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Society for LatinAmericanStudies
PergamonPress plc
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Finally,althoughbothPalmerandMcClintockacknowledgethe existence
of positionpapersandpoliticaldocumentswrittenby the PCP-SL,not once
do theyeitheranalyseor referto the actualcontentsof theseprimarysource
documents on party ideology, military strategy and political goals.26
Similarly,althoughbothauthorsclaimto be writingabouta 'dogmaticMaoist
party',neither refers to Mao's own writingsnor attemptsto distinguish
betweenthe manyvarietiesof internationaland PeruvianMaoism.Rather
thanlookingmoreclosely at such primarysourcematerialsor at studiesof
PeruvianMaoism,theyinsteadrelyon categoricalstatementsabout'Maoist
dogma'andon secondaryand/orjournalisticaccounts.27
Similarobfuscationsare used to supportboth authors'categoricalstatementsregardingthe differencesbetweenSenderoandotherPeruvianLeftist
of the peasantryandthe undocumentednature
groups,the indecipherability
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statingsimplythat'Themovementgrewgradually'.This'growth',she claims,
occurred at meetings held in the home of the 'charismaticGuzman'and
throughan obscure process in which 'studentsfrom peasant families ...
actuallylived for long periodsin Indiancommunities... learnedthe Indian
language... marriedinto the communities-and preachedpolitics' (ibid.,
p. 50).
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with,andknowledgesof, thePeruvianstate,nationalpoliticalpartiesandthe
capitalisteconomy.McClintock'sanalysissystematicallyglosses both the
complexityof theseregionallyspecificAndeanpeasantpoliticalcultures,and
the importantgenerationaldifferencesbetweenSendero'syouthfulsupportersand'thepeasantry'as a whole.61
originsandbackground
By elidingthe non-peasant(thatis, 'non-organic')
of manyof Sendero'smilitantsandleaders,by deletingthe historicalcontext
in whichpeasantpoliticaldecision-making
occurs,by omittingcrucialfactual
informationon the politicalgeneaologyof both the PCP-SLand its leader,
Abimael Guzmain,and by ignoring the coercive impact of Sendero's
authoritarian
militaryideology,McClintockconstructsan imageof Sendero
Luminosoas anorganicallyruralpeasantmovementwhichspeaksforthefelt
economic or 'subsistence'needs of the Peruvianpeasantry.'Sendero's
primarypeasantbase',she concludes,are 'ruralsmallholderswho are not
activein the market'(1984: 82).
particularly
The tenuoushistoricaldocumentationforthisassumptionaboutSendero's
exclusivelyruralbase and strategyis deniedby the sequenceandpatterning
of Sendero'smilitaryactionsand by the texts of PCP-SLpartydocuments.
McClintock'somission of this factualinformationon PCP-SL'smilitary
campaignrelatesto her fifth,and for our purposesfinal, supposition:the
'encircling'strategy of 'classic Maoism'. Building upon Mao Zedong's
militarytheories,the PCP-SLseeks to developarmedstrugglein two interrelated theatresof operations:the countrysideand the city.62However,
whereasMao, who elaboratedhis theoriesaroundthe particularsocial and
politicalconditionsof China,privilegedruralactions and saw the urban
insurrectionas a final step in the overthrowof the old regime,Guzman,
whose party seeks to attainpower in the quite differentcontext of Peru,
conceivesof militaryactionsin the city and the countrysideas paralleland
In Guzman'sown words,'Es
simultaneousarenasof militarymanoeuvre.63
una especificacionde la guerrapopularen el Peruihacerdel campoel teatro
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urban-rural,centre-periphery,proletariat-peasant.Nevertheless,Palmer
carefullytailorsthe 'sharpcontrastsandgreatcomplexity'(1985: 71) of Peru
to fit the moreparsimoniousandunfalsifiablecategoriesof centreandperiphery.
