mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations against
Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the
information before publishing his articles.
c)
Freedom of Expression and the right of privacy
AYER PRODUCTIONS V. CAPULONG This freedom is available in our
country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture
companies. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion
picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is
not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are owned
either by the government or the private sector but the private sectorowned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being
devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue producing activities. Indeed,
commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our
country and hence to exclude commercially owned and operated media
from the exerciseof constitutionally protected om of speech and of
expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional
liberties in our country.
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger
test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that
a different conclusion must here be reached:
The production and filming by petitioners of the projected

motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion

upon private respondent's "right of privacy."
prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the
exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The respondent Judge
has restrained petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed
motion picture. It is important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior
restrain of any kind imposed upon the movie producer who in fact
completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla. Because of
the speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity
vitiates. 14 The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not, of
course, mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a
person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent
Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte TRO a
day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a
Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion
picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like.
There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any

violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could
lawfully assert.
2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" is one of public interest
and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the
history of this countryand as such, must be regarded as having passed
into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and
expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject mater
does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of
private respondent Ponce Enrile.
Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla
necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is
not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent
Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it
focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be
historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the
precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in
February 1986.
3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of
"The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The
extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the
proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is
reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account.
Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in
"The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private
respondent or that of any member of his family.
4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private
respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a
"public figure:"A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or
calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other
words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who
have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the

public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist,
or any other entertainment.
The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous
inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant
prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a
lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where
public attention is focused upon him as a person. Such public figures were
held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to privacy. Three
reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the decisions" that
they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint
when they received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already
public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and
that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public
about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. On
one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there
was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to matters
legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused.
Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his
participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change
of government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was
major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails
to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be
grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not
retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to be
a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during which his
participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in
the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of
the Philippines.
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or
reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no
presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and
certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. 17 The
proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice MelencioHerrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of essentially private
concern." 18 To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in
portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution
to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public
facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's
privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such
portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private
respondent.
PHILIPINE JOURNALISTS V. THEONEN In the instant case, even if we

assume that the letter written by the spurious Atty. Angara is privileged
Kristine
Confesor
communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was
published in the newspaper and circulated among the general population.
A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated in public,[27] which was what
the petitioners did in this case. Neither is the news item a fair and true
report without any comments or remarks of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is
the article related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions, for it concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a
private individual seeking a quiet life. in a case where a newspaper or
broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is
neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional
privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in
a discussion of public interest
d)
Freedom of Expression and the Administration of Justice
Supreme Court: Fair criticism may be hurled at the courts. If the following
are present:
1.
It must be made in good faith
2.
It must be couched in respectful language
3.
Directed at the merits
4.
Must not downgrade the courts or insult the members
Reason: The court has inherent powers to insure that the proceeding are
conducted in a manner free from obstruction
obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be

insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort,
as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to
preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.[16]
IN THE MATTER-MACASAET We have no problems with legitimate

criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial reasoning, or even
how we run our public offices or public affairs. They should even be
constructive and should pave the way for a more responsive, effective and
efficient judiciary.
Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of
this genre. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless
scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press
freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of the
press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High Court,
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and
threaten the doctrine of judicial independence.
A veteran journalist of many years and a president of a group of
respectable media practitioners, respondentMacasaet has brilliantly sewn
an incredible tale, adorned it with some facts to make it lifelike, but
impregnated it as well with insinuations and innuendoes, which, when
digested entirely by an unsuspecting soul, may make him throw up with
seethe. Thus, he published his highly speculative articles that bribery
occurred in the High Court, based on specious information, without any
regard for the injury such would cause to the reputation of the judiciary
and the effective administration of justice. Nor did he give any thought to
the undue, irreparable damage such false accusations and thinly veiled
allusions would have on a member of the Court.
The Investigating Committee could not have put it any better when it
found respondent feigning his highest respect for this Court
IN RE PUBLISHED Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know

and discuss judicial proceedings, but such right does not cover statements
aimed at undermining the Courts integrity and authority, and interfering
with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and
must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important
public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. Thus, the making of
contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of
free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on
the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the
exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and
efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein. It is
a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts should
be immune from every extraneous influence as they resolve the issues
presented before them.[15]The court has previously held that----xxx As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press
and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the
maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. xxx This
Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner free from outside interference
Macasaets diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the

administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting
respect for its integrity and honor. They derogate his avowal of highest
respect for this Court (10, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); his declaration that he has
always upheld the majesty of the law as interpreted by the Court (96,
tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that his opinion of the Court has actually been
elevated ten miles up because of its decisions in the cases involving
Proclamation No. 1017, the CPR, EO 464, and the Peoples Initiative (97,
tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that he has done everything to preserve the integrity
and majesty of the Court and its jurists (84-85, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008); that he
wants the integrity of the Court preserved because this is the last bastion
of democracy (32, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008).
These tongue-in cheek protestations do not repair or erase the damage
and injury that his contemptuous remarks about the Court and the Justices
have wrought upon the institutional integrity, dignity, and honor of the
Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, nowhere in his columns do we find
a single word of respect for the Court or the integrity and honor of
the Court. On the contrary, what we find are allegations of pernicious
rumor that the courts are dirty, suspicions that the jurists are thieves,
that the Highest Court has a soiled reputation, and that the Supreme
Court has a sagging reputation.
To reiterate the words of the Committee, this case is not just another
event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the
allocated ramparts of free speech. [79] To allow respondent to use press
freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the reputation of the Court
and that of innocent private individuals would be to make a mockery of
this liberty. Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme
Court a court of thieves and a basket of rotten apples. These
publications directly undermine the integrity of the justices and render
suspect the Supreme Court as an institution.Without bases for his
publications, purely resorting to speculation and fishing expeditions in the
hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the
institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that
degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice.
We cannot close our eyes to the comprehensive Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee. It enumerated the
inconsistencies and assumptions of respondent which lacked veracity and
showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false or
not.[80]
Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent by
which he swears with his heart and soul [81]was found by the Investigating
Committee unbelievable. It was a story that reeked of urban legend, as it
generated more questions than answers.[82]
LEJANO V. PEOPLE ***SUBJUDICE RULE. "[the freedom of speech] needs

on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements
of equally important public interests such as the maintenance of the
integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice."
Courts, both within and outside this jurisdiction, have long grappled with
the dilemma of balancing the publics right to free speech and the
governments duty to administer fair and impartial justice. While the sub
judice rule may be considered as a curtailment of the right to free speech,
it is "necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice and the right
of an accused to a fair trial."3 Both these latter concerns are equally
paramount and cannot lightly be disregarded.
SUB JUDICE RULE IS NOT IMPOSED ON ALL FORMS OF SPEECH. In
so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, two classes of publicized
speech made during the pendency of the proceedings can be considered
as contemptuous:
1)
comments on the merits of the case, and
2)
intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the
courts with respect to the case.
Publicized speech should be understood to be limited to those aired or
printed in the various forms of media such as television, radio,
newspapers, magazines, and internet, and excludes discussions, in public
or in private, between and among ordinary citizens. The Constitution
Kristine
Confesor
simply gives the citizens the right to speech, not the right to unrestricted
publicized speech. 17 If the speech tends to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the court and its members, and
lowers or degrades the administration of justice, then the speech
constitutes contempt.18 "Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot
be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public
respect therefore and confidence therein."19 Without the sub judice rule
and the contempt power, the courts will be powerless to protect their
integrity and independence that are essential in the orderly and effective
dispensation and administration of justice.
This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of criticism against the
court. As the third branch of the government, the courts remain
accountable to the people. The peoples freedom to criticize the
government includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and
decisions. This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental
to our democratic society and ensures that
i. there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or
idiosyncrasy, and that
ii. the publics confidence in the administration of justice is
maintained.
The criticism must, however,
1)
be fair,
2)
made in good faith, and
3)
"not spill over the walls of decency and propriety."
4)
BASED ON fair and accurate reports (without comment) of what
have actually taken place in open court.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP FACULTY The Show Cause Resolution does not
deny respondents their freedom of expression.To reiterate, it was not the
circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo
was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not
only as an established fact, but a truth" when it was "[o]f public knowledge
[that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth
of such allegations. It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution
that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision.
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents
submissions, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern
that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members
of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this
Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and
fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits
of fair comment and common decency.
e)
Symbolic Expression- Flag burning Case
TEXAS V. JOHNSON The majority of the Court, according to Justice
William Brennan, agreed with Johnson and held that flag burning
constitutes a form of "symbolic speech" that is protected by the First

