1NC

CP
The United States should:
- Create a more personal, vivid and relatable education
initiative for military personnel in regards to human
trafficking, prostitution and sexual violence
- Hold military commanders liable for failure to reasonably
prevent, investigate, or punish a subordinate's serious
UCMJ violation in regards to trafficking, prostitution and
sexual violence
- Eliminate Commander discretion in investigation of
sexual violence allegations and require comprehensive
data collection on allegations and prosecution
- Grant Japan legal jurisdiction for prosecuting crimes by
United States service members in Okinawa, requiring
crimes be brought before a Prosecutorial Review
Commission comprised of Okinawa citizens
- Should preempt any state and local laws that fail to
meet TVPA victim-protection standards
- Should revise the Status of Forces Agreement to include
an environmental clause that mandates inspection,
mandatory clean-up, and efforts to reduce noise pollution
- Should cancel plans to build a Futenma Replacement
Facility in Henoko and Oura Bay
- Propose to the Japanese government the relocation of
United States military presence from Okinawa to Kyushu,
to be located jointly with Japanese Self Defense Force
units, and propose the creation of a Joint Expeditionary
Unit.
- Eliminate all prohibitions on women serving in combat
roles in the United States Armed Forces
- Mandate recruiting, retention, and promotion policies for
the United States Armed Forces that prioritize a
substantial increase in the number of women enrolled in
the United States Armed Forces and serving in Armed
Forces leadership positions

Solves the case:

Relocating U.S. presence to Kyushu eliminates the burden
on Okinawa, preserves the Marines effectiveness, and
does not require new base construction
Tomohiro Yara 12, Okinawa Times senior correspondent, Fall 2012,
Exploring Solutions to the U.S. Military-Base Issues in Okinawa, Eurasia
Border Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, https://srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/eurasia_border_review/Vol32/yara.pdf
it is imperative to find a way to enable the Marines to
relinquish Okinawa without compromising the Japan-U.S. alliance, in a
manner that will benefit the Marines. The issue could be solved
immediately if mainland Japan, not only Okinawa, decided to accept the
Marines. However, it is too late now to build a new U.S. military base on
mainland Japan. It is necessary to set conditions favorable for the Marines in
exchange for them leaving Okinawa. Although I am not a strategic or military analyst, I
At the risk of opening Pandoras box,

propose a set of recommendations based on years of experience in observing the Marines in Okinawa.

There Is a Solution I believe that these proposals will drastically reduce the
burden of the U.S. military presence on the people of Okinawa and also help
strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. Firstly, the routine functions and
operations of the Marines in Okinawa should be clarified .4 (1) The Marines stationed
in Okinawa travel to allied countries in the Asia-Pacific region to enhance military exchanges through joint
military exercises. In recent years, they have also focused their efforts on civil affairs operations, such as
repairing schools and roads or setting up field hospitals to provide medical care for locals in less affluent
villages in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. They also provide emergency rescue operations for large-scale
natural disasters, such as major earthquakes and tsunamis. (2) To provide a future U.S. presence in the
Pacific region, the U.S. Marine Corps is set to network joint training centers in Australia, the Philippines,
Thailand and South Korea, centering on Guam. (3) Ground combat units are dispatched to Okinawa from
the U.S. for a six-month mission. After receiving approximately two and a half months of initial training
they go on expeditions by amphibious warfare ships deployed from Sasebo. They visit allied countries to
engage in planned military exercises and civil affairs operations. When they return to Okinawa, their six To continue these missions ,
the Marines do not have to stay in Okinawa. Those on a six-month rotation may be

month mission is complete and they are replaced by the next units.

dispatched to Guam, not Okinawa, and achieve their missions by traveling to allied regions from Guam and

If they need to conduct joint military exercises

with Japans Self-Defense Forces, they can do so in larger areas, such as Hijudai in
Oita Prefecture, the Fuji Maneuver Area in Yamanashi and Shizuoka, Ohjojihara in Miyagi and
Yausubetsu in Hokkaido. The September 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs ran an article entitled Tokyos
carrying out their other duties from there.

Transformation by political scientists Eric Heginbotham, Ely Ratner, and Richard J. Samuels. They

the particular location of the Marines is less critical, as long as

training facilities and infrastructure are adequate. All they have to do is
theorized that

change the rotations. Since this means that the U.S. Marine Corps will lose Okinawa, there will be certain
damage to their prestige. But if it is possible to offset their losses, negotiations can be brought to a
successful conclusion. The

crux of my recommendations is to set conditions

acceptable to the Marines. These conditions would include the provision of
high speed vessels (HSV); the continuation of Japans financial support for U.S. forces that transfer
from Okinawa to new areas; and the participation of Japans Self-Defense Forces in
civil affairs operations and humanitarian operations by forming a Joint Expeditionary Unit
with Pacific Marines. This will become a great opportunity to demonstrate a
new form of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific region .

The militarys current failed policies on recruiting,

retention, and promotion of women and the combat
exclusion relegate women to mere token status in the
armed forces---reform boosts womens prestige and
leadership within the military---studies prove that has a
transformative effect on culture
Megan N. Schmid 10, Captain, United States Air Force, 2010, Comment:
COMBATING A DIFFERENT ENEMY: PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE CULTURE OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, Villanova Law Review, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 475
Military policies and leaders' actions that subordinate military women reinforce the
problematic aspects of the culture that contribute to sexual assault. n119
Therefore, this Comment proposes that the military should focus on reforms that can help
change the culture, such as moving military women beyond their mere
"token" status through recruiting, retention, and promotion efforts . n120 Also,
the United States government should abolish the exclusion on women from
combat in order to end the official subordination of military women . n121 Finally,
the military needs to recognize male victims of sexual assault by holding commanders who do not support
the prevention and response program accountable. n122 [*498] A. Giving Validity to Women's Military

Women still comprise only about

fourteen percent of the armed forces, which leads sociologists and legal scholars to
label their presence in the military as token. n123 This minority status hampers
women's ability to influence the military culture . n124 Thus, altering the
demographics of the military, by increasing the number of women in the
armed forces, may be the most effective way of changing the
Service and Enabling Military Women to Change the Culture

military culture. n125 Just as President Truman successfully ordered the racial integration of the
the President should use the commander-in-chief authority to fully
integrate women in the military. n126 Specifically, the President could give validity
to women's military service by directing the DoD to reevaluate
recruitment, retention, and assignment policies affecting women.
n127 Research has shown women's token presence in the military needs to
change to transform the culture and end sexual assault. n128 The DoD Task Force
on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies found that some members do
not value women as highly as men because "women are a minority , are
excluded from some of the highly regarded combat specialties , and are held to
military,

different physical fitness standards." n129 The Task Force recommended increasing the number of women
[*499] in key leadership positions and the percentage of women at the service academies to counteract

when present in
substantial numbers, women are viewed as peers and leaders, and the
gender line becomes less important. n131 Studies indicate that women can influence
cultural change within an organization when they comprise about twenty-five
percent of organization members. n132 Thus, the DoD should focus on
recruiting and retaining more women to increase the percentage of military
women - currently fourteen percent - to at least twenty-five percent. n133 In addition,
if more military women were promoted to leadership positions, women
such devaluation. n130 Similarly, sex-integration in the workplace has shown that

would have the ability to directly influence the military culture by

addressing misogynistic social practices. n134 Many non-military courts have
recognized the impact of tokenism on the work environment and the negative behaviors that result. n135
The United States Supreme Court "acknowledged the link between tokenism and the prevalence of
stereotyping" in a case where the only woman candidate was denied partnership in a large accounting
firm. n136 In another case involving a "hyper-masculine working environment," a district court [*500]
similarly recognized the connection between tokenism and the presence of stereotyping as combining to

tokenism is a viable theory in this

context, and if the DoD is committed to reducing the military's sexual assault
problem, the DoD needs to counteract the harmful effects of women's minority
status in the military by enlisting and retaining more women and encouraging
their promotion to positions of leadership. n138 Simply increasing the overall number of women is
not enough, however; the military services also must make specific efforts to
ensure women are evenly distributed among military units so that their
presence is significant enough to impact the culture . n139
create a sexually hostile work environment. n137 Thus,

CPs reforms to prosecution solve enforcement and create

an effective deterrent to sexual assault
Morris, Duke law professor, 1996
(Madeline, Article: By Force Of Arms: Rape, War, And Military Culture, Duke
Law Journal, 45 Duke L.J. 651, lexis)

The procedural framework governing the handling of rape by military personnel

may be somewhat more problematic. Reports of rape by military personnel are to be forwarded by the military personnel or
agency receiving the report to the immediate commander of the suspect (or to a law enforcement or investigative agency if no suspect is
identified). n93 That immediate commander is then required to make a preliminary inquiry into the alleged offense. n94 At this stage, the
commander generally should refer the case to the service's criminal investigative department (CID) for investigation pursuant to a regulation
stating that "in serious . . . cases the commander should consider whether to seek the assistance of law enforcement personnel in conducting
any inquiry or further investigation." n95 Assuming that a case is referred to CID, an investigative report is then sent back to the commander
who, usually in consultation with Judge Advocate General Corps personnel, [*683] decides whether to bring a charge of rape against the
suspect. n96 An Article Thirty-Two investigation, the military analog to a grand jury proceeding, is then convened to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to warrant referring the charge to a court martial. n97 Provisions intended to ensure adequate enforcement also are in
place. Article Ninety-Eight of the UCMJ provides that "any person . . . who (1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any
case of a person accused of an offense . . . shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." n98 The UCMJ also provides for the processing
and redress of complaints by "any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer." n99 Such wrongs
presumably would include failure to process a rape complaint properly. Notwithstanding these provisions intended to ensure enforcement,

there is anecdotal evidence of failure to enforce military rape laws, including

failures to investigate, to keep records, and to preserve evidence. n100 Witnesses at
Senate hearings in 1992 testified that such failures are common. n101 Other than anecdotal evidence, there are currently no data available to
evaluate the nature or extent of failures to enforce military rape law (much less to compare military enforcement with civilian enforcement).

