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Family Code 3nd Exam

91 What Constitutes ACP?

all properties acquired before and during marriage
Munoz, Jr. v. Carlos
Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U.
Francisco are the minor children of Cleodualdo M.
Francisco (Cleodualdo) and Michele Uriarte
Francisco (Michele).
The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC
to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the
subject property. The power of the court in
executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone,[15] in the present case to those belonging to
Michele and Matrai. One man's goods shall not be
sold for another man's debts.[16]
To begin with, the RTC should not have ignored
that TCT No. 167907 is in the name of Cleodualdo
M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco. On
its face, the title shows that the registered owner of
the property is not Matrai and Michele but
Cleodualdo, married to Michele. This describes the
civil status of Cleodualdo at the time the property
was acquired.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only
when she purchases things necessary for the support
of the family, or when she borrows money for that
purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the
needed sum; when administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts
or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate
donations for charity. Failure to establish any of
these circumstances means that the conjugal asset
may not be bound to answer for the wife's personal
obligation. Considering that the foregoing
circumstances are evidently not present in this case
as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a
judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case
against her and her partner Matrai.
The court cited BA Finance v. CA in ruling that the
present case is similar, that Michele, who was then
already living separately from Cleodualdo, rented a
house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrais own
benefit, they even entered in the lease agreement
and purported themselves as husband and wife.

To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the

obligations of Michele and Matrai would be going
against the spirit and avowed objective of the Civil
Code to give the utmost concern for the solidarity
and well-being of the family as a unit.[31]
In justifying the levy against the property, the RTC
went over the Compromise Agreement as embodied
in the Partial Decision dated November 29, 2000.
Oddly, the RTC ruled that there was no effective
transfer of ownership to the siblings Cleodia and
Ceamantha Francisco. In the same breath, the RTC
astonishingly ruled that Michele is now the owner
of the property inasmuch as Cleodualdo already
waived his rights over the property. The
Compromise Agreement must not be read piecemeal but in its entirety. It is provided therein, thus:

92 What are excluded from the community

property? Gratuitous title, personal or exclusive
use, acquired during previous marriage with
legitimate descendants

Family Code 3nd Exam

93- Presumption of Inclusion
94- Charges and Obligations
- support, debt and obligations, d & o without
consent if benefited, TaLiCE including major and
considered advances, litigation expenses.
- If community property is insufficient,
spouses are solidarily liable subject to
reimbursement at the time of liquidation
95- Game of Chance
96- Administration and enjoyment; disposition
- Joint administration and enjoyment of both
spouses, in case of disagreement, husband
prevails subject to recourse to the court for
relief by the wife within 5 years.
Art. 116 Conjugal partnership property
Article 121 (2) Charges upon and obligation of
the conjugal partnership (00,06)
Ayala Investments vs. CA
286 SCRA 272
Philippine Blooming Milles (PBM) obtained a loan
from petitioner Ayala Investment. Ching and PBMs
VP executed security agreements making them
jointly answerable for PBMs indebtedness. AIDC
sued PBM for failure to pay and RTC rendered
judgment ordering Ching and PBM to pay principal
amount with interest. Lower court issued a writ of
execution pending appeal, hence the sheriff served
the notices to levy 3 conjugal properties of the
Private respondents filed a case of injunction
alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on
the ground that, among others, the subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. AIDC filed a motion to dismiss having
the sale consummated, alleging that it rendered the
issue moot. However, 2 of the properties were
named to Encarnacion Ching presented evidence
while the creditor did not, and the RTC declared the
sale on execution null and void.
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that The
conjugal partnership shall be liable for: x x x (2)

All debts and obligations contracted during the

marriage by the designated Administrator-Spouse
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains
x x x. The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar,
respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the
debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains.
A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term x
x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or profession
of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed.
Simply stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

-The benefits must be one directly resulting from

the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself.