Amendment. The majority noted that freedom of speech protects actions
that society may find very offensive, but society's outrage alone is not
justification for suppressing free speech.
In particular, the majority noted that the Texas law discriminated upon
viewpoint, i.e., although the law punished actions, such as flag burning,
that might arouse anger in others, it specifically exempted from
prosecution actions that were respectful of venerated objects, e.g.,
burning and burying a worn-out flag. The majority said that the
government could not discriminate in this manner based solely upon
viewpoint.
f)
Assembly and Petition

1)
The standards for allowable impairment of speech and press
also apply to the right of assembly and petition.
2)
Rules on assembly in public places:
a.
Applicant should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when the
assembly will take place.
b.
The application should be filed ahead of time to
enable the public official concerned to apprise
whether there are valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant, but in another public place. The
grant or refusal should be based on the application of
the clear and present danger test.
c.
If the public authority is of the view that there is an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter
d.
The decision of the public authority, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the
applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they
may, if they so desire, have recourse to the proper
judicial authority.
3)
Rules in the assembly of private properties: only he consent of
the owner of the property or the person entitled to possession
thereof is required.
Assembly and Petition

DELA CRUZ V. CA Petitioners are numerous public school teachers from
various school in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged,
preventively dismissed in October 1990 by DECS Secretary Cario
because of their participation in the mass action/illegal strike on
September 19-21, 1990 and subsequent defiance of the return-to-work
order dated September 17, 1990. THE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS DID
NOT EXERCISE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WITHIN REASONABLE
LIMITS. They committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service
by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their
classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so.
Had the teachers availed of their free timerecess, after classes,
weekends or holidaysto dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with
the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no onenot the DECS, the
CSC or even the Supreme Courtcould have held them liable for their
participation in the mass actions.
THE TEACHERS WERE PENALIZED NOT BECAUSE THEY EXERCISED THEIR

RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLY BUT BECAUSE OF THE MANNER BY WHICH
SUCH RIGHT WAS EXERCISED.
D. CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
OBrien
-
Test: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if

it is within the constitutional power of the government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Osmea vs. COMELECT his is a petition for prohibition, seeking a

reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving
free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes, except to the COMELEC. Petitioners are candidates for public
office in the forthcoming (1992) elections. Petitioner Emilio M.R. Osmea is
candidate for President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia
is governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection.
W/N Sec. 11(b) is unconstitutional for limiting free speech.
Ruling: No.
The laws concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with
ensuring media equality between candidates with deep pockets. There
is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the
speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or
dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates,
there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying
exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Sec.4 of
the Constitution.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They
only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates
but require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass
media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the
election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of
newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates
these to the candidates.
The validity of regulations of time, place and manner, under well-defined
standards, is beyond question as what is involved here is simply regulation
of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass
media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and
air time to give all candidates equal time and space for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period as well as
campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political
advertising in the mass media skews the political process and subverts
democratic self-government. What is bad is if the law prohibits
campaigning by certain candidates because of the views expressed in the
ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling
reason.
Kristine
Confesor
The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on
speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to
achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the
use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on
speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.
What makes the regulation reasonable is that it is only enforced during
election period.
TEST FOR CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS. In Adiong vs. COMELEC, this
Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the
posting of campaign signs on public property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
This test was actually formulated in United States v. OBrien. It is an
appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like 11(b), are contentneutral. Unlike content-based restrictions, they are not imposed because
of the content of the speech. For this reason, content-neutral restrictions
are tests demanding standards. Like in Sanidad v. COMELEC, a rule
prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning
either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling
reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These
restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for
possible overbreadth and vagueness.
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral
regulations which, like 11(b), are not concerned with the content of the
speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest
to support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their
validity.
CLEAR AND DANGER TEST NOT APPLICABLE. Justice Panganibans
dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that media
ads do not partake of the real substantive evil that the state has a right
to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the peoples cardinal right
to choose their means of expression and of access to information. The
clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all
free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful student of
constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law and
only later appropriated for free speech cases. For the criminal law is
necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends
and a guilty conspiracy or attempt begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a
test for determining the constitutional validity of laws which, like 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but only
with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to such
regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail
when a regular hammer is all that is needed.
The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction
of speech is that content-based restrictions distort public debate, have
improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how
people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie contentneutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding
public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Applying the OBrien test in this case, we find that 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646
is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of
communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal
opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is
unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom of
expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the
purpose of promoting equality.
ABS-CBN V. COMELEC Main Issue: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls: May
the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In
answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on
the freedoms of speech and of the press?
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect
of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does
not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec
Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to
whether the polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the Omnibus Election
Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers. There is no
showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause
chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving
that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to
create disorder or confuse the voters.
SWS V. COMELEC Whether or not the restriction on the publication

