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Criminal Law II Digests

Prof. Arreza Outline


Treason Digests
(c/o Anit. Cantos. Damasing. Dela Cruz. Hipolito. Regalado. Santos)
U.S. vs. Abad
G.R. No. L-976, October 22, 1902
Ponente: Ladd, J.
Facts:
Maximo Abad was charged with violation of oath of allegiance when he denied to an officer of the
United States Army the existence of certain rifles at the time of his surrender in April 1901 when in
fact, he was aware of the existence and whereabouts of such rifles. Section 14 of Article 292 of the
United States Philippine Commission states that: "Any person who shall have taken any oath
before any military officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such
official so administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in which oath the
affiant is substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of the United States of
America in these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the
passage of this act, violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of such terms or
provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding ten years, or both."
Abad is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of amnesty if
the offense is one of those to which the proclamation applies. The denying of the whereabouts of
the rifles can be considered an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the
United States, giving them aid and comfort, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be
held to be covered by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under
another name.
Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the United States or
the Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere. Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same act
as the rising publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods
certain enumerated objects of a political character.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance fall under the category of treason and
sedition.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
The offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offenses defined in Act No.
292, is included in the general words "treason and sedition," as used in the amnesty proclamation
of July 4, 1902.
The offenses listed in Act No. 292 include: treason, misprision of treason, insurrection, conspiracy
to commit treason or insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, seditious words and
libels, the formation of secret political societies, and violation of oaths of allegiance. When the
framer of the proclamation used the words "treason and sedition" to describe the purely political
offenses covered by the amnesty, we think it was his intention, without specially enumerating the
political offenses defined in Act No. 292, to include them all under the terms treason and
sedition.
Ruling: The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation of amnesty, and upon filing in
the court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below with directions that he be
discharged.
People v. Adriano
GR#477 Jun 30, 1947
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En Banc
Ponente: Tuason, J.
FACTS: Appeal from decision of the Peoples Court sentencing Apolinario Adriano to life imprisonment
and a fine of PhP 10,000 plus costs. Adriano was charged with treason for being a Makapili and for
bearing arms and assisting the Japanese Army in its operations in the Gapan-San Leonardo Area from
Jan.-Apr. 1945. The Peoples Court established that: Adriano was a Makapili; he performed sentry
duties in the Japanese garrison in Gapan, Nueva Ecija; he carried a rifle in drills led by Japanese
commanders; he surrendered to the Americans with rifle in hand.
ISSUE: W/N Adriano is guilty of treason
HELD/RATIO: No. The Philippine law on treason follows the two-witness test derived from the AngloAmerican law on treason. This test requires the concurrence of two witnesses to an overt act of
treason. In this case, each of the overt acts imputed to Adriano failed the test. Although mere
membership in the Makapili organization is a treasonous act in itself (indicative of adherence and
giving aid and comfort to the enemy), such membership is an overt act which should be proven by at
least two witnesses. In this case, no two witnesses saw Adriano doing the same single act as a
Makapili.
Hilado, J. dissenting:
Membership being a continuous and indivisible act, it is not necessary that two witnesses have
ascertained that Adriano was a Makapili on the same day. The witnesses agree on the fact that
Adriano is a Makapili, hence he should be convicted.
PEOPLE vs.CARMELITO VICTORIA
78 Phil 129,
G.R. No. L-369
March 13, 1947
Ponente: Perfecto, J.
FACTS:
Appellant was sentenced by the lower court to supreme penalty of death and fine of P20,000. His
crime: Treason (in violation of duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did
knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, with which the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war,
giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort) in the following events:
1.
October 6, 1944: joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about 8 spies and a Japanese
soldier, which went to the house of Federico Unson in Lucena, accused Unson of hiding guerrillas. But
then, when the enemy was about to arrest Unson, guerrillas showed up and killed one of the spies.
The Jap patrol left, but came back afternoon of the same day, arrested Unson and two others (Perez
and Godoy), tortured them, and set fire to the house of Unson. Perez and Unson sustained numerous
bayonet wounds - mutilated and were found rotting in the vicinity of the house. Unson was tied to a
tree, and disembowelled by several bayonet wounds, while Perez was mutilated and appeared ankleless. Godoy was never heard of. It appears he was taken to Lucena and was killed there.
o Version of Defense: Although admitting his presence in the raid, he did not come along with
party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the actual arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy took
place.
o Lower courts decision: Guilty. Defense doesnt have enough weight to prevail over that of
the prosecuting witnesses.
2.
December 21, 1944: accompanied other Japanese spies to the house of Jose Unson, arrested
said Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short wave
radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the guerrillas and at the same time supporting
them; that said Unson was released on the same day, but on the next day he was again arrested and
brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned. The last
that was seen of Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months
after the arrest.
o Defense: He admitted to have taken part in the raid but claims that he tried to save Unson.
o Lower court: Only the latter (act of saving?) was accepted by the lower court, in view of
appellant's behaviour as recalled by witnesses Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio
Ramon Unson. Guilty as well.
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3.
February 10, 1945: accompanied armed members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai to
the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect,
and turned him over to the Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing themselves
near the house of Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him.
o Defense: Alibi - he was in Gagalagin, Manila.
o Lower court: Guilty.
4.
December 21, 1944 (5AM): accompanied two Japanese Military Police and two undercover
operatives to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and apprehended said Calauag,
conducted a search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he
was subjected to inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the Hunters ROTC
Guerrillas.
o Defense: He alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to accompany them
in the raid, admitted that he was present throughout the investigation and torture of Caluag who,
according to the accused himself, was tied suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes.
o Lower court: Guilty. Considered the account of the defense as corroborative of the facts
alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the prosecution.
5.
March 9, 1944 (5AM): acting as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, caused the Japanese
Military police to arrest and apprehend Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was thereupon
brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and unlawfully detained.
o Not proven.
6.
June, 1944: accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives to the house of Melecio
Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, where he was
tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
o Defendant: Feigned ignorance of the arrest.
o Lower court: Guilty. Accused himself testified that he promised to see what he could do
about Labalan and accepted three chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to the interpreter at
the kempei office.
7.
February, 1945: that as a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, he joined the Makapili
organization designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies;
that he took military training from the Japanese and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a
Makapili soldier, taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning of the
barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and
foodstuffs for the Japanese Army; that he performed sentry duty
o Not proven.
In all of these instances, appellant maintains that he is not a spy, and was only forced to be one. He
also claims to be a guerrilla and that he tried to help Filipino prisoners.
Aggravating circumstances (lower court): treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford
impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the
commission thereof.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of counts 1,2,3,4 and 6


o If guilty, whether or not his act of saving some Filipinos justify or mitigate his criminal
responsibility

Whether or not the penalty should be death, considering the aggravating circumstances
HELD:

Guilty.
RATIO: Appellants 130-page brief failed completely to point out any specific error in the conclusions
of fact of the lower court,
o The fact that he helped some Filipinos does not relieve him from criminal
responsibility for the acts he had committed. The performance of righteous action, no matter
how meritorious they may be is not a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of wrongs.

Sentence is reclusion perpetua.


RATIO: The voters are divided as to what the sentence should be. Majority is of the opinion that
the sentence should be death while the ponente is of the opinion that the circumstances in question
are essential elements of the treason appellant has committed. There being no unanimity of all the
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members of the Court in the imposition of the death penalty, the People's Court's decision is
modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.
People v Pedro Marcaida
79 Phil 283
Sept 18 1947
FACTS:

Pedro Marcaida: charged with treason by the Peoples Court

Marcaida alleges that the court erred in saying that his citizenship was sufficiently proven.

Defense claims that Marcaida testified in Tagalog that he is taga-Lopez (in Tayabas, Quezon)
and that he was born in Lopez, but there are no such details in the records.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Marcaida can be convicted of treason.


HELD/RATIO:

No. His citizenship is not sufficiently proven. The name Pedro Marcaida can be Filipino, Spanish
of South American. No evidence of citizenship of parents means there is no way to ascertain whether
or not he is a Filipino citizen, as he could be a descendant of Spanish subjects who chose to retain
Spanish citizenship even after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, or even by South Americans who
refused to go through the naturalization process.
Laurel v Misa
Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa
77 Phil 856, G.R. No. L-409
January 30, 1947
DOCTRINE: Allegiance is either permanent or temporary. A Filipino citizen owes permanent
allegiance to the Philippines while a resident alien owes a temporary allegiance to our country.
Treason cannot be committed in time of peace. It is a war crime. While there is peace, there are no
traitors. There must be a war in which the Philippines is involved.
FACTS:
This is a resolution of the decision of the SC denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed
by Laurel. Anastacio Laurel was arrested by the US Army and was interned under a commitment
order for collaborating with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation. He was turned over to
the Commonwealth Government and since then has been under the custody of the respondent
Director of Prisons. He filed an original action in the Supreme Court invoking the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
He maintains that his arrest was illegal and in violation of his constitutional rights and that the
Peoples Court Act 682 which suspends the application of the six-hour limitation on detention to
political prisoners is unconstitutional. The SC court in its decision, denied his petition and rejected
the petitioners contention mainly because no vested right was violated as the Act is not an expost facto law. Although the RPC was in effect during his arrest, he could not have asked for
release after 6 hours as Gen. Douglas McArthur revived the laws of Commonwealth but held the
active collaborationists in restraint for the duration of the war.
Laurel, not discouraged, filed a motion and contends that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason because a) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines, and
consequently, the allegiance of Filipino citizens was suspended; b) there was a change of
sovereignty over the Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic
ISSUES:
a) Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines is suspended upon
occupation
b) Whether the occupation by an enemy suspends the allegiance of Filipino citizens to the sovereignty
c) Whether the temporary allegiance by inhabitants of a territory to their occupants removes the
permanent allegiance of a citizen to his legitimate government
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d) Whether political laws, such as crimes against national security, are suspended or inapplicable
against the occupants
e) Whether political laws, such as crimes against national security, are suspended or inapplicable
against the inhabitants
f) Whether the occupant may repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason
g) Whether there was a change of sovereignty of the Islands upon proclamation of the Republic and
therefore petitioner can be released as treason was not committed against this sovereignty
h) Whether petitioner can be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
HELD/RATIO:
a) No. Sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier but
remains with the legitimate government. It cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor
thereof. What is suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy which passes temporarily to the occupant.
b) No. A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his legitimate government and it
cannot be transferred to the occupant. Moreover, sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists
during enemy occupation so the allegiance to the sovereign subsists and therefore there is no such
thing as suspended allegiance.
c) No. The temporary allegiance of inhabitants to occupants is similar to temporary allegiance of a
resident alien to the territory wherein he resides. In the same way that the citizen of a sovereign or
government can be convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, the inhabitant of a territory
occupied by military forces of an enemy may also commit treason against his own legitimate
government. Allegiance is not merely the obedience to laws in return for a mans protection in his
place of residence because by obeying said laws, he is not bound to obey the laws of his own
government.
d) Yes. With the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government,
the authority to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant and political laws are suspended.
They are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant because they
exclusively bear relation to the legitimate government. Crimes against national security (of the
legitimate government) such as treason as penalized by the RPC are also deemed suspended against
the occupant because they cannot be committed against it.
e) No. Treason is applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government because the inhabitants of the occupied territory are still bound by their allegiance to the
latter during enemy occupation.
f) No. This is not necessary to control the inhabitants and it is tantamount to practically transfer
temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the sovereign. If an inhabitant is compelled illegally,
he can lawfully resist or submit without becoming a traitor.
g) No. There is no change of sovereignty so the crime of treason committed during the Japanese
occupation was committed against the same sovereign people and the same government.
h) No. He cannot be released.
Perfecto, concurring:
Treason is a war crime and cannot be committed during time of peace. Allegiance to the government
was not suspended during the enemy occupation. 4 kinds: Natural, Acquired, Legal, Local. The idea of
suspended sovereignty of suspended allegiance is incompatible with the Constitution which states
that Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
Hilado, concurring:
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Allegiance to citizens of the country to the legitimate government and US was not suspended during
the Japanese occupation. Because of the Brian-Kellogg Pact in which Japan is an asignatory, the
unjustifiable war is a crime committed by Japan; hence it is an illegal war.
Dissent:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the
land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines
wasnt sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the
acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed
sovereign.
US v. Dalmacio Lagnason
3 Phil. 495
G.R. No. 1582, March 28, 1904
Ponente: Justice Willard
Facts:
Defendant charged under Act292 with treason, sentenced to death. When Americans occupied Negros
Occidental, there were a band of men in arms against US government led by defendant. Their aim
was to establish an independent government. On October 29, 1902, defendant with band attacked
pueblo Murcia, driven off by Constabulary. Defendant captured. They carried no banners, but did carry
two large wooden crosses which were captured, together with the cannon.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant is guilty.
Held:
Yes. Acts of violence committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the
Government was levying war against the US, and therefore treason, regardless of number of men. No
distinction made between foreign enemy and rebel or insurgent so far as act of levying is concerned.
Levying of war had a definite meaning. That the acts committed by the defendant constituted a
"levying of war" as that phrase was understood at the time the act of the Commission was passed,
can not be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that these same acts constituted a "rebellion or
insurrection" within the meaning of the third section of Act No. 292. The two sections can only be
reconciled in the manner employed in the case against Greathouse (a case mentioned), and that
decision should be followed. If rebellion and insurrection are treason, a defendant can not be
convicted under section 3 except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or by
confession in open court. If they are not treason he could be convicted upon the testimony required in
ordinary cases. The provisions as to two witnesses applied to prosecutions under the second section
of the act of 1862. It is not necessary, however, to decide that question in this case, as the overt act
of the defendant was proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary to decide whether the omission
in section 3 of the phrase "owing allegiance to the United States," which is found in section 1 taken in
connection with section 17 of the act, makes a difference between the two sections in the case at bar
the defendant was a native of Cebu and is therefore covered both by section 1 and section 3. In a
case, an accused has been acquitted because no overt act of treason was proved, and in another
there was acquittal because there were not two witnesses to the same overt act.
People Of The Philippines Vs. Gaudencio Roble
Tuason, J.; March 2, 1949
G.R. No. L-433
FACTS:
On March 20, 1944, in Dumagete, Cebu, Gaudencio Robles, as a member of the Philippines
Constabulary lead 10 other pro-Jap constabulary, all of them armed, to arrest Paulino Osorio for
helping guerillas, whom they maltreated and detained in the municipal jail of Dumagete.
On the same day, the same group arrested Melchor Campomanes and 7 other people and tortured
them for supporting and sympathizing with the guerillas. Robles then shot Campomanes, killing him.
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Someday after, Robles again lead other constabulary officers to arrest Fortunato Linares and others
in Dalaguete, Cebu. Robles cut their ears and tortured them severely that Antolin Rodriguez died as a
result.
Then on May 18, 1944, Robles again lead a group of constabulary officers to Mambaling and other
areas in Cebu City to arrest Eleuterio Padilla for being a guerilla. The group tortured and detained him
before he was killed by Roble on May 26.
Roble was caught and charged with 3 counts of treason.
He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the First Division of the People's Court sitting in
Tacloban, Leyte.
Issues:
Whether or not the penalty of death was correct.
Held:
No. Decision was modified and sentence was reduced to reclusion perpetua
Ratio:
The trial court erred in stating that it was a complex crime of treason with murders. The
torture and murders he committed formed part of treason.
Treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength are circumstances
inherent in treason and are not aggravating.
Ignominy (torture) is an aggravating circumstance.
Plea of guilt is also taken into consideration.
People vs. Perez
83 Phil 314
G.R. No. L-856, April 18, 1949
Ponente: Tuason, J.
Susano Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City
and sentenced to death by electrocution. Only five (1, 2, 4, 5, 6) out of seven counts of information
were substantiated by the prosecution.
Facts:
Count 1: Perez, with other Filipinos, recruited women girls and women against their will to satisfy
the lust of Colonel Mini. The victims included Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog,
Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos. Eriberta Ramo testified that on June 15,
1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the house of
her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas;
that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that the accused came again and told
her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job; that
a week later the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls
Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini
wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but
a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she was
brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed in
hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
Count 2: Perez, in company with some Japanese and Filipinos, took Eriberta Ramo and her sister
Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor
of Colonel Mini in order that Mini might select those who would later be taken to satisfy his lust. By
means of threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sisters were brought to the
headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran.
Count 4: On July 16, 1942, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes
in Corella, Bohol, by Perez and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the
Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his lust, but Perez and Bullecer raped the women first
before bringing them to Takibayas. Perez raped Eduarda and Bullecer raped Eutiquia Lamay.
Eduarda S. Daohog testified that while on the way to Tagbilaran, Perez through force and
intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was
delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified
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that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take her and
her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a
revolver if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that while
they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer
took Eutiquia Lamay; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that the
accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was raped
by Takibayas and Eutiquia was raped by another Japanese.
Count 5: On or about June 4, 1942, Perez commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana
and that they were to be taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a
case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and upon arriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused
brought the two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini and by means of violence, threat and
intimidation, Mini abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that Perez followed in
having carnal knowledge with Flaviana; that two days later, Perez brought Feliciana Bonalos to a
secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by means of threat and violence had
carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Count 6: Perez, together with his Filipino companion, apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora
Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance
and reception organized in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers which
was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that on July 8, 1942, said nurses were forced to
attend another banquet and dance in order that the Japanese officers might make a selection
which girls would suit best their fancy.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Perez in luring women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officials
constitute treason.
Held: No.
Ratio:
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must
be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be
directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. His "commandeering" of women to
satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor
was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more
pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women
themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or
organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and
materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State.
Ruling: Perez is guilty of four counts of rape and sentenced for each of them to an indeterminate
penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal.
People v. Alunan
Peoples Court Criminal Case No. 3461 Feb. 27, 1947 - 43 OG 1288
Ponente: Leopoldo Rovira
(NOTE: The decision was rendered in Spanish . Apparently the Peoples Court was the post-war
court set up to try collaborators with the Japanese. Rafael Alunan served in the puppet Japanese
government in the Philippines.)
FACTS: Rafael R. Alunan was charged with treason before the Peoples Court for accepting and
discharging official duties in the Philippine Executive Commission (the puppet government). Among
these functions were: accepting and serving in the ff. positions: Minister of Agriculture and
Commerce; Member of the Executive Council; Member of the Preparatory Commission on Philippine
Independence which drafted the 1943 Constitution; Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
participating in a gratitude mission to Tokyo; voting in favor of declaration of war against the Allied
Powers; conferring with the Japanese emperor; and helping draft and circulate a Letter of Response
which promised cooperation with the Japanese, among others. Alunan pleaded not guilty
ISSUE: W/N Alunan is guilty of treason
HELD: No. Motion to dismiss granted.
RATIO:
Although the witnesses have been able to prove Alunans participation in the puppet government, his
acts were duties of a public position held under abnormal circumstances. Such acts cannot be
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considered as giving aid or comfort to the enemy. Mere acceptance of public office and performance
of the duties of such offices under the Japanese puppet government do not constitute treason per se.
Granting arguendo that Alunans acts did constitute giving aid or comfort to the enemy, he cannot be
punished because his adherence to the enemy cause was not proven.
Diaz, J. concurring: (I put this in KASI ETO LANG YUNG ENGLISH ^^)
3 elements of treason: 1) allegiance of the accused; 2) treasonable adherence to the enemy 3)
commission by the accused of an overt act giving OR at least tending aid and comfort to the enemy
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (Sychangco, Formoso, Silayan, and Javalera) do not
establish intent on Alunans part to adhere to the enemy. They only establish certain overt acts
committed by Alunan. For treasonous intent to be inferred from overt acts, there must be absolutely
nothing in the proof of such overt acts which may negate the element of adherence. The same
records which showed that Alunan indeed served in the puppet government also showed that Alunan
was serving only out of necessity, and was more sympathetic to the Allied cause.
(POSTSCRIPT: Almost none of the other high-ranking officials of the Japanese puppet govt were
convicted.)
People v Abad
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FRANCISCO M. ABAD (alias PAQUITO)
G.R. No. L-430
July 30, 1947
PERFECTO, J.
FACTS:
Accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex crime of treason with homicide and
sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs of Osias Salvador in the amount
of P2,000, and to pay costs.
1. December 24, 1943: as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army, join participate in a raid
conducted by about fifteen Japanese soldiers of the Military Police at the house of Magno Ibarra,
apprehended the said Magno Ibarra, charging him of possession of a revolver which had been
previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the Japanese that Magno Ibarra still had the revolver.
2. March 11, 1944, caused the arrest and incarceration for more than two months, of one Mr.
Francisco, for having remarked that the Americans would soon return many places in the Philippines
had already been retaken.
3. September 28, 1944: forced, coerced, and compelled Osias Salvador and his two brothers to go to
the Japanese garrison where in accuseds presence, were tortured as guerrilla suspects, and although
Epifanio and Liberto Salvador managed later to escape from imprisonment, the said Osias Salvador
was unable to do so and died.
4. November 12, 1844: handed over one Francisco Donato to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and
kicked the said Donato, for an incident in which the accused was entirely to blame in that the said
accused annoyed Flora Esteban, wife of Francisco Donato, by throwing sugar cane butts at her.
The lower court found the accused guilty on the first three counts.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the first count. Defense maintains that only one witness
testified to the overt act alleged therein.
o HELD: Not guilty.
o RATIO: Two witnesses were called by the prosecution to prove the first count, Magno Ibarra and
his wife, Isabel. Appellant's going to the Ibarra house, in search of the revolver (testimony of Isabel),
is a single overt act, distinct and independent from appellant's overt act in requiring Magno Ibarra,
when the latter went to the garrison, to produce his revolver (testimony of Magno). Although both
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overt acts are inter-related. it would be too much to strain the imagination if they should be identified
as a single act or even as different manifestations, phases, or stage of the same overt act.

Whether or not the arrest and incarceration of Francisco was caused by accused. Defense
maintains that there could be other spies who heard Franciscos remarks.
o HELD: Guilty.
o
RATIO: The fact that appellant caused the arrest of Francisco at the auditorium night dance, by
pointing him as the man sought for to the Japanese soldiers who accompanied him and his brother
Mariano, in itself alone is sufficient to find him guilty of adherence to the Japanese enemies and of
giving them aid in the attainment of their was purposes.

Whether or not the accused caused the arrest of Salvador brothers. Defense maintains that it
was improbable for Liberato Salvador to have seen the accused making signs to Japs to arrest the
Salvador brothers.
o HELD: Guilty.
o
RATIO: It is satisfactorily explained by Liberato that "because a man wanted to by the
Japanese begins to observe everything," he had to observe "because I knew they were making signs"

In relation to the above, whether or not accused is responsible for the death of Osias Salvador.
o HELD: Not responsible.
o RATIO: It was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato, which must have enraged
the Japanese to the extent of killing Osias Salvador, who, were not so weak, had the same chance as
his brothers to escape. If his brothers did not escape, there is no ground to presume that Osias would
have been killed by the Japanese if we take into consideration that, after almost two and a half
months of confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto Francisco to be released. There is absolutely no
evidence that appellant was present or had anything to do with the killing of Osias Salvador.

Whether or not the court erred in admitting evidence of supposed treasonable acts not
specifically alleged in the information (referring to the gathering of info on the whereabouts of
guerrilla army members and the shooting of Domingo)
o HELD: Yes, the court erred. Not guilty.
o RATIO: The fact that accused is described therein as an informer is not enough, because the
description is a conclusion made by the author of the information based on the facts specifically
alleged in the four counts. Also, the lower court erred in finding the facts proven when the testimony
of has not been corroborated by any other witness, thus violating the two-witness rule in treason
cases.

Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused as informer based on mere assertions of
witnesses on charges not alleged in the information
o HELD: Yes, the trial court erred. Not guilty.
o The pronouncement appears to be based on the testimonies of Publio Dumaual, Rafael Guillermo,
and Agustin de la Cruz, each one of whom testified about facts not alleged in any of the counts of the
information, and their testimonies on said facts appear not to be corroborated by another witness, as
required by the two-witness rule.

Whether or not the court erred in not appreciating 2 mitigating circumstances: the fact that the
Abad family was persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution ending in the killing of Lino Abad Pine and
Antonio Abad, father and brother, respectively, of the accused, and, appellant's age.
o HELD: First circumstance not appreciated. Age is appreciated.
o RATIO: The killing of the father and brother of accused is not considered to mitigate appellant's
guilt as they are not of a similar nature or analogous to those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code.Appellant's age can be considered. He was born on October 20, 1924, and when he
committed the acts alleged in counts two and three, the latter on September 28, 1944, he was not
yet 20 years old. The circumstances of this case justify crediting appellant with a mitigating
circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

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Decision of the lower court modified (1 mitigating). Sentenced to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs.
People v Faustino Flores,
People v Leon Gutierrez, People v Felipe Reyes (1950)
85 Phil 403
Jan 31 1950
Facts:

Faustino Flores, Leon Gutierrez, Felipe Reyes: charged with several counts of treason (2,2 and
5, respectively). Case concerns the second count, as they are acquitted of their other counts due to
lack of proof.

Dec 1 1944, Barrio Tipas, Taguig, Rizal: Accused lead Japanese troops into a zonification
(rounding up the men suspected of being guerillas into an area, having makapilis point guerillas out,
and torture or abduct them), arrest 276 men in the process, search houses in the area for supplies to
gicve to the Japanese troops, load the 267 men into trucks which drove them to Pasig, from which
they were never heard of again.

Peoples Court finds the three guilty of treason.


Issue:

Whether or not the accused are guilty of the second account of treason.

Whether or not the Zoning of Tipas constitutes one act of treason for the purposes of the rule
that there should be testimonies from at least two witnesses.
Held/Ratio:

No. Witnesses testimonies for each of the accused fail to disclose that they refer to the same
act, therefore these are uncorroborated. This is a violation of the two-witness rule.

No. Each of the acts of the accused must be supported by at least two witnesses, or each
witness must testify to the whole act, in order for the rule to be complied with.
People v. Filemon Escleto
84 Phil 121, G.R. No. L-1006
June 28, 1949
Tuason, J.
DOCTRINE: No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of 2 witnesses at least
to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court. The 2-witness rule is severely
restrictive. Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgement of the Peoples Court.
March 11 1944: Japanese patrol with 17 men and 1 officer were ambushed and liquidated by
guerillas in Bibito, Lopez, Tayabas (now Quezon)
Residents of Bibito and neighboring barrios were arrested and others were ordered to report at the
poblacion which included Antonio Conducto, a guerilla and former USAFFE, his wife, parents and
relatives
Witnesses:
Sinforosa Mortero (Antonios mother): On March 18, 1944, at about 5PM, she and her family went
to the poblacion from barrio Danlagan. Still in Danlagan, in front of Filemon Escletos house,
Escleto told them to stop and took down their names. With her were her daughter-in-law, Patricia
Araya, her son Antonio Conductor, and three grandchildren. After writing their names, Escleto
conducted them to the PC garrison in the poblacion where they were questioned by some whose
name she did not know. This man asked her if she heard gunshots and she said yes but did not
know where they were. The next day they were allowed to go home with many others, but Antonio
Conducto was not released. Since then she had not seen her son. On cross-examination she said
that when Escleto took down their names Antonio Conducto asked the accused if anything would
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happen to him and his family, and Escleto answered, Nothing will happen to you because I am to
accompany you in going to town.
Patricia Araya (Antonios wife): Filemon Escleto stopped them and took down their names; that
after taking their names Escleto and the Philippine Constabulary soldier took them to the PC
garrison; that her husband asked Escleto what would happen to him and his family, and Escleto
said nothing and assured Conducto that he and his family would soon be allowed to go home;
that Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard him tell the latter, This is Antonio Conducto
who has firearm; that afterward they were sent upstairs and she did not know what happened to
her husband.
Filemon Escleto was charged in the Peoples Court with 3 counts of treason for:
o going out with Japanese military in patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and
of persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movements in the Philippines; bearing
arms against the American men and guerrilla forces and mounting guard and performing
guard duty for the Imperial Japanese Forces in their garrison in Lopez, Tayabas (now
Quezon)
o going out in patrols in search of guerillas
o treasonably arrested or caused arrest of Antonio Conducto as a guerilla and turned him
over to the Japanese authorities on Mar. 18, 1944 who has not been seen since then
The Peoples Court dismissed the first 2 counts because no true overt act was established and
there was no 2 witnesses to corroborate. However, the 3rd count was deemed fully substantiated.

ISSUES:
1) Whether Filemon Escleto is guilty of treason
2) Whether Escletos making note of persons who went to the poblacion is evidence of an overt act of
treason
3) Whether Patricia Arayas testimony is availing as proof of an overt act of treason
HELD:
1) NO. He is acquitted of the crime of treason.
2) NO. The only point of agreement between the 2 witnesses testimonies is that the accused took
down the names of Conducto and of the witnesses and came along with them to the town. This does
not show betrayal of Conducto because he may be merely doing his duties as lieutenant of the barrio.
Also, it is not necessary to write down Conductos name because Escleto can merely report him
secretly. That there were spies with masks during the registration and that others were released
further support the theory that Escleto was merely following orders in ordering them to write their
names.
3) NO. The only damaging evidence is Arayas testimony that the accused told a Philippine
Constabulary Soldier that the deceased has a firearm. However, the testimony was not shown to have
been made for a treasonable purpose nor did it necessarily have that implication. In addition, this was
not corroborated by another witness.
*People vs. Adriano : The authors of the two-witness provision in the American Constitution, from
which the Philippine treason law was taken, purposely made it severely restrictive and
conviction for treason difficult.
*Wigmore: Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must
be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
*Learned Hand: It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be
possible to piece bits together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two
oaths;.
*Cramer: The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that
it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused
actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every action, movement, deed, and word of the
defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses.
Conspiracy to commit Treason
US v. Francisco Bautista
6 Phil 581
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G.R. No. L-2189, November 3, 1906


Ponente: Justice Carson
Facts:
Appellants convicted in CFI Manila of conspiracy to overthrow by force US government and PH
government as defined in Act292. Francisco Bautista was sentenced with Aniceto de Guzman and
Tomas Puzon to imprisonment with fine and hard labor. During latter 1903 a junta was organized and
a conspiracy entered into by Filipino residents in HK for overthrowing the government by force of
arms and establishing in its stead a government known as Republica Universal Democratica Filipina.
Toward the end of 1903, Artemio Ricarte would come to Manila from Hong Kong and hold meetings to
further the conspiracy hatched in HK, like for the plan to enlist a revolution army and raising money
for it. The conspirators took to the field and offered armed resistance, only failing because of their
failure to combat and of the failure of the people to rise en masse in response to their propaganda.
Bautista, a Manila resident, was an intimate friend of Ricarte, notified by Ricarte of his coming to
Manila, Bautista giving him money for the trip, present in meetings, held the people in readiness.
Puzon distributed the bonds and appointed certain officials for the revolutionary forces. Puzon said he
only acted to not vex his friend, that joking tone, that he did not know Ricarte was organizing a
conspiracy.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants are guilty.
Held:
No. Puzon himself signed a written statement at the time he was arrested saying he was part of the
new revolution presided over by Ricarte, that he was brigadier-general, chief of signal corps since
they were childhood friends. Puzon did not deny this statement. His confession was clear and in no
way supports his pretense that he was excited as not to know what he was saying when he made it.
The accused voluntarily accepted the appointment and in doing so assumed all obligations implied by
such acceptance. Mere possession of such an appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor
executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not constitute sufficient proof of the guilt
of the defendant," applies only the case of Enrique Camonas, against whom the only evidence of
record was the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant was found at his house. It may be the
case that conspirators may send appoints to an unsuspecting person in the hope that such person
would accept it, and the person is entirely innocent of all intention to join. A genuine conspiracy must
be shown to exist, and it must be proven that accused voluntarily accepted the appointment. The
two-witness rule cannot apply in proving conspiracy to commit treason, only in treason. Aniceto de
Guzman cannot be convicted on his acceptance of a number of bonds from conspirators. It does not
mean he knew about the conspiracy, receiving the wrapped bonds not knowing what they were, then
destroying them thereafter.
United States Vs. Apolonio Caballeros
Mapa, J.; March 29, 1905
G.R. No. 1352
FACTS:
Roberto Baculi was in his banana plantation gathering bananas when he heard some shots fired. He
tried to run, but was seen by Damaso and Isidro, leaders of the band who fired the shots and striking
him with the butts of their guns, forced him to bury the victims: four American school teachers shot to
death.
Apolonio Caballeros and Baculi was then arrested for the crime.
The two confessed their guilt and was sentenced to seven years of presidio mayor as accessories.
Issues:
Whether or not the penalty was correct.
Held:
No. Decision reversed and defendants acquitted.
Ratio:
Baculi is exempt from liability for he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force
since he was under threat by the band.
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As for Caballeros, ther was no proof of his participation in any way to the crime charged.
Witnesses confirm that he was not even in the place where the burial took place.
Covarrubias, a witness, said that his confession of guilt was made through a promise that
nothing will be done to them. Under such circumstance, the confession cannot be accepted
as proof on trial, for it was not made freely and voluntarily.
Their failure to report the crime to the authorities is not a crime punishable by the RPC.
Espionage
Santos vs. Misa
G.R. No. L-319, March 28, 1946
76 Phil 415
Ponente: Bengzon=, J.
Facts:
Santos is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter Intelligence Corps of
the United States Army, turned over last September, to the Commonwealth Government, and
since then detained by the respondent as a political prisoner. He was detained due to active
collaboration with the Japanese.
Santos claims that the detention is illegal because he has not been charged before, nor convicted
by, the judge of a competent court, and because he may not be confined under Act. No. 682
because he does not owe allegiance to the US or the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The Solicitor-General declared that Santos may be charged for espionage, a crime against national
security wherein allegiance is immaterial, and may, therefore, be held in custody under
Commonwealth Act No. 682
Issue: Whether or not Santos is covered by Commonwealth Act No. 682. (With regard to detention of
political prisoners)
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
Section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 682:
Upon delivery the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of
the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of
Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and such other things as the
Government of the United States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said
political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as
possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . .. And, provided, further, That, in the
interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political
prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the People's Court, but
the period of suspension shall not be than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political
prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines to
the Commonwealth Government.
Santos may be prosecuted for espionage, a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender
and considered as an offense against national security.
Ruling: Petition denied.
Piracy
People v. Lol-lo and Saraw
GR#17958 Feb. 27, 1922
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
FACTS: Days after leaving Matuta, Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) on Jun. 30, 1920, two boats
carrying 12 Dutch nationals (1 person in one boat, 11 men, women and children in another) were
boarded by 24 armed Moros (including the accused Lol-lo and Saraw) at around 7:00 PM. The Moros
took all the cargo from the Dutch. They also raped and abducted the two women on board. The Moros
poked holes in the boat and left the rest of the Dutch in it (they were later rescued). The two women
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were able to escape once the Moros docked in the island of Maruro (also a Dutch possession). Lol-lo
and Saraw were arrested after returning to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-tawi. They were charged
w/ Piracy before the Sulu CFI and were found guilty, with punishment of life imprisonment; and to
return the stolen 39 sacks of copra plus 924 rupees in damages, plus costs.
ISSUES: 1) W/N the Sulu CFI has jurisdiction over the crime 2) W/N the defendants are guilty
HELD: 1) Yes 2) Yes
RATIO:
1) Piracy is a crime against all mankind. The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits, pirates
being hostes humani generis (enemies of mankind). Piracy may be prosecuted in any court where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
2) The provisions of the Spanish Penal Code on piracy (Arts. 153-154) remained in force after the
American takeover, by virtue of Pres. McKinleys Instructions. Art. 154 specified that piracy with rape
shall be punished by cadena perpetua to death. Lol-lo, who was proven to have taken part in the rape
of the two women, should therefore be put to death - the crime being aggravated by cruelty,
ignominy, and abuse of superior strength (rape of the women, abandonment of the other victims, 24
armed men vs. 12 men, women & children) with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
DECISION: Judgment affirmed with respect to Saraw, modified with respect to Lol-lo.
People v Siyoh
G.R. No. L-57292
February 18, 1986
The People Of The Philippines
vs.
Julaide Siyoh, Omar-Kayam Kiram, Namli Indanan & Andaw Jamahali,
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
Siyoh, Kiram, Indanan and Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated
murder. On July 14, 1979, accused fired their guns into the air and stopped the pumpboat wherein de
Castro, Hiloen and 2 de Guzmans were riding, boarded the said pumpboat and took, stole and carried
away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings
amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency, ordered them to jump into the
water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of de Castro
and one de Guzman while wounding the other de Guzman. It appears that Siyoh and Kiram were with
the victims, also selling their goods, before the incident happened.
Lower court decision: Sentenced to DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the
Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are
members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so called compassionate society, a
commutation to life imprisonment is recommended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Siyoh and Kiram are guilty beyond reasonable doubt, considering the credibility of the
witness
HELD:
Yes, they are guilty BRD.
RATIO:
Appellants contentions are unconvincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on
any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at
Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before
they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while
at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from
prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this
assertion.
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva
de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them
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shortly after the incident that their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The
thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers
and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the
accused.
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The
incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981
Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is
not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the
number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were
they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de
Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan
and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
Decision affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty
imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs
of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to
costs.
People v Ang Kio Cho
95 Phil 475
Jul 29 1954
FACTS:

Ang Kio Cho: charged with murder of Eduardo Diago and murder of Pedro Perlas

Dec 30 1952: Ang Cho is a passenger in PAL flight PI-C-38 from Laoag to Aparri
o Ang Cho shoots purser Diago
o Ang Cho coerces pilot Perlas into changing course for Amoy, in China. When Perlas refuses, Ang
Cho shoots him.

Ang Cho pleads guilty to both cases.


o 12 years prision mayor to 20 years reclusion temporal, plus indemnification of Diagos heirs for the
first case
o Reclusion perpetua for the second case

Attorney General contends that the lower court committed errors in each of the two cases:
o Aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation should be offset by plea of guilty; proper
penalty should be reclusion perpetua
o Crime charged should be the complex crime of grave coercion with murder; proper penalty should
be death

Supreme Court recognizes the error of the lower court in the first case, but rules that the claim
on the second case is baseless, as the coercion committed was not essential to the act of murder.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appeal made by the Attorney General concerning the first case has merit.
HELD/RATIO:

No. Placing upon the accused the risk of being given a higher penalty that what is imposed by
the lower court, even if the lower court erroneously gives the wrong penalty, counts as double
jeopardy.

"No error, however, flagrant, committed by the court against the state, can be reserved by it for
decision by the supreme court when the defendant has once been placed in jeopardy and discharged,
even though the discharge was the result of the error committed.
Illegal Detention
Lino v Fugoso
CECILIO M. LINO
vs.
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VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, and JOHN DOE, in their capacity as Mayor,
Chief of Police and Officer in charge of municipal jail, all of the City of Manila
G.R. No. L-1159
January 30, 1947
MORAN, C.J.:
Milo v Salanga
c/o A2015 Crim Digests
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan(Branch
IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR
[G.R. No.L-37007. July 20, 1987.]
GANCAYCO, J
Doctrine:
Arbitrary detention is commited by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The
elements of this crime are: 1) That the officer is a PUBLIC OFFICER or EMPLOYEE, 2) That he DETAINS
a person, and 3) That detention is without legal grounds
***Milo here is the the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan
Facts:
1.) 12 Oct. 1972 Information for Arbitrary Detention filed against Juan Tuvera Sr., Tomas Mendoza
and Rodolfo Mangsat in CFI of Pangasinan stating:
a. 21 April 1973 Juan Tuvera, Sr. (barrio captain) et al. MALTREATED Armando Valdez, hitting
the latter w/ butts of guns and fist blows
b. Tuvera w/o legal grounds and w/ members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan
conspiring, confedenrating and helping one another (JRB: I put this for good
measure) LODGED and LOCKED Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan
for about 11 hours.
2.) 4 April 1973 Tuvera filed motion to quash the Info bec. Acc. To him:
a. Facts do not constitute an offense (i.e., barrio captain =/= public official)
b. Proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information
c. TUVERAs ARGUMENTS:
i. He didnt have authority to make an arrest nor jail and detain Valdez (bec. Barrio
capt. Only)
ii. He is neither a peace officer or policeman
iii. He was not a public official
iv. He had nothing to do with the detention of Valdez (cops did it)
v. He is not directly or indirectly connected in the admin. Of the Manaoag Police Force
vi. Barrio capts on 21 April 1972 were not yet Persons in Authority and it was only
through PD 299 that they became such.
vii. Proper charge was ILLEGAL detention, and not ARBITRARY DETENTION
d. Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition to the motion
3.) 25 April 1973 Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash; found that Tuvera, Sr. was NOT a
Public Officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention (see QuickGuide for requisites of Arbit.
Det.)
ISSUES:
1.) Whether Tuvera, Sr. committed the crime of Arbitrary Detention against Armando
Valdez (By god, YES!)
RULING: Petition for Certiorari granted. The questioned order (granting motion to quash) is set
aside. CASE REMANDED to appropriate trial court for further proceedings.
RATIO:
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1.) Requisites of Arbitrary Detention are present


a. The Information charges Tuvera (barrio capt.) to having conspired with Corporal Mendoza and Pat.
Magsat who are members of the police force of Manaoag Pangasinan in detaining peti. Valdez for
about 11 hrs. in municipal jail w/o legal ground.
b. Requirement of a Public Officer contemplated in Arbitrary Detention:
i. Must have authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of ac rime
ii. Public Officers = policemen, other agents of the law (judges, mayors)
c. Court has held barrio lieutenants (ie, barrio captains/brgy captains) as PERSONS in AUTHORITY
i. US v Braganza - Barrio Lieutenant and a Municip. Councilor arrested a priest in church; no
crime committed by the priest; the 2 were convicted of arbitrary detention
ii. US v Gellada a Barrio Lieutenant w/ a Mr. Soliman, tied his houseboy Sixto and delivered
him to a justice of the peace, where he was detained during the whole night until 9 am the
next day. Justice of the peace released Sixto bec. He had not committed a crime. Barrio
Lieutenant Gellada was convicted of arbitrary detention
d. RA No. 3590 (Revised Barrio Charter)
i. Powers and duties of a barrio captain include looking after maintenance of public order in
the barrio and assist municipal mayor and councilor in the performance of duties in such
barrio, to look after gen. welfare, enforce all laws and ordinances w/in barrio, organize/lead
an emergency group when necessary to maintain peace and order
e. Prof. Aruegos Treatise on Barrio Govt Law and Administration (VERY IMPORTANT
This part SEALS the deal)
i. Upon barrio capt. Depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrioHe
is the peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such
HE MAY MAKE ARREST AND DETAIN PERSONS W/IN LEGAL LIMITS.
ii. ERGO, one need not be a police officer to be chargeable w/ Arbitrary Detention
iii. Powers and Functions of Mayors SIMILAR to those of brgy capt.; only difference is in size of
jurisdiction
iv. TUVERA STUPID ADMISSION:
1. W/ aid of his rural police, he as barrio capt. Could have led arrest of peti. Valdez
BONUS PART (Mainly Procedural)
On Motion to Quash:
1.) Tuvera asserted Motion to Quash was VALID as he only sought the aid and assistance of the
Manaoag Police Force and that he only accompanied Valdez to town for the latters personal safety
a. SC: Save it for your defense in trial, Tuvera!
i. These additional facts mentioned by Tuvera are contrary to the Information filed or do
not appear on its face, and so cannot be heard on hearing for a motion to quash.
NOTES FROM THE CASE ITSELF:
1.) There is no criminal delay in the delivery of the accused to the court, where the two days following
his arrest were holidays. (Medina vs. Orosco)
2.) A public officer or employee who DETAINS a person w/o LEGAL GROUNDS is guilty of
ARBITRARY DETENTION.
HOWEVER, a person so detained WILL NOT BE RELEASED if afterwards he is detained under a valid
information.

People v Bringas
Detention v Kidnapping for Ransom
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y GARCIA, BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA, JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y CRUZ,
ERICKSON PAJARILLO y BASER (deceased), and EDEN SY CHUNG
[G.R. No. 189093. April 23, 2010.]
VELASCO, JR
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US v Cabanag
Detention v Slavery
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
TOMAS CABANAG
[G.R. No.L-3241. March 16, 1907.]
TRACEY, J
US v Vallejo
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
SALVADOR VALLEJO, ET AL.,
[G.R. No. 4367. September 3, 1908.]
TRACEY, J
Crimes Against Public Order Digests
(c/o Anit. Bernardo. Calleja. Cantos. Damasing. Dela Cruz. Hipolito. Regalado. Santos)
Rebellion
People v Hernandez
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.,
99 Phil. 515.
Facts:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendant appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954,
and renewed on December 22, 1955. The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and
has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital
punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life
imprisonment. On the other hand, the defense contends, among other things, that rebellion can not
be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
The amended Information contained the allegation that on or about March 15, 1945, and for some
time before the said date and continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well as
with the 31 other defendants, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with
the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization
(CLO), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause,
direct and/or command the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (Huks) to
rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such
armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance
to the government and laws thereof, as in fact the said Huks have risen publicly and taken arms to
attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against
police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means
to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and
there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.
Issue: Can Rebellion be made into a complex crime?
Held: No, it cannot.
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Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez is hereby
granted and, upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000, and its approval
by the court, let said defendant-appellant be provisionally released. It is so ordered.
Ratio:
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
Pursuant to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code "any person, merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for "any person who
promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or
employment, takes part therein":
1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",
2. "destroying property", or
3. "committing serious violence",
4. "exacting contributions or"
5. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated".
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense,
and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P20,000.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by
"engaging in war against the forces of the government" and "committing serious violence" in the
prosecution of said "war". These expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely; resort to
arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty,
damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that
war leaves in its wake except that, very often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it
involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness
seldom found in a contest between strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and
"committing serious violence", said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life
and property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one crime that of rebellion plain and
simple. Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, one single crime, it follows
necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor
the commission of, at least, two crimes.
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as
may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a
crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof," then said
offense becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the
crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar: If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and
prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in
theabsence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
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singlea ggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant. Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was
enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than
that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately.
People vs Geronimo
100 Phil. 90
G.R. No. L-8936
October 23, 1956
Facts:
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony,
alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus
Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias
NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias
Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie,
Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres
Diapera alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo,
alias Albert, Teodoro Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias
Marquez, Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and
John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many others, were charged with the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping committed.
In Camarines Sur, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or members of, or
otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya
Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of
said Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an agreement and decide to commit
the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and confederating among themselves with
all of the thirty-one accused.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants committed the crime of rebellion?
Held:
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information. When the case was
called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the permission of the court to substitute his
original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to change his plea. On the basis of the plea of guilty,
the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his
voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating circumstance. Geronimos counsel, on the
other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the accused was only prision mayor, for the
reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnapping, because the crimes of murders robberies, and kidnapping being the natural
consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be considered
only as simple rebellion. On October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as
listed in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the
proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the sole question of
whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
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However, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (noncomplex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of
murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico
Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000,
(without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; and, as
above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs
of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs.
PEOPLE vs. CRUZ
3 SCRA 217
G.R. No. L-11870. October 16, 1961.
Concepcion, J.
FACTS:
- The said accused, being then ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HUK), have all come
together and agreed to commit the crime of rebellion (i.e. rising publicly and taking up arms against
the Government of the Republic of the Phiippines by making armed raids, sorties, ambushes, and
attacks against Phil Constabulary, Civilian Guards, Police, Army patrols, as well as civilians). In
furtherance thereof, they have committed the acts of murders, pillages lootings, plunders, arsons,
and planned destructions of private and public property to create disorder
- March 20, 1951; 830 AM: Benito Cruz, and other Huk members, entered the house of John Hardie,
with violence and intimidation, then took and carried away therefrom personal properties of material
values consisting of a typewriter, a radio, several pieces of jewelry, books, clothings and other articles
belonging to the latter amounting to Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) After ransacking the place, the
raiders tied the hands of John D. Hardie and his foreman Donald Capuano and shot them to death,
together with Mrs. Hardie. Late the month, a combat patrol led by Capt. Conrado M. Cabagui of the
14th BCT, with the assistance of one Tomas Timbresa, as guide, located a Huk camp in the Sierra
Madre Mountains.
- March 21, 1951: Some 70 armed members of FC #32 of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" led
by Comdr. Robert, fought the members of Co "D" of the 14th BCT, Armed Forces of the Philippines
under Capt. Conrado Cabague.
- April 21, 1951: Accused Fermin Tolentino, as the Commanding Officer of FC 25 of the 'Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan', leading some 70 armed members of the said organization, attacked, fired at
and engaged into a fight the officers and men of a detachment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
- November 15, 1952: Accused Domingo dela Torre and about 12 other armed men, all members of
Huk, in support of and/or in furtherance of the movement of the said organization to overthrow the
established government of the Phil, while soliciting food from civilians thereat, fought elements of the
7th BCT, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Civilian Commando Unit of Montalban, Rizal.
- April 5, 1951: Elements of the AFP had an encounter with 50 Huks under commander Silang at Sitio
Malabayas, Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, resulting in the death of one (1) Huk, two (2) EM and wounding of
another enlisted man.
- December 11, 1951: Elements of the AFP had an encounter with about fourteen (14) armed Huks
under Commander Aladdin at Sitio Kaulanog, Tanay, Rizal, resulting in the wounding of one (1)
enlisted man.
- April 28, 1949: An undetermined number of Huks jointly led by Commanders Viernes, Marzan, Lupo
and Mulong, treacherously ambushed, assaulted, attacked and fire upon the party of Mrs. Aurora A.
Quezon and her PC escort, whom they considered as their enemies, resulting in the death of Mrs.
Aurora A. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, Maj. P. San Agustin, Lt. Lasam, Philip
Buencamino III and several soldiers, and injuries to General Jalandoni and Capt. Manalang.
- August 25, 1950: An undetermined number of armed Huks raided, assaulted and attacked Camp
Makabulos and set fire on the buildings and installations therein killing Maj. E. D. Orlino, Capt. E. D.
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Cruz, Lts. Manacias, N. C. Tan, Eusebio Cabute, and several enlisted men, including Rosario Sotto, a
Red Cross Nurse.
- August 26, 1950: About 100 armed Huks, with intent of gain and for the purpose of procuring
supplies and other materials for the support and maintenance of the HMB organization, forcibly
brought the cashier of the Provincial Treasury, Vicente Reventar, from his house to the Provincial
Capitol and at the point of guns, forced him to open the treasury, and from which took money
amounting to Php 80,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellants committed the crime of rebellion.
HELD:
Yes. As stated in the brief for the Government, appellants herein are guilty of simple rebellion,
inasmuch as the information alleges, and the records show that the acts imputed to them were
performed as a means to commit the crime of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, although as Huk
Commanders, appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino fall under the first paragraph of Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000, whereas appellant Paterno Cruz comes under the second paragraph of said article, which
prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Accordingly, the penalty meted out to
appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino should be reduced to ten (10) years of prision mayor,
with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay each a fine of P10,000, and appellant
Paterno Cruz should be sentenced to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor,
with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the proportionate part of the
costs against said appellants.
Carino v People
FRANCISCO R. CARIO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
April 30, 1963 En Banc Labrador, J.
DOCTRINE: In rebellion or insurrection, the RPC expressly declares that there must be a public
uprising and the taking up of arms. The act of giving aid and comfort is not criminal in rebellion unlike
in treason.
FACTS:
- Accused was charged with rebellion for allegedly being in conspiracy with the other members of the
Communist Party, between the period from May 6, 1946 to September 12, 1950 for acts committed:
1) The ambush on May 6, 1946 of the 10th MPC Company in Barrio Sta. Monica, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija;
resulting in the death of 10 enlisted men; 2) The raid on August 6, 1946 of the Municipal Building of
Majayjay, Laguna; 3) The ambush on April 10, 1947 of 14 enlisted men in Barrio San Miguel na Munti,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija, during which Lt. Pablo Cruz and Pvt. Santiago Mercado were killed; 4) The raid
on the poblacion of Laur, Nueva Ecija of May 9, 1947; 5) The ambush on August 19, 1947 of a
detachment of the 155th Company, in San Miguel, Bulacan, killing two officers thereof; 6) The raid on
Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija of June 1946; 7) The ambush on April 25, 1947 of Mrs. Aurora Aragon
Quezon and party at Barrio Salubsob, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, resulting in the death of said Mrs.
Quezon and other members of her party; 8) The raid on Camp Macabulos, Tarlac, Tarlac, on August
25, 1950; 9) The raid on Sta. Cruz, Laguna, of August 26, 1950; 10) The raid on Arayat, Pampanga,
of August 25, 1950; 11) The seizure of September 12, 1950 of an army scout car in Barrio Mapalad,
Arayat, Pampanga and the murder of two TPs on the said occasion; 12) The attack on the
headquarters of a PC detachment of March 28, 1950, at Montalban, Rizal; and 13) The raid on San
Pablo, Laguna, of March 29, 1950, resulting in the death of Major Alikbusan of the government armed
forces.
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- He admitted the truthfulness of the said events but denied any participation.
- Accused is a good friend and a former high school classmate of Dr. Lava, a well-known Communist
leader. The latter has treated the family of the accused successfully and free of charge and is the
godfather of one of the children.
- 1946, nighttime: Lava arrived at their home and asked for shelter as he was being pursued by
politicians upon suspicion of his involvement in the killing of Mayor Roxas of Bulacan. He left early the
morning after.
- May 1949: A note from the Lava arrived asking for some cigarettes, powdered milk and canned
goods. The note was brought by a boy of 12 or 15 years, named Totoy, and through him the accused
sent the needed supplies. He was instructed to sign "Turko" all notes to be sent by him to Lava and to
address them to "Pinang" in order to conceal their respective identities.
- 1949 - April 1952: This exchange of notes between them and the furnishing of supplies and
foodstuffs by appellant to Dr. Lava lasted until the accused was arrested and detained.
- He also allegedly provided assistance to the Communist party as a ranking employee of the National
City Bank of New York when he was approached by a prominent member of a special unit of the
Communist Party, and delivered the amount of $6,000 to the treasurer of the communists. He also
assisted two top-level communists in opening current accounts in the National City Bank of New York
although their initial deposit was below P2,000, the minimum required by the bank. (However it was
not shown that the persons helped were known by appellant to be communist and the funds intended
to carry out the rebellion.)
- 1949: A spy, Florentino Diolata, heard him state that he was at the command of his comrades for
any assistance for the advancement and promotion of their common purpose at a banquet given by
the Communists in honor of Amado V. Hernandez
INFORMATION: Crime of rebellion with murders, arson, robberies and kidnappings, for
having, as a high ranking officer and/or member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and of the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), agreed in conspiracy
with 31 other who were charged with the same crime in other criminal cases then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government and disrupting its
activities.
CFI Manila: Guilty as accomplice in the crime of rebellion, and sentencing him to suffer two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to pay a fine in the sum of P2,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
CA: Affirmed CFI decision and convicted the accused of the crime of rebellion as the acts done by him
constitute acts of cooperation with the communists in their primordial purpose of overthrowing the
government and such acts naturally have contributed to some extent in the advancement and
promotion of their purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts committed by the petitioner were enough to render him guilty as an accomplice in
the crime of rebellion
HELD: No.
There are two elements required in order that a person may be considered an accomplice to a
criminal act, namely; 1) that he take part in the execution of the crime by previous and
simultaneous acts and; 2) that he intend by said acts to commit or take part in the execution
of the crime. The acts of the appellant do not prove any criminal intent of helping the Huks in
committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion. Good faith is presumed, and there is no
presumption of criminal intent or aiding the communists in their unlawful designs to overthrow
the Government.
Even if he had intent, he is still not liable as his assistance was not efficacious enough to help
in the success of the crime so as to make him an accomplice. Appellant's acts did not
constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the act of overthrowing the government.
Appellant was not a member of the Hukbalahap organization. He did not take up arms against
the Government, nor did he openly take part in the commission of the crime of rebellion or
insurrection as defined in article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, without which said crime
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would not have been committed. The only acts he was shown to have performed were the
sending or furnishing of cigarettes and food supplies to a Huk leader, the changing of dollars
into pesos for a top-level communists and the helping of Huks in opening accounts with the
bank of which he was an official.
Even if considered an indirect help or aid in the rebellion, they cannot constitute previous or
simultaneous acts or uprising or rebellion, for, unlike in the crime of treason, the acts giving
comfort of moral did is not criminal in the case of rebellion or insurrection, where the Revised
Penal Code expressly declares that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of arms.
DISPOSITION: The judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant ABSOLVED from
the charge contained in the information.
Buscayno v Military Commission
In the Matter of the Application for a writ of habeas corpus
Bernabe Buscayno, Jose Ma. Sison, Juliet Sison v. Mil. Comm. 1, 2, 6, 25
109 SCRA 273
Original Decision: Military Commission - Buscayno convicted of subversion, death by firing squad
SC Decision: No illegal detention. No bail. No double jeopardy.
Buscaynos cases
-Buscayno and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. charged before Mil. Comm. 2 with subversion
-staged NPA-sponsored demonstration in Manila
-Aquino gave Buscayno several .45 caliber pistols, two armored vests and walkie-talkies, and
ammunition.
-Aquino provided shelter and medical treatment for members of the HMB and NPA
-Aquino, Buscayno, as conspirators, charged with murder before Mil. Comm. 2
-took Cecilio Sumat, barrio captain, and killed him
-Buscayno, with 91 others charged with rebellion before Mil. Comm. 1
-Feb 4, 1972. rose publicly and took up arms against the government in Navotas, Rizal by
organizing the Karagatan Fishing Corporation to procure firearms
-Aug, 1973 - Feb, 1974. rebellion in Manila, Baguio, La Union, Pangasinan, Bulacan by acquiring
vessels, houses, lots to distribute firearms
-Buscayno arrested on Aug 26, 1976 in Pampanga
-At trial and arraignment, he waived his right to be present and to have counsel
-Pleaded not guilty
-Did not want to present evidence
-July 18, 1977 - Juan T. David entered his appearance as counsel for Buscayno and filed a
petition for habeas corpus and prohibition
-Commission found accused guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad
-May 4, 1981 - Commission reaffirmed original decision
Sison cases
-charged with rebellion before Special Mil Comm 1
-charged with subversion before Mil. Comm. 6
-alleged that accused became and have remained officers of CPP and NPA
-engaged in indoctrination, promotion of communist pattern of subversion
Rebellion case
-Sison and Buscayno assailed jurisdiction of the military tribunal to try civilians like them
-filed petition for habeas corpus, prohibition, mandamus. denied
Instant case
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-prayed that the decision of Mil. Comm. 2 be declared void because he was denied his
constitutional right to present evidence and that he be released from detention; charges for rebellion
and subversion be dismissed for being in contravention of the rule on double jeopardy
Issue: W/N they are legally detained. No, not illegally detained and no justification for their release
Held:
Proclamation No. 2045 sanctions continued confinement: persons under detention for rebellion and
subversion cannot enjoy the privilege of the write of habeas corpus
On the issue of the Anti-Subversion Law
Contention of Juliet de Lima-Sison: criminal liability for subversion extinguished when PD 885
repealed RA 1700. SC: No.
-Anti-Subversion Law expressly provides: acts committed in violation of the former law shall be
prosecuted and punished in accordance with the provisions of the former act and nothing in the
decree shall prevent prosecution of cases pending for violation of RA 1700
On the issue of double jeopardy
For an accused to be in jeopardy, required:
1 valid complaint or information filed against him
2 that the charge is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction
3 after pleading to the charge, accused is convicted, acquitted, case dismissed or terminated
Petitioners were all charged with rebellion. Only Buscaynos subversion case was decided but the
decision is subject to review. No case against petitioners has been terminated thus, the rule on
double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
On the issue of rebellion being an element of subversion
Subversion does not necessarily include rebellion. Subversion is a crime against national security.
Rebellion is a crime against public order.
Petitioners were accused of rebellion for having undertaken a public uprising to overthrow the
government. As for having been accused of subversion, they were allegedly officers and ranking
members of the Communist party. Overt acts of resisting armed forces were incidental to the main
charge of being leaders of subversive organizations.
Rebellion may be committed by noncommunists without collaborating with the agents of an alien
power. On the other hand subversion came into existence when the communists sought to dominate
the world in order to establish a new political order.
Enrile v Salazar
In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus, Juan Ponce Enrile v. RTC QC Judge Jaime
Salazar
G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990
186 SCRA 216
Ponente: Justice Narvasa
Facts:
In the afternoon of 2/27/1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader JPE, and spouses Panlilio, was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant issued by
respondent judge earlier that day, for rebellion and multiple murder during the period of the failed
coup attempt from 11/29 to 12/10/1990. JPE was taken and held overnight at the NBI headquarters in
Taft Avenue, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
warrant. The following morning, he was brought to Camp Karingal in QC. That day, JPE, through
counsel, filed a petitione for habeas corpus, alleging he was deprived of his constitutional rights in
being held to answer for a criminal offense nonexistent in statute books and charged with a crime in
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an information for which no complaint was initially filed or no preliminary investigation was conducted
(thus no due process), granted. The Solicitor General argued that petitioners case does not fall within
the Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common
crimes as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, of rebellion. The court granted JPE and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty on bail.
Petitioners pray for the abandonment of the Hernandez ruling, rule that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes and that Hernandez applies only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means, to commit rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which
also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character.
Issue:
Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder.
Held:
No. Hernandez stands. Murder is absorbed in rebellion. If murder were punished separately from
rebellion, and the two crimes were separately punished, then 2 penalties would be imposed, and so
the extreme penalty could not be imposed, which would be unfavorable. The purpose of RPC48 is to
favor the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if
the several acts performed by him were punished separately. If one act constitutes two or more
offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of
said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case,
imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. When two
or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he
commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one,
on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Also, since the information does not charge
an offense, and disregarding phrasing that rebellion be complexed, indictment is to be read as
charging only simple rebellion. Hence, entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
People V Lava
23 SCRA 72
Zaldivar J.; May 16, 1969
FACTS:
Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz y Adriano, Rosario C.
Viuda de Santos, Angel Baking, Lamberto Magboo, Nicanor Razon, Sr., Esteban Gonzales y la Torre,
Marcos Medina, Cesario Torres, Rosenda Canlas Reyes, Arturo Baking y Calma, Simeon Gutierrez y
Rodriguez, Julita Rodriguez y Gutierrez, Victorina Rodriguez y Gutierrez, Marciano de Leon, Honofre D.
Mangila, Cenon Bungay y Bagtas, Magno Pontillera Bueno, Nicanor Capalad, Rosalina Quizon, Pedro
Vicencio, Julia Mesina, Felipe Engreso, Elpidio Acuo Adime, Josefina Adelan y Abusejo, Conrado
Domingo, Aurora Garcia, and Naty Cruz were all arrested and charged with the complex crime of
rebellion with murders and arsons under an identical information that:
- On May 6, 1946, these people intended to overthrow the seat of the Govt of the Philippine
Republic in the City of Manila.
- And the accused, being high officials of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), of which the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) is its armed forces, decided to commit rebellion and did so by
making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army
detachments and committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of
private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism.