commanders have discretion in the processing of rape complaints,

That discretion could be misused to
divert cases from prosecution or otherwise to extend inappropriate leniency .
n102 If there is, in fact, a laxity in the enforcement of military laws against rape,
then that weakness would be expected to reduce the efficacy of that law in deterring
rape. n103 Such a lack of deterrence would be expected to increase military
rape rates and therefore could constitute an important element contributing to the rape differential. Implementation
of a thoroughgoing system of record-keeping, tracking all military rape
allegations from their initial report to final disposition and compiling those data in a central data
bank, would be valuable both in encouraging enforcement and in allowing
for identification of procedural flaws or enforcement problems in the
handling of rape within the military justice system . Careful record-keeping and oversight both would
[*684] Certainly,

especially in the early stages of the process, such as the preliminary inquiry.

tend to improve enforcement directly (simply by increasing the visibility of the handling of cases) and would assist in identification of any

Legislation instituting such centralized record-keeping

and oversight of military sexual misconduct cases has been proposed in the past,
n105 but none has been adopted to date. n106 [*685] Domestic military law, then, appears to be comparable to civilian
problems in enforcement procedures. n104

law in its substantive aspects but may be less stringent in its actual implementation. If military enforcement mechanisms are in fact

Improved
oversight in this area is warranted in order to identify and correct any
patterns of enforcement failure. The other body of law governing rape by military personnel is international
law. It appears that enforcement of the international laws against rape by military
personnel may be even more lacking than enforcement of other aspects of
international law relating to military personnel . n107 Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any feature of
international justice contributes appreciably to the rape differential. International law clearly criminalizes
rape by military personnel. n108 There is, however, evidence that international law's
prohibitions [*686] of rape have been even less subject to enforcement than have
other provisions of international criminal law. n109 Nonetheless, [*687] to date, international criminal law
comparatively weak, then a resulting reduction in deterrence might explain some part of the military rape differential.

relating to military personnel has been so rarely enforced -- whether regarding rape, murder, assault, or otherwise n110 -- that it seems
unlikely that differential enforcement of international provisions accounts for any significant part of the rape differential. The proposition that
underenforcement of international criminal law probably contributes little to an explanation of the rape differential should not be taken to
suggest that international criminal law could not contribute in the future to a reduction of rape by military personnel. There are indications that

the enforcement of international criminal law relating to military personnel

may improve considerably in the coming years. Within the past three years, we have witnessed the establishment
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, n111 and the establishment of a permanent International

tribunals for the

adjudication of international crimes would be expected to contribute
substantially to enforcement of international criminal law, including the
enforcement of international law prohibiting rape . n113 Thus, international criminal law has the
Criminal Court is becoming an ever more real possibility. n112 The establishment of [*688] such

potential to become a real factor in the deterrence of crime, including rape, by military personnel. But the influences of international criminal
justice probably contribute little to an explanation of the existing military rape differential.

DA
Conventional Prompt Global Strike funding is insufficient
now
Brustlein 15 (Corentin Brustlein, head of the Deterrence and Proliferation
research program at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI),
researcher in the institutes joint civil-military Defense Research Unit, and
PhD in Political Science from the Jean Moulin University of Lyon, January 2015,
Conventionalizing Deterrence? U.S. Prompt Strike Programs and Their Limits,
Security Studies Center,
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp52brustlein.pdf) PA
Development of CPGS capabilities has run into a series of budgetary, political and
technological barriers which have mutually reinforced each other. Taken together, they help understand
why progress has until now been extremely limited. These factors combined have pushed back the
perspective of deploying an operational capability to the end of the decade at least40. In the first place,
most U.S. projects suffer from their reliance on technologies that are not yet mature, particularly when
relying on HGVs (scramjet propulsion is another example). The requirements laid down by the Pentagon for
the planned systems strike any target on the earth with metric precision in less than one hour are
extremely ambitious. Because Congress had ruled out the only option based on relatively proven
technologies (CTM program), any CPGS system development first required key advances in mastering
hypersonic flight. In theory, only a hypersonic glide vehicle could combine global range, short flight time
and sufficient precision, while reducing the nuclear ambiguity problem thanks to its maneuverability during
the intermediate phase of flight. However, in concrete terms, achieving a mature design for a HGV with
global range poses numerous difficulties, either revealed during HTV-2 testing or anticipated in the longer
term: the conditions for stable gliding flight at hypersonic speeds are still poorly understood; test
costs are prohibitive, and reproducing hypersonic flight conditions in an experimental environment is both
difficult and expensive; shielding the payload from the extreme heat generated by highspeed
endoatmospheric flight constitutes a tremendous challenge; current precision guidance systems seem
inadequate for use with a HGV: the GPS signal could be disrupted by the plasma generated by atmospheric
heating, while inertial measurement units would lack precision considering the extreme speed of both the

To know whether these obstacles could be overcome and

explore the different potential technical options, large R&D investments
sustained in the long term would be needed42. However, this kind of
investments has not taken place. The first phase of significant investments was planned in
vehicle and payload41.

2007 and was to fund the CTM program on which the administration had pinned its hopes. After Congress
abruptly blocked credits due to the payload ambiguity problem, investment slightly increased in the

As of today, the conventional

prompt strike budget has never reached 200 million dollars which , though
nonnegligible, is still extremely modest in comparison with the U.S. R&D budget
following year, but remained at a limited level since then.

(see Figure 1.). Figure 1. Conventional prompt global strike budgets (2004-2019), in millions of dollars43

Not only has the budget allocated for CPGS programs remained modest (116 million
dollars per year on average since 2008), but the projects receiving funding have
frequently changed, moving within a few years from CTM to HTV-2 to AHW. This instability,
which can be explained both by political motives (nuclear ambiguity of the CTM) and by
the disappointing results of HTV-2 tests44, has reduced the ability of the project teams to
consolidate know-how and overcome technical obstacles they face. In addition, the
constraints weighing on the U.S. defense budget since 2011 have constituted a
severe test for a nascent program relying on immature technologies. The absolute necessity
for the administration to reduce federal spending on a long-term basis meant that budgetary priorities had
to be established in the defense sector. Although it has not been publicly acknowledged, the choices were
detrimental to CPGS programs. Due to the modest investments and sunk costs to date, the local economic
impact of these programs was practically zero. In fact, conventional strategic strike programs seem not to

have enjoyed sufficient support from either Congress, the armed forces or the OSD. At the very least, these
capabilities have not been considered important enough to be exempted from budgetary cuts. The
administration, which had planned in spring 2011 to allocate almost 1.8 billion dollars to CPGS programs
over the next five years, found itself forced to drastically scale back its ambitions: in early 2014, the
projected credit envelope for CPGS programs through 2018 was divided by almost three, to 673 million
dollars (see Figures 2 and 3), which approximately equals the actual spending levels from FY2010 to
FY2014. Figure 2 shows the extent to which credits projected on an annual basis dropped sharply after the
Budget Control Act was voted in summer 2011, forcing the administration to find more than 1,000 billion
dollars in savings over a decade, heavily impacting the Pentagons budget45.

Removing forward presence will result in CPGS for

compensation
Woolf 10/2 (Amy F Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at the CRS,
10/2/15, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, Congressional Research Service Report,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf) PA
[Page 1] In 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) specifically identified a new missionprompt global strike ( PGS)

the ability to strike targets anywhere on

Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour, without relying on forward based
forces. DOD argued that this capability would bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by providing the
that

sought to provide

the United States with

United States with the ability to attack high-value targets or fleeting targets that might be visible for only a short
amount of time promptly, at the start of or during a conflict. DOD has considered a number of systems that might provide
the United States with long-range strike capabilities. These include bombers, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and boost-

Congress has generally

supported the rationale for the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and
suggested changes in the direction of specific programs. It is likely to continue to review the technologies and
glide technologies that would mate a rocket booster with a hypersonic glide vehicle.

programs related to this mission as a part of the annual authorization and appropriations process. During the George W.
Bush Administration, analysts began to note that long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads would be
an ideal weapon for this mission. They argued that these weapons, based in the United States or on submarines at sea,
could attack targets worldwide with a high degree of precision in a short amount of time. However, during the latter years
of the Bush Administration and the early years of the Obama Administration, DODs programs began to focus on

analysts have questioned the

need for these programs, raising concerns, for example, about the possibility that U.S.
hypersonic weapons as the technology of choice for this mission. Some

adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry

whether existing U.S. military capabilities

might meet the need for prompt, conventional attacks in most
potential conflict scenarios without raising the risk of miscalculation or
misunderstanding. The Navy and Air Force have each studied concepts and technologies that might contribute
nuclear weapons. They have also questioned

to the conventional PGS (CPGS) mission. The Army is also developing a hypersonic vehicle that might be deployed on
long-range missiles. For several years, Congress funded programs managed by both the Navy and the Air Force. In
FY2008, however, Congress combined the funding in a new defense-wide account that would explore a wider range of
options for the prompt global strike mission. This report provides an overview of the rationale for the PGS mission and the
possible deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles or boost-glide systems in support of this
mission. It then reviews the Air Force and Navy efforts to develop these systems. It summarizes congressional reaction to
these proposals, then provides a more detailed account of the issues raised by these concepts and programs.