of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint. Nor does thissection pass the Obrient test for content
related regulation because (1) itsuppresses one type of expression
while allowing other types such as editorials,etc.; and (2) the
restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government
interest because the interest can e protected by narrower
restrictions such assubsequent punishment.
integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of

expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning
the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In
effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by
preferring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression means that the government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.
Nor is there justification for the prior restraint which 5.4 lays on protected
speech.
The prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the
ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental.
The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of
the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It
constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made
less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately
before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local
election.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is
unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free
expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion of
the OBrien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is
necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4
aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect, junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the
form of election cheating called dagdag-bawas. They cannot be attained
at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can
be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather
than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the
danger of such evils.
5.4 is invalid because
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial

governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover,
even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law
should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of
expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in question.
By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because
of the possibility that such publication might undermine the
(1)
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2)
it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even

though such suppression is only for a limited period, and
(3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved

by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
Kristine
Confesor
2.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
B.P. 880 (PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT OF 1985) - regulates the use of public
street or place. Public assembly excludes those which are for religious
purposes, those for the rights of labor in the labor code, those which are
for political meetings or rallies during campaigns. Outside of that, all are
considered as public assemblies.
Reason: is not to curtail the right of expression, but to allow of the public
to avail of the public spaces. That is why there is a requirement of permits.
It shall be the duty of the local executive to determine what time, or what
streets may be used.
Permits
1)
2)
3)
are not required for the use of:

Private properties
Freedom parks duly established by law or ordinances
Those in Govt owned or regulated educational institutions
Maximum Tolerance- the highest degree of restraint that the military,

police, and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public
assembly or in the disposal of the same.
SC circular: Admin matter guidelines for the conduct of demos, pickets,
rallies, etc w/I the vicinity of the courts.
Within 200m radius from the outer boundaries of the courts, you
cannot conduct rallies threon
It will be obstruction of the functions of the court
BAYAN VS ERMITA Whether or not BP 880 and the CPR Policy are
unconstitutional.
B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec, where the
Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place,
and manner of holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based,
since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the
government for redress of grievances" come from the wording
of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. There is need to address the situation adverted to
by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and
when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one,
the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary
consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the
police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from
said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to
show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the
law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has
been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully
dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by
the law.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid
a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has
the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since
the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P.
No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as
maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly,
what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely, maximum tolerance.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the
benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of
the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding
liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to
designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after
that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15
of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned
shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind
shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be
written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper
coordination and orderly activities.
IBP V. ATIENZA Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to

meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public
concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It
is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is
the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and
complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice
Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court
in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights
to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee

with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical,
are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation
placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine
the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole
justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the
danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.14 (emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of
1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.15 In
juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent
portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be
valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another
public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal
or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for
the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on
the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must
be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they
can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. 16 (italics and
underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion
when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard
first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the
applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the
permit.1avvphi1
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms
of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test
which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it,
render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of
discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is
not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be
a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what
Kristine
Confesor
may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific
public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held
there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice
Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be
"abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place."17 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or
explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to
just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a
specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not
to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the
applicant."
3.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN

THE PUBLIC SECTOR
ART. III, SEC. 8 . The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Right to Associate includes the right not to associate.

