Shin 16 02 16

Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Government of the People?

Right-wing Populism and Immigration Policy
Adrian J. Shin
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
Prepared for the MACIMIDE Migration Seminar

February 16, 2016
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Student
Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE 0718128. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Science Foundation.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Puzzle
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Questions and Answers
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Immigration Policy as
Mainstream Parties Weapon
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources
Data on Immigration Policy

Data on Parties
Overview of the Data
4 Empirical Analysis
Model and Expectations
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Puzzle
Xenophobia and Immigration Policy
Prejudice toward immigrants has always been present across
wealthy democracies.
How does the xenophobic segment of native population
influence immigration policy?
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Puzzle
Existing Explanations
Labor unions (Briggs 2001)
After World War II, union density has been declining while
restrictions on immigration have emerged.
Unions have maintained divergent stances on immigration.
Right-wing populism (Swank and Betz 2003)
Most right-wing populist parties are excluded from coalition
governments.
The lack of data on immigration policy has prevented the
literature from testing the link between right-wing populism
and immigration policy formation.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Puzzle
governments.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Puzzle
governments.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Puzzle
governments.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Questions
Do right-wing populist parties influence immigration policy
when excluded from coalition governments?

How do mainstream parties of coalition governments respond
to rising right-wing populism?
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Questions
Do right-wing populist parties influence immigration policy
when excluded from coalition governments?

How do mainstream parties of coalition governments respond
to rising right-wing populism?
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Short Answers
Right-wing populist parties have limited direct influence on
immigration policy when excluded from policy making.

Mainstream parties shift their stance on immigration policy
when a large number of voters support right-wing populist

parties because they seek to exclude right-wing populist parties
from coalition building (indirect influence).
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Short Answers
Right-wing populist parties have limited direct influence on
immigration policy when excluded from policy making.

Mainstream parties shift their stance on immigration policy
when a large number of voters support right-wing populist

parties because they seek to exclude right-wing populist parties
from coalition building (indirect influence).
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Contributions
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Contributions
Theoretical
An emphasis on the role of mainstream party strategies

Implications for the electoral success of niche parties
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Contributions
Empirical
A comprehensive dataset on national immigration policies
toward migrants from the developing world

Testing the relationship between right-wing populism and
low-skill immigration policy
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Assumptions
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Assumptions
Parties and Institutions
Right-wing populist parties are hostile to political compromise
and diversity.
Right-wing populist parties have the means to attain seats in
the national legislature.

Mainstream parties have vested interests in maintaining policy
stability and preserving existing rules of political discourse.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Immigration Policy as Mainstream Parties Weapon
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Raison dtre of Right-wing Populist Parties
Right-wing populist parties exercise ownership on immigration
issues.
In theory, mainstream parties have two choices:
Accommodative strategy (policy convergence)
Adversarial strategy (policy divergence)
Mainstream parties restrict immigration to appease xenophobic
voters.
Less immigration Xenophobic voters focus on other issues.
Right-wing populist parties lose support base.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
issues.
voters.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
issues.
voters.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
issues.
voters.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Hypotheses
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Hypotheses
Testable Hypotheses
H1: A rise in voter support for right-wing populism leads to
immigration policy restrictions.

H2: Center-right parties are more likely to restrict immigration
in response to right-wing populism.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Hypotheses
Testable Hypotheses
H1: A rise in voter support for right-wing populism leads to
immigration policy restrictions.

H2: Center-right parties are more likely to restrict immigration
in response to right-wing populism.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Immigration Policy Dimensions, Peters-Shin (2016)

Dimension
Universality by Nationality
Universality by Skill or Income
Citizenship
Immigrant Rights
Refugee
Refugee Provisions
Asylum
Asylum Provisions
Recruitment
Labor Prohibitions
Deportation
Enforcement
Family
Family Provisions
Quota
Description
Discrimination based on nationality
Discrimination based on skills or income
Ease of naturalization or citizenship acquisition
Political, legal or welfare rights
Number of refugees allowed to enter
Provisions on refugees
Ease of getting an asylum
Provisions on asylum
Visas or government programs
Labor market restrictions for immigrants
Deportable offenses and administrative processes
Border enforcement or employment screening
Sponsorship by citizenship and restrictions
Special provisions for families
Percentage of population allowed to enter annually
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Factor Analysis based on Principal Components

Variable
Nationality
Skill
Citizenship
Other Rights
Refugees
Asylum
Recruitment
Work Prohibitions
Deportation
Enforcement
Family Reunification
Quota
Factor 1
Immigration Policy
Factor
Scoring
Loadings
Coefficients
0.464
0.742
0.184
0.380
-0.668
-0.546
0.544
0.477
0.601
0.758
-0.682
0.609
0.117
0.186
0.046
0.095
-0.168
-0.137
0.137
0.120
0.151
0.190
-0.171
0.153
Factor 2
Immigrant Rights
Factor
Scoring
Loadings Coefficients
-0.058
0.033
0.623
0.725
0.436
0.440
0.096
0.535
0.465
-0.024
0.373
-0.280
-0.028
0.016
0.307
0.357
0.215
0.217
0.047
0.263
0.229
-0.012
0.184
-0.138
Uniqueness
0.782
0.448
0.578
0.330
0.364
0.509
0.694
0.487
0.424
0.425
0.396
0.551
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Why Factor Analysis?
Alternative approaches:
Using the individual dimensions
Using average scores
Problems:
Countries use some tools, but not others.
These policy measures are sometimes negatively or positively
correlated within a country.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Why Factor Analysis?
Alternative approaches:
Using the individual dimensions
Using average scores
Problems:
Countries use some tools, but not others.
These policy measures are sometimes negatively or positively
correlated within a country.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Countries Using Several Policy Measures

Sweden
Norway
1950
1970
1990
2010 1950
1970
1990
2010
Year
Quota
Skill
Nationality
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Countries with Policy Measure Preferences

United States
Canada
1950
1970
1990
20101950
1970
1990
2010
Year
Quota
Skill
Nationality
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Other Countries
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Austria
1950
1970
1990
2010 1950
1970
1990
2010 1950
1970
1990
2010 1950
1970
1990
2010
Year
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
How to Construct Immigration Policy Index
Goodman, Sara Wallace (2015) Conceptualizing and Measuring

Citizenship and Integration Policy Past Lessons and New
Approaches, Comparative Political Studies.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Sample Characteristics
Group
Former British
Colonies
European
Democracies
East Asia
Country
United States
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
Austria*
Belgium*
Denmark*
France
Germany
Ireland*
Netherlands
Norway*
Spain*
Sweden*
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Japan
Years Included
1950-2010
19502010
19502010
19502010
19502011
19502011
1950-2011
19502010
19502010
1950-2011
19502010
19502011
1977-2011
19502011
19502010
19502010
19502010
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Sample Characteristics
Group
Former British
Colonies
European
Democracies
East Asia
Country
United States
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
Austria*
Belgium*
Denmark*
France
Germany
Ireland*
Netherlands
Norway*
Spain*
Sweden*
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Japan
Years Included
1950-2010
19502010
19502010
19502010
19502011
19502011
1950-2011
19502010
19502010
1950-2011
19502010
19502011
1977-2011
19502011
19502010
19502010
19502010
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Data on Parties
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Data on Parties
Comparative Political Parties Dataset by Swank
Table: Right-wing Populism Correlation

Vote Share
Seat Share
Governing Seat Share
Vote Share
Seat Share
Government Seat Share
1.000
0.9474
0.5207
1.000
0.5477
1.000
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Western European Countries

Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
10
-2
30
-3
1
20
10
-1
-2
30
-3
1
20
-3
-2
10
-1
Immigration Policy Openness
-1
20
30
Austria
1950
1970
1990
2010 1950
1970
1990
2010 1950
1970
1990
2010 1950
1970
1990
2010
Year
Immigration Policy Openness
Right-wing Populism Vote Share
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Empirical Model
Immigration Policyit =
0 + 1 Immigration Policyit 1 + 2 RWP Vote/Seat Shareit
P
+ nk =3 k Control Variable(k 2),it + i + t + it ,
OLS with panel-corrected standard errors
i : country fixed effects
t : year fixed effects
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Empirical Expectations
Immigration Policyit =
0 + 1 Immigration Policyit 1 + 2 RWP Vote/Seat Shareit
P
+ nk =3 k Control Variable(k 2),it + i + t + it ,
OLS with panel-corrected standard errors
i : country fixed effects
t : year fixed effects
Note: negative sign, positive sign
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results
Outline
1 Introduction
Puzzle
Contributions
2 Theory
Assumptions
Hypotheses
3 Data Sources