For Palmer, the first point of 'continuity'between Sendero and the
rebellioustraditionsof 'theperiphery'is, then,one of exclusion('withdrawal'
or 'expulsion')fromthe centre.The secondpointof continuitywhichPalmer
wishesto argueis thatSendero,likethe peasantsof the periphery,has'taken
root and grown' (1986:142) in the disruptiveenvironmentof failed
modernisation.The scenario,as envisionedby Palmer,is that, duringthe
periodimmediatelyprecedingthe coup d'etatof 1968, modernisationwas
moving along smoothlyin Ayacucho.Accordingto Palmer,'therewas a
sense of progressand development,alongwith a perceptionamongmany
that the centrewas concernedwith the periphery'(1985: 79). The institutional impetusfor this process of modernisationand well-beingwas the
Universityof Huamanga,a colonialuniversitywhichwasre-openedin 1959
(ibid.).At the time Palmerwas there,the Universityservedas sponsorto
various extension programmesrun under the auspices of the Summer
Instituteof Linguistics,the Peace Corps, the FulbrightCommission,the
United Nations, the Danish, Dutch and Swiss governments,and 'the full
rangeof Peru'spoliticalparties'(1985: 80). Disputesarose,however,over
the'typesof change,its ends,andits organisers'(ibid.).Againstthebestintentionsof the university'srector,the
pluralisticmelangeof initiativesgraduallysuccumbedto increasingly
radical political criteria by which the universitywas perceived as
fulfillingits responsibilitiesonly if it was a committedinstitution('la
universidadcomprometida'),that is, committedto Marxistprinciples
(ibid.).
Aroundthe sametime,the economiccrisisof 1966-1967 led to fundingcuts,
the withdrawalof 'the more moderatefaculty',the eliminationof 'some
programmes',and the transformationof the Universityof Huamangainto
'yetanotherradicaluniversityalongLatinAmericanlines'(1985: 80).
ForPalmer,however,the coupdegracewasdeliveredby the 1968 military
takeoverof GeneralVelascoandthe resultingcutbacksin US economicaid.
Theseeventsled to the terminationof such'modernising'
programmesas the
Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps and the Summer Institute of
Linguistics(WycliffeBibleTranslators)(1986: 81). To makemattersworse,
the'tolerantreformistmilitarygovernment...wastryingto buildallieson the
left.. .justwhencontrolof theuniversityshiftedto the radicals'(1986: 141142). This isolationof the Universityand its ruralextensionprogrammes
influencesof US sponsoreddevelopmentprogrammes
fromthe rationalising
coincidedwith Guzman'sisolationfrom the rationalisinginfluencesof a
central party. Sendero, Palmer claims, was free to 'combinetheir own
emergingconceptionsof theoryand praxisratherthanthose of theirerstwhile comradesat the centre'(1985: 81). The resultwas a coalescenceof
forcespushingGuzmanand his grouptowardsan evercloseridentification
withthe peasantsof Ayacucho:
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157
lost control of both the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo and the student
organisationat Huamanga(FUSCH).In 1973 they were defeatedin special
electionscalledby a broadcoalitionof anti-Senderogroupsin the university.
The one divisionof the universityoverwhichSenderomaintainedhegemony
was the EducationProgramme.The only popularorganisation('organizacion de masas')over whichthey retainedcontrolwas the local branchof the
nationalteachers'union (SindicatoUnico de Trabajadoresde la Educacion,
SUTE-Huamanga).As a resultof their declininginfluenceover the Frente
and the FUSCH, the III PlenarySession of the CentralCommitteeof the
PCP-SL,held in 1973, moved to form organismosgenerados.These were
definedby the partyas 'naturalmovementsgeneratedby the proletariat(that
is, the PCP-SL)in the differentorganisingfronts'.92
The conceptoffrentesde trabajodoes not,however,meanthatthesefronts
in fact constituted demographicallyor politically significant 'bases of
support'. In fact Sendero's fronts, which were intentionallycreated to
penetratethe politicalspace alreadyoccupiedby those popularworkerand
peasantorganisationsled by differentleftist and non-leftistpartiesand by
governmentalorganisationssuch as SINAMOS, had only a very limited
success.For example,in 1975 the PCP-SLconvokeda congressof peasant
bases to createtheirown nationalpeasantorganisationto competewith the
already existing national peasant federations (CCP and CNA). This
congress,whichwas held not in the countrysidebutin the hallsof the Education Programmeof the Universityof Huamanga,failedmiserablybecauseno
peasants attended. Sendero was unable to convoke a single significant
peasantbase to supportits peasantcongress.The significanceof this failed
congress was, according to a contemporaryobserver of these events in
Ayacucho,that'SenderoLuminosodesaparecede la organizaciongremialdel
campesinado'.93
NeitherMcClintocknor Palmermentionsthe PCP-SL'sfailedattemptsto
penetratethe politicalspace occupied by the CCP and CNA. Nor do they
mentionthatthe principalearlybase of popularsupportfor the PCP-SLwas
a broad-basedurban defence front whichheld large,publicand extremely
visible assembliesand marchesin the Plaza de Armas of Ayacucho,just
across the street from the Universitywhere Palmerworked.McClintock
never mentionsthe importanceof the EducationProgrammeas the bastion
for Sendero'ssupportin the Universityor thefactthatSUTE-Huamanga
was
the majorvehiclefor their'workin the countryside'duringthese earlyyears.