Family Code 3nd Exam

Benefits such as prospects of longer employment
and probably increase in the value of stocks might
have been already apparent or could be anticipated
at the time the accommodation agreement was
entered into are not only incidental but also
speculative and too small to qualify the transaction
as one for the benefit of the suretys family.
-While the husband derives salaries, dividend
benefits from PBM (the debtor corporation), only
because said husband is an employee of said PBM.
These salaries and benefits are not the benefits
contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family
Code. The benefits contemplated by the exception
in Art. 122 (Family Code) are those benefits derived
directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar,
the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and
used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appelleehusband or his family.


380 SCRA 361
-May the husband notwithstanding his alleged
lack of consent in obtaining a loan be held solidarily
liable for such together with the wife?
While respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by the wife,
undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of
the family because it was used to purchase the
house and lot that became the conjugal home of
respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding
the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under
Article 121 of the Family Code, shall be solidarily
liable for such loan together with his wife.


423 SCRA 357
Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming
Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million
peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).
As added security for the loan, Alfredo Ching
together with 2 other persons executed a continuing
guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly
and severally guarantee the payment of all the
PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of
38 million pesos. PBMCI defaulted in the payment

of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties

P12,612,972.88. After the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment the sheriff then levied the
100,000 common shares of CityCorp. stocks
registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The
wife of Mr. Ching then moved to set aside the levy
on attachment claiming that the 100,000 shares of
stocks were acquired by her and her husband during
the marriage out of conjugal funds after the
CityCorp Investment Philippines was established in
1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?
Ruling: The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks
were registered in the corporate books of CityCorp
Investment solely in the name of Alfredo does not
constitute proof that the husband, not the conjugal
partnership, owned the same. It was, thus, the
burden of ABC to prove that the source of the
money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of
stocks was that of the husband alone. ABC failed to
adduce evidence to prove this assertion. In AIDC
vs. CA, this Court ruled that the signing as a surety
is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. It is not embarking in a business. No
matter how often an executive acted on or was
persuaded to act as surety for his own employer,
this should not be taken to mean that he thereby
embarked in the business of guaranty or
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a
liability that should appertain to the husband
alone, there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses. No
presumption can be inferred that when a husband
entered into an accommodation agreement or a
contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited.
It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the
Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of the
top 20 stockholders, and that his shares of stocks
and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could
be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that
Alfredos career would be enhanced should PBMCI

Family Code 3nd Exam

survive because of the infusion of fresh capital.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by
Article 161 of the Civil Code (Article 121 FC). The
benefits must be those directly resulting from the
loan. They cannot merely a by-product or a spin-off
of the loan itself (citing AIDC vs. CA).
Francisco v. Gonzales
565 S 638

Article 124 Administration of the conjugal

partnership property (00)


53 SCRA 283
Spouses Dailo purchased a house and lot situated at
San Pablo City and had it titled in the name of the
husband alone. In 1993, the husband obtained a
P300,000-peso loan from Homeowners secured by
the house and lot. With the loan unpaid, the bank
foreclosed the security. For failure to redeem,
Homeowners consolidated ownership over the
property. In 1995, the husband died and the wife
found out about the mortgage, foreclosure and
consolidation. Claiming absence of knowledge of
the loan obligation, the wife filed an action to annul
the mortgage, certificate of sale, etc. Homeowners
moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that the property is the exclusive property of
the husband having been titled in the husbands
name alone. That assuming that the property is
conjugal, Article 124 of the FC should be construed
in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code on coownership where the co-owner may alienate, assign
or mortgage and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment but the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon termination
of the co-ownership. Moreover, the loan redounded
to the benefit of the family as the proceeds thereof
were used to fund the husbands subdivision