Data on Parties
Results
5 Conclusion
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results
All Countries
Years Included
Immigration Policyt 1
RWP Vote Share
(1)
1950-2011
(2)
1950-2011
(3)
1950-2000
(4)
1950-1995
0.922
0.924
0.917
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.013)
0.905
(0.019)
-0.007
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.090
(0.038)
-0.013
(0.136)
0.011
(0.022)
(0.002)
-0.068
(0.046)
-0.176
(0.221)
0.027
(0.040)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.002
-0.002
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.081
(0.092)
GDP Growth
-0.322
(0.309)
Log of GDP per capita
0.015
(0.059)
Net Union Density
0.000
(0.002)
Income Taxes as % of GDP
-0.008
(0.004)
Welfare Taxes as % of GDP
-0.006
(0.004)
Observations
1000
1000
709
624
Countries
17
17
15
15
R2
0.976
0.976
0.974
0.972
+
Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and indicate statistical
significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects are
included in all models.
ln(Population)
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results
Europe and Non-Europe except USA

Years Included
Europe= 0:
RWP Vote Share
Europe= 1:
RWP Vote Share
(5)
1950-2011
(6)
1950-2011
(7)
1950-2000
(8)
1950-1995
0.922
(0.012)
-0.002+
0.924
(0.012)
0.903
(0.019)
-0.001
0.915
(0.013)
-0.003+
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.105
(0.039)
-0.039
(0.139)
0.013
(0.022)
(0.002)
-0.076
(0.046)
-0.230
(0.221)
0.034
(0.040)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.002
-0.003
-0.004
-0.003
-0.008
(0.004)
-0.112
(0.088)
GDP Growth
-0.385
(0.314)
0.020
(0.058)
Net Union Density
-0.000
(0.002)
-0.008+
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.004)
Observations
940
940
659
579
Countries
16
16
14
14
R2
0.975
0.976
0.974
0.973
+
ln(Population)
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results
An Alternative Mechanism
Right-wing populist parties support mainstream parties in
exchange for restrictive immigration policy.

If this is true, we should observe some negative correlation
between right-wing populist seat share and immigration policy

openness.
We do not observe this.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results


openness.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results


openness.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results
RWP Vote Share vs. Seat Share in Europe

Years Included
RWP Vote Share

RWP Seat Share
(9)
1950-2011
0.927
(0.013)
-0.003
(10)
1950-2011
0.924
(0.013)
-0.003+
(11)
1950-2000
0.910
(0.017)
-0.004
(12)
1950-1995
0.895
(0.024)
-0.007
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
0.001
0.000
-0.000
-0.001
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.221
(0.086)
0.217
(0.199)
-0.084
(0.032)
(0.002)
-0.166
(0.157)
-0.292
(0.311)
-0.069
(0.074)
-0.001
(0.001)
(0.004)
-0.316
(0.245)
GDP Growth
-0.485
(0.420)
-0.101
(0.119)
Net Union Density
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.008+
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.005)
Observations
700
700
511
454
Countries
12
12
11
11
R2
0.976
0.976
0.975
0.973
+
ln(Population)
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results
RWP in Coalition Governments

Years Included
RWP Seat Share

(Government)
RWP Vote Share
(13)
1950-2011
0.928
(0.013)
(14)
1950-2011
0.926
(0.013)
(15)
1950-2000
0.917
(0.017)
(16)
1950-2000
0.910
(0.017)
-0.000
-0.001
-0.001
0.002
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.002)
-0.134
-0.165
(0.093)
(0.169)
(0.166)
GDP Growth
0.291
-0.203
-0.302
(0.201)
(0.305)
(0.310)

-0.077
-0.102
-0.049
(0.033)
(0.076)
(0.077)
Net Union Density
-0.000
-0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
Observations
700
700
511
511
Countries
12
12
11
11
2
R
0.975
0.976
0.974
0.975
+
ln(Population)
-0.215
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results
Center-right Mainstream Parties in Europe

(20)
1950-2000
0.896
(0.024)
CR Seat Share
0.000
(0.001)
RWP Vote Share
-0.010
(0.007)
CR Seat Share RWP
0.000
Vote Share
(0.000)
ln(Population)
-0.345
(0.246)
GDP Growth
-0.474
(0.420)
-0.100
(0.119)
Net Union Density
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.008
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.005)
Observations
700
700
511
454
Countries
12
12
11
11
R2
0.976
0.976
0.975
0.973
Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical
Adrian J. Shin
Years Included
(17)
1950-2011
0.926
(0.013)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.000)
(18)
1950-2011
0.923
(0.013)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.184
(0.085)
0.195
(0.196)
-0.092
(0.032)
(19)
1950-2000
0.910
(0.017)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.006
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.179
(0.155)
-0.308
(0.313)
-0.072
(0.075)
-0.001
(0.001)
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Results
Center-right Mainstream Parties in Europe