The

Prompt Global Strike Mission (PGS) Rationale for the PGS Mission Throughout the Cold War, the United States
maintained military bases overseas so that it could position its troops to deter, and if necessary, respond promptly to an

forward bases were located, for the most

part, in Europe and Asiaregions where conflict seemed most likely to
occur. These overseas bases and forces were believed not only to increase preparedness, but also to deter conflict by
attack from the Soviet Union or its allies. These

their very presence in unstable regions. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,
analysts argued that the United States must be prepared to fight in unexpected areas against a wide range of potential
adversaries who may possess a great variety of military capabilities. Although the United States continues to deploy its
military forces at bases around the world, it has begun to restructure, and, in many cases, reduce, its forces based
overseas. It has also sought to improve its ability to move military forces into a region quickly when and if a conflict
occurs. Moreover, as some observers have noted, the United States can no longer be certain that these bases are located

close to the most likely areas of conflict. As a result, many analysts and military officials have argued that the United
States must maintain and enhance its long-range strike capability so that it can strike anywhere in
the world with forces that are based in or near the United States,3 or with forces that have the range to reach targets

This would not only allow the United States to

pursue an adversary without relying on forward bases, it would also allow the
United States to reach targets deep inside an enemys territory [Page 2] [Page 31] The PGS missions
requirements are based on the assumption that a future conflict would
take place far from existing U.S. bases overseas, and possibly far from ocean
areas where the United States has deployed most of its sea-based forces. They also assume that
a future conflict could develop quickly, allowing too little time for the U nited
States to move its forces into the region, either by acquiring basing rights on land or by moving seaacross the globe from wherever they are deployed.

based forces closer to the theater of conflict. Further, the concern about hidden or relocatable targets reflects an
assumption that targets could appear with little notice and remain vulnerable for a short period of time, factors that place
a premium on the ability to launch quickly and arrive on target quickly. The requirements also assume that U.S. forces are
likely to face an anti-access threat, or air defense capabilities that would impede operations by U.S. aircraft. Many of

these characteristics were present in Afghanistan in 2001, when the United States
attacked al Qaeda training camps and the Taliban government after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The attacks on the
United States came without warning, and, although the United States took several weeks to plan its response and acquire
the needed intelligence information on target areas, speed was of the essence if the United States hoped to trap and
destroy leaders at the training camps in Afghanistan.

The United States had no military bases in

the region, and had to take the time to acquire basing rights in
nearby nations and to move U.S. naval forces into the region. Further, the
mountainous terrain offered the enemy areas where their leadership could hide and hope to evade attack. These
characteristics, with the premium they place on prompt, long-range attacks, support the view that
the United States should deploy new boost-glide capabilities to meet the requirements of the PGS mission.
In this view, other weapons systems cannot address all the characteristics at the same time; bombers may be too slow to
arrive and too vulnerable to air defense systems, seabased or air-launched cruise missiles may also be too slow to arrive
and of too short a range to reach remote targets, and sea-based systems, with the exception of long-range ballistic

However,
the presence of many of these characteristics in one recent conflict does not
necessarily mean that they will all be present in most, or even many, future conflicts.
missiles, may also be too far away to reach high priority targets promptly at the sudden start of a conflict.

While each is certainly possible, taken together, these characteristics describe a worst-case scenario that may occur
rarely, or not at all, in its entirety.

This observation highlights several questions that

Congress could consider when reviewing the rationale for the PGS mission. How likely is it that the United
States would face a sudden, unanticipated conflict, with no time to build up its forces in the region and with the
requirement to strike some targets within hours of the start of the conflict? Would a delay of several hours or even days
undermine the value of attacking these targets at the start of a conflict? Could other weapons systems provide the United
States with the ability to loiter near the theater of operations, allowing a prompt attack during the conflict if hidden or
concealed targets are revealed?95 A comparison of the likelihood of those scenarios that may provide the most stressing

the conclusion that other

weapons systems can respond to many of these requirements in
most circumstances. [Page 32]
environments with the likelihood of less stressful scenarios may lead to

CPGS will cause nuclear war with China and Russia limited development has put us on the brink of an arms
race and China is moving away from NFU
Acton 14 (James M Acton is a co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program and
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. A physicist by training, Acton
specializes in deterrence, disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy,
The Arms Race Goes Hypersonic, 1/30/14, Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/the-arms-race-goes-hypersonic/) PA
With grainy photographs of Chinas new drones and manned stealth fighters trickling onto the Internet
every few months, Beijings rapid military modernization has become a reliable source of anxiety in

Western capitals. But theres one area of military technology youve probably never heard of, where a new
and potentially dangerous arms race is brewing and where a crisis could touch off rapid and uncontrollable
escalation. The arena for this contest is the obscure military technology of ultra-fast, long-range or
boost-glide weaponry. Such weapons are designed to be launched or "boosted" by large rockets. All
U.S. tests, for example, have used repurposed long-range ballistic missiles that, in a former life, were used
to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear warheads. But instead of arcing high above the Earth like ballistic
missiles, boost-glide weapons re-enter the atmosphere quickly and then glide at incredibly high speeds,
potentially for thousands of miles. Its old news that the United States is currently developing boost-glide

Conventional Prompt Global Strike program. As originally

conceived a decade ago, this program was intended to produce non-nuclear weapons
capable of reaching a target anywhere in the world within an hour. The
Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, on which the lions share of funding is currently focused,
would not meet this goal. But with a range of roughly 5,000 miles, it would still have a much
weapons as part of the Pentagons

longer reach than any non-nuclear missile the United States currently possesses. It now appears that China
and Russia are following the United States lead. China conducted its first test of a boost-glide weapon,
dubbed WU-14 by the U.S. Department of Defense, on Jan. 9. This test was not entirely unexpected.
Surveys of the unclassified Chinese technical literature (such as this one by Lora Saalman and this one by
Mark Stokes, both of whom are American experts on Chinese military research) reveal that theoretical
research into boost-glide weapons has been going on for some time. Still, very little information about the
test itself is publicly available. The Chinese government has stated that it took place "in our territory."
Elsewhere, it was reported that the missile was launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi
province. If these two claims are correct and thats an important caveat then together they imply that
the total flight distance must have been no more than about 1,800 miles (the distance from Taiyuan to the
farthest point still inside China.) The upper end of this range would represent an impressive technological
breakthrough. But it is also possible that the WU-14 flew a shorter distance and is simply a souped-up
version of its existing anti-ship ballistic missile the infamous DF-21D, which has recently sparked
concern in the U.S. Navy suggesting that the Chinese approach to boost-glide weapons development is

In general, the scope and ambition of the Chinese program are

unclear, including whether the goal is the delivery of nuclear or non-nuclear
warheads or both. As always, Russia wants a piece of the action too . In
December 2012, in his annual State of the Nation address, President Vladimir Putin gave a
shout-out to the U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike program and
announced a Russian response that would include future "advanced
weapons." Given recent statements from other senior Russian officials explicitly threatening to develop
evolutionary.

precision-guided weapons systems with "practically global range, if the U.S. does not pull back from its
program for creating such missile systems" and evidence of Russian flight tests, such advanced weapons

The implications of these developments for

stability particularly in Northeast Asia could be profound. If Beijing
decides to field a boost-glide weapon and it would probably take at least a decade from
now for it to do so there is little doubt that its primary target would be U.S. and
allied forces. Meanwhile, in a potentially dangerous symmetry, U.S. officials
have indicated that they are considering acquiring boost-glide weapons to
defeat Chinas advanced defensive capabiliti es, including the DF-21D, and its
anti-satellite weapons. So what would the addition of boost-glide weapons mean for a potential
almost certainly include boost-glide systems.

showdown with China? On the one hand, fear of U.S. capabilities could deter China from attempting to

in the event of a conflict, the

existence of boost-glide weapons could make it much harder to manage. One
risk practically the only one currently discussed in the United States is that, after further
developing its early warning capabilities, China might misidentify a Conventional
Prompt Global Strike weapon as a nuclear weapon and initiate a nuclear
response. But there are other, more likely pathways to escalation that have
barely been considered. For example, boost-glide weapons might enable the
United States to attack Chinese command and control facilities that are buried
change the territorial status quo by force. On the other,

too deeply to be threatened by other non-nuclear weapons. However, China

reportedly uses the same command and control system for its conventional
and nuclear missiles. A U.S. attack on this system for the purpose of disabling Chinese
conventional missiles could, therefore, be misinterpreted by Beijing as an attack aimed
at suppressing its nuclear capability. Rapid, uncontrollable escalation
could result. But the risks associated with developing boost-glide technology are not purely
hypothetical. Even though these weapons do not yet exist, their specter is
already influencing the nuclear policies of Russia and China. For example,
fear of American conventional weapons has sparked an internal Chinese
debate about whether Beijing should abandon its long-standing policy not to
use nuclear weapons first. Meanwhile, various Russian officials have repeatedly indicated a lack
of interest in negotiating further nuclear reductions because they worry that doing so would make their

fear is actually
leading Russia to diversify not contract its nuclear forces.
nuclear forces more vulnerable to American conventional weaponry. In fact, this

K
The 1AC expresses an attachment to the redemption of
the world. Their ethic forecloses the question of whether
America ought to exist. All discussions of the military will
be bankrupt unless first understand the shortcomings of
the American policy through exploration of what
constitutes modernity and those bodies who are
incapacitated from debate on pragmatics of American
sovereignty. The social fabric of America lays in slavery.
We cannot talk about the discontents of sovereignty
without talking about what constitutes that sovereignty.
Sovereignty is based on the constitutive exclusion of the
black body.
Sexton 2006 [Jared, Associate Professor of African American Studies and
Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of The Trifecta of
Tough, Race, Nation, and Empire in a Blackened World, Radical History
Review Issue 95]

In the United States, homegrown white supremacists, and the lions share of their more moderate
neighbors, have long considered black people to be weapons of mass destruction. Racial profiling, the
hallmark of Homeland Securitys dreadful encroachments, cut its fearsome teeth several years prior to the
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Prior, as well, to the American Civil Liberties Unions (ACLU) Driving while

Reagans infamous war

on drugs in the early 1980s, and even to President Richard Nixons earlier
consolidation of the first truly nationwide police apparatus in the late 1960s . In
fact, the genealogy of this nefarious police practice is properly charted beyond
the twentieth century, reaching back, with stunningly little modification, to the ethos of the
colonial slave patrols of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
centuries. Given this line of descent, it is not unreasonable to say that racial profiling is the
sine qua non of modern policing. In the consternated deliberations of national security, official
and unofficial, from the founding of the republic to the trumpeting of the new
world order, the social control and crisis management of the black population
has always figured centrally, even or perhaps especially when matters of
emancipation or racial equality have by no means enjoyed the focus of
debate. Across the sweep of U.S. history, policing the color line has required no
credible threat of invasion, no evidence of insurrectionary design, no proven stockpile of illicit
Black campaign in the late 1990s; prior to the launch of President Ronald

chemical agents or radioactive material, no particular breach of domestic or international law, no

sensational moral or ethical transgression (though all of these items, real or imagined, have factored in the

It has only required the presencewithin the polity,

a so-called problem people, dwelling as the absence of
human presence. We can note further that the institution of transatlantic racial slavery
whose political and economic relations constitute , present tense, the social fabric
of West-ern modernity in general, of the Americas in particular, and of the United States most
relevant discourses, public and private).
economy, culture, and societyof

acutelycannot be explained (away) by the acquisition of fixed capital, the minimization of variable
capital, or the maximization of profits, much less by the dictates of gunboat diplomacy, the expansion of
strategic overseas military installations, or the idiosyncrasies of the White House. It may seem so at times,
but only insofar as contemporary observers, or our historical counterparts, fundamentally misrecognize the

nature of racial slavery: as a brutal regime of labor exploitation; as the atrocious adjunct to land conquest
and the extermination, containment, and/or forced assimilation of indigenous peoples; or as an endeavor
functional to, rather than in excess of and at times at odds with, the advent and maturation of Eurocentric
capitalism. Of course, all of these procedures have been important to the history of racial slavery (and vice
versa), but none is essential to its origins, its development and, above all, its pernicious afterlife. Rather,

enslavementthe inaugural enterprise for the age of Europe, the precondition for the American
century and its coveted sequelis enabled by and dependent on the most basic of
operations: symbolic and material immobilization, the absolute divestment of
sovereignty at the site of the black body: its freedom of movement, its
conditions of labor, its physical and emotional sustenance, its social and
sexual reproduction, its political and cultural representation . Beyond its economic
utility, this rendering of the black as the object of dispossession par excellenceobject of accumulation,
prototypical commodity, captive fleshstructures indelibly the historical proliferation of modern
conceptions of sovereignty that now dominate political and legal discourse globally and provide the crucial

With
blacks barred by definition from the very notion of the sovereign (whatever their
nominal legal status, wherever their tentative place of residence), those not marked by the
material and symbolic stigma of slavery have the exclusive and positive
capacity to debate about sovereignty: to trivialize its importance and
rationalize its violation or to struggle in its defense, to name and lament its
loss, and wage war for its recovery. Blacks, then, suffer a peculiar relation to the U.S. empire
frames of intelligibility for both imperialism and anti-imperialism, empire and its discontents.

in the historic instance: neither its subjects (certainly not its authors or beneficiaries) nor its objects (at
least not in the most direct sense). This peculiarity was underscored dramatically during the notorious U.S.
war in Southeast Asia (196575) wherein black soldiers, overwhelmingly conscripted, were not only
disproportionately offered up as cannon fodder (after long being segregated and retained in noncombat
functions, depicted as cowardly and inept, denied access to the social capital of military heroism, etc.all
components of the typical critique of the racism internal to the armed forces ) but were also
differentiated by the enemies of the U.S. military invasion and occupation. Racially targeted propaganda
appealed to the cruel ironies of black military service (ironies already well known and articulated by midcentury) and offered ideological support to the struggle for freedom, justice, and equality that was, at the
time, intensifying and mutating stateside as it raised the galvanizing cry of Black Power. More important, I
think, were the notable combat tactics of Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers, which frequently
targeted white soldiers for ambush and sniper attacks while leaving unharmed (if at all possible)
contingents of black soldiers on hand, a veritable racial partition of attack. In this circumscribed domain,

the campaign of Vietnamese guerrilla fighters sought to exploitin parts

strategically, in parts earnestlythe living legacy of antiblackness among U.S.
fighting forces not only by suggesting a political affinity between blacks and
Asians as victims of white supremacy (whether European colonialism or U.S. imperialism)
but also by enacting a displacement of the racially distributed vulnerability to
violence that otherwise slated blacks for gratuitous assault without recourse .
Muhammad Alis famous 1966 statement, I aint got no quarrel with them Viet-Cong. No Viet-Cong ever
called me nigger, takes on added weight in this light. Black troops, for their part, contributed actively to
this antagonistic milieu with, among other things, hundreds of fraggings of white junior officers, the
repeated refusal of high-risk assignments, and, on several occasions, open rebellion and riot against the
system of overseas military policing and prisons in which they were, predictably, overrepresented as
captives. In the contemporary theater of operations in occupied Iraq, this historical discrepancywhich has
hardly been mitigated, even if it is newly mediated--promised to reassert itself briefly with the fragging

the racial politics of

U.S. militarism, so prominent at the height of black political movement and
social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s, have been consistently and
unsurprisingly convoluted by the combined effects of corporate media
machinations and the marked disarray of black politics domestically. The global
incident involving U.S. Army Sergeant Asan Akbar, a native-born black. But

antiwar movement, while eloquent on the menace of the former, has missed the latter point almost
entirely. In its drive for popular (if not populist) appeal, a drive fueled by the euphoria of mass

political opposition to the war on terror

across the global North has borrowed freely from the rhetorical repertoire of
black freedom struggle in and beyond the United States, but it has displayed
a striking disinterest in either the political energies or the lived experience of
actually existing black communities
demonstrations on the eve of the U.S. invasion,

Our interrogation of the anti-black policing paradigm is a

stance against gender policing which subjects trans and
gender nonconforming people to a status of capture
Rasheed and Stanley 14 [Janan Rasheed, Brooklyn-based conceptual
artist & Arts editor for Spook Magazine; Eric, PhD in Hist. of Consciousness @
UC Santa Cruz, UC Presidents postdoctoral Fellow at UCSD, The Carceral
State, http://thenewinquiry.com/features/the-carceral-state/#more-58702]
Abolition is not simply a
reaction to the [prison-industrial complex] but a political commitment that
makes the PIC impossible writes Eric A. Stanley in the introduction to Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison
California gets called progressive despite operating one of the worlds largest prison systems.

Industrial Complex. Nourishing these possibilities to create a future in which incarceration and policing are not normalized features of our
society has been at the core of Stanleys academic writing and activist work. A president postdoctoral fellow in the departments of
communication and critical gender studies at the University of California, San Diego, Stanley works at the intersections of radical trans/queer
politics and prison abolition. Stanley has directed the filmsHomotopia (2006) and Criminal Queers (2013) along with Chris Vargas. Stanley talks
to the New Inquiry about Californias incarceration culture and those who resist it, how language shapes our imagining of a post-incarceration
world and the importance of queering our conversations around the prison-industrial complex. What is unique about the Californian narrative
of incarceration and policing? How has the history of California been shaped by the prison-industrial complex? California is in many ways
emblematic of our current moment of U.S. empire. Our stage of late liberalism allows California to proclaim itself both the most progressive
state while simultaneously producing among the most brutal carceral practices. We can look to California and the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) as a cautionary tale of how even well-meaning prison reform almost always produces more violence,
rather than stopping it. To understand how progressive California became the way we talk about the operators of one of the largest prison
systems in the world, we could look to the recent Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, for an example. It is championed
by many state prison-reform groups because it claims it will help pull some people out of prisons and jails through resentencing of what the
legislation calls nonserious nonviolent inmates. And it might! At first glance, this seems like something that all of us fighting against the
prison-industrial complex (PIC) could support. We know that decarceration is one strategy in the long vision that is abolition. However, written
into the proposition is a provision that would mandate all the savings from releasing people be placed into a fund that would increase police
presence in schools and mandate harsher truancy discipline. What looks like a victory in our struggle would actually build up rather than
dismantle the PIC. As a response to the infamous overcrowding of Californias prisons, this is something we know would reimprison 10,000
people, even if 10,000 people are released. Overcrowding is not a malfunction of the prison-industrial complex, its how its designed. For a
more exacting account of Californias carceral topography, I would defer to Ruthie Gilmores amazing book,Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus,
Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California. There, Ruthie helps us understand how labor and land are central to Californias prison growth
but often overlooked. While it seems obvious that capitalism is a big part of the story of imprisonment, Golden Gulag helps push against the
understanding that it is only important at the level of a defendants ability to fight charges. Identifying a structuring logic of the prisonindustrial complex, Ruthie suggests her book is about class war, and it is. I am interested in exacting accounts. I think about the prisonindustrial complex especially in considering who collects and distributes information about it, and the specificity required in describing what it
is. How does this enumeration, calculation, and collecting further serve the prison-industrial complex? As example we might look at the
National Crime Victim Survey, a database funneled through the Bureau of Justice, is currently the only space where national biased violence
is aggregated. While having some important information, the database is little more than a misrecognition of the forms of structural
abandonment and direct attack many people face everyday. Some have argued that if the reporting or vectors could be corrected we would
have a more accurate representation of who is targeted for these kinds of harm. But I want us to undo the argument that more information or