Held: In Guiang vs. CA, it was held that the sale of

a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the
Family Code, this Court declared that the absence
of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and
void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
The same principle squarely applies to the instant
case. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the
system of conjugal partnership of gains governed
the property relations between the spouses. The
rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the
property relations of Marcelino and Miguela even in
a suppletory manner. The conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the
husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or
both spouses their efforts or by chance. Unlike the
absolute community of property wherein the rules
on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on partnership in all that is not in conflict with what
is expressly determined in the chapter or by the
spouses in their marriage settlements.
The basic and established fact is that during his
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of
his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed
part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in
the absence of court authority or written consent
of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property is void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance. Where the law does
not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership lies
with the creditor claiming as such. Petitioners
sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by
Marcelino to finance the construction of housing
units without a doubt redounded to the benefit
of his family is without adequate proof. Other
than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing
from the records to compel a finding that,
indeed, the loan redounded to the benefit of the

Family Code 3nd Exam

291 SCRA 372
-Court applied Art. 124 of the Family Code.
-Any alienation or encumbrance made after August
3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the
husband of the conjugal partnership property
without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Such contract is void as one of the essential
elements of a contract is absent.
- Neither can the amicable settlement be
considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence
of Article 124. The order of events is clear: after the
sale, Guiang filed a complaint for trespassing
against Corpuz, after which the barangay authorities
secured an amicable settlement. The settlement
however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell
the property or an acceptance of such a continuing
offer. Its tenor was to the effect that Corpuz would
vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document
as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
313 SCRA 493
-As the alienation was made prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, the Court applied Art. 173 of
the Civil Code.
-Contract is voidable but spouse must bring the
action for annulment within 10 years from
execution of the contract and during the subsistence
of the marriage.
374 SCRA 361
-Whether or not the husband may validly dispose a
conjugal property without the wifes written
Facts: Manalo was interested to buy the Taytay and
Makati properties of spouses Camaisa. During the
negotiations for the sale of the parcels of land both
spouses were present and that Manalo and Mr.
Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and
the terms of the payment, and a down payment was
made but the wife of the vendor refused to sign the
contracts to sell. Having been aware of the
transactions Manalo argues that Norma Camaisa

had consented to the transaction. And if she unjustly

refused to affix her signature to the contracts to sell,
court authorization under Article 124 of the Family
Code is warranted.
Held: The law requires that the disposition of a
conjugal property by the husband as administrator
in appropriate cases require the written consent of
the wife; otherwise, the disposition is void. The
properties, subject of the contracts were conjugal;
hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for
the sale of their conjugal properties but being
merely aware of a transaction is not consent. While
Manalo is correct insofar as she alleges that if the
written consent of the other spouse cannot be
obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be
brought to court which will give the same if
warranted by the circumstances. However, it should
be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is
only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does
not give consent is incapacitated. In this case
Manalo failed to allege and prove that Norma was
incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In
the absence of such showing of the wifes
incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
410 SCRA 97
If the sale of the conjugal real property is
annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or
only with respect to the share of the spouse who did
not give consent?
-The SC citing Paulino vs. Bucoy (131 Phil 790)
held that the plain meaning attached to the plain
language of the law is that the contract, in its
entirety, executed by the husband without the wifes
consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had
Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far
as the contract shall prejudice the wife, such
limitation should have been spelled out in the
statute. To be underscored here is that upon the
provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil
Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for many
obligations while the conjugal partnership exists.
Not only that. The conjugal partnership is even

Family Code 3nd Exam

subject to the payment of debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, as those for the
payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon
them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have
been covered, if it turns out that the spouse who is
bound thereby, should have no exclusive property
or if it be insufficient. These are the considerations
that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife
in the property. These are reasons enough for the
husband to be stopped from disposing of the
conjugal property without the consent of the wife.
Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is
decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice
but lack of consent of an indispensable party to the
contract under Article 166.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal or (community)
property concluded after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by
Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition as void if done without the conjoint
consent of the spouses or, in case of a spouses
inability, the authority of the court (footnote).
459 SCRA 475
In January 1988, Pelayo, by a deed of absolute sale,
conveyed to Perez 2 parcels of land situated in
Panabo. Lorenza, Pelayos wife, signed only on the
3rd page in the space provided for witnesses on
account of which Perez application for registration
of the deed with the office of the Register of Deeds
in Tagum was denied. Perez thereupon asked
Lorenza to sign the 1st and 2nd pages of the deed but
she refused, hence, he instituted an action for
specific performance.

