[G.R. No. 145368.

April 12, 2002]

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223
constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in
1998. The Committee was mandated to take charge of the nationwide preparations for
the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine
Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.[1]
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting
the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It
renamed the Committee as the National Centennial Commission. Appointed to chair the
reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado
M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons.[2]
Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate upon
the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations.[3] Like its
predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration
of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the
responsibility to prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the
Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Executive
Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff
support by a Secretariat to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the
Presidential Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and
the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time
Executive Director who shall be designated by the President.
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the
Department of Tourism and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be
recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for
succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation
(Expocorp) was created.[4] Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators,
who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief
Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the
Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of
Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35,
creating an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its component
activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the
Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the
Committees recommendations was the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr.
Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding,
relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development
Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK
to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has
caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude
audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said
contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law.[5]
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It
recommended the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper
cases of, among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently
referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On
January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before
the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman
against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP
President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and
Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal
complainant.[6]
In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and
those of his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to
Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but
the motion was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a
resolution finding probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and
TEODORO Q. PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of

Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594. The resolution also directed
that an information for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and Pea.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but
dismissed the charge against Pea.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order, commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the
Sandiganbayan or any court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral
argument.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a
public officer because:
A.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK
THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTIGRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE
CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
B.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.
C.
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICER AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.[7]
In addition, petitioner in his reply[8] invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan,[9] where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was
limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27
and higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or higher,
the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction
over him.
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that it is
the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding
information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:
The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and
regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control
over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770
(An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman, and for other purposes) which vests upon the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan And this is further buttressed

by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, repeated references
to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special
Prosecutors authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the
original.]
The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by
the Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in
its Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law
does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal act or omission
of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly
in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory
and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the
Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases. The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of
his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and
employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to
the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of
office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with
the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.
Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against
officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the
law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law

likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the
most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and
effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. A review of the
development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.]
Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which
petitioner relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was
not a public officer.
The Constitution[10] describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the
people, who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Among the awesome
powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution[11] upon the Office of the
Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law
respectively provide:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall
act promptly on complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of
the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil
and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote
efficient service by the Government to the people.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction,
it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases;
x x x.
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section
13, supra:
SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance
and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any

subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or

controlled corporations.[12]
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public
officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence[13] is that provided by
Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.[14]
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of
sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an
office.[15]
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of
NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he
purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the
NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is
a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or
contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either
legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.[16]
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government?
Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as
legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.[17] The executive
function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts,
Culture, and Sports) thereof:
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall
conserve, promote, and popularize the nations historical and cultural heritage and
resources, as well as artistic creations.
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for
the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998:

Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the
centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of
Filipino identity;
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby
strengthen Filipino values;
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through longrange planning and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise
and capability, particularly in communication and information dissemination, is
necessary for long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the
primary task of harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural,
and business sectors to serve as effective instruments from the launching and
overseeing of this long-term project;
x x x.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in
1998, cited the need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated
and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from
the government and non-government or private organizations. It also referred to the
need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry
them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation
of programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as
vehicles for history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity
and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial
Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within
Metro Manila, the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and
celebration of the Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all
information about the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the
programs and projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this
regard, the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer,
build-operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and
maintenance of the historical sites and structures;
(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite
private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,

(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities
as well as the status of the preparations for the Celebration.[18]
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,[19] created
the NCC by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance
Power), Section 2 describes the nature of executive orders:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.]
Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development,
especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments
before this Court:
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:
And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you agree that the
task of the centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio
economic development of the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the
area because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on
by lack of material time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made
Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President
Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because of the
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by
putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also
mention we wanted to generate employment aside from attracting business
investments and employment. And the Estrada administration decided to junk this
project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our
target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated, accelerated the
development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to that because they
had the airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the
original plan.
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full
employment is a fundamental state policy.[20]
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla[21] that the holding by a
municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function.
Petitioner argues that the holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the nations
100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of
the national governments proprietary function.[22] In Torio, we held:
[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code]
simply gives authority to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the
special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as
claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the

town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as distinguished
from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the
true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding
circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic
element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is
government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in
character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta.
Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the
Court cautioned that there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the
true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding
circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. Thus, in
footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the surrounding
circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds could produce a
conclusion different from that in Torio:
We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus
the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this
question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover
damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display resulting
in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants negligence. The
defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged
in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary
benefit and for negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability is imposed.
This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff
sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was for the corporate
advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely
public governmental duties, unless made liable by statute.
A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute,
conducted a public Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent
up a bomb intended to explode in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached
the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a
governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:
July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called
Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar
statutes. While there is no United States statute making a similar provision, the different
departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since the government
was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it has been
recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and
instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love
of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches

and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a musical program including

patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by fireworks. That
such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their promotion a proper
subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The
Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after
centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of
our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of
independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion
to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a
vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity, an opportunity to
showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values. The significance of
the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who remarked during the
hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to
rekindle the love for freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make
everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our
forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and
petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the
nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no
part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a
naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.
[23] Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary
office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary,
compensation or fees are attached.[24] But it is a public office, nonetheless.
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body
make said commission less of a public office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a
position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office.
But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules
prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by
government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any
contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the
person who performs the duties from an officer.
At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as
indispensable, for, if the other elements are present it can make no difference, says
Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the
office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good
behavior.[25]
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.[26] There
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United
States Centennial Commission is an office of trust as to disqualify its holder as elector of

the United States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States
Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is
disqualified from being appointed an elector.)
x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an
office of trust under the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office
of elector of President and Vice-President of the United States.
The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3,
1871. That statute provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign
arts, products, and manufactures, under the auspices of the government of the United
States, and for the constitution of a commission, to consist of more than one delegate
from each State and from each Territory of the United States, whose functions shall
continue until close of the exhibition, and whose duty it shall be to prepare and
superintend the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition. Under the statute the
commissioners are appointed by the President of the United States, on the nomination
of the governor of the States and Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed
upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it to have
exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should announce, by proclamation,
the date and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress
approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further
increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called The Centennial Board of
Finance, to cooperate with the commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was
to be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh section of the act
provides that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by
the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the United
States Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation,
governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights,
privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established
by the United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or
privileges of any description connected with said grounds or buildings, or relating to
said exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United States
Centennial Commission, and said commission shall have power to control, change, or
revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all
premiums. The tenth section of the act provides that it shall be the duty of the United
States Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs of said
corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the President of the United
States the financial results of the centennial exhibition.
It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of
the commission were various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully
performed only by men of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they
were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative,
discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons performing such duties
and exercising such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not
to be regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are,
properly speaking, officers, and that the places which they hold are offices. It appears,
moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under
which they were appointed declares, section 7, that no compensation for services shall
be paid to the commissioners or other officers, provided for in this act, from the
treasury of the United States. The only other officers provided for were the alternates
appointed to serve as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is,
therefore, a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether
Expocorp is a private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private
corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from
his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp
must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.[27]
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any
compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as
defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is,
therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which
reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term
xxx
(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding
paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly
limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of
determining the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law,
matters that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is
not restrictive.[28] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws
that define public officers. Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides
that a public officer is:

x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by

competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,[29] on
the other hand, states:
Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties not
being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person
having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of
governmental power, officer includes any government employee, agent or body having
authority to do the act or exercise that function.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a
public official whether or not one receives compensation, thus:
Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police
personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?
Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term
compensation, which is not defined by said law, has many meanings.
Under particular circumstances, compensation has been held to include allowance for
personal expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling
expenses, payments for services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and
wages.[30]
How then is compensation, as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be
interpreted?
Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner
did not receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee,
honorarium, or some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of
Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and compensation.[31] Would such fact bear
any significance?
Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we
preempt the trial court from resolving them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Courts
Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), no part due to close relation to a party.