Bothinsteadinsiston the exclusivelyruralnatureof Sendero'sbase,andboth
naturaliseSendero'slinkages to the peasantryas organic ties defined by
sharedpolitical'mentalities'.As we have seen, McClintockconstructsthese
organicties (or sharedmentalities)by falsifyingthe ethnicandclassoriginsof
the PCP-SL'sleadership.Palmer-who admits the mestizo and vanguard
natureof Senderoas a politicalparty,and the importanceof the teachersenvisions a 'logical' drifting of Sendero towards a sympatheticorganic
relationshipwiththe 'peripheral'peasantry.
Palmerimaginesthis 'drifting'as a reciprocalprocess of culturalcontact
between two worlds: the Marxistuniversityand the Indian countryside.
Those Sendero cadres who were from urbanor non-peasantbackgrounds
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intermarried
withthepeasantry,learnedthe'locallanguage',andwentnative.
Those cadreswho were from 'peasantbackgroundsand had grownup in
Indiancommunities'were 'exposed(in the Marxistuniversity)to a world
viewthatexaltedtheirclassorigins'(1985: 84; 1986: 138). NeitherMarxist
nor Indian,Westernnor Andean,Senderoand its peasantcadresbrought
togetherthe worstof 'twoworlds':on the one hand,Maoism,withits violent
programmeof 'encircling'the cities,and,on the other,the AndeanIndians'
historicalheritageof layingviolentsiegeto 'thecentre'.In Palmer'sview,the
and
merger of these two 'world views' reinforcesthe authoritarianism
of
both
Maoism
and
the
irrationality
disappointed'prepolitical'peasant
masses:
[Sendero's]movement emerged during a period when social and
economic circumstanceswere worseningin the area in which their
operationswere centred.Due both to governmentneglect (declining
budgets and programs)and to governmentactions (especially the
agrarianreform).Thiscontributedto theperceptionon thepartof many
Indiancomuneros(peasantcommunitymembers)that their situation
was worseningand that the centralgovernmentwas less concerned
aboutthem.At the microlevel at least, a sense of relativedeprivation
reinforcedby a declinein systemcapacityas expectationswere rising
made the peasantpopulationsusceptibleto radicalappeals(Palmer,
1986: 141).
Senderois seen by Palmeras
Reciprocally,becauseof its 'peripheralisation'
being susceptibleto the pre-moder traditionalismof the Indians.Palmer
claimsthatSendero,whichbeganas a politicalorganisationin the university
andthecity,assumesthe'prepolitical'
discourseandposturesof'millenarianism'and 'primitivecommunism'.LikeMcClintockwhenshe insinuatesInca
symbolsinto a PCP-SLdocument,Palmeroffers no concreteevidenceor
citationsas to how Senderomanifestsin words or actionsits supposedly
millenarianandprimitive-communistic
beliefs.94
This increasingentrenchmentin the pre-politicaltraditionsof the Indian
peripheryis seen to furtherhardenSendero'spoliticalisolationfrom the
centre,'even[from]organisationssharingat least the core elementsof their
own ideological perspective'(1985: 75). As a result Sendero'spolitical
programmeandbasebecameexclusivelyrural:
Sendero'scommitmentto the Indianpeasantryappearsto inhibitany
expansionof its supportwithinthe urbanproletariat,except perhaps
among the more recent migrantsfrom Indianareas who retainboth
family and economic ties to their communitiesof origin.With rare
exceptions,Senderohas shown little interestin pursuingany kind of
publicrelationscampaignto gaineithersympathyor supportfromthe
centre. Rather, its announced program involves the progressive
isolationof the centreto be followedby frontalattacks(1985: 75).
Here even Sendero's real urban proletariat bases-whose existence
McClintocksimplydenies-are transformedmagicallyinto 'peripheral'or
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(Palmer,1985: 76). On the whole,Palmertellsus, the citizensof the democraticmodernisedcentreare contentand 'willingto sufferadversityrather
thanriseup againstits government'(1985: 75; 1986: 133).