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Of the 31, five were acquitted, namely: Julia Mesina, Rosenda Canlas Reyes, Victorina Rodriguez y
Gutierrez, Nicanor Capalad and Aurora Garcia.
Of the 26 who were convicted, all appealed to this Court except defendant Esteban Gonzales la
Torre. And later on, Rosalina Quizon, Elpidio Acuo Adime, Josefina Adelan Abusejo, Conrado Domingo
and Naty Cruz withdrew their appeal.
During the pendency of the appeal, defendants Julita Rodriguez y Gutierrez and Magno Pontillera
Bueno died.
18 defendants were left to the appeal, namely: Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang,
Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Rosario Vda. de Santos, Angel Baking, Lamberto Magboo, Nicanor
Razon, Marcos Medina, Cesareo Torres, Arturo Baking, Simeon G. Rodriguez, Marciano de Leon,
Honofre Mangila, Cenon Bungay, Pedro Vicencio, and Felipe Engreso.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of rebellion.
Whether or not a person may be prosecuted and held guilty of the crime of rebellion complexed
with murder, arson, robbery and/or other common crimes.
Held:
Nicanor Razon, Sr. and Felipe Engreso were acquitted.
Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Angel Baking, Cesario
Torres, Simeon G. Rodriguez, Honofre Mangila and Simeon Bungay are found guilty as principals in the
commission of the crime of simple rebellion.
Rosario C. Vda. de Santos, Lamberto Magboo and Arturo Baking, Marciano de Leon and Pedro T.
Vicencio is found guilty as a participant in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion.
Marcos Medina is found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion
NO!!
Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. Decision is MODIFIED.
Ratio:
Nicanor Razon, Sr.: No sufficient evidence to show that he had performed any act, which would
constitute a cooperation in promoting the rebellion jointly undertaken by the CPP and the HMB. He is
only a member of the CCP, as secretary and treasurer.
Felipe Engreso: Was simply a houseboy of Federico Maclang. He did not know that he was dealing
with communists and was only following orders of his master.
Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Angel Baking, Cesario
Torres, Simeon G. Rodriguez, Honofre Mangila and Simeon Bungay are ALL high ranking officers of
either CPP and HMB. They all performed their duties and role in fulfilling the goals of the organization
and sought for rebellion against the Philippine govt. They were all LEADERS of the rebellion.
Rosario C. Vda. de Santos: only a staff member of the National Courier (or Communication) Division
of the CPP, and that she checked and made reports on the arrival and dispatch of couriers. She was
merely executing the orders or commands of others who are superior to her in the organizational setup of the CPP. And since all this she did while CPP went underground and HMB was already doing
armed operations, she is still liable as a participant.
Lamberto Magboo: He is only a courier from the headquarters of the National Courier Division of
the CPP in Manila and was actually working and cooperating with the armed operations to overthrow
the government. So still liable as a participant.
Arturo Baking: He is a confirmed communist, and was in full sympathy with the armed struggle
being promoted by the leaders of the CPP and the HMB in order to overthrow the existing government
of the Philippines. BUT he was only the assistant of appellant Cesario Torres, who was entrusted with
the publication and distribution of the official organs of the CPP and the HMB, as well as of the
printing and distribution of the documents of these two organizations. Being an assistant of appellant
Cesario Tores who is a principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and not proven to have
committed acts of rebellion himself, he is only a participant.
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Marciano de Leon: He also took part in the conspiracy to overthrow the government by armed
struggle and did his bit by furnishing Federico Bautista with information and records regarding the
HMB activities obtainable from the PC Headquarters by virtue of his position in the Personnel Section
of the Philippine Constabulary. BUT he is a mere participant in the commission of rebellion since he
only cooperated or helped in the prosecution of the armed rebellion.
Pedro T. Vicencio: It was not proven that he actually took part in the armed operations of the HMB.
BUT, his having delivered foodstuffs, medicines and other supplies which were intended for the HMB,
and his having delivered packages to Rosario Vda. de Santos who was in charge of the outpost where
couriers go to deliver, or to get, letters or articles intended for RECOS in the field, clearly indicate that
this appellant was actively cooperating in the efforts of those promoting the rebellion. Being 20 years
of age and a college student, it can be expected that he knew that he was doing something for the
communists and the Huks.
IMPORTANT RE Rebellion
Rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes.
The crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes
expressed in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the
first paragraph of Article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one
crime, and that without either of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.
US v Ravidas
DOCTRINE: No crime of misprision of rebellion (US vs. Ravidas) *Misprision is only to treason
RAPE DIGESTS
c/o Hipolito
1. PEOPLE vs RICKY ALFREDO y NORMAN
G.R. No. 188560
December 15, 2010
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations, the accusatory portions of which
read:
o
From April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, accused, by means of force, intimidation and threats, have carnal
knowledge with one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent
o From April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, by means of force, intimidation and threats, did commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting a flashlight into the vagina of one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old
woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
Pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Prosecutions Version:
Oral testimonies of the victim, AAA; her 10-year old son, BBB; Ernesto dela Cruz; Police Officer 3
James Ruadap; and Dr. Alma Ged-ang.
In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went home to Butiyao, Benguet, along with
her family, to harvest the peppers planted in their garden.
On April 27, 2001, AAA and her son, BBB, returned to their sayote plantation in Cadian, Topdac,
Atok, Benguet to harvest sayote.
April 28, 2001, AAA had the harvested sayote transported to Baguio City. Later that night, she and
her son stayed at their rented shack and retired early to bed.
In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming from the gaps in the
walls of the shack directly illuminating her face.
She then inquired who the person was, but nobody answered. Instead, the light was switched off.
After a few minutes, the light was switched on again.
Thereafter, a male voice shouted, "Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo
iti bala!" ("You better come out if you will not come out I will riddle you with bullets.")
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AAA remained seated. Then, the male voice uttered, "Lukatam daytoy no saan mo nga lukatan
bilangan ka, maysa, duwa" ("You better get out or else I will count, one, two")
AAA immediately woke BBB up. Just then, the male voice said, "Pabitaken kayo iti bala." ("I will
explode the bullet."). AAA cried out of fear.
Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, AAA lit the gas lamp placed on top of
the table, and opened the door while her son stood beside it. As the door opened, she saw
accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a flashlight.
AAA did not immediately recognize accused-appellant, as his hair was long and was covering his
face.
She invited him to come inside the shack, but the latter immediately held her hair and ordered
her to walk uphill.
Helpless and terrified, AAA obeyed him. All the while, accused-appellant was behind her.
Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop.
Thereafter, accused-appellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA to remove
her clothes.
When she refused, accused-appellant boxed her left eye and removed her clothes. When she also
attempted to stop accused-appellant, the latter angrily slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA
was again ordered to walk uphill.
Upon reaching a grassy portion and a stump about one foot high, accused-appellant ordered AAA
to stop and lie on top of the stump, after accused-appellant boxed her thighs. Accused-appellant
then bent down and spread open AAAs legs.
After directing the beam of the flashlight on AAAs naked body, accused-appellant removed his
pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Accused-appellant threatened to box her if she moves. Accused-appellant also held AAAs breast,
as well as the other parts of her body. He shifted the flashlight from one hand to another while he
moved his buttocks up and down.
AAA cried as she felt severe pain in her lower abdomen. Accused-appellant stood up and directed
the beam of the flashlight on her after he was satisfied.
Ten minutes later, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and inserted his penis into her
vagina and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied, accused-appellant stood up
and lit a cigarette.
Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and tried to insert his penis in the latters
vagina. His penis, however, has already softened.
Frustrated, accused-appellant knelt and inserted his fingers in her vagina. After removing his
fingers, accused-appellant held a twig about 10 inches long and the size of a small finger in
diameter which he used to pierce her vagina. Dissatisfied, accused-appellant removed the twig
and inserted the flashlight in her vagina.
After accused-appellant removed the flashlight from AAAs vagina, he went on top of her again,
pressing his elbows on her upper breasts and boxing her shoulders and thighs. Subsequently,
accused-appellant stood up and warned her not to report the incident to the authorities.
Immediately after, he left her at the scene.
Since she was too weak to walk, AAA rested for about 15 minutes before she got up and went
back to the shack where she immediately woke her son up. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
highway and boarded a jeep to Camp 30, Atok, Benguet. She also went to Sayangan, Atok,
Benguet the following day to report the incident to the police authorities.
MEDICAL EXAMINATION: AAA had a subconjunctival hemorrhage on the right eye and multiple
head injuries, which may have been caused by force such as a blow, a punch, or a hard object
hitting the eye. There was also tenderness on the upper part of the back of AAA, as well as on her
left infraclavicular area below the left clavicle, left flank area or at the left side of the waist, and
medial aspect on the inner part of the thigh. Moreover, there were also multiple linear abrasions,
or minor straight open wounds on the skin of her forearms and legs caused by sharp objects with
rough surface.

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INTERNAL EXAMINATION: Confluent abrasion on the left and medial aspects of her labia minora
about five centimeters long and a confluent circular abrasion caused by a blunt, rough object that
has been forcibly introduced into the genitalia.
Defense Version
Witnesses accused-appellant himself; his mother, Remina; his sister, Margaret; Hover Cotdi; Jona
Canuto; and Pina Mendoza
In the morning of April 28, 2001, accused-appellant was allegedly working in the sayote plantation
near his house. At noontime, he went home to eat his lunch. After having lunch, his mother told
him to bring the pile of sayote she harvested to the edge of the road.
Accused-appellant went to the place where the pile of harvested sayote was placed. However,
when he reached that place, he claimed that he saw AAA gathering the sayote harvested by his
mother and placing them in a sack.
Upon seeing what AAA was doing, accused-appellant shouted at her, prompting AAA to run away
with her son and leave the sack of sayote. When they left, accused-appellant started placing the
harvested sayote in the sack. He was able to fill eight sacks.
Remembering that his mother told him that he would be able to fill 10 sacks all in all, accusedappellant went to the shack of AAA after bringing the eight sacks near the road. He suspected that
she and her son were the ones who took the two missing sacks of sayote.
When he arrived at the place where AAA and her son were staying, accused-appellant allegedly
saw them packing sayote, and he also supposedly saw a sack of sayote with the name of his
father printed on it.
For this reason, accused-appellant got mad and told AAA to go away and leave the place because
what they were doing was wrong. AAA replied by saying that she would wait for Hover Cotdi, the
owner of the sayote plantation and the shack, to ask for permission to leave.
All this time, accused-appellant was allegedly speaking in an angry but non-threatening voice.
Nonetheless, while he was confronting AAA, her son ran into the shack and stayed there.
Before leaving the place, accused-appellant told AAA that the sacks of sayote belonged to his
family, although he decided not to take them back anymore. He supposedly left after five oclock
in the afternoon and arrived at their house at around seven oclock in the evening.
During this time, all his family members were watching television on Channel 3. Accused-appellant
joined them in watching a Tagalog movie. He then allegedly went to bed at 10 oclock in the
evening, while his parents continued to watch television until 11 oclock in the evening.
The following morning, on April 29, 2001, accused-appellant woke up between six to seven oclock
in the morning. After having breakfast, he helped his mother clean the sayote farm. At around
eight oclock in the morning, he saw AAA by the road waiting for a ride with a baggage placed in a
carton box. His mother then went down the road and talked to AAA, leaving accused-appellant
behind. He claimed to pity AAA upon seeing her but could not do anything.
RTC: Gave credence to the version of the prosecution and found appellant GUILTY OF TWO COUNTS
OF RAPE; suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua including all the accessory penalties imposed by
law for 1st count; suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, and eight (8) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum for 2nd count.
For each count of rape, he shall pay [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) by
way of civil indemnity and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral
damages.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, accused transferred
to Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the expiration of fifteen (15) days
from date of promulgation
People v. Mateo: For cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to
the CA.
CA: Affirmed RTC; GUILTY of two counts of rape.
Issues:
(1) Whether material inconsistencies in claims of witnesses vs. his alibi warrant his acquittal (NO)
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(2) Whether the court committed error in relying on the demeanor of prosecution witnesses when
it did not have opportunity to hear witnesses
(3) Whether conduct of accuse is unlikely to yield guilty verdict (NO)
(4) Whether award of damages is correct (NO)
HELD: Accused-appellants conviction SUSTAINED
1. a. Alibi is an inherently weak defense
He contends that although denial and alibi are the weakest defenses in criminal cases,
consideration should also be given to the fact that denial becomes the most plausible line of
defense considering the nature of the crime of rape where normally only two persons are involved.
It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in
another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. A review of the records in the instant case would reveal that accused-appellant failed
to present convincing evidence that he did not leave his house, which is only about 150 meters
away from the shack of AAA, in the evening of April 28, 2001. Significantly, it was also not
physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present on the mountain where he allegedly
raped AAA at the time it was said to have been committed.
Alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful
witnesses. It is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. In
addition, alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused
himself and his or her relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms, and not by credible persons.
1.b. As between the statement made in an affidavit and that given in open court, the
latter is superior
Material inconsistencies in the testimonies and affidavits: (1) whether accused-appellants penis
was erect or not; and (2) whether AAA indeed recognized accused-appellant when they were
already on the mountain or while they were still in the shack.
AAA testified in open court that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina several
times but was unable to do so since his penis has already softened. On the other hand, AAA stated
in her affidavit that "the suspect ordered me to lay [sic] flatly on the ground and there he started
to light and view my whole naked body while removing his pant [sic] and tried to insert his pennis
[sic] on [sic] my vagina but I wonder it does not erect [sic]."
There is no inconsistency between AAAs testimony and her affidavit. The only
difference is that she failed to state in her affidavit that before accused-appellant
unsuccessfully tried to insert his penis into AAAs vagina, he had already succeeded
twice in penetrating her private organ.
There is likewise no incompatibility between AAAs affidavit stating that she came to know of
accused-appellant as the culprit when they were on the mountain and his flashlight illuminated his
face as he lay on top of her, and her testimony that while they were still in the shack, AAA was
"not then sure" but already suspected that her rapist was accused-appellant "because of his hair."
In other words, AAA was not yet sure whether accused-appellant was the culprit while they were
still in the shack, as she only became positively certain that it was him when the flashlight
illuminated his face while they were on the mountain.
Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for affidavits,
being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are, thus, generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.
2. The validity of conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who
rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case,
does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to
support its conclusion. As this Court held in People v. Competente: The circumstance that the
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Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses, does not
detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision
would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully
studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the Court
carefully passed upon. Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were
extant and complete. Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case.
3. The guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt
In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or
secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of forced
coitus.
In the instant case, accused-appellant is charged with two counts of rapeone under paragraph
1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and the other under par. 2 of Art. 266-A.
Elements of rape under par. 1(a) of Art. 266-A of the Code are the following: (1) that the
offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is
accomplished by using force or intimidation.
On the other hand, the elements of rape under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the Code are as follows:
(1) that the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual assault is
committed by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and that the act of sexual
assault is accomplished by using force or intimidation, among others.
When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of the incident that
transpired in the evening of April 28, 2001 and early morning of April 29, 2001. AAA categorically
asserted that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her and even sexually assaulted her
against her will with the use of force, threat, or intimidation.
Particularly, AAA testified that accused-appellant threatened to riddle her and her son with bullets
if they do not open the door of their shack. Accused-appellant thereafter forcibly pulled her hair
and dragged her to the mountains. AAA pleaded for her life. Nonetheless, accused-appellant
boxed her every time she did not yield to his demands. He boxed her thighs forcing AAA to sit, and
he threatened to box her if she moves while he carried out his bestial desires.
AAA testified further that after accused-appellant satisfied his lust, he sexually assaulted her. He
inserted his fingers into her vagina and then he tried to pierce the same with a twig.
Subsequently, he inserted his flashlight into her vagina. AAA was too weak to stop him. She had
struggled to free herself from accused-appellant from the moment she was dragged from the
shack until they reached the mountains. However, accused-appellant still prevailed over her.
Notably, AAA was six months pregnant at that time. She was frightened and hopeless.
Also, it should be noted that the findings in the medical examination of Dr. Ged-ang corroborated
the testimony of AAA. While a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the
prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a medical examination for the successful
prosecution of the case, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are
veritable corroborative pieces of evidence, which strongly bolster AAAs testimony.
Moreover, the police found the red t-shirt and blue shorts of AAA in the place where accusedappellant was said to have removed her clothes. In addition, AAAs son, BBB, testified as to how
accused-appellant threatened them in the evening of April 28, 2001, how he was able to identify
accused-appellant as the perpetrator, and what his mother looked like when she returned home in
the early morning of April 29, 2001. According to BBB, his mother was naked except for a dirty
white jacket she was wearing. He also noticed that his mother had wounds and blood all over her
body. All these are consistent with the testimony of AAA.
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4. Award of Damages must be modified. For rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, the CA was correct in awarding PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 50,000 as moral
damages. However, for rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code, the
award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 30,000 as moral
damages.
People v. Cristobal that "for sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has
shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of
marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from
committing similar acts or for correction for the public good is warranted."
Notably, there were instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence of
an aggravating circumstance.
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts award exemplary
damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same
was not alleged in the information in accordance with Article 2230. However, with the
promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not
alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even
if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not
award exemplary damages. x x x
However, Article 2230 must not only be ground for granting exemplary damages because it simply
takes into account the attendance of aggravating circumstance and not the very reason why
exemplary damages are awarded.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended
to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is
preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has
been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for
the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression,
insult or fraud or gross fraud that intensifies the injury.
The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that
may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these
damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar
conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.
In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be
awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Court used as
basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. The
application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the
present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary
damages to set a public example or correction for the public good."
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 finding accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 is ordered to
pay PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary
damages. In Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay PhP 30,000
as civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
2. People v Alejandro Rellota -> Rape vis a vis Acts of Lasciviousness
FACTS:
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AAA the complainant, native of Eastern Samar, was 12 years old when the incidents allegedly
happened. Together with her siblings, AAA lived with her aunt, DDD and the latters second
husband, appellant in Antipolo City, Rizal from September 1992 to January 1994. 2 cousins also
live with them. DDD was working overseas then.
According to AAA, appellant had been kissing her and touching her private parts since September
1993 and raped her several times between Sept. 1993 and Jan. 1994.
She narrated that appellant would usually rape her at night when the other members of the family
were either out of the house or asleep. AAA stated that she resisted the advances of appellant,
but was not successful. Appellant, according to her would usually place a bolo beside him
whenever she would rape her. She added that appellant would threaten AAA by telling her that he
would kill her brother and sister and that he would stop sending her to school.
December 20, 1993: after AAA took a bath at an artesian well near their house, she wrapped her
body w/ towel before going inside the house when she was followed by appellant and raped AAA
twice in the latters bedroom. He tied her hands with a rope before forcibly inserting his penis
inside her vagina while AAA was kicking and scratching. Then, he left so AAA slipped on her T-shirt
and shorts but then accused returned and raped her again.
The same incident happened on January 31, 1994 when AAA was inside their room. Appellant laid
her down on the sofa, kissed her and touched her private part, while AAA kicked him and
scratched his arms. She was able to push him and after which appellant ran out the door.
AAA, told her older sister after in which the latter accompanied AAA to police station. Three
separate complaints for rape were filed against appellant.
Prosecutions Arguments
Testimony and medical exam that there is a healed laceration in the hymen of more than a month.
Laceration in the hymen could have been caused by forcible entry of a hard object. Penis may be
blunt hard object.
Defense Version
Impossible for him to have raped AAA in September 1993 because his wife only left for Jeddah on
October 21, 1993.
He points out that AAA herself testified that he only kissed her, touched her breast and private
parts, but failed to mention that he inserted his penis to her vagina.
He also denied raping AAA on January 31, 1994 and December 20, 1993. He further claims that
the filing of the criminal charges were instigated by AAA's aunt for his refusal to lend her money.
OSG Comment
appellant used his moral ascendancy over the victim in having carnal knowledge of her against
her will.
medical report bolsters the victim's claim that she was repeatedly raped by appellant and that the
latter's defense of denial is weak and deserves scant consideration
HOWEVER, agrees with CA that Jan 31 rape was not sufficiently proven to have actually
consummated and is merely attempted rape
RTC: GUILTY of 3 counts of Rape as alleged and suffer Reclusion Perpetua for each count. Indemnity
of P50, 000 for each
o Not death penalty because AAA was above 12 and although below 18, relationship with
appellant not established as marriage between AAAs aunt and appellant not supported with
evidence
In accordance with People v Mateo: Case imposing reclusion perpetua so transferred to CA upon
appeal
CA: ruled that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of consummated rape and 1 count of attempted rape
o June 31 incident when he was able to push him is ATTEMPTED
o Reclusion perpetua for first two counts and prision correccional for 3rd
ISSUE:
1. Whether accused should be acquitted as AAAs testimony is inconsistent and full of falsehoods?
2. Whether or not the actions of appellant on January 31, 1994 constitute acts of lasciviousness and
not attempted rape?
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HELD:
1. No. The claim of appellant that he could not have raped AAA because his wife was still in the
country during the alleged period when the rape was committed is so flimsy that it does not deserve
even the slightest consideration from this Court.
o It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of time or place. Neither the crampness of the
room, nor the presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held
sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape. There have been too many
instances when rape was committed under circumstances as indiscreet and audacious as a room
full of family members sleeping side by side. There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in
seclusion.
o As to the contention of appellant that the testimony of AAA was barren of any statement that the
former's penis was inserted in the latter's vagina is not quite accurate. AAA categorically
stated during her testimony that she was raped. In her testimony, she stated that He
forced me and inserted his penis inside my vagina and he repeated his acts.
o As to inconsistency that she was merely wearing a towel and then she stated that she wore a Tshirt and shorts, these were not inconsistent as there was a lapse of time between the first and
the second rape. Likewise, when AAA testified that she put on her t-shirt and panty, she was
referring to the first time of the rape where, after ravishing her, appellant untied her hands and
left only to return to rape her once more. There was enough time for AAA to dress up.
o Inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor ones which do not affect the credibility of AAA
nor erase the fact that the latter was raped. The inconsistencies are trivial and forgivable, since a
victim of rape cannot possibly give an exacting detail for each of the previous incidents, since
these may just be but mere fragments of a prolonged and continuing nightmare, a calvary she
might even be struggling to forget. Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the presence of strangers,
face to face with her tormentor and being cross-examined by his hostile and intimidating lawyer
would be benumbed with tension and nervousness and this can affect the accuracy of her
testimony. However, considering her youth and her traumatic experience, ample margin of error
and understanding should be accorded to a young victim of a vicious crime like rape.
o In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by these principles:
o first, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable
doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction;
o second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense;
o third, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal;
o fourth, an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; and,
o fifth, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution.
2. Yes, crime is not attempted rape but acts of lasciviousness as defined in RPC as elements are
absent.
Attempted rape requires that:
o The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
o He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
o The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
o The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance
Appellants act of removing the towel wrapped in the body of AAA, laying her on the sofa and
kissing and touching her private parts does not exactly demonstrate the intent of appellant to
have carnal knowledge on AAA on that particular date.
Even so, the said acts should not be left unpunished as the elements of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness as defined in RPC in relation to RA 7610, AAA being a minor when the incident
happened, are present:
o That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
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That is done (a) By using force and intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) When the offended party is under 12 years of age
o That the offended party is another person of either sex.
o As defined in IRR of RA 7610: [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person.
The actions of appellant on January 31, 1994, by definition, lascivious or lewd, and based on AAAs
testimony, the intimidation from appellant was in existence and apparent.
Sec 5 of RA No7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also
one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case
law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion
equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party
Accused can still be guilty of acts of lasciviousness even if not charged because it is necessarily
included in rape. Under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there
is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision finding accused GUILTY of the crime of two (2) counts rape is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the same appellant is also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness as defined in the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5,
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (+reclusion perpetua for first
2 counts) and per previous ruling of this Court, must also indemnify the victim in the amount of
P15,000.00 as moral damages and pay a fine in the same amount.
o

3. People v Juanito Apattad G.R. No. 193188 August 10, 2011


FACTS:
Accused was charged in four (4) separate informations, the accusatory portions of which read:
o 2001 and 2002, in the evening, in the Municipality of Peablanca, Province of Cagayan,
JUANITO APATTAD, father of the offended party, [AAA] a minor below 12 years of
age, thus have moral ascendancy over the complainant, with lewd design and by the use
of force, have sexual intercourse with his own daughter, against her will.
o That on or about June 10 and 11 2003, in the Municipality of Peablanca, Province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, JUANITO
APATTAD, father of the offended party, [AAA], a minor below 12 years of age, thus
have moral ascendancy over the complainant, with lewd design and by the use of force,
did, have sexual intercourse with his own daughter, the herein offended party, against her
will.
June 1, 2004, the accused, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty to all the charges
against him
Subsequently, on June 8, 2004, pre-trial conference was held and was terminated on the same
day, with the parties stipulating on the following:
(a) The identities of the accused and AAA;
(b) AAA is the daughter of the accused;
(c) AAA was a minor, being born on October 14, 1994, and was only ten (10) years old
during the commission of the crime;
(d) The existence of the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA; and
(e) The existence of the Medico Legal Report of AAA issued by Dr. Mila LinganSimangan, Health Officer of Peablanca, Cagayan.
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Version of the Prosecution


Offered the oral testimonies of AAA and Dr. Mila Lingan-Simangan
2001, while she was sleeping with her sisters, the accused pulled and positioned her just below
the feet of her siblings, and right then and there, succeeded in molesting her. AAA was just seven
(7) years old then.
June 10, 2003, the accused sexually abused AAA again. While she was sleeping beside her
younger sister in their room, accused carried her from the bed through the window and placed her
on the floor. Afterwards, accused removed his own shirt and used it to cover the mouth of AAA.
Accused then removed his underwear and AAAs underwear, and inserted his penis inside AAAs
vagina, while telling her not to report the incident to her mother. When the accused was finished
in satisfying his lust, he put AAAs clothes back on, carried her back to bed, and untied the shirt
covering AAAs mouth.
The same incident happened on June 11, 2003, when accused carried AAA once again through the
window, placed her on the floor, covered her mouth, undressed her, and inserted his penis into
her vagina. The accused also threatened to kill her if she reports the incident to her mother.
When AAA finally told her mother on June 13, 2003 that she was being abused by her own father,
her mother whipped her for not telling her about it immediately. Her reason for not telling
immediately was because she was afraid that her father would kill them. AAA also confirmed that
her parents often quarrel and shout at each other. She even admitted that she had seen her father
slap her mother and that because of this, she sympathized and took pity on her. When asked
whether she would do anything that her mother would tell her to do, AAA answered in the
affirmative. However, on re-direct examination, AAA clarified that her mother did not teach her to
claim that she was raped and that she was only telling the truth.
Thereafter, they went to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) office in
Peablanca, Cagayan, where AAA was interviewed by a certain Ms. Abrena, a DSWD personnel.
Afterwards, they proceeded to the police station where AAA executed a sworn statement narrating
what happened.
Dr. Mila Lingan-Simangan (Dr. Simangan) also subsequently conducted a physical examination on
AAA on June 16, 2003, she conducted a physical examination on AAA and discovered that the
latter had a healed hymen laceration at 4 and 7 oclock positions, and that her vagina admitted
the tip of the fifth finger easily. She stated that the laceration could have been caused by a blunt
object. She also testified that after conducting the physical examination, she interviewed AAA and
the latter gave her the name of the person who raped her. However, Dr. Simangan admitted that
she can no longer remember the name that was mentioned by AAA .
Version of the Defense
Presented as its witnesses the accused himself and Louie Calimag
The accused denied the accusation of rape hurled against him and claimed that his wife
was the one who initiated the criminal complaint against him because she thinks that he
has a mistress.
Louie Calimag (Calimag), testified that from June 3, 2003 until July 8, 2003, he employed
the services of the accused to help him in the operation of the chainsaw. As part of their
routine, he and the accused would saw logs in the forest from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., go
back to his house, and sleep there at night. Calimag further testified that when the accused
was arrested by the police in the forest on July 8, 2003, he was also with him. Thus, when
he found out that the accused was arrested for rape allegedly committed on June 10 and
11, 2003, Calimag claimed that he did not believe this because the accused stayed in his
house on those days.
Calimag likewise added that after the accused was arrested, he saw AAA, who admitted to
him that she was not raped by the accused and that it was her mother who instructed her
to give false information. AAA allegedly told him that her parents had a fight due to her
fathers illicit relationship with another woman.
On cross-examination, Calimag admitted that the house of the accused was only three (3)
kilometers away from his house and that the accuseds house may be reached by jeepney
in an hour and by foot in four (4) hours.
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RTC: Gave credence to the version of the prosecution and found accused GUILTY of three (3) counts
of rape. PENALTY: RECLUSION PERPETUA for each case and pay P150,000.00 Pesos as civil indemnity.
Accused is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 10173 (2002 Rape) for lack of sufficient evidence.
CA: Affirmed RTC with MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity awarded should be P75,000.00
for each count of rape. In addition, moral damages and exemplary damages in the amounts of
P75,000.00 and Php25,000.00 respectively, for each count of rape are hereby awarded.
ISSUES: Whether accused should be convicted of statutory rape (YES)
HELD: Yes. CONVICTED.
Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
Jurisprudential rules and precepts guide this Court in assessing the proffered defense.
o One, alibis and denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak.
o Two, they cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime.
o Three, for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
o Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by
credible and disinterested witnesses.
o Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and the
assessment made by the trial court unless patently and clearly inconsistent
must be accepted
In the present case, AAA positively identified accused-appellant in her testimony as the
very perpetrator of the crime of rape committed against her when she identified her
father as the one who carried her.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place
when the crime was committed as he must likewise prove that it was physically impossible
for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. A distance of three (3) kilometers does not make it physically impossible for
accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Calimag
himself admitted during cross-examination that the house of accused-appellant may be
reached by jeepney in an hour. Significantly, even if accused-appellant indeed stayed in
Calimags house on the dates that he committed rape, it was still not physically impossible
for accused-appellant to go home and commit the said crime at the time it was said to have
been committed.
Also, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by credible
and disinterested witnesses. In this regard, it should be noted that alibi becomes unworthy
of merit not only because accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA but also in
cases where it is established mainly by the accused himself, his relatives, friends and
comrades-in-arms and not by credible persons.
Finally, as mentioned in Estoya, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of
witnesses, and that the assessment made by the trial court must be accepted unless it is
patently and clearly inconsistent.
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight
of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having
the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to
evaluate testimonial evidence properly
The guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt

In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made:

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an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person, though innocent, to disprove;
o n view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
o evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
o Nonetheless, it also bears stressing that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation
or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of
forced coitus.
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of rape is committed by a
man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
o through force, threat or intimidation;
o when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
o by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
o when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present
People v. Orillosa: Incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed
where the overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice. Thus, in order for the accused
to be found guilty of the crime of statutory rape in this jurisdiction, only two (2) elements must
concur: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that the victim is below
twelve (12) years old.
AGE ESTABLISHED: AAA, was below twelve (12) years old when the crime was committed. A copy
of AAAs birth certificate to prove her age was duly presented in evidence by the prosecution,
indicating that she was indeed born on October 14, 1994. Concomitantly, AAA was only seven (7)
years old when the crime of rape was first committed against her in 2001, and was only nine (9)
years old when the accused once again succeeded in committing the same crime in 2003.
RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED: Also, it is undisputed that accused-appellant is the father of AAA, as
stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial conference and as also indicated in AAAs birth
certificate.
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE ESTABLISHED: When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a
detailed narration of how she was sexually molested by her father, which narration is difficult, if
not improbable, for a 10-year-old girl to concoct. As aptly observed by the CA, [AAA] was able to
describe in detail how her father carried her through the window, laid her down the floor, tied her
mouth, removed her clothes and inserted his penis inside her vagina. She even described that she
felt pain while her father was performing the carnal act against her
Pertinently, it is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight and
credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Moreover, the fact that AAAs testimony was able to withstand scrutiny during cross-examination
bolsters her credibility and makes her statements more credible. Further, it should be noted that
the findings in the medical examination of Dr. Simangan corroborate the testimony of AAA. In this
regard, while a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the
prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a medical examination for its successful
prosecution, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are
veritable corroborative evidence, which strongly bolster AAAs testimony.
In addition, this Court is not convinced that a child of a tender age would concoct a story as sordid
as in the instant case due to her mothers alleged ill motive. In People v. Padilla, We held that
accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the victims mother for being jealous of another
woman is clearly unmeritorious, for no mother in her right mind would possibly wish to stamp her
child with the stigma that follows the crime of rape only because she is consumed with hatred and
revenge
o

Award of Damages. The CA decision as to the damages awarded must be modified. In rape cases,
when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
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guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse
of the parent of the victim, the imposable penalty is death. However, with the enactment of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,
the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the RPC.
Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of damages is the penalty provided by law
or imposable for the off se because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on
the offender.
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of
death were it not for RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP
75,000, racionating that [t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the
Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.
Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted without need of
pleading or proving them. In rape cases, it is recognized that the victims injury is concomitant
with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral
damages.
Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000, despite the lack
of any aggravating circumstances, to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction
for the public good.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 03173 finding accused-appellant Juanito Apattad guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA for each count of rape,
PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
4. People v Sixto Padua G.R. No. 192821
March 21, 2011
FACTS:
June 20, 2001: the appellant was charged with rape before the QC RTC committed against his 6year old niece AAA sometime in April 1991. The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. In
the trial that followed, AAA testified on the details of the crime.
Sometime in April 1991, between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m., AAA, then six years old, was playing at the
balcony of their house in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City. BBB (AAAs mother) was downstairs
cleaning the house, while AAAs sisters were outside the house.
The appellant (BBBs brother) or the victims uncle was watching TV. The appellant called AAA and
told her to lie beside him. He then asked her to remove her shorts and underwear. He also
removed his shorts, laid her down, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA felt pain but she
did not cry out. Thereafter, the appellant told her not to report the incident to her mother or to
anyone else.
AAA did not tell anyone about the incident since she did not know that what had been done to her
was wrong. AAA only realized that her sexual experience with her uncle was wrong when she was
already 12 or 13 years old, or at about the time she was in Grade VI. She did not disclose the
incident to anyone then as she was afraid.
It was not until after her graduation from elementary school that she finally disclosed the incident
to CCC (AAAs older sister). CCC, in turn, also revealed that a similar incident had happened to her
when she was at about the same age as AAA when the latters experience happened.
AAA and CCC never before told their father about their experience because they feared for his
health, but subsequently, the incident came to their fathers knowledge after CCC had a bitter
confrontation with him. Thereafter, AAA and her father went to the police station where she
executed her sworn statement and underwent a medical examination that confirmed that she was
no longer a virgin
DEFENSE: The appellant, interposing denial and alibi, claimed that he was in San Vicente, Bicol,
sometime in April 1991
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RTC: Guilty of rape (statutory). Qualified by minority (victim 6 years old when it happened) so penalty
must be DEATH but with the abolition of the death penalty under Republic Act No. 9346, the RTC
sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the appellant to pay AAA P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
It relied on AAAs clear, direct and positive testimony, and rejected the appellants alibi for his
failure to show that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the rape.
It noted that AAAs delay in reporting the rape was not indicative of a fabricated charge,
considering her young age and her family ties with the appellant; AAA only came to know that
the sexual incident was wrong when she was in Grade VI, and she feared for her fathers health
should the latter learn of the incident.
CA: Convicted the appellant of simple rape under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, but reduced to P50,000.00 the civil indemnity to AAA
AAAs minority cannot be appreciated as the prosecution failed to present the certificate of live
birth or any other authentic document to prove the age of AAA at the time of the commission of
the offense.
It noted further that the appellant did not expressly admit AAAs age. Instead, the appellate court
appreciated force and intimidation, noting that the appellants relationship to AAA had been
proven by his own admission. It stressed that in incestuous rape, the moral ascendancy of the
accused over the victim takes the place of force and intimidation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether statutory rape or simple rape because of lack of document to prove age (simple rape)
2. What is the applicable law? (RPC Art. 335 and not RPC 266-A)
HELD: CONVICTION AFFIRMED
1. CA properly convicted the appellant for simple rape whose penalty is reclusion perpetua.
An appellant can justifiably be convicted of rape based solely on the credible testimony of the
victim. Nothing in the records indicates to us that the RTC and the CA overlooked or failed to
appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.
Agree with the CA that the appellant cannot be held liable for qualified, much less statutory, rape;
the prosecution failed to prove by independent evidence the age of AAA, much less the allegation
that she was under the age of 12 when she was raped.
The appellate court properly appreciated force and intimidation. In rape committed by a close
kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence or intimidation
2. Art 335 of RPC on simple rape must be applied. The CA held that the appellant was guilty of
simple rape under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the crime was committed
in 1991, i.e., prior to the passage of the law imposing the death penalty for rape cases
(Republic Act No. 7659: 1993) and prior to the new rape law (Republic Act No. 8353 or the AntiRape Law of 1997: 1997). The law then in place Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code should
apply. Under this law, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. To conform with existing
jurisprudence, we reduce the amount of exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the September 10, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 03023 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Sixto Padua y Felomina is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay
AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
5. People v Manuel Pruna or Erman Pruna G.R. No. 138471

October 10, 2002

FACTS:
Nature: Automatic review of RTC Bataan decision
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Jan. 3, 1995: while 3-yr old Lizette Arabelle Gonzales was defecating at their neighbors backyard,
a certain Manuel Boy Pruna called him & placed her on his lap. Boy was then under the bridge,
sniffing rugby & drinking alcohol w/some friends. Boy later on brought her to a grassy area &
raped her. Boy was later on arrested.
Boys counsel filed a motion to put him under psychiatric/mental exam claiming that he couldnt
get a coherent answer from the accused. But the Natl Center for Mental Health issued a
certification that he was in fair condition.
Prosecution witnesses:
Jacqueline Gonzales Lizettes mom who claims that she was fetching water from the artesian
well when incident happened. She claims she saw Lizette crying & the girl then narrated to her
what happened & pulled her to Boys house however accused was not home.
Lizette testified that she knew the accused & that he inserted his penis into her vagina as she was
laid down in a grassy area. She likewise testified that she knew that it was sin to tell a lie.
Dr. Emelita Quiroz OG-Gyne who examined Lizette testified that girls vagina was positive for
sperm cells w/c signified that sexual intercourse took place.
Teresita Magtanob, med tech, corroborated Quiroz findings re sperm cells
SPO2 Romeo Bunsoy, PNP member on duty when Lizette reported incident. He conducted an
ocular inspection of the alleged place of incident & discovered that grasses were flattened. People
in nearby areas likewise testified that they saw Boy bring Lizette in that area.
Defense witnesses:
Carlito Bondoc testified that Boy was at home during the time the incident occurred because he
& Carlito were having coffee.
Boy denied having raped the girl. Alibi: he was in his house preparing coffee for Carlito.
RTC: convicted of qualified rape sentenced to death, thus automatic review.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON Lizette is a competent & credible witness considering that she was only 3 when raped & 5
during trial (YES)
Gen rule: when a witness takes a stand is to presume that hes competent.
Burden: upon party objecting to competency to establish ground of incompetency.
Sec. 21, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence (ROE): kids whose mental maturity renders them incapable
of perceiving the facts respecting w/c theyre examined & relating them truthfully are disqualified
to be witnesses. No precise minimum age is fixed.
Test of competency: Intelligence not age. As long as child can perceive & make known his
perception to other & that hes capable of relating truthfully facts for w/c hes examined. Consider
childs capacity : to receive correct impressions during incident; to comprehend obligation of an
oath; relate to those facts truthfully to the court at the time hes offered as a witness. Kid should
understand the punishment w/c may result fr false swearing.
Determined by sound discretion of the court & such is respected unless found erroneous. In this
case, Boy failed to discharge burden of proving Lizettes mental immaturity. RTC held that kid had
capacity of observation, recollection & communication & that she could discern the consequence
of telling a lie. Two years lapse since time of incident is immaterial considering that its a most nat.
reaction for victims of criml violence to have a lasting impression of how crime was committed &
identity of aggressor.
2. WON Jacquelines testimony is hearsay? (NO)
Not covered by hearsay rule, Sec. 36, Rule 130, ROE w/c provides that a witness can testify only to
those facts w/c he knows of his personal knowledge except as otherwise provided by the ROC.
Hearsay: evidence not founded upon personal knowledge of witness but rather on facts learned
from a 3rd person not sworn as a witness to those facts, w/c testimony is inadmissible. Excluded
because theres no chance for Court to cross-examine alleged source of info & to test his
credibility.
Not applicable in this case considering that source of info (Lizette) was actually sworn in & crossexamined. Court had the chance to observe her manner of testifying. Besides, Jacquelines
testimony merely corroborated Lizettes testimony. Kids testimony is sufficient to convict Boy.
3. WON Gloria Tolentino should still be presented as a witness? (NO)
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Tolentino listed as witness who saw accused carrying & bringing kid to grassy area at the back of
her house.
No need because she already moved out, besides, her testimony would only be corroborative of
kids testimony.
4. WON prosecutions evidence was sufficient to convict accused? (YES)
Victim spontaneously identified accused as rapist.
Kids immediate revelation to her mom of the crime.
Kid led her mom to accuseds house right after the incident
Prompt filing of complaint before the authorities
Victims submission to medical examination
Hyperemia in kids private part
Presence of sperm cells in kids vaginal canal & urine.
Alibi not accepted considering that his alleged location did not make it physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene during the time crime was committed. Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of victim. Esp since alibi was only corroborated by accuseds friend.
5. WON Lizettes minority was properly established & imposition of death penalty is proper ? (YES)
RPC Art. 335, par. 7, no. 4, amended by RA No. 7659: death penalty shall be imposed if crime of
rapes committed to a kid below 7 yrs old. Minority must be proved w/equal certainty & clearance
as crime itself. Failure to prove such would bar conviction for qualified rape.
Best proof of age would be the birth certificate. But Court has conflicting pronouncements as to
WON such is a condition sine qua non to prove ones age to appreciate minority as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. Some cases wherein no birth certificate was presented
ruled that the victims age was not proven. (see pp. 599-603 for list of cases cited) In some
instances, mere pronouncement of age was considered as hearsay. On the other hand SC held in
some cases that age was sufficiently established despite failure of prosecution to present the birth
certificate.
Court now sets guidelines in appreciating age either as an element of crime or a
qualifying circumstance:
1. Best evidence: original/certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of part.
2. Absence of such: similar authentic records such as baptismal cert & school records showing date
of birth would be sufficient.
3. If documents were lost, destroyed or unavailable, clear & credible testimony of victims mom or
other family members either by affinity/consanguinity qualified to testify re pedigree such as exact
age/date of birth of victim pursuant to Sec. 40, Rule 130, ROE shall be sufficient under ff conditions:
a. victims alleged to be below 3 & seek to prove that shes below 7.
b. victims alleged to be below 7 & seek to prove that shes below18.
c. victims alleged to be below 12 & seek to prove that shes below 18.
4. Absence of aforementioned, victims testimony will suffice as long as such is clearly & expressly
admitted.
5.
Prosecution has burden of proof of proving victims age. Accuseds failure to object to the
testimonial evidence shall not be taken against him.
6. Trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the victims age.
In this case, RTC based its decision on medico-legal findings & fact that defense did not contest
kids age & even questioned her tender age. Former does not establish childs age. It doesnt even
mention childs age. Only testimonial evidence presented to establish childs age was Moms
testimony. Victims testimony was conflicting for although she claimed to be 5 yrs old at the time,
she also testified that she was already 5 during the time she was raped. Note that 2 years have
lapsed between the time of the incident & the hearing.

In convicting accused of qualified rape & sentencing him to death, impt to establish that Lizette
was indeed below 7 yrs old at the time of the commission of crime. However, due to uncertainty
of her age, corroborative evidence (pertinent documents) should be presented to appreciate the
qualifying circumstance of rape. Lack of objection from defense as to victims age does not
discharge prosecution of its burden.
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Testimony of Lizettes mom: sufficient to hold accused liable for statutory rape/rape of girl below
12. RPC Art. 335 amended by RA 7659 provides that such is punishable w/RP, thus sentence is
lowered from death to RP. P50k indemnity + P50k moral damages.
Held: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt. RTC modified.
6. People v Heracleo Abello -> edit pa
FACTS:
The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She contracted polio when she was
seven (7) months old. She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking. Hence, she
could only read and write her name including that of her friends
On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 oclock (sic) in the early morning, AAA was sleeping in their
house in Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She
was suddenly awakened when Abello mashed her breast.
Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again mashed the breast of AAA practically under
the same previous situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to
recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside which illuminated the house.
Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth
of AAA. The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed
Aray forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The
victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.
Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of
denial. In all of the instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on
his way to his room after retiring home..
3 INFORMATIONS:
on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA with lewd
design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously putting his penis inside the mouth of said AAA, against her will and without her
consent.
That on or about the 30th day of June 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic)
years old, and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her
consent.
That on or about the 2nd day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic) 21
years old, and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her
consent.
RTC: 1. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Paragraph 2, Article
226-A, Republic Act [No.] 8353 (Anti Rape Law) and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Seven (7) Years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Thirteen (13) Years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum
2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act [No.] 7610 (Child Abuse Act) and hereby sentences him in each of the two cases to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years of prision correctional (sic), as minimum, to Twelve
(12) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as maximum.
CA: affirmed Abellos conviction on appeal but modified the penalties imposed.
1.In Criminal Case No. 19623-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; Appellant is further ordered to pay complainant, AAA, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00
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2. In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the two cases
Issue: Whether or not, the court a quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant of the crime.
Held: We note that both the RTC and CA found AAAs testimony to be positive, direct, and categorical,
while the RTC found the defenses version too strained to be believed for being contrary to human
experience. A material point we noted is that Abello could not say why AAA would falsely accuse him.
The substance and tenor of the testimony and the element of motivation are critical points for us
since a straightforward, categorical and candid narration by the victim deserves credence if no ill
motive can be shown driving her to falsely testify against the accused. Our consideration of Abellos
defense of denial and his other arguments lead us to reject them for the following reasons:
First, the issue of his credibility is reduced to a choice between the offended partys positive
testimony and the denial of the accused. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of ones
involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.
Second, we flatly reject Abellos argument that his relationship with AAA insulates him from the
crimes charged. Our judicial experience tells us that in handling these types of cases, the relationship
between the offender and the offended party has never been an obstacle to the commission of the
crime against chastity.
Third, we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained of, to be
preposterous. In the normal course, a woman will not expose herself to these risks unless she is
certain of what happened and she seeks to obtain justice against the perpetrator. Based on these
considerations and in the absence of clear indications of errors in giving credence to AAAs testimony,
we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA
Rape by sexual assault

Both the RTC and the CA failed to notice the variance between the allegations in the Information
for rape and that proven at the trial on the mode of committing the offense. The Information
alleges force and intimidation as the mode of commission, while AAA testified during the
trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to find Abellos male organ
inside her mouth.
This variance is not fatal to Abellos conviction for rape by sexual assault. In People v. Corpuz, we
ruled that a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he
fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what
was alleged. In the present case, Abello did not object to the presentation of evidence showing
that the crime charged was committed in a different manner than what was stated in the
Information. Thus, the variance is not a bar to Abellos conviction of the crime charged in the
Information.
R.A. No. 8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997 introduced into the Philippine legal system
the concept of rape by sexual assault. This amendment not only reclassified rape as a crime
against persons, but also expanded the definition of rape from the traditional concept of a sexual
intercourse committed by a man against an unwilling woman.
The second paragraph of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended defines rape by sexual assault as
committed by any person who, under any of the circumstance mentioned in paragraph 1 shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
The elements of rape by sexual assault are:
(1)That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
(2)That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
(a) By inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice; or
(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) By using force or intimidation;
(b) When a woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
Acts of lasciviousness

Abello was convicted of two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child:
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The essential elements of this provision are:


1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (h), Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610 (implementing
rules) defines lascivious conduct as a crime committed through the intentional touching, either
directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with
the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, among others.
FIRST ELEMENT: Records show that AAA duly established this element when she positively
testified that Abello fondled her breasts on two separate occasions while she slept.
SECOND ELEMENT ABSENT: Not a child. The second element requires that the lascivious
conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse. This second element requires evidence proving that: (a) AAA was either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse and (b) she is a child as defined under R.A. No. 7610.
In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the phrase, other sexual abuse in the above
provision covers not only a child who is abused for profit, but also one who engages in lascivious
conduct through the coercion or intimidation by an adult. In the latter case, there must be
some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the
offended partys will.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that force or coercion
attended Abellos sexual abuse on AAA; the evidence reveals that she was asleep at the time
these crimes happened and only awoke when she felt her breasts being fondled.
Hence, she could have not resisted Abellos advances as she was unconscious at the time it
happened. In the same manner, there was also no evidence showing that Abello compelled her, or
cowed her into silence to bear his sexual assault, after being roused from sleep. Neither is there
evidence that she had the time to manifest conscious lack of consent or resistance to Abellos
assault.
More importantly, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The
implementing rules elaborated on this definition when it defined a child as one who is below 18
years of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a qualified physician, psychologist
or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of taking care of herself fully because of a
physical or mental disability or condition or of protecting herself from abuse.
While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor who filed the
corresponding Informations, considered AAAs polio as a physical disability that rendered
her incapable of normal function, no evidence was in fact presented showing the
prosecutions compliance with the implementing rules. Specifically, the prosecution did not
present any evidence, testimonial or documentary, of any medical evaluation or medical finding
from a qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that AAAs physical condition
rendered her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse.
Under the circumstances, we cannot consider AAA a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
7610.
We cannot hold Abello liable under R.A. No. 7610. However, we still find him liable for
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.
In the present case, although the two Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law
violated; the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article 336 of the
RPC whose elements are:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;
2. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and
3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented
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The presence of the first and second elements of the offense has been earlier discussed, albeit in
the consideration of a charge under R.A. No. 7610. The prosecution established these elements
through AAAs testimony that her breasts were fondled while she was asleep.
While she did not actually see Abello fondling her (as the fondling was done while she was asleep
and stopped when she awakened), she related that she identified Abello because she saw him
enter her mothers room immediately after she felt her breasts fondled and after he stepped with
his knees on her hand
AAA also testified that Abello was illuminated by a light coming from outside their house. Further,
the perpetrator could only be Abello as the only other occupants of the house at the time were her
mother, her sister-in-law and her young nephew who were all asleep. The third element was
proven by her testimony that, on two occasions, Abello mashed her breasts while she was
sleeping.
As we discussed above, the Informations alleged the element of violence and intimidation as the
mode of committing the sexual abuses, contrary to what the prosecution established during the
trial that AAA was asleep on the two occasions when the offenses were committed.

The Penalty
The three Informations all alleged the stepfather-stepdaughter relationship between AAA and
Abello. Relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC, as amended, and
is an aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity and in rape.
This modifying circumstance, however, was not duly proven in the present case due to the
prosecutions failure to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAAs mother. If the
fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was via an admission by Abello of his marriage
to AAAs mother.
This admission, however, is inconclusive evidence to prove the marriage to AAAs mother as the
marriage contract still remains the best evidence to prove the fact of marriage stricter
requirement is only proper as relationship is an aggravating circumstance that increases the
imposable penalty, and hence must be proven by competent evidence.
Rape by sexual assault is penalized by prision mayor which has a range of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be within the full range of the penalty that is one degree lower than
prision mayor, in this case, prision correccional which has a range of penalty from six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken within the medium period of prision
mayor, or eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years
Hence, Abello may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, as maximum, for the crime of rape.
The imposable penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended,
is prision correccional. Under Scale No. 1 of Article 71 of this law, one degree lower from prision
correccional is arresto mayor which has a range of penalty from one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the full range of arresto mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in the case, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of prision correccional or two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months.
Accordingly, Abello may be meted an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, for each count of acts of lasciviousness.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 3, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23746 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS in that:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 19623, we find appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada GUILTY of rape by
sexual assault defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
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Code, as amended. We sentence him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ORDERED to
pay AAA P30,000.00 as civil liability; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, we find appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada
GUILTY of 2 counts of acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. For each count, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. He is further ORDERED to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, in each case.
7. People v Romulo Garcia
DOCTRINE: Accused contend that AAA was never sexually abused because the medico-legal findings
showed that there were no signs of swelling on her vagina when she was examined. However, the
Court stated that the lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken
hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that the hymen of the victim is still intact
does not rule out rape since research show that the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus.
In any case, for rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. It suffices that there is
proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ.
FACTS:
On March 27, 2000, an Information for rape was filed against appellant which reads as follows: 6 th
day of January 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, have carnal knowledge of one [AAA],
five (5) years of age and his grandniece by affinity thus sexual abuse prejudicial to the childs
development
On June 20, 2000, both parties stipulated during pre-trial that the victim AAA was a minor, being
born on June 22, 1994
In the afternoon of January 6, 2000, AAA, then five (5) years old, was playing with her friends on
the street outside their house in Sto. Rosario Street, Mandaluyong City.
Appellant called AAA and brought her to his house, which was right next to AAAs house. At the
time, the house was unoccupied. They went up to the second floor where appellants room is
located. Inside his room, appellant began removing AAAs dress, shorts and panty. Appellant then
removed his own clothes. He told AAA to lie on the bed, and wasting no time, inserted his penis
into her vagina. AAA felt pain, but she was unable to cry for help because appellant warned her
not to tell anyone. Thereafter, appellant told AAA to dress up and go home
Around 6:00 p.m. of the same day, BBB, the grandmother of AAA, was preparing to take a bath
when the latter arrived. AAA asked her grandmother to give her a bath, but when BBB was about
to wash AAAs genital area, she refused. BBB noticed that her granddaughter was trembling and
covering her private part with her hands. BBB became suspicious and asked her to explain what
happened. AAA replied that it was painful because it was pierced by a stick. They went upstairs
and BBB told her granddaughter to lie down. BBB looked at AAAs vagina and saw that it was
swollen and reddish. Hence, she suspected that AAA had been abuse
The following day, January 7, 2000, BBB brought AAA to the house of her sister-in-law, CCC, in
Makati City, to inform her of AAAs condition. AAA requested BBB to go out of the room because
she was embarrassed. It was on this occasion that AAA revealed to CCC that it was appellant,
whom she calls Lolo Boyet, who abused her in the afternoon of January 6, 2000. BBB explained
that AAA is appellants grandniece because his wife, DDD, is her sister
Consequently, BBB reported the incident to the PNP Mandaluyong City Police Station. The case
was referred to PO1 Josefina L. Abenojar of the Women and Childrens Desk for investigation. PO1
Abenojar prepared the sworn statements executed by BBB and AAA relative to the incident
SPO4 Julieta SI Espiritu, Chief of the Women and Childrens Desk, corroborated the testimony of
PO1 Abenojar. SPO4 Espiritu testified that she tried to familiarize AAA with the surroundings in the
police station because she was hesitant to talk at first. She also noticed that AAA looked serious
about what she was saying and observed AAA to be a bit afraid and ashamed. She attested that
she issued a referral letter to the City Prosecutors Office
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Dr. Daniel testified that she conducted physical and medico-genital examination on AAA
o No evident signs of extragenital physical injury was noted on the body of the subject at the
time of examination.
o Hymen, intact and its orifice small (0.3 cm. in diameter) as to preclude complete
penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing
genital injury.
o According to Dr. Daniel, the phrase to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized
adult Filipino male organ means that the hymen was not penetrated by an erect penis, but
explained that in rape cases, a normal finding will not disprove that there was no sexual
intercourse or abuse
DEFENSE: Alibi.
Testifying for appellant, DDD, appellants common-law-wife, testified that on January 6, 2000, she
woke up at 7:00 a.m. and cooked breakfast for her children and husband. Appellant was allegedly
already downstairs, outside their house, fixing the motor pump when she cooked breakfast. She
testified that appellant fixed the water pump the whole day, but admitted that she did not actually
see her husband the whole time because every now and then her husband would go outside to
test the pump. She was not able to monitor the movements of appellant as he was sometimes
out of her sight.
DDD admitted that the victim is her niece while the latters guardian, BBB, is her sister. She
further said that she had disagreements with BBB regarding the house where she resides, and that
the house was given to her by BBB and their other sister
appellant, for his part, testified that on January 6, 2000, he was at the house of Marvin Tara in St.
Ignacio Street, Mandaluyong City, installing a water pump. He started at 8:00 a.m. and came back
around 12:00 noon. From 1:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., he was at the said house with Mario Odtuhan,
his helper; Cora Reyes; a nephew of Marvin, whose name he does not know; and a certain
Carding. He further testified that DDD is his live-in partner, and admitted that he did not have a
harmonious relationship with DDDs father and sister, BBB
RTC: Morally convinced that the accused GUILTY of the crime of RAPE, as defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, in relation to R.A. 7160.
Finding the victim, [AAA], to have been under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
rape on January 6, 2000 and finding the offender to be a relative by affinity within the third
civil degree, in addition to the fact that said victim is below seven (7) years old, this Court
imposes the supreme penalty of Death through Lethal Injection, as provided for in
Republic Act, 8177, amending section 24 of R.A. 7659, in the manner and procedure therein
provided.
Indemnify the offended party the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (Php 75,000.00) Pesos,
the crime of Rape being effectively qualified by the circumstances under which the Death
Penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory lawsIndemnify the victim in the amount
of Fifty Thousand (Php 50,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages.
Automatic review to SC but referred to CA
CA: Reduced the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to reclusion perpetua in view of the
abolition of the Death Penalty by Republic Act No.
ISSUE: Whether the crime of rape has been sufficiently proven.
HELD: YES.
He contends that the trial court hastily disregarded his defense of denial, which was sufficient to
absolve him in light of the evidence on record. He emphasizes that the medico-legal officer
testified that there were no signs of swelling on the victims vagina when she was examined.
Appellant further claims that the victim was coached to make false accusations against him,
considering that he was not in good terms with the victims grandmother
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three
well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
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crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense
In the present case, AAA categorically testified that appellant directly inserted his penis into her
vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAAs testimony specified the acts committed by appellant when
he violated her on January 6, 2000,
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that AAA was categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, convincing, clear and candid in her testimony. A rape
victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains
consistent, is a credible witness
In resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victims
testimony. The settled rule is that the trial courts conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in
rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times even finality, unless
there appear in the record certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the lower
court overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the
case
Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying, the trial court stood in a much better position to decide the question of credibility
Here, we note that no such facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted by the trial and appellate courts.
Appellants claim that the criminal complaint was filed against him because he was not in good
terms with AAAs grandmother deserves scant consideration. The Court finds it incredible for AAA
and her grandmother to trump up charges of rape against appellant for the simple reason that
they did not have a harmonious relationship. Well-settled is the rule that testimonies of young
victims of rape deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere
fabrication.
Moreover, it is highly improbable that BBB would allow her granddaughter to be exposed to the
ridicule of a public trial, if the charges were not true. We note that AAA has been in the custody of
BBB since she was an infant, and who treated her as if she were her own daughter. It was thus
very unlikely that she would sacrifice her own granddaughter, a child of tender years,
and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of a public trial for rape, if she were not
motivated by an honest desire to have her daughters transgressor punished accordingly
AAA was never sexually abused because the medico-legal findings showed that there were no
signs of swelling on the victims vagina when she was examined. Lack of lacerated wounds does
not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape.
Even the fact that the hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility of rape.
Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no significance, since the hymen
may not be torn despite repeated coitus
any case, for rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. Penile invasion
necessarily entails contact with the labia. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry
into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a
conviction for rape
As to the penalty, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
o The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
o l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;
xxx
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
Xxx
Under Article 266-B, paragraph 6, subsection 1, the death penalty shall be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed when the victim is under 18 years old and the offender is a

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parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the


third degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The circumstances that qualify a crime should be alleged and proved beyond reasonable
doubt as the crime itself, as these attendant circumstances alter the nature of the crime of
rape and increase the penalty. They are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. The age
of the victim and her relationship with the offender must, therefore, be both
alleged in the information and proven during the trial; otherwise, the death
penalty cannot be imposed
Here, the Information alleged that AAA is appellants grandniece by affinity. It should be
pointed out, however, that this relationship does not make the appellant a relative
of the victim by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. Hence, the
provision in Article 266-B, paragraph 6, subsection 1, is not applicable in this case.
Nevertheless, it is provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 6, subsection 5, that the death
penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the victim is a
child below seven (7) years old.
o Testimonies, birth certificate establish that the victim was only five (5) years old
when the rape was committed.
Thus, appellant was, at that time, correctly sentenced to death by the trial court. In view
of the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006, repealing the Death Penalty Law,
the Court of Appeals also correctly modified the death penalty imposed upon appellant to
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02170 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellant is further ordered to
indemnify the victim P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
8. People v Ernesto Uyboco
DOCTRINE:
If the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration
of his detention is immaterial.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within
the latters reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase within the area of his immediate control means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so
for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense with their own eyes.
Requisites before a warrantless arrest can be effected under the second instance of lawful
warrantless arrest (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.
Court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can
be just as easily concocted.
FACTS:
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On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were
abducted and brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque. Nimfa was able to recognized
one of the kidnappers as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office.

The kidnappers called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of the
kidnappers, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business
transactions.
After numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million, some in
cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to
bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center and ordered him to
put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without
turning back.
P/Insp. Escandor and P/Supt. Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center
and brought a camera to take photo and video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified
Macias together with appellant and the latter as the one who took the ransom.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him
that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway.
He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas
station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio then heard on their radio that
the suspects vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction.
A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in
Makati. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle.
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be
appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed
to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and
a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag
ISSUES: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?
HELD:
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which provides: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: x x x; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) x x x.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
which states: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it.
Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in
Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates
the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in
Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to
personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the
arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them
to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal
knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented
to such. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car,
they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule
126.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within
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the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car
as he was driving it when he was arrested
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from are AFFIRMED
9. People v Dima Montanir
FACTS:
Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia a.k.a. Alice Buenaflor, together with appellants Ronald Norva and
Eduardo Chua, on December 17, 1997, concocted a plan to kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after
several days of conducting surveillance on their intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided
to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon City. However, the intended kidnapping failed,
because Rafael did not show up at the said place.

On February 5, 1998, a second attempt was made, but they encountered an accident before they
could even execute their original plan.
Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to tell
her that she wanted to meet her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB, Valenzuela City to settle the former's
loan of P350,000.00. She requested Rosalina to bring the land title which she was given as
collateral for the said loan.
Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia. Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same
date, Alicia showed up outside the store aboard a car. She was with appellant Ronald Norva.
Alicia motioned Rosalina and Rafael to approach the car, which the two did as requested. While
inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced appellant Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed
Rosalina and Rafael that she would pay them at her place.
When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house was located, Rosalina asked the former
where they were going. Alicia answered that they had to drop by the house of her financier who
agreed to redeem her title and substitute as her creditor. Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did
not protest. They finally reached a house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.
Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle and talked to a man inside a store, later
identified as Jonard Mangelin. The gate of the house was then opened by appellant Dima. The car
proceeded to the garage and Rosalina and Rafael were asked to go inside the house. Rosalina
followed Alicia, while Rafael trailed Rosalina as they entered through a kitchen door. They passed
by a man (Jessie Doe) who was washing his hands in the sink.
While Rosalina was walking behind Alicia, she suddenly heard a dull moan coupled with the sound
of stomping feet. She looked back at the direction where the sounds came from and saw Rafael
being forcibly dragged inside a room. She decided to look for Rafael and on her way, she saw
Jessie Doe place his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a gun at him. Rafael struggled to get
free. Rosalina pleaded with Jessie Doe to have pity on Rafael because of his existing heart
ailment.
Appellant Ronald rushed towards her, poked a gun at her mouth, tied her to a bed and warned her
not to make any noise. He told her that all they want is her money, upon which, Rosalina said that
if they really wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then appeared to be on the verge of
having a heart attack. Rosalina was untied and she immediately rushed to Rafael and began
pumping his chest. She asked Jonard, who had just entered the room, to help her pump Rafael's
chest while she applied CPR on the latter. Jonard did as told. While CPR was being administered,
appellant Dima started removing all of Rafael's personal belongings, which include his ring, wallet,
watch and other items inside his pocket, and passed them on to appellant Ronald.
Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take Rosalina to another room. While inside the
room where she was brought, Rosalina begged Jonard to help her escape. Jonard was moved by
Rosalina's plea and agreed to help her. During their conversation, Jonard told Rosalina that two
women had tipped them off as the kidnap victims. When asked who they were, Jonard refused to
reveal their identities.
Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom around 12:00 noon because certain female
visitors arrived. After the visitors left, Rosalina was returned to the room where she was
previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard about Rafael's condition, to which he replied that Rafael
would be brought to the hospital. A little later, at around 1 p.m., Jonard went to check on Rafael
and confirmed that he was still alive.
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Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of someone being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she
asked Jonard the whereabouts of Rafael and was told that he was brought to the hospital. But
unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had just died and his body was placed inside the trunk of a car.
Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will be brought to another safe house. She was
taken to a car and placed at the back seat, together with Jonard and three other men, later
identified as Larry, Jack and Boy. The driver of the car was appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald
instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's head with a jacket which Jonard did. As they were about to
leave, the man seated beside Ronald started to talk. Rosalina recognized the voice of Robert. She
then lifted the jacket covering her head and was able to confirm that the one talking was Robert.
Rosalina cried, Robert, Robert, why did you do this, we did not do anything to you and Robert
responded, Pasensiyahan na lang tayo.
By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi, Bulacan where there was no electricity.
Thus, they lit candles for illumination. Rosalina found the house familiar and concluded that it was
Alicia's. Rosalina was brought to a room on the second floor and while inside the room, she was
told by one of the men guarding her that one of the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the leader's
instruction, the guard put out the candle light. The man then seated himself beside Rosalina and
warned her against escaping as they were a large and armed group. Rosalina recognized the
voice as that of Robert's. Before he left the room, Robert gave instructions to Jonard and the other
men inside. Meanwhile, the group started digging a pit at the back of the same house near the
swimming pool.
Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18), the group buried Rafael's body in the pit.
Thereafter, Robert instructed appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that the latter should kill Rosalina,
which Jonard refused to do. Nonetheless, Robert instructed Jonard and the others to guard
Rosalina well, as he himself would deal with her upon his return.
Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the same day. Sensing that Jonard was
sympathetic to her, Rosalina begged him again to help her escape for the sake of her children.
When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the men guarding Rosalina turned off the light
inside the room. The room was only illuminated by a light coming from the hallway. Rosalina saw
a person wearing a wig and sunglasses enter the room. Rosalina recognized him as Robert.
Trying to mimic a woman by modulating his voice, Robert told her that Rafael was in the hospital
and that he could still sign a check. He asked Rosalina the whereabouts of the other land titles
and the identities of the other financiers whom she knew. Rosalina replied in the negative. Robert
angrily poked a gun at her and shouted, That's impossible, and then left the room. He gave
instructions to his members and left.
At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her about Robert's order to kill her, which caused
the latter to panic and cry. She then implored the help of Jonard for her escape. Afterwards,
Jonard went to his companions Larry, Jack and Boy and told them that he would help Rosalina
escape. His companions immediately cocked their guns and an argument ensued. Rosalina talked
to them and begged them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's companions told Rosalina that if
they would allow her to escape, they too would get into trouble. Taking advantage of the
situation, Rosalina suggested that all of them should escape. They all agreed to escape in the
early morning.
Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy left the safe house. They walked through a
rice field for about 30 minutes and then boarded a jeepney bound for Balagtas, Bulacan. From
Balagtas, they took a bus going to Cubao and arrived at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her pieces of
jewelry for P1,500.00 and gave the P1,000.00 to Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told Jonard to stay
with Rosalina so that she would have a witness and, in case Rosalina would further need their
help, left their address with Jonard.
When the three left, Rosalina immediately called Rafael's brother Tito, and related what happened
to her and his brother. When Tito asked Jonard which hospital Rafael was brought to, Jonard
revealed to Rosalina that Rafael died at the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.
Rosalina called her lawyer, Atty. Teresita Agbi and asked her to meet them at Farmer's, Cubao.
When Atty. Agbi arrived, she accompanied them to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) where an investigation was conducted.

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The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the DILG were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the
appellants, and Robert. Alicia and Josie were not at their homes, while appellants Ronald and
Dima were arrested at the residence of Robert. While at the DILG office, Rosalina positively
identified appellants Ronald and Dima as her kidnappers. Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the
police authorities to the safe house in Pandi, Bulacan and showed them where the body of Rafael
was buried. The remains of Rafael was later on exhumed.
Two Informations were filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City (Branch 171:
o 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, being then private person, did then and kidnap one ROSALINA REYES
against her will and detained her, thereby depriving her of her liberty for a period of two
days.
o 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, being then a private person, did then and kidnap one RAFAEL
MENDOZA against his will and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the
occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted (Kidnapping resulting to homicide?)
Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Jonard and appellants Ronald, Dima and
Eduardo, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Robert Uy, Alice Buenaflor and Jessie Doe
remained at-large during the trial of the case. Jonard was later on discharged as a state witness.
Afterwards, the trial on the merits ensued.
RTC: DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA, and EDUARDO CHUA are hereby found GUILTY, crime of
kidnapping (SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE) and in accordance with
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
- Penalty of DEATH on accused NORVA and MONTANIR. As regards accused CHUA, this Court
hereby imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
- Further, accused Montanir, Norva and Chua are hereby held jointly and severally liable to pay
the heirs of Mendoza the amount of Php 71,000.00 in actual damages and Php 50,000.00 as
moral damages.
- As for accused JOSIE HERRERA, the Court hereby ACQUITS her on reasonable doubt of the
charge of kidnapping.
- MISSING: With regard to accused ALICE BUENAFLOR, ROBERT UY and one JESSIE DOE, let the
cases against them be ARCHIVED pending their apprehension. Meantime, let an alias warrant
issue for their apprehension.
CA: On automatic review, Affirmed the conviction with modification on the penalty imposed, thus:
Penalty of death imposed on accused Montanir and Norva is hereby modified to reclusion perpetua to
conform to and in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. Appellants Montanir, Norva and Chua are
ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the
victims.
ISSUES:
DIMA MONTANIR: Not beyond reasonable doubt
EDUARDO CHUA: Not a conspirator
RONALD NORVA: Beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act
No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, now provides:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
o 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
o 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
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3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made
o 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime'
of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by
the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be
punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as
amended by RA No. 7659.
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law
provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting
crime is called a special complex crime.
As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime.
It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct
relation, and intimate connection between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy,
rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component
offense forming part of the herein special complex crime
"Where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing
was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267."
The same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer
be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a
special complex crime.
At any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of no consequence in the
imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal
detention if complexed with either homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty
of death shall be imposed.
In this particular case, the Information specifically alleges that the appellants wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped Rafael Mendoza against his will and detained him,
thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the death of the
victim resulted. The trial court, in its decision, particularly in the dispositive portion,
merely stated that the appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping, however, its mention of the phrase, in accordance with Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on
accused Norva and Montanir, clearly refers to the crime committed as that of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.
The appellants, therefore, were correctly punished under the last paragraph of Article 267
as the evidence presented during the trial, in its entirety, undoubtedly proves that the
death of Rafael Mendoza, although of natural causes, occurred on the occasion of the
kidnapping.
o

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BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT: The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with
arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has not been considered
Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge
acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by
appellate courts
Inconsistencies
Appellants claim that Jonard, a witness for the prosecution, stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
that he was the one who whispered to appellant Ronald to transfer Rosalina to another room so
that the latter would have no idea that Rafael was in a critical condition, but during trial, Jonard
testified that it was Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to a different room.
Appellants also point out that in the same sworn statement, Jonard averred that he resided in
Taguig since October, 1987, which is contrary to what he testified in court that he resided in that
same place since 1997. In addition, appellants further argue that in her testimony, Rosalina
declared that she was with four men seated at the back of the car when she was brought to Pandi,
Bulacan, however, Jonard, in his own testimony, stated that there were four of them including
Rosalina seated at the back of the car.
A close reading of the above inconsistencies asserted by the appellants show that the same refer
only to minor details and collateral matters and do not affect the veracity and weight
of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. What really prevails is the consistency
of the testimonies of the witnesses in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification
of the appellants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. They are thus safeguards against
memorized perjury.
Testimonies in court are given more weight than affidavits, thus: Affidavits are not entirely reliable
evidence in court due to their incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have attended their
formulationIn general, such affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another
person (i.e., investigator) who may have used his own language in writing the statement or
misunderstood the affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and impatience that usually
attend the preparation of such affidavits.
An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and
inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject
affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open
court
Incidentally, the CA was correct in stating that Jonard was able to explain and reconcile the
minor discrepancies in his testimony by saying that he whispered to appellant Ronald that
Rafael was in a bad condition and afterwards, it was appellant Ronald who instructed him to
transfer Rosalina to another room, thus: A: The two are true, ma'am, because when I
whispered to him that the old man was in a bad condition he gave me instruction
to transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room.
The same is true with his inconsistent statements regarding his time of residence in Taguig,
thus: The truth is 1997
Prosecution was not able to establish his participation in the commission of the crime
because he was merely the house helper of the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela,
when the kidnappers and the victims arrived. In the same vein, appellant Ronald
asserts that there was no convincing evidence presented by the prosecution that will point
to his clear participation in the crime because he was just the driver of the car
that brought the victims to the place where the latter were kept. Appellant Eduardo also
insists that he was not a participant in the offense charged in the Information.
Basically, the appellants deny any participation in the kidnapping.
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Conspiracy exists
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.
Verily, when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not
individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the
commission of the felony
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally
in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even
though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not
confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral
acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging
in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in
contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result
Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs
radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit
As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck when a conspirator embarks upon a
criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so
be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them.
EVIDENCE: The trial court correctly found the denial of appellant Dima that he had knowledge of
the kidnapping, unbelievable. The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even
weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him.
As for accused Montanir, again, this Court finds the testimonies of prosecution witnesses more
credible than his testimony applying the same principle that evidence to be believed must not
only proceed from a mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such that the
common experience and observation of mankind can show it as probable under the
circumstances.
Certainly, this Court is not convinced by accused Montanir's claim that he was at Ciudad Grande
because he was a house boy of accused Chua after he admitted the circumstances under which he
has to live there a few days before the victims were brought there.
To begin with, this Court does not buy accused Montanir's explanation that he transferred to Chua
because he was looking for a permanent job is hardly credible because he himself admitted that
when he was brought by accused Uy to the residence of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande, it was
the understanding that it would be accused Uy who would be paying his salary. Why would
accused Uy pay the salary of accused Montanir if he was to work as a house boy of accused Chua?
Evidently, the only plausible reason why accused Uy would pay the salary of accused Montanir is
because he was actually working for the former and only posted in the house of accused Chua at
Ciudad Grande to play his part in the execution of the planned kidnapping. This conclusion is
bolstered by accused Montanir's admission that he never even spoke with accused Chua during all
those times that he stayed at accused Chua's residence as in fact, he took orders from accused
Uy.
Moreover, this Court finds it rather perplexing that accused Montanir would suddenly go back to
the house of accused Uy on 19 February 1998 on the shallow reason that he had no companion at
Ciudad Grande when precisely he said he was hired as a caretaker thereat while the regular boy
was on vacation.
The above conclusion was bolstered by the positive identification of the same appellant and his
exact participation in the execution of the crime, by the witnesses for the prosecution, thus:
WITNESS JONARD: I saw Jess and Dems poking a gun to (sic) Mr. Mendoza. WITNESS
ROSALINA: While we were pumping Mr. Mendoza's chest, Dima Montanir was busy
removing the things of Mr. Mendoza. Who was there? Dima Montanir.
In like manner, appellant Eduardo's denial that he participated in the offense charged does not
outweigh the testimonies of the witnesses positively identifying him as one of the culprits, thus:
WITNESS JONARD Q When you said they are my Boss, to whom, Mr. Witness, are you
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referring to? A Ronald Norva, Robert Uy, Eduardo Chua, Alice Buenaflor and Josie
Herrera.
Q You also mentioned the name of Eduardo Chua as one of your bosses, why do you
say so that he was one of your bosses? A Because they were the ones planning how
they could get Mr. Mendoza.
Q Who were these people in the group, Mr. Witness? A Alice Buenaflor, Robert Uy,
Ronald Norva, Eduardo Chua and Josie Herrera.
Q And who participated in the plan, Mr. Witness? A
Eduardo Chua, Robert Uy,
Ronald, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
It must always be remembered that between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring
of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails.
It is also not disputed that the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, where the victims were
brought was owned by appellant Eduardo.
The trial court was also correct in dismissing the claim of appellant Eduardo that he merely lent
his car to Robert and allowed the latter to occupy his house because Robert had been so
accommodating to him and had facilitated his loan, thus: Regarding the criminal liability of
accused Chua, while it is conceded that the said accused was nowhere in the actual scene of
the incident, this Court nonetheless finds the said accused guilty of kidnapping as one of the
conspirators to the commission of the felony who participated by furnishing the vehicle used in
abducting the victims and the house where they were held captive and where Mendoza died.
It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after receiving the money he borrowed, he
would spend it in going to Davao with his daughter on 18 February 1988, without any previous
plan whatsoever and suspiciously, upon invitation of accused Uy who had known by then that one
of the victims, Mendoza, had died in the course of the kidnapping.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals, affirming
with modification the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela
City, Branch 171 is hereby AFFIRMED, with further MODIFICATION that all the appellants herein are
equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.
10. People v Joel Baluya
FACTS:
o In an Information dated September 4, 2003, appellant was indicted before RTC of Manila for the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, allegedly committed as follows:
o That on or about August 31, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, take,
detain and carry away one GLODIL CASTILLON Y MAAMBONG, a minor, nine (9) years
old, son of Gloria Castillon y Maambong, while the latter was playing outside of their residence
along Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, this City, by poking a knife on his back, twisting his hands and
forcibly bringing him to Novaliches, Quezon City, thus detaining and depriving him of his liberty
under restraint and against his will and consent.
o Around 10:30 a.m. of August 31, 2003, the victim, Glodil Castillon (Glodil), who at that time was
nine (9) years old, was playing in front of their house located along Laon Laan St., Sampaloc,
Manila. While in the midst of play, he saw herein appellant. Appellant then called Glodil's attention
and summoned him to come forth.
o Immediately thereafter, appellant seized him by twisting his right arm, pointed a knife at him and
told him that if appellant's wife, Marissa, would not show up Glodil's mother would not see him
anymore. Appellant and Glodil then boarded a jeepney and went to Blumentritt. When they were
in Blumentritt, appellant called up Glodil's mother, Gloria, telling her to show him his wife so that
she will also be able to see Glodil.
o Gloria then asked appellant to allow her to talk to her son as proof that Glodil was indeed with
him. Appellant then passed the telephone to Glodil, but the latter was only able to momentarily
talk with his mother because appellant immediately grabbed the telephone from him.
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Thereafter, Glodil's mother reported the incident to the police. Meanwhile, appellant and Glodil
again boarded a jeepney and went to Novaliches. It was Glodil's first time to reach Novaliches.
Upon reaching Novaliches Bayan, they headed straight to a barbershop where they fetched
appellant's three minor children.
o They then proceeded to a church where appellant left his children and Glodil in the playground
within the church premises. Glodil played, ate and slept with appellant's children until the
afternoon of the same day. During that period, appellant returned from time to time to check on
them and bring them food.
o At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, appellant again called up Gloria and, while shouting, asked if his
wife was already there. He then threatened Gloria by saying that kapag hindi mo ipakita sa akin
si Marissa, hindi mo na makikita ang anak mo. Subsequently, Gloria was able to talk to Marissa
and convince her to meet with appellant at the Novaliches public market.
o Unknown to appellant, the police already had a plan to arrest him, which they did when he showed
up to meet with his wife. In the meantime, around 4:00 p.m. of August 31, 2003, Glodil was able
to seize an opportunity to escape while appellant was away. He walked from the place where
appellant left him in Novaliches until he reached their house and it took him around four hours to
do so. He was able to trace back their house by reading the signboard of the jeepneys and
following the route of those that pass by his place of residence.
DEFENSE:
o On the other hand, the defense interposed the defense of denial alleging that on August 31, 2003,
appellant went to the house of his common-law-wife's aunt, Gloria, at Laon Laan St. in Sampaloc,
Manila for the purpose of asking the latter if his wife, with whom he has been separated, has been
there.
o Gloria told him that his wife went to their house once but has not seen her since then. After an
hour of talking with Gloria, appellant bid her goodbye. It was then that Glodil approached him and
asked if he could go with him to Novaliches. Since Glodil already went with him to Novaliches
several times in the past, appellant acceded to the child's request on the condition that he ask his
mother for permission, which the latter readily gave.
o Appellant and Glodil then proceeded to the former's house in Novaliches. After taking lunch,
appellant took his children and Glodil to the playground and left them there. When he returned
around 4:30 p.m., Glodil was no longer there. His children told him that Glodil's aunt, by the name
of Rosaly, fetched him.
o Appellant then brought home his children. Around 6:00 p.m. of the same day, the police, together
with Gloria and his wife, arrived at his house wherein he was apprehended and brought to a police
station in Novaliches. After having been subjected to a medical examination, he was turned over
to Police Station 4 in Balic-Balic, Manila, where he was subsequently charged with kidnapping.
o Appellant alleges that his wife and her aunt came up with the scheme of accusing him with
kidnapping so that his wife would be able to take their children from him. Appellant also claims
that Gloria is angry with warays and because he is a waray she is also angry with him.
o

RTC: GUILTY of the crime of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the
costs.
CA: AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that accused JOEL BALUYA y NOTARTE is ordered to pay to
victim Glodil M. Castillon the amounts of P30,000.00 as moral damages and of P15,000.00 as nominal
damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether tHE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT THE VICTIM WAS FORCIBLY TAKEN AND DEPRIVED OF HIS
LIBERTY UNDER RESTRAINT AND AGAINST HIS WILL AND CONSENT.
3. Whether COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE ALLEGATION OF
MINORITY OF THE VICTIM.
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Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of all the elements of the crime
charged. In particular, the defense contends that there is no evidence to show that the victim was
deprived of his liberty.

HELD: AFFIRM CONVICTION


o

The elements of kidnapping and serious


Penal Code (RPC) are:

illegal detention under Article 267of the Revised

1.
2.
3.
4.

the offender is a private individual;


he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating
public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer.

FIRST: The presence of the first element is not in issue as there is no dispute that appellant is a
private individual.
SECOND: As to the second element of the crime, the deprivation required by Article 267 of the RPC
means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time.
o It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or
is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. If the victim is a child, it also includes the intention
of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. In other words, the essence of
kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the
intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
o In the present case, Glodil was in the control of appellant as he was kept in a place strange and
unfamiliar to him. Because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back
home, he was then and there deprived of his liberty. The intention to deprive Glodil's parents of
his custody is also indicated by appellant's actual taking of the child without the permission or
knowledge of his parents, of subsequently calling up the victims mother to inform her that the
child is in his custody and of threatening her that she will no longer see her son if she failed to
show his wife to him.
o Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was not
confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no evidence to show that Glodil
sustained any injury, cannot hold water.
o The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender
kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping
case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the
victim.
o As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if
he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of
liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the mercy and control of the
abductor. It remains undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that he did not
know his way home from the place where he was left. It just so happened that the victim had the
presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape, he ran away from the place where
appellant left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of the passenger
jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place of residence.
o Appellant alleges that Glodil was not forcibly taken, but instead voluntarily went with appellant to
Novaliches. The general rule is that the prosecution is burdened to prove lack of consent
on the part of the victim. However, where the victim is a minor, lack of consent is
presumed. Aside from his self-serving testimony, appellant failed to present competent evidence
to overcome such presumption. Thus, the presumption stands that Glodil, being only nine (9)
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o
o

o
o

years old on August 31, 2003, is incapable of giving consent and is incompetent to assent to his
seizure and illegal detention.
The defense further argues that appellant had no intention to detain Glodil and that his purpose is
to merely use him as a leverage against Glodil's mother, who refused to produce Marissa, his
live-in partner. The Court, however, cannot fathom how appellant could have used Glodil as
leverage or bargaining tool to force Marissa to meet with him without depriving him of his liberty.
In any case, appellant's motive is not relevant, because it is not an element of the crime.
THIRD ELEMENT: Act of detaining the victim was without lawful cause.
FOURTH ELEMENT: Victim's minority was alleged by the prosecution in the information and was
not disputed. During his direct examination, the victim testified as to his minority claiming that, at
the time that he was presented at the witness stand, he was only 10 years old. This fact was
affirmed by his mother who also testified as to his minority at the time that he was abducted. As
correctly contended by the OSG, appellant did not raise any issue as to the victim's minority when
the victim's and his mother's testimonies were offered.
However, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of Glodil and his mother finding them to
be trustworthy and believable. The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the
testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its
first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it.
It is thus no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses
enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify.
Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are
entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said
findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts
and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.
Also, against the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant can only offer the
defense of denial. However, denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given
greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative
matters.
Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who, as in this case, were not shown to have any ill motive to testify
against petitioner.

DISPOSITVE: CA Decision AFFIRMED finding Baluya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention
11. People v Alberto Anticamara
FACTS:
Lando, Al, Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas OrdeizaTaedo (Cita), and Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious
Illegal Detention in two separate Informations, which read:
For Murder: That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, accused, being then armed with a
hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad, driver of the Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a
secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim.
For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention: That on or about the 7 th day of May 2002, more or less
3:00 o'clock in the early morning, at the Estrella Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of
Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, who are private persons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
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Sulpacio Abad and AAA both employees of the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all
against their will for a period of twenty-seven (27) days.
That in the course of the
kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy. Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan and
AAA was raped for several times by her abductors.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while
Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad Sulpacio
were sleeping in their employers' house located in Barangay Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were out of the house at that time
Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard voices saying, We will kill her, kill her
now and another voice saying, Not yet! Hiding under her blanket, AAA later heard someone
saying, We only need money, we only need money. Thereafter, she heard someone talking in
Ilocano which she could not understand.
Then she heard somebody say, Cebuana yan, Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing Cebu. AAA
heard the persons conversing which she estimated about four to five meters away
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as
accused Dick Taedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara
alias Al Camara, and Fernando Fernandez alias Lando Calaguas. One of the intruders
approached her and told her not to move
Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run but to her
surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom she later recognized as
Dick Taedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Taedo, Why Kuya? Taedo replied, Somebody
will die. After a brief commotion, appellant alias Lando Calaguas asked the group saying, What
shall we do now? They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her outside the
house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA saw Cita
Taedo there. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away
Later, alias Fred returned telling the group, Make the decision now, Abad has already four
bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl. When Cita Taedo made a motion of cutting
her neck, appellant alias Lando Calaguas and Fred boarded the vehicle taking along with them
AAA. They later proceeded towards San Miguel Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided. They stayed
in Lando's house where they kept AAA from May 7 to May 9, 2002
On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Taedo would kill her.
Lando then brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he would leave her there as soon as
Fred and Bert Taedo leave the place. However, once inside the hotel room, appellant Lando
Calaguas sexually molested AAA. Lando told AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that
he would turn her over to Fred and Bert Taedo. After Lando raped AAA, he brought her back to his
house. Later, Fred, Bert Taedo and Lando Calaguas transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac (
AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred kept AAA as his
wife. At nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA, threatening her that he would give her back
to appellant Lando Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio. She was afraid Lando might
also kill her
On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte, together with his wife
Marsha and their children. AAA stayed in the house of Marsha's brother Sito, where she was made
as a house helper
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and sought
the help of her friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight, Susana called AAA's brother in
Cebu, who later fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyte and brought her to Mandaue City. When they arrived
in Mandaue City, they immediately reported the incident to the police authorities.
Dr. Bandonil prepared Autopsy Report
o x Remains placed in a sealed metal coffin, wrapped in two (2) layers of black, plastic
garbage bags, and covered in (sic) a red-stripped cotton blanker. A thick layer of lime
embeds the whole torso.
o Remains in a far advanced state of decomposition, with the head completely devoid of soft
tissue. A cloth is wrapped around the eyesockets and tied to the back of the skull. The skull
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does not show any signs of dents, chips nor fractures. The other recognizable body part is
the chest area which retained a few soft tissues and skin, but generally far advanced in
decomposition. The whole gamut of internal organs have undergone liquefaction necrosis
and have been turned into grayish-black pultaceous masses. Worn on top of the remaining
chest is a sando shirt with observable holes at the left side, both front and back. A large
hole is seen at the area of the left nipple, with traces of burning at its edges and inward in
direction. A tied cloth is also observable at the remnants of the left wrist.
o At the upper chest, which is the most recognizable, remaining and intact part of the torso, a
hole, 1.0 cm. x 2.0 cms., with signs of burning, edges inverted, is seen at the left anterior
axillary line just below the left nipple. Another hole is seen 1.5 cms. x 2.5 cms. in diameter,
edged averted (sic) at the right chest, along the right anterior axillary line, 5.0 cms. below
the right nipple. A 3rd hole, almost unrecognizable is seen at the left groin area.
o The other parts of the cadaver are too far advanced in decomposition to have remarkable
findings
o CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUNDS, TRUNK
DEFENSE: Alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in
Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in
Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or
vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was
ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed,
including the members of his family who were in Cebu.
RTC:
o For Murder: Accused Nicetas Cita Taedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence;; Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and
Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the presence of aggravating
circumstance of pre-meditation, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the
penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez
(Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). They are also ordered jointly and severally
[to] pay the heirs of the victim Abad Sulpacio the following:
1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; 2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as indemnity for the death of the victim; 3) Fifty-Seven Thousand One Hundred TwentyTwo Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P57,122.30) as actual damages; and 4) The cost of suit.
o For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention: Accused Nicetas Cita Taedo is hereby
acquitted of the crime
charged for insufficiency of evidence; Accused Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal
Detention of the victim AAA as charged, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. Considering that the victim AAA was raped during her
detention, the maximum penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two accused, Fernando
Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The two accused are
also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the victim AAA the amount of:
1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages; 2) Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and 3) Cost of suit.
CA: Affirmed RTC; however, in view of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, the appellants were sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
ISSUES:
For Lando
1. Whether CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE
CRIME.
2. Whether accused should be convicted of homicide instead of murder
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3. Whether the penalty of death should be imposed for THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION, AGGRAVATED BY RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
For AI
1. Whether there was conspiracy
2. Whether death should be applied as he did not participate in aggravating RAPE
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
Circumstantial Evidence
o

o
o

The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the
early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the
prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the
identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.]
Testimony of witnesses. In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA
heard Fred utter Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement is
that whoever comes our way should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde
testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his
companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the
house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond.
Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy
conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several
holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the
cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of
cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another
cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was
able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the
Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly
shot and buried.

Conspiracy EXISTS
Prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in Carmen, Pangasinan
and discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement that whoever comes
their way will be eliminated
o Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the house of the Estrellas with the task
of reporting any movements outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable gate of the Estrella
compound and then opened the small door and the rest of the group entered the house of the
Estrellas through that opening
o After almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA
and Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. In that
place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was brought to another place and deprived of her liberty.
o These circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the
malefactors in committing the crime. Clearly, the group conspired to rob the house of the
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o

o
o
o

Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The killing of Sulpacio was part of their
conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun constitutes direct evidence of a
deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to
participate in the commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened
to be killed. NO IRRESISTIBLE FORCE NOR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF EQUAL OR GREATER
INJURY. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of
an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is
greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force,
fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of
future injury is not enough.
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress
from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from
incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed
to station himself across the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m of
the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field.
Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer
subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the
house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours and thereafter returned to the landing field where
the group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas house.
When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his
companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to
Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA
Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to, but he never did. Neither
did he request for assistance from the authorities or any person passing by the house of the
Estrellas during the period he was stationed there.
Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself
from criminal

Alibi and Denial WEAK DEFENSES


LANDO.
o He claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family.
On the other hand, the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6)
malefactors who forcibly took her and Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of May
7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible.
o As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the
time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for
Lando to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
o Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant
was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to
be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail. During the trial of the case, Lando
testified that the distance between his house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of
Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40) kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less
than 30 minutes using a private car and when the travel is continuous.
o Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant Lando to be at the locus criminis at the
time of the incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it
impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical
Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery, premeditation/// superior strength
absorbed
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TREACHERY EXISTS:
o There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.Two
conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted
o In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw Sulpacio tied and
blindfolded. Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio, still tied and blindfolded, was led out
of the vehicle by the group. When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter found by the authorities,
the autopsy report indicated that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and
tied at the back of the skull and another cloth was also found tied at the left wrist of the victim.
There is no question therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had his hands tied and
blindfolded. This situation of the victim when found shows without doubt that he was killed while
tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was present in
the commission of the crime.
o Means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the killing of the victims, so as to
afford the victims no opportunity to defend themselves, was the act of tying the hands of the
victims.
o The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated
because it is absorbed by treachery.
o EVIDENT PREMEDITATION EXISTS: The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof
showing: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act
o The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment
o From the time the group met at the landing field at around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and
discussed the possibility of killing anyone who stands on their way, up to the time they took
Sulpacio away from the Estrellas house and eventually killed him thereafter at around past 3:00
a.m., more than eight hours had elapsed sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the
consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if they wished to.
Instead, appellants evidently clung to their determination and went ahead with their nefarious
plan.
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
o The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape, defined in and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code.
o The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal;
and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer.
o The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants
Lando and Al, both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the
Estrellas and held her captive against her will.
o Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was
deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious illegal
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o
o
o

o
o

detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining
him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home
Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the
intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
Although AAA was not confined in an enclosure, she was restrained and deprived of her liberty,
because every time appellant Lando and his wife went out of the house, they brought AAA with
them. The foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly guarded by appellant Lando and his
family.
The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on
May 9, 2002, appellant Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended
to kill her. Appellant Lando told her to follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and
Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando raped her
Clearly, for fear of being delivered to Fred and Bert and of losing her life, AAA had no choice but
to give in to appellant Lando's lustful assault. In rape cases, the credibility of the victim's
testimony is almost always the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is
credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction.This is so because owing to the
nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be given regarding the matter is
the testimony of the offended party
The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a
special complex crime. Thus, We hold that appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape
AI NOT LIABLE FOR RAPE. Although, Court ruled that once conspiracy is established between
several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for
the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them
proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape
Also, even if with conspiracy, it also as convincingly suggests that the agreement was to commit
kidnapping only; and there is no evidence that the other members were aware of Canturia's lustful
intent and his consummation thereof so that they could have attempted to prevent the same.
There is no evidence to prove that appellant Al was aware of the subsequent events that
transpired after the killing of Sulpacio and the kidnapping of AAA. Appellant Al could not have
prevented appellant Lando from raping AAA, because at the time of rape, he was no longer
associated with appellant Lando.
AAA even testified that only Fred and appellant Lando brought her to Tarlac and she never saw
appellant Al again after May 7, 2002, the day she was held captive. She only saw appellant Al
once more during the trial of the case Thus, appellant Al cannot be held liable for the subsequent
rape of AAA.

The Penalties
o Murder case, the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder. The penalty
for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged and proven, the imposable
penalty upon the appellants is death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole
o Kidnapping case, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape is death. In view of R.A. No. 9346, the penalty of death is reduced to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for
appellant Lando is reclusion perpetua.
o As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
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The Damages
MURDER:
Civil indemnity: Award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime.Even if the penalty of death is not to be
imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because
it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense.
Moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim. However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes
where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,
the award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00
Exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime. The Court awards the
amount of P30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with current jurisprudence on the matter
Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio, incurred expenses
in the amount of P57,122.30, which was duly supported by receipts
KIDNAPPING:
Civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the
finding of rape. Applying prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code without the necessity of additional
pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's
injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. Such award is separate and distinct from
the civil indemnity. However, the amount of P100,000.00 awarded as moral damages is reduced to
P75,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence
Exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of P50,000 is hereby reduced to P30,000.00 in
accordance with recent jurisprudence.
As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is individual and
not collective. Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of serious illegal detention, he is
jointly and severally liable only to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious
illegal detention, the award of civil indemnity is in the amount of P50,000.00, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the
amount of P50,000.00. Pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered in cases of illegal detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety
and fright when she was detained for almost one (1) month
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) MURDER:, appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias Lando and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara
alias Al are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Sulpacio Abad the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P57,122.30 as actual damages.
(b) LANDO: Special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay the
offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Al: Crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. He is also directed to pay, jointly and severally, with appellant Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez alias Lando, the victim AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
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12. People v Felipe Mirandilla


FACTS:
o AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.
o It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the plaza,
AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB
o AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way back
through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knifes point
thrust at her right side. She will come to know the mans name at the police station, after her
escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr
o He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others
stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked
farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy
fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle.
o Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after
receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Minutes
later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis
o Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he
ordered her to remove her pants. When she defied him, he slapped her and hit her arms with a
gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three
fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants down and
lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside. Sayang ka, she heard him whisper at her as
she succumbed to pain and exhaustion.
o When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting
until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
o At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered
her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling
through her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he
dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the roads side, Mirandilla pushed
her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and
pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandillas penis inside her
vagina. A little while, a companion warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away
o They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth.
Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and again
inserted his penis into her vagina
o The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered the
same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth from one place to
another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up
in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her cell, then to
Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly
raped 27 times]
o
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that
Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran, crossed a
river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she
walked through the fields and stayed out of peoples sight for two nights.
o Finally, she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who
brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and
sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her food. When the police
presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the mans face she was certain
it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her
o The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah Vasquez,
Legazpi Citys Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered hymenal lacerations
in different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual intercourse. Foul smelling pus also oozed
from her vagina - AAA had contracted gonorrhoea]
o Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.
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Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each other at the
Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They had a short chat. They
were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife and daughter there for good
o Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting her and, after five
days, as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they became lovers. Mirandilla was then 33 years old.
o Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends houses and in cheap motels. On
24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mothers house in Kilikao, they met again at the
park, at their usual meeting place, in front of the parks comfort room, near Arlene Moret, a
cigarette vendor who also served as the CRs guard
o They decided to elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the back
of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to them for P1,500.00.
They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000. From 12 December 2000 until 11
January 2001, Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio Marcellanas house, at the resettlement Site in
Banquerohan, Legazpi City.
o Mirandilla and AAAs nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during AAAs
menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000. In late December, however,
Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting his mother in Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood,
moaning in excruciating stomach pain. AAA had abortion an inference he drew upon seeing the
cover of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled for days until she left him in
January 2001 after quarrelling for days
o Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA missed her
menstruation in December 2001 and that he would not have known she had an abortion had she
not confessed it to him.
Information: Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 5,
with kidnapping with rape, four counts of rape, and rape through sexual assault.
RTC: Convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual
assault with this finding:
o This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the company of three
others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx, City of xxx, on or on about midnight of
December 2, 2000 or early morning of December 3, 2000, held her in detention for thirty-nine
days in separate cells situated in the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx.
o
Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty seven
times, employing force and intimidation.
o The twenty seven sexual intercourses were eventually perpetrated between the City of xxx and
the towns of xxx and xxx. At least once, Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA
against her will while employing intimidation, threats, and force.
CA: Affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. GUILTY of the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of
rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault.
o It rejected Mirandillas defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual
encounters were consensual.
o It noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to sustain his
defense.
o

HELD: Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention
with rape.
o Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened
almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in partners, entangled
in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed
ironically to separation mainly because of AAAs intentional abortion of their first child to be a
betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive.
o In stark contrast to Mirandillas tale of a love affair, is AAAs claim of her horrific ordeal and her
flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27 times.
Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be
believed, it must not only come from a credible witness but must be credible in itself tested by
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human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through
the years. Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience.
1. First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAAs manner and demeanour on the
witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: AAA appeared to be a simple and truthful woman,
whose testimony was consistent, steady and firm, free from any material and serious contradictions.
No ill motive. When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.,
to positively identify him in open court, she was crying. Felipe Mirandilla Jr.s response was to smile.
AAA was a picture of a woman who was gravely harmed, craving for justice.
2. AAAs testimony to be credible in itself. AAAs ordeal was entered into the police blotter
immediately after her escape negating opportunity for concoction. While in Mirandillas company,
none of her parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew her, visited, saw, or
talked to her. None of them knew her whereabouts. AAAs testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah
Vasquez, Legazpi Citys Health Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal lacerations
but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
3. CA Affirmed. We emphasize that a trial courts assessment of a witness credibility, when affirmed
by the CA, is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight or influence. This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are
in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and
having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under gruelling examination.
o In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the
following principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower courts, unless
there is a showing that it overlooked or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine
their demeanour when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a
clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.
Second Issue: Sweetheart Theory not Proven
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

Accuseds bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first
element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or
intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust.
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof after the prosecution has successfully established
a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduce evidence
that the intercourse was consensual
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence
sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation
Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during
the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow one when created against
him.
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the prosecutions prima
facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio
Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend Arlene Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CRs guard, testified that on 30 October
2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the park. They approached her and chatted with her.
On cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone two hours earlier, chatting
with her first, before AAA finally came. She also claimed meeting the couple for the first time on
30 October 2000, only to contradict herself on cross examination with the version that she met

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o
o
o
o
o
o

them previously, three times at least, in the previous month. On the other hand, Mirandilla
claimed first meeting AAA on 3 October 2000 at the park.
The accuseds mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living in Kilikao
only after his imprisonment. This contradicted Mirandillas claim that he visited his mother several
times in Kilikao, from October 2000 until January 2001.
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood, agonizing in pain,
with the abortifacient pills cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled with his other claim that he
came to know AAAs abortion only through the latters admission.
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses testimonies contradicted each other and
flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they concocted stories in a
desperate attempt to exonerate the accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should be reconciled, it
being true that such is possible since a witness is not expected to give error-free testimony
considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory
But, this principle, learned from lessons of human experience, applies only to minor or trivial
matters innocent lapses that do not affect witness credibility. They do not apply to selfcontradictions on material facts
Where these contradictions cannot be reconciled, the Court has to reject the testimonies and
apply the maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Thus, to completely disregard all the testimony
of a witness based on the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, testimony must have been false
as to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a
material point. In other words, its requirements, which must concur, are the following: (1) that the
false testimony is as to one or more material points; and (2) that there should be a conscious and
deliberate intention to falsity.

Crimes and Punishment


An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not
raised by the parties as embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
o SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the
judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the
case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.
o The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,
he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open
to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.
o To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-76-77), and one
count of rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
o The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that Mirandilla
kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more than three days during which
time he had carnal knowledge of her, against her will
o The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no
less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and carnally
abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife
o Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
o Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1.
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
o

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o
o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force, threat,
or intimidation.
She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth; (2) through force,
threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code:
o Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death;
If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. Xxx
An imminent Spanish commentator explained: deprivation of liberty of a person, in any form or by
any means or for any time under which proves interrupted the free exercise of their activity.
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This
provision gives rise to a special complex crime.
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape
This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No.
7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the
seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in
the present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not
have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape.
The taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes
committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible
abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes
distinct and separate count of rape
Mirandillas act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and on the
occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape,
warranting the penalty of death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of death is hereby reduced to
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole
We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate informations of rape cannot
be considered as separate and distinct crimes in view of the above discussion.
As to the award of damages, upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil damages ex
delicto is mandatory. Thus, we held that the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised Penal
Code, that is, restitution, reparation, and indemnification, all correspond to actual or
compensatory damages in the Civil Code
Court enunciated that if, in the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex
delicto for the victim shall be in the increased amount of NOT less than P75,000.00. To
reiterate the words of the Court: this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity ex
delicto of P75,000.00 still applies because this indemnity is not dependent on the actual
imposition of death, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
penalty of death attended the commission of the offense
the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death,
and the offense is still heinous

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AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code without the necessity of
additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. Indeed, the conventional requirement of
allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in
criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate
pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of P30,000.00, pursuant to the present jurisprudence.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
13. PEOPLE vs. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito
FACTS:
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape Borongan, Eastern Samar.
o March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria
St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, above named accused with lewd
designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself for the
purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan
against her will and without her consent.
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at
Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her
classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her
classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden,
somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door
which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant to use the
back door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped around her neck and
his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14,
ibid). When they reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the
Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one
hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her
clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said
position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her
as she kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a
small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his
hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and climbed the
partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased
her. She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of the
boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building
and knocked on the back door.
When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they found complainant naked
sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and
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wrapped it around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw
somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where
she was physically examined.
o Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states:
came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes; appears in state of shock, per
unambulatory.
Neck- Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.; Breast linear abrasions below (L)
breast.
Back Multiple pinpoint marks; Extremities Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
Vulva No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva,
errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact;
no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with
difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
After the witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted,
the prosecution rested its case.
Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence and instead filed a Motion
to Dismiss.
RTC: Crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same,
o PENALTY: ISL imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as
minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S.
ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
o no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus convicted
the accused of frustrated rape only.
CA: GUILTY of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988 decision and forwarded
the case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show remarkable
and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt
to its candor, truth and validity
ISSUES:
Whether or not the crime of frustrated rape was committed (NO, consummated)
HELD:
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies
which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations
Far from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be
justifiably considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points.
These little deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most
candid witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily
impair their intrinsic credibility (People v. Cabato)
Rather than discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor
details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies
(Aportadera et al. v. Court of Appeals)
As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of
untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity (People v. Bazar, )
However, one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is, the testimony
of the victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal
knowledge of her. According to the accused, this is strange because "this is the only case
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where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out by the victim in order that there will be a
consummation of the act." (p. 34, Rollo).
The allegation would have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended there. The
victim testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression.
This is a material part of the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has
the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling
the truth (People v. Samson)
To the Court she was a picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication
of the affront to her honor. It is inculcated into the mind of the Court that the accused had
wronged her; had traversed illegally her honor.
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and
her sincerity and candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso).
The victim in this case did not only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on
how the rape was committed. The victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of
the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat.
Donceras.
Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was
presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and
right knees, linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed
hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender
vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim
The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of
the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):
The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of
both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in the manner as
narrated. The partitions of every room were of strong materials, securedly nailed, and would
not give way even by hastily scaling the same.
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio,
). . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground
which was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps occasion no injury
to a frightened individual being pursued.
Common experience will tell us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring (sic) in
high buildings, many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights without
being injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom
honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs?
Besides, the exposure of her private parts when she sought assistance from authorities, as
corroborated, is enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless she is
mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to show that she was out of her mind.
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely
naked by appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the latter and
managed to gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. All these acts
she would not have done nor would these facts have occurred unless she was sexually
assaulted in the manner she narrated.
As for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim, the
trial court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified
inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available. The accused did not bother to
contradict this statement.
Whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:
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Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a
woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies as
well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages
apply to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will.
In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209, 212, Justice Moreland set a distinction
between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily understood even by law students:
o The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the
latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the
beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been
performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such
intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts
which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart
from his voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony
is consummated.
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture
of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts
of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts.
Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be
committed.
People v. Eria [1927] is STRAY DECISION where offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. It has not been
reiterated in subsequent decisions.
Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which
provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or
frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the
opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eria case,
o

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supra, might have prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the
amendments introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim,
the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he "categorically declared that the
findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact, he
tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was
penetration."
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not
exist. On the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous
(which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in
inflammation) and tender.
It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim.
He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. Anent this
testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of
the victim's testimony if credible (
Moreover, Dr. Zamora's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in
the prosecution of this case (People v. Alfonso, supra).
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus,
the proper imposable penalty is death.
In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Our ruling in People v.
Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited Constitutional provision did
not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it
was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua
Reclusion perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (
DISPOSITIVE: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of CONSUMMATED rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
GRAVE COERCION
c/o HIPOLITO
Alejandro v Bernas
JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, CARMINA A. ABBAS and MA. ELENA GO
FRANCISCO
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. BERNAS, ATTY. MARIE LOURDES SIA-BERNAS, FERNANDO AMOR, EDUARDO AGUILAR,
JOHN DOE and PETER DOE
[G.R. No. 179243. September 7, 2011.]
PERALTA, J p:
FACTS:
Alejandro is the lessee-purchaser of condominium unit No. 2402 (the Unit), 4th Floor, Discovery
Center Condominium in Pasig City under the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase with the
lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI).
On October 15, 2000, Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other petitioners Firdausi I.Y. Abbas
(Firdausi), Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (Carmina) and Ma. Elena Go Francisco (Ma. Elena) to be
used as a law office.
However, a defect in the air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to suspend payments
until the problem is fixed by the management.
Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment before the
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Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, against Alejandro for the latter's failure to pay
rentals.
Alejandro, for his part, interposed the defense of justified suspension of payments.
In the meantime, the Discovery Center Condominium Corporation (DCCC) was organized to
administer the Discovery Center Condominium independent of OPI. Respondent Fernando Amor
(Amor) was appointed as the Property Manager of DCCC.
During the pendency of the ejectment case, or on June 10, 2004, OPI, allegedly through
respondent Atty. Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas (Sia-Bernas), ordered that the Unit be padlocked.
In an Order 8 dated June 11, 2004, the MeTC directed OPI to remove the padlock of the Unit
and discontinue the inventory of the properties. The order was reiterated when the MeTC
issued a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of Alejandro.
However, on August 11, 2004, at 8:00 in the evening, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Jose
Bernas, again padlocked the Unit. The padlocking was allegedly executed by Amor, as property
manager, and respondent Eduardo Aguilar (Aguilar) as head of the security unit, together with
security officers John Doe and Peter Doe.
Respondents, likewise, cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities on August 16,
2004.
On August 17, 2004, the MeTC rendered a Decision in the ejectment case in favor of Alejandro
and against OPI. The court found Alejandro's suspension of payment justified.
The decision was, however, reversed and set aside by the Regional Trial Court, whose
decision was in turn affirmed by the CA.
On October 27, 2004, petitioners filed a criminal complaint for grave coercion against
respondents Bernas, Sia-Bernas, Amor, Aguilar, Peter Doe and John Doe with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig.
o Petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was illegal, felonious and
unlawful which prevented them from entering the premises.
o Petitioners also alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off of facilities had
unduly prejudiced them and thus constituted grave coercion.
In their Counter-Affidavit, Bernas and Sia-Bernas averred that the elements of grave coercion were
not alleged and proven by petitioners. They also claimed that nowhere in petitioners' complaint
was it alleged that respondents employed violence which is an essential element of grave
coercion.
o In addition to the above defenses, Amor and Aguilar maintained that petitioners did not
allege that the former actually prevented the latter to enter the Unit. They added
that petitioners in fact gained access to the Unit by forcibly destroying the
padlock.
On March 22, 2005, the OCP issued a Resolution, respondents Fernando Amor and Eduardo Aguilar
are charged with unjust vexation and the attached information be filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City. Bail is not necessary unless required by the Court.
The charges against respondents Jose Bernas and Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas is dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
o The OCP held that respondents could not be charged with grave coercion as no violence
was employed by the latter. In padlocking the leased premises and cutting off of
facilities, respondents Amor and Aguilar were found to be probably guilty of the crime of
unjust vexation
Appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the appeal was dismissed for
their failure to comply with Section 12, paragraph (b) of Department Circular No. 70.
o The DOJ Secretary, acting through Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda, explained that
petitioners failed to submit a legible true copy of the joint counter-affidavit of
some of the respondents.
o Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution 24 dated April 3,
2006.
Notwithstanding the DOJ's conclusion that respondents cannot be charged with grave coercion, it
ordered the filing of information for unjust vexation against Amor, the Property Manager of

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DCCC and Aguilar as head of the security division


Elevated the matter to the CA that rendered the assailed Decision 25 on May 23, 2007.
o On whether or not there was probable cause for the crime of grave coercion, the CA
answered in the negative.
o It held that the mere presence of the security guards was insufficient to cause
intimidation.
Petitioners claim that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove the fact of padlocking and
cutting off of facilities thereat.
o They insist that the allegations and evidence presented in the Joint Affidavit-Complaint are
sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause for grave coercion irrespective of
any defense that may be put up by respondents.
o Although violence was not present during the commission of the acts complained of, there
was sufficient intimidation by the mere presence of the security guards.
Respondents do not agree with petitioners that the mere presence of security guards constituted
intimidation amounting to grave coercion and insist that there is no legal impediment to cause the
padlocking and repossession of the Unit as a valid exercise of proprietary right under the
contract of lease.

ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE COERCION CAN BE COMMITTED THROUGH INTIMIDATION ALONE BY MERE
PRESENCE WITHOUT VIOLENCE? NO. BUT UNJUST VEXATION
HELD:
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:
1.
that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2.
that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3.
that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity, water and telephone
facilities. Petitioners were thus prevented from occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose for
which it was intended, that is, to be used as a law office.
At the time of the padlocking and cutting off of facilities, there was already a case for the
determination of the rights and obligations of both Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as lessor, pending
before the MeTC. There was in fact an order for the respondents to remove the padlock.
Thus, in performing the acts complained of, Amor and Aguilar had no right to do so.
NO VIOLENCE. The problem, however, lies on the second element. A perusal of petitioners' Joint
Affidavit-Complaint shows that petitioners merely alleged the fact of padlocking and cutting off of
facilities to prevent the petitioners from entering the Unit. For petitioners, the commission of these
acts is sufficient to indict respondents of grave coercion. It was never alleged that the acts were
effected by violence, threat or intimidation. Petitioners belatedly alleged that they were
intimidated by the presence of security guards during the questioned incident.
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause
intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and wellgrounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the
person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
Material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the
mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient.
In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the
presence of security guardsIt was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to
intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and
that they produced fear on the part of petitioners.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person
shall be borne in mind.
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Here, the petitioners, who were allegedly intimidated by the guards, are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners
to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they
insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for
which it was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of
respondents
In Sy, the respondents therein, together with several men, armed with hammers, ropes, axes,
crowbars and other tools, arrived at the complainants' residence and ordered them to vacate the
building because they were going to demolish it. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition
team, complainants were prevented from peacefully occupying their residence and were
compelled to leave against their will. Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the
demolition, while complainants watched helplessly as their building was torn down. The Court thus
found that there was prima facie showing that complainants were intimidated and that there was
probable cause for the crime of grave coercion.
Barbasa v. Tuquero applies. In Barbasa, the lessor, together with the head of security and several
armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by the complainants-lessees
because of the latter's failure to pay the back rentals. The Court held that there was no violence,
force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon the lessees' employees
when the cutting off of electricity was effected. On the contrary, the Court found that it was
done peacefully and that the guards were there not to intimidate them but to prevent any
untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of the lessor's right under the contract.
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended
party is an essential ingredient.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that
would justify conviction.
UNJUST VEXATION.
o The second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and provides
for the penalty of unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could
unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.
o Nevertheless, Amor and Aguilar may disprove petitioners' charges but such matters may
only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the
elements of the crime may be thoroughly passed upon
The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to the determination of whether the assailed
executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
[Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is
so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge
HELD: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Barbasa v Tuquero
ROBERTO BARBASA
vs.
HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, DOJ Sec, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG
[G.R. No. 163898. December 23, 2008.]
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FACTS:
Petitioner avers that he is the president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which leases commercial
stalls CS-PL 05, 19 and 30 in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties,
On June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito, merchandising officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a
notice of disconnection of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, the Credit and
Collection Manager of TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding
obligations for Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals.
Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, which payment was accepted
by private respondent Guarin, but petitioner failed to pay the back rentals.
July 1, 1999, private respondents Guarin, Nestor Sangalang, engineering manager of TPI, and
Victor Callueng, TPI head of security, together with several armed guards, disconnected the
electricity in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru Marketing.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its
officers, David Go, Robert Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art Brondial, and herein private
respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
The complaint dated July 13, 1999 alleged that TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in
petitioner's stalls "in a violent and intimidating manner" and by unnecessarily employing
"several armed guards to intimidate and frighten" petitioner and his employees and
agents.
Defense: that the July 1, 1999 cutting off of electrical supply was done peacefully;
o that it was an act performed in the lawful performance of their assigned duties,
and in accordance with the covenants set forth in the written agreements previously
executed between petitioner and TPI;
o that petitioner was not present when the alleged acts were committed;
o petitioner had outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA billings, electrical and
water bills, unpaid interest and penalty charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the
amount of P267,513.39 for all his rented stalls, as reflected in three Interest-Penalty
Reports 8 duly sent to him.
o Petitioner was likewise given demand letter-notices in writing at least three times
wherein it was stated that if he did not settle his arrears in full, electricity would be cut. 9
Of the total amount due from him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of the
third notice.
o Accordingly, private respondents proceeded with the power cut-off, but only after sending
a "Notice of Disconnection of Utilities" to petitioner's stalls informing him of the
impending act.
o Private respondents also pointed out that aside from the above arrears, petitioner has
outstanding accountabilities with respect to "Priority Premium Fees" in the amount
of P5,907,013.10.
o They likewise stressed that their Agreement with petitioner contains the following
stipulations:
PRIORITY PREMIUM
: P 2,367,750.00
RENT PER MONTH
: P 378.00 per sq. m
Plus P 37.80 10% VAT)
OTHER FEES AND EXPENSES CHARGEABLE TO THE LESSEE:
(CUSA) CHARGES: Minimum rate of P190.00/sq. m./mo.
ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION
: metered + reasonable service
In cases where payments made by the LESSEE for any given month is not sufficient
to cover all outstanding obligations for said period, the order of priority in the
application of the payments made is as follows:
Penalties, Interests, Insurance, CUSA Charges, Rent, Priority Premium
PENALTY CLAUSE:
It is also expressly agreed that in case the LESSEE fails to
pay at any time the LESSOR is hereby granted the option to cut off power and
other utility services to the LESSEE until full payment of said charges, expenses,
penalty and interest is made,
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Petitioner filed his Reply Affidavit:


o Go, Castanares, Mariano, Brondial, Guarin and Sangalang, while not personally present at
the scene at the time, were to be held liable as the authors of the criminal design
since they were the ones who ordered the cutting off of petitioner's electricity.
o Petitioner admitted that none of the armed personnel drew his gun, much more aimed
or fired it, but insisted that he was unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment
of his business and his person.
o He claimed that the officers of TPI were unable to show the amount and extent of his
unpaid bills; that as to the electric bills, the same were paid;
o Ongoing negotiation with respect to the matter of rentals and for reformation of the lease
agreements.
Prosecutor: Dismissed the complaint against David Go, Roberto Castanares, Buddy Mariano and
Art Brondial but found probable cause against private respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor
Sangalang and Victor Callueng.
On January 13, 2000, an Information for grave coercion was filed in court, but proceedings
therein were deferred when the private respondents filed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
On August 23, 2000, the Secretary of Justice reversed the City Prosecutor's Resolution, as
follows: Move for the dismissal
Petitioner assailed the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before the Court of Appeals through a
petition for certiorari, which was, however, dismissed by the appellate court for lack of merit. The
appellate court likewise denied his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether private respondents' act of disconnecting the supply of electricity to petitioner's
stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion? (NO)
HELD: NO.
o The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is prevented by another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it
right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material
force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will
of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.
o The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce
intimidation upon petitioner's employees when the cutting off of petitioner's electricity was
effected.
o On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after written notice to petitioner was sent.
o The guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the
exercise of TPI's rights under the lease agreements. If the respondents desired a violent
result, they would have gone there unannounced or cut petitioner's electricity through less
desirable and conspicuous means
o There could be no grave coercion in the private respondents' act of exercising in behalf
of TPI a right afforded to TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a contract to
which petitioner had agreed and which he did execute and sign.
o Penalty clause in the Contracts of Lease entered into by the parties that TPI is given the
option to cut off power and other utility services in petitioner's stalls in case petitioner fails
to pay at any time
o Contracts constitute the law between the parties. They must be read together and
interpreted in a manner that reconciles and gives life to all of them. The intent of the
parties, as shown by the clear language used, prevails over post facto explanations that
find no support from the words employed by the parties or from their contemporary and
subsequent acts showing their understanding of such contracts.
o We could not see how the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D.
Marzan, could have made a finding of probable cause to file a criminal case for grave coercion
against private respondents, in light of the evidence then and now prevailing, which will show that
there was a mutual agreement, in a contract of lease, that provided for the cutting off of
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electricity as an acceptable penalty for failure to abide faithfully with what has been covenanted.
Although the propriety of its exercise may be the subject of controversy, mere resort to it may not
so readily expose the lessor TPI to a charge of grave coercion. Considering that petitioner owed
TPI the total amount of more than P5 million, which was undisputed, we find that the resort to the
penalty clause under the lease agreements was justified.
o A penal clause is "an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for
the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation
(generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is
irregularly or inadequately fulfilled."
o Quite common in lease contracts, this clause functions to strengthen the coercive force of the
obligation and to provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting from a
breach. There is nothing immoral or illegal in such indemnity/penalty clause, absent any showing
that it was forced upon or fraudulently foisted on the obligor.
DISPOSITIVE: DENIED.
o

Sy v Secretary of Justice
ALFREDO SY for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of GONZALO SY, VERONICA SY, ROSARIO SY, MANUEL
SY and JOSE SEE
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, LEON MARIA MAGSAYSAY and ENG'R. EMMANUEL LALIN
[G.R. No. 166315. December 14, 2006.]
FACTS:
1985, Dolores F. Posadas, through respondent, Leon Maria F. Magsaysay, as her attorney-in-fact,
filed an ejectment case against them to recover a parcel of land in Paco, Manila consisting of
approximately 8,295 sq.m.
Several structures stand on the land including their post-war built building which has served as
their family residence with a small sari-sari store. The trial court thereafter ruled in favor of
Dolores F. Posadas.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the trial court's decision. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter court set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint.
However, during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, respondent Leon Maria F.
Magsaysay obtained from the office of the Building Official of Manila a Notice of Condemnation
dated February 8, 1996.
In response, the [petitioners] caused the assessment of the structural soundness of their
residence. Consequently, on February 20, 1996, a Certificate of Structural Inspection was issued
by a licensed engineer, certifying to the general integrity of the structure which merely needed
minor repairs.
In October, 1997, the [petitioners] received a letter from the Office of the Building Official
informing them that respondent Leon Maria F. Magsaysay had requested for the condemnation of
certain structures, including the structure owned by [petitioners]. The [petitioners] were directed
to submit their Answer/Comment and supporting papers.
A scheduled ocular inspection of the property was deferred at the instance of [petitioners']
counsel. Subsequently, an order of demolition dated February 3, 1998 was issued by Manila
Building Official Hermogenes B. Garcia, on the basis of a Resolution dated February 3, 1998 issued
by a committee created to act on the letter dated October 13, 1997 of respondent Leon Maria
Guerrero.
The [petitioners] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order with the Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The complainants also obtained a TRO
enjoining the enforcement of the order of demolition.
In the morning of August 28, 1998, respondent Emmanuel T. Lalin, together with
several men with hammers, ropes, axes and crowbars, arrived at the complainants'
residence and over their protests, demolished the building which served as their family
residence and sari-sari store.
The [petitioners] contend that the respondents' act of demolishing their building without any legal
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authority to do so is an act of grave coercion, punishable under Article 286 of the Revised Penal
Code.
On the other hand, respondent Leon Ma. Magsaysay, in his counter affidavit, avers that he is one
of the co-owners of the land located at the corner of Pedro Gil and A. Isip Sts., Paco, Manila as
evidenced by TCT Nos. 216323 and 216327. He further avers that the demolition of the
[petitioners'] structure was based on the lawful order of the City Building Official of Manila and
affirmed by the DPWH.
Respondent Civil Engineer Emmanuel T. La[l]in, for his part, also avers that the demolition was
undertaken pursuant to a duly-issued demolition order and that he was only hired by
respondent Leon Maria Magsaysay to implement the same.
The City Prosecutor of Manila dismissed the complaint for grave coercion for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Justice but same was denied, finding that the
demolition was carried out pursuant to a duly issued demolition order.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which denied the petition
for lack of merit.
Petitioners alleged that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause for the
filing of an information for grave coercion against respondents and that the Secretary of Justice
gravely abused his discretion in holding otherwise.
Respondents argued that the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is
an executive function, the correctness of which is a matter that the courts may not be compelled
to pass upon. At any rate, they claim that the Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion in
finding that the complaint for grave coercion is without merit.

ISSUES: Whether there is probable cause for the filing of an information against respondents
Magsaysay and Lalin for the offense of grave coercion? YES.
HELD:
The elements of grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: 1) that
a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, threats or intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of
another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of
law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
It is undisputed that on August 28, 1998, respondents, together with several men armed with
hammers, ropes, axes, crowbars and other tools arrived at the petitioners' residence and ordered
them to vacate the building because they were going to demolish it.
Petitioners tried to stop respondents from proceeding with the demolition but their
pleas went unheeded. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition team, petitioners were
prevented from peacefully occupying their residence and were compelled to leave against their
will.
Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the demolition while petitioners watched
helplessly as their building was torn down.
From the facts alleged in the complaint, as well as the evidence presented in support thereof,
there is prima facie showing that respondents did not act under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right.
Respondent Magsaysay claimed that the demolition was carried out by the Office of the Building
Official, which is tasked to implement the National Building Code.
We note, however, that respondent Lalin admitted in his Counter-Affidavit that he was hired by
Magsaysay to implement the Demolition Order. The building officials made
manifestations before the trial court in Civil Case No. 98-87513 that they were not
aware of the demolition and that respondent Lalin is not connected with their office.
They also denied conspiring with respondent Magsaysay in effecting the demolition.
Likewise, the Office of the Building Official issued an Order 13 dated August 28, 1998 directing
respondent Magsaysay to desist from proceeding with the demolition. On the same date, it
also issued a Notice advising respondent Lalin to stop the demolition for failing to
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comply with the 5-day prior notice requirement and considering that the demolition was
being effected within the 15-day reglementary period for appeal.
In another Order dated September 10, 1998, the Office of the Building Official declared that the
demolition was hastily done and in contravention of the terms and conditions of the Demolition
Order.
Indeed, while respondents claim to have acted under authority of law in compelling
petitioners to vacate the subject property and effecting the demolition, the documentary
evidence show otherwise.
From the records, it is clear that a prima facie case for grave coercion exists and that there is
sufficient ground to sustain a finding of probable cause which needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused.
Nevertheless, respondents may disprove petitioners' charges but such matters may only be
determined in a full-blown trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the elements of
the crime may be thoroughly passed upon.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent
is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that
a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause;" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
While it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are
nevertheless empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the
same was rendered without or in excess of authority.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED.

ESTAFA DIGESTS
c/o HIPOLITO
1. PEOPLE vs. TOMAS MANANSALA ET AL., defendants.
GALICANO ALON and RICARDO CABRALES, appellants.
VICKERS, J p: [G.R. No. 38948. November 18, 1933.]
FACTS:
The appellants Galicano Alon (alias Grego), and Ricardo Cabrales (alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala,
Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza, were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of estafa.
A week prior to February 19, 1932, 'Grego' (Alon) and 'Maning' (Cabrales) in company with another person whom they
called 'Pepe' offered to sell Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of opium at P1.50 each telling him that he could sell
them for P10 a tin.
For profit, Abordo agreed to buy the merchandise, and the accused agreed to sell it to him in lots of 1,000 tins at P600
lot. Delivery of 1,000 tins would take place at 5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz.
February 19, 1932: Abordo went to the place indicated with the money, and there waited for them. Alon arrived alone in
an automobile and invited Abordo to go with him to the place where the 1,000 tins of opium were kept.
Trusting Alon, who always called Abordo 'brother' because he claimed to be a Mason like Mr. Abordo, the latter went
with him in his automobile to the rotunda of Rizal Avenue Extension. Chauffeur Jose Jonsay was at the wheel.

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It was already twilight when they arrived at the rotunda, and there they met Maning (Cabrales), who, in company with
others, was waiting for Abordo in another automobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortly thereafter appeared
Pepe who was ordered by Cabrales to get the tins of opium.
Pepe got from a lot nearby, the can, the top of which was opened by Cabrales in order to show Abordo the 6 tins of
opium contained in a wooden box which Abordo saw when the top of said can was opened.
Finding that said tins really contained opium, Abordo believed that the rest of the contents of the can also consisted of
tins of opium. He handed the P600 to Maning, who, after receiving the money, immediately went to the automobile
where his companions were waiting.
At the same time Abordo returned to his car with the accused Alon and the person named Pepe, carrying the can.
While proceeding towards Taft Avenue Extension, Abordo noticed that the accused Cabrales was following in his
automobile, and that when they were nearing the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz the car in which
Cabrales was riding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Alon told Abordo that those in the other automobile were
constabulary men and it would be better to get rid of the can.
Cabrales, whom Abordo was able to recognize very well, and the companions of the former whom Abordo was not able
to identify because it was already dark, approached his car saying that they were constabulary agents and told Abordo
that he was under arrest.
Knowing that they were not constabulary agents and that their purpose was to get possession of the can, Abordo drew
his revolver and ordered his chauffeur to proceed.
Cabrales and his companions again followed him in their car and for the second time tried to head off Abordo
somewhere before the intersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but Abordo proceeded until he arrived at his
house. There he opened the can and inside he found the wooden box, but the rest of the contents of the can was sand.
He bore a hole in one of the tins and found that it only contained molasses.
Defense (Testimony of accused and Miguel Rosales-> convicted 12x for estafa):
o Abordo engaged Cabrales, through the intervention of Rosales, to prepare 1,000 tins of molasses resembling
tins of opium, and that on the afternoon agreed upon for the payment, Abordo refused to deliver the money
because purchaser of said tins had not arrived, and invited the accused to his house in Pasay in order to make
the payment
o Before arriving in Pasay, Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile and required the latter to hand over the money,
at the same time placing at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which he said contained the 1,000 tins of
molasses asked for by Abordo.
Information: In the municipalities of Pasay and Caloocan, Province of Rizal, within two and a half miles from the city
limits, the said accused conspiring together defraud Perfecto Abordo:
o by means of false and fraudulent representations to Abordo that they had for sale six hundred (600) tins of
opium, a prohibited drug, and that they would deliver the same to him upon paying them P600 in advance
o and by means of other similar deceit, induced the said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver to them, as in fact he
gave and delivered to them, the said sum of P600,
o in consideration of which the accused gave him a gasoline can which they represented to contain the 600 tins
of opium, when in truth, as the said accused well knew, the said can contained only six small tin cans
containing a black substance which was not opium,
o Tomas Manansala and Galicano Alon have each once been convicted of the crime of estafa
o Habitual Delinquents: Ricardo Cabrales (1x convicted for robbery, theft 1x, 3x for estafa, last sentence: Feb. 4,
1927) and Isidro Mendoza (1x estafa and 1x robbery, last sentence: October 30, 1922)
Information was dismissed as to Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza for lack of evidence
RTC: Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa, in accordance with the provisions of article 354. No. 2, of
the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244
o PENALTY: four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties + indemnify P600
ISSUES: Whether or not estafa was committed even though there was illegal consideration? Yes.
HELD:
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Estafa as defined in article 315, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that any person who shall
defraud another through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of
anything of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be
based on an immoral or illegal consideration.
PENALTY: The amount of the fraud being P600, the penalty applicable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period.
ALON: Recidivist as he had already been convicted of estafa -> PENALTY: maximum period (one year, eight months,
and one day of prision correccional)
CABRALES: Habitual delinquent, but his prior convictions cannot be taken into consideration also as an aggravating
circumstance for the purpose of increasing the principal penalty. PENALTY: medium (one year and one day of prision
correccional + additional penalty of eleven years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision mayor bec. Habitual
delinquent)
SolGen mistaken that medium degree of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods based upon the idea that
only the prior convictions of this appellant for estafa are to be taken into account.
All prior convictions of any of the crimes of theft, robbery, estafa, or falsification should be taken into account when a
person is convicted of any one of these crimes and of being a habitual delinquent. To hold otherwise, a person might be
twice convicted of each of these four crimes, and still not be a habitual delinquent.

2. 2. UNITED STATES vs. JOSE ABAD


CARSON, J p: [G.R. No. 7520. November 23, 1912.]
FACTS:
Information: Charged with the crime of estafa:
o December 10, 1910, in Cavite
o Accused entered the bicycle renting establishment, named 'Ligaya," located in Plaza Soledad in Cavite,
pretended that his name was Jose de los Santos and that he lived at No. 111 Calle Paseo, and rented from
the proprietor of said establishment, named Leoncio Pangilinan, an Iver Johnson bicycle, No. 169787, with
the private marks No. 10 and the initials L. P.,
o Agreeing to the sum of 50 centavos an hour, and to return it after one hour; but having taken away said
bicycle he did not return it at the time agreed or pay the rental thereof,
o Against the will of its owner take possession of it for himself and for the sake of gain, keeping it in his
possession until January 29, 1911, when the said bicycle was found in the possession of the said accused in
the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, P. I."
During trial, evidence put forth that tricycle was valued at P75 or 375 pesetas
TC: Guilty of Estafa as charged and defined and penalized in section 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, read together
with section 1 of article 534. Convicted the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of
more than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas.
Defense:
o Since the information fails expressly to allege that the bicycle in question had a specific definite value,
and to set forth just what that value was, a judgment of conviction upon this information should not be
sustained.
o Erred in convicting the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of more than
250 and less than 6,000 pesetas. (No value alleged)
ISSUES:
1. Whether Abad should be convicted of estafa even though the specific value of the object was not alleged in the
information? (YES)
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2. Whether the TC erred in convicting the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of more
than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas? (YES)
HELD:
1. Yes. Mere omission of an allegation of the specific value of the bicycle mentioned in the information did not render it
fatally defective, because the facts alleged in the complaint, when proven, establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the
bicycle had some value.
o It is true that a conviction of the crime of estafa cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that the subject matter of
the fraud perpetrated by the accused had some value, and while in good practice a complaint or information charging
the commission of the crime of estafa should specifically allege the monetary value of the subject matter of the fraud
where that is possible. However, specific value is not necessary, it is necessary that the facts allege that it has
some value.
o Estafa: Bicycle was personal property of some value is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the provisions of
subsection 1 of article 534, which prescribes the penalty to be imposed where the value of the subject matter of
the fraud is not shown to be in excess of 250 pesetas
o Bicycle in question had some value (agreed to rent it for 50 cents/hr)
o It was the personal property of the complaining witness (in use in Pangilinans bicycle renting establishment)
o Bicycle had been converted or misappropriated by the defendant
o U.S. vs. De la Cruz: Defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery of a watch, the specific value of which was not set
out expressly in the complaint.
o "Since the crime of robbery is complete when all the other requisites set out in the definition of the code concur,
if the property taken has even the smallest value, we think we would be justified in holding that the watch taken
had sufficient value to sustain a conviction of robbery, unless it affirmatively appeared that it was absolutely
worthless, for without testimony to the contrary a watch, which the owner valued enough to carry, may fairly
be presumed to have some value, however insignificant that value may be."
2. Yes. Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of more
than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas.
o Information does not charge that the value of the property taken was more than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas
although its allegations amount to a charge that a bicycle of some value was taken. No case can a conviction be
sustained for a higher offense than that charged in the information, nor for a different offense, unless it is necessarily
included in the offense charged. It is manifest therefore that the conviction in this case for the higher offense must be
reversed.
o It is true that the witnesses testified that the bicycle in question was worth some P75 (or 375 pesetas), and that, if this
testimony could be taken into consideration for the purpose of classifying the estafa committed by the defendant with
those penalized under the provisions of subsection 2 of article 534, the judgment of conviction should not be disturbed.
o However, the testimony cannot cure its not being alleged in the information because:
o It is in direct conflict with the general rule convictions were not sustained for higher offenses than those charged
in the information, which has its foundation in the constitutional right of the accused to be advised at the outset
of the proceedings as to the precise nature of the charge against him;
o Timely objection was made to the introduction of the evidence as to the specific value of the bicycle, and under
elementary rules of evidence, the testimony in this connection should have been excluded, at least in so far as
it was offered for the purpose of establishing a higher or a different offense from that charged in the complaint.
Dispositive: TC Reversed. Still GUILTY OF ESTAFA but that defined and penalized in section 5 of article 535 of the Penal
Code, read together with section 1 of article 534, and there being no evidence as to the existence of aggravating or
extenuating circumstances, we sentence him to the prescribed penalty in its medium degree, that is to say, to two months
and one day of arresto mayor
3. UNITED STATES, vs. NIEVES DE VERA Y GAYTE
VILLAMOR, J.: G.R. No. L-16961 September 19, 1921
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Facts:
February 20, 1920: three Igorots named Jose II, Balatan, and Pepe were on the Escolta, of this city, trying to dispose of
a bar of gold when an Ilocano invited them to go to his house, stating that there was a woman there who would buy the
precious metal.
They accompanied the Ilocano to the house indicated by him where they met a woman, the accused herein, who
apparently, was desirous of buying the gold and requested them to hand it to her so that she might take it to a
silversmith and have it examined, stating that she would return within a short time to report the result.
The Igorot Pepe, who was the owner of the bar of gold, handed it to her, together with P200 in bank notes which he
requested to her to have changed into silver coins as they were more desirable in the Mountain Province.
The woman then left the house at about 12 o'clock on that day, asking the Igorots to wait there. But the woman did not
return. They waited in vain for hours for her and at nightfall they agreed that one of them should remain on watch while
the other two went to the Meisic police station to report the matter.
The police acted promptly and effectively. The policeman Jose Gonzales, assigned to take charge of the case, soon
identified the woman who had taken away the bar of gold, by the description which the Igorots had given him, and at a
few minutes after 11 o'clock he already was in a house on Calle Barcelona, examining the accused as to the
whereabouts of the bar of gold and the bank notes of the Igorots.
As the woman gave evasive answers, it became necessary to ask for assistance from the office of the police, and
shortly thereafter, two other policemen, Mr. Abbot and one Ronas, arrived, who took the woman to the house at No.
541 Calle Regidor, followed by Gonzales and the three Igorots. There the bar of gold divided into three pieces was
found wrapped in a handkerchief and placed inside the water tank of a water-closet. The accused requested one
Mamerta de la Rosa to let her have P150 which she in turn handed to the policeman.
A certificate issued by the Bureau of Science show that the bar of gold delivered to the accused weighed 559.7
grammes and was worth P587.68 at the rate of P1.05 per gramme; whereas, the three bars found by the police
weighed only 416 grammes, and were therefore, 143.7 grammes short. Of the P200 bank notes delivered to the
accused, she returned only P150.
Information:
o Nieves de Vera and John Doe (the latter name is fictitious, his true name being unknown) of the crime of theft
committed as follows:
o February 20, 1920, in the city of Manila, the said accused conspiring and through craft, take and carry away,
with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner, a gold bar weighing 559.7 grams and worth
P587.68, and P200 in bank notes of different denominations, to the damage and prejudice of Pepe (Igorot),
owner of the bar and money aforementioned, in the total sum of P787.68, Philippine currency, equivalent to
3,938.4 pesetas.
TC: Guilty of the crime of theft punished in article 518, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, without any circumstance
modifying the liability, and sentenced her to eight months and twenty-one days of prison correccional, to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P201,20, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
Defense:
o Evidence does not establish the essential elements of theft, the crime charged in the information, but those
of the crime of estafa.
o She cannot be convicted for this crime for the reason that the information upon which she was arraigned was
for the crime of theft, the essential elements of which are different from those of estafa, he recommends
the remanding of the case to the court of origin for proper proceeding in accordance with law.
o Goods appropriated were not taken by the accused without the consent of the owner who had delivered
them to her voluntarily, and this element being lacking, it cannot be the crime of theft.
o When the things were received and then appropriated or converted to one's own use without the consent of the
owner, the crime committed is not that of theft
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by the accused falls under theft or estafa? (Theft)
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HELD:
o Essential elements of the crime of theft:
o Taking of personal property
o Property belongs to another
o Taking away be done with intent of gain
o Taking away be done without consent of the owner
o Taking away be accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.
o Viada: Getting possession, laying hold of the thing, so that if the things were not taken away, but received and then
appropriated or converted without the consent of the owner, it may be any other crime, that of estafa for instance,
but in no way that of theft, which consists in the taking away of the thing, that is, in removing it from the place where
it is kept by the legal owner, without the latter's consent, of the legitimate owner.
o GEN RULE: Purchase and sale perfect upon agreement on goods to be sold and price and title transfers to
purchaser
o EXCEPTION: If goods sold are the kind which are usually tried, measured, or weighed.
As the goods are not sold in bulk, but by the weight or measurement, the sale is not perfected, since
the risk or deterioration of the goods is not shifted to the buyer until it is measured or weighed;
o In leaving the risk of the goods sold to the vendor until said operation is completed, applying the maxim res
perit domino, it was evidently the intention of the legislator that until then the transfer of the ownership was not
effected: it is true that there exists a promise which binds the vendor, and which, if broken, would give the
purchaser the right to demand delivery of the goods upon payment of its price, after the same had been
measured or weighed, or to claim indemnity for damages;
o But it also true that until the goods sold are delivered, no definite change of ownership takes place, and
the sale is not so to speak finally perfected;
o Where after the sale, but prior to the measuring or weighing, the purchaser takes away fraudulently, that is,
with intent of gain, a part of the goods covered by the contract, this, is evidently , theft, with all its essential
elements, as it cannot be reasonably argued that the purchaser has taken what is his own.
o Groizard: Buyer guilty of theft if converts the whole or part of the thing sold before ownership passes to her or before
delivery
o There is necessity of investigating in whom the ownership is vested to determine whether or not the crime of
theft has been committed.
o The contract of purchase and sale is perfected as between the vendor and the vendee and is binding on both of
them, when they come to an agreement as to the thing and the price. But the ownership passes from the
vendor to the vendee only when the thing is delivered.
o If before this takes place the purchaser converts the whole or a part of the thing sold, he must be dealt with as
guilty of theft, notwithstanding his undeniable right to demand and obtain the carrying out of the contract.
o On the other hand, if the owner of a thing in the lawful possession of another, take it away with or without
employing violence, intimidation or force, will commit neither robbery nor theft, although he may, and must be
criminally responsible for another kind of offense "Rei nostrae furtum facere non possumus."
o Viada Question answered by SC:
o Is the shepherd, who takes away and converts to his own use several head of the cattle under his care, guilty of
the crime of estafa, or of theft? THEFT
o Takes away personal property of another without the owner's consent as accused, with intent of gain, took
away two bucks and a female goat, against the will of his master, the owner of the said cattle, which were under
his care as shepherd
o SC ANSWER: There was voluntarily delivery of the sheep but there was no consent from the owner when he
took away some of the cattle and converted them to his own use? Crime committed THEFT notwithstanding the
fact that the thing was misappropriated had been delivered voluntarily by the owner to the supposed he, who
disposes of it without the owner's consent.
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o Delivery of the cattle to the shepherd does not have the effect of transferring the judicial possession of, or
title to, the cattle thus delivered, just as the delivery of the rice does not have such effect, the possession
of, and title to, the thing to be presumed to remain in the vendor, until the sale is completely
consummated.
o LARCENCY: American crime which has the same characteristics as those of theft
o The intention of the owner to part with his property is the gist and essence of the offense of theft (larceny),
and the vital point on which the crime hinges and is to be determined. Generally a felonious taking is necessary
and a taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious.
o But if the owner parts with the possession for a particular purpose, and the person who receives the possession
avowedly for that purpose has the fraudulent intention to make use of it as the means of converting it to his
own use, and does so convert it, this is larceny.
Fraud supplies the place of the trespass in the taking, or, as otherwise stated, the subsequent
felonious conversion of the property by the alleged thief will relate back and make the taking and
conversion larceny.
Act goes farther than the consent, and may be fairly said to be against it. If money is given to a person
to be applied to a particular purpose, it is larceny for the receiver to appropriate it to his own use which
was not the purpose contemplated by the owner. This is so for the reason that the delivery of money to
another for the sole purpose of getting it changed is a parting with the custody only and not the
amount does not relieve him from liability for the larceny of the entire amount given him.
o Where the parties are engaged in a cash sale the whole transaction is incomplete until the payment is
completed; and the possession of the goods remains in the seller and that of the money in the buyer, until they
are simultaneously exchanged.
o If, in such case, the buyer gets control of the goods and makes off with them without paying for them, he
is guilty of larceny. And conversely if the seller gets the money and refuses to give up the goods, it is larceny.
o Theft proven in the cause to have been committed by the appellant by appropriating the gold bar delivered to her for
examination, and by converting to her own use, without the consent of the owner, the bank notes which had been
handed her to be exchanged for silver coins
Dispositive: TC Decision AFFIRMED. THEFT not Estafa
4. PEOPLE vs. MIGUEL G. CONCEPCION
In other case: People v TEODORO ANGELES, ABELARDO CRISOLOGO, RICARDO PAREDES
STREET, J.: G.R. No. L-19192 February 28, 1923
Facts:
Estafa by means of falsification of mercantile documents -> Information included 3 other persons, Teodorico
Angeles, Abelardo Crisologo, and Ricardo Paredes, who were named as codefendants with this accused; but a
severance was had, and the trial of the present appellant occurred at a different time than that of his co-accused, so
considered here is Miguel Concepcions alone
Teodorico Angeles was manager of a Aparri branch of PNB, in Cagayan. At the same time Miguel Concepcion is a
resident and representative of Cagayan in the Philippine Assembly and was manager of a limited partnership engaged
in the business of buying and selling tobacco in the Cagayan Valley, known as "Puno y Concepcion."
o The mercantile operations of this firm were for a time carried on upon an extensive scale, and Miguel
Concepcion was naturally therefore frequently brought into contact with Teodorico Angeles as manager of
Aparri branch of the PNB.
o Moreover, it appears that Miguel Concepcion is a son of Venancio Concepcion at that time president of PNB
Manila; and by reason of both his social and business relations Miguel Concepcion evidently acquired an
undue influence over Teodorico Angeles, with the result that the latter in a great measure surrendered his
discretion as manager of the bank to the will of the former.
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October, 1919: Miguel Concepcion had need of funds, which could only be had from PNB and as he apparently had no
bankable security available, recourse was had to the expedient of getting the money upon loans from the bank upon
fictitious warehouse receipts (quedans), with the knowledge and connivance of Teodorico Angeles.
Testimony by Abelardo Crisologo and Ricardo Paredes of how loans were obtained (Paredes is Crisologos father-inlaw)
o Charged in the information as joint principals in the offense of estafa by means of falsification of
mercantile documents but who, as we believe, were rather victims of the artifices of their coaccused than
designing participants in crime.
o Abelardo Crisologo had long been an intimate friend of Miguel G. Concepcion; and, as Crisologo lived in
Tuguegarao, it had been the custom of Concepcion on visits to that place in the past to stay in Crisologo's
hospitable home. Paredes was the father-in-law of Crisologo and at the same time an employee of the firm of
"Puno y Concepcion," though prior to September, 1919, he had been employed by the branch of the Philippine
National Bank in Aparri as an inspector.
October 1919: Teodorico Angeles and Miguel G. Concepcion were in Tuguegarao, and they were invited to dine at the
house of Crisologo, Paredes being also present.
After the meals was over, and the appropriate time had arrived for the exchange of confidences, the subject of the
tobacco trade was broached, and Miguel G. Concepcion, directing himself to Angeles, said: "Manager, I have three
thousand quintals of tobacco in the pueblos of Enrile, Peablanca, and Baggao, and I should like to pledge them to
the bank but I should not like for my name to appear on the documents. I mean that I should not like to make the pledge
myself."
To this Teodorico Angeles replied: "Whose name then would you like to have appear?"
Thereupon Concepcion indicated Crisologo as a person who would perhaps be obliging enough to figure as borrower
in the loan. To this Crisologo at first hesitated to give his assent, but the matter was managed with such diplomatic skill
by the two principal interlocutors that Crisologo yielded, not before Concepcion, however, had pointed out that in making
the pledge Crisologo would not have to appear as owner of the tobacco but merely as depositary.
Explanation given to Crisologo by Concepcion for the necessity of the intervention of someone else than himself was, in
effect, that Concepcion wanted to use the money for the purchase of tobacco in competition with the firm of
"Puno y Concepcion," of which Concepcion was manager, and he thought it would look ugly for his name to appear
in connection with the loan.
Bank lends sum of P55,000 secured by warehouse receipts for 3,000 quintals of tobacco
Three principals met again the next day in the house where Concepcion was then staying in Tuguegarao; and it was
determined that a loan of P35,000 should forthwith be made on the purported security of a quedan to be signed
by Crisologo for 2,000 quintals of tobacco, leaving a loan of P20,000 to be effected later upon the security of another
quedan for the remaining thousand quintals of tobacco.
Angeles assured Crisologo that he had personally inspected the warehouse where that part of the tobacco supposed
to be then in Tuguegarao was deposited and found it to be there as Concepcion had claimed.
Upon this Crisologo indicated his readiness to proceed, and the necessary documents were accordingly prepared.
o Four promissory notes, amounting altogether to the sum of P35,000, signed by Abelardo Crisologo, payable to
the Philippine National Bank and purporting to be secured by the deposit of a quedan for 2,000 quintals of
tobacco.
o Warehouse receipt for said tobacco, in the usual commercial form, signed by Crisologo and purporting to show
that 2,000 quintals of tobacco had been deposited in his bodegas. This quedan was reduced to typewritten from
by Concepcion himself just before the documents was signed by Crisologo, its contents being dictated by
Teodorico Angeles.
October 24, 1919: In Aparri, Angeles discounted the four notes and place the proceeds nominally to the credit of an
individual account then opened in the name of Abelardo Crisologo. Of the account thus placed to the credit of
Crisologo, the sum of P30,000 was forthwith remitted to Concepcion in Tuguegarao by telegraph through the provincial

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treasurer and was by the latter paid to Concepcion in due course. The amount of P5,000 remaining to Crisologo's credit
was used either to pay the charges incidental to the making of the loan or to defray interest upon the loan.
Three or four weeks later the remaining portion of the sum of P55,000, originally agreed upon as the total amount of
the loan, was advanced by the bank upon two promissory notes of P10,000 each, signed by Crisologo, and
purporting to be secured by a quedan for the other thousand quintals of tobacco, supposedly in Baggao, likewise signed
by Crisologo.
About this time the firm of "Puno y Concepcion," for which Paredes was acting as buyer, had need of money, and of this
fact Paredes had duly informed Concepcion. The latter therefore instructed Angeles to pay Paredes the proceeds of the
second loan; and accordingly when Angeles discounted the two notes of Abelardo Crisologo for P20,000, on November
19, 1919, he delivered to Paredes the sum of P500 in currency and a draft for P18,000, making P18,500 in all, which
was charged to Crisologo's account.
After the first notes executed by Crisologo had been in the bank for some time, Paredes, acting for Crisologo and others
concerned, made a payment of interest due or to become due upon said notes, using upon this occasion about P1,600,
believed to have been derived from the resources of Concepcion
Paredes acting as attorney in fact to his son-in-law, Abelardo Crisologo, went through the form of executing in favor of
the bank a pledge of the same non-existing tobacco that had been included in original quedans signed by Crisologo
The remainder of the proceeds of the notes was consumed in the payment of charges incidental to the loan and in the
payment of interest. From this it will be seen, and it is an undeniable fact, that although Crisologo signed the notes and
quedans, as above stated, he in no wise profited by the transaction and never so much as saw the gleam of a
single copper proceeding from the loan.
At the time the quedans referred to were signed and delivered to the bank neither Crisologo nor Concepcion possessed
the tobacco which was purported to be on deposits with Abelardo Crisologo; and, although the evidence on this point is
purely circumstantial, it is certain that Angeles knew that the tobacco was non-existent as he assured Crisologo that
Concepcion had the tobacco and that the signing of the documents by Crisologo was a matter of pure form.
The notes have not been paid by Abelardo Crisologo; the tobacco has been found to be non-existent, as Angeles and
Concepcion all along knew; Concepcion denies all responsibility for the transaction, as if he were a total stranger
thereto; and since December 23, 1921, Angeles occupies the grave of a suicide.
After all the notes had long been overdue, and the bank desired to get its credits consolidated. Paredes, also acting
under a power of attorney from Crisologo, went through the form of consolidating the original notes and quedans into
one note and one quedan.
CFI: Miguel G. Concepcion, GUILTY of the offense of estafa by means of falsification of mercantile documents
o PENALTY: Five years, four months and twenty days, prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by
law; to pay a fine of P1,500; to indemnify the branch of the Philippine National Bank in Aparri in the sum of
P55,000, with subsidiary imprisonment (not to exceed one year) in case of insolvency; and to pay the onefourth part of the costs of prosecution.
CFI: Ricardo Paredes and Alberto Crisologo, guilty of the offense of falsification of a commercial document
o PENALTY: six years and one day, presidio mayor, with the accessories provided by law, to pay a fine of P250,
and jointly and severally to indemnify the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank in the amount of
P55,000, and each to pay one-fourth part of the costs
ISSUES:
1. Whether Concepcion is guilty of estafa? (YES)
2. Whether Ricardo Paredes and Alberto Crisologo are guilty of falsification of commercial document? (NO)
HELD:
1. Concepcion, guilty of the complex offense of estafa by means of the falsification of mercantile documents.
o The estafa here involved consists in the fact that Teodorico Angeles, as manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and as such having charge of the funds of said institution, converted, misappropriated, and misapplied
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the sum of about P55,000 of the bank's money, upon security that was known to him to be wholly fictitious, for the
benefits of the appellant Concepcion and to the prejudice of the bank
o Induced the falsification of two warehouse receipts as a necessary requisite to accomplish estafa the was a necessary
prerequisite; and is also the mechanical author of at least the first receipt, having himself reduced the document to
proper from upon his own typewriting machine at the dictation of Teodorico Angeles.
o This appellant is therefore subject to punishment under article 301 of the Penal Code, as amended, in relation with
article 89 of the same Code. The trial judge was therefore not in error in sentencing him to imprisonment for a period
within the limits of maximum degree of prision correccional; but a precise estimate of the penalty to be imposed shows
that the period fixed by his Honor falls short of the true legal requirement by one day.
o Information charges an estafa founded upon deceit by means of false representation (estafa subsection 1) but it is
actually, estafa under subsection 5 or fraudulent misapplication of the funds of the bank by its manager as Angeles, the
manager of the bank, who let the money out, knew that the tobacco was non-existent, the estafa committed cannot be
considered to have been of the precise form alleged.
2. Miguel G. Concepcion and Teodorico Angeles are principals of this crime, while Ricardo Paredes and Abelardo Crisologo
were rather victims of the articles of the two than designing participants in crime
o PAREDES:
o No complicity on part of Ricardo Paredes in the original estafa and falsification. His intervention in behalf of
Crisologo, in doing certain acts as attorney in fact of the latter, is explainable by the fact that Crisologo was his
son-in-law and lived in Tuguegarao, while the acts which Paredes did in behalf of Crisologo were done at the
bank in Aparri upon occasions when Crisologo was at home in Tuguegarao and was not or could not
conveniently be present.
o What he did later by executing a pledge done at the instance of the bank can assume the fact that he knew that
the tobacco referred to in the pledge and quedans was non-existing, but no estafa was then committed and
the only offense charged in the present information has reference to the original estafa and falsification
committed when the money was obtained.
o CRISOLOGO: No criminal intent and no misrepresentation to anyone
o He signed the promissory notes and the quedans for the tobacco which supposedly justified the loan. In signing
these notes Crisologo was, civilly speaking, substantially in the position of an accommodation maker; and he
of course made himself personally liable to the bank upon those notes for the benefit of Conception.
o The act of affixing his signature to the quedans was done in a spirit of blind complaisance explainable only in
the light of his friendly personal relations with Conception and his deference to the joint wishes of Conception
and the banks manager.
o It must be remembered also that this act was done in response to the representation of Teodorico Angeles that
Conception had the tobacco and that the signing of the quedans by Crisologo was all a matter of mere
formality. Crisologo therefore misrepresented nothing to anyone; and we are of the opinion that criminal
responsibility cannot be predicated of his acts, for want of the essential element of criminal intent. He
was a mere tool in the hands of others and is sufficiently punished by the ruin that must follow from making
himself civilly liable for so large a sum of money.
Dispositive as to Miguel Concepcion: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by adding one day to the penalty within the
maximum of the maximum degree of prision correcional
Dispositive as to Paredes and Crisologo: ACQUITTED.
5. ELVIRA LATEO, FRANCISCO ELCA, and BARTOLOME BALDEMOR vs. PEOPLE
NACHURA, J p: [G.R. No. 161651. June 8, 2011.]
Facts:
Prosecution's version
1994: Lateo and Elca proposed that Lucero finance the titling of the 122 hectares of land located in Muntinlupa
allegedly owned by Elca as the sole heir of Gregorio Elca. Title to the property had not been transferred to Elca's name
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because of a certain discrepancy between the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 77730. Elca offered to assign to Lucero 70
hectares of said land. She was then introduced to Baldemor, Orlando Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman.
Lucero released to petitioners about P4.7 million in staggered amounts.
Elca told Lucero that certain portions of the property will first be put in the name of Lateo and would later be assigned to
her. Lucero was given a Deed of Sale dated March 27, 1987. Elca likewise executed an irrevocable Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Lucero.
Later, she was presented certified true copies of three (3) titles, issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City in the
name of Lateo covering approximately twenty-seven (27) hectares of Plan A-7 of the Muntinlupa Estate, situated in
Barrio Magdaong, Poblacion, Muntinlupa.
December 1994: Lucero verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati, she discovered that the aforesaid titles of the
property were actually registered in the names of Marc Oliver R. Singson, Mary Jeanne S. Go and Feliza C. Torrigoza.
Lucero confronted petitioners and demanded from them return of the money. She was told that they did not have any
money to return. They instead offered a five (5) hectare property identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441
located at Bacoor, Cavite allegedly owned by Elca. Elca, however, demanded an additional P2 million for the transfer
of title. Through a letter, he said that the current valuation of the property is P450.00 per square meter and hence, the
property will be more than sufficient to cover obligates
As it turned out, Elca did not own 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite. He merely had an inchoate right over the Bacoor
property, derived from his Application to Purchase Friar Lands, which covered only 7 hectares. Elca's application was
later amended to cover only 4 hectares, in view of the protest by Alfredo Salenga (Salenga).
Lucero verified this with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that Elca only had a pending application
for the sales patent over a four 4-hectare area of the subject land. These misrepresentations prompted her to file a
complaint with the Task Force Kamagong, PACC, Manila.
April 26, 1995: the task force conducted an entrapment at Furosato Restaurant. Petitioners were apprehended in
possession of marked 100-peso bills amounting to P100,000.00, supposedly in exchange for the Deed of Assignment
prepared by Lucero for their transaction.

