Case number 25 SJS VS ATIENZA JR.

Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila City Council on November 28, 2001 and effective
December 28, 2001, reclassifies portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial
and directs the owners and operators of businesses to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within 6 months from the ordinances effectivity. Among the businesses in the area
are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of Chevron, Petron, and Shell.
Chevron, Petron and Shell, questioned the validity of the said ordinance. They argued that they
are fighting for their right to property alleging that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced
[to] relocate. Are the contentions of the oil companies tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted pursuant to the delegated
police power of local government units to promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and
general welfare of the society. It explained that based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or [local government unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals right to property, the former should prevail. (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society,
et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)
Ordinance No. 8027 visit fellester.blogspot.com was enacted right after the Philippines, along
with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City.
The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No
reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
NOTES:
In 2007, the SC ruled that the Local Government Code imposes upon Mayor Atienza, to enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice.
(GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7, 2007)
In 2008, The Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by Chevron, Petron, and
Shell, and instead reiterated its March 7, 2007 decision. (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society,
et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)
In 2009, the SC recently denied with finality the second motion for reconsideration of the three
big oil players. The Court stressed that the second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading pursuant to sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. It said that it already passed upon the
basic issues in its February 13, 2008 resolution and noted that the arguments of the oil firms
were a mere rehash of their arguments raised in the first motion for reconsideration. (Min. Res.,
GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., April 28, 2009)

Case number 31 binay vs domingo

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends
P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed

P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the
municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement
of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2)
government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal
protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare
clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum
non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health,
safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all
the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of
the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied
with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community,
it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out
of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the
corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the

promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor
has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights
and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a
member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must
not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo,
G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)

Case number 32 villavicencio vs lukban

Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was
also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without
their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and
knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia
Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the
city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus
100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen
and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he
has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed
has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of
law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within
the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing
her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who
has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus
be easily evaded.

Case number 33 city of manila vs laguio jr

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding
Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as
Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance
is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following
errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;

(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which
allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified
therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in
declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an
enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police
power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such
delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance
of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment
of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not
only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process
clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the
social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers,
the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys
social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The
closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed
under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will
not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will
not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor
will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to
the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for
immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be
classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a
naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other
social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of
the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it
may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;
and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means
to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement
of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional
guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property.

Modality employed is unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be
used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking
occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A
regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government
regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in
a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the

name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments
three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to
transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to
other kinds of business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business
operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment
to accommodate an allowed business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the
Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A
zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a
wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes
the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not
noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know
them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad
and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in
its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than
the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its
validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the
Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments
without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns,
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition,
all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other
services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest
on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the
Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious
establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is
not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity
to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council
to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The
Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general
welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings.
That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health
or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not
per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the
provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already
converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree
allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments
except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule
is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be
within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And
not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Case number 31 city of manila vs laguio jr

City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio GR NO 118127 April 12 2005 CASE DIGEST

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE
ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars,
motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed
as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development
Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that
they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC
also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit
their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police
Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose
of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment
of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not
only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate
to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the
enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different from
sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The Supreme Court Said that it is baseless and
insupportable.

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests

the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. Ordinances placing restrictions
upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify
the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid. The Ordinance
however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and
unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid