POWER OF TAXATION

PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

110 PHIL 331
GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from
such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly
for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads,
however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but
projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision,
belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder
roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway.
The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the
subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also
gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to
the government.
ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of
justifying an expenditure of the government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue
for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus
the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage
of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the
law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance
imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and
penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal
Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various
professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398.
The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and
authorize what amounts to double taxation.

Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its
discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is
not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose
occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the
domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one
tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there
is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is
reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
Lladoc vs Commisioner of Internal Revenue (1965)
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in
the locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift tax return. In 1960, the
Commissioner issued an assessment for donees gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a
protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all
kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as
property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax
but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest
upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of
the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for
religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.
Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare
void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building located at Bangued,
Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said Notice of
Seizure by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was
issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the
building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and
rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is
not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner
availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before
the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable or educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial
purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the

first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from
taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the
assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the
ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as
incidental to education (residence of the director).
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
ART 3, SEC 1
MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
J. Carpio Morales
Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003.
Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the
bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and
convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project.
Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the
power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret
the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law
contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the
Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the
MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to
conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and
the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties
without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial
court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision,
this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority
of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the
closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable
controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or
orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the
Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies
to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA
and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that
between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Issues:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:

1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of
their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or
rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to
property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such
that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement."
Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance
can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been
satisfied by respondents.
2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private
investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and communications
systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not
the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of
the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the
DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish
and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There
was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in
Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects
concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and
education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated
by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not
merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested
statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of
any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of
the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject
for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be
addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that
franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem,
this Court has not been enlightened.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of
terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the
franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the
Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb) was empowered to "impose such
conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public
interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The
law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate
any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.
DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Publication requirement
TANADA v. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986
FACTS:
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners Tanada, Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. However, respondents contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. The point stressed is anchored
on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, x x x.
In the decision of this case on 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for all presidential
decrees and issuance of general application to be published in the Official Gazette otherwise,
these laws shall have no binding force and effect. Petitioners Tanada et al. moved for
reconsideration and clarification.
ISSUE: Is publication still required in the light of the clause unless it is otherwise provided in
Article 2 of the Civil Code?
RULING:
YES. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or
extended.
The requirement of publication applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or
directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of
enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city
notwithstanding that it applies only to a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place;(5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act
which that body is supposed to enforce.

On the other hand, publication requirements does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties; and (3)
instructions of Ministry heads on case studies, assignments of personnel, etc. Municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since the purpose of publication
itself is to make the public aware of the contents of the laws.
Philippine International Trading Corporation vs Judge Angeles Case Digest
G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996
Justice Torres Jr.
FACTS: The Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative
Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the
People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed
Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself or through a
tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from
PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Private respondents Remington and Firestone individually applied for authority to import from
PROC with the petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for
importers, and after they executed respective undertakings. Subsequently, for failing to comply
with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations,
further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that
the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. As a result, the private respondents
filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against the PITC.
The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not
published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by PITC is null and void on the ground that it
was not published in accordance with Article 2 of the New Civil Code.
HELD: Yes. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the
context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise
provided. . . .
The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed
their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does
not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one
of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444
and EO 133.

Republic vs Extelcom, [373 SCRA 316; GR 147096, January 15, 2002]

(Administrative Law, quasi-legislative power, proper procedure, filing and publication)
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional
authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative
applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were
filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase on its own initiative
were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and
effect in granting provisional authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the
rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The
National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules
and regulations can take effect.
B. Judicial proceedings
Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
on 6:41 AM in Case Digests, Civil Law, Political Law, Remedial Law 0
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in
Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on
January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted
foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants
last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this
requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and
afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7,
1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of
this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was
that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the
requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There

must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner,
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as
essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in
addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a
means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect
it.
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may
never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be
very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much
increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as
upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision
of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice
unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is
known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of
this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which
may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last known address constitute denial of
due process?
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a
denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid
the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only
form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely
necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it
be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the
matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either
has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be
considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from
the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the
application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so
rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is
an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper,
it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in
applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of
the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of
judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the

provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law has not been infringed.
(Missing: Galvez v. CA G.R. No. 114046

October 24, 1994)

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, vs. JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial

Court,Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994STATE
Facts: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a
complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The
case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of
the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960 filed by the
members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely
on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be
reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign
exchange restrictions. The respondents decision was founded on his belief that the
reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the
CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus
motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge
to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part. The complainants contend that the
respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he purported to be a public
knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has
lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to
accord due process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence
thereby depriving the government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave
abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. In
the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published
in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It
cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular
no.1353 which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper, believing that the
public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such
matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is
a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of
general circulation before its effectivity. When the Presidents statement was
published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB
circular 1353thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely
based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires
for the court to take judicial notice of. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and
discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact
cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the
judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge
of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that
involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he obtained from the
newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not
yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be
heard and of due process. The reason is simple, a law which is not yet in force and hence, still
inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration,
which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his
discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

JUAN CARVAJAL vs. CA, et al.