This provision expressly guarantees the right to form unions to those
employed in the public and private sectors
Only limitation: for purposes not contrary to law
***Right to strike is NOT constitutionally granted.
Government employees not given the right to strike
Reason: Right to strike involves work stoppage, not related with
public interest. What is constitutionally guaranteed is the right
of government employees to organize, like rifht to form unions
or associations.
Employees in the private sector are statutorily granted.
GSIS v. KAPISANAN employees in the public service may not engage in
strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right
of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions
or associations, without including the right to strike. Jacinto v. Court of
Appeals[23] came next and there we explained:
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was
positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs.
Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of
assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding
considerations of national security . . . .As regards the right to strike, the
Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision in accordance

with law. This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate
the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive
Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of
government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an
earlier CSC circular which enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service by
stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in government service shall be observed. (Emphasis and words
in bracket added; citations omitted) And in the fairly recent case of Gesite
v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court defined the limits of the right of
government employees to organize in the following wise:
It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this
jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of
mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. The right of government employees
to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations
only, without including the right to strike, adding that public
employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join
concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
GSIS v. VILLAVIZA WON an unruly mass gathering of twenty employees,
lasting for more than an hour during office hours, inside office premises
and within a unit tasked to hear an administrative case, to protest the
prohibition against the appearance of their leader as counsel in the said
administrative case, falls within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.
HELD:
YES. CAs decision affirmed. As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.
02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the
government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed
must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession."
Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU
office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some
even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of
an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the
purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC
Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of
such prohibition.
Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of
government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally
depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any

person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to
be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive
them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by
joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or
waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only
but can never be taken away.
The recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS is
inapplicable. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSISIU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan
ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same
manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust. Thus, respondents'
freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's Resolution
No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that
definition, respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action. The CSC and the CA were both correct
in arriving at said conclusion.
4. MOVIE CENSORSHIP
On the state regulation regaring TV, Radio, & in newspapers & in other
forms of print media. Here, freedom of expression is guaranteed. However,
the limitations for them are the same, i.e. clear and present danger.
Stage regulation for radio and TV however, are different from

that of the forms of print media because of the extent of
publication. TV and radio are readily available in ones home. It
is easily accessible to children. (Hence, there is emphasis on TV
and radio)
Print media is not easily accessible to all; especially in the far

flung areas. These are easily available in the cities and
metropolitan areas
This requires further the ability to read and it requires you the
ability to analyze
For TV, there is the MTRCB that rates and re-rates TV shows.
GONZALEZ v. KALAW KATIGBAK Motion pictures are important both as
a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the
artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues
and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits
is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson is the "importance
of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear
dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure.
If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right
to free expression.
Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.
This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech,
absolute. It can be limited if there be a 'clear and present danger of a
Kristine
Confesor
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The test to
determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and
present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a
right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the
expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also,
there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time
element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only
probable.
The basic postulate is that where the movies, theatrical
productions radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of
expression are concerned included as they are in freedom of expression
censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable
only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to public morals, public health or any other legitimate
public interest.
The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion
pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is
concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because
unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television
reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be
among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. It is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult
population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is
called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. CA INC has a television program entitled "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 and Channel 13. The program
presents and propagates INCs religious beliefs, doctrines and practices
often times in comparative studies with other religions. The Board of
Review for Moving Pictures classified INCs submitted VTR tapes as "X" or
not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an
attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior
restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that
restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the Board to overthrow
this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship
will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. Second. The evidence
shows that the Board x-rated INCs TV series for "attacking" either
religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence
will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.
The Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by INC but
that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they
may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to
favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Third. The Board cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another
religion" in x-rating the religious program of INC. Even a side glance at
section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to
justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television
program.
It is opined that the board can still utilize "attack against any religion" as a
ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials
which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the RPC punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion. We
respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not
synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of
the RPC should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show
which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship
of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986,
included "attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The
ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a
decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the
Executive Department espouses this view.
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the INC, the board failed to apply the
clear and present danger rule. The records show that the decision of the
Board is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that
the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.
Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent
evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
5.
-
RADIO BROADCAST
The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and
print media.
EASTERN BROADCASTING V. DANS All forms of media, whether print or

broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech
and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE that words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and
indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more
than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection
from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented
over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the
privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from
making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity
cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is
constantly tuning in and out.
THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST, therefore, must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision
of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the
industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not
be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio
and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are
limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since
they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying
views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
g)
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ART. III, SEC. 7 The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
government research data used as basis for policy
developments, shall be afforded to the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
Rights guaranteed to Filipino citizens only.