This mechanisticand universalisingmodel leaves out all 'grey areas'
between the essentialisedpoles of violence and democracy,illegitimate
radicalsand legitimatepower.In this, Palmer'smodel coincidesboth with
McClintock'ssanitised vision of Peruvianpolitics and with the racist
essentialisationsof ethnicitywhich fuel Peru's'dirtywar'.No mentionis
made of the popular democraticmovementswhich are critical of both
Senderoandthedemocraticgovernment.No mentionis madeof theviolence
perpetratedby a 'democratic'governmentwhichfields counter-insurgency
operationsand practicesa politics of hunger.Democracy/legitimacyand
becomeequatedfinallyandabsolutelywiththeopposiviolence/illegitimacy
tions of centre-periphery,Spanish-Indian,and urban-rural.Accordingto
this calculus, as long as Peru remains divided between 'Indians'and
'Spaniards','traditional'and 'modern',the nation will never become a
modern'legitimate'state.98
SENDEROLOGYCOMESOF AGE
For academicsand policymakersalike, brandrecognitionoffersthe same
benefitsit offerssoap manufacturers,
benefitswhich accrueirrespectiveof
Shafer99
productquality-Michael
Policy-makers,
journalists,businessanalystsand internationallaw enforcement agenciesrequireaccessibleand easily digestableexplanationsof the
world aroundthem.Throughoutthe Cold War era, modernisationtheory,
withits familiarandunquestionedcategoriesof us andthem,civilisationand
barbarism,the West and the Rest, providedpreciselythe commoditythey
sought.100
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As in McClintock'searlierarticle,the crucialdistinctionspointedout in
this citation (and reiteratedthroughoutthe rest of Gonzalez's article)
betweena politicalparty'strabajocampesino,a 'peasantmovement',and a
movement supportedby universitystudents of peasant origins, are not
broughtto bearon McClintock'sunderlyinghypothesisregardingthe rural,
peasantnatureof Sendero's'rebellion'.Insteadsheclaimsthat'Sendero'scall
for a newgovernmentrunby andfor Indianswasindubitablyveryappealing'
(McClintock,1989: 82). Elsewhere,she arguesthat Sendero'sterritorial
reachand emphasison urbanactions-in short,all the facts whichdo not
accordwiththemodelof anAyacucho-basedruralrebellionpresentedin her
1984 publication-reflect the subsequentemergenceof 'more than one
Sendero'(ibid.,64). Laterin the articleshe specifiesthat 'Especiallysince
1982, it has seemed possiblethat thereis more thanone Senderoand the
variousnew organisationshave distinctiveorientations'(ibid.,83). One of
these 'organisations'she locates in Puno, anotherin the coca-producing
HuallagaValley,and a third'in the cities ... especiallyin Lima'(ibid.,64).
McClintockcites no evidenceto supportthese ersatz'Senderos',phrasing
their existenceinstead as a logical possibilitypremisedon the lack of fit
between the PCP-SL'spoliticalmilitarytrajectoryand her own previous
categorical assertions about its rural Ayacuchano peasant base. Her
pronouncementregardingthe 'three Senderos',moreover,not only runs
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166
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It is
'havenot beenfundamentally
affectedby the thawin globaltensions'.134
this emphasison a particularideologicalconstructionof 'Terrorism'which
distinguishesMcCormick'sand Tarazona'ssenderologyfrom that of their
moretraditionalprecedecessors.WhereasPalmer'sandMcClintock'sbrand
of modernisationtheorydepictedSendero'spoliticsas a 'spiralof violence'
containedwithin the polarisedboundariesof a not-yet-modernPeruvian
state,McCormickandTarazonaenvisiona 'terroristviolence'whichspreads
fromits particularPeruvianperipheryto encompassother'barbarian'
fringes
and, eventually,to threatenthe very centre of world civilisation.Thus,
claimsthat
McCormick,who writesfor a book on 'terroristorganisations',
'Sendero'sgoal ... is not simplythe overthrowof the governmentin Lima,
but a largerLatinAmericanrevolutionunitingthe Quechuanationin a new
socialiststate'.135
Tarazona,whose interestslie not in describingterroristorganisationper
se, but in demonstratingthe connectionbetweenterrorismand the drug
trade,uses a differentargumentto sustainher claimsregardingSendero's
internationalambitions:
Sendero Luminoso seeks to unify the entire 'Andean nation'....
CountriesthatneighborPerucouldwelllendthemselvesto the Sendero
in Bolivia,as in
approach.... Boliviais particularlyripefor infiltration:
of
some
sectors
the
now
almost
Peru,
population
depend
entirelyupon
coca production for their livelihood. Sendero has penetrated in
Northern Argentina ... [and] may also be seeking to expand into
Ecuador.136
173
CONCLUSIONS
The texts which become central to the productionof any one brand of
academicdiscourseare selected, or 'authorised'accordingto two criteria.