Petitioners' version
1994: Lucero, Lateo, Oscar Lalota met with Elca in Muntinlupa to discuss the proposal of Lucero to finance the titling of
Elca's land.
June 28, 1994: in a meeting called by Lucero, she laid down the terms and conditions regarding her plans to finance the
titling of Elca's land.
o 22 out of the 122 hectares of the land would be given to the old tenants of the property, the 30 hectares would
be titled in the name of Elca as his retained share and the other 70 hectares would be her profit as financier of
the transaction.
o Lucero would also pay P10.00 for every square meter of the 70 hectares or a total amount of P7 million. All the
expenses for the titling and management of the land would be deducted from P7 million. The remaining balance
would then be given to petitioners
Lucero assigned Oscar Lalota to work for the titling of the land and to prepare all documents necessary thereto.
Baldemor would act as overseer of the transaction as Lucero's attorney-in-fact. Lateo would serve as secretary and
assistant of Lucero. Elca would guard the property to keep off squatters. He and his wife were instructed to sign all
documents prepared by Oscar Lalota.
December 1994: Lucero told Elca that upon verification from the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, she found out that all
the documents submitted by Oscar Lalota pertaining to their transaction were falsified. Oscar Lalota disappeared after
getting the money.
In order to recover her losses from the anomalous transaction, Lucero offered to purchase Elca's property in Cavite.
Elca agreed to sell 2 hectares of his property at a price of P100.00 per square meter. Elca informed Lucero that the land
was not yet titled although the documents had already been completed. Lucero agreed to pay in advance the amount of
P200,000.00 for the immediate titling of the land.
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December 21, 1994: Lucero gave no advance payment. Elca was made to return in January 1995. On that date still
Lucero made no payment.
April 25, 1995: Lucero promised to give the P200,000.00 advance payment at Furosato Restaurant on Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City. Having failed to contact his lawyer, on April 26, 1995, Elca went alone to Furosato Restaurant.
Because of the absence of Lateo, Lucero postponed their meeting to April 27, 1995.
Elca arrived at Furosato Restaurant on April 27, 1995, Lucero and her lawyer Atty. Velasquez, Lateo and Baldemor and
Atty. Ambrosio were already there.
Atty. Velasquez, upon the order of Lucero, produced a document entitled "Contract to Sell" outlining their agreement
over the 2 hectares of land in Bacoor, Cavite. Atty. Ambrosio examined the contract to find out if it contains the terms
and conditions agreed upon. Attys. Velasquez and Ambrosio made their own handwritten corrections in the contract
including the change of the title from "Contract to Sell" to "Deed of Assignment," after which, both of them signed the
document. Elca and Lucero signed the document as parties while Lateo and Baldemor signed as witnesses.
After the signing of the Deed of Assignment, Lucero brought out the P200,000.00 as the promised payment for the land.
While Baldemor was counting the money, Atty. Velasquez and Lucero went to the comfort room. Thereafter, several
agents of the PACC approached them. They were arrested and brought to the NBI Headquarters
Information: On April 28, 1995, Lateo, Elca, and Baldemor, along with Orlando Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman, were
charged with estafa:
o April 27, 1995: Pasay City ,accused ELVIRA LATEO y ELEAZAR, conspiring and confederating with
FRANCISCO ELCA y ARCAS, BARTOLOME BALDEMOR y MADRIGAL, ORLANDO LALOTA and NOLASCO
DE GUZMAN, and mutually helping one another, by means of deceit, that is, by falsely representing
themselves to be the true and [lawful] owner of a piece of land located in the province of Cavite, and
possessing power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions and by
means of other similar deceits, did then and there, induce ELEONOR LUCERO to part with her money in the
amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS,, as indeed she parted only with the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) PESO, which said accused actually received in marked Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said ELEONOR LUCERO
May 31, 1995: Petitioners pleaded not guilty. Accused Lalota and De Guzman remained at large.
RTC: Francisco Elca, Elvira Lateo and Bartolome Baldemor guilty ATTEMPTED ESTAFA and is hereby sentenced to
imprisonment of Ten (10) years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years.
Transaction over the Cavite property was a continuation of and is somehow related to their first transaction. The
same was offered to Lucero in lieu of the Muntinlupa property. The second transaction which covers the Bacoor
property was again an attempt to defraud Lucero when Francisco Elca again represented himself as the owner of
the said property when he merely has an application to purchase Friar Lands hence accused has no right and/or
authority to deliver or transfer the ownership over said parcel of land to [Lucero].
Celino vs. CA: "Estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by means of using fictitious
name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transaction or by means of other similar deceits.
Villaflor vs. CA: SC held that what is material is the fact that appellant was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation
when knowing that the car was then owned by the Northern Motors, Inc., still he told the private complainant that
the car was actually owned by him for purposes of and at the time he obtained the loan from the latter.
ATTEMPTED NOT CONSUMMATED: The attempt to defraud the complainant did not materialize due to the timely
intervention of the Task Force Kamagong operatives.
o Art. 6, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "there is an attempt when the offender convinces the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
o The entrapment thus prevented the consummation of the transaction over the Cavite property
o Koh Tieck Heng vs. People: "Although one of the essential elements of Estafa is damage or prejudice to
the offended party, in the absence of proof thereof, the offender would be guilty of attempted estafa."
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o Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown respondent court
correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.
INTENTION TO DEFRAUD SHOWN. The culpability of the accused is strengthened by the transfer of his rights
over the same subject land in Cavite in favor of Leticia Ramirez thus clearly influencing his intention to defraud
herein complainant as the same shows his lack of intent to transfer his rights and/or ownership to complainant.
The representations made by Francisco Elca that he owns the property in Bacoor, Cavite, his having offered the
same again to the complainant in lieu of the aborted deal in the Muntinlupa property their constant follow-up of
complainant's decision over the matter convincing the complainant to accept the offer and their persona[l] presence
at the place of entrapment and their receipt of the P100,000.00 marked money which they even counted one after
the other, thus making all of them positive of the presence of fluorescent powder.
CA: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Elvira E. Lateo, Francisco A. Elca and Bartolome M.
Baldemor are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Petitioners Arguments:
Transaction involving the Bacoor property do not show that it was an attempt to defraud Eleonor Lucero
Petitioners deny that they deceived Lucero. They claim that Lucero was aware that the Bacoor property is not yet titled
in the name of Elca; and that they went to Furosato restaurant upon Lucero's invitation and on Lucero's representation
that she would hand to them the P200,000.00 needed to facilitate the issuance of title in Elca's name.
Assail the penalty imposed by the CA for being erroneous. OSG asks for modification of penalty to six (6) months of
arresto mayor.
ISSUE:
1. Whether there was attempted estafa not consummated? YES. ATTEMPTED ESTAFA (not consummated because as
yet no damage to Lucero)
2. What penalty to impose?
HELD:
Elements of estafa Art. 315 (2) (a): 2.By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.
o That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
o That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
o That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he
was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means.
o That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage
Transaction involving the Bacoor property was a continuation of the transaction involving parcels of land in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. When Lucero discovered that Elca's certificates of title over the Muntinlupa property were fake, Elca
offered, as substitute, the 5-hectare portion of his purported 14-hectare lot in Bacoor, Cavite, but asked for an additional
P2,000,000.00, through a letter.
Elca was in no position to transfer ownership of the 5-hectare Bacoor property at the time petitioners offered it to Lucero
because his right was merely inchoate and was still under protest.
Alcantara v. CA: FRAUD AND DECEIT
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o Fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed,
resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a
generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by
one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and
includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated.
o Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
ATTEMPTED NOT CONSUMMATED: Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been
shown, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted petitioners of attempted estafa

PENALTY
o The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded.
o IF CONSUMMATED: Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount of P100,000.00. Hence, the applicable penalty
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would have been prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the first
P22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty should not exceed twenty years.
o BEC. ATTEMPTED: Two degrees lower than that of consummated pursuant to Article 51. Accordingly, the imposable
penalty would be arresto mayor in its medium period to arresto mayor in its maximum period, or an imprisonment
term ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. And because the amount involved exceeded
P22,000.00, one (1) year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 should be added, bringing the total to seven (7) years.
IDESTH
o However, we agree with the OSG that it would be inequitable to impose the additional incremental penalty of 7 years to
the maximum period of penalty, considering that petitioners were charged and convicted merely of attempted and not
consummated estafa.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED. Petitioners Elvira Lateo, Francisco Elca, and Bartolome
Baldemor are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted estafa, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) months of arresto mayor.
6. PEOPLE vs. LOURDES LO, GRACE CALIMON AND AIDA COMILA
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p: [G.R. No. 175229. January 29, 2009.]
Facts:
Prosecution: (3 private complainants + Corazon Cristobal an employee of POEA and PO2 Edward Catalan)
o 1998: Lo persuaded private complainants to apply for a job in Italy through the services of accused-appellants.
o Lo introduced them to Calimon who represented herself as a sub-agent of Axil International Services and
Consultancy (AISC), a legitimate recruitment agency. Calimon showed a job order of factory workers purportedly
issued by an Italian firm. Devanadera called up AISC to verify Calimon's representation. The person who answered the
phone readily confirmed accused-appellant Calimon's claim.
o When accused Calimon asked P10,000.00 from each of the private complainants to cover expenses for medical
examination and processing fees for travel documents, both Devanadera and Agramon readily parted with their money,
as evidenced by receipts duly signed by Calimon.
o They likewise gave their respective passports, birth certificates, NBI clearances, resumes and other documents. 19
Thereafter, Calimon brought them to St. Martin's Clinic for medical examination.
o October 24, 1998: Upon the urging of Lo, private complainant Magnaye paid P20,000.00 to Calimon for the latter's
recruitment services.
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

January 15, 1999: private complainants were subjected to another medical examination at St. Camillus Clinic,
Pasig City, because according to Calimon the medical examinations at St. Martin's Clinic were not honored by the
Italian Embassy. On the same date, Magnaye gave an additional amount of P15,000.00 to Calimon. While
Devanadera and Agramon gave her an additional amount of P7,500.00 each.
At one time, in the course of following up the status of her overseas employment application, Calimon introduced
complainant Devanadera to accused-appellant Comila who showed her file and informed her of the need to secure a
visa with the Italian Embassy. Calimon then asked for more money to secure the visa, but Devanadera refused to
pay.
Private complainant Agramon's follow ups with Calimon were just met by repeated assurance that she will be deployed
immediately once her papers are completely processed. The other complainants received similar treatment.
January 1999: Calimon gave private complainants their supposed individual employment contracts as factory
workers in Italy. However, the contracts did not indicate an employer.
The three proceeded to the POEA to verify the status of their contract where they discovered that while AISC was a
licensed recruitment agency, Lo and accused-appellants Calimon and Comila were not among its registered
employees.
April 27, 1999: three separate complaint-affidavits were filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) charging Lourdes Lo, Grace Calimon and Aida Comila with illegal recruitment and estafa. The complaints
were initiated by Fe Magnaye, Lucila Agramon, and Daisy Devanadera.
May 6, 1999: POEA, referred the matter to the DOJ and submitted evidence before it.
After several months, accused-appellants were apprehended for their involvement in other cases of illegal recruitment
and estafa. Private complainants Magnaye, Agramon and Devanadera were summoned to a preliminary investigation at
the DOJ.
October 8, 1999: the DOJ issued a Resolution recommending the filing of the corresponding Information against Lo and
the accused-appellants.
December 28, 1999: an Information was filed with the RTC, charging Lo and accused-appellants with illegal
recruitment in large scale defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7, respectively, of Republic Act No. 8042.
o Criminal Case No. 00-179745: September 1998 in Manila, feloniously recruit the herein complainants, FE
MAGNAYE, LUCILA AGRAMON and DAISY DEVANADERA to Italy as factory workers for the consideration
thereof, they were required to pay placement fees of the total amount of (P110,000.00) for the consideration
thereof, without accused having secured the necessary license and authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers to Italy.
Three separate Informations for estafa arising from the same acts penalized under paragraph 2 (a), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code were also filed against the three:
o Criminal Case No. 00-180519: October 1998, in Manila, conspiring and confederating with each other
feloniously recruit and promise employment to FE MAGNAYE in Italy as factory worker for a total consideration
of P55,000.00 as placement and processing fees, knowing that they have no capacity whatsoever and with
no intention to fulfill their promise, but merely as a pretext, scheme or excuse to get or exact money from the
said complainant as they in fact collected and received the amount of P55,000.00 from said FE MAGNAYE to
her damage, loss and prejudice for the aforesaid amount.
o Criminal Case No. 00-180520: September 1998, in Manila, accused, conspiring and confederating with each
other, did then feloniously recruit and promise employment to LUCILA C. AGRAMON in Italy as factory worker
for a total consideration of P27,500.00 (or in decision P17, 500) as placement and processing fees,
knowing that they have no capacity whatsoever and with no intention to fulfill their promise, but merely as a
pretext, scheme or excuse to get or exact money from the said complainant as they in fact collected and
received the amount of P27,500.00 from said LUCILA C. AGRAMON to her damage, loss and prejudice for the
aforesaid amount
o Criminal Case No. 00-180521: September 1998, in Manila, accused, conspiring and confederating with each
other, did then feloniously recruit and promise employment to DAISY DEVANADERA alias 'Renata P. Luciano'
in Italy as factory worker for a total consideration of P27,500.00 (or in decision P17, 500) as placement and

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processing fees, knowing that they have no capacity whatsoever and with no intention to fulfill their promise,
but merely as a pretext, scheme or excuse to get or exact money from the said complainant as they in fact
collected and received the amount of P27,500.00 from said DAISY DEVANADERA alias 'Renata P. Luciano' to
her damage, loss and prejudice for the aforesaid amount.
o Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellants pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. Lo, has remained at large.
Defense: (presented accused-appellants as witnesses)
o Calimon denied the accusations against her. She claimed that she was also an applicant for overseas job
placement and that she never promised any work abroad to private complainants. She averred that it was Lo who
recruited her and private complainants. She likewise denied having received any money from private complainants. She
maintained that it was Comila who received the money from her amounting to P16,000.00 as payment for her
placement fee.
o Comila denied having known or seen Lo. However, she maintained that it was accused Lo who recruited and received
money from private complainants. She averred she could not have recruited private complainants because she gave
birth in Baguio in October 1998.
RTC: Convicted Calimon of Illegal recruitment in large scale + 3 counts of estafa; Convicted Comila of Simple illegal
recruitment + 1 count of estafa
o Criminal Case No. 00-179745 (Illegal Recruitment):
o GRACE CALIMON guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing said accused to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P800,000.00;
o AIDA COMILA guilty of simple illegal recruitment and sentencing said accused to imprisonment from eight
(8) to ten (10) years, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. With costs against the two accused in proportionate
shares
o Criminal Cases Nos. 00-180519 and 00-180521 (estafa: victim Magnaye & Devanadera):
o GRACE CALIMON guilty of two counts of estafa defined under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code
o PENALTY for estafa committed on Magnaye: Indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum;
o PENALTY for estafa committed on Luciano: Indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as
maximum; and to pay the costs for each case
o Criminal Case No. 00-180520 (estafa: victim Agramon)
o GRACE CALIMON and AIDA COMILA guilty of estafa defined under paragraph 2 (a) Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code
o PENALTY: Indeterminate penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years, 11 months and 10 days
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay the costs in equal shares.
o Service of the accused + Detention imprisonment credited
o PAYMENT:
o Criminal Cases Nos. 00-179745, 00-180519 and 00-180521, accused Grace Calimon is ordered to pay to
complainants Fe Magnaye and Daisy Devanadera the sums of P35,000.00 and P17,500.00, respectively, as
reparations for the damages she caused them.
o Criminal Cases Nos. 00-179745 and 00-180520, accused Grace Calimon and accused Aida Comila are
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay offended party Lucila C. Agramon the sum of P10,000.00, as reparation for
the damages she caused her.
CA: Affirmed the Decision of the RTC but with modifications.
o ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT:
o Modify penalty for large scale recruitment from P800,000 to fine of P1M when the offender is a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority to recruit and deploy workers abroad, as in the instant case (Sec. 7, Republic Act No.
8042).
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o Comila was likewise correctly convicted by the RTC of the crime of simple Illegal Recruitment. The sentence
pronounced by the RTC was proper.
o ESTAFA: Comila was proven to be conspirator in estafa against Devanadera but acquitted so liable civilly
o Criminal Case No. 00-180519, Grace Calimon was properly found guilty of Estafa through false pretenses.
Since the amount defrauded from Fe Magnaye was P35,000.00, the penalty imposed by the RTC was proper.
o In Criminal Case No. 00-180520, since the amount defrauded from Lucila Agramon is [P17,500.00], the correct
penalty that should be imposed upon Calimon and Comila, in the absence of any modifying circumstances,
should be the indeterminate 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months
and 20 days of prision mayor, as maximum instead of 6 years to 11 years +++.
o In Criminal Case No. 00-180521, the amount involved is P17,500.00. There being no modifying circumstances,
the penalty imposed by the trial court on Calimon is correct.
However, it has been duly proven that Comila was a conspirator to the crime subject of this case.
In view of her acquittal by the RTC, this matter can no longer be questioned in this appeal on the
ground of double jeopardy. However, Comila should be made solidarily liable with Calimon to indemnify
P17,500.00 to Daisy Devanadera, since Comila's acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt did not
declare whether the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Last paragraph, Section
2, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
Petitioners Arguments:
o Only Lo recruited private complainants and promised to deploy them abroad.
o They deny having collected placement fees, but ironically admitted that the amount collected was for medical
examination, visa and passport fees.
o Not guilty of estafa through false pretenses because they did not commit any act of deceit as it was only accused Lo
who promised to deploy private complainants to Italy for a fee.
ISSUE: Whether they are guilty of estafa and illegal recruitment despite Lo being the only one who promised them for a
fee? (YES)
HELD:
ESTAFA: The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence their conviction for
estafa was proper.
o Accused-appellants' acts of deliberately misrepresenting themselves to private complainants as having the necessary
authority or license to recruit applicants for overseas employment, and collecting money from them allegedly for
processing fees and travel documents, but failing to deploy them and to return the money they had collected despite
several demands clearly amount to estafa.
o Guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code: 2.
By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using
fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
o There are three ways of committing estafa:
o (1) by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits.
o Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. In the present case, the deceit consists of accusedappellants' false statement or fraudulent representation which was made prior to, or at least simultaneously
with, the delivery of the money by the complainants. To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the
complainant to part with the thing of value.
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o Accused-appellants led private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, means and legal qualifications
to provide the latter with work in Italy, when in fact they did not. Private complainants parted with their hard-earned
money and suffered damage by reason of accused-appellants' deceitful and illegal acts.
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
o Calimon committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale because by her conduct, Calimon successfully gave
private complainants the impression that she had the ability to send workers abroad although she did not in fact have
the authority to do so. She was also able to induce private complainants to tender payment for fees. Since there were
three (3) workers involved in the transaction, she committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
o Comila committed the crime of simple illegal recruitment because there is clear and convincing evidence that she
conspired with Calimon. However, conspiracy was not alleged in the Information. Hence, Comila can only be
convicted for simple illegal recruitment, not for illegal recruitment in large scale in conspiracy with Calimon.
o The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 state:
o SEC. 6.
Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a nonlicensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, that any such non-licensee or nonholder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged.
o Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
o Sec. 7.
Penalties.
o (a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
o (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined herein. Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or nonholder of authority.
o In a litany of cases, we held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale three (3) elements must concur:
o (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement of workers;
o (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Art.
13, par. (b), of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the same Code
(now Sec. 6, RA 8042); and,
o (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
o Corollarily, Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code enumerates the acts which constitute recruitment and
placement: (b)
'Recruitment and placement' refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
o ELEMENTS PROVEN: Here, we are convinced that the three elements of Recruitment in Large Scale were sufficiently
proved beyond reasonable doubt for Calimon while 3 rd element not proven for Comila so Simple Illegal Recruitment
only.

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o First, accused-appellants, undoubtedly, did not have any license to recruit persons for overseas work. This is
substantiated by the POEA, Licensing Branch which issued a Certification to this effect and the testimony of an
employee of the POEA, Corazon Cristobal.
o Second, accused-appellants engaged in illegal recruitment activities, offering overseas employment for a fee.
Magnaye and Agramon also corroborated the testimony of Devanadera. Their narration undoubtedly
established that accused-appellants promised them employment in Italy as factory workers and they (accusedappellants) asked money from them (private complainants) to allegedly process their papers and visas. Private
complainants were deceived as they relied on accused-appellants' misrepresentation and scheme that caused
them to entrust their money to them in exchange of what they later discovered was a vain hope of obtaining
employment abroad
o Third, accused-appellant Calimon committed illegal recruitment activities involving at least three persons, i.e.,
the three private complainants herein. On the part of Comila, this third element was not proved and thus, she
was properly convicted of simple illegal recruitment only.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
7. PEOPLE vs. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p: [G.R. No. 184053. August 31, 2011.]
Facts:
o May 17, 1996, 1:00 PM: Montaner, in exchange for cash, issued to private complainant Reynaldo Solis in his house
at Caliraya Street, Holiday Homes, San Pedro, Laguna, ten (10) Prudential Bank checks, specifically, check nos.
0002284, 0002285, 0002286, 0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290, 0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 all postdated
June 17, 1996, each in the amount of P5,000.00 all in the total amount of P50,000.00. They were all signed by her.
o Accused represented to complainant Solis that the checks were fully funded.
o October 4, 1996: When private complainant deposited the checks for encashment at Premier Bank, San Pedro, Laguna.
However, they were dishonored for the reason "account closed".
o Ruel Allan Pajarito, Branch Cashier O-I-C of Prudential Bank testified that they placed the mark "account
closed" on the ten (10) checks issued in the account of accused Montaner considering that at the time the
same were presented to them, the account of accused Montaner was already closed.
o Witness Pajarito further testified that as per their records, the account of accused Montaner, account no. 00099000050-4 was closed on July 11, 1996. The checks were returned on for the reason account closed.
o October 13, 1996: Private complainant verbally and thereafter, thru demand letter formally demanded that accused
settle her accounts. It was received by her husband.
o Despite receipt of the demand letter, accused Montaner failed to pay the value of the ten (10) checks, thus private
complainant Reynaldo Solis filed the instant complaint for estafa.
o Information 3 dated April 21, 1998:
o May 17, 1996: in San Pedro, Laguna, Montaner did then and there feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in
the following manner: said accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully
funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis the following TEN Prudential Bank Checks Nos.:
0002284, 0002285, 0002286, 0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290, 0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 each
for P5,000.00 with total value of P50,000 and all aforesaid checks are postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for
cash knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said checks were presented for
payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank on reason of "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite
demand accused failed and refused to pay the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in
the aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.
o Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge leveled against her during her arraignment on June 10, 1998.
o Accused, thru counsel initially manifested that she is intending to file a demurrer to evidence. However, her right to file
the same was considered waived in view of her failure to file the demurrer despite due notice.
RTC: Convicted for Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
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o PENALTY: Indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twentytwo (22) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the amount of
P50,000.00.
CA: AFFIRMED TCs Decision in toto.
Petitioners Defense:
o To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten
(10) checks in private complainant's favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her by one Marlyn
Galope because the latter needed money.
o She gave the ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount and payee were left blank so
that the checks cannot be used for any negotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not funded.
o When she learned that a case was filed against her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that
money will not be given to her if she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent
to her by private complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for
abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.
o Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable doubt that she issued the checks purposely to defraud
Reynaldo Solis into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had ever transpired between her and
Solis. Admitting that she may have been imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not
translate to criminal liability.
ISSUE: Whether Montaner is guilty of estafa
HELD:
o Paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides: 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (d)
By postdating a check,
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
o The elements of estafa under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are:
o (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued;
o (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
o (3) damage to the payee.
o In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under
paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis's clear and categorical testimony, appellant
issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his
house in exchange for their cash equivalent.
o Direct Examination: Representation about them? To deposit those checks on their due date, ma'am.
o It was evident that Solis would not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10
Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his
cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was
already closed.
o Solis wrote appellant a demand letter but she did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount
necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of
deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the
second sentence of paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
o Claims to have entrusted Garope is incredulous and defies ordinary common sense and human experience. Moreover,
it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
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which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As aptly
noted by the trial court, appellant's failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her cause.
DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision AFFIRMED.
8. PEOPLE vs. ELIZABETH CARDENAS
CARPIO MORALES, J.: G.R. No. 178064 February 10, 2009
Facts:
Nenit Musni who does business under the name Bombom Jewelries, buys pieces of jewelry from pawnshops for
resale.
In 1991, in the course of her business operation, she was introduced to Cardenas to whom she had since been selling
gold. Their usual practice was to weigh the gold and agree on the price, after which appellant would issue checks
covering the value thereof.
Nenit and appellants transactions were regular until...
October 15, 1994 when appellant issued 2 checks - Check No. 001247A for P401,000 and Check No. 001248A for the
same amount covering payment of gold, which checks were dishonored. Nenit informed appellant of the dishonor, but
she denied owing anything to her.
o accused received jewelries from the complaining witness at Laoag City;
o accused has a checking account with the PCIB, Vigan
o due to such receipt of jewelries, the accused delivered to the complainant PCIB Vigan Branch Check No.
001247A covering the amount of P401,000.00 dated November 15, 1994 and Check No. 001248A in the
amount of P401,000.00 dated December 15, 1994
o (2) checks aforestated were presented for payment but dishonored.
November 2, 1994: Cardenas again issued three checks drawn against PCIB Vigan Branch representing payment of
gold: Check No. 001231A for P318,000, Check No. 001232A for P779,000, and Check No. 001233A for P1,093,000.
Again the checks were dishonored.
o accused received jewelries from the complaining witness at Laoag City;
o due to the receipt of the jewelries, the accused delivered three (3) postdated checks to the complainant PCIB
Vigan Branch Check No. 001231A dated February 20, 1995 in the amount of P318,000.00; Check No. 001232A
dated December 25, 1994 in the amount of P779,000.00 and Check No. 001233A in the amount of
P1,093,000.00 dated January 15, 1995;
o 3 checks aforementioned were presented for payment but dishonored because the signatures differ from the
signature on file.
November 15, 1994: Cardenas issued two postdated checks drawn against PCIB Vigan Branch representing payment
of gold purchased from Nenit: Check No. 001226A for P250,000 and Check No. 01227A for P668,000. Still again the
checks were dishonored.
o accused received jewelries from the complaining witness at Laoag City;
o due to such receipt of jewelries, the accused delivered two (2) postdated checks, PCIB Vigan Check No.
001226A dated December 30, 1994 covering the amount of P250,000.00 and Check No. 001227A dated
December 15, 1994 in the amount of P668,000.00;
o checks were presented for payment with the drawee bank on their respective due dates;
o checks were dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground that the signature of the drawer differs from the
signature on file (and insufficient funds/closed account).
December 15, 1994: appellant issued to Nenit two postdated checks, both drawn against PCIB Vigan Branch: Check
No. 001222A for P400,000, and Check No. 001260A for P458,000 representing payment of gold. Like the previous
checks, these two were dishonored.
o accused received jewelries from the complaining witness at Laoag City;
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o out of the receipt of the jewelries by the accused from the complaining witness, the accused delivered two (2)
postdated checks, PCIB Vigan Branch Check No. 001222A dated March 31, 1995 in the amount of P400,000.0
and Check No. 001260A dated March 15, 1995 in the amount of P458,000.00;
o Check No. 001222A when presented for payment was dishonored because the signature on file is different
from the signature on the check; (and insufficient funds/closed account)
o Check No. 001260A in the amount of P458,000.00 was delivered to the complainant with the signature of
the accused, the same being signed by her on the same date of the delivery of the jewelries.
Nenit demanded the settlement of the dishonored checks, but appellant maintained not having any obligations to her.
On complaint of Nenit, four Informations each charging with estafa were filed before the RTC of Laoag City:
o Criminal Case No. 8740-13 alleged: October 15, 1994, in Laoag, accused with deceit and intent to defraud,
feloniously issue the following checks in favor of Nenette Musni, against the drawee PCIB, Vigan therein a
signature different from her specimen signature on file with the drawee bank and representing that the
checks will be paid when presented for payment, simultaneous to and as payment for jewelries purchased by
the accused from Nenette Musni, which checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank when
presented for payment due to signature different on file and for having been drawn against insufficient
funds, and despite notice to the accused of the dishonor of her checks and demands made upon her by
Nenette Musni for the cash replacement of the checks, the accused had refused and failed to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of Nenete Musni:
Check No. 001247A = P401,000.00, Postdated: November 15, 1994
Check No. 001248A = P401,000.00, Postdated: December 15, 1994
o Criminal Case No. 8741-13 alleged: November 15, 1994, in Laoag, accused with deceit and intent to defraud,
feloniously issue the following checks in favor of Nenette Musni, against the drawee PCIB, Vigan therein a
signature different from her specimen signature on file with the drawee bank and representing that the
checks will be paid when presented for payment, simultaneous to and as payment for jewelries purchased by
the accused from Nenette Musni, which checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank when
presented for payment due to signature different on file and for having been drawn against insufficient
funds, and despite notice to the accused of the dishonor of her checks and demands made upon her by
Nenette Musni for the cash replacement of the checks, the accused had refused and failed to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of Nenete Musni:
Check No. 001226A =
P250,000.00, Postdated: December 30, 1994
Check No. 001227A =
P668,000.00, Postdated: December 15, 1994
o Criminal Case No. 8742-13 alleged: November 2, 1994, in Laoag, accused with deceit and intent to defraud,
feloniously issue the following checks in favor of Nenette Musni, against the drawee PCIB, Vigan therein a
signature different from her specimen signature on file with the drawee bank and representing that the
checks will be paid when presented for payment, simultaneous to and as payment for jewelries purchased by
the accused from Nenette Musni, which checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank when
presented for payment due to signature different on file and for having been drawn against a closed
account for Check No. 001231A and against insufficient funds for Check Nos. 001232A and 001233A, and
despite notice to the accused of the dishonor of her checks and demands made upon her by Nenette Musni
for the cash replacement of the checks, the accused had refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
Nenette Musni:
Check No. 001231A = P 318,000.00, Postdated: February 20, 1995
Check No. 001232A = P 779,000.00, Postdated: December 25, 1994
Check No. 001233A = P1,093,000.00, Postdated: January 15, 1995
o Criminal Case No. 8743-13 alleged: December 15, 1994, in Laoag, with deceit and intent to defraud, did
feloniously issue the following checks in favor of Nenette Musni, against the drawee PCIB Vigan, affixing
therein a signature different from her specimen signature on file with the drawee bank for Check No.
001222A and representing that the checks will be paid when presented for payment, simultaneous to and as

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payment for jewelries purchased by the accused from Nenette Musni, which checks were subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank when presented for payment due to signature different on file for Check
001222A and for having been drawn against a closed account for both checks, and despite notice to the
accused of the dishonor of her checks and demands made upon her by Nenette Musni for the cash
replacement of the checks, the accused had refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Nenette Musni :
Check No. 001222A = P400,000.00, Postdated: March 31, 1995
Check No. 001260A = P458,000.00, Postdated: March 15, 1995 (not different specimen signature or
due to insufficient funds but on closed account)
Defense of Cardenas:
Appellant claimed that, except for Check No. 1260A, (one of the two checks subject of the fourth case) all the checks
subject of the cases were unsigned as they were issued as a "secondary collateral."
Whenever Nenit entrusted to her jewelry for resale, she was required to and did sign receipts and did issue the
unsigned checks; that failing to resell the jewelry, she would return them and ask Nenit to return to her the receipts she
signed and the unsigned checks, but Nenit would merely claim that she would tear them;
With respect to Check No. 1260A, for P458,000, she having sold the jewelry covered thereby, she affixed her signature
thereon, but she did not cause the check to be honored because she and Nenit agreed to offset the against the
amount which Nenit and her son owed her for jewelry they had borrowed from her.
Appellant thus claimed that the signatures attributed to her on all the checks, except Check No. 1260A for
P458,000, were forged, in support of which she presented National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Senior Documents
Examiner Adela Cruz-Demantillo (Adela) who examined the signatures on the questioned checks and concluded that
the signature on Check No. 1260A and those on other checks were not made by one and the same person.
RTC: Convicted appellant of the four counts of estafa, disposing as follows:
PENALTY: Each of the charges the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE YEARS of
prision mayor as maximum to THIRTY YEARS of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private complainant the
sum of P4,768,000.00 representing her total obligation and with legal interest thereon to be reckoned from the
finality of this judgment, with costs against her.
CA: Acquitted appellant in the first and second cases but affirmed 3 rd and 4th
For 1st and 2nd, the checks subject thereof having been dishonored because the signatures thereon differed from
the specimen signatures of appellant on file at the drawee bank.
Insufficiency of evidence. It may be recalled that criminal and penal statutes are strictly construed against the State,
that is, they cannot be enlarged by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In other words, the
language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry out into effect the general
purpose for which the statute was enacted. The reason for dishonor goes into the element of the felony and may
not justly be ignored. When the law speaks of "insufficiency of funds" as the reason for dishonor, it means just
that and nothing else.
For 3rd and 4th, Affirmed because insufficient funds
ISSUES:
1. Whether Cardenas is guilty of the 3 rd and 4th charges because of insufficiency of funds or by reason that checks were
dishonored due to account closed despite evidence of forged signature? NO
2. Whether Cardenas is guilty of estafa for Check 001264A despite lack of fraud as the issuance of the check was not the
means to attain the jewelry? NO.
HELD:
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1. Checks subject thereof were dishonored due to "payment stopped" or "account closed. However, only photocopies of
the checks bearing "payment stopped" or "account closed" stamped thereon form part of the records and while they
were not objected to, the photocopies of the checks still may not be appreciated as they were not formally offered in
evidence.
Relevant stipulations of the prosecution and defense during pre-trial were that the checks, except Check No.
001260A which is one of the two checks subject of the fourth case, were dishonored because the signatures therein
were different from appellants signature on file.
Forged handwriting. The prosecution contends, however, that appellant intentionally altered her own signature on
the checks. In light, however, of the findings of the handwriting expert and, indeed, from the naked eye, a
comparison of the questioned signatures with the standard signature of appellant the possibility that appellants
signature on the checks in question was forged is not ruled out.
2. NO ESTAFA. Misrepresentation of checks not used as means to obtain the jewelry
OFFSET. Check No. 001260A was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and the defense of offsetting cannot be
credited. Her evidence of receipts do not indicate that the items mentioned there were to offset the jewelry or for a
Rosita earring valued of P100,000.00 which was part of the alleged offsetting. Moreover, if there was an offsetting, the
accused has not fully explained why the value of the jewelry that complainant and Carlito Musni received from her were
more than the value of the check which is P458,000.
Under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means herein below . 2.
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud: (d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure
of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds
shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The issuance of a check should be the means to obtain money or property from the payee. It would have been
unnecessary for the accused to assure the payee that the checks would be sufficiently funded on maturity to convince
her to give her the jewelry.
During her transactions since 1991 with Nenit, appellant usually issued postdated checks after jewelry was turned over
to her and that in fact some of the postdated checks previously issued were dishonored but were not made
subject of criminal complaints.
Appellant did not thus have to assure Nenit when she issued on November 15, 1994 Check No. 001260A postdated
December 30, 1994 that it would be funded on maturity to convince her to part off with the jewelry. In other words, the
issuance of the check was not the means to obtain the jewelry. Appellant did not thus employ fraud. Ergo she did not
commit estafa.
However, appellants civil liability under Check No. 001260A for P458,000 stands in the absence of evidence that she
had, as she claimed, already settled the same.
DISPOSITIVE: Elizabeth Cardenas, is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 8742-13. Appellant is likewise ACQUITTED in
Criminal Case No. 8743-13. She is, however, declared civilly liable to the private complainant, Nenette a.k.a. Nenit
Musni, insofar as the case involves Check No. 001260A, and is ORDERED to pay her its face value of P458,000.00.
9. PEOPLE vs. ERLINDA ABORDO and VINA CABANLONG
CARPIO, J p: [G.R. No. 179934. May 21, 2009.]
Facts:
o February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994: Abordo recruited Jesus Rayray for possible employment abroad and collected a
total of P14,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured Rayray that he could soon leave for abroad. Rayray was unable to
leave as promised and only saw Abordo again when she was already in jail.
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o September 1994: Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Esmenia Cario in Lipay, Villasis, Pangasinan, to
persuade her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Cario and Cabanlong used to be neighbors in San Blas,
Villasis, Pangasinan. Upon being convinced by the accused, Cario gave a total of P15,000 as placement fee. Despite
this payment, Cario was unable to leave for abroad.
o December 1994: Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Segundina Fernandez in Caramitan, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Cabanlong and Segundina are first cousins. Cabanlong introduced Abordo as a recruiter. The accused told
Segundina that they could secure employment for her son, Jaime, in Hong Kong upon payment of the placement fee.
Segundina and Jaime agreed to the proposition. Segundina gave the accused cash and other valuables amounting to
P45,000. Abordo gave a plane ticket to Jaime, which turned out to be fake; hence, Jaime was unable to leave for
abroad.
o December 1994: the accused went to the house of Exequiel Mendoza in San Blas, Villasis, Pangasinan to convince
him to work in Hong Kong as a security guard. Mendoza agreed to be recruited and to pay P45,000 as placement fee.
Abordo assured him that as soon as he could pay the placement fee, he could work abroad. Mendoza gave Abordo
cash and pieces of jewelry amounting to P39,000. Despite several promises from Abordo, Mendoza was unable to
leave for Hong Kong. Thus, he demanded from the accused the return of his money and pieces of jewelry, but to no
avail.
o Adonis Peralta, Dagupan District Officer of DOLE, issued certifications dated 29 September 1993 and 3 August 1993
stating that the accused were not included in the POEA list of those licensed to recruit in Pangasinan.
o The Informations against the accused read as follows: (Abordo: Estafa 4, Illegal Recruitment - 4 ; Cabanlong: Estafa
3, Illegal Recruitment - 3)
o Criminal Case No. V-0654 (Estafa): February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994, at Villasis, Pangasinan, Abordo by
means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting herself to be capable of causing the employment of
laborers abroad, knowing fully well that she is not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and receive from Jesus Rayray y Bascos
the sum of P14,000.00, with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and thereafter, despite
repeated demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant's employment abroad, failed and refused
to return the said amount of P14,000.00, thereby appropriating and converting the same for her own use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Jesus Rayray y Bascos in the said amount.
o Criminal Case No. V-0655 (Illegal Recruitment): February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994 at Villasis, Pangasinan,
Abordo, feloniously recruit Jesus Rayray y Bascos for employment abroad, without first securing the
requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
o Criminal Case No. V-0767 (Estafa): December, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and Cabanlong,
conspiring, by means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting themselves to be capable of causing the
employment of laborers abroad, knowing fully well that they are not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers
for employment abroad, did then and there feloniously demand and receive from Jaime Fernandez the sum of
P45,000.00, Philippine currency with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and thereafter,
despite repeated demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant's employment abroad, failed and
refused to return the said amount
o Criminal Case No. V-0768 (Illegal Recruitment): December, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and
Cabanlong conspiring, one another, did then feloniously recruit Jaime Fernandez y Simon for employment
abroad, without first securing the requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
o Criminal Case No. V-0769 (Estafa): December, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and Cabanlong
conspiring, by means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting themselves to be capable of causing the
employment of laborers abroad, knowing fully well that they are not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers
for employment abroad, did then and feloniously demand and receive from Exequiel Mendoza the sum of
P45,000.00, with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and, thereafter, despite repeated
demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant's employment abroad, failed and refused to return
the said amount of P45,000.00, thereby appropriating and converting the same for their own use and benefit to
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o Criminal Case No. V-0770 (Illegal Recruitment): December, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis accused Abordo and
Cabanlong conspiring, feloniously recruit Exequiel Mendoza y Olivar for employment abroad, without first
securing the requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
o Criminal Case No. V-0771 (Illegal Recruitment): September, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and
Cabanlong conspiring and feloniously recruit Esmenia Cario for employment abroad, without first securing
the requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
o Criminal Case No. V-0772 (Estafa): September, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and Cabanlong
conspiring, by means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting themselves to be capable of causing the
employment of laborers abroad, knowing fully well that they are not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers
for employment abroad, did then and there feloniously demand and receive from Esmenia Cario the sum of
P15,000.00, with the undertaking of working for her employment abroad and, thereafter, despite repeated
demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant's employment abroad, failed and refused to return
the said amount of P15,000.00,
RTC:
Abordo and Cabanlong GUILTY of Illegal Recruitment in large scale in Crim. Case Nos. V-0655, V-0768, V-0770 and V0771, defined and penalized under Art. 38, par. (a) in relation to Art. 39, par. (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended by P.D. 2018
o Penalty of life imprisonment and to pay, jointly and severally, fine of 100,000.00
Abordo GUILTY of Estafa in Crim. Case No. V-0654, as provided under Art. 315, par. 2(a),
o Penalty indeterminate penalty of SIX MONTHS and ONE DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, as the minimum, to FOUR YEARS, TWO MONTHS and ONE DAY of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, as the maximum, and to reimburse Jesus Rayray
the amount of P14,000.00
Abordo and Cabanlong are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of estafa
o Crim. Case No. V-0767: 6 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in it minimum and medium periods, as
the minimum to 10 YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Jaime Fernandez the
amount of P45,000.00;
o Crim. Case No. V-0769: 6 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as
the minimum, to 9 YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Exequiel Mendoza
the amount of P39,000.00
o Crim. Case No. V-0772: 6 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as
the minimum to 4 YEARS, 2 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, as the maximum, and to reimburse Esmenia Carino the amount of P15,000.00
CA: Guilty with modification for penalties and crime Simple Illegal Recruitment per count and not Illegal
Recruitment in a Large Scale
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT: The act of the accused of recruiting complainants for employment abroad without the
necessary license from the POEA constitutes the offense of illegal recruitment.
ESTAFA: The Court of Appeals stated that the very same evidence proving the accused's commission of the offense of
illegal recruitment also established that the accused connived in defrauding complainants by misrepresenting that they
had the power, influence, agency and business to obtain overseas employment for complainants upon payment of
placement fees. Complainants suffered damages to the extent of the various sums of money they delivered to accused.
The Court of Appeals modified the penalties imposed on the accused as each information involved only one
complainant. The accused cannot be convicted for illegal recruitment in large scale based on several informations
each filed by only one complainant. The trial court erred in considering the three complainants in the two criminal cases
when it convicted the accused of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since the accused were prosecuted under several
informations for different complainants, the penalty imposed should be for each information. To convict the accused of
illegal recruitment in large scale, there must be one information that must include all the complainants. Otherwise, the
accused should be held liable only for simple illegal recruitment.
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As to Rayray:
o Abordo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment and is sentenced to suffer
a prison term of 6 years and 1 day as minimum, to 12 years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.
o Abordo guilty of Estafa , as provided for under Art. 315, par. 2(a), and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 6 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as
minimum, to 4 YEARS, 2 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, as maximum, and to reimburse Jesus Rayray in the amount of P14,000
As to Others:
o Abordo and Cabanlong are found Guilty of three (3) counts of Simple Illegal Recruitment, and are sentenced to
suffer a prison term of 6 years and 1 day as minimum, to 12 years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000
on each count.
o Abordo and Cabanlong are found guilty of three (3) counts of estafa and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of:
6 MONTHS AND 1 DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as the minimum,
to 10 YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Jaime Fernandez in the
amount of P45,000
b) 6 MONTHS AND 1 DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as the
minimum, to 9 YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Exequiel
Mendoza in the amount of P39,000.
6 MONTHS AND 1 DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as the minimum to
4 YEARS, 2 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, as maximum, and to reimburse Esmenia Cario in the amount of P15,000
Defense:
Could not be held liable for estafa under Article 315, 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code since the element of deceit was
not established. They alleged that they received the placement fees on behalf of the travel agency. They argued that it
was unclear whether the false statements or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneously
with the delivery of the money by the complainants.
Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of simple illegal recruitment and estafa under Article 315, 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code.
HELD: YES, modify penalty on estafa cases
ESTAFA
The Court also affirms the conviction of Abordo for estafa committed against Rayray and the conviction of Abordo and
Cabanlong for estafa committed against Jaime, Mendoza, and Cario. Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal
recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa.
Estafa under Article 315, 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, which states: 2.
By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By
using
fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The prosecution established that in falsely pretending to possess power to deploy persons for overseas employment,
the accused deceived the complainants into believing that they would provide them overseas work. Their assurances
made complainants pay the placement fees required in exchange for the promised jobs. The elements of deceit and
damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present; hence, the conviction for estafa in Criminal Case Nos. V0654 (against Abordo), V-0767, V-0769, and V-0772 (against Abordo and Cabanlong) should be affirmed.
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
The elements of illegal recruitment are:
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(1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and
o (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b) of
the Labor Code.
Recruitment and placement is "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers; and includes referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement".
The prosecution sufficiently established Abordo's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of simple illegal
recruitment in Criminal Case No. V-0655. Without the necessary license, Abordo unlawfully recruited Rayray for
deployment abroad. In exchange for this promised overseas job, Rayray paid Abordo P14,000.
Conniving with Cabanlong, Abordo also illegally recruited Jaime, Mendoza, and Cario who paid the accused P45,000,
P39,000 and P15,000, respectively, as placement fees. Despite their payments of the placement fees, all the
complainants were unable to depart the country for work abroad.
SIMPLE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT NOT LARGE SCALE. Since the accused were prosecuted under several
informations for different complainants, the penalty imposed should be for each information charged. To convict the
accused for illegal recruitment in large scale, there must be one information that must include all the
complainants.
o

PENALTIES
Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is punished by "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to prision mayor in its minimum period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years), if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty . . . shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. .
The penalty prescribed for estafa is composed of only two, not three, periods. In such a case, Article 65 of the Revised
Penal Code requires the division into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one
period of each of the three portions. Therefore, the maximum, medium, and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed
are:
o Minimum 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days
o Medium 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
o Maximum 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years 25
If the amount defrauded does not exceed P22,000 and there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period, or 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional to 6
years, 8 months and 20 days of prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed. On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime.
o The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 315 is prision correccional in its minimum period (6
months, 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). From this, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be
taken.
Criminal Case No. V-0654 (for estafa involving P14,000), Abordo is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months
and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional, as maximum.
Abordo should also refund to Rayray the amount of P14,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until this
amount is fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. V-0767 (for estafa involving P45,000), Abordo and Cabanlong are sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The
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accused should also refund to Jaime the amount of P45,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until this
amount is fully paid
In Criminal Case No. V-0769 (for estafa involving P39,000), Abordo and Cabanlong are sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The
accused should also refund to Mendoza the amount of P39,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until
this amount is fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. V-0772 (for estafa involving P15,000), Abordo and Cabanlong are sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision
correccional, as maximum. The accused should also refund to Cario the amount of P15,000 with legal interest from the
filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
The penalties in this case consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of
such penalties. Hence, since the accused are sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be
served successively.

DISPOSITIVE: AFFRIMED with MODIFICATIONS:

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10. PEOPLE v CHAGUE GANASI -> 318


FACTS:
Ganasi is owner of 2 parcels of land in La Trinidad Benguet
o Parcel 1 (1,468 sqm): NE, provincial road, SW, public land, NW, subdivision plan -> greater value than the other
due to its even terrain and location
o Parcel 2 (1,472 sqm): Bounded on NE by property, on E, La trinidad road, on SE and SW, public land -> has
uneven and hilly terrain
September 1956: Ganasi incurred a P3,500 debt from complainant Dacanay and so he pointed to Parcel 1 to the
complainant, offering it as security or mortgage. He showed them the land, together with the lawyers for an ocular
inspection.
Finding the land suitable for his business of a carpentry shop, Dacanay delivered the money as a loan and the accused
executed a Deed of Mortgage.
Unable to pay on due date, the accused sold the same property to the complainant to settle his obligation.
When Dacanay went to the Register of Deeds to have his ownership over Parcel 1 registered, he was informed that
what he was sold was not Parcel 1 but Parcel 2.
It turned out that the accused had switched lots in the execution of the Deeds of Mortgage and sale; what the accused
had mortgaged and sold was not the land represented by him to the complainant as the security for the loan but another
lot which was worthless for the use intended by the Dacanay.
He immediately went to Ganasi to confront him about it but Ganasi refused to do anything about it so Dacanay decided
to bring the case to court.
Defense
Borrowed for Hawaii fare
No misrepresentation in the legal sense because the complainant was in a position to detect the misrepresentation,
assuming that there was misrepresentation.
o 2 lawyers
The accused contends that there is no law that covers his case, while the Solicitor General maintains that the accused
is guilty of estafa, under paragraph 1 (a) , Article 315, RPC.
ISSUE: Whether there was estafa?
HELD: Not under 315 but under 318.
o There was no alteration of substance, quantity or quality in the sense intended by paragraph 1 (a), Article 315, of the
Code, in the execution of the mortgage and later of the sale by the accused. Since the facts are not covered by any of
the provisions of Article 315, 316, 317 and the offense committed must perforce come within the meaning and
intendment of the blanket provisions of paragraph 1 (a), Article 318 of the Code.
o Under 315, the obligation to deliver already exists and the offender on making delivery has altered the substance,
quantity or quality of the thing delivered. Here Ganasi deceitfully pointed to Dacanay one parcel of land, offering it as
security on the strength of which deceit Dacanay parted with his money. The deceit practiced by Ganasi preceded the
alienation by Dacanay of his money. It is therefore clear that there was no alteration of substance, quantity or quality in
the sense intended by 315 in Ganasis execution of the mortgage and later of the sale.
o Dacanay cannot be technically qualified to notice the discrepancies adverted to by the appellant as this would require
some knowledge in surveying. Moreover, the discrepancies are of such a nature that the average person would usually
fail to notice them. Two lawyers were with him only when he went to see the lot offered by the appellant and not when
the deed of mortgage and deed of sale were executed and when Dacanay went to the Register of Deeds to register the
sale.
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DISPOSITIVE: Guilty under 318; penalty is 3 months arresto mayor and pay fine of P3577.70
ARSON
c/o HIPOLITO
1. PEOPLE vs. JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA
PEREZ, J.:
G.R. No. 182460 March 9, 2010
FACTS:
Eulogio Quilates is the owner of a two-storey house in Paringao, Bauang, La Union.
Among the occupants of his house were his sister Felicidad Quilates; another sister Alicia
Manlupig; and nephew Herminio Manlupig.
Appellant, who is the adopted son of Felicidad, occupied one room in the house.
At around 3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was having a drinking spree with his cousin
Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey Viduya and Ricky Viduya in front of their house.
Appellant and Herminio were arguing over the matter of caring for Felicidad while the latter was
confined in the hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two. Appellant was then seen going
inside the house to get a bolo.
When he emerged from the house ten (10) minutes later, he ran after Herminio but the latter
managed to escape unscathed. Appellant again went back to the house.
Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed drinking. A few minutes later,
he saw smoke coming from the room of appellant.
As Ricky was about to enter the house, he met appellant at the door. Appellant apparently tried to
stab Ricky but was unsuccessful. Ricky witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia.
Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the smoke. He peeped
through the small window of the house and witnessed appellant burning some clothes and
boxes in the sala. Herminio immediately went inside the house to save his personal
belongings. Upon emerging from the house, Herminio saw his mother, Alicia, bloodied.
Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she saw smoke coming out of
appellants room. Before she could react, appellant came charging at her and stabbed her. She
sustained wounds on her upper thigh, arms, below her breast and on her ear. Alicia was still able
to ask for help, and her daughter-in-law brought her to the hospital.
Eulogio heard a commotion while he was cooking in the second floor of the house. When Eulogio
went down, he already saw smoke coming from the room of appellant. He then saw Felicidad near
the comfort room located outside the house and was bleeding from her mouth. As he was about
to help Felicidad, he met appellant who was then holding a knife. Eulogio immediately ran away.
Upon seeing Herminio, appellant immediately attacked him with a knife. However, Herminio and
Ricky were able to pin appellant down. Before they could retaliate, the barangay captain arrived
at the scene. As a result, eight (8) houses were razed.
Inspector Ferdinand Formacion responded to the fire incident and saw four (4) houses were
already burned. After putting out the fire, he and the arson investigator conducted an ocular
investigation and invited witnesses to the police station to submit their sworn statements.
SPO2 Rodolfo Lomboy, chief investigator of Philippine National Police Bauang Police Station, was
told by witnesses that appellant intentionally set the boxes on fire inside the house.
Information dated 6 April 2004: crime of arson
o 24th day of March, 2004, in Bauang, La Union, accused, motivated by some evil motive,
feloniously set fire and burn a residential house knowing the same to be inhabited by
one FELICIDAD M. QUILATES burning and killing said FELICIDAD M. QUILATES as well
as burning and damaging 9 other neighboring houses in the process, to the damage of
said house-owners in the amount of P3M as well as to the damage of her heirs
o The charge is qualified by the resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates.
Also charged in another Information for frustrated homicide
o 24th day of March, 2004, in Bauang, La Union, Philippines, accused, with intent to kill,
feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon
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the latter stab wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason
of causes independent of the will; that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered
to said Alicia Q. Manlupig which prevented her death, all to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial on the merits
ensued.
Eulogio estimated the value of his house at P250,000.00, while another sister of Felicidad, Pacita
Quilates, presented a receipt covering the burial expenses for Felicidad, amounting to P10,000.00.
An autopsy was performed on Felicidad, and it was disclosed that she died from cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to third degree burns involving 90% of body surface to include
underlying tissues and organs.