We have elaborate data on incarceration rates for black

people in the U.S., and we know that this research has done nothing to curtail the
reality that the prison-industrial complex functions as antiblackness . Even if statistics
show how the prison-industrial complex is constitutively anti-trans and anti-black,
they dont halt it. I think youre right. Weve always known this information, but that information by itself is not liberatory. Beyond
research necessarily produces more liberation.

the information we have about the functioning of the PIC, I am also interested in the information we have about movements challenging the
PIC. I think it is easy to conflate the myriad of struggles against the PIC and this conflation can obscure the work of distincactivist
organizations. I spent a little over a year with Critical Resistance, where I learned about the distinction between a prison-reform movement and
a prison-abolition movement. For those who conceptualize prison reform in terms of more rehabilitation programs or the ending of mandatory
minimums, how does your work for prison abolition differ from prison reform? Whats the difference between asserting that the prison system

While usually suspicious of the work of

binary oppositions, I think the distinction between reform and abolition is vital. When
they become confused, we end up with people arguing that Prop 47 is going to solve
the problem of mass incarceration. If we say that the prison system is working as
designed, that is, as a set of antiblack, ableist, and gender-normative practices used
is broken versus the assertion that is working as it is designed to function?

to constrict, and at times liquidate, people and communities under the empty signifiers
of justice and safety, then we can more adequately assess what something like Prop 47
will actually do: Trade a few of the prison systems current hostages for an expansion
into schools. We often arrive at the idea that the system is broken not because we have such a strong attachment to the state, but
because we have a scarcity of language around the intensity of its violence. One of the ways its common sense remains entrenched is in our
collective inability to articulate the enormity of our current conditions. Instead wemyself includedmost often use language that is readily
available, helping sabotage our own chances of living otherwise. In concrete terms, what does it mean to continue believing that the prison
system is broken? If we believe that the prison system is broken, then we must also believe in its ability to be fixed. Here we can see how the
PIC keeps functioning through the rehearsal of the broken system narrative. As Angela Davis and many others have argued, it is precisely
through reform that the prison-industrial complex expands. We can see the materiality of this expansion through the mandatory increase in
police in schools through Proposition 47. I was born and raised in California and I know this proposition would affect my old students and family
members so lets talk about Prop 47. It is on the November 4 ballot. If it is approved by the states voters, it would reduce the classification of
most nonserious and nonviolent property and drug crimes from a felony to a misdemeanor. How do you respond to people who say this

In abolitionist work we sometimes talk about

nonreformist reforms to think about the distance between people getting their
immediate needs met, or their conditions made less unlivable, and the political
worlds we want. Under our regime of racial capitalism, perhaps all we can inhabit is a
set of shifting contradictions. Given this, one of the questions we try to continually ask is,
Will this reform be something we have to fight against in five years? For me, this is how I
reform, however small, is better than nothing at all?

determine if the compromise is too dangerous. In the case of Californias Proposition 47, Im not convinced it will actually lead to the release of

Focusing our efforts only on, and in the

name of nonviolent and nonserious incarcerated people can also work to reaffirm
the assumed serious and inescapable violence of those still inside. Are we willing to
always allow the state to decide what constitutes the limits of violence? Under Proposition
people and will instead further involve schools as punitive practices.

47, someone who defrauds an entire community out of their homes may be considered nonviolent, while someone who blocks their own
home from being foreclosed could remain imprisoned as a violent offender. I want to talk more about the abolitionist vision and the
construction of the violent and nonviolent offenders, as well as accountability. A tiring critique of prison abolition that can make even a
self-identified radical sound like a mouthpiece for the right is that if we abolish the PIC, we will all be subject to greater risks of harm. In
response to this assertion, it is important to note at least two related points. First, the most dangerous, violent people in our society are not in
prison, but are running our military, government, prisons, and banks. Secondly, what we have now, even for people who have caused harm, is
a form of nonaccountability where the survivors of a violation are often harmed again through the desires of a district attorney whose only
interest is conviction rates. Anyone who has been deposed or been through a trial can attest to this. Abolition is not simply about letting

ould be an important component. It is

forged in the work of daring to ask what true accountability, justice, and safety might
look and feel like and what are the ways we might build our world now so violence in
all its forms is decreased, rather than something that we only attend to postinfraction. I am interested in how we move toward abolition. Who are the people challenging the normalization of incarceration? Can you
everyone out of prison, as our critics like to suggest, although that w

talk to us about local movements around prison abolition? And beyond California, what work is being done? I have to first give a shout-out to
the Transgender, Gender Variant Intersex Justice Project based here in San Francisco. TGIJP is an organization by and for formerly incarcerated
trans women of color, held down by Miss Major, Janetta Johnson, and others. I think what is unique about TGIJP is that unlike some antiprison
organizations that tokenize currently or formerly incarcerated people, they center them in every aspect of their work. TGIJP is also working

When people are released, especially those with

felonies, the issues that found them in the prison industrial complex are dramatically
compounded. With almost no resources, people get released into situations that are
hyper-policed, and more often than not people get swept back up in the system. I would
hard on re-entry for trans women as abolitionist work.

also point people toward Californians for a Responsible Budget (CURP), a statewide coalition of people and organizations fighting jail and
prison expansion all over the state. As you know, there are also chapters of Critical Resistance in Los Angeles and Oakland that continue to
push toward abolition in a culture where compromise is often the most we can expect. Im also excited by all the work being done in less
formal ways, by collectives of people like Black and Pink-San Diego, a prison letter-writing group, and Gay Shame, which I have organized with
for the past 12 years. With Gay Shame, we keep trying to show the ways the prison industrial complex is ever-expanding and how LGBT people
are at times complicit in its proliferation. As the banner at our last action read, we are pro-sex, anti-prison, queers for abolition. In Captive
Genders, you write that this prison abolition work and trans/queer liberation must be grown together. How are these movements mutually
dependent? In the past few decades, we have seen the mainstream LGBT movement fight hard to become part of the same systems of
domination that have already destroyed so much. Most visibly, this fight toward inclusion resides in the legalization of gay marriage, military
service, and the expansion of hate crimes legislation on both the state and federal level. When I was writing the introduction to Captive
Genders, I wanted to help (with many others) redirect resources and organizing toward abolitionist work, and also remember the histories of
trans and queer people, particularly low-income and/or of color, who have always fought against policing and incarceration. In other words, I
wanted to mark both the unique moment of the organizing and analysis that Captive Genders gathers up, and also the ways we are in a
genealogy of struggle that will continue beyond us. I have also been involved in various abolitionist projects over the past decade that did not
necessarily foreground trans/queer politics. I think in similar ways I wanted to push trans/queer organizing to center abolition, I wanted to push
antiprison organizing to include a trans/queer analysis that understood the specific ways trans/queer people of color have been and continue
to be targets of the prison industrial complex. Both Nat [Smith] and I began the project knowing that we wanted it to be an explicitly
abolitionist text. As it was the first book that centered the ways trans/queer people experience the PIC, we wanted to foreground a radical
analysis. We also had a commitment to making space for currently and formerly incarcerated people while not wanting to rehearse the

among the most

volatile points of contact between state violence and ones body is the domain of
gender. Youve also written about how prisons are gendering institutions as well as queer spaces .
somewhat false division between theory and practice. In the introduction to Captive Genders, you write that

Binary
genders (male/female) are not something that pre-exist any institution (like prisons)
but are produced and reproduced in their moment of interaction . In other words, the
imagined stability of only two genders is part of the work of prisons. Not only are
prisons gender segregated, but quotidian practice inside mandates the group fantasy
of gender normativity. This is a bit of a different argument than suggesting that we only pay attention to the ways prisons treat
trans/queer and gender nonconforming people, although we also need to do that. Yet even against the relentless force
of punitive gender normativity, people still find ways to resist and embody , although
perhaps protracted, gender self-determination in these spaces of suspended death.
These usually take the form of what might look like small moments of resistance, but
are the daily material that allow some people to survive the unsurvivable. For example, I
have a friend who was inside a womens prison and she sewed boxer shorts out of
sheets for her butch and trans masculine friends because they could not legally
obtain them as they were not regulation in womens prisons. People also find ways
to do their hair, get or make cosmetics and other things that help them express
whatever gender they are feeling. Resistance also comes in the ways people inside
are in leadership positions of many outside organizations, like Sylvia Rivera Law
Project and Justice Now and California Coalition for Women Prisoners (CCWP). We know
the prison-industrial complex exists along a continuum, from the ways that people
are policed and criminalized, to the point of trial and incarceration, to the moment of
reentry. How does the prison industrial complex affect the lives of queer/trans folks living outside the physical site of the prison?
When people first started using the term prison industrial complex it was an
attempt to think about all the ways the prison as a force exists far beyond its walls .
While we want to be vigilant in our attention to the condition of those inside , we
always want to be aware of the various ways people are policed, criminalized and
constricted that may seem less obvious. Through this expanded understanding of
the PIC we must look at psychiatric imprisonment, public housing, shelters, Native
boarding schools, drug treatment and diversion programs, juvenile facilities, ICE
detention centers (and more) as all central to our work as abolitionists.
How does this happen simultaneously? What are some examples of this resistance to gender normativity within prisons?