(1) Right to information on matters of public concern; and
(2) Access to official records and documents
o
Not absolute: subject to limitations as may be

provided by law, like compliance with reasonable
regulations (payment of a fee as a regulation) and
must have lawful purpose for procuring the
documents.
NERI V. SENATE RIGHT TO INFORMATION NOT CURBED. There is no

debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to
information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and
transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective
functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to
the whims and caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if
they are denied access to information. And the policies on public
accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty
words if access to such information of public concern is denied.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect
to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the publics right to
information or diminish the importance of public accountability and
transparency. This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the
assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into
the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call
petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his
willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of
respondents investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers
covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be
compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions. We
Kristine
Confesor
have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive
privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of
such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States.
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT. Indeed,
the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not
espouse an absolute right to information. By their wording, the intention of
the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is
unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions show
the obvious limitations on the right to information, thus:
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated
that there are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such
rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and
banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information. National security matters include state secrets regarding
military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on intergovernment exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need
to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in strict
confidence and given scrupulous protection."
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent
Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the
peoples right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in
the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid
down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and
"neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong
to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this
juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner
Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any
individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate
legislative inquiry and the public's right to information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did
not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN
Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that
are covered by executive privilege. WHEREFORE, SENATES MR
DENIED.
CPEG V. COMELEC RATIONALE: The cornerstone of this republican

system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State.
In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the
limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can
become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had
been delegated.The postulate of public office is a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to
such information of public concern is denied x x x.x x x The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as
in checking abuse in government. (Emphasis supplied) The peoples
constitutional right to information is intertwined with the governments
constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest. For every right of the people, there is a corresponding duty
on the part of those who govern to protect and respect that right. Section
28, Article II of the Constitution succinctly expresses this state policy:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
PEOPLES RIGHT TO INFORMATION IS LIMITED TO MATTERS OF
PUBLIC CONCERN. What then constitutes Public Concern? Public concern
like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because such matters directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Comelec cannot shirk its constitutional duty to disclose fully
to the public complete details of all information relating to its preparations
for the 10 May 2010 elections without violating the Constitution and
relevant laws.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 [SALN] Thus, while public concern
like public interest eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because such matters directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, [52] the
Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the
information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and
interest. In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to
know. Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the
latter is a permission. Hence, the duty on the part of members of the
government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner provided
by law:
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with
its companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While
providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that the
peoples right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further

subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
limitations
(1) national security matters and intelligence information;
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions;
(3) criminal matters; and
(4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified
information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of
their office and not made available to the public as well as
diplomatic correspondence,
closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access
to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to
regulation.
E. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
ART. XIV Sec. 5, No. 2
Academic freedom should be enjoyed by institutions of higher learning.
(1) It must be emphasized that academic freedom is only
guaranteed under the Constitution for institutions of higher
learning
(2) For elementary and secondary education, there is greater state
intervention not only in the public but also in the private sectors
Three aspects of Academic Freedom
(1) On part of the school
a.
Involves the right to decide for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them, free from
outside control, except possibly when overriding
public welfare requires it.
b. The CHED now is the administrative body tasked to
oversee and supervise institutions of higher learning.
The regulatory powers of the state are only limited to
ensure quality education
c.
But as to the aims and objectives of the school, the
manner by which it selects its faculty, its students,
the subjects to be offered, these are based largely on
the discretion of the school via the academic freedom
(2) On part of the teaching faculty
a.
Right to pursue further studies to enhance his skills,
to publish, and teach the subject as he sees fit
b. For as long as it is not contrary to any of the public
interests requirements, it will be acceptable
c.
It is for the faculty member to advance himself in skill
and to conduct research and publish the results of the
studies without fear of retribution
(3) On the students
a.
Every citizen has the right to select a profession or
study subject to fair and reasonable requirements
b. Old education act of 1982 guarantees for students the
right to choose what course that may be taken, the
Kristine
Confesor
right to enroll and re-enroll in the school until
conclusion.
***Common denominators of the rights of the student
Must not
Academically deficient or
Have violated the rules on discipline