DEFENSE:
He stated that while he was having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get a
glass of water. He followed her and gave her water.
He noticed Felicidad light a gas lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He
got into a heated argument with Herminio. The latter struck him in the head.
He immediately went inside the house to get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo, went back
outside and hit Herminio. The latter ran away and appellant chased him.
Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed
him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and lost
consciousness because, apparently, he was struck by something in the back.
Appellant denied setting the house on fire.
Appellant maintains his innocence of the charge of arson. He questions the credibility of some
witnesses and specifically imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio in testifying against him,
especially after their fight.
Appellant submits that the testimonies of witnesses, which failed to turn into a coherent whole,
did not prove the identity of the perpetrator.
RTC: Guilty of arson (Destructive under RPC) and frustrated homicide
Arson: as charged and defined under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death; to indemnify the
heirs of the victim Felicidad Quilates, the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
Php50,000.00 as death indemnity; Php10,000.00 as actual damages and another
Php10,000.00 as temperate damages. Further, the accused is ordered to indemnify Eulogio
Quilates the amount of P250,000.00, representing the value of the burned house. (AUTOMATIC
REVIEW)
Frustrated homicide: PENALTY 4 YEARS of prision correccional as minimum, to 10 YEARS
of prision mayor as maximum; to pay the victim Alicia Q. Manlupig the amount of
Php10,000.00 as temperate damages
Credited with his preventive imprisonment provided for by RPC 29
Corpus delicti in arson, as well as the identity of the perpetrator, were established
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. While no evidence to directly link
appellant to the crime, TC relied on circumstantial evidence.
CA: Affirmed the trial court but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide, hence the review is limited to the
crime of arson.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the crime of arson can be proven beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial
evidence? (YES)
2. Whether he is guilty of Destructive Arson or Simple Arson? (Simple Arson)
3. Whether penalty was proper? (Modified)
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HELD:
1. YES. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence
establishes:
o (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and
o (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime.
o In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire
and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a
single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant
conviction.
The photographs, evidencing the charred remains of the houses, established the occurrence of
the fire.
In this case, however, there is no direct evidence to establish the culpability of appellant. At any
rate, direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel
a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. Indeed, rules on evidence and principles in
jurisprudence have long recognized that the accused may be convicted through circumstantial
evidence.
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides: Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal
responsibility of the accused. While nobody directly saw appellant burn the house, these
circumstances would yield to a logical conclusion that the fire that gutted eight (8) houses
was authored by appellant.
o First, accused-appellant Murcia returned inside E. Quilates house after chasing H.
Manlupig with a bolo and after being pacified by R. Viduya and J. Viduya;
o Second, during the resumption of their drinking session, R. Viduya and H. Manlupig
saw a thick smoke emanating from E. Quilates house particularly the window of
accused-appellant Murcias room in the ground floor;
o Third, H. Manlupig peeped through the said window and saw accusedappellant Murcia throwing cartons of clothes into the fire. Meanwhile, E. Quilates,
who was then cooking at the second floor, went downstairs and saw the fire coming
from the room occupied by accused-appellant Murcia in the ground floor;
o Fourth, R. Viduya saw accused-appellant Murcia stabbing F. Quilates and A. Manlupig,
among other persons. E. Quilates saw his sister F. Quilates with blood oozing from
her mouth. Accused-appellant Murcia met him at the ground brandishing a knife at
him which prevented him from helping the wounded F. Quilates and forced him to
run away for safety. E. Quilates other sister, A. Manlupig, was also seen wounded
and lying unconscious in the canal; and
o Fifth, the houses of E. Quilates and his neighbors were razed by fire and the
commission of the crime of arson resulted in the demise of F. Quilates whose
remains were burned beyond recognition.
Indeed, appellant was last seen inside the house before the fire started. Eulogio and Ricky
saw smoke emanating from the room of appellant. Herminio testified that he saw appellant
burning clothes in his room. Appellant then went on a stabbing rampage while the house
was on fire.
On credibility of witnesses, TC is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses
since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which
would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the
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case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial
court remain binding on an appellate tribunal.
Herminios testimony, having withstood cross-examination, there is no presumption of false
testimony despite imputation of ill motive and his testimony has passed the scrutiny of the
lower courts and was held to be credible.

2. SIMPLE ARSON because according to a close examination of the records, as well as description of
the crime as stated in the information, the crime committed is in fact simple arson because the
burned properties are residential houses.
There are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree
No. 1316.
Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property
burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.
Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.
Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms,
mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments.
3. PENALTY:
Penalty for simple arson resulting to death, under Section 5 of PD 1613, is reclusion perpetua to
death so correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua with repeal of death penalty
MODIFY award of damages:
o Heirs of Felicidad: Temperate damages from P10,000.00 to P 25,000.00, and delete the
amount of actual damages, in line with the ruling in People v. Villanueva because when
actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, the
award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a
lesser amount.
o Eulogio: Actual damages awarded to amounting to P250,000.00, as indemnification for the
burned house, not awarded as amount representing the value of the burned house was
merely given by Eulogio as an estimate. It was not substantiated by any document or
receipt. For one to be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the
actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.
Award temperate damages in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, providing
that temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proven with certainty. It is thus reasonable to expect that the value
of the house burned down amounted to at least P200,000.00.
DISPOSITIVE: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
PENALTY: crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua
INDEMNITY: Heirs of Felicidad Quilates, P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as death
indemnity; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The award of P10,000.00 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of Felicidad Quilates is
deleted.
Pay Eulogio Quilates the amount of P200,000.00 as temperate damages.
Award of P250,000.00 as actual damages in favor of Eulogio Quilates is deleted.
2. PEOPLE vs. FERDINAND T. BALUNTONG
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
G.R. No. 182061
FACTS:
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At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-year old Jovelyn Santos was sleeping in the
house of her grandmother Celerina Solangon at Barangay Dangay, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, she
was awakened by heat emanating from the walls of the house. She thus roused her cousin
Dorecyll and together they went out of the house.
Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the house near the terrace where the fire
started, but appellant ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.
Appellants neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona, also saw appellant near Celerinas house after it caught
fire, following which, appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the house, as
other neighbors repaired to the scene to help contain the flames.
Felicitas also saw Celerina, who was at a neighbors house before the fire started, enter the
burning house and resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.
Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to their death. Joshua
sustained second degree burns.
Information of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder:
o July 31, 1998, at about 10:30 PM at Bgy Danggay, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, accused, with
malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to kill, set on fire, the house of Celerina
Solangon, causing the complete destruction of the said house and the death of
Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on Josua
Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.

DEFENSE:
Denying the charge, invoked alibi, claiming that he, on his mother Rosalindas request, went
to Caloocan City on July 15, 1998 (16 days before the incident) and stayed there until February
1999. Rosalinda corroborated appellants alibi.
RTC: GUILTY of complex crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder punishable under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 in relation to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code
o PENALTY: DEATH
o Pay the heirs of Celerina Suba Solangon the sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages
o Pay and the heirs of Alvin Savariz, 50,000.00 as compensatory damages, P16,500.00
as actual damages; and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
CA: AFFIRMED but MODIFIED penalty from death to reclusion perpetua bec. of RA 9346 and
additionally awarding exemplary damages to the heirs of the victims (Celerina and Alvin),
and temperate damages to Joshua representing his hospitalization and recuperation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether
2. Whether
3. Whether
3. Whether

the identity of the malefactor was sufficiently established to find him guilty? (YES)
the crime is Double Murder with Frustated Murder? (NO, simple arson)
he can be convicted of Simple Arson despite different crime charged in Information? (YES)
penalty is correct? (Yes with modification on damages)

HELD:
1. YES. Prosecution witnesses Felicitas and Jovelyns positive identification of their neighbor-herein
appellant as the person they saw during the burning of the house, given, among other things, the
illumination generated by the fire.
Appellants contention that Felicitas claim was to be doubted that she saw appellant fleeing away
from the burning house, it being then 10:30 p.m. and, therefore, dark is without merit. Also, that
she failed to ask him to stop putting dried hay around the house if indeed her claim were true is
unmerited.
FIRE was already up so cannot be dark.
TESTIMONY OF FELICITAS:
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Portion of the house which was on fire when you saw Balentong for the first time was at the
rear portion going up, sir.
o Balentong was just infront of the house, sir.
o He was about two (2) meters away from the burning portion of the house (not front portion)
TESTIMONY OF JOVELYN:
o The fire was already considerable size when she saw the back of this Ferdinand Balontong
o The surrounding was illuminated by that fire, very visible.
o

2. SIMPLE ARSON.
People v. Malngan: In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it
is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor
o (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed;
o (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a
building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only
o (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are
two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, Amending the Law on Arson, reads: Section 3. Other Cases
of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following: 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
No showing that appellants main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the
fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.
Felicitas affidavit stated that what she knew is that Celerina wanted appellant, who was renting a
house near Celerinas, to move out. How Felicitas acquired such knowledge was not probed into,
however, despite the fact that she was cross-examined thereon.
Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants,
appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true
with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill
her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house,
Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning
house to save her grandsons.
3. YES. Even if Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, appellant
may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248
(3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act.
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the
house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence,
absorbed by arson.
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense
proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or
the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
4. PENALTY: Penalty reclusion perpetua.
DAMAGES: No compensatory damages to heirs of Celerina because entitlement thereto was
not proven.
Compensatory damages and actual damages for heirs of Alvin are the same. Since the trial
court awarded the duly proven actual damages of P16,500.00 representing burial expenses,
the award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 does not lie.

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Alvin was hospitalized for five days, hence, an award of P8,500.00 as temperate damages for
the purpose would be reasonable. As for the award to Alvin of moral damages, the records do
not yield any basis therefor
No exemplary damages to the heirs of the victims, absent proof of the presence of any
aggravating circumstances
When death occurs due to a crime, the grant of civil indemnity requires no proof other than the
death of the victim. The heirs of Celerina are thus entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto[ And so are Alvins.
The appellate courts award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 to Joshua is in order.

DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE


CRIME: Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613
PENALTY: Reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.
INDEMNITY: Pay P50,000.00 to the heirs of Celerina Solangon, and the same amount to the
heirs of Alvin Savariz, representing civil indemnity
Pay P16,500.00 to the heirs of Alvin as actual damages for burial expenses, and P8,500.00 as
temperate damages for hospitalization expenses.
Pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of Celerina.
Pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages to Joshua Savariz.
3. People v Go Foo Suy

4. PEOPLE vs. CARLITO DE LEON, BIEN DE LEON, CORNELIO AKA NELIO CABILDO and
FILOTEO DE LEON
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: G.R. No. 180762
March 4, 2009
FACTS:
At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint and her sister Leonisa
Mercado, together with their nephew Narciso Mercado Jr., were inside a hut owned by their father
Rafael Mercado located on a tumana in Polillo, San Josef, Pearanda, Nueva Ecija.
The loud and insistent barking of their dog prompted Aquilina to peep through the window and
saw five men approaching the premises whom she recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and herein
appellants. Aquilina and Leonisa hurriedly went out of the hut and hid behind a pile of wood
nearby while Junior was dispatched to call for help.
From their hiding place, they saw appellants surround the hut and set to fire the cogon roofing.
While the hut was burning, Leonisa grabbed a flashlight from her sister and focused the same at
the group in order to see them more clearly. Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio
ordered the others to leave and the men immediately fled the premises.
By the time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the ground.
On April 6, 1986, Police Officer Lucio Mercado conducted an investigation at the scene of the
crime and saw a big wood still on fire. A certain Julio took pictures of the remains of the hut.
Aquilina and Leonisa valued the hut at P3,000.00 and claimed that a pair of earrings, some
beddings, rice, P1,500.00 in cash and plenty of wood were also lost in the fire. They also testified
that prior to the incident, appellants had been to the premises, destroyed the plants, the fence
and a hut which was first built therein.
Appellants likewise physically attacked their father and issued threats that if he would not
give up his claim on the land, something untoward would happen to him; and that their father
Rafael filed several cases for Malicious Mischief, Forcible Entry and Serious Physical Injuries
against appellants.
June 14, 1989, an Information was filed charging Gaudencio Legaspi, Carlito de Leon, Bien de
Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon with the crime of arson.
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April 5, 1986, in Pearanda, Nueva Ecija, above-named accused, conspiring and


confederating together and mutually aiding and helping one another, did then and there,
feloniously burn or set on fire the house of one RAFAEL MERCADO, an inhabited house or
dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of said Rafael Mercado in an amount that may be
awarded to him under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Gaudencio Legaspi died on February 5, 1987 prior to his arraignment.
Appellants Bien de Leon, Carlito de Leon, Filoteo de Leon and Nelio Cabildo were subsequently
arraigned and they all pleaded not guilty to the charge.
o

DEFENSE:
Appellants denied the charge against them.
Carlito alleged that on the day of the alleged incident, he was working in Cavite where he had
been staying for a year with his family; that his uncle Gaudencio was originally in possession of
the tumana contrary to Rafaels claims; that his uncle used to plant vegetables and make charcoal
therein until 1975 when he took over upon the latters request; and that when Gaudencio passed
away in 1987, he applied for a patent over the tumana with the Bureau of Lands.
Carlito also alleged that there was actually no structure on the premises because Rafaels
attempt to build a hut was foiled by his helper, herein appellant Nelio. On cross-examination
however, he admitted that on March 12, 1986, he destroyed the first hut constructed by
Rafael on the subject tumana when the prosecution confronted him with evidence which showed
that he was found guilty of Malicious Mischief in Criminal Case No. 1985 filed against him by
Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of Pearanda.
Nelio testified that on the day of the incident, the appellants were in their respective homes and
could not have gone to the tumana to commit the crime as charged; that the burnt parts depicted
in the pictures presented by the prosecution were actually parts of tree trunks turned to
charcoal; and that the cogon and bamboo shown in the pictures were materials brought by Rafael
into the landholding during the latters unsuccessful attempt to build a hut on the tumana.
Bien also vehemently denied the charges against him and attributed the same to complainants
desire to grab the tumana which rightfully belongs to his mother. He testified that since 1982, he
has been living in Rizal, Nueva Ecija which is about 35 kilometers away from Pearanda.
For his part, Filoteo corroborated the claims made by his co-appellants
RTC: GUILTY for the crime of arson, and they are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Rafael Mercado
the sum of P3,000.00 representing the value of the burned hut.
CA: Affirmed with modification the RTC Decision as to penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of the private complainant P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Special aggravating circumstance of being committed by a syndicate
ISSUES: Whether the CA is correct in ruling that penalty is reclusion perpertua by virtue of
aggravating circumstance of crime being committed by a syndicate
HELD: (YES)
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 amending the law on arson provides: Sec. 3. Other
Cases of Arson. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:
2.
Any inhabited house or dwelling;
Section 4 of the same law provides that if the crime of arson was committed by a syndicate, i.e., if
it is planned or carried out by a group of three or more persons, the penalty shall be imposed
in its maximum period.
Under the following provision, the elements of arson are:
o (a) there is intentional burning; and,
o (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
The appellate court correctly found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of the two essential elements of the offense.
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Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it may be inferred from the acts of
the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and
when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to
produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. If there is an eyewitness to the crime of arson, he
can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done the only substantial issue is the
credibility of the witness.
Testimonies of witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa worthy of credence: The inconsistencies and
contradictions presented in the case at bench do not detract from the fact that Rafaels house was
intentionally burned by accused-appellants who were positively identified by witnesses
Aquilina and Leonisa.
TESTIMONY OF AQUILINA
o
Aquilina was in the tumana, outside the house when they burned the house
because when the accused were arriving or entering the premises of the house of
my father or the tumana, our dog barked and we peeped thru the window. They
saw that 5 men and she recognized them. After that, they went outside of the
house and hid behind the piles of wood which is more or less seven meters far.
They hid because they were their adversary.
o
When she went out of the house, she was only with Leonisa because she already
instructed nephew to go to our house when we noticed them coming and I
instructed him to fetch my brothers.
o
When she was already behind the piles of wood, the accused surrounded our
house and they lighted it up with match. Gaudencio Legaspi, first lighted a
match for purposes of burning the house. And the others also lighted their
matches after Gaudencio Legaspi lighted his match. The cogon roofing of the hut
was first lighted as it was the portion that could be easily burned.
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which,
if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. The appellants had not shown that it was physically
impossible for them to be present at the time and place of the crime.
Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of
criminal offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a
crime has actually been committed.
In arson, the corpus delicti is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the
fire, e.g., the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally
caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible,
may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. The corpus
delicti has been satisfactorily proven in the instant case.
The appellate court correctly imposed the penalty in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion
perpetua considering the presence of the special aggravating circumstance. The crime was
committed by a syndicate since it was carried out by a group of three or more persons.
On the matter of damages, the appellate court likewise correctly awarded temperate
damages in the amount of P2,000.00. In view of the presence of the special aggravating
circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 is likewise appropriate.

DISPOSITIVE: Appeal DENIED. CA DECISION AFFIRMED: crime of arson, PENALTY: reclusion


perpetua and pay the heirs of private complainant Rafael Mercado P2,000.00 as temperate damages
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages

MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
c/o HIPOLITO
1. ROBERT TAGUINOD vs. PEOPLE
PERALTA, J.:
G.R. No. 185833 October 12, 2011
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FACTS:
May 26, 2002 at the parking area of the Rockwell Powerplant Mall.
Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) from the 3 rd basement parking,
while Robert Taguinod was driving his Suzuki Vitara from the 2 nd basement parking.
When they were about to queue at the corner to pay the parking fees, the respective vehicles
were edging each other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which
resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara was pushed
backward and naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was pushed forward.
This prompted the private complainant's wife and daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann,
respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the petitioner. Petitioner appeared to be hostile,
hence, the private complainant instructed his wife and daughter to go back to the CRV.
While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated the Vitara and moved backward
as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane.
Private complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. When the
CRV was at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear portion and
pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp.
As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the
front bumper, the repair of which amounted to P57,464.66. The insurance company shouldered
the said amount, but the private complainant paid P18,191.66 as his participation. On the other
hand, the Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper.
Information was filed in the MeTC of Makati City for the crime of Malicious Mischief as defined in
and penalized under RPC 327
o May 26, 2002, in the City of Makati, accused, with deliberate intent to cause damage, and
motivated by hate and revenge and other evil motives, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously bump the rear portion of a Honda CRV car bearing Plate
No. APS-222 driven by Pedro N. Ang, thus, causing damage thereon in the amount
of P200.00.
Petitioner pleaded Not Guilty during the arraignment on March 10, 2003.
Consequently, the trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the testimony of private
complainant. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Mary Susan Lim
Taguinod, the wife of petitioner, Jojet N. San Miguel, Jason H. Lazo and Engr. Jules Ronquillo.
MeTC: Guilty of Malicious Mischief penalized under RPC 329 and sentencing accused to FOUR (4)
MONTHS imprisonment.
Pay Pedro Ang the amount of P18,191.66, representing complainant's participation in the
insurance liability on the Honda CRV, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the
amount of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
RTC: AFFIRMED MeTC in all respects.
CA: Partly granted the petition in its Decision MODIFIED:
Penalty of 30 days imprisonment; the award of moral damages is reduced to P20,000.00; and
the award of attorney's fee is reduced to P10,000.00.
DEFENSE:
It was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara
Lone testimony of the witness for the prosecution was self-serving.
MeTC was wrong in not finding the testimony of his own witness, Mary Susan Lim
Taguinod, to be credible enough
ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of malicious mischief? YES.
HELD: Partly granted -> omitted attorneys fees
Witnesses credible as established by trial court. It is apparent in this present case that both the
RTC and the CA accorded respect to the findings of the MeTC; hence, this Court finds no reason to
oppose the other two courts in the absence of any clear and valid circumstance that would merit a
review of the MeTC's assessment as to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies.
Defense witness Mary Susan Lim Taguinod is wanting in credibility. Her recollection of the past
events is hazy as shown by her testimony on cross-examination. While she stated in her affidavit
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that the Honda CRV's left side view mirror hit our right side view mirror, causing our side view
mirror to fold she testified on cross-examination that the right side view mirror of the Vitara did
not fold and there was only a slight dent or scratch. She initially testified that she does not recall
having submitted her written version of the incident but ultimately admitted having executed an
affidavit.
Also, while the Affidavit stated that Mary Susan Lim Taguinod personally appeared before the
Notary Public, on cross-examination, she admitted that she did not, and what she only did was to
sign the Affidavit in Quezon City and give it to her husband. Thus, her inaccurate recollection of
the past incident, as shown by her testimony on cross-examination, is in direct contrast with her
Affidavit which appears to be precise in its narration of the incident and its details. Such Affidavit,
therefore, deserves scant consideration as it was apparently prepared and narrated by another.
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;
(3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it
The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is proof enough to
establish the existence of the element of hate, revenge and other evil motive. Here,
the accused entertained hate, revenge and other evil motive because to his mind, he
was wronged by the complainant when the CRV overtook his Vitara while proceeding
toward the booth to pay their parking fee, as a consequence of which, their side
view mirrors collided.
On the same occasion, the hood of his Vitara was also pounded, and he was badmouthed by the
complainant's wife and daughter when they alighted from the CRV to confront him for the collision
of the side view mirrors. These circumstances motivated the accused to push upward the ramp
complainant's CRV until it reached the steel railing of the exit ramp. The pushing of the CRV by
the Vitara is corroborated by the Incident Report dated May 26, 2002 prepared by SO Robert
Cambre, Shift-In-Charge of the Power Plant Mall, as well as the Police Report
First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate
as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private complainant that the
petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was
more believable than the petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which moved
backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the
P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant and his family to
move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his
speed in view of the gravitational pull.
Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or
other crimes involving destruction.
Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his
anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private
complainant.
Moral damages to be awarded. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
o An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions:
first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant;
second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established;
third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and
fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article
2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
o It is true that the private complainant is entitled to the award of moral damages under
Article 2220 of the New Civil Code because the injury contemplated by the law which
merits the said award was clearly established.

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Private complainant testified that he felt bad and lost sleep. The said testimony is
substantial to prove the moral injury suffered by the private complainant for it is only him
who can personally approximate the emotional suffering he experienced. For the court to
arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent and
substantial proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it.
o The same also applies with private complainant's claim that his wife felt dizzy after the
incident and had to be taken to the hospital
No award of attorney's fees as the same was not established. There must always be a factual
basis for the award of attorneys fees.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
attorneys fees are OMITTED.
o

Crimes Against Chastity Digests


RPC 333-346
c/o Aguinaldo, Hipolito, Magat, Mambuay, Paras, Smith, Ugalino
01 People v Collado
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO COLLADO (alias NINOY), defendant-appellant.
September 14, 1934
Diaz, J
FACTS:

Accused Marcelino Collado, between 3 and 4 in the afternoon of July 31, 1933 went to the
house of Paula Bautista, who only had 3-yr old asleep child with her on the house (situated in the
eastern part of the town of Bacnotan of the Province of La Union), on the pretext of asking for a
glass of water, stealthily approached her and, without giving her an opportunity to defend herself,
embraced and kissed her and caught hold of her breasts.

When she recovered from the shock, in spite of the fact that the accused threatened to kill her
with a dagger, she defended herself and bit him on the right side of the chest thereby forcing him
to release her instantly.

She cried for help and, picking up a bolo nearby, tried to strike him (SO BRAVE!!). However, the
accused, who is stronger and more agile than she, succeeded in holding her by the arms and they
were found in this position by her cousin Crispulo Ariola who was the first to come to her aid.

Surprised, he did not go down the stairs but jumped from the house to the ground, fleeing from
the scene of the crime with the utmost speed.

witnesses for prosec: her cousin Ariola and Luis Cariaso, who also came to her aid

witness for the defense: Paulino Palaroan and Laureano Nebrija

RTC: acts of lasciviousness: two months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four
months and one day of prision correccional

defense:
he knew her cousin Ariola and his witness Palaroan were just 6 meters away and
conversing; and that his witness Nebrija was inside the house -> would have been foolish of
him to commit such
his version was that Bautista reproached him because she had heard, that he had been
spreading false reports that she was his mistress or that the two were maintaining illicit
relations
ISSUE: WoN accused is guilty of crime of acts of lasciviousness defined in article 336 (YES!)
HELD: GUILTY, RTC modified: six months of arresto mayor to four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional
RATIO:

on his defense: His knowledge that Ariola & Palaroan were near does not make it improbable
for him to have committed the crime cause she was alone in the house (her husband has gone to
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Manila about a month ago to work as an agent) & accused showed her a dagger and threatened to
kill her if she did not accede to his desires. He must have believed that she would neither offer
any resistance nor give a cry of alarm. Moreover he might have thought that said two witnesses
would not continue conversing at the same place after he had left them.
SC doesnt believe Nebrijas testimony that he was inside house because aside from his
testimony and that of the appellant, nothing in the record to prove the contrary
Ariola and Palaroan did not testify that they had seen said witness come out of house even
if they were only 6 meters away
Cariaso testified that when they went up into the house they found only Bautista and her small
child, not mentioning the appellant
Palaroan admitted that after he had arrived at his boarding house which is about 25 meters
from Bautista's house and also after Ariola had gone up into the latter house, he saw the appellant
walking rapidly. This shows that the appellant actually came out of said house with the utmost
speed and that Palaroan left Ariola when the appellant went to the offended party's house to ask
for a glass of water.
on the alleged reproaching, his version of the story: what really happened, according to the
evidence, is that the appellant upon seeing that the offended party, whom he had courted before
her marriage, although in vain because she paid no attention to him, was alone, he was led into
temptation, thus again proving the old adage that "opportunity makes the thief".
no doubt but that the offended party cried for help notwithstanding the witness Palaroan's
testimony that he heard no such cry -> because Palaroan himself testified that he heard Agaton
Ariola (whose house was 25 meters away) tell his son Crispulo to go and find out what was
happening at the offended party's house
US v Campo: although a complaint or information contains no allegation that generic
aggravating circumstances of any kind were present in the commission of the crime, said
circumstances may be proven at the trial and, if proven, must be taken into consideration in
imposing the corresponding penalty
aggravating circ of dwelling had been proven at the trial, although it was not alleged in
the information; should have been taken into consideration by the trial court!

02 People vs Buenafe
May 30, 1956
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO BUENAFE Y CALUPAS, defendant-appellant.
Paras, J.
FACTS:
Victims Version:

While Dominga Reyes (the offended party) was walking near the corner of Algeciras and
Espana streets, she saw the accused alight from a taxicab.

He then approached, grabbed and lifted her into the vehicle.

Inside, the accused embraced and kissed her and touched her private parts.

While she was struggling against the accused to free herself, she succeeded in opening the
door of the taxi and at the same time she leaped out and fell in a canal.

The accused went after her but she managed to escape until she reached the house of Sims at
No. 1103 Washington Street.
Version of the accused:

From the evidence presented by the accused, it appears that he and Dominga Reyes were
sweethearts as shown by the letters sent by her to him marked Exhibits 2 to 13.

Said letters show that she often asked for, and received money from the accused for her needs
at school and for her personal use; that they used to go out together to dances and movie houses,
and that they used to meet in the Science Building of the Far Eastern University.

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In a letter of the offended party to the accused dated December 2, 1953 she asked him to be
at their usual meeting place in the Science Building of the Far Eastern University the following
Monday, or December 7, 1953.

In that letter, she stated that she needed some money for Christmas and for her personal
expenses.

The accused met her at the Science Building and in the course of their conversation, Dominga
told him that she needed P50.

The accused stated that he did not have money at that time but he would try to secure the
needed amount and promised to give the money to her in the afternoon of that day, as such, they
agreed to meet on Algeciras Street after lunch time.

Accordingly, he arrived there in a taxicab and soon thereafter, the offended party appeared
and boarded the vehicle.

While they were passing along Espaa Street, the offended party asked him for the money and
he answered that he had only P10 at that time.

The accused embraced and kissed her and took liberties with her person, and evidently
because of her disappointment in not getting the amount she needed, she struggled against him
and jumped from the vehicle. She ran away followed by the accused until she reached said house
of Sims where she asked for help.
Francisco Buenafe y Calupas (defendant-appellant) was charged with forcible abduction in
the CFI of Manila.
TC: Convicted him only of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced him to 6 months and 1 day of
prision correccional

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of committing acts of lasciviousness (NO)
HELD: The appealed decision is reversed and the appellant is ACQUITTED.
RATIO:

Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code any act of lasciviousness committed upon a
person of either sex, is punished by prision correccional if any of the circumstances mentioned in
Article 335 is present, among which is the use of force and intimidation.

In the case at bar, although the trial court concluded that the appellant embraced and kissed,
and took liberties with the person of, the offended party against her strong resistance, it did not
expressly find that said appellant was prompted by lust or lewd designs.

Considering that the incident took place in a taxicab while passing along a public thoroughfare
and at about noon time, it is difficult to believe that the appellant could have desired more than
the ordinary outbursts of one in love.

Even as regards the resistance put up by the offended party, the trial court observed that she
struggled against appellant because of her disappointment in not receiving the P50 promised by
him implying that she resisted not because she did not welcome appellant's caresses but
because she expected him first to comply with his commitment.

To sustain the charge of abusos deshonestos, something more must appear than that, with or
without her consent, an ardent lover kissed and embraced for a moment a young woman of whom
he was enamored, (U. S. vs. Gomez, 30 Phil., 22).
03 Tibong vs. People (Sept. 15, 2010)
JAREN TIBONG y CULLA-AG, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
18-year old AAA, a college student at the Benguet State University, was at the house owned by
Tibongs parents at Betag, La Trinidad, Benguet where she was boarding
She occupied a room at the 3-bedroom basement
One of the rooms was occupied by Tibong and his wife; 3rd room was unoccupied
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Tibong and AAA are first cousins (AAAs father and Tibongs mother are siblings)
Before the incident, Tibongs wife left the house after a misunderstanding with him
Before midnight of Apr. 17, 2006, Tibong arrived and repaired to the sofa at the basements living
room
AAA thereafter fell asleep but was awakened at about midnight as she felt someone was
undressing her
She saw Tibong wearing only briefs and crouching over her, on top of her bed, and pulling down
her pajamas and panties
She asked Tibong why he was doing that
He replied that they will have sexual intercourse and keep it a secret
She asked if he was not sickened about it; he replied that she need not be bothered about their
being cousins
She resisted and pulled up her pajamas and panties but Tibong pulled them down to her knees
and mashed her breasts
He soon told her that they should watch a bold movie and apply what they watched
She struggled to free herself but he forced her to lie down
She tried to shout for help; he covered her mouth
He thereafter went towards the CD player which was in fron of the door of her room to insert/play
a CD
Finding the opportunity to escape, she grabbed her cell phone and bag and ran out of the house
after he failed to restrain her
She headed towards the highway, took a taxi and proceeded to her elder brothers house (BBB) in
Bahong, La Trinidad
Tibong claims that from the afternoon of Apr. 17 up to 1 am of the next day, he was drinking liquor
with his friend Benny Malao in 3 places---first at Tibongs fathers house, then at Maryland, and
finally at Malaos boarding house, all in La Trinidad
On returning home drunk, he immediately went to sleep in the living room
Information:
Attempted rape
With lewd designs...try and attempt to rape AAA... while sleeping and unconscious
Did not perform all the acts by reason that the offended party was awakened, defended herself
and escaped
Not because of spontaneous desistance
RTC of La Trinidad:
Guilty of attempted rape
Indeterminate penalty of 3 years and 4 months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to 8
years and 6 months of prision mayor medium, as maximum
Ordered to pay AAA P25K as moral damages + costs
CA: affirmed his conviction
Tibongs arguments:
Tibong, citing Perez vs. CA, contends that there was no attempted rape as he did not commence
to insert his penis into her vagina
He says that he merely told AAA that they will have sexual intercourse
That this is not equivalent to carnal knowledge or even an attempt
He contends that this could just be acts of lasciviousness
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed is attempted rape OR only acts of lasciviousness (ATTEMPTED
RAPE)
RATIO:
Art. 6, RPC: attempt: when the offender commences commission of felony directly by overt acts
but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance
While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different
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For in rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element
is absent.
Defenses cross examination of AAA:
o She said that he tried to force his penis into her vagina but she covered her vagina
o That his briefs were already lowered down to the middle of his upper leg
o Petitioners acts, as narrated by AAA, far from being mere obscene or lewd, indisputably
show that he intended to have, and was bent on consummating, carnal knowledge of AAA.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision of October 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31644 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
04 People v Bon
January 28, 2003.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
NEMESIO BON
FACTS:

Maricris Bonode: 6 years of age and living with her family at 128 Bearbrand Alley, Pangako
St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.

Bon (uncle): Also staying in their house and is the eldest brother of Violeta Bonode, the
victim's mother

Aug 19, 1997, 3PM: victim was playing on the upper level of their house while Violeta was
downstairs washing their clothes. After Violeta finished her laundry, she went upstairs and saw
Bon lying on top of the victim. They were fully clothed when she saw them. He had his pants on
while Maricris was wearing "sando and shorts". Upon seeing Violeta, accused-appellant
immediately stood up and ran downstairs. Maricris also ran downstairs crying. Violeta asked her
daughter about the incident but the latter refused to answer and just cried.

Following morning: Violeta learned from her youngest daughter that Bon sexually abused
Maricris. When confronted, the victim told her that Bon poked (sinundot) her private part.

Violeta feared Bon so she chose not to confront him about the incident. Instead, she
transferred to Atimonan, Quezon with her family.

Jan 1998: Violeta learned that he was in jail for acts of lasciviousness committed on the
daughter of her sister-in-law. Emboldened by his arrest, Violeta revealed to her husband that Bon
molested their daughter. Thus, a complaint for rape was filed against him.

Jan 21, 1998, Dr. Tomas D. Suguitan, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Lab
an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed laceration at 5 o'clock position.
Subject is in non-virgin state physically. There are no external signs of application of any
form of violence.

Defense: Bon denied the accusation against him and claimed that Violeta filed the rape case
against him because she was influenced by her sister-in-law who filed a case for acts of
lasciviousness against him. He narrated that he lived with the family of Maricris and that she and
her 2 other sisters were close to him. At 2pm on Aug 19, 1997, when he went upstairs to sleep,
the victim and her sisters followed and lay beside him. Later, the 3 children went downstairs.
Maricris came back and lay on top of him with her face pressed to his chest. He heard a noise from
the stairs, so he got up and lay Maricris on her back. It turned out that the noise came from
Violeta, who looked angrily at him. Violeta must have thought that he abused her daughter
because she saw him in the act of laying the victim on her back.

TC: guilty of rape on a child below 7 years of age; penalty of death (by lethal injection),
pursuant to Art 335 of the RPC as amended by RA No. 7659. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity

In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the case is now before us on automatic review,
pursuant to Art 47 of the RPC, as amended.
ISSUE: W/N he is guilty of rape? (No, only acts of lasciviousness)
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HELD: RTC MODIFIED; Accused-appellant Nemesio Bon is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as defined and penalized under Art 336 of the RPC, in relation to
Article III, Section 5 (b), of RA No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as min to fifteen 15 years, 6 months and 20 days of reclusion
temporal as max; P30,000.00 as moral damages.
RATIO:

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the law
in force at the time of the commission of the offense on August 19, 1997, rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1)
By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or demented.

Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily
connections with a woman.

People v. Campuhan: touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labia of
the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.

The general rule is that factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
alter the result of the case.

However, a careful review of the evidence on record of the case compels us to take exception
to the aforesaid rule. The prosecution has failed to discharge its onus of proving, beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of rape. Specifically, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution does not conclusively establish the element of
carnal knowledge. As testified to by the victim, accused-appellant removed her underwear,
inserted his finger into and licked her vagina. It is therefore clear from the foregoing
testimony that accused-appellant did not have sexual intercourse or sexual bodily
connections with the victim. Absent direct proof of carnal knowledge, accusedappellant cannot be convicted of rape.

It appears that in the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of the victim, she never claimed that accusedappellant's penis grazed or touched her private parts. According to her, he committed the
following acts: "Sinundot-sundot ang pekpek ko, dinilaan ang pekpek ko."

The presence of a deep healed laceration on the hymen of the victim does not
conclusively prove carnal knowledge. As testified to by Dr. Suguitan, the laceration could
have been caused by introduction of any of the following objects into the victim's vagina: (1)
finger; (2) erect penis; or (3) any other blunt instrument that can be inserted in the vagina.
Standing alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does not
prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that
rape may be deemed to have been established.

Likewise, the testimony of Violeta failed to establish the element of carnal


knowledge. Violeta saw that accused-appellant was lying on top of the victim; and that accusedappellant and the victim were fully clothed. Note that she never witnessed any sexual act.

Verily, from the testimony of Violeta, it is easy to speculate that the victim was raped. But in
criminal cases, speculation and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, no matter how strong, must not
sway judgment.

Under the present law on rape, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353 (or the "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which took effect on October 22, 1997), and
interpreted in People v. Soriano, 23 insertion of one's finger into the genital of another constitutes
"rape through sexual assault." This law, however, finds no application in the case at bar,
considering that the governing law at the time of the commission of the crime on
August 19, 1997 was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, where insertion of one's finger into the genitals of another does not amount to
rape.
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Nevertheless, accused-appellant is not completely without liability.


Dulla v. Court of Appeals, et al.: although the information charged the crime of rape, accusedappellant can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because it is included in rape. Rule 120, Sec.
4 of the Rules of Court states:
Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in that which is proved.
The elements of the crime of acts lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done: (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.
Section 32, Article XIII, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610 or the Child
Abuse Law defines lascivious conduct, as follows:
"[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person."
In the case at bar, all the elements of the offense were established, making
accused-appellant liable for the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as defined and
penalized under Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. No. 7610 or
the Child Abuse Law. As evidenced by her birth certificate, the victim was 6 years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense on August 19, 1997, having been born
on November 3, 1991. Accused-appellant's acts of removing the victim's underwear,
inserting his finger into and licking her vagina, and lying on top of her, constitute
lascivious conduct intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Indeed, the victim's
testimony that accused-appellant performed the said lecherous acts should be given
full faith and credence. In cases of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the
offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. Such is the
testimony of victims who are young, immature, and have no motive to falsely testify
against the accused, as in the instant case.
Article III, Section 5, of Republic Act No. 7610, provides:
Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for
money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
(b)
Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraphs 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; . . . .
Considering that the victim in the instant case was only 6 years old at the time the crime was
committed, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
In line with current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is liable to pay the victim the amount of
P30,000.00 as moral damages.

05 People v Alejandro Rellota -> Rape vis a vis Acts of Lasciviousness


FACTS:
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AAA the complainant, native of Eastern Samar, was 12 years old when the incidents allegedly
happened. Together with her siblings, AAA lived with her aunt, DDD and the latters second
husband, appellant in Antipolo City, Rizal from September 1992 to January 1994. 2 cousins also
live with them. DDD was working overseas then.
According to AAA, appellant had been kissing her and touching her private parts since September
1993 and raped her several times between Sept. 1993 and Jan. 1994.
She narrated that appellant would usually rape her at night when the other members of the family
were either out of the house or asleep. AAA stated that she resisted the advances of appellant,
but was not successful. Appellant, according to her would usually place a bolo beside him
whenever she would rape her. She added that appellant would threaten AAA by telling her that he
would kill her brother and sister and that he would stop sending her to school.
December 20, 1993: after AAA took a bath at an artesian well near their house, she wrapped her
body w/ towel before going inside the house when she was followed by appellant and raped AAA
twice in the latters bedroom. He tied her hands with a rope before forcibly inserting his penis
inside her vagina while AAA was kicking and scratching. Then, he left so AAA slipped on her T-shirt
and shorts but then accused returned and raped her again. (1 HOUR: 12:00-1:00 -> PENIS inside
for 1 minute)
The same incident happened on January 31, 1994 when AAA was inside their room. Appellant laid
her down on the sofa, kissed her and touched her private part, while AAA kicked him and
scratched his arms. She was able to push him and after which appellant ran out the door.
AAA, told her older sister after in which the latter accompanied AAA to police station. Three
separate complaints for rape were filed against appellant.
Prosecutions Arguments
Testimony and medical exam that there is a healed laceration in the hymen of more than a month.
Laceration in the hymen could have been caused by forcible entry of a hard object. Penis may be
blunt hard object.
Defense Version
Impossible for him to have raped AAA in September 1993 because his wife only left for Jeddah on
October 21, 1993.
He points out that AAA herself testified that he only kissed her, touched her breast and private
parts, but failed to mention that he inserted his penis to her vagina.
He also denied raping AAA on January 31, 1994 and December 20, 1993. He further claims that
the filing of the criminal charges were instigated by AAA's aunt for his refusal to lend her money.
OSG Comment
appellant used his moral ascendancy over the victim in having carnal knowledge of her against
her will.
medical report bolsters the victim's claim that she was repeatedly raped by appellant and that the
latter's defense of denial is weak and deserves scant consideration
HOWEVER, agrees with CA that Jan 31 rape was not sufficiently proven to have actually
consummated and is merely attempted rape
RTC: GUILTY of 3 counts of Rape as alleged and suffer Reclusion Perpetua for each count. Indemnity
of P50, 000 for each
o Not death penalty because AAA was above 12 and although below 18, relationship with
appellant not established as marriage between AAAs aunt and appellant not supported with
evidence
In accordance with People v Mateo: Case imposing reclusion perpetua so transferred to CA upon
appeal
CA: ruled that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of consummated rape and 1 count of attempted rape
o June 31 incident when he was able to push him is ATTEMPTED
o Reclusion perpetua for first two counts and prision correccional for 3rd
ISSUE:
1. Whether accused should be acquitted as AAAs testimony is inconsistent and full of falsehoods?
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2. Whether or not the actions of appellant on January 31, 1994 constitute acts of lasciviousness and
not attempted rape?
HELD:
1. No. The claim of appellant that he could not have raped AAA because his wife was still in the
country during the alleged period when the rape was committed is so flimsy that it does not deserve
even the slightest consideration from this Court.
o It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of time or place. Neither the crampness of the
room, nor the presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held
sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape. There have been too many
instances when rape was committed under circumstances as indiscreet and audacious as a room
full of family members sleeping side by side. There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in
seclusion.
o As to the contention of appellant that the testimony of AAA was barren of any statement that the
former's penis was inserted in the latter's vagina is not quite accurate. AAA categorically
stated during her testimony that she was raped. In her testimony, she stated that He
forced me and inserted his penis inside my vagina and he repeated his acts.
o As to inconsistency that she was merely wearing a towel and then she stated that she wore a Tshirt and shorts, these were not inconsistent as there was a lapse of time between the first and
the second rape. Likewise, when AAA testified that she put on her t-shirt and panty, she was
referring to the first time of the rape where, after ravishing her, appellant untied her hands and
left only to return to rape her once more. There was enough time for AAA to dress up.
o Inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor ones which do not affect the credibility of AAA
nor erase the fact that the latter was raped. The inconsistencies are trivial and forgivable, since a
victim of rape cannot possibly give an exacting detail for each of the previous incidents, since
these may just be but mere fragments of a prolonged and continuing nightmare, a calvary she
might even be struggling to forget. Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the presence of strangers,
face to face with her tormentor and being cross-examined by his hostile and intimidating lawyer
would be benumbed with tension and nervousness and this can affect the accuracy of her
testimony. However, considering her youth and her traumatic experience, ample margin of error
and understanding should be accorded to a young victim of a vicious crime like rape.
o In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by these principles:
o first, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable
doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction;
o second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense;
o third, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal;
o fourth, an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; and,
o fifth, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution.
2. Yes, crime is not attempted rape but acts of lasciviousness as defined in RPC as elements are
absent.
Attempted rape requires that:
o The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
o He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
o The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
o The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance
Appellants act of removing the towel wrapped in the body of AAA, laying her on the sofa and
kissing and touching her private parts does not exactly demonstrate the intent of appellant to
have carnal knowledge on AAA on that particular date.

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Even so, the said acts should not be left unpunished as the elements of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness as defined in RPC in relation to RA 7610, AAA being a minor when the incident
happened, are present:
o That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
o That is done (a) By using force and intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) When the offended party is under 12 years of age
o That the offended party is another person of either sex.
o As defined in IRR of RA 7610: [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person.
The actions of appellant on January 31, 1994, by definition, lascivious or lewd, and based on AAAs
testimony, the intimidation from appellant was in existence and apparent.
Sec 5 of RA No7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also
one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case
law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion
equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party
Accused can still be guilty of acts of lasciviousness even if not charged because it is necessarily
included in rape. Under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there
is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision finding accused GUILTY of the crime of two (2) counts rape is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the same appellant is also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness as defined in the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5,
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (+reclusion perpetua for first
2 counts) and per previous ruling of this Court, must also indemnify the victim in the amount of
P15,000.00 as moral damages and pay a fine in the same amount.
06 US v De Vivar
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BRAULIO DE VIVAR, defendant-appellant.
February 11, 1915
Araullo, J.
FACTS:

Teodora Bondoc, unmarried woman 22 years 8 months and 17 days of age on date of the
commission of the crime, daughter of railroad station agent in Magalang, Province of Pampanga,
living at said station with her father and was being courted by Benigno Indiongco (living in
Manila), an employee of the same railroad company

defendant Braulio de Vivar, company's train conductor on the line between Manila and
Magalang, served as an intermediary between the lovers

early morning of December 30, 1911: Bondoc left her house and accompanied by defendant
who was waiting for her outside went to a spot near a growth of sugar cane, short distance
from the station in the said pueblo, in the belief that her lover, Indiongco, was awaiting her there
for the purpose of joining her and eloping with her, an elopement which defendant made her
believe had been planned the night before.

when defendant and young woman arrived, she inquired about her lover since she didnt see
him, defendant replied that before delivering her to him she should be for defendant
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she attempted to return home, but defendant caught her by the hand, gave her a slap and
dragged her into the midst of the sugar cane, threatening her with a dagger he had in
his hand, he overcame her resistance and succeeded in lying with her (NOTE - RAPE, shy pa ang
ponente LOL)
defendant kept Teodora Bondoc among the sugar cane until nighttime, when he took her, also
by force, in a cart through the fields to the house of a relative of his in the vicinity of a wood
in the municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac. There he remained with her alone for three
days and, taking advantage of her helplessness and by intimidating her, lay with her several
times during that period, until, as a result of the search and inquiries made by her father and
brother, she was found in the said house and freed from defendant's control.
CFI Pampanga: guilty of abduction, fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, indemnify Teodora Bondoc in the sum of
P500

ISSUE: WoN accused guilty of abduction given womans of legal age (YES)
HELD: CFI affirmed but wont suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency bec of indemnity of
P500 he was sentenced
RATIO:
Article 445 of the Penal Code punishes by reclusion temporal the abduction of a woman
against her will and with lewd designs; elements:
(1) The person kidnapped must be a woman. It is immaterial whether she be a widow, a
married woman, or a virgin, for all three classes are comprised within the generic term of
"woman"
(2) The crime must be committed against her will
(3) It must be committed with unchaste designs that is, with the intention of lying with the woman
It is unquestionable that Teodora Bondoc, who had freely gone to the place where she believed
she would find her fiancee, lost her liberty from the moment defendant opposed her
returning home, and that, consequently, it was against her will that she was taken by
defendant into the sugar cane ->this was the commencement of the abduction of the
young woman, committed by defendant with violence and against her will. When he got her
into the cane field, he abused her by means of force and intimidation.
If defendant had then left her free, the crime committed by him might perhaps have been
classified as rape, because then the deprivation of her liberty would have been but brief and
only for the purpose of his lying with her. But, considering that defendant retained her among
the sugar cane until night, continued to retain her in Capas for three days longer in his
company and against her will, and that he also enjoyed her carnally there; and considering the
deprivation of liberty of the aggrieved party during all of that time, in connection with the
unchaste designs which defendant entertained toward her and which were the motive of his
abducting her against her will, the acts committed by this defendant, and which were proved
at the trial, constitute the crime of abduction
Abduction: kidnapping of a woman by removing her from her home, or from whatever place
she may be, to take her to some other, for the purpose of her abductor's marrying her or
corrupting her.
Defendant deceived Teodora Bondoc by telling her that her fiancee, Indiongco, was
awaiting her outside of her house
Briefly, he stole Teodora Bondoc in the one place and took her to the other and kept her
in his power for three days for the purpose of corrupting her. It matters not whether the
kidnapping of the young woman was effected after she had voluntarily left her house,
deceived, as she was, by the defendant, or whether it took place in the house itself; nor
does it matter whether the offended party was or was not then of legal age, because
the acts performed by defendant with respect to her involved offenses against liberty,
honor and public order. These are offenses which the law punishes in the crime
of abduction with force, and those same acts contain the elements that go to
make such crime, and not that of abduction with consent to which article 446
of the Penal Code refers.
could have been abduction with consent if:
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(provided she was of the age specified by law for the existence of such a crime) fiancee

had been in that place and, taking advantage of the presence of his sweetheart,
Teodora Bondoc, had taken her away with him for unchaste purposes, thus removing her
from her father's control -> in that case the defendant would have been a coprincipal or
accomplice in the said crime
however, there is no evidence that Indiongco intended this; it was all defendants doing
07 US vs Ramirez
March 8, 1919
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUFINO RAMIREZ,. VICTORIANO CORPUS and PLACIDO DE OCAMPO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
Rufino Ramirez was, prior to October 13, 1916, an unsuccessful lover of a young lady
named Regina Tolentino.
In view of his disappointment, Ramirez sought the aid of Victoriano Corpus and Placido de
Ocampo for the purpose of abducting the girl.
October 13, 1916: The three defendants hired an automobile, it then being nightfall, and
proceeded toward the district of Santa Mesa, Manila, stopping at the Rotonda.
Regina Tolentino, accompanied by a male companion, Francisco Malabunga, and a female
companion, Marcelina Tolentino, while walking in Calle Santa Mesa, was suddenly grasped
by Placido de Ocampo. Marcelina Tolentino and Regina Tolentino, amidst screams, struggled
against Placido de Ocampo but without success.
Regina was forcibly taken to the automobile where Rufino Ramirez waited for her.
Victoriano Corpus, during this occurrence held Francisco Malabunga.
To prevent Regina Tolentino from screaming any further, De Ocampo and Ramirez placed a
handkerchief over her mouth. While in the automobile, Regina fainted.
The senseless girl was then taken by the accused in the automobile to a place near the
cemetery of Balic-balic.
Upon reaching this place, the chauffeur because of his suspicions deliberately ran the
automobile into the mud, telling the accused that the automobile could not go any further.
The two defendants thereupon, together with Rufino Ramirez, left the car and took Regina to
the rice paddies.
The girl who had just come to her senses renewed her screaming. The neighboring people
responded promptly to the outcries for help, and the accused, upon seeing that many people
were coming to the aid of the girl, fled.
Information: Rufino Ramirez, Victoriano Corpus, and Placido de Ocampo were charged in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with force.
The trial proceeded as to the defendants Corpus and De Ocampo, the other accused Ramirez
not yet having been arrested.
TC: Found the two defendants guilty as principals of the crime of frustrated abduction, with the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity
Appellant's assignments of error divide into three main issues: (1) The refusal of the trial court
to continue the case; (2) the presence of the essential elements that go to constitute the crime
of abduction with force; and (3) the degree of the offense.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the trial court erred in not continuing the case (NO)
2 Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of abduction with force were present (YES)
3 Whether or not the crime was consummated (YES)
HELD: GUILTY OF ABDUCTION WITH FORCE. There being present in the commission of the crime
one aggravating circumstance not compensated by any mitigating circumstance, the penalty
provided by article 445 must be imposed in the maximum degree. Judgment is reversed and each
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defendant and appellant is sentenced to seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, together with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one third of the costs in
the first instance and one half of the costs in this instance.
RATIO:
1.

CONTINUANCES.
The attorney for the appellants contends that the court erred in refusing to grant a further
continuance with a view to giving the defense an opportunity to look for their material witness,
who in the case at bar was also one of the accused.
It is claimed by counsel that "It is the right of every accused to be able to present as a witness
any person whom he believes to be necessary for his defense," and that to deprive him of said
right would be tantamount to denying him one of the means allowed by law for his defense.
Between the day when the information was presented and the day of the trial about sixteen
months had elapsed, during which time the defendants had obtained seven continuances.
This was the situation when the case was called, and counsel for the defense asked for further
time to find the co-accused Ramirez.
Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Where
the court conceives it to be necessary for the more perfect attainment of justice, it has the power
upon the motion of either party to continue the case. But a party charged with a crime has no
natural or inalienable right to a continuance.
Other jurisdictions have held that three things are necessary to put off a trial on
account of the absence of a witness:
1 First, that the witness is really material and appears to the court to be so;
2 Second, that the party who applies has been guilty of no neglect;
3 And third, that the witness can be had at the time to which the trial has been deferred, and
incidentally, that no similar evidence could be obtained.
There must be, in order to sustain the motion, facts from which the court can infer that there is
a reasonable prospect that the attendance of the witness, or his testimony, can be
procured at a future day.
Rufino Ramirez, the coaccused, is admitted to be a fugitive from justice. Counsel, after seven
continuances had been granted in the lower court, nowhere purposes to have said witness
before the court at a specified time. At the trial the attorney upon being asked by the court to
state whether or not he could make certain the attendance of the witness replied as follows: "I
cannot bind myself to find him for the reason that we do not know his
whereabouts."
If continuances could be procured on the ground of the absence of one of the material
witnesses without stating that the witness can be brought before the court at a reasonable
time in the future, the delays in the administration of justice would soon become intolerable.
Whilst great liberality should be extended to persons charged with crime in preparing their
defense and particularly in procuring the attendance of witnesses, the rule must not be relaxed
so as to defeat the ends of justice.