280 SCRA 351
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking the nullification of two Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals on
August 3, 1999 and May 25, 2000.
On October 9, 1997, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision, In G.R. No. 98328, penned by
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban. denying Juan C. Carvajal's petition to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The latter court upheld the trial court LRC Case No. 414(-A), LRC Record No.
N-60084 filed before Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, Branch 71. in dismissing petitioner's
application for registration of title of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. The Court recognized
respondent Solid Homes, Inc. as the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. N7873, situated in Antipolo City.
On May 13, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a complaint for
annulment of title with damages against private respondent.
Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-7873 by
inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal who came to possess the unregistered land in 1938,
continuously, openly, adversely and peacefully in the concept of an owner up to the time of his
death.
On August 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint.
On August 3, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the questioned resolution. The decretal portion
reads:
"WHEREFORE, for being insufficient in form and substance, the petition for certiorari should be,
as it is hereby, DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED." The petition revealed that
petitioner failed to comply with Rule 46, Section 3, par. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requiring the statement of the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for the new trial or reconsideration, if
any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received. On May 25, 2000, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition filed on July 7, 2000.

HELD:
The court ruled on denying the petition because the issues raised are factual. This Court is not a
trier of facts. Blanco vs. Quasha, G.R. No. 133148, November 17, 1999. Well-settled is the rule
that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to
great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstance which would substantially affect the
disposition of the case.
There would be no end to litigations if parties who unsuccessfully availed themselves of any of
the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault would still be heard.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED
The Court further Resolves to:
(a)GRANT the motion of private respondent for a second extension of five (5) days from
September 5, 2000 within which to file a comment on the petition for review on certiorari; and
(b)NOTEthe said comment thereafter filed
Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons
with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita NicolasVizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her
April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the
DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right
to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to
charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed
to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?

(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary
investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica
Alfaro in the information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant
for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted
searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to
be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for
the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this
right is to prosecute their violators.
Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995
Facts: Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the high-profile case Vizconde massacre.
Preliminary investigation was provided by NBI and the case was raffled to Judge Zosimo Escano
who inhibited himself from the case for being employed with NBI before. His pair Judge Escano
issued warrant of arrest to defendants. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge
Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest. Webb and the others voluntarily
surrendered. They files before the court petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They
contend that (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them:
(2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to
charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their
constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel

unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
Information as an accused.
Issue: Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived Webb and the others of their right to fair
trial?
Decision: Petition dismissed. to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone
and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed,
their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The
length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity
with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness.
At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel
on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
People of the Philippines vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
294 SCRA 54
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On July 10, 1991 Maureen Hultman, Jussi Leino and Roland Chapman while walking along the
corner of Caballero & Mahogany streets, was approached by the accused Teehankee jr. And after
a series of events, the accused fired his gun killing Chapman and mortally wounding Hultman and
Leino, then left. Leino, though mortally wounded mustered all his strength and called for help and
noticed at least 3 people looking on from outside their house namely Vicente Mangubat, Domingo
Florece and Agripino Cadenas.Mangubat, after the gunman sped away, ran outside his house,
helped the victims and reported the incident to the proper authorities.During their Investigation the
NBI and the Makati police asked Jussi Leino twice regarding the person who shot them; The first
instance was On July 15, 1991 while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown (3) pictures of
different men bythe investigators. He identified Claudio Teehankee Jr. as the gunman from the
pictures.In order to confirm the identification made by Leino and other witnesses Cadenas and
Mangubat who also pointed the accused as the gunman thru a separate out of court
identification procedures. The Assistant director of NBI Epimaco Velasco, the Chief of NBISpecial operations group Salvador Ranin and 2 other agents brought the accused to Forbes park
for further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just been discharged from
the hospital the day before. Since his parents were worried about his safety, they requested the
NBI to conduct the investigation of the gunman in Forbes Park where the Leinos also live. The
NBI agreed.So, the security agents from US embassy fetched Leino at his house and his father to
a vacant house in Forbes Park. After a couple of minutes, Leino was brought out of the laws and
placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about 5 meters away from the
house. Inside the car with Leino was his Father, NBI-SOG chief Salvador Ranin anda driver.
Leino was instructed to look at men who will be coming out of the house and identify the gunman
from the line up. A group of five to six men (including the accused) then came out of the
unoccupied house, into the street. From the group, Leino identified the accused as the gunman
for the second time.3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2)
FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN
HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and
during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.

The trial court convicted the accused Claudio Teehankee jr. because the strength of the
testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, in his
appeal, he vigorously assailed the validity of the out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses
especially the identification of Jussi Leino.
ISSUE: Whether or not the out-of-court identification in this case is a valid and licit way in the
identification of the accused?
HELD: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru showups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done
thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and
its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. (People vs. Teehankee jr. 249
SCRA 54-125, pg 95).Based on this statement given by the high court regarding the issue, we
can say that out-of the court identification of the accused is valid and licit when it is in line with the
rules that the Supreme court have fashioned. In the case given, the authorities did not violate
anything stated in the latter, otherwise it is stated in the decision that they violated one.
Wherefore, the out of court identification in this case is valid and licit. Which makes the contention
of the accused regarding the validity of the identification, groundless.