TAXATIONciti
Definition and Scope
It is the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property,
levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of the
government and for all public needs.
It is as broad as the purpose for which it is given.
Purpose:
(1) To raise revenue
(2) Tool for regulation
(3) Protection/power to keep alive
Tax for special purpose [Sec. 29 (3), Art. VI]:
Treated as a special fund and
paid out for such purpose only;
when purpose is fulfilled, the balance, if any
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. [See:
Osmena v. Orbos (1993)]
Scope and Limitation
General Limitations
Power to tax exists for the general welfare; should be exercised only for a
public purpose
Might be justified as for public purpose even if the immediate beneficiaries

are private individuals
Tax should not be confiscatory: If a tax measure is so unconscionable as to
amount to confiscation of property, the Court will invalidate it. But
invalidating a tax measure must be exercised with utmost caution,
otherwise, the States power to legislate for the public welfare might be
seriously curtailed
Taxes should be uniform and equitable [Sec. 28(1), Art. VI]
Judicial review for unconscionable and unjust tax amounting to
confiscation of property
The legislature has discretion to determine the nature, object, extent,
coverage, and situs of taxation. But where a tax measure becomes so
unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts
will not hesitate to strike it down, for despite all its plenitude, the power to
tax cannot override constitutional prescriptions. [Tan v. del Rosario (1994)]
Specific Limitations
(1) Uniformity of taxation
General Rule: simply geographical uniformity, meaning it operates with
the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found
Exception: Rule does not prohibit classification for purposes of taxation,
provided the ff requisites are met: (SNAGAE)
standards used are Substantial and Not Arbitrary
if the classification is Germane to achieve the legislative purpose
if that classification Applies to both present and future conditions, other
circumstances being equal
applies Equally to members of the same class. [Pepsi Cola v. City of
Butuan (1968)].
(2) Tax Exemptions

No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress [Sec. 28 (4), Art.
VI]
A corollary power but must be for a public purpose, uniform and equitable
and in conformity with the equal protection clause
Tax exemptions are granted gratuitously and may be revoked at will,
except when it was granted for valuable consideration
May either be constitutional or statutory.
If statutory, it has to have been passed by majority of all the members of
Congress [Sec. 28 (4), Art. VI]
Constitutional exemptions [sec. 28(3), Art. VI]
Requisite: Exclusive Use
Educational institutions (both profit and non-profit used actually, directly
and exclusively for educational purposes): Benefits redound to students,
but only applied to property taxes and not excise taxes
Charitable institutions: Religious and charitable institutions give
considerable assistance to the State in the improvement of the morality of
the people and the care of the indigent and the handicapped
Religious property: Charitable Institutions, churches, and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used
for religious, charitable or educational purposes

Consti Law Exam 1

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Consti Law Exam 1

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Kristine

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

State where due process is supposed to be imposed on the school before it

Train hard, endure. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

government ID with your photograph, so you have your drivers license,

With respect to taxation, except for the provisions of the Constitution

With respect to eminent domain, what is required under the Local

In relation to delegation, police power and power of eminent domain may

not contravene the Constitution or the law;

So in any regulatory measure, LGU, as a matter of law, cannot prohibit the

Train hard, endure. 2

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

Fundamental principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of

the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition

Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of

3. No. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the

Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme

Tanada vs. Angara

In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts

Domino vs. Comelec

Train hard, endure. 3

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

Pamatong vs. Comelec

Reasoning: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in

YRASUEGUI VS. PAL

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA VS. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Train hard, endure. 4

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as

The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means of

It covers any governmental action which constitutes a deprivation of some

Train hard, endure. 5

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. [Sarmiento v.

PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The defendant must be given an opportunity to be

The SC reiterated that the right to appeal is not a natural right

Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing and must

Note: The allowance or denial of motions for extension rests principally on

PDP IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

PDP IN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Train hard, endure. 6

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

JUDICIAL STANDARD REVIEWThe judicial standard review of legislation

(1) lacks comprehensible standards that

AS APPLIED DOCTRINEis the limited case or petition to declare a law

GARCILLANO V. COMMITTEES (2008) the requisite of publication of the

Train hard, endure. 7

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with

only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an

Train hard, endure. 8

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

YLAYA V. GACOTT[d]ue process, as a constitutional precept, does not

Due Process and Police Power

Train hard, endure. 9

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMPILED NOTES: FIRST EXAM

REQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE

Lawful Means: Means employed are reasonably necessary for the

The SC applied strict scrutiny because the ordinance restricts patrons

Least Restrictions of Individual Rights: It must also be evident

In the White Light Case, SC held that ORDINANCE MUST BE STRUCK