The Constitution confers wide powers upon the Supreme Court such as the power to

grant special leave against orders or decrees from any court or tribunal in the
country or to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide election disputes of the President
or Vice-President Moreover, the law laid down by the Supreme Court is the law of the
land binding on all the courts and tribunals in the country Such powers have been
conferred upon the Supreme Court to ensure that the court does not suffer from any
jurisdictional difficulties to do justice between the parties before it.
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Article 142 is one such provision in our Constitution which empowers the Supreme
Court to pass such "decree or order as may be necessary for doing complete justice
between the parties". Thus Article 142 supplements the powers already conferred
upon the Supreme Court under the Constitution to guarantee that justice is done and in
doing so the Court is not restrained by lack of jurisdiction or authority of law. Over
the years the Supreme Court to meet the ends of justice has frequently relied upon
Article 142. However, exercise of exceptional powers conferred under Article 142 has
of late met with some criticism with the courts today more frequently resorting to use
of Article 142 than ever before. Critics thus demand that the Supreme Court should
clearly state the extent and scope of its powers under Article 142 thereby defining its
limits within which the Supreme Court may opt to exercise its power.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court has time and again resorted to Article 142 in a variety of cases
and passed orders to do "complete justice". It is thus imperative for us to analyse the
current understanding of Article 142 to be better equipped to answer whether it is time
that the Court limits its powers under Article 142.
Article 142 is conceived to meet the situations which cannot be effectively and
appropriately tackled by existing provisions of law. Thus it appears that where
existing provisions of law can adequately deal with the issue at hand and do justice
between the parties, the Supreme Court would not normally exercise its powers under
Article 142:
"The phrase 'complete justice' engrafted in Article 142(1) is the word of width
couched with elasticity to meet myriad situations created by human ingenuity or cause
or result of operation of statute law or law declared under Articles 32, 136 and 141 of
the Constitution and cannot be cribbed or cabined within any limitations or
phraseology."
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Sahai, J. in S. Nagaraj case has observed that: "18. Justice is a virtue which
transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can
stand in its way." This wide definition of "justice" ensures that the Court can exercise
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its powers under Article 142 to do "complete justice" in a range of cases each decided
by the Court based on its facts and circumstances. Article 142 also lays down no
limitations regarding causes or the circumstances in which the power is to be
exercised. The exercise of such power is left completely to the discretion of the
highest court.
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Moreover, such power of passing any order or decree in the interest of justice has been
conferred upon the Supreme Court only vide Article 142 and in the absence of
analogous provisions, the High Courts or the tribunals do not have similar
powers. Therefore the Supreme Court, being the sole repository of such wide-ranging
power, can pass a range of orders under this article. It has been held that the
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wide powers given to the Court can be used for adding parties to the proceedings
pending before it, or in admitting additional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in
allowing a new point to be raised for the first time.
10

Furthermore, under Article 142, the Supreme Court can grant relief even to a party
which is not before the Court and has omitted to challenge the impugned order before
the Supreme Court. The Court has also exercised its power under Article 142 to order
a CBI inquiry without the State Government's consent where such consent was
required by the statute and did not remove clerks even though their appointments
were held invalid, as they had put in ten years of service and thus deserved "justice by
mercy".
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Scope of Power under Article 142

The scope and ambit of the Supreme Court's power under Article 142 has often been
subject to judicial scrutiny. The question that the Court has often faced is whether an
order made under Article 142, being a constitutional provision, could override express
statutory provisions? The answer to this question is important, as this will decide
whether the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers can ignore express statutory
provisions and pass an order to the contrary in order to do complete justice?
The Supreme Court perhaps first answered this question inPrem Chand v. Excise
Commr., U.P. wherein the Court held that:
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"An order which this Court can make in order to do complete justice between the
parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the
relevant statutory laws."
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Thus the Supreme Court limited its powers under Article 142 as no such order could
be passed by the Court which violates an express statutory provision. The Court then
in the famousA.R. Antulay case upheld the earlier pronouncement when it held that
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"however wide and plenary the language of the article, the directions given by the
court should not be inconsistent with, repugnant to or in violation of the specific
provisions of any statute" (SCC p. 730, para 206).
The Supreme Court again got an opportunity to review the interpretation accorded to
Article 142 in Delhi Judicial Service Assn. case wherein the Court reversing its
earlier judgments held that:
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No enactment made by the legislature can limit or restrict the constitutional power of
the Supreme Court under Article 142, though the Court must take into consideration
the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute.
This view was reaffirmed by the Court in Union Carbide case wherein the Court held
that:
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"The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of
the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the Supreme
Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous. ... Perhaps, the proper way of
expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the
needs of 'complete justice' of a cause or matter, the Supreme Court will take note of
the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some
fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and
discretion accordingly."
Thus the view taken by the Supreme Court was that although statutory provisions are
not a limitation for exercise of its constitutional powers under Article 142, the Court
while exercising such power to do complete justice must consider them.
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The question regarding the width and amplitude of the Court's power under Article
142 came up again for consideration inSupreme Court Bar Assn. case wherein the
Court laid down the law currently followed when it held that:
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"Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, becontrolled by any statutory
provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their
exercisemay come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a
statute dealing expressly with the subject."
(emphasis supplied)
The Court thus described its power as

a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction and thus a residual power, which this
Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so.
21