The alternative is to abandon the affirmatives antiblack

notions of gender by dancing with death. Refuse the 1ACs
redemption of social life in favor of a politics that begins
and ends with the position of social death. The black body
is the ungendered site of social death par excellence,
having become dead by a 700-year injunction barring its
subjectivity. Social death is a condition of existence and
not some avoidable impacthow we relate to this
condition is all that is important.
Wilderson- 2002
Frank Wilderson- The Prison Slave as Hegemony's (Silent) Scandal-Presented
a t #Imprisoned Intellectuals # Conference Brown University, April 13th
2002
Civil society is not a terrain intended for the Black subject. It is coded as waged
and wages are White. Civil society is the terrain where hegemony is produced,

contested, mapped. And th e invitat ion to p articipate in hegemony's gestures of

influence, leadership, and consent is not ext ended to t he unwaged. We live in the
world , but ex ist out side of civil s ociety. This structurally impossible position is a

paradox, because the Black subject, the slave, is vital to political economy: s/he
kick-starts capital at its genesis and rescues it from its over-accumulation crisis
at its end. But Marxism has no account of this phenomenal birth and life-saving

from Marx and Gr amsci we have con sistent s

ilence. In taking Foucau lt to ta sk for a ssum ing a univ ersal s ubject in r evolt ag ainst d
iscipline, in the same s pirit in which I have t aken Gr amsci to ta sk for as suming a u
niversal sub ject, the subject of civil societ y in revolt a gainst capita l, Joy Jam es writes :
The U.S. carceral network kills, however, and in its prisons, it kills more blacks than any
other ethnic group. American prisons constitute an "outside" in U.S. political life. In fact,
our society displays waves of concentric outside circles with increasing distances from
bourgeois self-policing. The state routinely polices the14 unassim ilable in the hell of
lockdow n, deprivat ion tanks , control units , and holes for political prisoners (Resisting
State Violence 1996: 34 ) But this peculiar preoccupation is not Gramsci's bailiwick. His
concern is with White folks; or with folks in a White (ned) enough subject position that
they are confronted by, or threat ened by th e remova l of, a wag e -- be it monetary or
social. But Black subjectivity itself disarticulates the Gramscian dream as a
role played by the Black subject:

like most White

activists, and radical American movements like the prison abolition
movement, has no theory of the unwaged, no solidarity with the slave If we
are to take Fanon at his word when he writes, #Decolonization, which
sets out to change the order of the world , is, obviously, a program
of complete disorder # (37) then we must accept the fact that no other body
ubiquitous emancipatory strategy,

because Gramsci ,

functions in the Imaginary, the Symbolic, or the Real so completely as a

repository of complete disorder as the Black body. Blackness is the site of
absolute dereliction at the level of the Real, for in its magnetizing of bullets the
Black body functions as the map of gratuitous violence through which civil
society is possible: namely, those other bodies for which violence is, or can be,

Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of

the Symbolic, for Blackness in America generates no categories for the
contingent.

chromosome of History, no data for the categories of Immigration or Sovereignty;

it is an experience without analog # a past, without a

heritage. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of t
he Imaginary for #whoever says #rape # says Black , # (Fanon) ,
whoever says #prison # says Black , and whoever says #AIDS # says Black
(Sexton) # the #Negro is a phobogenic object # (Fanon). Indeed &a phobogenic object
&a past without a heritage &the map of gratuitous violence &a program of complete
disorder. But whereas this realization is, and should be cause for alarm, it should

or worse, disavowal # not at least, for a

true revolutionary, or for a truly revolutionary movement such as
prison a bolition. 15 If a social movement is to be neither social democratic,
not be cause for lament,

nor Marxist, in terms of the structure of its political desire then it should grasp

that
present themselves; and, if we are to be honest with
the invitation to assume the positionality of subjects of social death

ourselves we must admit that the Negro has been inviting Whites,
and as well as civil society #s junior partners, to the dance of social death for
hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps. They have been ,

and remain today # even in the most anti-racist movements, like the
prison abolition movement # invested elsewhere. This is not to say that all
oppositional political desire today is pro-White, but it is to say that it is almost
always anti-Black which is to say it will not dance with death. Black liberation,

as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous

to the U.S. Not because it

raises the specter of some alternative polity (like socialism, or community
control of existing resources) but because its condition of possibility as well as

its gesture of resistance functions as a negative dialectic: a politics of refusal and

a refus al to affirm , a program of complete disorder. One mus t embrace its
disorder, its in coherence and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one's
politics are to be underwritten by a desire to take this country down. If this is not
the desire which underwrites one #s politics then through what strategy of legitimation is the word
#prison # being linked t o the wo rd #abolition #? Wh at ar e this movem ent #s lines of po litical a
ccount abilit y? There #s nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of
disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is
not anathema in and of itself: no one, for example, has ever been known to say #gee-whiz, if only
my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all. # But few so-called radicals desire
to be embraced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness # and the state of
politica l movemen ts in A merica to day is ma rked by t his very N egroph obogen isis: #gee-whiz, if
only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all. # Perhaps there #s something
more terrifying about the joy of Black, then there is about the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex wit
h a Negr o). Perhaps coalitions today p refer to remain in- orgas mic in the fa ce of civilsociety #
with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. But if, through this stasis, or paralysis , they tr y
to do t he work of pr ison a bolit ion # that work will fail; because it is always work from a position
of coherence (i.e. the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence, the Black subject, or prison
slave. In this way, social formations on the Left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions bet
ween worker s and s laves. T hey remain coalitions opera ting with in the logic of civil society; and
function less as revolutionary promises and more as crowding out scenarios of Black antagonisms #
they simply feed our frustration. Whereas the positionality of the worker # be s/he a factory worker
demanding a monetary wage or an immigrant or White woman demanding a social wage # gestures
toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the Black subject # be s/he a prisonslave or a prison-slave-in-waiting # gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society: from the

A civil
war which reclaims Blackness not as a positive value, but as a politically enabling
site, to quote Fanon, of absolute dereliction: a scandal which rends civil
society asunder. Civil war, then, becomes that unthought, but never forgotten
understudy of hegemony. A Black specter waiting in the wings, an endless
antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation) but must
nonetheless be pursued to the death.
coherence of civil society, t he Black subject beckons with the in coherence of civil war.

Case
Single base closures solve nothing about the overall
patriarchal structure of the military
Cynthia Enloe 93, Research Professor and Adjunct Professor of Political
Science, Clark University, 1993, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End
of the Cold War, p. 149-150
The closing of both Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base in 1992 forced
many Filipinas in precarious states of health into the ranks of the country's
unemployed. Their few options included migrating to Okinawa or Guam,
or even to Germany, to continue working as prostitutes for U.S. military men.
They may also have been vulnerable to recruiters procuring Filipina women
for Japan's entertainment industry, an industry that is increasingly dependent
on young women from abroad.9 Olongapo City's businessman mayor, with his
own entertainment investments now in jeopardy, has been in the forefront of
promoters urging that Subic Bay's enormous facilities be converted into
private enterprises, although the Filipino military is also eager to take over at
least part of the operations for its own purposes. Military base conversion
is always an intensely gendered process. Even if women working the
entertainment sector are not at the conversion negotiation table, they will be
on many of the negotiators' minds. For instance, the above-mentioned
mayor, among others, has urged not only that privatized ship maintenance
be developed at Subic Bay, but also that tourism development be high on the
new investment list.10 In the coming years, the politics of prostitution in
Olongapo City may take on a civilian look, but many of the tourists attracted
may be slightly older American men trying to relive their earlier militarized
sexual adventures with Filipina women.
There is no evidence thus far that being compelled by the forces of nature
and nationalism to shut down two of their most prized overseas bases has
caused U.S. military planners to rethink their prostitution policies.
Shifting some of the Philippines operations to Guam or Singapore or back
home to the United States does not in itself guarantee new official
presumptions about the kinds of sexual relations required to sustain U.S.
military power in the postCold War world. The governments of Singapore
and the United States signed a basing agreement in Tokyo in mid-1992. But,
despite popular misgivings about the implications of allowing U.S. Navy
personnel to use the small island nation for repairs and training, the basing
agreement itself was kept secret. Thus, Singapore citizens, as well as U.S.
citizens, are left with little information about what policing formulas, public
health formulas, and commercial zoning formulas have been devised by the
two governments to shape the sexual relations between American and
Singapore men and the women of Singapore.

Plan just causes a shift to different place with more

colonial governance Plan destroys movements fighting
for total demilitarization now
Davis 15 (Professor of Geography and Environmental Science at University of
Hawaii at Hilo)
(Sasha, The Empires' Edge: Militarization, Resistance and Transcending
Hegemony in the Pacific, pg. 89-90
To conclude this discussion of the local effects of militarization and colonialism I want to make a few explicit points. First, while faraway power
centers may place bases in islands at the imperial margins to bolster a militarized notion of security, the daily operation of these bases and
training areas has negative in-place effects that leave residents less safe and secure. Second, due to these negative environmental and social

resistance movements have arisen to reclaim security through political action aimed at demilitarizing
been successful and caused bases and
training areas to close or move , or for military activities to be curtailed. Fourth, demonstrating how militarization and colonialism
are increasingly mutually reinforcing, the US, military has responded to these pressures from social
movements (and wary governments) by shifting bases to spaces with less organized civil-society
resistance movements and with more blatantly colonial forms of governance. Fifth, this
effects,

landscapes and reclaiming sovereignty. Third, some of these actions have

spatial "dance" regarding where bases are going to be located around the region-driven by the contest between social movements and
antagonistic military planners-is still very much continuing.
This fifth point is demonstrated by the enormous fluidity of the situation in the western Pacific. As discussed in this chapter, military planners
were initially quite confident that increasing the military footprint on Guam would be a simple matter. Due to resistance from residents of
Guam, as well as from key u.s. senators and Japanese politicians concerned about its cost, it has proven to be anything but simple, As a
further example of the region's political fluidity, one of the reasons why the US, military became so dependent on Guam in 2009 and 2010 was
that other countries in the region such as Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia initially refused to accept any of the military units
being moved out of Okinawa. In 2011 and 2012, however, these governments changed tack and have agreed to a greater US, military
presence on their soil,

Given the US, military's ability to rapidly shift their base posture around the
region, activists have employed spatial strategies of their own in an effort to make one
island's demilitarization success not just another island's burden . Activists
have become more explicit that antimilitarization efforts cannot be aimed and
performed with only the local scale in mind. To this end, there has ,I been a greater focus on networks of affinity and
solidarity that span the region and the globe. In chapter 6 I analyze the regional and global forms of antimill- tarization and anticolonial
activism as well as the ways in which this affinity- seeking power is arrayed against projects for militarized hegemony. Before that, however. it
is necessary to delve into one more theme in order to present a full picture of the context in which this contest between local groups and
distant he- gemons is playing out. That theme is the complex and often paradoxical inter- actions among militarization, colonialism, and island
environments. examined in the next chapter.