2.
ABDUCTION OF ARTICLE 445 OF THE PENAL CODE ANALYZED. Article 445 of the Penal
Code reads:
"The abduction of a woman against her will and with lewd designs shall be punished by reclusion
temporal.
"The same penalty shall be imposed in every case if the female abducted be under twelve years of
age."

Both the civil and the common law authorities agree in the conclusion that the crime of
abduction is one "sumamente grave y odioso" (highly serious and detestable.)
The penal law regarding abduction, says the supreme court of Spain, was intended to punish
the offense against public morality and the insult to the family of the abducted girl.
The three elements in the crime punished by article 445 of the Penal Code are:

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3.

(1) That the person abducted be a woman; (2) that the abduction must have been against the
will of the woman; and (3) that the abduction must have been for lewd or unchaste designs.
That the first two elements are here present is incontestable. The "taking," as contemplated by
the Code, is demonstrated by the force used in snatching the offended girl from a street in the
city of Manila and carrying her to the rice paddies some distance away.
Stress is laid by counsel for appellants on the absence of the third essential element, namely,
lewd or unchaste designs.
In a criminal action for abduction, in order to demonstrate the presence of the lewd designs,
actual illicit criminal relations with the person abducted need not be shown. The intent to
seduce the girl is sufficient
The presence of the lewd designs is here revealed by the actions of the accused. Among other
indications of this intent can be mentioned the taking of the girl at night by the use of force
and threats to overcome her resistance; the act of embracing her while in the
automobile; the proposition to go to a house in Balic-balic; the beating of the chauffeur who
did not want to start the engine of the automobile, and the fact that Rufino Ramirez had been
making love to the girl prior to the abduction
DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE.
Sexual intercourse not being necessary in order to commit abduction wherein lewd designs is
an essential element, the crime is a consummated one, for the reason that the evil which the
law contemplated in providing for the offense has been effected.
Although Rufino Ramirez appears as the moving spirit in the commission of the crime,
nevertheless the present appellants Placido de Ocampo and Victoriano Corpus are guilty as
principals in that they took a direct part in the commission of the crime.
In the commission of the crime there was present the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity. It is clear that the appellants selected the night time for their detestable act,
knowing that they could not accomplish it as easily or at all in the day time.
The trial court gave the appellants the benefit of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code
as amended by Act No. 2142. This court holds that the benefits of article 11 of the Penal Code
as amended should not be extended to persons who commit crimes against chastity.

08 People vs. Crisostomo (Feb. 17, 1923) NOT ABDUCTION BUT ILLEGAL DETENTION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, a plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.
FACTS:
After 8 or 9 am of Dec. 26, 1920, in Bacoor, Cavite: While Macaria Gabriel (30 years old), Macaria,
and her aunt Candida Acua were walking in the direction of their houses from that of Gregoria
Acua (to whom Macaria had paid the sum of P30) the accused met them on the way
Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde dragged Macaria along and took her
against her will to a rice field
Macaria was not able to prevent it by her cries and strife and insults
The other defendants, Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, caught hold of
Candida (her aunt) thus preventing her from helping Macaria
Gregoria, attracted by the cries of Candida, went to the place and attacked with a club those
holding Macaria until they released her
As soon as Candida was released by her aggressors, she went to Macarias house and reported the
incident to Macarias brother, Constantino
Constantino ran after the abductors of his sister overtaking them when they had just released her,
which they did upon seeing him
Prosecution contends that Macaria was abducted by Crisostomo against her will

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Defense asserts that there was an agreement between her and Crisostomo and that both of them,
by mutual accord, had escaped from the parental house of said Macaria when her brother
Constantino overtook them
Information:
"defendants conspiring and confederating together, did intentionally, unlawfully, and criminally
and with unchaste designs and through force kidnap Macaria Gabriel on a road leading to Salinas,
Bacoor, Cavite, taking her therefrom to a rice field in said municipality against her will"
CFI of Cavite:
Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde guilty as principals (14 years, 8 mos,
and 1 day of reclusion temporal)
Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat as accomplices (8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor
All of the consummated crime of abduction through violence
Each to pay 1/6 of the costs
Crisostomo is further sentenced to pay to Macaria the sum of P500 as an endowment.
ISSUE:
1)
W/N the accused are guilty of ABDUCTION (No)
2)
W/N the accused are guilty of ILLEGAL DETENTION (YES)
3)
W/N the accused are guilty of ATTEMPTED COERCION (No)
HELD:
1) ABDUCTION
Earmarks of veracity prevail in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses (as found and given
credence by the trial judge)
In addition, the manner of the eloping alleged by the defense is improbable in the case of
a woman like Macaria who, by reason of her 30 years' age, must be presumed more reflexive
and cautions in carrying out a preconceived plan than a young woman
If it were true that it was Macaria's object to escape, she would not have done so in the daytime,
nor would she have gone in company with Candida, nor would she have, so childishly and in the
presence of several persons, taken advantage of the circumstances of her companion entering the
house of Gregoria to speak with the latter for some minutes.
It does not appear that Macaria was under the vigilance of her relatives and, in view of her age,
she would have naturally enjoyed a certain degree of liberty such as to go, as she did, to the
barrio of Salinas, Bacoor, from her residence in Palicot, Imus; with which liberty she could have
planned and carried into effect with full success her escape from the parental house.
Crisostomo also admitted to a Constabulary officer that they deemed it better to abduct Macaria
as she firmly answered in the negative to his previous proposal
On another occasion, he requested Macarias another brother Epifaniol to intervene in his favour
The record as whole does not leave room for doubt that the defendants took away
Macaria Gabriel against her will
But in order that this fact may constitute abduction, it is necessary that the other
element thereof should have been proven, to wit, that if unchaste designs.
Crisostomo testified that his intention in eloping with Macaria was to get married with her in
Bacoor
While it was not proven that Macaria consented to such an elopement, the violent taking away is
not incompatible with such intention to marry her
Does this intention to marry constitute unchaste designs? SC: NO.
In this case: both Macaria and Crisostomo had the required age for consenting to
marriage, and it does not appear that either of them had any impediment to contracting it
As a general proposition the intention to marry may sometime constitute unchaste designs not by
itself but by the concurring circumstances which may vitiate such an intention (e.g in the case of
abduction of a minor where the male knows that she cannot legally consent to the marriage and
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yet he elopes with her; in this case, seduction is presumed, which may very well be covered by
the intention to get married)
Viada: By abduction is meant the taking away of a woman from her house or the place where she
may be for the purpose of carrying her to another place with intent to marry or to corrupt her
(libidinis causa)
o he specifies an essential element constituting abduction with violence:
that it be committed with unchaste designs, that is to say, with intent to abuse
her
Without this element: illegal detention only
Therefore, even considering that in kidnapping Macaria, Crisostomo had the intention
to marry her, such designs cannot beconsidered as unchaste
On Macarias testimony that the accused, while dragging her, kissed her many times against her
will
o She says: They dragged me along and at a certain distance I got seasick became
unconscious etc.
Those acts that she thought were kisses under those circumstances in which she was
seasick and unconscious cannot be considered proven
Could be mere accidental collisions of heads or faces in those moments in which,
according to her, Crisostomo had caught hold of her by the waist and the back and her head
was hanging
much less can such kissing be held proven over the categorial denial of Pedro
Crisostomo of having kissed her
it does not appear that outside the supposed kissing, they accused had committed
any slight unchaste act with her, considering that she was with them for a while, even during
the time Candida went to her house to report the matter to Macarias brother
It was not necessary to show that such unchaste designs were carried into effect, but it was
required to establish the existence itself of the unchaste intention; but no act or
circumstance tending to show such a fact was proven in the record
2) ILLEGAL DETENTION
The accused deprived Macaria of her liberty even without placing her in an inclosure
llegal detentions consists not only in imprisoning a person but also in detaining her or depriving
her in any manner of her liberty.
o ART. 481. Any private individual who shall lock up or detain another, or in any manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor.
Neither is it an argument against this finding in the present case that the information
by which this prosecution was initiated is for another crime, for it is alleged therein that
the "defendants conspiring and confederating together, did intentionally, unlawfully, and
criminally and with unchaste designs" (the latter were not proven) and "through force kidnap
Macaria Gabriel...
As may be seen, it is alleged in this information that the defendants, in the manner aforesaid
deprived Macaria of her liberty
3) ATTEMPTED COERCION (in so far as the defendants attempted through force to compel Macaria to
marry Crisostomo)
It is not proven that they did in fact attempt to compel Macaria to contract marriage.
It can be supposed that they merely tried to take Macaria away from the environment of the
family, in the hope that she might be persuaded without force or violence whatsoever to marry
Crisostomo
The mere fact of taking away Macaria might as well have been for the purpose of injuring or
affronting her, or of compelling her through force to marry Crisostomo
On the accuseds participation:
Crisostomo: principal
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Lorenzo Alcoba and Casimiro Garde, who held Macaria and dragged her along to a rice field,
assisted by Pedro Crisostomo, are likewise principals for having taken direct part in the
commission of the crime
Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, who did not lay hands on Macaria, but
did hold her companion Candida, evidently for the purpose of preventing Candida from helping
Macaria: accomplices for having cooperated in the performance of the crime by simultaneous
acts

On conspiracy:
It is true that no witness testified to having seen or heard the accused conspire or confederate
But in view of their simultaneous acts three seizing Macaria Gabriel and the other three getting
hold of her companion: joint act and tends to the same end: that of illegally depriving Macaria of
her liberty
It cannot be conceived that there was no agreement between the defendants
Said act constitutes in itself evident and sufficient proof of the conspiracy and confederacy
DISPOSITIVE:
The judgment appealed from is reversed
appellants found guilty of illegal detention
principals: eight years and one day of prision mayor
accomplices: two years, four months and one day of prision correccional
each to pay proportionate part of the costs
the endowment that the lower court awarded to Macaria is deleted because they were found
guilty of illegal detention and not abduction
09 People v Garcia
February 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY and THREE JOHN DOES, accused.
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY, accused-appellant.
FACTS:

Cleopatra Changlapon: 19 y.o., sophomore student of B.S. Physical Therapy at the Baguio
Central University.

July 14, 1998, she left school at 6:30 p.m. to go home to Km. 3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she
was crossing Bonifacio St, Baguio City, she saw a white van approaching so she stopped to let it
pass. Suddenly, the van stopped in front of her. The rear door slid open and Cleopatra was pulled
by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door closed and the van sped away. Something was
sprayed on her face which made her eyes sting and feel dizzy. She shouted, then felt a fist blow on
her stomach and fell unconscious.

When Cleopatra came to (her senses), she was inside a room totally undressed lying flat on her
back on a bed with four men in the room. One of them, who had Bombay features, was also totally
naked while the other 3 were in briefs smoking cigarettes.

(1st rape) The Bombay-looking man lay on top of her. She tried to push him away but he held
her left arm. Another man with long hair, whom she later identified as accused-appellant Jeffrey
Garcia, burned her right chin with a lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but Garcia held her
right arm. While Garcia was seated on her right side and holding her, the Bombay-looking man
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She tried to kick him and close her legs, but 2 men
held her feet, boxed her thighs and burned her legs with cigarettes.

(2nd rape) After the Bombay-looking man finished, Garcia took his turn and went on top of her.
One of the men sat on her right leg and pinned it down, while another held her left leg. Cleopatra
tried to punch Garcia with her right hand, but the Bombay-looking man held her right arm. Garcia
then had sexual intercourse with her while holding her left arm.
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(3rd rape) The third man, whom Cleopatra noted had pimples on his face, went on top of her.
The Bombay-looking man was still holding her right arm, while the man on top of her held her left
arm. She tried to close her legs but someone hit her right thigh, which forced her to keep her legs
apart. The third man with pimples succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.
(4th rape) The fourth man was next in raping Cleopatra. By that time, she was feeling helpless
and was too tired to struggle. As the fourth man was having sexual intercourse with her, she saw
the Bombay-looking man burning her panties with a lighted cigarette. She closed her eyes and
heard the men laughing. After the fourth man finished raping her, he got up.
She felt dizzy and her private parts were aching. She opened her eyes and tried to move, but
Garcia hit her on the abdomen.One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatra's face
which made her vision blurred. She heard somebody say that it was 1:30. After that, she blacked
out.
When she regained consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere bet Tam-awan
and Longlong. It was still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all over her body and
was unable to move. A taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afraid to ride the taxi,
she boarded it just to get home. The taxi brought her to her house.
Her aunt, Rufina Angog, saw Cleopatra alight the taxi crying. She also noticed that Cleopatra's
clothes were inverted and she smelled bad. She woke up Cleopatra's brothers and cousins. They
asked her what happened. Cleopatra just kept crying and was unable to talk. After some time,
when she was able to regain her composure, she told them that she had been raped by four men.
The following day, July 15, 1998, Cleopatra was brought to the Baguio City Police Station. After
giving her statement to the police, she was brought to the Crime Laboratory of the Baguio City
Police, where she was examined by Dr. Vladimir Villaseor.
Garcia was arrested at 4:30 p.m. of July 17, 1998 in connection with another rape charge
against him by a certain Gilda Mangyo.
The cartographic sketches were published in the Sun-Star newspaper. Police Officers Bulalit
and Diaz saw the sketches and noticed that one of the suspects bore a striking resemblance to
accused-appellant, who was in their custody. On Jul 26, 1998, Cleopatra was summoned to the
police station to identify accused-appellant. Cleopatra recognized accused-appellant among those
watching the basketball game from the upper floor of the police building. When she saw accusedappellant face to face, she started to tremble and cry. Then she tried to attack him but she was
restrained by the police officers. On the same day, Cleopatra gave a supplemental statement to
the police, confirming her identification of accused-appellant as one of her rapists.
Defense: He spent the whole day of July 14, 1998 at the boarding house where his brother-inlaw lived, located at No. 36 Torres Bugallon Street, Aurora Hills, Baguio City. His brother-in-law
asked him to go there to take care of his nephew. That evening, while he was in the said house
watching television, some of his friends came over to visit him. They brought a bottle of gin and
began to have a drinking session. Garcia did not join them because his stomach was upset.
Garcia's brother-in-law arrived a little before midnight, after which his guests left. When asked
about the charges of rape against him, he denied the same.
Other witnesses(Catherine Faith Madella and Joy Tabinas) testified visiting Garcia
TC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count of forcible abduction with rape and three
counts of rape; P146,125.75 as actual damages; P50,000 moral damages

ISSUE/S:
W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING GARCIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE AND FOR THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY WITH THREE (3) OTHERS? (NO)
W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE
THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY IS ONLY A LOOK-ALIKE OF THE REAL
CULPRIT? (NO)
W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLEOPATRA CHANGLAPON HAD POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY AS ONE OF THOSE WHO ABDUCTED AND RAPED HER? (NO)
HELD: RTC AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Death for the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and Reclusion Perpetua for
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each of the three counts of rape; P146,125.75 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
RATIO:

Based on our own review of the records of this case, we find that complainant was neither
influenced nor induced by the police to point to accused-appellant as one of her
molesters. On the contrary, the transcripts convincingly show that complainant was left to freely
study the faces of the thirty or more inmates on the basketball court below to see whether she
recognized any of them. There was no suggestion from the police to point to the new detainee,
who had just been arrested on another rape charge.

Owing to the gravity of the crime and penalty involved, we have meticulously studied the
testimony of complainant Cleopatra Changlapon and find it to be clear, straightforward and
categorical. The details of her narration are consistent on all material points. Her actions
throughout her ordeal correspond to normal human behavior. We take particular note of her
natural and spontaneous reaction of crying and attacking her molester when brought before her
face to face. The records also eloquently exhibit that she repeatedly cried throughout her
testimony. All of these actuations bear the ring of truth and deserve full faith and credit.

More importantly, complainant's narration of the events is well substantiated by the


physical evidence. The second degree burns found on her face, chest and thighs prove that she
was indeed burned with lighted cigarettes whenever she attempted to fight her assailants. The
medico-legal officer confirmed that they were consistent with cigarette burns. Furthermore, the
contusions found on her body were said to be caused by a blunt instrument like a closed fist. This
confirms her testimony that she was repeatedly hit to stop her from struggling. The medico-legal
officer placed the time of infliction of the external physical injuries on complainant within the last
twenty-four hours. The findings on her genitals namely the gaping labia majora, the congested
and abraded labia minora, and the lacerations all suggest the entry of a foreign object, such as
a fully erect male organ. Finally, the presence of spermatozoa further confirms that complainant
recently had sexual intercourse.

In the face of complainant's positive and categorical declarations that accused-appellant was
one of her rapists, accused-appellant's alibi must fail.

It is a well-settled rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and
consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence
are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

Furthermore, in order that the defense of alibi may prosper, accused-appellant must establish
not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.
In the case at bar, the place of commission of the rapes somewhere between Tam-awan and
Longlong and the boarding house where accused-appellant alleged he was in the evening of
July 14, 1998, are both situated within Baguio City. The distance between Tam-awan and Aurora
Hills, especially at dawn, can be traversed in just a matter of minutes.

Indeed, as pointed out by the trial court, accused-appellant's witnesses failed to account for his
whereabouts after 12:00 midnight. At the time of the rape, complainant distinctly heard one of her
molesters state the time as 1:30. Since it was still dark when complainant was dropped off on the
side of the road, it can safely be assumed that the crimes were committed at dawn.

The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in
Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with
lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there
is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using
force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible
abduction, i.e., the taking of complainant against her will and with lewd design. It was
likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired,
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confederated and mutually aided one another in having carnal knowledge of


complainant by means of force and intimidation and against her will.
Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution
convincingly established that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and
intimidation. Moreover, the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellant succeeded in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd
designs, established by the actual rape.
Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape. He should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three coaccused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted efforts
to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused helped
one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her, the other
three held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted cigarettes to
stop her from warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the
rape committed personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as well.
However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for
the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as
separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached
from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accusedappellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and
three separate acts of rape.
The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when committed
by more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for forcible abduction with rape.
As regards the other three acts of rape, accused-appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior
strength and motor vehicle. However, these were not alleged in the information. Under the
amended provisions of Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the information, otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if
proven at the trial. Being favorable to accused-appellant, this rule should be applied retroactively
in this case. Hence, there being no aggravating circumstance that may be appreciated, and with
no mitigating circumstance, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be applied, pursuant to
Article 63, paragraph (2) of the RPC
Anent the matter of damages, the trial correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages. This was justified by complainant's emotional and physical suffering, as narrated in her
testimony. Notably, the prosecution successfully proved that complainant lost her virginity during
the rape. As she narrated, virginity is a highly regarded virtue among the people of Kalinga.
However, the trial court failed to award civil indemnity to the complainant. We have ruled that
if rape is committed or qualified by any of the circumstances which authorize the imposition of the
death penalty, the civil indemnity shall be not less than P75,000.00. For the other three counts of
simple rape, where the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, accused-appellant is liable for civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count.
We also find that the actual damages awarded by the trial court was well substantiated.
Complainant presented the required receipts for her medications, transportation and other
expenses. 50 Complainant testified that as a member of the Kalinga tribe, she had to undergo the
korong and songa rituals, wherein they had to butcher several chickens, pigs, and carabaos,
thereby incurring total expenses of P90,000.00. These rituals were intended for complainant's
safety and to call on the tribe's spirits so that no more violence or misfortune may befall her. The
grand total of all these actual expenses, including those for medicines and transportation, as duly
proved by the receipts and computations presented in evidence, is P146,125.75, the amount
awarded by the trial court.

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10. People v Toledo (1949)


Accused: Santos Toledo, Benito Guevara, Anacleto Vecido, Pedro Cahinhin, Martin Montoya, Augusto
Garcia and Pedro Garcia.
FACTS:
September 22, 1945
Magdalena Ronzairo, 21 years old, and Gloria Jimenez, took a passenger bus in Manila in
the direction of Cavite to sell canned food
Magdalena and Gloria alighted, Toledo Santos following them.
Gloria walked away to wash her feet.
Magdalena, while waiting, was dragged by Benito Guevarra who suddenly grabbed her right
wrist and pushed towards Santos Toledo (who had a) revolver in hand.
Santos (?) took her to a house but the owner opposed their evil designs
He dragged her to an unpopulated place where there were seven men.
Benito Guevara took her inside and got to lie with her, with the help of his fellow who held
her by the feet and forearms
After Benito, Anacleto Vecido, Pedro Cahinhin, Santos Toledo, Pedro Garcia and Augusto
Garcia had intercourse with her. (not Montoya)
Toledo Santos carried Magdalena, already weakened, to a house and gave her dinner. After
recovering, Magdalena and Santos and Toledo walked down the street to find the bus and
met Gloria and two policemen who went in search of Magdalena
police arrested Santos Toledo.
External Examination:
"(a)
Contusions mark of the upper external part of the left arm.
"(b)
Bruises mark on upper external part of the left leg.
"(c)
Bruises mark on frontal and middle part of the right leg.
"Internal Examination:
"(a)
Fresh blood oozes out when vaginal opening was being examined.
"(b)
Presence of pain during exploratory tactation of the vagina.
"(c)
Hymen not intact.
"(d)
Rupture of the pudendum.
"(e)
There was sexual penetration."
Evidence: a jacket, a skirt, underpants, and a nightgown, torn and stained with blood
ACCUSED:
Benito Guevara died in prison
Anacleto Cahinhin Vecido and Pedro have not been apprehended yet
Martin Montoya was acquitted on reasonable doubt
Santos Toledo was convicted on charges of rape with violence and rape to 30 years in
prison perpetual, and Augusto Garcia and Pedro Garcia, per violation, to an
indeterminate term of 12 years imprisonment as a minimum sentence, and 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum punishment, with the accessories and costs.
Toledo and Garcia brothers appeal
ISSUE: WON accused are guilty of rape (yes)

DEFENSE:
Toledo: was at home and at night went to wait for a bus to go to Tagaytay City. military
police arrested him because he carried a revolver, then a member of the Second Battalion
of guerrillas Moreno. it is not true that he had raped Magdalena
Pedro Garcia: afternoon, in the mill grinding rice. He went to the den. Guevara asked if he
wanted to have relationship with the woman and he said no because he had to pay five
dollars, and returned to the mill. Magdalena Ronzairo Probably believed that I was one of
those who had sexual intercourse with her. because she saw me down. "
Garcia Augusto: after reaping rice in the afternoon of that day he retired to his home, went
to the den to ask for water, and saw Four men and a woman lying; saw a man and woman
in sexual intercourse, Guevara Benito came and informed him that if he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with women. could do so by paying five dollars,
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However, It's hard to believe that Magdalena, a stranger in the place, dared to testify falsely
against the accused.
the rape of a woman by an organized group of men is a rare case. For its rarity, raises public
outrage.
With the combined force of 6 men and one with a revolver against a weak woman, resistance is
not possible.
There is no penalty prescribed specifically for multiple violations, but the sense of justice
requires that a sentence be imposed for each violation.
It is clear that Benedict (benito?) is author of rape pro direct?, assisted by the other
defendants, and each of these, of those who helped, of course, is as coauthor of rape
Each of them except Anacleto Cahinhin Vecido and Pedro, who have not yet been arrested,
should receive, for the six pro violations each, six convictions for rape.
We therefore condemn each of the appellants to suffer six convictions of rape, and a
sentence is 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory; ero in meeting
these six sentences, according to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Law No.
217 Commonwealth ccada one must not suffer more than 40 years. It confirms the judgment, in
terms of compensation. Appellants pay their fair share in the costs.
Rape absorbs forcible abduction if the main objective was to rape the victim.

PERFECTO, J. (bengzon, montemayor), dissenting:


It appears, however, that the alleged six rapes were committed on the same occasion, against the
same victim, Magdalena Ronzairo, in the same place, although perpetrated by the six appellants by
having, one after another, one successive sexual intercourse each with the victim. We vote to
sentence appellants for only one crime of rape, and the penalties should not be more than an
indeterminate one of ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion mayor to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
11. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee
vs. FRANCISCO REYES, defendant-appellant. (1911)
FACTS:

At dusk on the evening of June 26, 1910:


Lorenza Cornejo, a girl of about 15 years of age, unmarried, left her house to return some
flags which she had borrowed
while returning home she was approached by Francisco Reyes, who for some time past had
been courting her, making her promises of marriage, and who had arranged with her to
accompany him to this city for the purpose of getting married.
Reyes insisted on Lorenza's going away with him, and accordingly advised her to go alone
to the street-car station, saying that he would follow her, so that no one might see them
traveling together;
They took a car for this city and went to the house of Jose Torno, situated on Calle
Cervantes, and there they remained and lived together conjugally. They had carnal
intercourse about ten times. whenever the abducted girl demanded of her abductor that he
fulfill his promise of marriage, he would reply that his mother was looking for some
influential person who might speak to Lorenza's mother; and that the girl afterwards
learned from her own mother that the defendant was married
After more than fifteen days, they were found by the girl's mother, Cirila Escobar, and a
policeman. Reyes was wearing a Chinese camisa, and the girl a chemisette tucked under
her skirt.

charged Francisco Reyes with the crime of consented abduction

CFI: guilty- two years eleven months and ten days of prision correccional, to pay an
indemnity of P3,000 to the offended party, Lorenza Cornejo, and, in case of insolvency, to the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, in conformity with article 50, rule 1, of the Penal Code, to
pay the costs, and to suffer the other penalties specified in the said judgment.
ISSUE: WON guilty of consented abduction- yes
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RATIO:

Art 446 (old) penal code: abduction was committed against the person of a maiden of over 12
and under 23 years of age, with her consent and with unchaste designs.

SC of Spain: purpose of the law is to prescribe punishment for the disgrace to her
family and the alarm caused therein by the disappearance of one who is by her age and
sex, susceptible to cajolery and deceit.

Witnesses: Telesforo Pestaas and Miguela de Guzman saw them going along the street
together toward the street-car station

Other witnesses: The policeman, Eugenio Wenceslao,and the owners of the house, Jose Torno
and Aurelia Ligdao

it is unquestionable that the defendant, with unchaste designs, through cajolery and false
promises of marriage made deceitfully and in bad faith, succeeded in seducing the young
girl who left her mother's house, by prearrangement with the defendant and at his bidding,
inasmuch as he awaited her on the road and they came together to this city and hid themselves
and lodged at the house of Jose Torno

The crime of abduction, with unchaste designs and the consent of the abducted, was
consummated, because the girl left her mother's house, gave herself up to her abductor, had
carnal intercourse no less than 10 times, and lived with him conjugally

Although she was not forcibly taken, it is sufficient that the girl should have left, as she did,
removing herself from her mother's custody and yielding to the cajolery, inducement, and
promises of her abductor, who took her away with unchaste designs.

DEFENSE: The defendant denied the charge and pleaded not guilty,

The averment by Marcelino de la Virgen can not be held to have been proven, which was to the
effect that the mother of the abducted girl charged him to tell the defendant that he should give
her P2,000, else he would be prosecuted. This statement is unsupported by proof and was denied
by the mother
Dispositive:
judgment is hereby affirmed; provided, however, that the defendant, Francisco Reyes. shall be
sentenced to the penalty of one year eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional,
to the accessories of article 61, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the offended party, Lorenza Cornejo,
and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed onethird of the principal penalty, to support the offspring, should there be any, and to pay the costs.

12. People vs. Amante


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIGIO AMANTE, PEDRO AMANTE, VICENTE SANCHEZ and FRANCISCO SANCHEZ, defendantsappellants.
VILLA-REAL, J p:
December 6, 1926
SUMMARY: Appellants induced and helped the offended party to leave her home to elope to Ligao,
Albay in order to marry Pedro Amante, one of the accused; however she was persuaded to go to San
Juan and they ended up at Josefa Sto. Domingos house. She was persuaded to go to the coconut
grove and on the way, she was forcibly violated (raped) 4 times: (1) Eligio Amante away from the
house into the road to the coconut grove -> alone (2) Francisco Sanchez raped her as he held her by
the hands and threatened her with a knife with Eligio pinning her to the coconut tree and held her by
the feet, (3) Vicente Sanchez, threw her to the ground covered her mouth with a handkerchief and
violated her, while Pedro Amante held her feet and looked on, (4) Pedro Amante, took hold of her
hands, and succeeded in violating her.
TOPIC: CONSENTED ABDUCTION (WITH RAPE)
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FACTS:
Accused Eligio Amante and Pedro Amante were carpenters in the house of Mariquita Motos in Baoa,
Camarines Sur, who is the mother of Jose Sanchez, uncle of the accused Vicente Sanchez. Accused
Francisco Sanchez is also Vicente Sanchez's uncle. All of them were residents of the municipality of
Ligao, but during the course of construction of the house they lived in Mariquita Motos' house.
Patrocinio Botardo, the offended party, is a young girl 15 years of age and a pupil in the fourth
grade of the public school of Baao, lived alone with her mother, Martiana Botardo, in said
municipality.
Early July (PM):, While Patrocinio Botardo was going to the market with her mother, she met Vicente
Sanchez and Pedro Amante, and Vicente Sanchez introduced Pedro Amante to the girl.
Pedro Amante began to visit Patrocinio Botardo at her house. After two or three visits, Pedro
Amante, who had also attended the public school of this town, began to make love (probably only
woo-> must be virgin for crime to be committed) to the girl and proposed marriage to her.
Patrocinio Botardo told Pedro Amante that she could not accept his proposal unless he first asked
her mother and because she was still going to school.
July 8, 1925 (PM): Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez called upon Patrocinio Botardo at her home.
Vicente Sanchez tried to persuade her to marry Pedro Amante, saying that he was a good man; but
she insisted in her refusal, because Pedro Amante had not as yet spoken to her mother.
July 22, 1925: Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante called on her again and spoke to her mother.
They afterwards spoke to the girl alone and tried to persuade her to accept the proposal of marriage.
That night the mother and daughter did not sleep in their house but in the house of the former's
cousin in order to keep her company. During their absence, Vicente Sanchez entered Patrocinio
Botardo's house and took her clothes from her trunk. (See intent to abduct with taking of
clothes)
The following day, before sunrise, Martiniana Botardo left for Iriga to sell fish. Patrocinio Botardo had
asked her mother's permission to go to her aunt Simeona's house to iron some clothes. At 7 AM (July
23): Patrocinio Botardo left her house and went to the market, and from there she went to her aunt
Simeona's house. Before arriving at her aunt's house she met the accused Vicente Sanchez and Eligio
Amante, who persuaded her to follow them by train from the station at Baao to Ligao,
Albay, in order to marry Pedro Amante.
As she was already predisposed to marry Pedro Amante, she agreed and they went to the railroad
station at Baao. Upon arriving there, Vicente Sanchez and Eligio Amante said to her: "We should first
go to the chapel, lest your mother might find you here," referring to the San Juan's Chapel. Patriconio
at first hesitated, but Vicente Sanchez said to her: "Let us take the train at San Juan, because my
fiancee Pascuala is there."
Upon arriving at San Juan, where they said they would take the truck, Vicente Sanchez and Eligio
Amante took her to the house of one Josefa Sto.. Domingo and upon arriving there, Vicente
Sanchez said. "We had better go along the road for Pascuala and Pedro Amante ought to be there."
They immediately went downstairs and followed a long path, bordered by tall weeds, in the
direction of a coconut grove. Upon arriving at a certain place, Vicente Sanchez said to them: "Let us
go back because Pascuala and Pedro are not there."
They did so, and upon arriving at Josefa's house, Vicente Sanchez had them saying: "I am going to
town for a moment, you wait here with Eligio Amante." Just as Vicente Sanchez had left to buy
something to eat, Francisco Sanchez arrived. Eligio Amante then said: "Let us go to the coconut
grove because Vicente, Pedro and Pascuala ought to be there now." Francisco Sanchez agreed but
Patrocinio Botardo refused to go with them so Eligio Amante said to her: "As you will not come with
us, I will tie you with 'panela' (rope)."
Patrocinio Botardo then remarked: "Am I a carabao that you need to tie me?;" and Eligio Amante
replied: "Certainly, if you do not want to come with us I will tie you with this rope. When a young
woman elopes she has an earnest desire to carry it to a finish."
Francisco Sanchez and Eligio Amante told her afterward that somebody had told them that Vicente
was waiting for them on the road. Whereupon she consented to go, and they left the house.
Upon seeing that they were going to a forest where there was no road, Josefa Sto. Domingo said to
them: "That is not the way to the road." Patrocinio Botardo repeated the same remark, but Eligio
Amante insisted, saying: "This is the way to the road."
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When they were a good distance from the house, Vicente Sanchez left them saying: "You go ahead,
I will meet you on the road." While Eligio Amante and Patrocinio Botardo were alone, the former
insisted upon taking the latter to an Indian almond tree (talisay).
Patrocinio Botardo wanted to take the way that led to the road, but Eligio Amante took hold of her
hands and wanted to take her to a bamboo grove. She refused to go with him and said: "What
shall we do there?" and Eligio Amante replied: "Why won't you go with me?, why won't you obey me?
Obey me because it will only take a few minutes."
As she resisted, he took hold of her hands and feet, threw her on the ground, and tried to violate
her. She stood up, but he again took hold of her hands and feet and threw her on the ground; and as
she was down, he held and mounted her. The girl succeeded in getting up again, but she could not
stand and dropped down. Eligio Amante then lay down beside her, but she stood up for the third time.
For the fourth time, he threw her on the ground and held her hands.
Patrocinio Botardo tried to shout, but could not do so, because Eligio Amante covered her mouth
with a handkerchief. Having completely overpowered her, he raised her dress and succeeded in
violating her. It was then about 8 o'clock in the morning. After having sexually abused her, Eligio
Amante invited her to stand up and leave the place with him.
They had not gone very far when Francisco Sanchez appeared, and addressing Eligio Amante, said
"Eligio, first go and buy tuba, for I want a drink of tuba very much." When Eligio Amante had left,
Patrocinio Botardo said to Francisco Sanchez: "Your companion wanted to violate me;" and
Francisco said: "Why did you not shout," and she replied that she could not because Eligio Amante
covered her mouth with a handkerchief.
A little later, Eligio Amante returned and said "There is no tuba, I was unable to buy it." He then
turned and walked toward a coconut grove. Francisco Sanchez, who remained alone with the girl,
wanted to take his turn and violate her, but as she resisted, he said to Eligio Amante: "She refuses."
Whereupon Eligio Amante pinned her to an inclined coconut tree and held her by the feet,
while Francisco Sanchez held her by the hands and threatened her with a knife. At the same
time, Eligio Amante raised her dress, and Francisco Sanchez, after slapping her face, caught her
around the neck. Francisco Sanchez with the aid of Eligio Amante succeeded in violating the girl.
After the violation by Francisco Sanchez, Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez appeared. Upon seeing
them, the girl wanted to flee, but Vicente Sanchez said to her: "Now that we are here, will you go?"
and she replied: Naturally, because Francisco Sanchez and his companion wanted to
violate me."
Exhausted and weakened she sat on the trunk of a guava tree, when Pedro Amante and Vicente
Sanchez approached her, the latter saying: Please me also, now that Francisco and Eligio have
already abused you." "I do not want to," she replied Vicente Sanchez then Sanchez then said: "Why
not?, I have helped you so that your mother might not overtake you!"
As the girl used to consent to their lewd desires, Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante took hold of
her hands, and she said: "Why do you hold me, you are like dogs." The girl had not as yet recovered
her strength, and it was an easy matter for Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante to throw her ground,
which they covered-with their shirts.
She wanted to shout, but Vicente Sanchez covered her mouth with a handkerchief and
violated her, while Pedro Amante held her feet and looked on. Pedro Amante then took his
turn, notwithstanding her protest and remarks, telling him that the actions of his companions were
more than those of animals. Pedro Amante took hold of her hands, and succeeded in violating
her.
After the consummation of the carnal act, Pedro Amante helped the girl to stand up and to walk
until they arrived near Josefa Sto. Domingo's house, where he left her. Vicente Sanchez then said:
"You wait here, I will see if Pedro is in Josefa Sto. Domingo's house," promising to return for
her.
As she thought that it was probably about 11 o'clock and Vicente Sanchez has not yet arrived, she
went alone to Josefa Sto. Domingo's house and inquired for Vicente Sanchez. The former replied that
he had already gone. After a short while Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante arrived. She asked the
former: "Why did you leave me?, you promised to return for me." He then replied: "I merely went to
get you dress and Eligio Amante's shirt." Pedro Amante gave her shirts and told her that he would go
to the house where Vicente Sanchez stayed and get her clothes.
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When Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante had left, Patrocinio Botardo asked Josefa Sto. Domingo to
let her lie down for a short time because she felt very weak. Josefa Sto. Domingo asked her: "Why are
you so weak?" and she replied: "Because those four men violated me."
Josefa Sto. Domingo gave her a mat and a blanket upon which she lay down, while the former
prepared the food. Patrocinio Botardo fell asleep and Josefa Sto. Domingo awakened her to eat. While
she was eating, Pedro Amante arrived with her clothes, and told her that she should go on
ahead to the municipality of Oas, Albay, and wait for him there.
She asked Pedro Amante: "Why wont you go with me, after taking me away from home, you want
to leave alone?" After eating, Pedro Amante said to her: "You dress because I have to take an auto,"
and he gave her P0.75 to pay her fare from Baao to Oas, telling her that he could not go with her
because he already found work, but that he would go to Ligao the following Saturday to get her and
marry her.
After having waited together on the road for some time at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon a truck
for Oas came along and she took it. Upon arriving at Oas, the girl went to her aunt Florencia Angelo's
house where she stopped to wait for Pedro Amante. She remained in Oas for about three weeks,
but Pedro Amante did not appear, and she did not want to return to Baao because she was
ashamed of what had happened to her.
After three weeks her mother, Martiniana Botardo, came to get her, but she did not want to go with
her mother saying that she was ashamed because Pedro and Eligio Amante, and Vicente and
Francisco Sanchez had violated her. Martiniana Botardo then returned to Baao to tell Juan Botardo,
her brother, what had happened, who went back to Oas with her to get the girl.
When all of them had returned to Baao, Juan Botardo filed a complaint against Pedro Amante, Eligio
Amante, Vicente Sanchez, Francisco Sanchez and Norberto Iballa, husband of Josefa Sto. Domingo.
EVIDENCE:
Josefa Sto. Domingo saw that the blanket which she had used was stained with blood, which could
not be removed by the first washing.
Medical examination on August 12, 1926: Hymen ruptured and a large amount of a mucous like
secretion in the vaginal canal due to a slight inflammation of the vagina, which might have been
caused by a sexual intercourse.
DEFENSE:
Vicente Sanchez claims that on July 21,1925 he went to Naga, a distance of 30 kilometers from
Baao, to order a silk shirt from his old sewing woman Esperanza Margallo, living in his aunt Pilar
Sanchez' house until the following day, when he returned to Baao, arriving there at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon.
The accused Francisco Sanchez attempted to prove that on July 15, 1925, at the request of his sister
Pilar, he went to Naga to supervise the repairs on her house and did not return to Baao until the 4th
of the following August.
The accused Pedro and Eligio Amante tried to prove that during the day in question, they were
working on the construction of Mariquita Motos' house in Baao, and that they had not left the place.
Josefa Sto. Domingos testimony that she did not see any of the accused in her house, and that
Patrocinio had been in her house accompanied by two unknown men different from the accused. She
testified in the preliminary investigation because of threat by Juan Botardo, who told her that if she
did not testify as he wanted her to, her husband would not be excluded from the complaint and would
not be released. DENIED by Juan Botardo
CFI of Camarines Sur: Eligio Amante, Francisco Sanchez, Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez
GUILTY of the complex crime of abduction with consent, with rape (or consented abduction with rape)
PENALTY: Brothers Amante and F. Sanchez sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
reclusion temporal, Vicente Sanchez, on account of being under 18 years of age to 12 years
prision mayor, Indemnify the offended party Patrocinio Botardo in the sum of P500, and each
to pay one-fourth of the costs of the action.
ISSUES:
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1. Whether the accused are guilty of the crime of consented abduction with rape in view of
contradictory testimony of witnesses? (YES)
2. Whether the relations, which, according to the prosecution existed between the offended party
Patrocinio Botardo and Pedro Amante, were against the will of the former and were brought by the
use of force? (Not specifically answered but still YES)
HELD:
1. Yes. Testimony CREDIBLE. Far from destroying the probative force of said testimony they
strengthen the same, as seen that neither could there have been a conspiracy nor a preconceived
plan as to what they were to testify to. Considering the varied points of view of persons and their
perceptive ability, it is but natural that they should differ in the narration of their observations. It is
psychologically impossible that they should agree in all details. Hence, when the testimony of
two witnesses agrees even in its minute details, it ceases to be an accurate statement of
the subjective truth.
MAIDEN CREDIBILITY: The offended party is a young girl fifteen years of against whom there cannot
be the least doubt as to her chastity and honor.
Like all maidens of her race, the loss of her virginity made her so ashamed that at first she did not
want to return to her town where two of those who had outraged her lived. A girl who has hardly
begun to know the ways of the world, and who has such a high and delicate regard for purity, is
not capable of fabricating such a bestial and shameful act of which she was a victim; her
own sentiment of purity would rebel against such an idea, inasmuch as she would be exposed to the
scorn and disrespect of honest people.
This is shown by the fact that she was ashamed to tell even those who had violated her that
she had been violated, and in accusing those who first had sexual intercourse with her, she only
said to those who succeeded them that they wanted to violate her.
2. YES. The contention of the defense that Patrocinios confidence in Amantes promise after she was
violated disproves her testimony of the outrage she suffered is without merit. If the position in which
she found herself and the loss of what all reputable women consider as their most precious
possession are taken into consideration, it is not strange that in order to save herself from
dishonor she should still continue believing him, as a drowning man who clings to the smallest
floating object to save himself from drowning.
DISPOSITIVE: Affirmed CFI Ruling
Elements of Consented Abduction:
That offended party must be a virgin
That she must be OVER 12 and UNDER 18 years of age
That the TAKING AWAY of the offended party must be WITH HER CONSENT, after solicitation or
cajolery from the offender
That the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs
13. Samilin vs. CFI
APOLINARIO SAMILIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, respondent.
BUTTE, J p:
October 15, 1932
TOPIC: PROSECUTION OF CRIMES OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION, RAPE AND
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

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NATURE: Original petition praying that a writ of prohibition issue to the respondent court
commanding it to desist and refrain from further proceedings in criminal case No. 12004 entitled the
People vs. Apolinario Samilin, in which the defendant (petitioner here) is on trial for the crime of rape.
FACTS:
April 16, 1931: Criminal case (Rape committed to girl of 12 yrs. old) was commenced on, by a
complaint signed and filed by the chief of police of the municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan,
before the justice of the peace, in conformity with the provisions of Act No. 1773
After a finding of probable cause, the case was sent to the CFI Pangasinan
June 11, 1931: the provincial fiscal signed and filed an information against the accused for the said
crime of rape, again pursuant to Act No. 1773
June 29, 1931: the petitioner was duly arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty
November 17, 1931: the trial began with the testimony of the alleged offended party. The trial was
continued and set for hearing on January 13, 1932.
January 1, 1932: Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) took effect.
January 13, 1932: Trial resumed; the accused through his counsel moved that the court dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction, invoking article 22 in connection with articles 344, paragraph 2, 336 and
367 of the Revised Penal Code.
February 9, 1932: Court denied said motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
LAWS:
o RPC 22: "Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
o RPC 344, paragraph 2: The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
o Section 1 of Act No. 1773, which took effect October 11, 1907, provides: "Hereafter the
crimes of adultery, estupro (rape of minor), abduction, rape, calumny (slander), and libel, as
defined by the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, shall be deemed to be public crimes and
shall be prosecuted in the same manner as are all other crimes defined by said Penal Code or
by the Acts of the Philippine Commission.
o Act No. 1773 was expressly repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code, saving,
however, the cases covered by article 366 which reads as follows: "Application of laws
enacted prior to this Code. Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Article 22 of
this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this
Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their
commission.
PETITIONER:
o Complaint was not signed or filed by the aggrieved party (in this case a girl of 12 years), or
her parents, grand-parents or guardian, the court is now without jurisdiction to proceed with
prosecution.
o Since January 1, 1932, the RPC 344, paragraph 2, prosecution for rape requires that the complaint
shall be made by the offended party or her parents, grand- parents or guardian as the case may be.
o This is a jurisdictional requirement and the requirement favors the petitioner; and under RPC 22,
said requirement must be given a retroactive effect and relate back to the complaint filed in this
case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the requirement of article 344, paragraph 2, that the complaint must be made by the
aggrieved party or her relatives favor persons charged with the crimes there mentioned? In other
words, should it be given retroactive effect? (NO)
a. Whether by virtue of the enactment of RPC, the offense is now a private offense out of what
was under the previous code a public offense? (NO)
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2. Whether the requirement is jurisdictional in the sense that prosecutions in such cases, begun
before January 1, 1932, and pending thereafter, must be dismissed if the complaints were not signed
and filed by the offended party or her relatives as aforesaid? (NO)
HELD:
1. NO. Article 344, paragraph 2 cannot have retroactive effect as it was not made favorable to the
accused. Article 22 makes the penal laws retroactive "favor the persons guilty of felony". Their
appellants major premise, that article 344, paragraph 2, is favorable to persons charged with the
crimes there indicated fails. There can be no reasonable doubt that CFI Pangasinan in this case should
proceed to final judgment in accordance with article 366 of the Revised Penal Code UNLESS article 22
stands in the way.
Article 22 is not to be applied in this case (as provision not enacted to favor the accused);
Article 366 applies insofar as it applies the law at the time of the commission of the offense.
PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 344: Moreover, it is patent that the provision requiring that the
proceedings must be initiated upon complaint filed by the offended party or her relatives, was
enacted out of consideration for the offended party and her family who might prefer
to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public
trial.
It would be an insult to the Legislature to hold that article 344, paragraph 2 was enacted with
the intention of favoring seducers and rapists.
Citing People of the Philippine Islands vs. Dionisio Candido, Article 344, paragraph 2:
o In this case, it was argued that the court had no jurisdiction upon the absence of a
signature in the complaint of the offended party as required by Article 344,
paragraph 2. Defendant charged with the crime of abduction with consent upon an
information signed and filed by the provincial fiscal was convicted and sentenced, and
an appeal was filed in the SC. The motion for reconsideration was denied and the
judgment of conviction affirmed by the First Division.
COMPARE WITH: Clemente Laceste vs. the Director of Prisons, Article 344, paragraph 3:
o Criminal liability of the offender which is extinguished upon marriage with offended
party benefits co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the
abovementioned crimes." It is not to be overlooked that article 344 provides that
marriage "shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed
upon him." It is obvious that the provision for the remission of all penalty upon marriage
is favorable both to the principal and the accessory.
1a. No, this is a mere verbal distinction, for it is the government in both cases that conducts the
prosecution and punishes the offender. Nor is it clear that a complaint is any less likely to be filed or
any less likely to be vigorously prosecuted in the one case than in the other. It is not apparent that it
can make any real difference to the accused whether he is tried on a complaint filed by the offended
party or on one filed by the fiscal.
Indeed, it is conceivable that the offended party might insist upon the filing and trial of a
complaint which an experienced and impartial fiscal would be unwilling to file for technical
reasons or for lack of sufficient evidence that would lead to conviction. A private individual
might file a complaint out of malice or other improper motive, which would not ordinarily be
imputable to the government or its officials.
2. NOT DOCTRINAL but People vs. Tolentino held that "it does not appear from the Revised Penal Code
that it was the intention of the law to divest Courts of First Instance of jurisdiction over crimes already
acquired; the contrary is clearly implied."
Penal laws that relate to mere matters of form or procedure are colorless when examined to
ascertain whether or not they favor the accused. They are all designed to secure to the defendant a
speedy and impartial trial in accordance with law, without advantage either to the prosecution or to
the defense.
Viewed in this light, changes in procedure introduced by the Revised Penal Code are not to
be given retroactive effect in the sense that all proceedings prior to January 1, 1932, which
conform to the law in force at the time, must be overturned and new proceedings begun. Article 366
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was enacted to avoid the havoc which would have resulted if said changes had been made
retroactive.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition for writ of prohibition is denied with costs against the petitioner.
SIMULATION OF BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR ANOTHER AND CONCEALMENT
OR ABANDONMENT OF LEGITIMATE CHILD
c/o Hipolito
Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and concealment or abandonment
of a legitimate child. The simulation of births and the substitution of one child for another shall be
punished by prision mayor and a fine of not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall conceal or abandon any legitimate
child with intent to cause such child to lose its civil status.
Any physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of the duties of his profession or office,
shall cooperate in the execution of any of the crimes mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs, shall suffer the penalties therein prescribed and also the penalty of temporary special
disqualification.
COMPARE WITH: Art. 276. Abandoning a minor. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any one who shall abandon a child under seven years of
age, the custody of which is incumbent upon him.
When the death of the minor shall result from such abandonment, the culprit shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; but if the life of the minor shall have been
in danger only, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions contained in the two preceding paragraphs shall not prevent the imposition of the
penalty provided for the act committed, when the same shall constitute a more serious offense.
2. UNITED STATES vs. SATURNINO CAPILLO and PETRONA PADUGA
CARSON, J.: March 25, 1915
G.R. No. L-9279
FACTS:
Information: Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga charged with Crime of exposing a
legitimate child to lose his civil status
August 12, 1913: in Manila, Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did feloniously expose a child, 1 month old,
the legitimate son of the accused Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to
lose his civil status
Saturnino Capillo, with intent to cause his legitimate child to lose his civil status and in
cooperation with the defendant Petrona Paduga, took the said without the permission of his
mother Vicenta Umanbang or the authority of the courts of this city and agreed with one Chua
Pue Tee to deliver to him the said child and never to claim it again
Asking the said Chua Pue Tee at the same time to lend them the sum of P150 to defray the
expenses incurred by the defendant Saturnino Capillo during the last sickness and death of
his wife Vicente Umanbang
Received from said Chua Pue Tee the sum of P106 of which P50 corresponded to the
defendant Saturnino Capillo and P56 to defendant Petrona Paduga.
That the living of said child under such circumstances in the possession of said Chua Pue Tee
and His wife Sio Suat King exposes said child to lose his civil status, to wit, that of the
legitimate son of the said defendant Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to that
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of an unknown and nameless child or at the most to that of the child of one Chua Pue Tee
and his wife.
Aggravating circumstance of price should be taken into consideration.
August 21, 1913: Defendants pleaded not guilty
September 1, 1913: the defendants counsel filed a motion, in the nature of a demurrer and
argument
That the case be DISMISSED, basing his contention upon the fact that the information fails
to show facts of sufficient weight to constitute a cause of action, that is, that the facts
stated do not constitute a crime.
o Article 468 of the Penal Code in force, paragraph 2 of which is mentioned by the
prosecuting attorney, does not define as a crime the acts attributed to defendants. Nor
is it inferred from the historical precedents that the facts which gave rise to this case
constitute a crime.
o The hypothesis of the legislator as to meaning of said paragraph 2 is the fact of
concealing or exposing a legitimate child with intent to cause such a child to lose his
civil status, when this act is done by the person to whom the child is entrusted
for its nursing or for some other lawful purpose.
o This crime is rather applicable to Spain only, where nursing children are usually given
to wet nurses, living out in the country, who are not able to move their residence to the
city where the childs parents live.
o In the Philippines the children are usually nursed by their own mother, and, if they are
given to a wet nurse, the latter goes to live at the house of the childs parents.
CFI Manila: Considered it a demurrer to the information and plea of not guilty considered withdrawn;
Granted Motion and Dismissed the case
Complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged.
United States APPEALED
ISSUES:
1. Whether Article 468 of Penal Code penalizes abandonment of a child with the intent to lose its civil
status and not merely an exposure or danger to the loss of civil status or simple abandonment? (YES)
2. Whether the CFI properly dismissed the case for lack of cause of action? (YES)
HELD: (YES)
2. The contentions of the parties on this appeal turn upon the meaning which should be given to
the word expusiere as found in the original Spanish version.
o The verb exponer is given various meaning in El Diccionario de la LenguaCastellanapor
la Real Academia Espaola, 12th edition. Among others arriesgar, aventurar,
ponerunacosa en contingencia de perderse (to risk, to adventure, to put a thing in danger
of being lost); and also dejar a un nioreciennacido a la puerta de unaiglesia o casa o en
otroparajepublico, por no tener con quecriarlosus padres o porque no se sepaquienes son
(to leave a recently born baby at the door of a church, or a house or other public place, the
parents not having means to support it, or the paents being unknown).
o Having in mind the qualifying phrase which provides that the offense is committed when
the child is exposed con animo de hacerleperdersuestado civil (with intent to expose it to
lose its civil status), the word must be held to have been used by the authors of the code in
the sense of to abandon, in some such manner as is indicated in the last of the above
cited meaning given the word in the Diccionario; that being the clear, definite and well
understood signification of the word when used by the Spanish authors of the code with
relation to infants or children, as it manifestly is in this article.
o The contention of the prosecution is that the true meaning of the language of the statute is
that the prescribed penalties are to be imposed upon one who conceals, or exposes or
subjects to danger of loss of civil status, a legitimate child, with intent to cause it to lose its
civil status.
o But without the addition of the qualifying phrase with intent to cause it (the infant) to lose
its civil status, the transitive verbs ocultare and expusiere convey no thought of loss of
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civil status, and in construing the verb exponer to mean to expose or subject to danger
of loss of civil status, the prosecution gives to it a meaning which is not found in any
dictionary.
o It is worthy of observation, furthermore, that the transitive verb expusiere (shall expose)
is joined in grammatical construction with the verb ocultare (shall conceal) and, like it,
has for its sole object the word child (hijo), and sound principles of grammatical
construction forbid the attempt to import into one of these verbs a meaning from the
common qualifying phrase which it is manifestly impossible to give to the other.
The practice of abandoning new-born infants and very young children at the door of hospitals,
churches and other religious institutions was formerly so well known in Spain that, as will be seen
from the definition above cited from the dictionary of the Real Academia, it gave rise to the use
of the verb exponer (to expose) in a peculiar and special sense with reference to this practice,
when the grammatical object of the verb is an infant or small child. We are well satisfied that it is
in this sense that the word is used in the article of the code under consideration, and that in this
connection it may and should be construed in both Spanish and English by its substantial
equivalent to abandon.
Expusiere (shall expose) = ABANDONMENT
Groizard: the exposition which is caused by abandoning a new-born child in place where it cannot
be easily assisted, intending that it should perish and save the honor of the mother, is a crime
against life. The exposition of a child and the abandonment thereof in a place where it may not
be in danger may be a crime against the safety of persons. Only that which has for its
purpose the deprivation of the new-born childs civil status is what constitutes the present crime.
o It is necessary that the acts committed by the guilty party plainly show his intent.
o The fact that one abandons, in the midst of a lonely forest, an unfortunate child that needs
all kinds of assistance during the first moments of coming into the world cannot be
admitted as intent to destroy its civil status, but as an attempt against its life.
o On the contrary, he who places at the door of a charitable person, a new-born child which is
in condition to stand the first in clemencies of the weather, is supposed to do it in order
that it may be taken up and protected, and therefore the legal presumption must be that he
does not act with any other purpose than to cause the loss of any trace as to the filiation of
the child.
Viada: Child must be understood a fully developed and living being, as the child born not
capable of living has no status, nor can he transmit any rights whatever. It is, therefore, an
essential condition of this crime, that crime, that the child who has been exposed or concealed
shall have been born alive, and therefore, the clandestine burial of a child who was born dead is
not included within the provisions of the last paragraph of this article, although it may be included
within the provisions of article 349 of this Code.
o Exposition or concealment must be of a legitimate child and done with the intention of
making him lose his civil status, that is, his inherent rights as a legitimate child
o Were he illegitimate, or, were the intentions of the one who concealed or exposed the
child different, the act may constitute a crime against liberty and security, but certainly
not an attempt against the civil status of the child.
2. Case properly dismissed. It is manifest from the information itself, and from the argument of
counsel on the demurrer, that the real object sought to be attained by the prosecution is to penalize,
under the provisions of article 468 of the code, the conduct of the father in turning over his new-born
child to the Chinaman and his wife, with a promise not to reclaim it, taking from the Chinaman for so
doing money by way of loan or otherwise. But it is very clear that it was not the intention of the
authors of the coded to penalize such conduct by the provisions of the article relied upon by the
prosecution.
It is urged that the transaction set forth in the information was in truth and effect a heartless sale
of his own flesh and blood by the accused for one hundred and odd pesos, and that he should not
be permitted to go unpunished.
It is not necessary for us to consider and decide, at this time, under what circumstances, if any, a
father, left with a motherless child, may turn it over to others with or without an agreement to
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reclaim it, or whether, in the event that he does turn the child over to others, be would ever be
permitted to receive money or other consideration from those who adopt the child.
Our ruling at this time is merely that the offense defined and penalized in article 468 of the Penal
Code is not the unlawful sale of a child by its father, and that such conduct cannot properly be
penalized under its provisions.
If the accused has been guilty of conduct constituting an offense of this kind, in violation of the
laws of the Philippine Islands, he should be charged with and tried for the offense actually
committed, so that the penalty to be imposed upon conviction may be adjudged by the courts in
accord with the provisions of the statute defining and penalizing the crime of which he is found
guilty.
DISPOSITIVE: CFI AFFIRMED, CASE DISMISSED
BIGAMY
c/o Hipolito
RPC 349: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
2. CENON R. TEVES vs. PEOPLE and DANILO R. BONGALON
PEREZ, J.:
August 24, 2011 G.R. No. 188775
FACTS:
November 26, 1992: Cenon Teves and Thelma Jaime-Teves married at the MTC of Muntinlupa City,
Metro Manila.
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines for
vacations.
While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a
certain Edita Calderon.
To verify the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the
Certificate of Marriage indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10
December 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
February 13, 2006: Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint accusing petitioner of committing bigamy.
May 4, 2006: Before the filing of information for the criminal case of bigamy, the RTC Caloocan
rendered a decision dated declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the
ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY).
June 8, 2006: Teves was charged with bigamy under RPC 349 in an Information:
o December 10, 2001 up to the present: Meycauayan, Bulacan, Cenon R. Teves being
previously united in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and
without the said marriage having legally dissolved, unlawfully contract a second marriage
with one Edita T. Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused Cenon
R. Teves to marry her and in concurrence thereof, unlawfully cooperate in the
execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the existence
of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.
June 27, 2006: Decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality
RTC: TEVES GUILTY; Penalty: ISL 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Teves appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals contending that:
o His criminal action or liability had already been extinguished (marriage declared VOID)
o Defective Information filed by the prosecution
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CA: AFFIRMED RTC