Thus the Court was of the view that the power under Article 142 should not be so
exercised as to violate an express statutory provision dealing exclusively with the
subject in spite of holding that statutory provisions cannot be a limitation on exercise
of Article 142.
22

This view was further reaffirmed by the Court in M.C. Mehtav. Kamal Nath wherein
the Court held that (SCC p. 223, para 19)
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Article 142 cannot be pressed into service in a situation where action under that article
would amount to contravention of specific provisions of the Act.
The current position in law can thus aptly be summarised as that being a constitutional
provision, Article 142 can override any statutory provision. But, in practice, the Court
does not use its powers under Article 142 in direct confrontation with any express
statutory provisions applicable to the case at hand. This is a self-imposed restriction
but the Court can bypass the same if equitable considerations demand.
Therefore the accepted view today seems to be that even though the courts have opted
to leave their powers under Article 142 undefined and uncatalogued, they have over a
period of time evolved certain limitations on exercise of their power. Thus the
Supreme Court would not be inclined to exercise its power under Article 142 if a
specific statutory provision exists to deal with the issue involved until and unless the
same is absolutely necessary in the interests of complete justice. Being the highest
court of the land from which no appeal lies the constitution-makers have gone that
extra mile and given wide powers to the Supreme Court under Article 142 so as to be
sure that there's nothing restraining the Supreme Court from meting out justice.
Moreover, the current position of law (that the Supreme Court will not infringe
statutory provisions until necessary) seems to be better suited to achieve the goals our
constitution-makers expected through Article 142 than the available alternatives. Now
had the position of law as declared been that Supreme Court cannot pass any order
under Article 142 that infringes an express statutory provision dealing with the subject
then the Supreme Court would have had needlessly imposed a significant restriction
on its inherent powers to do "complete justice" where required. If the Court finds that
an order, though violating a provision of law, is essential to do "complete justice", the
Court then should not be unnecessarily constrained. Furthermore, had the position of
law as declared been that the Supreme Court can pass any order irrespective of any
existing statutory provision, then such wide-ranging power would have given the
court ample opportunity to excessively interfere with statutory mechanisms. Existence

of statutes expressly dealing with the subject-matter would perhaps have had no
impact on the outcome of the case or the nature of the order passed under Article 142
then and this would in turn have encouraged litigants to pray for an order under
Article 142 avoiding the mandatory statutory process. Thus the current position of law
lies between the two abovementioned propositions and maintains a balance between
the Court's power to do complete justice on one hand as well giving due regard to
existing statutes. The Court must endeavour to give primacy to statutory provisions
and only in few cases where interests of complete justice genuinely demand, the Court
may pass an order confronting statutory provisions.
Exercise of Article 142 in the absence of a legislation
The Supreme Court has the power to issue directions under Article 142 where none
already exist and such directions shall be binding till such time as new rules are
enacted by the legislature on the subject. Thus it has been held that
ample powers are conferred on the Court under Articles 32, 141, 142 and 144 to issue
necessary directions to fill vacuum till either legislature steps in to cover the gap or
the executive discharges its role. (SCC para 49)
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The Court had in the famous Vishaka case formulated guidelines providing for
protection of women from sexual harassment at the workplace in the absence of any
enacted law on the same and the same are binding on all the courts under Article 141.
Thus where there is inaction by the executive, the judiciary must step in, in exercise of
its constitutional obligations to provide a solution till such time as the legislature acts
to perform its role by enacting proper legislation to cover the field.
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Conclusion
Article 142 was introduced in our Constitution to serve the interests of justice. The
Supreme Court is the highest court from which no appeal lies. Its decisions are final
and binding. Thus this article was included in our Constitution with a view to ensure
that the interests of justice are paramount and in doing so the Supreme Court can
disregard any provision which prevents the court from performing its constitutional
obligations.
The scope of Article 142 has often come up for discussion before the Supreme Court
and has received varied interpretations over the years. Beginning with Prem Chand
case14 wherein the Supreme Court restrained its powers and held that it cannot pass
any order under Article 142 which violates an express statutory provision to, V.C.
Mishra, In re case19, wherein the Court held that Article 142 being a constitutional
power cannot be limited by any statutory provision to finally the position laid down

in Supreme Court Bar Association case20 wherein the Court sort of harmonised the
two extremes and held that even though statutory provisions cannot act as a limitation
on the Court's constitutional power under Article 142, the powers are not meant to be
exercised where such provisions exist. The move is thus towards restricting as
opposed to expanding the inherentpower vested with the Supreme Court under Article
142.
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