(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
19501950195019502011
2011
2000
2000
Immigration Policyt 1 0.926 0.923 0.910 0.896
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.017)
(0.024)
CR Seat Share 0.002
0.001
0.001
0.000
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
RWP Vote Share -0.003
-0.002
-0.006
-0.010
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.007)
CR Seat Share RWP -0.000
-0.000
0.000
0.000
Vote Share (0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Observations 700
700
511
454
Countries 12
12
11
11
R2 0.976
0.976
0.975
0.973
Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *
and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively. Country and year fixed effects are included in all models.
Years Included
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Implications
Mainstream parties respond to right-wing populism by
implementing restrictive immigration policy (e.g. Meguid

2005).
Ruling right-wing populist parties do not restrict immigration
policy.
Little variation in ruling RWP parties prior to 1995 (blame the
data).
Ruling RWP parties have exhausted all policy options in
restricting immigration policy on their way into government

coalition.
Ruling RWP parties may face some constraints once they
come into power.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Implications
Mainstream parties respond to right-wing populism by
implementing restrictive immigration policy (e.g. Meguid

2005).
Ruling right-wing populist parties do not restrict immigration
policy.
Little variation in ruling RWP parties prior to 1995 (blame the
data).
Ruling RWP parties have exhausted all policy options in
restricting immigration policy on their way into government

coalition.
Ruling RWP parties may face some constraints once they
come into power.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
An Extension: Refugee Policy

Region
Years Included
Refugee Policyt 1
RWP Vote Share
(21)
All
1950-2011
0.866
(0.015)
-0.003
(22)
All
1950-2011
0.892
(0.014)
-0.005
(23)
Europe
1950-2000
0.893
(0.025)
-0.003
(24)
Europe
1950-2000
0.872
(0.010)
-0.004
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
0.467
0.672
1.182
(0.148)
(0.172)
(0.132)
GDP Growth
0.545
0.282
0.249
(0.239)
(0.324)
(0.206)
0.174
-0.046
-0.079
(0.026)
(0.048)
(0.040)
Net Union Density
0.001
0.003
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.001
0.003+
(0.002)
(0.001)
0.006
0.004
(0.002)
(0.002)
Observations
1000
624
700
454
Countries
17
15
12
11
R2
0.966
0.979
0.982
0.986
Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical
ln(Population)
(0.001)
0.470
(0.074)
0.109
(0.305)
0.141
(0.043)
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Future Research
Examine the effect of immigration (policy) on right-wing
populist parties electoral success.

Explore the mechanisms on why right-wing parties do not
restrict immigration policy when they govern.
Adrian J. Shin
Introduction
Theory
Data Sources
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Future Research
Examine the effect of immigration (policy) on right-wing
populist parties electoral success.

Explore the mechanisms on why right-wing parties do not
restrict immigration policy when they govern.
Adrian J. Shin

Shin 16 02 16

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Introduction

Government of the People?

Prepared for the MACIMIDE Migration Seminar

Government of the People?

Data on Immigration Policy

Xenophobia and Immigration Policy

Prejudice toward immigrants has always been present across

influence immigration policy?

Government of the People?

Government of the People?

Government of the People?

Government of the People?

Government of the People?

Questions and Answers

Government of the People?

Data on Immigration Policy

Questions and Answers

Do right-wing populist parties influence immigration policy

when excluded from coalition governments?

to rising right-wing populism?

Government of the People?

Questions and Answers

Do right-wing populist parties influence immigration policy

when excluded from coalition governments?

to rising right-wing populism?

Government of the People?

Questions and Answers

Right-wing populist parties have limited direct influence on

immigration policy when excluded from policy making.

when a large number of voters support right-wing populist

Government of the People?

Questions and Answers

Right-wing populist parties have limited direct influence on

immigration policy when excluded from policy making.

when a large number of voters support right-wing populist

Government of the People?

Government of the People?

Data on Immigration Policy

An emphasis on the role of mainstream party strategies

Government of the People?

A comprehensive dataset on national immigration policies

toward migrants from the developing world

low-skill immigration policy

Government of the People?

Government of the People?

Data on Immigration Policy

Parties and Institutions

Right-wing populist parties are hostile to political compromise

the national legislature.

stability and preserving existing rules of political discourse.

Government of the People?

Immigration Policy as Mainstream Parties Weapon

Government of the People?

Data on Immigration Policy

Immigration Policy as Mainstream Parties Weapon

Raison dtre of Right-wing Populist Parties

Right-wing populist parties exercise ownership on immigration

Government of the People?

Immigration Policy as Mainstream Parties Weapon

Raison dtre of Right-wing Populist Parties

Right-wing populist parties exercise ownership on immigration

Government of the People?

Immigration Policy as Mainstream Parties Weapon