Maintaining deterrence does not lock in structural or

gender violence---pragmatic feminist analysis concludes
that its ethically mandatory to maintain deterrent force
against the threat of large-scale violence
Lucinda Joy Peach 4, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and
Religion at American University, 2004, A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the
Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction, in Ethics and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Hashmi, p. 442-443
Antiwar feminists highlight an important issue often lacking in discussions of the
morality of deterrence by emphasizing the unstated costs of the development,
deployment, maintenance, and disposal of WMD, including the diversion of funds that otherwise might be
available for social welfare programs, the costs of disposing of hazardous wastes, exposure to radiation,
and so on. In addition, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence as an inhibitor of armed aggression is
dubious in the post-cold war era, dominated by internal armed conflicts that do not directly involve one
(nuclear) nation pitted against another, and the growing threat of terrorist tactics such as those used by alQaida on September 11, 2001.

Despite these costs, pragmatic feminist strategy

deals with existing actualities, not utopian ideals. Deterrence has been
successful, if success can be measured in terms of the lack of the use of
nuclear weapons for nearly fifty years. Looking pragmatically at human history
and the scant possibility that nations that have already developed weapons of
mass destruction will voluntarily destroy them (all of them, that is) or be deterred from
ever using them in the absence of a credible threat that such use
would be met by equal or greater force the possession of WMD for purposes
of deterrence may be morally necessary, at least given current geopolitical
realities. As military philosopher Malham Wakin suggests: When we ask whether nuclear
deterrence is the only effective way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in a
total war, we must be sure to do so in the context of the actual world
situation we now find ourselves in, a situation that includes a very large number of
nuclear warheads in the possession of several nations and in least one of those
nations many of those nuclear weapons are aimed at the United States and its NATO allies. In that
realistic context is it reasonable to suppose that a nuclear balance is better
calculated to deter total war than a nuclear imbalance ? Given the goal of
pragmatist feminism to end oppression, including the domination and
control of some nations and peoples by others, and given that the possession and
threatened use of WMD have become one of the most effective means by
which nations in the world today assert their power, deterrence is morally
necessary to help ensure against the oppression of some nations or
peoples by others armed with WMD. However, since the goal of international peace and
security can never be fully achieved while nuclear and other WMD exist, whether for defensive, deterrent,
or other purposes, pragmatist feminists allow for the interim use of deterrence only in the context of active
efforts by nuclear nations to bring about multilateral disarmament, such as that called for by the

Pragmatist feminists thus disagree with the antiwar

feminist rejection of any use of nuclear weapons, even for
deterrence purposes, arguing for such use as a temporary, interim strategy through the process of
mutual disarmament. Therefore, while pragmatist feminists might agree with antiwar
feminists that nuclear weapons never should have been invented or, once
invented, never should have been tested or deployed or used as the basis for
deterrence, that is not the reality we find ourselves in today. Yes,
development and deployment must be factored into the ethical status of
deterrence, as antiwar feminists suggest. However, these costs in and of
themselves are not too high if viewed from the vantage point of the
present, since much of the cost has, in effect, already been spent. The
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

antiwar feminist point about the costs of development and deployment is highly relevant, however, to
considering whether to build additional WMD for deterrence purposes.

2NC/1NR

CPGS

OV
Conventional war spreads regionally and causes human
rights abuses.
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, executive secretary of the Global Coalition for
Africa and former head of African economic affairs at the UN, 2000, Burundi
on the Brink 1993-95, p. 10-11

These conflicts should be seen not only as confrontations within states or societies,
but also in terms of their negative regional and global effects: criminalization of the
international economy, drug and mineral trafficking, money laundering, arms flows, use of
mercenaries, and the spread of violence and political intolerance in weak states with
fragile institutions. The risks of infection of neighboring states is another challenge. For
example, the disaster in Rwanda has had devastating and lasting effects on the Great Lakes
region as a whole. Poor and ill-equipped governments in Burundi, Congo/Zaire, Tanzania, and
Uganda have had to divert funds and human resources (army, police, administrators, and so
forth) to protect and control vast numbers of Rwandan refugees. These governments have had to
delimit large areas to accommodate the refugees, whose very presence inflicts great damage on
the local environment. They have also had to deal with the United Nations and other
humanitarian organizations attending to the refugees' welfare (while ignoring the welfare of the
governments' own citizens), and watch as many of the staff at their own schools and dispensaries
quit for better-paying work with the UN agencies and NGOs. National security forces,
fearful that the refugees will directly or indirectly destabilize their host countries, act
aggressively toward both the refugees and the local population, spawning human rights
abuses and fostering further violence. Another, little-reported consequence of the
Rwandan civil war and genocide has been to foster a negative image of the regionand, indeed,
of Africaas a whole. Trade, investment, and tourism all suffer.

CPGS will be used in broad range of missions, lead to high

civilian casualties and backlash to US presence.
Grossman 8
Elaine M. Grossman, staff writer, 11-7-2008. [Global Security Newswire,
Strategic Arms Funds Tilt Conventional in 2009, p.
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/ts_20081107_5200.php]
Hans Kristensen

of the Federation of American Scientists said he worries that the mission

for conventional prompt global strike weapons could easily expand beyond limited
scenarios. U.S. intelligence might only rarely offer sufficient confidence about the
nature and location of such critical targets in the short time frames discussed, said
Kristensen, director of his organizations Nuclear Information Project.

If based on less-than-perfect intelligence, a broader use of quick-strike weapons

could increase unintended civilian casualties perhaps of the kind seen recently as a result of
U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan and potentially intensify backlash against U.S. policies or
presence around the globe, Kristensen said.

In principle, he said, youd be crazy not to launch a prompt global strike attack under the urgent
circumstances defense leaders describe for the mission. However, Kristensen

sees a slippery
slope in which the weapons high value could make them deceptively attractive tools
under a wider set of scenarios.
Its

just really hard to separate the urgency and the honest requirement [for a limited
tool] from the hype associated with this antiterrorism mission, he said.

Tech
Hypersonic weapons are on the brink more CPGS funding
is key
Weitz 15 (Richard Weitz, director of the center for political-military analysis
at Hudson, Arms Racing in Strategic Technologies: Asia's New Frontier,
Hudson Institute, May 3 2015, http://www.hudson.org/research/11307-armsracing-in-strategic-technologies-asia-s-new-frontier) PA
Ongoing scientific and technical developments of new materials, fuels,
manufacturing processes, and artificial intelligence systems could make it
easier to develop effective hypersonic delivery systems in the future.29 The
United States launched the first research and development program for
hypersonic weapons more than a decade ago as part of a loosely defined
Department of Defense initiative known as Conventional Prompt Global
Strike. The Pentagon has spent about $1 billion on research, but several more
billions will be needed to build and deploy operational hypersonic
weapons.30

2NC Link
Freed funds will go to CPGS the DoD loves it
Woolf 10/2 (Amy F Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at the CRS,
10/2/15, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, Congressional Research Service Report,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf) PA
DOD has also addressed the prompt global strike mission in specific reports
on Air Force doctrine, which have noted that rapid power projection based in
the continental United States has become the predominant military strategy.
In May 2003, the Air Force issued a formal Mission Need Statement for the
Prompt Global Strike (PGS) Mission. This statement indicated that the United
States should be able to strike globally and rapidly with joint conventional
forces against high-payoff targets, that the United States should be able to
plan and execute these attacks in a matter of minutes or hoursas opposed
to the days or weeks needed for planning and execution with existing forces
and that it should be able to execute these attacks even when it had no
permanent military presence in the region where the conflict would occur.7
Officials in the Bush Administration viewed the prompt global strike mission
as a means to extend the U.S. capability to address global contingencies that
could threaten U.S. security and U.S. interests. For example, Admiral James O.
Ellis, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) from 2002 to
2004, explained that PGS would provide a wider range of options to the
President in responding to time-critical global challenges.8 General James
Cartwright, who served as commander of STRATCOM between 2004 and
2007, defined the global strike mission by stating that it provides to the
nation the ability to rapidly plan and rapidly deliver effect any place on the
globe.