First, they are usually the earliest texts written on a particularsubject.
Second,theyaretextswhichhavea close, yet flexible,fit withthe demandsof
both the academicand foreignpolicymarket-place.These requirementsare
parsimony,familiarity,explanatoryutility, prescriptiveutility, and ideoOurclose readingsof Palmer'sandMcClintock'swork,and
logicalutility.140
theirinfluenceon otherSenderologists,revealsthe extentto whichtheirtexts
satisfythese criteria.Their models are parsimoniousin that they leave out
complicatingdetails of historicalcausality.They are familiarin that they
subscribefaithfullyto the tenets of politicaldevelopmenttheory.They have
explanatoryutility in that their categoriesare universaland unfalsifiable.
Their discourseof Maoist encirclement,the peasant'other'and politics as
contagiousmentalitieshave prescriptiveutilityin thatthey virtuallyoverlap
withthe fundamentalpremisesof counter-insurgency
doctrine.Finally,their
recourse to the ethnocentric,and ultimatelyracist, dichotomisationof a
rationalcentreversusan irrationaland traditionalperipherylends them an
obviousideologicalutilityin an age of both xenophobicforeignpolicy,and a
domestic situation of class and racial polarisationwhose structuraland
discursivefeaturesmimicthose of imperialcentreand colonialperiphery.
While the centralityof both Sendero and the Andean drug-producing
nationsto thepost-ColdWarforeignand domesticpolicymarket-placemay
be new, the discursiveand academic traditionswhich the Senderologists
bringto theiranalysesof Peruarenot. Sincethe timeof the Spanishconquest,
Andean peoples-particularly those in the Inca state-controlledareas of
what would later be Peru-have been subject to Western academic and
intellectualscrutiny.The SpanishCrownandreligiousorderscommissioned
social and geographic surveys, economic and demographic censuses,
political and social histories,ethnographicreports and geneaologiesfrom
These
both government functionaries and independent intellectuals.141
to
work
of
answered
and
like
the
chronicles,
today'sSenderologists,
reports
the specificpoliticalneeds of the colonial(andecclesiastical)administrations
they served.
Like the Senderologiststoo, this politicalencodingof the earlyAndean
chronicles and reports was complementedby a process of inter-textual
authorisation.Although the earliest Spanish chroniclersoften recorded
valuable first-handtestimonies of Inca society and customs, their final
accounts were inevitably shaped not by historical explanations,but by
Spanishand Christianideas of social and moral order.Later writersoften
copied verbatimfrom these earlier chronicles and thereby incorporated
wholesale the moral assumptionsand interpretivestereotypeswhich had
structuredtheir predecessors'accounts.In this way, the specificmoraland
politicalbiaseswithwhichthe earliestchroniclershadfilledthe tabularasaof
Andean social history, became incorporatedinto both concrete colonial
policies and the general body of European knowledge about Spain's
Peruviansubjects.
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178
NOTES
1. AbimaelGuzman(1985), 'Iniciode la luchaarmada(ILA-80)',in RoggerMercado,Los
PartidosPoliticosen el Peri, p. 89. Fondode Cultura(Lima).
2. For the PCP-SL'smilitaryprogramme,see ComiteCentralPartidoComunistadel Peru
la Guerrade Guerrillas,
Lima:BanderaRoja(Lima)(1982);andLuis
(SL),Desarrollemos
Arce Borja and Janet Talavera,'PresidenteGonzalo [AbimaelGuzman]Rompe el
Silencio.Entrevistaen la clandestinidad.
Reportajedel Siglo',El Diario (Lima),24 July
1988 [reprintedas Entrevistaal PresidenteGonzalo,EdicionesBanderaRoja (Lima),
1989];andLuisArce Borja(ed.), GuerraPopularen el Peru:El PensamientoGonzalo,
LuisArce Borja(Brussels),1989. For a completechronologyof Sendero'sactions,see
Violenciapoliticaen elPeri, 1980-1988,DESCO(Lima),2 vols.,1989.
3. From'YouMustLearn',by KRS-OneforBoogieDownProductions,GhettoMusic,BMG
& RCARecords(1989).