MOR filed but was DENIED.
Petitioners Arguments:
o Since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all,
and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.
o Differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and
posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second
marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined.
o Ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case
the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was
filed. In petitioners case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the
bigamy case was filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether husband cannot be guilty of the crime of bigamy if the marriage was declared null and void
before the filing of the bigamy case in court? (NO, still GUILTY)
HELD: GUILTY of Bigamy; His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit.
Elements of BIGAMY:
1.
That the offender has been legally married;
2.
That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3.
That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4.
That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
2nd MARRIAGE:
o Element 1: Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
o Element 2&3: At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with
Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision
declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006
or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita.
o Element 4: Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita
has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the
validity of such subsequent marriage.
Family Code: A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee took the
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
PURPOSE OF REQUIREMENT FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION: It is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
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If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply
evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him.
We note that in petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was
declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can
still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes
the filing of the Information in court.
Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the
ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioners strained
reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him
until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the
criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for
determining prescription.
The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he
contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact
to the date of the bigamous marriage.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision
dated 21 January 2009 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

3. ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. vs. PEOPLE


CARPIO, J.: G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
FACTS:
April 6, 1999: First marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on
at [IE]MELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the
IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony.
December 8, 2001: Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena Gerldino at
Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila. Rev. Honorato D.
Santos officiated the ceremony.
P. Geraldino on in Quezon City (admitted in a counter-affidavit by both parties, Certificate of
Marriage)
August 24, 2004: Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Rowena P. Geraldino for the crime
of Bigamy.:
o December 8, 2001: ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA
PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting,
did then and there unlawfully contract a subsequent or second marriage with his coaccused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to
her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.
Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by
the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when
arraigned
Prosecution:
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Jesusa Pinat Nollora testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while
she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital
While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because
of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 when
she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino on
Novermber 2003 with a friend (Ruth Santos) at Rowenas workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked
her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which
Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and
childhood friends.
Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage
with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was brought
by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her
to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a
friend and she heard everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff
Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what happened to her was
a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of
what happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left
her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia.
However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just
asked for the return of her money in the amount of P50,000

Defense:
Atilanos testimony
Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private
complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he
was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage
with the private complainant. As a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4)
wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief
PROOF OF MUSLIM FAITH:
o Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji
Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (
o Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage
because he told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said
private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of his second
marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino.
He further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private
complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he
does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a
Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In
his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was also
indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not
approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single despite his first marriage to
keep said first marriage a secret
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Maduenos Testimony
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and president
of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and
authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion.
He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran.
However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of
the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no
necessity to secure her consent
If a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to
the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be
able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was
aware of the second. Since the second marriage with Rowena P.Geraldino was not in accordance
with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in
accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true
Muslim
Geraldinos testimony
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous
marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and
only came to know her when this case was filed.
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to
the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. contracted a first
marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said
marriage.
Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter responded
that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after
she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert.
She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she
and Atilano O. Nollora Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
She also belied the allegations of the private complainant about their confrontation and alleged
that she came only to know private complainant at the filing of the case.
RTC: Nollora guilty of bigamy under RPC 349. Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the
prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Penalty: prison term of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties
provided by law.
o Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, and
did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare
that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his
converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just
marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant.
o What is clear, therefore, is that a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody
the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is,
he should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice
should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required
since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has this
authority.
o In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that
has already been violated.
o NO LIABILITY FOR GERALDINO: No sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena
P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation
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that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is
insufficient, being open to several interpretations.
o Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters
house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and
heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena
P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married.
o This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena
P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic
that (E)very circumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof
against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment
CA: DISMISSED appeal and affirmed TC
o The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran.
o The appellate court denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the
prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil
laws. Nolloras two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply.
o Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in
protecting the general welfare.
o Denied MOR
Issue: Whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
Held: YES.
Only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 of the Family Code, or Executive
Order No. 209, and Article 180 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083.
o Art. 41. Absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. Disappearance where there is danger of death
for two years shall be sufficient.
o Art. 180. Law applicable. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code relative to
the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person married in accordance with the
provisions of this Code or, before its effectivity, under Muslim law.
Petitioner invokes his faith as a defense for the crime. For the defense of his Muslim faith to apply,
the marriage must be solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or Code.
Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws read:
o Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
o Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons
after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
o Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age
and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any
impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed
to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
o Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person
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solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said
witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to
the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer
who shall keep the third.
o Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim
law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person
designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to
authorize the solemnization.
o Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque,
office of the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali,
or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
o Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the
contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If
the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall,
upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the
parties.
o Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the
qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: [N]o Muslim male can
have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases.
o The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed
only to meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having
plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances
o Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages,
before so doing, shall notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family
resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of
them object; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to
secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27,
decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines).
In this case, since the marriage is between a Muslim and a non-Muslim and it was not celebrated
in accordance with Muslim law and the following law applies:
o Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.
Thus, the Family Code applies to the Muslim spouse and the requirements for validity must be
followed; the exception to the application of the RPC stated in Art. 180 of Muslim Code does not
apply.
Elements of Bigamy:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy.
(1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat;
o EVIDENCE OF FIRST MARRIAGE:
o Marriage certificate
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(2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage;
(3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino and
o EVIDENCE OF 2nd MARRIAGE:
o Marriage certificate
o A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General
reads: We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on
February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in
our National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002.
(4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack
of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage
o Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is single.
Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or
falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential
requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy.
o Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by the omissions in
both marriage certificates: he being single and being Catholic Pentecostal because he wanted to keep
it a secret since society doesnt approve a Catholic to marry another religion and his being
single was because he wanted to keep his first marriage secret. He was also not able to
secure permission from his first wife because she was very mad at him.
o Even though 2nd bigamous marriage would be considered void, there is a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. the petition. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
GUILTY OF BIGAMY; Penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one
day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.
4. VERONICO TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: G.R. No. 150758
February 18, 2004
DOCTRINE: Bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is
contracted before the judicial declaration of its nullity). Subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally
liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
April 10, 1990: Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas
wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, solemnized at Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a
Minister of the Gospel.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes
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January 25, 1993: Tenebro contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the RTC Cebu
When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was
indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
September 1995: Information
o April 10, 1990, in Lapu-lapu, Philippines, accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
November 20, 1995: Judicial declaration of nullity of 2nd marriage by virtue of psychological
incapacity as penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch
26

DEFENSE:
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom
he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each
other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.
He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.
He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of
said marriage
November 10, 1997: the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, GUILTY of bigamy
o PENALTY: 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, as maximum.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for
lack of merit.
Defense:
He (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and
He (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
celebrated.
Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and
prays for his acquittal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the accused is guilty of bigamy despite the non-existence, as alleged, of the first
marriage? (Guilty, inexistence not proven)
2. Whether the accused is guilty of bigamy despite the declaration of nullity of 2nd marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity? (YES)
HELD: GUILTY of Bigamy
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
1. EVIDENCE OF FIRST MARRIAGE:
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(1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986
(2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that
Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented:
o (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995
o (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.
o Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a
marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986.
Neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely
attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. They cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to
establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three (marriage contract and certification) of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all.
Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
Certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody, was admissible as
the best evidence of its contents. It should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents. Also, both certification documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage
to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present.
o Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the
valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity
2. There is no merit to petitioners argument that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States
penal laws are concerned.
o As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.
o Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy.
o A plain reading of the law, Art 349, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.
o PURPOSE: The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses,
and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the
special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
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Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity.

The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into
essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer,
marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).

Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 3826 may
contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least
two witnesses.
o Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects.

Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory,
and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
o The act of the accused in contracting marriage a third time displays a deliberate disregard for
the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a
special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution,
the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED. GUILTY of Bigamy; 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum
o

VITUG, J., SEPARATE OPINION

Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in
the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration
of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more,
would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy.
The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact
of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the
relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the
marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered
into it.

*Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being
void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
* Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of psychological incapacity void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity
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* The complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent
can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy
* Strong reservation on the ruling that bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null and
void (if marriage is contracted before the judicial declaration of its nullity)
* Canon law-> reconcile grounds for nullity of marriage
* Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however,
being a mental state may not be so readily evident
c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void
CARPIO, J., DISSENTING OPINION
a) Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of bigamy are: 1.
The offender is legally married; 2. The marriage is not legally dissolved; 3. The offender contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; 4. The second or subsequent marriage is valid except for the
existence of the first marriage.
b) If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage,
then legally there exists no second marriage.
c) Second marriage must be valid were it not for the existence of the first marriage
d) To hold that the validity of the second marriage is immaterial, as the majority opinion so holds,
would interpret Article 349 too liberally in favor of the State and too strictly against the accused.
(must rule in favor of accused)
CALLEJO, Sr. J., DISSENTING OPINION
Vote to grant pro hac vice the petition. GROIZARD: Since second marriage is null and void ab initio,
such marriage in in contemplation of criminal law never existed and for that reason, one of the
essential elements of bigamy has disappeared.
5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO NEPOMUCENO, JR.
ESGUERRA, J.:
G.R. No. L-40624 June 27, 1975
FACTS:
March 20, 1969: Nepomuceno married Dolores Desiderio on, in Balagtas, Bulacan,
August 16, 1969: Five months later, he again married Norma Jimenez in Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Information dated December 8, 1969 reads as follows:
o August 16, 1969, in Norzagaray, Bulacan, accused Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr., being then
previously united in lawful marriage with one Dolores Desiderio, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with one Norma Jimenez.
Upon arraignment on February 4, 1970, accused pleaded not guilty and trial proceeded
accordingly. After the prosecution had presented one witness, the accused, on August 11, 1970,
withdrew his plea of not guilty and changed it into one of guilty. The case however
proceeded for the reception of evidence on the civil aspect.
December 9, 1970: Motion to quash was filed on the ground that the information is defective as it
charged only the accused for bigamy without including the second wife and such
failure, according to accused, conferred no jurisdiction on the lower court to try and decide
the case.
Said motion was denied on February 22, 1971. On April 28, 1971, private prosecutor orally
withdrew the claim for damages, which the lower court granted.
RTC: GUILTY of Bigamy; PENALTY: ISL 6 Months and l Day of Prision Correccional as minimum, to 6
Years and 4 Months of Prision Mayor, as maximum, with costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, accused cited as a single error the lower court's failure to
quash the information for lack of jurisdiction. While awaiting completion of the records the
private prosecutor filed a motion to forward the case to the Supreme Court on the ground
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that the appeal involves a pure question of law. Two other motions of the same nature were
subsequently filed.
CA: In its resolution of May 11, 1973, the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals resolved to give
due course to the appeal, to consider it submitted for decision, the same to be raffled immediately
and to refer the motions to certify the case to the Supreme Court to the Division to which the case
may be raffled.
The case was eventually assigned to the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five Justices which
promulgated the resolution of April 14, 1975, by a four to one vote ruled that only a question of
law is involved in the appeal, and decision on the case is not dependent on factual findings to
be made so as to bring the case within the competence of the appellate court. SO submitted to SC
for Decision.
o The dissenting opinion holds that there is no question of law involved as what is to be
decided is the question of whether or not the information filed was defective for not
including the second wife as an accused and, hence, the Court of Appeals could have
decided it on the merits by affirming the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
o Whether the lower court erred in not quashing the information because it was defective for not
including the second wife (not because of lack of jurisdiction) (NO)
o Whether he is guilty of BIGAMY? (YES)
HELD:
o RPC 349: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proceedings.
o The crime of bigamy is committed when a person contracts a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
judicially declared as presumptively dead. Accused undeniably contracted two marriages in the
short span of five months, which he categorically admitted when he pleaded guilty.
o Appellant's contention that the crime of bigamy entails the joint liability of two persons who
marry each other, while the previous marriage of one or the other is valid and subsisting is
completely devoid of merit.
o Even a cursory scrutiny of RPC 349 will disclose that the crime of bigamy can be committed
by one person who contracts a subsequent marriage while, the former marriage is
valid and subsisting.
o Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and concubinage, wherein the law specifically
requires that the culprits, if both are alive, should be prosecuted or included in the information.
o In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information
as a co-accused.
o Bigamy is a public offense and a crime against status, while adultery and concubinage are
private offenses and are crimes against chastity. In adultery and concubinage, pardon by the
offended party will bar the prosecution of the case, which is not so in bigamy. It is, therefore, clear
that bigamy is not similar to adultery or concubinage.
o No reason to include Norma Jimenez in the information as there was no showing in the recitation
of facts in the information to the effect that Norma Jimenez, the second wife, had knowledge of
the first marriage,and despite said knowledge she contracted the second marriage with the
accused; nor is there any showing that Norma Jimenez had had a previous marriage of her of her
own.
o Whether or not the second spouse, Norma Jimenez, should be included in the information is a
question of fact that was determined by the fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation in
this case. That the fiscal did not include Norma Jimenez in the information simply shows absence
of evidence that could make her liable for the crime.
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Her non-inclusion in the information as a co-accused of appellant Nepomuceno in the


crime of bigamy is not a defect in the information filed against Nepomuceno alone
since her inclusion or not in said information depended upon available evidence
against her.

DISPOSITIVE: TC Decision AFFIRMED, CA REVERSED. GUILTY OF BIGAMY


PREMATURE MARRIAGES
c/o Hipolito
6. UNITED STATES vs. PASCUAL DULAY -> SEDUCTION
TORRES, J.: GR. No. L-40267 March 7, 1908
FACTS:
May 1904: Pascual Dulay, of about 23 years of age, began courting Gregoria Pimentel a girl of 16,
residing in the pueblo of Aringay, San Fernando, La Union.
Their relations became every day more intimate, on account of the promises of marriage made by
the accused Dulay, and the girl was seduced.
The defendant accomplished his desire for the first time on a certain night in the latter part of
December, 1905. The act was repeated on various occasions from that time until the 28th of
April 1906.
April 29, 1906: Accused, besides the promise previously given to the injured girl, informed her
parents of his intention to marry her, and following the advice of the parents the marriage was
postponed until the time when the accused was to complete his studies.
However, in the month of June following, in view of the fact that his fiancee was pregnant, the
defendant disregarded his promise of marriage, and denied being the author of the girls
pregnancy.
The latter positively asserted that she never had sexual intercourse with any other man, and that
during his courtship he sent to her several letters, cards, photographs of himself, handkerchiefs,
and a ring, all of which were exhibited at the trial and recognized by him.
He confessed that he had maintained friendly relations with her, but denied that he had ever had
any sexual intercourse with her, or that he was the father of the child born on the 20th of
October, 1906, which was produced at the trial.
Among the letters exhibited, written in the dialect of the province, one appears at folio 44 of the
record, the English translation of which taken from the Spanish translation is as follows:
o GOYANG: I can not stand my hearts grief because if I could help it I would not part from
you; but, what can I do? I must leave for important reasons; however, although I am going
away, some one will make arrangements for my return in the month of June; may Heaven
grant this. Oh! my Gregoria, I feel uneasy; I dont know what to do; you do as I have told
you to do; do it because I think it is more advisable that you should tell the old man
(grandfather) the sin we have committed in the eyes of God, for if somebody else does it,
or, if you wait until he notices the consequences thereof, it will be worse for you. Do it, do
not fail to comply with what I am asking of you so that the old man may not become too
angry.
Do go and hear mass tomorrow, and I will wait for you because I have a very important
thing to ask you to do; hear mass without fail so that you may know what you ought to do; I
will do the same so that our intentions may not have bad results
Your brother [among Ilocanos, this word is used when the parties are very intimate, or when
they are lovers], PASCUAL.
Defense:
The defendant alleges that from the latter part of December, 1905, to the 25 th of April, 1906, he
had not returned to his pueblo where the injured girl resided
As her confinement only took place on the 20th of October of 1906 and the first carnal intercourse,
according to her own statement, took place upon one of the last days of December, 1905, it
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thereby appears that the pregnancy of the injured party lasted about two hundred and ninetyeight days at least; that is, more than nine months.
ISSUES:
1. Whether he is guilty of seduction? (YES)
2. Whether the child is not his and is not responsible for his welfare as he was born more than 9
months old after alleged intercourse? (NO, its his child)
HELD:
1. The above facts are duly proven in this case, and constitute the crime of estupro (seduction),
defined and punished by article 443 paragraph 3 of the Penal Code
By reason of the intimate relations between the accused and the injured party, the latter was
seduced by his repeated promises of marriage, and she permitted him to lie with her on various
occasions from the latter part of December, 1905, to the last days of April, 1906;
Without any just reason the accused has refused to comply with the promise of marriage made to
Gregoria Pimentel after being pregnant and it is therefore clear that he acted deceitfully when
making the promise solely with the unlawful purpose of inducing her to yield to his desire, and
upon pretext of her pregnancy he wrote to her parents stating that he declined to carry out his
promise of marriage.
A promise of marriage given to a woman over 12 and under 23 years of age, with the evil intent of
committing an unlawful act and voluntarily abandoned without just cause, constitutes the
deceit referred to in article 458 of the Code of Spain, equivalent to article 443 of that
of the Philippines, according to the doctrine established by the supreme court of Spain, among
other decisions in that of October 7, 1864.
The culpability of the accused as the only author of the crime cannot be denied, inasmuch as he
acknowledged that he had maintained intimate relations with the aforenamed Gregoria Pimentel
from May 1904 to the same month in 1906.
No evidence is offered that would even indicate that the girl had maintained any such relations
with any man other than the accused, and in view of her affirmation that Pascual Dulay was the
only man who did lie with her on the several occasions.
It is unquestionable that the accused is responsible for the crime and that he has incurred the
penalty that the law imposes, because he managed to have intercourse with the injured girl on
several occasions by means of deceit and committed the seduction under promise of
marriage.
The translation of the letter without date, hereinbefore inserted, shows that the accused
addressed it to the injured girl while he was still in the pueblo of Aringay, and before coming to
this city; that he wrote the same after he had had sexual intercourse with the girl, and at a time
when he was aware that she had conceived and was pregnant; it was for this reason that he
compelled her to inform her father of the offense that they had committed.
2. Data that child is more than 9 months old and therefore is not his child does not hold merit as it is
not shown that the accused is not the author of the pregnancy of the girl, who states positively that
from December, 1905, to April, 1906, the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with
her.
PREMATURE MARRIAGES:
REASON FOR FIXING 301 (10 months) DAYS: If the ordinary average duration of the pregnancy of
women is nine months and some days, a tardy birth is not an impossibility or an unusual to have a
delayed or retarded conception, one of the inexplicable mysteries of nature, since the opinions of
physicians upon the matter are conflicting; for this reason the Penal Code, by article 476, imposes
punishment upon a widow who marries before three hundred and one days have elapsed from the
death of her husband, a prohibition which is in accordance with other legal provisions
PURPOSE: It is intended to prevent confusion in connection with filiation and paternity, inasmuch
as the widow might have conceived and become pregnant by her late husband. So that the law
when fixing the said three hundred and one days, admits the possibility that a woman may
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be in pregnancy for more than nine months, and that the birth of a child taking place
nine months after it was conceived is not an impossibility.
DISPOSITIVE: AFFIRMED Decision. Penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to recognize and
maintain the offspring, to indemnify the injured party, Gregoria Pimentel, in the sum of P1,000 and, in
case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment which shall not exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, and to pay the costs, should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant; provided,
however, that the amount to be paid to the injured party for the subsistence of her child until the
same shall reach his majority, shall be P15 monthly.
PERFORMANCE OF ILLEGAL CEREMONY
c/o Hipolito
7. UNITED STATES vs. DOMINGO SAN JUAN
MORELAND, J.:
G.R. No. L-8502
October 10, 1913
FACTS:
Information was originally filed against the spouses, the two witnesses to the marriage, and the
minister performing the ceremony.

At the request of the prosecuting attorney the case was dismissed with respect to the defendant
Antonio de la Llana, one of the witnesses to the marriage, in order that he might be used as a
witness for the Government, under the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
With respect to the defendants, Florencio San Miguel and Eulogia Dizon, the spouses, and Teofilo
San Miguel, the other witness to the marriage, the case was also dismissed, under paragraph 2 of
article 475 of the Penal Code, for the reason that Esteban Dizon, the father of Eulogia Dizon, the
bride, having, subsequent to the ceremony, given his consent to the marriage.
The only defendant remaining, therefore, is Domingo San Juan, the minister who performed the
ceremony.
CFI: GUILTY of performing a marriage ceremony where one of the contracting parties was under the
age of consent; PENALTY: Four years of suspension for practicing his profession as a minister of the
National Evangelical Church of the Philippines, to pay a fine of 1,500 pesetas and one-fifth of the
costs.
ISSUES:
Whether the defendant minister not guilty if there was no intent, in other words, whether the person
solemnizing the marriage may plead similar good faith in defense to an action brought against him
under article 479.? (YES)
HELD:
o It is not necessary to hold in this action that no crime mentioned in the Code can exist without
intent. It suffices for the present to decide, as we do decide, that one cannot be convicted
under article 475 when by reason of a mistake of fact there does not exist the intention
to commit the crime.
Citing United States vs. Marcosa Pealosa and Enrique Rodriguez, decided January 27, 1902 (1
Phil. Rep., 109),
o Neither of the spouses can be convicted for a violation of article 475 if he acted in good
faith and without the knowledge that the other was under the age of consent.
o A minor who marries without parental consent in the false belief that she if of age is not
criminally responsible, and that, it is not criminal negligence for a husband to
rely upon his wifes statement of her age nor for the wife to rely upon that of her
father.
o In that case, the facts relative to the guilt of the husband, who was charged with a violation
of article 475 of the Penal Code in that he had married a woman who at the time of the
ceremony was under the age of consent, are stated by the court as follows:

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As for the husband, it has been proved that two days before the marriage was
celebrated he received a letter from the woman in which she said that she was
21 years of age.
o This letter the defendant showed to the clergyman who married them. The woman when
the marriage ceremony was performed took an oath before the clerygman, in the
presence of her husband, that she was 21 years of age.
o The defendant testifies that he had no suspicion that the woman was a minor. This
statement has not been contradicted and we consider that it suffices to demonstrate
that the defendant acted under a mistake of fact, and in conformity with the
principle laid down in this opinion he has not been guilty of a violation of article 475
in connection with article 13, No. 3, nor in any other manner
o Defendant was therefore properly acquitted of the crime charged in the complaint.
o If in US v Penalosa, spouses were acquitted if in good faith, the person solemnizing
may also plead good faith as a defense.
o These presents itself to us no reason why the rule applicable to the persons married
should not be alike applicable to the person performing the ceremony which makes
them man and wife.
o It is very easy to deceive an officiating clergyman as to the ages of the persons who
present themselves for marriage much easier than it is to deceive either of the
spouses in relation to the same matter.
o Persons who are sufficiently acquainted with each other to desire marriage are naturally
presumed to know the age of each other. If a man desiring to marry a woman may be
excused from criminal prosecution upon the ground that he has been deceived and
mistaken as to her age, it would seem that the clergyman, who knows neither of the
parties and who must of necessity depend upon an independent investigation in order
to determine the ages of the parties, would be in far better position to invoke the
protection of the principle than would the husband.
LAWS:
There is no penalty in the General Orders attached to the solemnization of a marriage between
person under age.
o General Orders, No. 68, section 7 (as amended by Act No. 1451), reads as follows: SEC. VII.
The person solemnizing a marriage must make and sign a certificate showing:
3. The real and full names of the parties and their places of residence.
4. Their ages.
5. The consent of the father, mother, or guardian, or of one having the charge of such person, if any
such be given, if the male be under the age of twenty years or the female be under the age of
eighteen years.
For the purpose of ascertaining these facts, the person solemnizing the marriage is
authorized to examine parties and witnesses on oath and receive affidavits, and he
must state such facts in his certificate.
The marriage shall not be performed in case of nonage, unless the consent
hereinbefore required shall be personality given by the parent or guardian or person
having charge of the infant, or certified in writing over his or her signature, attested by
two or more subscribing witnesses and proved by the oath of one of them.
o It was the intention of the makers of that law to permit the officiating clergyman or other
person solemnizing the marriage to determine the fact of age or nonage upon the
testimony of witnesses. To that end he is given the authority to examine on oath the
persons who present themselves for marriage and any witnesses which they may produce
or which he may desire to call relative to age.
o Having the right to determine a question upon the testimony of witnesses, it would seem
strange indeed that he could be prosecuted criminally for a wrong determination of that
question. The mere fact that two persons might differ as to the conclusion which ought to
be reached upon a given state of facts or upon the testimony of certain witnesses is not
sufficient to justify the conclusion that the one whose conclusion is wrong is guilty of a
crime, while he whose judgment is right is innocent.
o

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Both have exercised the same qualities, the same functions, and the same good faith. That
the one may be wrong and the other right furnishes no reason for classifying the one as a
criminal and the other as an innocent person.
The prosecution must be sustained, therefore, if at all, under the Penal Code in connection with
said General Orders.
o ART. 479. Any ecclesiastical or civil authority who shall perform or authorize the ceremony
in any marriage prohibited by law, or barred by an impediment not capable of
dispensation, shall suffer the penalties of suspension in its medium and maximum
degrees and a fine of not less than 625 and not more than 6,250, pesetas.
If the impediment shall be subject to dispensation, the penalty shall be destierro in its
maximum degree and a fine of not less than 325 and not more than 3,250, pesetas.
o

ART. 475. Any minor who shall marry without the consent of his or her parents, or
other person standing in loco parenties, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium degrees.
o The offender shall be pardoned as soon as the parents or the persons referred to in the
next preceding paragraph shall approve the marriage.
Article 1 of the Code does not contain the words with malice that are to be found in the Code of
1822; nevertheless Pacheco, the eminent commentator, has said that those words are included in
the word voluntary and he states positively that crime cannot exist without intent.
Other commentators, without being in entire conformity with Pacheco, nevertheless are agreed up
to a certain point.
o Groizard says: Such is the general rule; so it is ordinarily.
o Viada says that in the majority of cases, in the absence of intent there has been no
crime; but that there can exist in some case the latter without the former.
o Silvela says: In effect it suffices to remember the first article, which states that where
there is no intent there is no crime, . . . in order to asset without fear of mistake that
in our Code the substance of a crime does not exists if there is not a deed, an act which
falls within the sphere of ethics, if there is not a moral wrong
The theory that the absence of the word with malice in the prevailing Code has this effect is
supported by the provisions of article 568 which says: He who by reckless negligence commits an
act which would constitute a grave crime if malice were present shall be punished, etc.
o

o
o

Registering as legitimate those illegitimate


o

The supreme court in several successive sentences has the same doctrine: It is
indispensable that this (action) in order to constitute a crime should carry with it all the
malice which the violation and intention to cause the evil which may be the object of
the said crime suppose.
In a cause for falsity the facts involved were that the defendant had married before the
municipal judge of the pueblo of Rubete without other ceremony than the simple
manifestation and expression of his wishes and those of the woman Leonor with whom
he married before said municipal judge
Relying upon that, on account of his ignorance and lack of instruction, on the 27 th of
June, 1882, and the 5th of April, 1884, in the municipal court of the pueblo of Polopos he
registered as legitimate children his sons, Jose and Emilio, the offspring of the illicit
union of the defendant and Leonor Gonzales.
For the crime of falsity committed by reckless negligence the Criminal Audiencia of
Albuol condemned the said defendant to the penalty of four months and one day
of arresto mayor. The Supreme Court annulled said sentence considering that
whatever might be the civil effects of the registration of his three sons
entered by the accused in the Civil and Parochial Registers, it cannot partake
of the nature of a crime for lack of the necessary element of volition or intent
to offend, essential to every punishable act or omission; neither did he act with
negligence.

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o
o

Falsification of trademarks
o In a cause prosecuted against the Chinese Sy-Tioco and against Don Guillermo Partier, in
the court of Quiapo, for falsification of trade-marks, the Criminal Chamber of the
Audiencia of Manila condemned the Chinaman to two years and some months of
presidio correccional, and Partier to one year and some months of similar imprisonment.
A writ of error was sued out in the name of Partier.
o The Supreme Court annulled this sentence, considering that the moral element of
the crime, or, in other words, existence or nonexistence of intent and malice
in the commission of an act designated and punished by the law as criminal is
essentially a question of fact for exclusive judgment and determination of the trial
court.
o Considering that the act charged against the accused, Guillermo Partier, of having
printed in his lithographic establishment the trade-mark of the cigarette
packages of the Insular factory by virtue of a supposed order of the owner of said
factory, to whose injury the Chinaman Abelardo Zacarias Sy-Tioco ordered him to do the
said fraudulent printing, cannot be considered (from the facts declared proved in the
final sentence of acquittal of the Court of First Instance, accepted in its entirety and
without any addition by the Appellate Court) as constituting intentional participation or
cooperation in deed of falsification and defraudation committed by the former, since it
does not appear in any part of the sentence that Partier was in connivance with Sy-Tioco
nor that he had any reason to suspect the true character of him who, styling himself the
representative of Seor Santa Marina, the owner of the La Insular factory, gave him the
order to print the trade-mark of this factory on the packages, which were to be used to
hold cigarettes.
Citing United States vs. De los Reyes it was held that a woman who marries a second time under
a bona fide belief that her former spouse is dead is not guilty of bigamy, the court saying:
NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN THAT THERE IS NO GOOD FAITH:
One of the witnesses for the prosecution intimating that the accused was informed by
one of the contracting parties that the girl was under eighteen, and that he, instead of
refusing thereupon to go forward with the marriage, suggested to her that she declare
herself to be eighteen or over and that he would obtain witnesses to substantiate her
declaration.
o Evidence or testimony are not sufficient. The documents were proof of the parties
attestation. They were duly signed and sworn to by those parties and witnesses.
Although the oath is not in the form prescribed by General Orders, No. 68, nevertheless
it contains all of the requisites essential to a valid declaration under that Act.
It appearing clear to us that, even though it be admitted that the marriage complained of was
illegal and that the subsequent consent of the parent did not relive the defendant of liability for
the part he had taken therein, the accused acted in good faith without criminal intent, and that he
made the investigation required by law in a reasonably satisfactory manner, the conviction cannot
stand.
o

DISPOSITIVE: The judgment is reversed and the accused acquitted of the crime charged.
LIBEL
c/o Hipolito
8. DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI vs. PEOPLE and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR
DEL CASTILLO, J.: G.R. No. 172203
February 14, 2011
DOCTRINE: A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who
is dead." "For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be
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defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be
identifiable." Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
FACTS:
Prosecution:
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused, that the
private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the
nickname "Bading" and that the petitioner calls the private complainant "Bading."
Early part of November 2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private
respondent saw billboards with the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space
before the word "NEVER" directly under said phrase.
o Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz
Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and
wondered on what the message conveyed since it was incomplete.
o Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating
that the blank space preceding the word "NEVER" was filled up with the added words
"BADING AND SAGAY."
o The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER" printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored
with the printed phrase and of being a "tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after
consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against
petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for
him and his family. He thus prayed for damages.
Jude Martin Jaropillo is a licensing officer of the Permit and License Division of Cadiz City. While on
a licensing campaign, he was able to read the message on the billboards. He wondered what fault
the person alluded therein has done as the message is so negative. He felt that the message is an
insult to the mayor since it creates a negative impression, as if he was being rejected by the
people of Cadiz City. He claimed that he was giving his testimony voluntarily and he was not being
rewarded, coerced or forced by anybody.
Nenita Bermeo, a retired government employee of Cadiz City, was at Delilahs Coffee Shop in the
morning of November 19, 2002 when she heard the petitioner shouting "Bading, Bading, Never,
Never." She and the tricycle drivers drinking coffee were told by petitioner "You watch out I will
add larger billboards."
o When she went around Cadiz City, she saw larger billboards with the phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER," thus confirming what petitioner had said. With the
message, she felt as if the people were trying to disown the private respondent. According
to her, petitioner has an ax to grind against the mayor. Like Jude, she was not also forced or
rewarded in giving her testimony.
Bernardita Villaceran also found the message unpleasant because Mayor Escalante is an
honorable and dignified resident of Cadiz City. According to her, the message is an insult not only
to the person of the mayor but also to the people of Cadiz City.
Defense
Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things
happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in conformity with the
many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention whatsoever of
referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of Sagay.
He contended that it was private respondent who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of Sagay. He further
maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he will never love Bading and Sagay.
He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a wake-up call for Cadiz City.
Information
On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31, 2003:
o November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously
o With intent to impeach the integrity, reputation and putting to public ridicule and dishonor
the offended party MAYOR SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with
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malice and intent to injure and expose the said offended party to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule put up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz
City and at Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows
"CADIZ FOREVER" "__________ NEVER"
o thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from the
residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word "NEVER".
o Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein private
complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word "NEVER" thus
making the billboard appear as follows "CADIZ FOREVER" "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
o For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce the
readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was going on,
therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor Salvador G.
Escalante, Jr.,
o And hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good name, character and
reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said billboards/signboards were
read by thousands if not hundreds of thousands of persons, which caused damage and
prejudice to the offended party by way of moral damages in the amount of: P5,000,000.00
as moral damages.
Upon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of "not guilty."
RTC: Guilty of LIBEL defined and penalized under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant
Penalty of imprisonment of FOUR MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Arresto Mayor maximum as
the minimum to TWO YEARS, ELEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium
as the maximum and a FINE of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of P5,000,000.00 by
way of moral damages.
The cash bond posted by the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and returned to the
accused, however the penalty of Fine adjudged against the accused is hereby ordered
deducted from the cash bond posted by the accused pursuant to Section 22 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court and the remaining balance ordered returned to the accused.
The accused is hereby ordered immediately committed to the BJMP, Cadiz City for the service
of his sentence.
CA: Affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC. GUILTY but reduced damages; Amount of
moral damages to P500,000.00.
Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its
Resolution dated April 7, 2006.
Petitioners Claims:
Petitioner takes exception to the CAs ruling that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER,
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity
and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City.
He avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on
the character, integrity and reputation of private respondent.
ISSUES:
1) Whether only question of law can be reviewed? (NO)
2) Whether the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" is libelous as it shows
the injurious nature of the imputations made against the private respondent and tends to induce
suspicion on his character, integrity and reputation as Mayor of Cadiz City?
3) Whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication? (NO)
2a. Whether they comprise fair commentary on matters of public matter which are therefore
privileged?
2b. Whether the presumption of malice has not been overthrown?
4) Whether he is liable for the moral damages of P500,000?
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HELD: Reverse the CA ruling.


1. YES. The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and are not reviewable by this
Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions: 4. When the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts;
Following the general rule, we are precluded from making further evaluation of the factual
antecedents of the case. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower courts have
greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their unanimous conclusion
2. NO. Phrase does not tend to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and
reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or
any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his
dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh
and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondents integrity.
Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary
sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents integrity and
reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as
it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered
view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private
respondents performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and
besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.
A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead."
"For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:
a) it must be defamatory;
b) it must be malicious;
c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable."
* Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase
must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words
imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is
necessarily rendered immaterial.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
To determine "whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense."
Moreover, "[a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose
and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of
certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold
the person or persons up to public ridicule."
OSG: "there is nothing in the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" and "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" which
ascribe to private respondent any crime, vice or defect, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or put him into contempt."
WITNESS NOT TRUSTWORTHY: Trustworthiness of these witnesses is doubtful considering the
moral ascendancy exercised over them by the private respondent such that it is quite easy for
them to draw such negative impression.
o As observed by the OSG, at the time the billboards were erected and during the
incumbency of private respondent as mayor of Cadiz City, these witnesses were either
employed in the Cadiz City Hall or active in the project of the city government.
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Bernardita was a member of the Clean and Green Program of Cadiz City; Jude was
employed as a licensing officer under the Permit and License Division of the Cadiz City Hall
and Nenita held the position of Utility Worker II of the General Services Office of Cadiz City.
o These witnesses, according to the OSG, would naturally testify in his favor. They could have
verbicide the meaning of the word "NEVER."
According to the private respondent, the message in the billboards would like to convey to the
people of Cadiz that he is a tuta of Sagay City.
o During the proceedings in the trial court, private respondent testified that the subject
billboards maligned his character and portrayed him as a puppet of Sagay City
o I know the intention because to answer your question, it will not only require those
"BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" billboards, it was after which additional billboards were put
up. That strengthen, that I am being a "Tuta of Sagay. I am being maligned because of
those billboards that states and I repeat: "Ang Tubig san Cadiz, ginkuha sang Sagay",
"Welcome to Brgy. Cadiz" and there is a small word under it, Zone 2, very small, very very
small, you cannot see it at a glance.
o That is the meaning of the signboard[s]. The message that the signboards would like to
convey to the people of Cadiz, that the Mayor of Cadiz City is a "Tuta" or Puppet of Sagay
City.
There is nothing in the subject billboards which state, either directly or indirectly, that he is, in his
words, a "tuta" or "puppet" of Sagay City. Except for private respondent, not a single prosecution
witness testified that the billboards portray Mayor Bading Escalante, Jr. as a "tuta or "puppet" of
Sagay.
He refers to the circumstances mentioned in another billboard that is not the subject matter in the
present charge. The aforesaid facts dismally failed to support the allegations in the instant
information. Be that as it may, private respondent nevertheless did not specify any actionable
wrong or particular act or omission on petitioners part that could have defamed him or caused his
alleged injury.
Private respondent was not pleased with the controversial printed matter; however, that is grossly
insufficient to make it actionable by itself. "Personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even
if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation," "words which are merely insulting
are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
3. Granting that the controversial phrase is considered defamatory, still, no liability
attaches on petitioner. The reasons elicited by the prosecution in erecting said billboards mainly
relate to the discharge of private respondents official duties as City Mayor of Cadiz City.
Pursuant to Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a
public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the
truth of the allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even
though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends.
US v Bustos: the policy of a public official may be attacked, rightly or wrongly with every
argument which ability can find or ingenuity invent. The public officer "may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A
public official must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts."
"In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting
the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a
finding of guilt."
In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court, the
prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER" imputes derogatory remarks on private respondents character, reputation and integrity.
In this light, any discussion on the issue of malice is rendered moot.
o

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DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Special Laws Digest
c/o Emergency D2016 Digest
Art. 365 Imprudence and negligence
Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 486 (1982)
EPITACIO BUERANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
July 19, 1982
Relova, J
FACTS:

Sept 20, 1957: Epitacio Buerano was the driver of LTB bus which collided with the Mabuhay
Bakery delivery panel driven by Hipolito Vismonte and owned by Chu Yu in Tanay, Rizal

Dec 3, 1957: Chief of Police of Tanay, filed case with Municipal Judge, Slight and Serious
Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence, alleging:
causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence that the said bus, driven and
operated to collide with the delivery truck of Mabuhay Bakery owned by Mr. Chu Yu, result
of which the right front side of the said truck was greatly damaged and the driver, Hipolito
Vismonte, including the two (2) helpers, namely, Bonifacio Virtudazo and Sy Tian alias
Martin, suffered physical injuries on the different parts of the body which required medical
attention as follows:
Hipolito Vismonte 5 days
Bonifacio Virtudazo10 days
Sy Tian alias Martin1 month

Feb 6, 1958: petitioner found guilty of slight and less serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence and sentenced "to suffer imprisonment from 1 month and 1 day to 2
months and to pay the cost of the suit
petitioner appealed to CFI which later affirmed and sentenced petitioner to suffer four
months of Arresto Mayor and to pay the costs

In the meantime, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed case in CFI charging herein petitioner
with Damage to property through reckless imprudence. He filed a Motion to Quash on the
ground of double jeopardy in that because he has been previously convicted of the offense
charged.
Opposition was filed by the Provincial Fiscal contending that the crime for which petitioner
was convicted was for less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, whereas
the second case was for damages to property through reckless imprudence which are
distinct offenses.
CFI denied motion to quash and, after trial, found petitioner guilty of the crime of
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed CFI and sentenced herein petitioner "to pay a fine
of P4,387.00 which is double the amount of damages suffered by the delivery truck with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to indemnify the offended party, the owner
of the delivery truck in the amount of P2,193.50, representing the amount of damages
suffered by the said delivery truck, and to pay the costs"

CA held no double jeopardy because:


1 Neither in the JP Court nor in the CFI on appeal was the appellant convicted or acquitted
of the offense of Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence
2 JP Court which found him guilty of Slight and Less Serious Physical injuries was not a
court of competent jurisdiction to try the offense of Damage to Property Thru Reckless
Imprudence (bec of imposable penalty)
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3
4

Appellant could not have validly pleaded before the JP Court to the said offense of
Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence
offense of Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence was alleged in the Information
(in the second case) does not include and is not necessarily included in the first charge
of Slight and Less Serious Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence
Appellant was never tried at all in the JP Court of Tanay in forcrime of Damage to
Property Thru Reckless Imprudence

ISSUE: WoN CA erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy (YES)
HELD: petitioner ACQUITTED; CA judgment set aside
RATIO:
CA based its decision on SC ruling on pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940, which is no longer controlling
People v Buan (March 29, 1968), SC thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, accused
may not be prosecuted again for same act
essence of quasi offense of criminal negligence under RPC 365 lies in the execution of
an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can
not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
Then SolGen, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries, then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely
damage to propertynot deathand physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human
life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."
People v. City Court of Manila, 206 Phil. 555 (1983)
Apr 27, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XI and FRANCISCO GAPAY y MALLARES, respondents.
RELOVA, J:
FACTS:
Oct 17, 1971: the incident leading to the charge happened; the accused/priv resp Gapay was the
truck driver; the victim was Diolito de la Cruz
Oct 18, 1971: an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
against the accused
However, on the same day (Oct 18), the victim died
Oct 20, 1972: accused was arraigned; pleaded guilty; sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto
mayor and commenced serving his sentence
Oct 24, 1972: another information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against
accused
Defense moved to dismiss
City Court of Manila (Nov 17, 1972):
Dismissed the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy
While there is a ruling in Melo vs. People which states: where after the first prosecution, a
new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of
the offense and, together with the facts existing at a time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the second
offense.
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City Court held that the doctrine of Melo vs. People does not apply in the case at bar because of
SCs ruling in People vs. Buan
People vs. Buan: Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind
and not the resulting injury
It concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be
prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury

ISSUE: W/N double jeopardy lies (YES)


RATIO:

Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged
again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the
former.

However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People, the rule of Identity does not apply when
the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the
reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.

Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together
with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused
cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense

In this case: the victim died on the day the information was filed

The accused was arraigned 2 days after

Thus, when the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed on
October 24, 1972, the accused was already in jeopardy

The OSG said on October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the
"hearing and arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that the victim,
Diolito dela Cruz died, and the information would have to be amended."
SC: Be that as it may, the fact remains that the victim died 1 day after the accident and the
arrest of the accused. And that on October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded
guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact
supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused.
HELD: City Court of Manilas dismissal is affirmed.

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Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, Nov. 17, 2010


JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the MTC, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, respondents.
FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367)
case 1-for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) case 2- for the death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Case1 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure

petitioner moved to quash the Information in Case 2 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence MTC denied, finding no identity of
offenses in the 2 cases

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC, in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Case 2 including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking
S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question

Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days
later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.

RTC: affirmed MeTC. dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803 due to petitioner's forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner
for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Case 2

Hence this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding and explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him
to forego participation in the proceedings in Case 2
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Case 2 (no)
2. if in the negative, WON petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Case 2 (yes)
RATIO:
On non-appearance

Petitioners non appearance at the arraignment in case 1 did not divest him of
standing to maintain petition in the SCA 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape from custody or violation of the
terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court
or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of
Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
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The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to review a prearraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in
Case2 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence.
The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a defendant who absents himself from postarraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond
Further, the RTC's observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding" at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC's proceedings.

On double jeopardy

The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for
the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.

It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in Case 1 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Cases 1 and 2
involve the "same offense."

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense
of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."

We find for petitioner. Reckless Imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on


persons and property are material only to determine the penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the RPC, Art 365, defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
Reckless Imprudence is not a mere mode of committing a crime

The proposition that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to
deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In
truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible

Were it a mode, it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to


commit so grave a wrong

It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes
Prior conviction/ acquittal bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts
JBL Reyes: in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused's prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained:
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.

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as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several

persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions

One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one
would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or
whether one crime is an ingredient of the other (People v Diaz)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under
Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude . . . behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight . . ., a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. We DISMISS the Information in Case 2 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar on
the ground of double jeopardy.
P.D. No. 1866, as amended
B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
Azarcon v. People, 622 SCRA 341
LOURDES AZARCON
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARCOSA GONZALES
CARPIO MORALES, J.: G.R. No. 185906 June 29, 2010
FACTS:

Since 1990, Lourdes Azarcon, a businesswoman, had been borrowing money from Marcosa
Gonzales, the latter being engaged in an informal money-lending business. Between Aug to Dec
1992, Azarcon issues several Premiere Bank checks payable to Marcosa, for amounts borrowed.
However, checks were, upon maturity, dishonored bec. Account Closed

Dec 1 1993: Marcosa, through counsel, writes letter, demands the P749,000 due her bec.
checks were dishonored

Dec 17 1993: Azarcon replies, asks for "reconciliation of her accountability since [she] has also
some receipt payments covering the checks she has issued" and says that she is willing to settle her
account

Feb 15 1994: Manuel Azarcon, Lourdes husband, pays Marcosa P200,000 representing initial
payment with undertaking to settle balance within 1 year via monthly installments

2 years pass without obligation being paid, prompting Marcosa to file complaint for violation
of BP 22 against Azarcon, involving 120 dishonored checks amounting to P746,250

Azarcons defense: obligation to pay was novated when husband assumed liability

TC: Azarcon guilty of 824 violations of BP 22, subtracted amounts which prosecution either
failed to offer in evidence or Marcosa failed to dispute
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CA appeals: no prior demand from Marcosa to settle checks after their being dishonored, TC did
not appreciate novation

CA affirms TC

Azarcon files petition before SC


ISSUE/HELD:

W/N Azarcon is guilty of violation of BP 22 (YES)


RATIO:

Elements for BP 22 violation all present: (1) The accused makes, draws or issues any
check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.

re: prior demand: Marcosas Dec 1 1993 letter satisfies notice of dishonor
requirement to bring up the presumption that there was knowledge of insufficient funds

re: novation defense: no express agreement to a novation, plus initial installment


payments were either paid by Azarcon herself, or received "the account of Mrs. Lourdes
Azarcon"
RULING: Petition denied
R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
Cadiao-Palacios v. People, 582 SCRA 713
LINDA CADIAO-PALACIOS, Petitioner,
Vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
March 31, 2009
NACHURA, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Cadiao-Palacios was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique from July
1998 to June 2001. During her administration, there were infrastructure projects that were initiated
during the incumbency of her predecessor, then Mayor Aida Alpas, which remained partially unpaid.
These included the Janlagasi Diversion Dam, San Luis Diversion Dam, Caridad-Bagacay Road, and San
Juan-Tumao Road, which were contracted by L.S. Gamotin Construction with a total project cost of P2
million. For the said projects, the municipality owed the contractor P791,047.
Relative to the aforesaid projects, petitioner, together with Victor S. Venturanza, then the
Municipal Security Officer, was indicted in an Information which accused them of demanding money
from Grace Superficial of L.S. Gamotin Construction for in connection with the aforesaid contracts
concerning the infrastructure projects, wherein, as public officers in their official capacities, they had
to intervene under the law. The Information accused them of receiving P15,000.00 in cash and
P162,400 in LBP Check No. 3395274.
Both accused voluntarily surrendered and, upon motion, posted a reduced bail bond of P15,000 each.
They pleaded Not Guilty upon arraignment.
During trial, the prosecution presented its sole witnessthe private complainant herself, Grace M.
Superficial (Superficial). Her testimony may be summarized as follows:
For and on behalf of L.S. Gamotin, she (Superficial) took charge of the collection of the unpaid billings
of the municipality. Prior to the full payment of the municipalitys obligation, petitioner demanded
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money from her, under threat that the final payment would not be released, unless she complied.
Acceding to petitioners demand, she gave the formers husband P15,000. Sometime in January 1999,
petitioner demanded from Superficial the full payment of her total kickback, which should be 10%
of the project cost. The two then agreed that Superficial would deliver a check in lieu of cash.
On January 25, 1999, petitioner gave to Neil Superficial, then an incumbent councilor and the
husband of private complainant, 3 checks representing the final payment for the construction
projects.
On January 26, 1999, Venturanza picked up the check promised by Superficial as payment for the
10% kickback. In accordance with petitioners instruction, the check was made payable to
Venturanza in the amount of P162,400. The check was encashed by Venturanza at the Land Bank of
the Philippines, San Jose, Antique Branch, which is about 90km - 100km away from Culasi; and the
amount was received by Venturanza. It was Venturanza also who deposited the 3 checks,
representing the full payment of the project.
The prosecution offered the following documentary evidence:
1.
Minutes of the Meeting of Pre-Qualification, [Bid] and Award Committee (PBAC) held at the
Municipality of Antique;
2.
Land Bank Check No. 3395274P dated January 26, 1999 in the amount of P162,400;
3.
Complainants Consolidated Sur-Reply; and
4.
Deposit Slip of the 3 LBP Checks representing full payment of the project.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses: 1) petitioner herself, 2)
Venturanza, 3) Engr. Armand Cadigal, 4) petitioners husband Emmanuel Palacios, 5) petitioners
Executive Assistant Eugene de Los Reyes, and 6) Atty. Rex Suiza Castillon. Their testimonies may be
summarized as follows:
Petitioner denied Superficials allegations. She insisted that she only dealt with the owner of
L.S. Gamotin, Engr. Leobardo S. Gamotin, relative to the infrastructure projects; thus, she could have
made the demand directly from him and not from Superficial. It was Engr. Gamotin himself who
claimed payment through a demand letter addressed to petitioner.
She only met Superficial when the latter received the checks representing the final payment. She
further testified that she never entrusted any highly sensitive matter to Venturanza, since her trusted
employee was her chief of staff. She also averred that she was not the only person responsible for the
release of the checks, since the vouchers also required the signatures of the municipal treasurer, the
municipal budget officer, and the municipal accountant. As far as Venturanza was concerned, she
denied knowledge of such transaction. Lastly, she claimed that the filing of the case against her was
politically motivated.
Emmanuel Palacios likewise denied having received P15,000.00 from Superficial. He claimed that he
was financially stable. He also claimed that the institution of the criminal case was ill-motivated as
Neil Superficial, in fact, initiated a complaint against him for frustrated murder
Venturanza admitted that he indeed received the check from Superficial, but denied that it was
grease money. He claimed that the P162,400 was received by him in the form of a loan. He
explained that he borrowed from Superficial P150,000 to finance his trip to Australia so that he could
attend the wedding of his nephew; and asked for an additional amount for his expenses in processing
his visa. Venturanza, however, failed to leave for Australia. Of the total amount of his loan, he
allegedly spent P15,000 in processing his visa. Venturanza stated that he was able to repay the
entire amount immediately because he obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Aklan, Pandan Branch,
to pay the amount he used in applying for his visa. He further testified that he was persuaded by the
Superficials to campaign against petitioner.

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The Sandiganbayan convicted both accused of violating Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sa