although it appears on the face of the deed of sale

that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness,
circumstances leading to the execution of said
document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully
aware of the sale of their conjugal property and
consented to the sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article
166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in
effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in
question was executed, the lack of marital consent
to the disposition of conjugal property does not
make the contract void ab initio but merely
voidable. Hence, it has been held that the contract is
valid until the court annuls the same and only upon
an action brought by the wife whose consent was
not obtained.

BUADO vs. CA and NICOL 586 SCRA 397

(April 24, 2009)
Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was
also adjudged to pay the sum of P35,000.00
representing moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and cost. Erlindas property
however, was insufficient to answer for the liability
so the sheriff levied the conjugal property of the
Nicol spouses. The husband questioned the levy and
the subsequent sale claiming that he is a stranger to
the suit and hence, levy upon the conjugal property
was improper.

SC: We agree with the CA ruling that Lorenza by

affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the
space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have
given her implied consent to the contract of sale.

SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the

husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a
stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged
against his wife for an obligation that has redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must
further be settled whether the obligation of the
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership or not.

Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by

mere consent, which may either be express or
implied. A wifes consent to the husbands
disposition of conjugal property does not always
have to be explicit or set forth in any particular
document, so long as it is given. In the present case,

Unlike in the system of absolute community

property where liabilities incurred by either spouse
by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to
the absolute community of property, in the absence
or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the
debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded

Family Code 3nd Exam

in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to
make advance payments for the liability of the
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it
be concluded that the civil obligation arising from
the crime of slander committed by Erlinda
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(October 16, 2009).
In 1982, spouses Pedro and Mary Ann acquired a
555-square meter lot adjacent to the land that was
acquired by Pedro while still single. They then
introduced improvements on the property. In 1991,
Pedro offered to sell the house and the 2 lots to
Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified Ravina of
her objections but Pedro, nonetheless, sold the
house and the 2 lots without Mary Anns consent.
SC: The lot acquired during the marriage was
conjugal in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
or to prove that the subject property is exclusively
owned by Pedro.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property
concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code is
void if done a.) without the consent (written) of
both the husband and the wife, or b.) in case of one
spouses inability the authority of the court.
If the sale was with the knowledge but without the
approval of the wife, thereby resulting in
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance
of the wife who is given 5 years from the date the
contract implementing the decision to institute the
SR., et. al. 608 SCRA 394
(December 18, 2009)
Hernandez married to Sergia, was awarded a piece
of real property by PHHC by way of salary
deduction. After full payment, TCT No. 107534 was

issued to the spouses. It bears a restriction of any

unauthorized sale to 3rd persons within a certain
period. The heirs learned, after Hernandez death in
1983 that TCT No. 107534 was cancelled in 1982
and in lieu thereof TCT No. 290121 was issued in
favor of respondents. Apparently, Hernandez was
unable to fully pay the purchase price so to prevent
forfeiture of his right to purchase, Hernandez sold
to Dolores Camisura his rights in 1963. To
circumvent the prohibition, the spouses Hernandez
executed an irrevocable special power of attorney to
enable Dolores to sell the lot to Plaridel Mingoa
without the need of requiring Hernandez to sign a
deed of conveyance. Plaridel then sold the property
to his daughter Melanie, then 20 years old. It was
alleged that Sergias signature on the SPA was
falsified. The forgery is so blatant as to be
remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an
ordinary person. Petitioners now contend that the
SPA and the deed of sale are fictitious, hence null
and void under Article 1409 of the NCC. The
declaration of the non-existence of a contract under
Article 1410 does not prescribe.
SC: Articles 1409 and 1410 are not applicable. The
subject matter involves conjugal property. The
events occurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Article 173 of the NCC governs these
transactions and it states: The wife, may during the
marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her
consent when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her
or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of the property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
The failure of Sergia to file an action for annulment
of the contract during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction necessarily barred her
form questioning the sale of the subject property to
3rd persons.
618 SCRA 702 April 21, 2010