4. See CynthiaMcClintock,PeasantCooperatives
andPoliticalChangein Peru,Princeton
UniversityPress (Princeton),1981; 'Post-revolutionary
AgrarianPoliticsin Peru',in
Peru. The Politics of Transformation,
StephenM. Gorman(ed.), Post-revolutionary
WestviewPress (Boulder),1982, pp. 135-156; and 'Velasco,officersand citizens:the
politicsof stealth',in AbrahamLowenthalandCynthiaMcClintock(eds), ThePeruvian
PrincetonUniversityPress(Princeton),1983, pp. 275-308.
Re-considered,
Experiment
5. McClintock,'Peru'sSendero Luminosorebellion:origins and trajectory',in Susan
Eckstein(ed.), Powerand PopularProtest,Universityof CaliforniaPress (Berkeley),
1989, pp. 61-101, p. 63, fn 2.
6. At thattime,PeaceCorpsvolunteerswereinvolvedin variousextensionprogrammes
and
in teachingat the Universityof Huamanga.In October 1963, duringa period when
blockadeof Cuba,
Huamangastudentswere protestingthe Kennedyadministration's
Palmerandtwo othervolunteerswho wereteachingEnglishat Huamanga
wereexpelled
fromthe University.See DavidScottPalmer,'Expulsionfroma PeruvianUniversity',in
RobertB. Textor (ed.), CulturalFrontiersof the Peace Corps,MIT UniversityPress
1966, pp. 243-270.
(Cambridge),
7. DavidScottPalmer,'Terrorism
as a revolutionary
Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',in
strategy:
BarryRubin(ed.), The Politicsof Terrorism,JohnsHopkinsForeignPolicyInstitute,
Schoolof AdvancedInternational
Studies(Washington),
1989, p. 133, fn 5; DavidScott
Palmer,'TheSenderoLuminosorebellionin ruralPeru',in GeorgesFauriol(ed.),Latin
AmericanInsurgencies,GeorgetownUniversityCenterfor Strategicand International
StudiesandtheNationalDefenseUniversity(Washington),
1985,p. 91.
8. David Scott Palmer, 'Revolutionfrom Above', MilitaryGovernmentand Popular
Participationin Peru,1968-1972,LatinAmericanStudiesProgram,CornellUniversity
andPoliticalDevelop(Ithaca),1973;see alsoDavidScottPalmer,MilitaryGovernment
ment:Lessons
from Peru,Sage(BeverlyHills),1975.
9. DavidScottPalmer,Peru:theAuthoritarian
Tradition,Praeger(NewYork),1980.
10. JamesDavies(1962),'Towarda theoryof revolution',
AmericanSociologicalReview,27:
5-19; SamuelHuntington,PoliticalOrderin ChangingSocieties,Yale UniversityPress
(NewHaven),1968.
11. Huntington,PoliticalOrder,pp.73 ss.
12. John Trumpbour,'Harvard,the Cold War, and the National Liberal State', in
J. Trumpbour(ed.), How HarvardRules, South End Press (Boston), 1989, pp. 107108.
13. NoamChomsky,AmericanPowerand the New Mandarins,Vintage(NewYork)1969,
Harvard,pp. 78-79.
pp. 21,42-43; andTrumpbour,
14. Huntington,PoliticalOrder,p. 35.
15. Huntington,PoliticalOrder,pp. 8,48, 77-78.
16. See D. MichaelShafer,DeadlyParadigms.TheFailureof US Counterinsurgency
Policy,
PrincetonUniversityPress(Princeton),1988, pp.60-62.
17. Huntington,PoliticalOrder,p. 262.
18. Shafer,DeadlyParadigms,p. 55.
19. McClintock,'Whypeasantsrebel.The case of Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',WorldPolitics
37:48-84, p. 50, fn 8. McClintock's
othersourcesfor thehistoryof Senderoareherown
20.
21.
22.
23.
179
180
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
Milenariaen el Peru, Vol. 1, EditorialApoyo (Lima),1990; Nelson Manrique,'La
Decadade la Violencia',Mdrgenes5/6:137-182; andAlbertoFlores-Galindo,'La
guerra
silenciosa',in BuscandoUn Inca.Identidady utopiaen los Andes, Institutode Apoyo
Agrario(Lima),1987, pp.339-356.
Hector Bejar(1969), Peru 1965:Notes on a GuerrillaExperience,tr. WilliamRose,
MonthlyReview(NewYork),1970;HenriFavre,'Perou:SentierLumineuxet horizons
oscurs',Problemesd'Amerique
Latine,No. 72 (1984).Palmer(1986:146, fn 44) citesthe
Spanishtranslationof two chaptersfromthisworkpublishedin Quehacer31: (October
strategies
1984) 25-35. RauilGonzalezpublishedanalysesof Sendero'spolitical-military
andactions,andtranscripts
of PCPdocumentson a regularbasisin thePeruvianmonthly
Quehacer(see note 23).
