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Antigone's Defense: A Critical Study of "Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays"

Author(s): Daniel N. Robinson


Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Dec., 1991), pp. 363-392
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
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ANTIGONE'S DEFENSE: A CRITICALSTUDY OF


NATURAL LAW THEORY:CONTEMPORARYESSAYS'
DANIEL N. ROBINSON

To

law belongs
the natural
. .
to his nature.
according
is
there
of
form
man,
proper
to reason; and this
according

a man
to which
is inclined
everything
.Therefore,
since the rational
soul is the
to act
in every man a natural
inclination
to virtue.2
is to act according

JLn this PASSAGE, and in dozens like it, Thomas Aquinas laid the
foundations for that most enduring European tradition in philosophy
of law: natural law theory.
It is a tradition still thriving, if not
in the Law Merchant
acknowledged,
explicitly
in the background
and various
assumptions

and more
of

provisions

tional law. If much of the formal philosophical


tradition is Thomistic, the tradition is nonetheless

generally
interna

of the
dateless
virtually
character

a theory
As early as Hesiod,
of divine
jurisprudence.
to explain
is invoked
the transcendent
nature
of that
provenance
summons
to which
law would
of conscience
give public
expression.
serves
as
more
a
the
fourth
Aristotle
recorder
of
B.c.,
century
By
in Western

when
he declares
than a legal theorist
that "the principles
history
are permanent
of equity
and changeless,
and . . . the universal
law
same
not
for
it
is
the
law
of
At this
does
nature."3
either,
change
place

he goes

on to recall

the

exculpatory

lines

has

Sophocles

given

to Antigone:
Not of today or yesterday
they are,
But live eternal: none can date their birth.
Not I would fear the wrath
of any man,
And brave Gods' vengeance
for defying
these.

1
Law Theory: Contemporary
ed. Robert
Natural
P. George
Essays,
in this essay are to this
Press, 1992).
Page references
(Oxford: Clarendon
book.
2
Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae
I-II, q. 94, a. 3.
(ST, hereafter)
3
1375a30.
Rhetoric
Aristotle,
Review

of Metaphysics

45

(December

1991):

363-392.

Copyright

1991

by

Metaphysics

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the Review

of

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

364
the

By

sixth

of the modern

century

and

era,

or argument,

of analysis

benefit

without

granted,

centuries

after

of

jurists, the core prin


it is simply taken for

and skillful application by Roman


ciples appear in Justinian's Institutes, where
refinement

that

are governed
nations who are ruled by laws and customs
partly
are common
own
to all
those
laws
which
their
and
laws,
by
partly by
a people enacts
The law which
is called the Civil Law of
mankind.
reason appoints
for all mankind
that people, but that which
natural
use it.4
is called the Law of Nations,
because all nations
All

Thus, if the venerable were ipsofacto the valid, this part of the Long
Debate

would

Over

been

have

concluded

two centuries,

the past

ages

ago.

however,

all of the prin

practically

ciples and arguments on which the theory (allegedly) depends have


been subjected to relentless scrutiny by lawyers and philosophers
of law armed with perspectives and findings borrowed from soci
linguistics,

ology,

comparative

proper.

philosophy

ethics, and then with Austin's

of utilitarian
movement

Beginning
natural

against

the nineteenth
under

thick

these

same

and
jurisprudence,
anthropology
with Hume's
and Bentham's
defenses

law theory

influential

lectures, the

momentum
gathered
tenets
its central

century.
By mid-century,
of suspicion.
From
that time
to criticisms
tenets would
be exposed
clouds

until

in
early
had come

quite

recently,
came
finally

many

to regard as nothing less than fatal. First the legal realists made
clear that little if anything envisaged by natural law theory makes
contact
Then

with
came

what

takes

actually

the new

arena.
adjudicative
whose
very definitions

in the

place

of positivists,
Most
law theory requires.
natural
everything
nearly
we are asked
to
era?wherein
in our vaunted
postmodern
generation

of law excluded
recently,
console
has

with

ourselves

been

now

"solidarity",

deconstructed?the

theory

has

that
been

in that museum of failed absolutes.


But phoenix-like, or rather in the manner
immune
these
resilient.

natural

system,
not-so-fatal
Thus

attacks,
may

law has

recovered
to prove

all hope
given

under

fully decline the role of one "crying in the wilderness"

4
The Institutes
Greenwood
Press,

trans. Thomas
of Justinian,
2.
ch.
bk.
1,
1970),

a special

place

of a highly adaptive

repeatedly
ever more

only
the editor of the collection

of objectivity

Sandars

from
resistant
review

of

each

and
grace

as he observes

(Westport,

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Conn.:

365

NATURAL LAW THEORY


the

assortment

"remarkable

of natural

of ideas"
market-place
Not only is the assortment
its distinguished,
disclosing

law

rich,

it is subtle,

if troubled,

rabile dictu, it is the voice of natural

not

sometimes

fully
mi

In addition,

ancestry.

law theory's traditional


even

now begins
to sound
somewhat
monotone,
So the time seems propitious
of the register.

part

in to

(p. v).

day's

that

on offer

theories

critics

in the

shrill

to examine

again

the major claims and implications of this oldest of theories, the


assets that might be claimed for it and the liabilities that may still
plague it, the versions worth developing and the criticisms worth
If the time is, in fact, right for so difficult a project, then
weighing.
the volume assembled by Robert George may be profitably adopted
as the best

available

than four-hundred
the most

important

textual

essays

from them the most


in a field

expect

reasonably
confusion.

to philosophy

contributors

contemporary

could

and

troversy

in less

and

chapters

pages, not only has he been joined by many

but he has also obtained


one

In a dozen

guide.

The volume is neatly and aptly partitioned

of

of law,

lucid and instructive


this

dense

with

into four parts.

con

Part

I provides
that explain,
and criticize,
elaborate,
defend,
chapters
versions
of natural
law theory.
both
traditional
and current
The
are the subject
between
natural
law and legal theory
connections

of Part II, again balanced by the inclusion of proponents

same core assumptions.


In Part
III the scope of the
is again
the
of chap
this
time
inclusion
broadened,
by
to concepts
to natural
law in relation
of justice
and

the

addressing
undertaking
ters devoted
The

concluding
"Legal Formalism

rights.

and critics

heading

two

appear

chapters
and Legal

in Part

IV under

the

Rationality."

In chapter 1 Joseph Boyle identifies and carefully examines


nodal
ics.

of dispute
between
points
He makes
clear that any

natural
number

law theorists
of challenges

and
often

their

the
crit

regarded

as telling are not especially difficult to meet, even on traditional


Thomistic grounds.
Thus from the fact (or putative fact) that a
legal theory (such as natural law) is grounded in traditions of one
sort or another, it does not follow that the theory depends upon
tradition
vious

fact

for

its validity
that normative

or meaning.
principles

Moreover,
arise within

to accept
the ob
a given
intellectual

tradition "does not provide a reason for thinking [they] are not crit
ically

vindicated"

of moral

(p. 9).

theory within

Boyle

goes

the natural

on to argue

that

the architects

law tradition have been drawn

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366

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

from

various

that

of shared,
lived
"community
law to be a cultural
artifact:

take

and distinct

epochs

cultures

and

values"

do not

thus

assumed

enter

into

those

by

who

The work
of casuistry
is hardly
intellectual
intelligible
(as honest
from its perversion
in intellectually
elaborate
ratio
work, as distinct
is morally
except for those who care deeply about what
nalization)
as such the tradition
But the work
itself is largely analytical;
good.
it presupposes
is the tradition of intellectual
enquiry, not a community
of shared values,
(p. 12)
It is a particular
the more
the

acknowledging
that might
be
(p. 24).
are not
which

prosaic
"deep

raised

challenges
semantic
and

is that

the very

carries

with

have made

might

it the

arguments

aspiration

Indeed,
between

of community
to bear,

here
two

the

But

he does
when

Donagan,

bring
he notes

is beyond at least the possibility

and

lived

icism"
bers

(p. 16).
beholden

on Aquinas's
as developed
in ST

communitarian

society which
its actual

values

merely

relied

of mos

theories

in light of their inability


itself.

following

if

fidelity

attachment

have

might
senses

with

patient

is called for, especially

reside within

be no collective

it would yield not a living tradition but

Boyle
the

more

(p. 27),

(as

There
knowingly.
is to be avoided.
Were

q. 58, a. 1.
is also
Boyle

lenge

of any weight

commendable
essay
in "tradition-dependence")
a set of values
to perpetuate
and be

imposed and unquestioned


a sleep-walk.
own distinction

it successfully
theory while

in this

can

practitioner
a category
error

grounds

theories

to them, and that this species of fidelity must

each

MI,

clearer

of tradition

concept

law

epistemological
objections"
the Thomistic
notion
of self-evidence

against

too, that ethical


acknowledges,
to
be
defeated
likely
by self-refutation
is to say he takes his critics
seriously.
Boyle

that

essay
to natural

He

What

faithful

of Boyle's

strength

confronts

do not.

Were

the moral

only

to serviceable

. .

horizon

to establish

a more

direct

that

"There

of moral
a basis

provide
of a society
there

customs,

than

for

drawn
would

the
chal
is no

criticism,
this

crit

by mem
be

simply

nothing sufficiently reflexive to locate that horizon within the larger


realm of moral possibilities.
Morality would then be nothing but
a habit,
sense.
in the dreariest
It is true, as Boyle
observes
(agreeing
that Aquinas
Alasdair
does
Maclntyre),
always

subscribe

to some

number

of moral

here
not

for the moment


claim

principles

that

all

(p. 20).

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with
people
Aqui

NATURAL LAW THEORY

367

recalls Caesar's
observations
I-II, q. 94, a. 4, for example,
custom
But
of theft.
German
and unrepentant
of the widespread
if
some
must
that
assumed
be
is
there
argues
knowledge,
Boyle,
at ST

nas,

deliberated action itself is to be possible, and at least certain aspects


of this knowledge must qualify as moral knowledge.
Referring to
he goes

ST

I-II, Prologue,
of human
aspect

life

on to say

that
that morality
"deals with
as
most
function
properly

humans

in which

image," linking this to creativity,

God's

say,
list, I should
than what Aquinas

This

(p. 21).

contemporary
Law:

and the will

deliberation,
more

is rather
makes

"humanistic"
in his Treatise

explicit

and
On

of the divine law is to establish man in friendship


The chief intention
. . .But there cannot possibly
be any friendship
of man to
with God.
men
unless
become
is
Who
q. 99,
good,
(ST
I-II,
good.
God,
supremely
a. 2)
one recent
and increasingly
In chapter
2, written
by the editor,
is defended:
the version
law theory
version
of natural
influential
with
and
Germain
associated
Grisez,
developed
especially
usually
must
main
Robert
address
The
Finnis.
John
George
complaint
by
in the hands

is that,

and Finnis,
natural
law has
Boyle,
in the great
natural
its foundations
inflexible
been replaced
reed
though
by

of Grisez,

as it were,
denatured,
of the cosmos
having
The
task
"self-evidents."

been,
order
thin

to argue
First,
moral
divorced

that
norms

Grisez,
from

sets

George

and

Finnis,
human

for himself

their

nature

defenders
itself

(thus

is twofold.
have

not

providing

what Imight call morality without a knowing subject). Second, to


show that Grisez is correct in insisting that the (mere?) facts of
nature

human

cannot

properly

understood.

completed
in which

by George's
the relevance

The

second

task

George

are

at

issue.

by nonspecialists,
to them.
duction

The

nature

the more
separation
Readers

succeed?

those works

after studying
claims

of human

is, of course,

a worrisome

is to establish
Does

a logical warrant
norm
for any moral
supply
and successfully
The first task is essentially
in
works
Finnis
and Grisez
noting
places
by
to moral

is affirmed.

for to succeed

here
daunting,
between
and nature.
morality
must
but probably
decide,
only

(by Grisez, Finnis,

works

science

themselves

so George's
will
chapter
for illustrative
Consider

are

and others) whose


not

be a most
purposes

engaged
easily
useful
intro
just

line of defense:

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one major

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

368

are correct
If Grisez
and his followers
to hold that
reasons
for action are not derived
from facts about
how are these reasons known?
in
They are known
acts of understanding
in which we grasp possible
ends
worth while
for their own sakes. (p. 34)

Finnis

wants
George
version
of natural

nature

of which

there

is human

What

to establish
is that

the most
basic
human
nature,
non-inferential
or purposes
as

in behalf
of the Grisez
here,
are certain
there
ends
the

law,
is self-evidently
to the understanding
desirable
and
as a consequence
not desirable
of something
known
about
(factually)
human
or
for example,
that they shun painful
beings,
experiences
or
relish
seek
the
of
It
others.
is
that
company
variety
enough

for there
to be ends worthy
of it,
understanding
attributes
human
have.
beings might
In reminding
our duties
readers
of John Finnis's
claim?that
were we of a different
would
be different
nature?George
provides
whatever

other

a boundary condition for what might be called the (anthropological)


indifference
fairly wide

principle.
terrain,

required by which
ferential

even

and

such

all, "acts of understanding"


that a separate
theory would

to identify which
noncontextual.

Thomas

of them might
Quoting
about

Aquinas
taking
propositions
"per se nota and indemonstrabilia"
between
sharp distinction
epistemological
In Aquinas,
ST
however,
(for example,
to be

are

covers

After

seem

to be

be truly nonin

from

who
has
Finnis,
human
goods
primary

(p. 35), George


and ontological
I, q. 94, a. 4) the

makes

analysis.
indemon

common
notions
to be
Aristotle
takes
just those
not self-evident
the starting
for that rea
point of a science,
though
son.
That
cannot
the limit of a line is a point
be demonstrated
(in
sense
as an
the logical
of demonstration).
it is stipulated
Rather,
of geometry.
the limit of a line is a point
axiom
That
originating
to those who
to know
is per se nota
and accept
the
only
happen
strabilia

often

of point.
As Aquinas
"some
says in this very connection,
are self-evident
who understand
the
propositions
only to the wise,
a.
terms
of
the
of
such
meaning
propositions"
(ST I, q. 94,
2).
room
There
for
in
differences
is, of course,
ample
interpretive
definition

issues

of

this complexity.
As George
makes
quite
clear,
no
room
is
for
that
the
Grisez-Finnis
however,
really
claiming
moral
trivial by dissolving
dilemmas
them in allegedly
theory makes
reasons
most
self-evident
truths.
the
basic
for action
Rather,
"only
treating

there

are

self-evident"

be) at cross

(p. 36), and such


There must,
purposes.

reasons
therefore,

often

will

be moral

be

(or seem to
norms
avail

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369

NATURAL LAW THEORY


to relax

able

tension

the

patible
norms.

alternatives",
Thus, even

reasons

for action,

on a defensible

and

the basic

that

triumph

are not

these

of basic

taxonomy
and still be at work

ethics.

of normative

system

incom

but

appealing
"rationally
reasons
themselves

in possession
of an undisputed
we would
still face dilemmas

is a minor

It

between

success

George's

is mixed

in this

chapter in light of the goal he set for himself. He seem^ to sense


that his success has been limited when he says, in the only impatient
in the

passage

man"

to establish

meant

that

theories

is one who

has

and

tumble

discourse.

and

virtue

for what

are at cross

theories
he

calls

"an

argues that natural


purposes

intermediate

level

his argument
develops
by summarizing
In focusing
and Alan Gewirth's
of
it.
critique

of natural
between

to

is natural

into the rough

entered

already

He

46).

of pur

to be impressed

truth-seeking

In the third chapter Russell Hittinger


the need

the point

But he might well have added that one who fails to

(p. 37).

see a point
of principled

to see

fails

just for its own sake is unlikely

suing knowledge
by arguments

who

"Someone

chapter,

law theory, Hittinger


the

natural

law

and thus point


of discussion"

Maclntyre's
on Gewirth's

is able to illustrate

tradition

law
to
(p.

position
version

the tension

in considerations

(grounded

of

rights of dignity and respect) and virtue theories which

universal
are designed

to distinguish

degrees

of merit

and worthiness.

After

bringing cogent criticism to bear on Gewirth's theory, he finds this


limited function for natural law theory: "[It] can be (inmodern legal
an effort
to isolate
the minimal
institutions)
can be articulated
even while
prescinding

moral
from

standards
full-scaled

that
elabo

rations of which moral qualities

(virtues) best befit the development

of human

understood

But

agents"
(p. 55).
the theory
"is exceedingly
limited.
Hittinger,
to
moral
claims
port elementary
personhood,
strain

in advance

(p. 56).
Against
virtue
erations
the

and

actions

all this Hittinger


the

reveals
strong

and

sound
itself,

and

in terms

argues
terms,
Its role is to sup
to con
thereupon

of

claims"

rights

it not

be pushed
and laws.

aside

by

consid

rules
Again,
however,
the willingness
to consider
virtue
certain
natural
law principles
(for ex

public
for once

sincere,

...

arrays Edmund Pincoffs' defense of


that

requirement

of otherwise

tension

becomes

certain

...

in these

ample, ideals of equality and equal respect) seem to be anything but


apodictic

"debate-stoppers."

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DANIEL N. ROBINSON

370
a way

As

envisages,
Such

pose.
and

should

Next,

and

natural

of reconciling
would
Hittinger

severely
cannot
he argues,

theories,
be

to actions

restricted

in the patrimony
add to the store

theories

the

and

In this

of

telic,
recover

that

and

he
pur

conduct,
i-claims.

upon

right
have
would

Hittinger

such

anthropological
detail,
nature
for nurtur
argues

and as an extension

of the preceding
the ju
interrelate

to

be used

"might
and

realities

reach

all human

bear

consequential
of human

the minimal

they will

to the
their

address

of Aristotle,

how the nature


clearer
making
ance within
the polity.
Finally,
law theories
natural
mission,
ristic

law theories
constrict

the perfectionist,
foci" (p. 63).
of the Thomistic
version
according

the spirit

to which,
Nature

and

are

law

. . .

terms

analogous

matters

encompassing

ends, custom, human


precepts,
virtues,
legislation,
and theological
least, the relation between
philosophical
of the good in human actions"
(p. 63).

moral

It is doubtful
would

settle

for

that any of today's leading natural


a theory

that

To accept his
on the Nicomachean
Ethics

would

As

law

theory
estimations

tributing
society.
far greater
not
Part
Ethical
Hittinger's

Nor

form

of

not

need

of moral

life.

ways

said, Hittinger's
within
integration

I concludes
Theory."
aims:

quite
natural

succeed
law the

of the virtues,
at least in the
a kind of descriptive
anthro

the
with

In a long

thus

and

worthiness,

among

Hittinger
ethics
and

a body of directives
to
conducing
The universalistic
of natural
aspects
to at the expense
of carefully
graded
at

the

to the development

This

to say

law theorists

what

too?but

be held

in substantive

does

virtue

the analysis
is not merely

it is that

pology?though
a eudaimonic

ory,

knows,

of Aristotle,

tradition

and

pluralism.
between
the wedge

he well

than

Hittinger
to write
is essentially
glosses
to temper
those passages
that chal

liberal

lenge today's
in positioning

no more

conceptions

constraints

allow.

ories.

seeks

of

and not the

criticisms
any given

several
Jeffrey

underscore
version

the

of natural

influential

currently
Stout's
"Truth,

footnote,

expense

Stout

of con

of both law and


for

law the

versions.

Natural

compares

need

his

Law
aims

and
with

on
from opposite
and I are putting
pressure,
directions,
Hittinger
like to get by without
the
who would
natural
law theorists
making
. . . He
Thomism
of traditional
commitments
extensive metaphysical
a
a
to
role
within
content
have
the
is
community
theory play
religious
to the metaphysics
I do not
the theory requires.
committed
already
(p. 102)
accept the metaphysics,

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NATURAL LAW THEORY 371


are

There

daring

skeptical

in this

flourishes

animated

essay:

. . .people claim that there is a law higher and better than the
When
over
artificial
constructions
of human society,
they differ drastically
the source and substance
of that law. They cannot all be right, and
all be wrong,
(p. 71)
they might
are

There

if defective,

breathless,

of Thomism:

condensations

is essential
to law. . . .This implies
[Aquinas] held that promulgation
as its source.
that a higher
law, if there is one, has a promulgator
cannot be merely human?not
if the law in question
That promulgator
is higher
than all codes promulgated
and better
by the likes of us.

(p. 72)
are

There

not

very well
disguised
law once its metaphysical

for natural

functions

deprecating
foundations

have

reserved

been

reduced

to rubble:
these [Natural Law] locutions at all?
Why preserve
They have long
been a rhetorically
effective means
of emphasizing
that the all-too
human codes we confront
in society are always likely to include moral
room for
and conceptual
This fact makes
falsehoods
deficiencies.
to such codes, (p. 81)
conscientious
objection

all this, however, Stout then quite uncritically

With
number
and

of

larger

David

Lewis

to consider

trendy
mission.

the

vast

and

Indeed,
of modern

adopts any

about

its history
science,
F. P. Ramsey
and
upon John Mill,
not
of metaphysical
minimalism,
pausing
literature
that opposes
such
compelling

contemporary
He
relies

for a defense

formulations.

notions

it might

be argued
against
were
surprising

minimalism

that

the surprises
the
physics
only because
was
of
too
received
the
nineteenth
It
century
metaphysics
simple.
be argued,
is
also, that the minimalism
might
propounded
by Stout
are
in metaphysical
itself grounded
that
neither
assumptions
simple
nor

true, and that to judge


obviously
even more
call for a metaphysics
would
more
because
less simple,
productive.

Relying
of

the

on Bernard Williams

quasi-Burkean

position
theoretical

for

argument
strong
a reading
of Wittgenstein's
who

"see

implicit

practice."
(pp.
and widespread
june.

rules

"The

practice

paradox

seems

there

wherever

nonetheless
may

dissolves,"

fundamental

Stout

restraint.

as a palliative
is a tradition
and

recognizes
as morally
judged
Stout
insists, when

be

and

simplicity
therefore

Baier for a defense

to hold,
and

or

truth

their

and Annette

modesty
Brown
Book

He

85-6).

he

of

that

a
develops
He offers
for

those

teachable
an

abiding
or je
perverse
his use of "true"

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DANIEL N. ROBINSON

372
is understood.
within

moral

ordinary

theoretical

only one of the "legitimate


divorced
from
those

he means

"true"

By

discourse,"
of moral

explanations

truth

(p. 88).

grammatical?
Book help?)
When Stout turns to psychological
of

pool

that

ipsedixits

Apart

in language

a whole

(Is it
Blue

he draws upon

speculation

sustained

in which

term

the

of whether

of an

generation
is used"

'true'

(p. 89).

future scholars will wonder

an account,

such

believed

actually

has

games

from the question

anyone

still

may

"We acquire the concept of truth by partici

alytical philosophers:
pating

dreaded

the source of legitimacy is in moral discourse


Might Wittgenstein's
logical? conventional?

wonder what

that

Readers

moves

is the matter

there

if

of the

standard of truth available to Stout when called upon to defend the


claim itself. Note that the concept of truth would have to precede
or be

the

necessary

logically

at all,

of participation
at face
actions

else

value.

for

precondition
the participant

Wittgenstein

not

could
is not

to be any

there

take

to blame

form
trans

the

for

here,

he

fully appreciated the moral dimensions of the language game itself.


The special and pernicious work done by the word game is that it
seems

to sanction

ments

that

the
awe

inspired

of those
activities
trivializing
in more
ages.
Alas,
discerning

of speech is now nearly official in philosophical


of

intellectual

history

As for quantum
claim"
of the realist's
times

reassuring
the mass

attain

will

to let

have

to remind

ourselves
pea,

to attach

begun

ready

to an antirealism

themselves

to abandon.

In any

its course.
refutation

"living

is some

Fine)?it

that, once things


their
"indeterminacy"

one part in 1030. It will be disappointing

in the world
is that

if philosophers
that modern

case?and

achieve

this manner

circles, and students


it run

simply
and relativity?that
theory
Arthur
(Stout here quoting

of a garden

and

here

of

now begin

science
I should

has
think

al
the

beings are real


right palliative might be William James?human
enough and have real purposes which they seek to fulfill in a prin
They get home from work and are
cipled and defensible manner.
careful

when

world's

the onions.

dicing

"truthmongers,"

particle's
Stout

vanishingly
wants

These

(p. 91)

even

activities
as

they

brief and untroubled


an

to retain

ethical

survive
learn

of

among
the

life.

perspective,

but without

heavy burdens

of a defining and explicating

theory, except

Ramsey-Lewis

sense

a new

moralists.

of

theory.

The eighteenth

This

the

xi-zeta

is not

desire

the

in the
among

century produced not only Burke but

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373

NATURAL LAW THEORY


Thomas
tures

that

Reid,
of men."
on

is based

its own
contact

meaningful
have good
villainy

outspoken
But as Reid

prevail

suppressed.

breed

of

with

life

are "the
of theories,
which
to show,
careful
skepticism

critic
was

and

one

that

crea
itself

to make

refuses

theory,
as it is actually
lived.
Stout would
over evil; he would
have decency
and
rewarded
He would
choose
truth over deception.
These

choices are not willy-nilly and can be explicated only in terms that
are at least roughly theoretical; the explication itself must be drawn
a pool of candidate-explications,
rized by what
is at least roughly
as he claims.
be as innocent
from

the draw

itself

autho

being
he
Thus,

a metaphysics.

cannot

The four chapters of Part II invite the reader into that intricate
examination

of

the

between
moral
relationship
choice of contributors
is faultless:

The
prudence.
John Finnis,
Jeremy
Waldron,
to this volume
butions
must
accessible

statements

books

articles.

and

Neil
tone
H.L.A.
be

Hart

of

in that
and

challenged

essay
the

and

compelling.
then brush

natural

law

is magisterial

and
between

the separationist
the

to Finnis's
old

contri

economical

and

in many

other

translucent.
Lon

The

Fuller

and

for positions
that will
restraint
and modesty

thesis MacCormick

work,

tormenting
a morally
defective
is no serious
difference

Their

developed

exchange
is complete
respect
and
wholesome
rejected,

aside

"there

they have

famous

Thanks

account,

Moore.
the most

among

there

(p. 129) in advancing


finds

rank

of positions

MacCormick's

is redolent

and Michael

and juris
theory
Neil MacCormick,

himself

can explain
on a
of whether,

MacCormick

question
law is a law.
between

With

few

the

exceptions,
'positivist'
and the proponent
of 'natural
all the generations
of
law', despite
to
directed
this
of
the
'existence'
of
the
very point
controversy
unjust
"
law 'as such'
Both
theories
stand firm in recognizing
the
(p. 109).
even
diminished
claim a morally
law has to our allegiance,
defective

granting in the strictly technical sense that such a law is legally


valid. One can grant this validity and still insist that laws,
are fully intelligible
like other social institutions,
only by reference
...
to the ends or values
It is thus the case
they ought to realize.
. . are on that very account
that laws we judge unjust.
laws that we
of
deficient
the
to
which
genus
judge essentially
examples
they belong,

(p. 113)
this sort of connection between law and morality,
Accepting
MacCormick must still conclude that "it does not protect us from

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DANIEL N. ROBINSON

374
very much".

If the

verted

not

values,

law embodies
to mention

it may

values,

different

merely

then

per
com

embody
otherwise

but

values held by different members of a large legislative


The latter, inescapable fact of political life then triggers

mendable
assembly.

of
"principles
least permissible

tolerance

and

which
compromise"
to assent
to legislation

sincerely
as partly
(pp. 117-18).
unjust"
to be "the reasonable
law comes
of disputes"

arising

invariably

individuals

(p. 120).

self-evident

same

one

token,

the

of conflict
regulation
within
communities

and

of natural

goods"

regards
function
of
settlement

of autonomous

that there are just those

further

Granting

basic

"incommensurable

the

By

it at

"make

may
which

law

as

identified

theory,

reason,

by practical

there will indeed be a role for states which can facilitate


interpersonal
co-ordination
upon a reasonable
by determining
body of law which as
far as possible
leaves individuals
free to pursue the good as they judge
it within
the bounds of reason,
(p. 126)
even
can be pluralism
and the Liberal
State
On the ques
of natural
law are undisputed.
goods
MacCormick
tion of the basic goods
however,
accepts
themselves,
to the right,
but he remains
is prior
that the good
the proposition
of self-evidence
tied to
with
of the claim
the ipsedixitism
"uneasy
there

Accordingly,
the basic
where

a bald listing of seven basic goods" (p. 128).


John

as
chapter,
coming
and struggle,
of confusion

expressions
One
of pace.
the

and
hands,

in it the

finds

confident

just after MacCormick's


a quite abrupt
change
provides
and
rigor,
sharpness,
clarity,

of the

much

confusion

Finnis

Although

and

the

about

"basic

like

is swept

Finnis

In

basic

to as

referred

human

to

goods,

life, or what

at all in this essay is bodily


has

the master's

self-evidence,
reasons,"
as
so cleanly
aside

of opposition.
the grounds
seven
lists the now-famous

the only one discussed


contexts

expected
and anthropology.

taxonomy

incommensurability,
about
leave no doubt

other

it does

Finnis's

"integral

in

physiological

At first blush this is just the sort incommensurable,


functioning."
just the sort of basic good that might be expected to be a debate
stopper. But is it?
two

Consider
mann?suffering

intellectual

session

of his

temic

physiology

bodily
wreckage.

them

patients?call
from
ravaging
and

is in ruins.

diseases.
rational
On

life or integral physiological


Fleischmann,

on

the

but

his

entire

hand,

sys
of

understanding

plausible

function, Hauptmann

other

Fleisch
is in pos

Hauptmann
faculties,

any

and

Hauptmann

has

a nearly

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is mere
perfect

375

NATURAL LAW THEORY

by the slightest

bodily life, at least from the chin down, undisturbed


blemish.

Unfortunately,
a third
Suppose

prowess.
ferred
This

by practical
is not the place

is destitute

he

of all cognitive
and rational
con
the
with
wisdom
equipped

person,

choose

must

reason,

to argue

these

between

one

for

over

choice

afflictions.

another.

The

how
commensurable
certain
is given
just to underscore
how
less than self-evidently
basic
be, and
goods might
competing
one
notes
another.
Finnis
outcome
is
when
against
paired
"good"
an
account
not
of
entail
but do
the basic
that
presuppose
goods
example

human

can be composed
only "by
anthropology
human
i.e., as reasons
goods
practically,
reasons
which
full sense of supporting
make

the

correct

understands

the

nature;

one who

and

for choice

action,

and spontaneities"
feelings
traces many
Finnis

logically

he calls the "irreducible

natural

(as examined

order
the

ordered,

turally/linguistically
here the important

by physicists),

personally/historically
Finnis
ordered.

differences

of concern

of reality"

orders

the conceptually/
and the cul
ordered,

to make
evident
attempts
as
for example,
(1) sounds

between,

energy fluxes, (2) sounds as heard, (3) sounds as intelligibly


events,
cultural

and

(4) sounds

and

linguistic

as meaningful

to persons
Put

traditions.

to ra

be identified as the

Briefly put, these orders might

tional beings.
purely

"four

those

among

in philosophy

abounding

to appreciate what

of law to the failure


distinctions"

(p. 135).
of the confusions

ordered

distinctive
sharing
the four orders

another

way,

of reality can be illustrated by the differences between and among


(1) hearing sounds, (2) hearing arguments, (3) hearing a (for ex
The first
discourse.
(4) hearing
that
to those who
study phenomena
The
failure
and judgments.
considerations
and

musical)
performance,
ample,
is of interest
order covers what
are

of human

independent

to distinguish
ordering
a course

between

of affairs

with

of action

might

(3) and (4) leads to a conflation of the rational


what

be regarded

fourth order of reality while


in the

reasonableness

are merely

third.

and rationality
Legal
reasoning
in
because,
peculiar elusiveness
and chosen purpose?of
moral,
and right relationships?there
fourth-order
object, "the law."
On Finnis's
when

they

account,

fail

in that

of practical

also,

has ...
the service

theorists

to appreciate

penchants.
as a "rational
choice"

failing the requirements


Thus,

Thus

cultural

the

and its
its distinctiveness
of a third-order,
existential,
in a just order of fair
living together
a
has been and is being constructed
(p. 141)
such

as Ronald

difference

Dworkin

between

go wrong
these

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levels.

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

376
two criteria
(Early) Dworkin's
cation"?are
incommensurable

tension

predictable
as "a moral
had

and

legal judging?"fit"
and are drawn
from

two

It was

in justice"
act participating
in which
to handle
instances

no way

faithful to (a) was less than faithful


by Finnis to be empty (p. 144).

"justifi
different

to resolve

Dworkin's
aim, says Finnis,
as
a culturally
means
produced
(a) law
to problems
of social coordination,
solutions

of reality.
between

orders

of

the

of providing
and (b) law

however,
(p. 143).
Dworkin,
most
the judicial
reasoning

are judged

to (b); his attempts

an instructive
on the notion
to provide
paragraph
to the "cost-benefit
in relation
of incommensurability
analysis"
he calls "technical
characteristic
of what
The
latter
rationality."
are
cost
there
well-defined
of
works
where
goals
quantifiable
only
Finnis

pauses

of quantifiable
the realistic
promise
carrying
in moral
conditions
is fulfilled
these
reasoning,"

benefits.

"None

Finnis

of

concludes.

were
reasons
there really
it otherwise,
technical
for
winning
course
x
over
then
the
rational
of
action
would
be
y,
choosing
utterly
"no choice of the sort that moral
theories
seek
determined,
leaving

Were

are those
moral
choices
Genuinely
(p. 146).
made
between
rationally
appealing
options.5
for a significant
In this same essay Finnis
argues
reasons
for and reasons
There
between
against
doing.

that must

to guide"

of reasons

numbers

for doing

be

asymmetry
are limitless

something.

cannot choose every option


Being finite, I simply cannot do everything,
for which
there are reasons.
But I can refrain from doing anything.
. . . So, an unconditional
or absolute
affirmative
duty (duty to . . .)
an
burden
and
be
would
but negative
irrational;
impossible
impose
to in any and
moral absolutes
(duties not to . . .). . . can be adhered
every circumstance,
(p. 148)
It

is such

reasoning
In "The
moral

fronts

negative

moral

absolutes,

its backbone."
Irrelevance
realists

Without
of Moral
and

says
these,

Objectivity,"
to take
promises

tifies them by their commitment

Finnis,
the

that

law has
Jeremy

"give
legal
no backbone.

Waldron

no prisoners.

to this proposition:

He

con
iden

"There are

It is precisely
because
of the need to choose between
ap
rationally
and to develop and weigh the reasons required to render
pealing possibilities
Roberto Unger's
cri
that Finnis
such choices
intelligible
easily dismisses
a
to
it
that
the
would
have
such
grasp
Unger,
point,
theory
failing
tique.
or depreciating
as Finnis's
choice by installing
ends up denying
rigid and
human
irrefutable
goods.
objective

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NATURAL LAW THEORY


stated

facts which

ments

377

some moral

make

or principle)
true and
of anyone's
beliefs
about

of value

independent
He
158).
and

on

goes

normative

moral

claim

the

contamination

vantage;
In addition,
convinced

by Gerald
it.6

Waldron
not

does

here

take

to a moral

claim

about

moral

in question"

between
latter

descriptive
a central

makes

"It

claims:

(p.

identifies

Postema

this

that Hobbes,
with

playful

words,

all

and Bentham

Hume,

for he surely
to be a moral

however,

positivists
stipulation
by normative
have
his meaning
then he would

to subscribe

not be
loss would
the alleged
of value,
otherwise
nor
is
that
his
What
he
means,
clearly,
consequential.
with
cluttered
the jurai domain
does not want
positivist

morally
mative
moral

having
distinguished
to insist
that the

is being

If this were

claim.

false,
the matters

is, some state


are
facts which

as a disad
of legal decision
by moral
judgment
that we
lose something
of value
thereby"
(p. 161).
to back
if authority
is needed
this claim, Waldron
is

it says

affirmed

then,

positivism,
of its own?a

(that

judgments
others

theory

utterances

thwart

to promote

designed

certain

outcomes

legal

and

others.
us

Let

return

cannot

to the moral

decide

finally
tamer
quasi-realism
moral
truths
by those

between

the

sources

of their

realists.
an

outright

of Simon
who

judgements.
to views
of this

Waldron

As with

chapter
and
position

antirealist

Blackburn,

nonetheless

in this

who

allows

talk

of

the subjective
recognize
so many
of those who attach

to charac
it easier
finds
sort, Waldron
the subjectivity
than the objectivity
it
terize
of morals
of whatever
or contrapuntal
to
be put in dialectical
is that might
relationship
morals.
He
is also not clear as to whether
the moral
realist's
po
themselves

sition

is defeated

the possibility

because

it is a moral

position

or because

it embraces

of truth and falsity.

What
is finally
not clear
in these parts
of his essay
is whether
is a complete
loses
the
warrants
skeptic
(who thereupon
epistemic
or merely
a moral
to assert
he needs
The bur
skeptic.
anything)
more
once
of this
den
observation
becomes
Waldron's
visible
he

It cannot be off the point here to recall that famous passage


from
15 of Hobbes's
"The Foole hath sayd in his
Leviathan:
I, chapter
also with his tongue;
heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and sometimes
that every mans conservation,
and contentment,
seriously
alleaging,
being
committed
to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might
not do what he thought
conduced
thereunto."

Part

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DANIEL N. ROBINSON

378
version

stated

"technically"

the

case

judgment; (d) if and when this is the case, it remains

sorts

would

scarcely
exists.

as

to render
that

Note,

then,
is accepted

belief

realist's

true

the

ifWaldron's

as stated,
on objectivity
succeeds.

casualty
moral
objectivity

his

Continuing

cribes to them the conviction


are

left with

than
haps
those

opinion
it would

all others
affect.

enough

"The

titled

characterizes

the moral

moral

more
refusing

seriously
the moral

referring
something

other

than
over

of a moral

or the

of the majority

fur
Waldron
emotivism,"
as charging
not
with
emotivists
to
too, he seems
Here,
(p. 167).
about

realist

"being

the possibility

seriousness

powers
trumping
choice.
But
moral
velopment

from

different

to countenance
to

panic
realist

First,

point.
than and

surely

unwilling

means

something
. . .
[and]
view" when

to budge

one's
of changing
to
serious
be
is,

is to be

That

(p. 167).
It is to accord
stubborn.

powers

theory

to a moral

in settings

nonmoral

these

of

emotional

enthusiasms

judgments

the

as

Per
Grisez?
Germain
George?
to say that, for the moral
realist,
have
forfeited
the
of morals
may

the

In the section

taking

and

Robert

been

have

then

Waldron

preferences
opinion
names
to the label, one is free
assign
a moral
is surely
but he
He
realist,
in their moral
storehouse
have no more

objectivity
deny
to trump
the
by which
of the oppressor.

reach

miss

and

who

means

ther

Finnis?

targets.
not argue that

of the moral

that those who deny the objectivity

nothing
does not

(p. 163).
to look for
does

of realists,

but

As Waldron

it is
facts,
fact of prom
an obligation

is but one
objectivity
on
another
or,
reading,

itself;

characterization

as
the

that
judgment
characterization
moral

in the assault

morals

on the noncon

accept

is unable

ising

in

"moral"

Moreover,
(a) if (d) is granted.
of certain
understanding
performatives
that anyone would
imaginable
deny that

troversial

the matters

about

the word

say,
with,
replaces
that any scientist
It is scarcely
imaginable
include Duhem-Quine
least as long as "beliefs"
that any metaphy
It is scarcely
imaginable

Suppose
"scientific."

sician

beliefs

anyone's

now

one

accept
(d), at
of possibilities.

would

of

independently

question.
the word

(a) there are

true or false;
(c)
judgments
true or false by at least one

can render
some
facts;
(b) some facts
at least one of the judgments
rendered

fact is a moral

anew.

is examined

realist's belief to the following:

the moral

He commits

belief

of the realist's

principles
are conferred

able

to sustain

that

principle
call for

only after
realism
moral

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the

de

itself.

NATURAL LAW THEORY


who

the moralist

Obviously,

379
can have
judgments
in the face of pragmatically

that moral

denies

truth can only be stubborn


objective
to moral-sounding
richer
solutions
problems.
moral
realist
it is just the nonrealist's
willingness
any

which

negotiate
away?that
his commitment
of
should

action

that

of

requisite
and

The

take

appropriate
in this collection,

our

that

stronger

these

are,

As

with

Waldron

explanation

happy

under
author

that

an
is a

This
As
can

("they

of modern

apparatus

as

it fails

as a justification.
to addressing.

it fails

psy
are

in temporal
reach; but
the power
of such

is not

emotivism
that

to the complex

disagreement

and

denies

not get around


two utilitarians
in conflict

for

scenario

but

and
who

realist

does

Waldron

problem

it is

that

proceed
we
the more
seriously
more
than one other

in nature

with

problem
of actions,

readers

from motives

fast and loose with


his
plays
fairly
The motives
to have
in mind
he seems

assumptions.
reduced
sort, both
there
is no named moral
The

reminds

actions

activities.

chological
of a rather
again
motives.

sincerity.
Waldron

emotivism,

counts,

sentiments.

is of objective
moral
value
that strips
I
seriousness.
The better
requisite
word,

the

is the

think,
In defense

the

for
Moreover,
to negotiate?to

for his

refer

that

consequentialism"

[p. 174]), it is perhaps best thought of as droll.


In his

makes
much
of the inability
sections, Waldron
concluding
to settle
moral
realism
the sorts of problems
of an undisputed
even of
in the adjudicative
domain?the
faced
routinely
inability
to reach the same conclusion.
in legal contests
moral
locked
realists
even

in the

are,

They

supporting

"no better

circumstance,

the legitimacy

and, as has been


The question
results.
for such
to the
is to be traced
failure
here
be the

well

or to those
realist's
Part

quite

essay

emotivist
ters

distinct

of nature"

"orders

that

ends

and

that

theory
very much whether

This may

(p. 182).

technical
Moore's

occupied

by

critique

of Waldron's

contra

concludes,
realism

the moral

reasoning.
"Law as a Functional

a four-page

with

moral

Waldron,
is true or false.

it mat

that
Moore

takes

the following as a sound basis for disqualifying

the emotivist

a central

"For

there
better

position
is no question
equipped

in debates
to ask
to

describe

about
about
the

in

emotivist

at least is prepared
noted, Finnis
remains
whether
open, however,
of moral
"irrelevance
objectivity,"

and the lawyer's


ontology
II concludes
with Michael
an

Kind,"

case

the

off than

of judicial review"

legal

whether
rights

theory:
a court
persons

from

the emotivist,

or a legislature
actually

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possess

is

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

380

don't actually
the emotivist,
possess
people
as &feuilleton
this is offered more
than
But
a
it
different
is
consideration
and
really
quite

for

because,
(p. 231).
argument,
the main

are addressed.
of his chapter
parts
not
the validity
here
is
in
interested

pecially
the other

theory which
at least
depends,

of natural

face

of his

instantiate

truth

"the
the

This

of

truth
is what

(p. 190).
proposition(s)"
of natural
thesis"
law, and it is the
sorts of relationship
that
to develop
the special

essay
thesis.

the

begin,
between

across

the

between
lationships
statements.
moral
established

and correspondingly
particulars
particular
At the most
with
general
level, one is dealing
is
at
which
and
this
the
level
Moore's
systems,
that

appreciates

nailed
fact

down,
. . . how

for

actors

the moral

even

do

the boundary
of all moral

settles
attribute
tional

such

legal
is to be understood.

argument
Moore
easily
other

that
on

in part,

but

realism,

is one of a necessary
connection
relationship
(p.
law and morality,
law here taken at the most
general
as Moore
the primary
relational
calls it, obtains
Thus,
thesis,
are
re
all particular
there
though
legal systems,
secondary

To
193)
level.

insists

is es

Moore

of moral

law

of any
legal proposition
some
moral
corresponding
dubs
the "relationship
Moore
burden

What

any rights"
a developed
to which

if moral

they
issue by

other
that

invoking

as objective

tedly broad,
to filter
is enough

from

differ

actions:

recognize
but the widely

of the relationship
are "as factual
facts

is not

side

facts"

serviceable

are

grounded
to act.

they
reasons

sense

comprehended

as any

(p. 195)?
natural

He

in what

ra

This

of morality

law

is admit
itself

out clearly
principles.
inappropriate
of
the
itself?
The
and purest
then,
strongest
What,
relationship
norm
a
of
such that the moral
establishes
is that of identity,
justness
as law (p. 197).
Moore
observes
that few today
in the
that norm
to this; they choose
would
subscribe
instead
law community
natural
as only relevant
as
to their status
of norms
to regard
the morality
of support
from the slightness
It is not clear, however,
law.
enjoyed
In any
less
that
it
is
of
this
any
strong.
strongest
relationships,
by
and defends
"relevance"
standard
the mere
case, Moore
goes beyond
a sturdier
necessary

claim,
to its

following
as
status

Augustine:
law, but

"The
. . . law

of a norm
is
justness
are not
and morality

for if a and b
This
is all perhaps
overwrought,
(p. 198).
are identical,
then they can stand only in a tautologous
relationship.
seem to be as
would
of a necessary
the assertion
relationship
Thus,
as the modal
of the issue would
allow.
dimensions
strong
identical"

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381

NATURAL LAW THEORY


Moore

would

fashionable

of the

facts

if it weren't

(p. 206)
notion
of metaphysical
necessity,
that arise
from the con
relations

in those
actual

H20"

that
(wisely)
rejects
(p. 199), and the "socio
it would
What
sanction.

identity"

"contingent
of jurisprudence"
is Saul Kripke's

stitutive

as he

this,

chimera,

logical conception
he finally
endorses
the necessity
obtaining
water

accept

probably

world.

(p. 200).

"Something
the waters
here

are

troubled.

The entire issue of identity is vexed and it is probably wiser


its own

natural

law theory, with


have served Moore's

may

to keep

clear

vexations,
to rely here

perennial
better
purposes

be

wouldn't

Thus,
But

It

of it.

on Aristotle's

and to go on to argue
of hypothetical
if there
necessity,
that,
would
be law, there must
be moral
The sense
necessarily
principles.
water
if
it
in which
wouldn't
be
weren't
is different
something
H20
notion

sense

the

from

an

in which

it weren't

just.
Actually,
of these
propositions

first

sentence

imperative
there are at

least

wouldn't

two

in which

therefore

on

to

is found

inspection,
it can be declared

lack

in this

latter

y, these

identify
descriptive
Moore
plies
that

jurisprudence.
to extricate
works

to critics

of functionalist

"strange

as

jurisprudence
is not convincing.
On
a "direct
fers

being

the very

the matter

of

reference"

not

or

in the

search

for

empty,

law

never

is

of y and
the

"meta

is what

Moore
If it
by

to

by which
out by Moore's

thickets

in his

re

at one point
jurisprudence,
concluding
to say, the circularity
of functionalist
. .but a virtue"
The defense
(p. 219).

itself,

Moore

in the

affirms

his

commitment

Thus,

the

term

to believe

be observed

to

"law"

"re

Moore
intervening"
(p. 205).
sands of linguistic
convention

shifting
truths
of analytic
not
the
laws,
concept.
thus enter
"functional

prudence
study
able to recognize
them;
reason
There
is good
that will

such

if eternal,

should

cosmos

ruled

from

of meaning.
theory
some third thing

to law without

will

law

There

law and morality.


means
independent

requirements

himself

it may
sound
is not a defect.

that

independent means

to identify x, and legally

chemical

attribute

instance

physical
necessity"
obtaining
is proposing
for the relationship
between
to
then
would
have
be
there
were,
morally

which

one

It is doubtful

non-y.

the

One

might
none of the attributes
be y if it possessed
are uniquely
attributes
and causally
determined
by the
as
is factual:
The other
H20.
configurations
represented
an x which,

if

x
is empty:
of y where
said

be understood.

not

would

law

be

senses

that

propositions.
To do so,

be

kinds."

there

by human

Juris
it must

are

objects

percipients,

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in the
let alone

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

382
or used

discussed

that
by them.
They have, nonetheless,
properties
them as a certain
kind of entity, which Moore
dubs a "natural
qualify
are
The attributes
of entity.
kind"
that establish
natural
kinds
or
to human
what
indifferent
conventions
they are, and are utterly
even

the

of human

existence

"nominal

kinds"

(for
their

whatever

which,

Then

life.

particular
and so on),

Moore

in Los

Street

Figueroa

example,

are what

there

attributes

physical
enter
into

might
classifications

calls

Angeles)
be (as

concrete,
dirt,
phalt,
by con
were
was
to
at
vention.
the
if
issue
law
"whatever
hand,
Applied
of English,"
'law' by native
called
speakers
general
descriptive
ju
no
have
would
stable
risprudence
(p. 206).
subject
not a natural
is also not a nominal
kind.
Law,
then, though
kind,

Rather,

it is a functional

Automobiles,

airplanes,
thus have

and

portation
functional

like Lon

kind,

What

kind.

trains

and

a kindred
Fuller's

kind of functional
are

bicycles

function;
steam
engine.

all modes

kind?

of trans

they are of the same


The "Functionalist

Moore
advocates
this.
health
goes beyond
Choosing
as
the body's
and
instructive
systems
subsystems
physiological
a form of jurisprudence
he proposes
that would
analogies,
identify

Jurisprudence"
and

to the functions
served
law according
and the overall
explicate
about and maintains.
conditions
it brings
Readers
be
less than fully satisfied
may
pro
by the four-step
text to which
for assembling
the medical
advances
cedure Moore

and

the

text

of

is analogized.

jurisprudence

For

step

example,

3 is as

follows:
We

ascertain
by the human
that physical
for. (p. 212)

goods which one or ones could be served


health being such a good, we hypothesize
Physical
is the goal of the body; i.e., what the body is good

of all the human


body.
health

Could this not be recast thus:


ascertain
of all the human goods which one or ones could be served
An early death in the pink of life being better
by the human body.
than the ravages
of wasting
that the soon-to
age, we hypothesize
burst cerebral aneurism
is the goal of the body; i.e., what
the body is
good for.

We

In any

case,

to a theory
of
he has already
two.

To

be

the overall
law

tethered

clarifies
approach
to functions
that

a metaphysical
postulated
the
law,
envisaged
goal(s)

Moore's
serve

commitment
moral

ends, for
as
the
relating
necessity
must
be good,
such that "a

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383

NATURAL LAW THEORY

. . . not be a legal
will
system
system"
unjust
(p. 224).
with
the analogy
the body-machine
breaks
for
down,
(Here again
no one would
to
that physiological
health
claim
inimical
processes
not physiological
In virtue
for that reason,
of this
were,
processes).
sufficiently

for establishing
at what
recipes
or obstructed,
of the larger goals are promoted
the attainment
points
a
to have
Moore
in
to or
claims
for
put
procedure
place
getting
one:
a Natural
Law
assuming
theory without
generating
connection

of the functionalist

and

The theory that law is a kind and that its nature


is given by such and
as is the atomic theory
such a goal is just that, a theory, falsifiable
. . . True,
if law is a functional
kind then necessarily
of gold.
law
serves some good and thus, necessarily,
law is in that way related to
not a posit, of functionalist
But this is a discovery,
juris
morality.
prudence

[p. 221].
this

intricate

9 the collection

turns

judge whether
to the point of origin.
will

Readers
one

With
law

Chapter

of

and

questions
and
deeply

a rich,

and

justice

that

(with

of meter

portance

in America)

the Depression
defines

range
to some of

humanity
law must

carries

of music

the harmonies

of mathematics.

sequent

as Alexander
reasonings

is that the binding


store

legislation

it an

must

spawned

of law bore

All

found

depend"

by

that virtually

the harmonies

Hamilton

im

moral
incorrigible
logic to which
"Cicero
understood
that
readily
of them

The Constitution
(p. 259).
and
principles
clearly
expressive
at once external
informed
by principles

principles,

of the

explanation

reckless

in nature"

logic immanent
on "self-evident"
to be

and

The thesis defended

is that the rationality

with

of natural

offers
Arkes
Hadley
of
the
provenance
analysis

Cicero's

be answerable.

positive
the harmonies

had

from
the

return

rights.

of rights and the limits of constitutionalism.


illustrations

than

to an examination

informed

classically

does more

map

observed,
(p. 250).

a relation

their

root

to
in a

itself, founded
of ultimate
ends,
to it?
and prior

all sub
"upon which
What
Arkes would
urge

force of law is not the punishment

it holds

for the

in

but the universal


of the moral
lawless,
appeal
principle
To say that the appeal
is universal,
is not
however,
to ignore
of conditions
the variety
that may
render
per
particular
sons
to
inaccessible
it. The appeal
of moral
first principles
is at
it instantiates.

root

an

to reason,
audible
in whom
"Nature
appeal
only to those
a
has placed...
herself
from Cicero
power of hearing"?this
passage
into
title
of
the
Arkes's
entering
chapter.

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DANIEL N. ROBINSON

384
relies

Arkes
a more
lems

willing
than Plato

and

heavily
contributor

on Cicero,

instructively

to today's
complex
latter
The

or Aristotle.

social

in him
seeing
and legal prob

or
than speculative
that there was nothing
knowledge
higher
. . . [whereas Cicero] would argue that, "those duties
contemplation
are closer to Nature which depend upon the social instinct than those
and among the objects of our wisdom
which
depend on knowledge";
or knowledge,
that bears on our social obligations would
the knowledge
theoretical,
that is merely
than knowledge
be higher
(p. 252)
held

The
Cicero's
and
life

contrast

offered

"ancient

masters"

to be

needs

here

lest

however,

tempered,

be misjudged.
Aristotle
votes,
finally,
a
for
of
difficult
deliberations,
contemplative
that that which
for its own sake
is pursued
is

the most

only after
on the grounds

higher than that which is done for the sake of something else. The
life is most divine because it is thus liberated from
contemplative
cares.

contingent
far better

Moreover,

metaphysician
this estimable

encouraged

can

that

knowledge
the

tablish

priority

theoretical
of

support
the entire
of moral

reasoning

over

the

of

forms

alleged
hierarchy
of Arkes's
burden
analysis

is to es
and

legal

period)

Arkes

makes

clear

social

that

this

instructive

was

teachers
(and the leading
by Cicero
nor superstitious.
The
neither
naive

Throughout
embraced
naturalism
classical

it is only

that

contain.

they

possibilities

to recall

Roman
the

Indeed,

knowledge.

was
a
not a lawyer, Aristotle
though
than was Cicero.
He would
have
surely

essay,

the

of

the

social

are not
initiative
about and enriched
by human
brought
or contraptions,
that
of aspirations
but expressions
devices
artificial
are
there
of humanity.
into the very definition
enter
Accordingly,
institutions

and

propositions
self-defeating,

Arkes

itself.

nature

activities

and

classified

readily

as

contradictory
is thoroughly

as perverse,
the

regards
aware
that

unnatural,
of human

nature
the

taxonomy

here

Moral
is not
developed.
philosophy
completely
so transparently
to
there are principles
finished.
necessary
Still,
as
to rule out sincere
form of life
of a human
the possibility
skep
a
is
He
moral
realist.
Arkes
In current
ticism.
then,
parlance,
less

remains

takes

the moral

of facts
assigned
With
dential

than

dimensions

every bit as objective


to human
beings.
Cicero
considerations

(and

even

life as marking

of human
as any

Kant),

in settings

other

Arkes
that

test

out

set of attributes

is not
one's

plausibly

indifferent
fidelity

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a terrain

to pru

to principle:

NATURAL LAW THEORY


was

"Kant

such

the class

to show

relaxation
Then,

seems

is permissible

of the rule

cation

of the very

must

be

the

rule

itself
those

in the

is to reverse

with

Consistent

Arkes

arguments

for

is needed

these

(as Cicero

in the

of distraction)
order

the

has

rules

qua

by

of prudence-maxims
law.
by natural

dained

the

But in this case something outside

often did, and as Kant did only in moments


domain

or

itself,

of the rule, that contains

outside
rules
implication,
the
rules.
To
search
apply

and,
who

judgment.

rule

be argued,
for example,
that
a
to
weakness
of the very autonomy

required by the kingdom of ends.


to guide

The

It might

leads

application

this way:

of moral

ends

something

in the application

for destructiveness.

potential

sanction

the inflexible appli

(obligatory?) where

there

at least something

that would

to answer

prepared

is destructive

however,

unbending

of consequences

how

Arkes

consequentialism.

an

from

too much,
to require
It is not asking
however,
are not grounded
such dispensations
in

accommodations.

the moralist

release

a
in places
where
principles
to the very ends of moral
be destructive
too
It would
be asking
of any moralist
much

(p. 254).
in advance

judgment"
to set down

a certain

of moral

application
. . might
.

adherence

...

to accommodate

willing

rigorous

overly
strict

385

defended

of

or

things

persuasively

and at length in his First Things (1986), this essay encourages readers
to appreciate
structure
the logical
of moral
science
and thus the
once the major
it yields
deductive
certainties
moral
have
premises
removes
It is this "logic of morals"
been granted.
that so clearly
it from the chaotic
and often pathetic
duchies
of opinion
and popular
A

enthusiasm.

constitution

that

takes

universal

equality

as

self

or ortho

is not informed
data of sociology
by the variable
a
but
chain
of
to locate
by
complex
understandings
seeking
paedics,
a
state.
the necessary
of
features
The presumption
of equality
just
the
human
records
fitness
of
human
for
qua
beings
merely
beings
evident

the rule of law. It establishes that the burden of justification must


be borne by those (including the state itself) prepared to infringe
the

or challenge
the dignity
of anyone.
more
than
is
fundamental
expresses

tution

the latter existing


brought
How
right

What

rights

the

such

constitution

a consti
itself,

only to record the irreducibly moral values that

it about.
far

answers

the

internal

to vexing

logic
questions

of morals
must

moves
remain

one

along

disputable.

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toward
Arkes

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

386
an

provides

says

Mclnerny

from

illustration
the

Mclnery's

Ralph

of suicide.

analysis

following:

or other can be desired, pursued or chosen only insofar as


Something
of me or a constituent
of
it is good for me, and that means,
fulfilling
that could qualify as good in that
of me.
what
is fulfilling
Anything
once it is attained.
sense presupposes
my existence
Thus, my ceasing
to be cannot be my good.
to be cannot be chosen as a good.
Ceasing

(P. 264)
As Arkes notes, this will not quite do. Adolph Eichmann,
example,
and

others

in choosing
suicide,
exact a redemptive

is intended

ample
achieved
merely
That

through
instrumental

do what

on himself.

judgment

to illustrate
the

at

might

once

is the difference
and

of morals

logic
or functional

those

for

is good
the

What

results

between
arise

that

for
ex

from

interests.

a logic of morals
answers
coherent
produces
logically
it produces
That
the right answer
is no doubt.
is, of course,
If it is
natural
law are finally
all about.
about
debates

there
what
granted
question

such

it does,
answers,
indeed,
right
produce
morally
a
as
to
extent
to
which
of
laws
and
the
system
lingers

that

judgments is thereby determined.


It is to questions of this sort that Lloyd Weinreb's

the
legal

"Natural

notes
in chapter
Weinreb
is addressed
and Rights"
10, where
a
than
does
thinner
current
of
have
history
rights
conceptions
"In contemporary
law to which
the natural
they are often referred:

Law

that

although
joined
they are frequently
philosophy,
substantive
is scarcely
there
any connection,
law and rights"
natural
(p. 279).
in this

Nevertheless,
"natural

law

has

same

for rhetorical
or

formal,

effect,
between

to say the least,


in which,
that natural
Weinreb
observes

century

not

flourished,"
of
rubric
the ambiguous
"under
have prospered,
especially
rights
"
sees
"a
Weinreb
'human
Nevertheless,
genuine
rights'
(p. 279).
a connection
law and rights,
natural
between
connection"
and strong

itself established
freedom
With
regarding

and
not

by the connection

responsibility."
a wasted
word,

the connection

Weinreb

between

between
summarizes

natural

and human

"rights

law and

his

central

rights

thesis

as follows:

. . .
. . . are in a rather special way constitutive
of freedom
Rights
The duties that
that indeed is what rights are and all that they are.
are correlative
the beings
the rights constitute
to rights arise because

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NATURAL LAW THEORY

387

as autonomous
than
them
rather
possess
beings?persons
whom
such duties are owed.
the way
in which
Further,
things?to
is the way of natural
law. (p. 280)
the rights constitute
freedom

who

to be attributes
rights
Taking
neither
fundamentally
prescriptive

Weinreb
attributes
testing
he

nor

then has the task of finding


the possession
by which
various
notions
the
about
the

adopts

position

relational,

fundamentally
comes

about.

After

of rights,
attributive

grounding
a "personal

have

it is found in that capacity

aspect,"

and

kind,

just those other qualifying

of rights
nature
and

if rights

that

of a certain

of entities

for freedom by which

rights

as morally
In
regarded
responsible
(p. 286).
properly
as
between
this Weinreb
is distinguishing
conferred
rights
by pos
even
to
is
aloof
itive law (which,
administered,
evenly
differences,
are

holders

extreme

ones,

citizens)

and the more basic ontological

in the

rational,

moral,

and

intellectual

to be occupied
only by the morally
responsible.
to the controversies
is sensitive
immediately
one begins
as having
to tag some but not others
the

takes

Weinreb
once

not to mention
the difficulties
attribute,
from the manifest
differences
between
at random.

He

incorrectly
literature"

and

philosophy

for
any

what
charges
a
with
solution

he calls

to the problem

it, that

Weinreb

with

Greek
based

Aristotle's

provides

arising
chosen

"classical

(p. 289), for it is this very philosophy,

of

spawned
requisite

the proposition
pair of persons

a fatalistic naturalism
version

of

prowess

domain of rights which he

on

at least

a defensible

gambit.7

All of the factors


thesis

of moral

form

of

social

need

not

be

were

responsibility
or psychological

considered,
the positions

true,
and we would
termined,
ness at hand.
As noted
suspension)

identified by Weinreb

such

draw

sustenance

as telling against his


from

one

or another

or biological
determinism.
for
if
the
deterministic
therefore,
we would
take on it would
also now
simply
below,

determinism,

They
thesis
be de

with
the busi
go on (determinately)
Weinreb
into
finally
(or puts
rejects
it
cannot
that
inform
recognizing

7
The "familial
guilt" cited by Weinreb
(p. 289) to support his view
was the phratic justice that Solon's reforms
about the classical
perspective
There
is some merit
ended.
in dating the dawn of the Classical
age with
and with the replacement
of fatalism
just such understanding
by human
ism.

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388

DANIEL N. ROBINSON
can

but

eliminate

only
than

default

moral

but

philosophy;

he

so more

does

by

by conquest.
seems
to yield
If Weinreb
too much
to determinism,
he seems
too little concerned
about moral
The skeptic wants
to
skepticism.
we
are
know
how
of
"constituted"
and just which
attri
rights,
just
or faculties
butes
of ours admit
an
of this constituting.
Weinreb
swers

as follows:
No more

is required
to make
a person
the notion of reconstituting
to normative
criteria
concrete
and familiar
than a recog
according
nition
that we are who we are as individuals
a social
only within
in the limited sense that
context, some aspects of which are "natural"
human effort but many, or most, aspects
deliberate
they arise without
are the product
of which
or at
of more or less effective,
deliberate,
social action,
any rate alterable,
(p. 279)
will

Some

insist

a notion

concrete

what

calls

he
we

what

we

point
are determined

more

and

is needed
offers

to make

such

more

of
by way
we
are
Thus,
although
a social context,
from a moral

only within
are not merely
but persons
whose
"actions
beings,
selves"
For there
to be a moral
by their
(p. 294).
it is simply
the case that the freedom-determinism

of view,
must
be

point
debate

much

very

and Weinreb
familiar,
"the moral
of view."
point

are as

of view

that

individuals

of

This,

suspended.

not

does

course,

defeat

the

skeptics who reject such a point of view, but it at least invites them
out

of the

conversation.

to the
Turning
the well-known
through

delineation

of

tries

Weinreb

rights,

to

cut

rights
only on beings
that
"if
it is accepted
"self-determining."
Though
noting
are self-determining,
that all, and only, human
the categories
beings
are
of natural
and
human
rights
rights
equivalent"
(p. 295), he nev

who

ertheless
may

thickets

by conferring

are

in a footnote

acknowledges

well

qualify

here,

just

as

some

some

that
human

nonhuman

beings

may

animals
not.

For

all practical purposes, though, it is the normal individual person


who qualifies, onWeinreb's account (p. 295). Still, the reader is left
to wonder
to

the

which
classical

rights
origins

are
of

thus

established.

natural

law

Weinreb's
theory

for all he offers is that set of beliefs widely


and

(rather

less

so)

in the Hellenistic

do

period
by the word

a far greater
extension
The laws,
"nature."

help

here,

shared in the Hellenic

world.