Family Code 3nd Exam

Tarciano married but separated-in-fact sold a parcel
of land to the Fuentes spouses by way of an
agreement to sell. The vendees were to give a down
payment with the balance to be paid as soon as
Tarciano clears the lot of structures and occupants
and secure the consent of the estranged spouse
Rosario to the sale. Allegedly, Atty. Plagata worked
on the requirements including Rosarios consent to
the sale. He alleged that Rosario signed the
affidavit of consent in Manila but he notarized it in
Zamboanga City. Tarciano then executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.
When Tarciano and Rosario died in 1990, their
children, in 1997, filed an action for annulment of
sale and reconveyance of the land claiming that the
sale was void since Rosario did not give consent to
the sale. Her signature on the affidavit was forged.
SC: Rosario had been living separately from
Tarciano for 30 years since 1958, it would have
been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her
signature and avoid the risk that she would not give
her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.
The affidavit of consent has a defective notarization
that strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat,
taken together with the marks of forgery in the
signature, dooms such document as proof of
Rosarios consent to the sale of the land.
While Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
the property was sold on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the FC took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 124 of the FC provides that without the
other spouses consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing
contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force
and effect from the very beginning. And this rule
applies to contracts that are declared void by
positive provision of the law, as in the case of a sale
of conjugal property without the other spouses
written consent. A void contract is equivalent to
nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It

cannot be validated either by ratification or

Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not
forgery but the lack of written consent of their
mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence
of lack of consent.
The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to
Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the
law gave the right to bring an action to declare void
her husbands sale of conjugal land. But Rosario
died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean
that the right to have the sale declared void is lost
No. The sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of
Tarciano and Rosario despite the sale. When the two
died, they passed on the ownership of the property
to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As Lawful owners,
the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the
NCC, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and
164201 December 10, 2012
Melecia together with other accused were found
guilty of the crime of murder. They were also
adjudged jointly and severally to indemnify the
heirs damages and civil indemnity. To satisfy the
award, the properties registered in the names of
Efren and Melecia were levied upon.
They moved for the quashal of the writ of
execution, claiming that rhe levied properties were
conjugal assets, and not the paraphernal assets of
Melecia. The heirs did not dispute that it was the
Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed
the marriage, they insisted though, that it was the
absolute community of property that applied to
Efren and Melecia because of Article 256 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 105 of the same
Code as none of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no
vested rights have been acquired by each over the
SC: While it is true that the personal stakes of each
spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or

Family Code 3nd Exam

unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of gains and , therefore, none of them
can be said to have acquired vested rights in
specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the
FC does not intend to reach back and automatically
convert into absolute community of property
relation all conjugal partnership of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with
prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that
marriage settlements cannot be modified except
prior to the marriage.
Post-modification of such settlements can take place
only where (1) the absolute community or conjugal
partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon the
decree of legal separation; (2) the spouses who were
legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive
their former property regime; (3) judicial separation
of property had been had on the ground that the
spouse abandons the other without just cause or
fails to comply with his obligations to the family;
(4) there was judicial separation of property under
Article 135; (5) the spouses jointly filed a petition
for voluntary dissolution of their absolute

community or conjugal partnership of gains. None

of the circumstances exists in the case at bar.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of
gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code,
the husband and the wife place only the fruits of
their separate property and incomes from their work
or industry in the common fund. This means they
continue under such property regime to enjoy rights
of ownership over their separate properties .
Consequently, to automatically change the marriage
settlements of couples who got married under the
Civil Code into absolute community of property in
1988 when the FC took effect would be to impair
their acquired or vested rights to such separate