ColinHarding(1984), 'Noteson SenderoLuminoso',Communist
Affairs3:45-61.
La Guerra
See,forexample,ComiteCentralPartidoComunistadelPeril,iDesarrollemos
de Guerrillas!(1982), Berkeley:Committeeto Supportthe Revolutionin Peru, 1984
(translation)-DevelopGuerrillaWarfare,Berkeley:Committeeto Supportthe RevoluMovement(RIM),
Internationalist
tion in Peru,1985);Declarationof the Revolutionary
Movement(RIM),Textof the
London:RIM,March1984;Revolutionary
Internationalist
London Press Conference,London:RIM, April 1984. PCP-SLdocumentsare also
regularlypublishedin both Spanishand Englishin the RevolutionaryInternationalist
CommunistParty'snewspapers,
Movement'sA WorldTo Win,in the US Revolutionary
Committee
andbytheBerkeley-based
WorkerandObreroRevoucionario,
Revolutionary
to Supportthe Revoutionin Peru.Translationsof excerptsfromotherPCP-SLdocuments, as well as interviewswith Senderoleadersand militants,have been published
regularlyin the AndeanRegionalReport.Completedocumentswere transcribedand
publishedin PiedadParejaPflucker(Lima),1981, and in RauilGonzalez'sarticlesin
Quehacer(see note 23 above).WhilePalmerandMcClintockbothreferenceGonzalez,
andPalmerusesPareja,neithermentionthedocumentsreproducedin theirpublications,
preferringinsteadto maintainthatthePCP-SLwasa mysteriousandineluctable'enigma'.
OtherPCP-SLdocumentswereavailablein RoggerMercado,Los PartidosPoliticosen el
Peni, Ediciones de CulturaPopular (Lima), 1982; Rogger Mercado, El Partido
Comunistadel Peru:SenderoLuminoso,Edicionesde CulturaPopular(Lima),1982;
RoggerMercado,Algo Mas SobreSendero:Teoriay Tdctica,Violencia,Represi6ny
Documentos,Edicionesde CulturaPopular(Lima),1983;andin Alvaro
Desaparecidos.
Rojas Samanez, Partidos, Politicos en el Peri. Manual y Registro, Centro de
Andina(Lima),1982 (2ndEdn, 1983).
Documentaci6ne Informaci6n
TheirjournalismsourcesincludeCaretasandthe WallStreetJournal,aswellas suchpress
summariesas LatinAmericanWeeklyReport,LatinAmericanRegionalReport,Andean
Report,andResumenSemanal.ResumenSemanalis a weeklysummaryof thePeruvian
presspublishedbyDESCOin Lima.NeitherPalmernorMcClintockrefer,forexample,to
LewisTaylor'sthoroughandinsightfulaccountof Sendero'spoliticalformation,Maoism
in the Andes, or to JamesAnderson'sPeru'sMaoistGuerrillas,ControlRisks Ltd.
(London),1983.
Political-historical
analysesand first-handaccountsof the 1960s guerrillasnot citedby
McClintockincludeBejar,Notes;HugoBlanco,Landor Death,Pathfinder(NewYork),
La Convenci6n,Peru',Journalof Latin
1972;EricHobsbawm,'A caseof neo-feudalism:
AmericanStudies1:(May1969),31-50; RoggerMercado,LaguerrillasdelPeri:MIR,de
lapredicaa la acci6narmada,Lima,1967;HugoNeira,LosAndes:Tierrao Muerte,Ed.
XYZ (Madrid), 1968; and Sara Beatriz Guardia, Proceso a los campesinos de la guerrilla
is includedin
TupacAmaru,CIP(Lima),1972. An excellentcomprehensive
bibliography
1:3;
GavinSmith(1976), 'Movimientos
campesinosen la regioncentral',Churmichasum
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184
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186
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ViolenceandtheLatinAmericanRevolutionaries,
Transaction
Books(NewBrunswick),
1988, pp. 25-26.
73. 'TheSenderoLuminosorebellionin ruralPeru',in GeorgesFauriol(ed.),LatinAmerican
Insurgencies,Georgetown University CSIS and the National Defense University
(Washington),1985, pp. 67-96. The core of Palmer'sanalysisis identical-andat times
verbatimthesame-in the twopublications.