AT No US-China War Interdependence

Interdependence wont check US China war
Stuart 12 (Douglas Stuart is a Professor of International Studies at Dickinson
College, November 29 2012, San Francisco 2.0: Military Aspects of the U.S.
Pivot toward Asia, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 39:4,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00927678.2012.731360#.VeXxO
_ZVgk0) PA
Some commentators have sought reassurance from Chinas increasing integration into the global economy.
Without discounting the threat posed by Chinas enhanced capability to project military power beyond its

commentators argue that Beijing has a growing stake in an orderly

and predictable international system. Optimists like Edward Steinfeld have also asserted that
borders, these

China is on a path toward self-obsolescing authoritarianism and that its time as an existential adversary

Chinas economic progress quite differently,

however: As the engine of Chinese defense modernization , as the source of
an increasingly expansive and assertive Chinese foreign policy, and as a
direct threat to various principles of free trade and international economic
cooperation. Commentators have also noted that the situation of mutual
assured economic destruction that currently exists between Washington and
Beijing is not a reliable stabilizing factor, since it encourages each nation to
assumein accordance with the logic of brinkmanshipthat they can push the other side
very far without a loss of control.
has drawn to a close. Other American experts view

Pan concedes that studies of China can be effective they

have to prove a specific link to our scholarship
Chengxin Pan, Australian National University, 2004, Discourses of China
in International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, Doctoral
Thesis, p.35
Perhaps for this reason, I will occasionally be guilty of broad brush
generalisation (e.g., by employing the terms mainstream Western scholars)
and I might do violence to some individual China scholars. This is not my
intention. And while I have misgivings about the general field of China
studies, this is by no means to suggest that mainstream Chinese foreign
policy scholarship has no valuable insight to offer . Nor, indeed, is my position
to imply that all Western students of Chinese foreign relations are invariably
or equally guilty, for I am perfectly aware that this whole has never been
entirely homogeneous. Rather, my point is that the problem I will deal with
here is a general mode of thinking which cannot be simply reduced to the
individual level but which nonetheless has to be illustrated in relation to
specific works.

cp

2NC Solves noise/enviro/health

Solves noise pollution and environmental damage
Rinehart 14 Analyst in Asian Affairs (Ian E., The U.S. Military Presence in
Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, August 14, 2014 ,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf)
The U.S. and Japanese governments have implemented measures to mitigate
some impacts of the U.S. military presence for Okinawan residents. The DPRI
initiated several of these actions, whereas more recent steps were developed on an ad hoc basis. The
Aviation Training Relocation program reduces noise pollution for local
residents by having U.S. aircraft conduct training in Guam, away from crowded base
areas. The United States has increased access for local fisherman to the ocean
training area known as Hotel/Hotel off the eastern coast of Okinawa. Based on
the DPRI and SACO agreements, the U.S. military has turned several plots of land
over to the Okinawan local authorities, including Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Sobe
Communications Site, and Gimbaru Training Area. Several more areas of present-day U.S.
military facilities are approved for expedited return in the near future.
Portions of Camp Kuwae and Makiminato Service Area are scheduled to be
turned over by early 2016. A rash of off-base criminal incidents involving U.S.
servicemembers in 2012 spurred U.S. military leaders in Japan to institute
new conduct policies for servicemembers. These restrictive policies likely
played a role in the significant drop in 2013 in reported crimes linked to U.S.
military personnel (including dependents and DOD civilian employees) on Okinawa.14

Framing
Consequentialism key---alt is complicit with evil
Isaac 2Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy
and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, Ends, Means, and Politics, p. Proquest)

It is assumed that U.S. military

intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the
aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in
Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather
terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power
through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would
prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam
Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring
criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and
important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they
are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any
account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address
the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so
would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is
of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a
As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked.

dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the

Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of
power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the
means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to
exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say
that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold
Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness
undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of
personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention
does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or
refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may
seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard
to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of
their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and
injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form
of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as
opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In
categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain
violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as
much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is
the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most
significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that
world.

generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or
idealistic;

it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing

these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically
contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates

those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines
political effectiveness.

AT Perm
Multiculturalism DA: The permutation is nothing more
than white supremacys attempt to take the alien
body/presence and integrate it into the localities of
whiteness- this inclusion of the other is simply another
way in which white hegemony makes minorities take on
the white identity even if it is the so called enemy
population- this multiculturalist white supremacy is
crucial to the project of white supremacist globality. The
aff makes just makes the system that secure white
supremacy more elastic and durable. It allows Asian
woman to form coalitional strategies to combat their
oppressors they get to be incorporated into civil society
while black woman continue to be rapeable
Rodriguez 2009 [Dylan Rodriguez, University of California,
Riverside, The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and
Abolition Critical Sociology, Volume 36, Issue 1, 2009]It thus is
within the confines of Homeland Security as white supremacist
territoriality a structure of feeling that organizes the cohesion of
racial and spatial entitlement that multiculturalism is recognized
as a fact of life, an empirical feature of the world that is
inescapable and unavoidable, something to be tolerated, policed,
and patriotically valorized at once and in turn. On the one hand,
white locality is a site of existential identification that generates
(and therefore corresponds to) a white supremacist materiality. As
subjects (including ostensibly non-white subjects) identify with
this sentimental structure a process that is not cleanly agential or
altogether voluntary they enter a relation of discomforting
intimacy with embodied threats to their sense of the local. Those
alien bodies and subjects, whose movement suggests the
possibility of disruption and disarticulation, become objects of a
discrete discursive labor as well as material/military endeavors.
Most importantly, they become specified and particularized sites
for white localitys punitive performances: racialized punishment,
capture, and discipline are entwined in the historical fabric of white
supremacist social formations from conquest and chattel
enslavement onward, and the emergence of white localitys
hypermobility has necessitated new technologies commensurate

with the hyperpresence actual and virtual of white subjectivities.

As white bodies and subjects exert the capacity to manifest
authority and presence in places they both do and do not physically
occupy (call the latter absentee white supremacy for shorthand),
the old relations of classical white supremacist apartheid are
necessarily and persistently reinvented: racial subjection becomes
a technology of inclusion that crucially accompanies and is
radically enhanced by ongoing proliferations of racist state and
state-sanctioned violence. Further, this logic of multiculturalist
white supremacist inclusion does not exclusively rely on strategies
of coercion or punishment to assimilate others such as in the
paradigmatic examples of bodily subjection that formed the
institutional machinery of Native American boarding and mission
schools (Adams 1995; Smith 2005), but instead builds upon the
more plastic and sustainable platforms of consensus and collective
identity formation. I do not mean to suggest that either consensus
building or identity formation are benign projects of autonomous
racial self-invention, somehow operating independently of the
structuring relations of dominance that characterize a given social
formation. Rather, I am arguing that the social technologies of
white supremacy are, in this historical moment, not reducible to
discrete arrangements of institutionalized (and state legitimated)
violence or strategies of social exclusion (Da Silva 2007) but are
significantly altered and innovated through the crises of bodily
proximity that white locality bears to its alien (and even enemy)
populations.

AT: Contingent Violence

They misunderstand anti-black violence through the
sociological register not the ontological

Wilderson-2010- Frank B Wilderson III- Professor at UC irvine- Red, White

and Black- p. 8-10
I have little interest in assailing political conservatives. Nor is my ar- gument
wedded to the disciplinary needs of political science, or even sociology,
where injury must be established, first, as White supremacist event, from
which one then embarks on a demonstration of intent, or racism; and, if one
is lucky, or foolish, enough, a solution is proposed. If the position of the
Black is, as I argue, a paradigmatic impossibility in the Western
Hemisphere, indeed, in the world, in other words, if a Black is the very
antithesis of a Human subject, as imagined by Marxism and psychoanalysis, then his or her paradigmatic exile is not simply a
function of repressive practices on the part of institutions (as political
science and sociology would have it). This banishment from the Human
fold is to be found most profoundly in the emancipatory meditations
of Black people's staunchest "allies," and in some of the most "radical"
films. Herenot in restrictive policy, unjust legislation, police
brutality, or conservative scholarshipis where the Settler/Master's
sinews are most resilient. The polemic animating this research stems from
(1) my reading of Native and Black American meta-commentaries on Indian
and Black subject positions written over the past twenty-three years and ( 2 )
a sense of how much that work appears out of joint with intellectual protocols
and political ethics which underwrite political praxis and socially engaged
popular cinema in this epoch of multiculturalism and globalization. The sense
of abandonment I experience when I read the meta-commentaries on Red
positionality (by theorists such as Leslie Silko, Ward Churchill, Taiaiake Alfred,
Vine Deloria Jr., and Haunani-Kay Trask) and the meta-commentaries on Black
positionality (by theorists such as David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald
Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe) against the
deluge of multicultural positivity is overwhelming. One suddenly realizes
that, though the semantic field on which subjec- tivity is imagined has
expanded phenomenally through the protocols of multiculturalism and
globalization theory, Blackness and an unflinching articulation of Redness are
more unimaginable and illegible within this expanded semantic field than
they were during the height of the F B I ' S repressive Counterintelligence
Program ( C O I N T E L P R O ) . On the seman- tic field on which the new
protocols are possible, Indigenism can indeed lO become partially legible
through a programmatics of structural adjust- ment (as fits our globalized
era). In other words, for the Indians' subject position to be legible, their
positive registers of lost or threatened cultural identity must be foregrounded,
when in point of fact the antagonistic register of dispossession that Indians
"possess" is a position in relation to a socius structured by genocide. As

Churchill points out, everyone from Armenians to Jews have been subjected
to genocide, but the Indigenous position is one for which genocide is a
constitutive element, not merely an historical event, without which Indians
would not, paradoxically, "exist." 9 Regarding the Black position, some
might ask why, after claims suc- cessfully made on the state by the
Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic
for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a
dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other
words, why should we think of today's Blacks in the United States as Slaves
and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could
answer these questions by demonstrat- ing how nothing remotely
approaching claims successfully made on the state has come to
pass. In other words, the election of a Black president aside, police brutality,
mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing,
astronomical rates of H I V infection, and the threat of being turned away
en masse at the polls still constitute the lived expe- rience of Black life.
But such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong
direction; we would find ourselves on "solid" ground, which would
only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to
appeal to "facts," the "historical record," and empirical markers of
stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with
more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology,
political sci- ence, history, and public policy debates would be the very
rubric that I am calling into question: the grammar of suffering
known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby
subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those
who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker.
Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in
Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or
forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the "solid" plank
of "work" is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent
notion of "claims against the state"the proposition that the state
and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the
possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position
disintegrates into thin air. The imaginary of the state and civil society is
parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put an- other way, No slave, no world. And,
in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological
position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an
anti-Human, a position against which Hu- manity establishes, maintains, and
renews its coherence, its corporeal in- tegrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from
Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and
void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized,
a being outside of re- lationality, then our analysis cannot be approached
through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state
and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains
how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the
Master/Slave dichotomy but on the one who argues there is a

distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where

did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits
an answer.