It is not beside the point to recall that phusis


had

not

references

than
the polis,

anything
and the

in the classical
now

understood

regulative

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prin

389

NATURAL LAW THEORY


ciples of moral
the daily
food

thought

were

not

less natural

than
to, say, Aristotle
of a richer,
writers
understood
the

of

Possessed

elephants.
consumption
ancient
naturalism,
ideological,
as the unfolding
between
causality

because

less

difference
potentialities,
contractions.

efficient

The

appearance
a
of
natural
process,

the outcome
of man.

nature

the

and

Weinreb

one

(pp. 297-8).
The concluding
Ernest

Weinrib,

ticularly,
they
Ernest
of
tique

addressed

Weinrib's

as

then,

understood,

by the special
of this per

occasioned

it finally
extends
support
as "spec
which
he describes

in the
essays
and are addressed

are

muscle

the

in convincing

unsuccessful"

of various

example,

a reconsideration

urges

wisely
but he then underestimates
spective,
to current
law formulations
natural
tacularly

for

of,
was

causality
of the polis
but

realization

but

any

true

the

believer

are

collection

Raz and
by Joseph
More
formalism.
par

to legal

to Joseph
Raz's
version
of formalism,

uncompromising
and Weinrib's

cri
self

defense.

Just what
for

it both

it as

learned

appears
to do

logical and ontological


cant.
The formalism

chiefly
heavy
other

Among

Its defenders

is legal formalism?

its detractors
sanctions,
dismissing
that is the target of Raz's critique
on "the Rule of Law,"
a phrase made

in disquisitions
in the social

work

missions,

are likely to claim

and

affairs

political
to Raz,

according

of

nations.

to protect people's
the rule of law is generally
claimed
and
liberties,
to curtail arbitrary
tran
The rule of law is an ideal which
power.
scends politics,
it is non-political,
it protects
and, at least to a degree,
of the political
contest.
the
people from the consequences
Finally,
In conforming
rule of law is an ideal rooted in the very essence of law.
to it the law does nothing more
to its own nature,
than be faithful

(p. 309)
(Before
noting
covers

considering
if the
that,
it, did

not

Raz's
rule

of

achieve

to all

objections
law and
such

it might
be worth
this,
formalism
which
dis
legal

that

noble

objectives,

would

something

have to. But I get ahead of myself.)


At
but

issue

otherwise
called

ciously
ist,"
precise,
quality

or

are a number
generally
formalists.

of claims
shared
Note

or "neurotic,"
"liberal,"
but merely
diagnostic.
as to
of asseverations

by
that

those
the

who
term

is not

and

Some

small

the

in Weinrib's

appearing

essence

might
itself,
is not

be

like "behavior
intended

number
of

law,

works,
nonmali

and
once

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to be
special

accepted,

390

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

one as a formalist.
qualify
an identifiable
nature which,

such

One
when

idly be included in its province.


this for Raz:

asseveration

is that

law has

what

can val

establishes

known,

There is something

too precious

in

mean when he says that the law is intrinsically


could Weinrib
because
it can and should be understood
its es
intelligible
through
sential properties?
How else can the law be understood?
Is there
a way of understanding
what
chairs are which
does not involve un
that they are items of furniture made
to sit on? (p. 311)
derstanding

What

be noted,

It should

in the preceding
To
less obvious.

be

shaped
checkered

These
such
stitute

like

castles

quandary
Raz

passage,

to no more
examines

important

replaced
would
question
wooden
figures

whose
part of something
If Weinrib's
formalism

all

this,

of

parts

essential
a bit

floats

of course,

around
the

story.

once it is understood

intelligible

too low.
begins
to accept
is prepared

"chess"

to Raz's

that
little
example,
are items made
to move

the most

intrinsically

are
pieces
a game.

the answer

for
learn,
and crowns

is to miss

board

become

if the word

that

however,

"law"

properties
too high,

that
con
Raz's

it amounts

because

than a logical (or lexical) truth (p. 313), but he then


he

what

to be

takes

Weinrib
implications
the
is
course,
rejection

and
of

the

others

or

counterintuitive
draw

from

instrumentalism,

it.
for,

indefensible
of

One

of

these,

as Weinrib

says,

can be understood
an instrument
to the purpose
it
only by reference
. . .Therefore,
can
serves.
to the extent that juridical
relationships
forms and thus by reference
be seen in the light of their underlying
to themselves,
there is no need to grasp them instrumentally.
(p. 313)

Raz rejects the proposition that an instrument's intelligibility


lies
as
outside itself, dismissing it
"logically false" (p. 314). "The form
of a chair,"
which

he

insists,

Formalism,
a formal

that the most

is that

"it

is used

to sit on."

to be legal

establish

system

one.

must
formalism,
as
a
legal
qualifies

basic juridical relationships

the basis

Weinrib

upon

proposes

are those obtaining

be

with
interests.
The re
distinguishable
independent
parties
that might
such parties
include
of juridical
consequence
lationships
are those
or the de
of
either
the
requiring
adjudication
disputes
of respective
burdens.
the two essential
termination
forms
Thus,
tween

of justice
the forms

are
of

the corrective

and

the distributive,

and

these

law.

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then

are

391

NATURAL LAW THEORY

Against this Raz opposes what he takes to be the historical fact


that distributive justice arises out of political action and is subject
of political
"to the rough and tumble
...
Is there any way of reconciling

of it, both proclaimed

and its independence


Moreover,
a normative

to the clash of interests.


debate,
the subservience
of law to politics

the parallel
one that

forms

between

seem

would

by Weinrib"

of justice

to require

and

(p. 317)?
of law

forms

of forms

of

law

is

that

they express justice. Raz exploits this thesis, finding it incompatible


with the requirement of intrinsic intelligibility.
This surely ac
for Weinrib's
says Raz,
counts,
in his discussion
of law," even

ence and intelligibility

of the

It is also Raz's objective


dictionary
of

grounds

as he

insists

upon

on theorists

who

incoherence

or

rational"

terms

moral

of coher

qualities

that suggest "a normativity

the normativity

moral,

to invoke

"reluctance

deeper than the

(p. 323).

here to impose the discipline

would

dismiss

opposing

of the
on

perspectives

irrationality:

one employs
test of understanding
Whatever
there is no reason to
think that unjust
laws are as such unintelligible.
Nor is there any
reason to think they are incoherent.
There can be coherent
injustice.
To be effectively
and intelligible
unjust a law must be both coherent
to a high degree,
(p. 325)

In addressing Weinrib's

concepts of judicial duty and judicial

sources
discovers
further
of perplexity.
special
role,
Judges
are obliged,
cases
to
a
to
these
manner
decide
in
according
concepts,
Raz

faithful

to the forms of justice (these being the corrective and dis

What
a scheme
should
enact
tributive).
if, asks Raz, Parliament
for spreading
the costs arising
from accident
claims?a
scheme
that
offends
the corrective
doctrine.
Weinrib's
(stipulatively)
justice
seems
to require
the courts
to disregard
the act.
But
theory
a charge
to justices,
to Raz,
could only arise within
according
institutional
of
framework
the very framework
larger
society,
which Weinrib's
the law.
insulate
theory must

How does Weinrib


collection

not get

does

deal with such criticisms?


around

to replying

in the form of a brief comment.

to Raz

until

the very

The body of the chapter

a reply
to Raz,
then, but more
generally
framework"
of contemporary
jurisprudence.
is the economic
Richard
(for example,
analysts
an
to
contribute
of tort law, and
understanding

would
of cases
how,

coming

asks Weinrib,

under
can

it, through
a better

extralegal
understanding

entire

One

specific

who
Posner)
the resolution
Just

considerations.
of

end,

is not

to the

"standard
target

the
from

His essay in this

as

offered

such

tort

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law

come

392

DANIEL N. ROBINSON

from

that

analyses

structure

conceptual
other modes
The
legal

are

"indifferent
and

to the

of legal ordering"
the
eschews

arrangements
at least

formalist,
relevant

to legal

own

characteristic
tort

law

and

seeks

and

to understand

in the hands
of the
Thus,
that
law might
ir
become

(p. 351).

scholarship"

In acknowledging

extralegal
terms.

is no danger

"there

law's

between

(p. 347)?

formalist

in their

to tort

both
distinction

that each of the forms of justice

included

under

the Kantian
formalism
notion
of agency"
"presupposes
(p.
an
must
Weinrib
clear
makes
that
there
be
355),
extralegal
starting
for law itself,
and thus his concept
of law is not the free
point
critics.
floating
mirage
depicted
by some of formalism's
turn to Raz's
does
restates
Weinrib
finally
critique,
to formalism,
what
is central
form
What
itself.
Weinrib
namely,
finds missing
Raz's
is all reference
throughout
"spirited
critique"
to form as a principle
of unity.
"Formalism
above
is,
all, a theory
. . . For
to juridical
of the coherence
internal
the
relationships.
When

he

structure

formalist,

is paramount,

ing this point, says Weinrib,


own

the

hallucinations"
Apart
current

nescent,
It would
debate
the

the

be unrealistic
fortify

integrity
to its editor, whose
ment

enduring
climate

political
in the
interest

sheer

is further

substance"

In miss

(p. 359).

Raz is left to struggle

"only with his

(p. 360).

from

would

not

to which

issues

to expect
themselves
reflected
established

of natural

importance
has excited

that
with

in these

law

theories,

a more

if eva
immediate,
are
addressed.
essays

these
those

now

the wisdom,

the national
leading
the tolerance,
and
The book is a credit

chapters.
for fairness
reputation

and

discern

enhanced.

Georgetown

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