74. In his forewordto the GeorgetownCSIS volume,US Army Lt. GeneralRichardD.
Lawrence,outlinesthe importanceand purposeof this volume.After alludingto the
'involvement'
of such'powers'as the SovietUnion,Libya,and the PalestineLiberation
in recentLatinAmericaninsurgencies,
Gen.Lawrencepraisesthe analyses
Organisation
bestto contain'suchinsurgencies
containedin thevolumeas anaidto understanding'how
and how to 'betterformulateUS policy towardthe generalregion'.Fauriol,Latin
AmericanInsurgencies,
p. vi.
75. In his 1985 article by comparison,Palmer'sinterest in predictionis couched in
ideologicalrather than scientificlanguage.These differencessurface in minor, yet
revealing,ways.For example,Palmerchangesthe subtitlesof the fourmajorsectionsof
the work. Section2, which is entitled 'The National Context:Socio-economicand
PoliticalEnvironments'in the academicpublication,becomes'The NationalContext:
Socio-economicand PoliticalTurbulence'in the piece writtenfor foreignpolicy and
militaryexperts.On a similarnote, his academic'Conclusions'assumea morepractical
tone as 'Perspectivesfor The Future'for his CSIS/DefenseDepartmentaudience.
of
Analogousrevisionssurfaceat variouspointsin his texts.In theconcludingparagraph
his first section of the 'Developmentof Sendero Luminoso',for example,Palmer
concludesdramatically
with'Sendero'sunwavering
commitment
to thearmedstrugglefor
the gloryof Marx,Mao,andMariategui'.
Palmer,'TheSendero',p. 71. Thisideologically
stirringsentence,andotherslike it, disappearin his moresober,yet otherwiseidentical,
Politicstext.Palmer,'Rebellion',p. 129.
Comparative
76. Davies'J-curverelates'decliningcapacityto increasingexpectationsanda resultinglossof
Palmer,'Rebellion',
legitimacyfor theestablishedgovernment'.
p. 143,fn 1.SeeJ. Davies,
'Towarda theoryof revolution'.The centre-periphery
model employedby Palmeris
drawnfrompoliticaldevelopmentand modernisation
theory.See EdwardShils,Center
and Periphery,Universityof Chicago Press (Chicago),1975; and Shafer, Deadly
Paradigms,pp. 57-78.
77. DavidScottPalmer,'Terrorismas a revolutionary
strategy:Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',in
TheJohnsHopkinsForeignPolicyInstitute,
BarryRubin(ed.),ThePoliticsof Terrorism,
Studies(Washington,
Schoolof AdvancedInternational
D.C.), 1989, pp. 129-152 and
p. 133,fn 5.
Politicstextis
78. Thephrase'theoriesof revolution'whichappearsin Palmer'sComparative
replacedby 'thetheoryof revolution'in his DefenseDepartmentandCSISpublication.
Palmer,1985, p. 67.
79. Palmer'suse of racialor ethnicterms,suchas mestizoandIndianto definecoastaland
completelythecomplexethnicandculturalcomposihighlandpopulations,misrepresent
tion of Peru. This forced impositionof essentialisedracialor culturalcategorieson
Peruviangeographyreachesan extremein Palmer'slaterpublicationswherehe focuses
specificallyon theproblemof 'terrorism'.
80. Shafter,DeadlyParadigms,p. 71.
What
81. Forthe'countrybumpkins'
PalmercitesParejaPflucker,Terrorismo.
interpretation,
Palmerdoes nottellthereader,however,is thatPareja'sbookwaswrittenas anallegation
of 'outsideinfluences'in theunionstrikeattheCanariasMiningCompanyin Ayacuchoin
1980. At the time, the author,who was trainedas a labourhistorian,was the general
managerof the familyowned CanariasMiningCompany.While her book provides
on thepoliticalatmospherein Ayacucho,its analysisis
valuabledocumentary
information
heavilybiasedtowardsthePfluckerfamilyinterests.
82. For Guzmanand Sendero,BanderaRoja was a 'grupoliquidacionistade derecha'.
Senderowas opposed to Bandera'srecognitionof the military'sagrarianreform,their
effortsto organisepeasantswithintheCCP,andtheireffortsto organiseworkerswithouta
properrevolutionary
perspective.SeePCP-SLComit6Central,Bases,pp.62-63; see also
Degregori,Ayacucho,pp. 167-170.
For ParedesandBandera,Guzminandhis factionwere'oportunistas
liquidacionistas
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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188
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190
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