A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad

Theodore Caplow
American Sociological Review, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Aug., 1956), pp. 489-493.
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A THEORY O F COALITIONS IN T H E TRIAD

THEODORE
C APLOW
University of Minnesota

of the triad is one of the most interesting and satisfactory areas of current research activity in sociology. The
relevant theory is unusually simple and
straightforward. I t lends itself to empirical
verification more readily than most other
models of interaction. The theory of the
triad promises to be applicable to situations
of different scale, although this advantage
has not yet been fully exploited. I t seems
likely that generalizations developed in the
three-person group will be applicable to
situations where the interacting units are
organized groups, even such very large
groups as political parties and states. I n his
original discussion, Simmel deliberately compared intimate human situations such as the
contention of two men for one woman with
large scale situations like the European
balance of power.
For many years Simmel's powerful but
unsystematic analysis was admired and neglected. The development of research evidence
on the triad has come about very recently.
The last two years have seen the publication
of a series of brilliant experiments by Mills,
Strodtbeck, Torrance, Bales and Borgatta.
These experiments have demonstrated the
reality of the phenomenon which Simmel
stressed-the tendency of the triad to become
a coalition of two against one. They have
also demonstrated that small differences in
"power," "activity," and other characteristics of the members of the triad have considerable influence upon the formation and
persistence of coalitions.
The purpose of this paper is to examine
the model of the triad whose members are
not identical in power and to call attention
to a neglected feature of this model, namely,
that the formation of given coalitions depends
upon the initial distribution of power in the
triad and, other things being equal, may be
~redicted to some extent when the initial
distribution of power is known.
In their discussion of the zero-sum threeperson game, van Neumann and MOrgellstern consider at some length the case nf

TUDY

unsymmetric distribution, i.e., those in which

different coalitions receive different results.
They remark, "it seems that what a player
can get in a definite coalition depends not
only on what the rules of the game provide
for that eventuality, but also on the other
(competing) possibility of coalition for himself and for his partner. Since the rules of
the game are absolute and inviolable, this
means that under certain conditions conzpensations must be paid among coalition partners; i.e., that a player must have to pay a
well defined price to a prospective coalition
partner. The amount of the compensations
will depend on what other alternatives are
open to each of the players." l Concealed in
this and subsequent discussions is the assumption of equality of power among the
three players, even when they have different
possibilities of gain or loss. (See especially
their figure 51). This assumption does not
fit many triads of sociological interest in
which the typical gain consists of domination
over other triad members, and not in an external reward to be obtained by a given
coalition. This is the case in three-sibling
rivalries, in three-cornered political contests,
and in many other concrete situations.
We shall consider six types. The following
asumptions will apply:
Assumption 1. Members of a triad may
differ in strength. A stronger member can
control a weaker member, and will seek to
do so.
Assumption 2. Each member of the triad
seeks control over the others. Control over
two others is preferred to control over one
other. Control over one other is preferred to
control over none.
Assumption 3. Strength is additive. The
strength of a coalition is equal to the sum of
the strengths of its two members.
Assumption 4. The formation of coalitions
takes place in an existing triadic situation,
l

John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,

Theory o f Games and Econolnic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947, p. 227. See
also Chapter 5, especially 22.1.1 to 22.3.4 and
Chapter 6, 29.2.1 and 29.2.2.

490

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

so that there is a pre-coalition condition in

every triad. Any attempt by a stronger
member to coerce a weaker member into
joining a non-advantageous coalition will provoke the formation of an advantageous
coalition to oppose the coercion.
The question of how well these assumptions are met by the triads we encounter in
laboratory situations must be left for later
consideration.
T y p e 1: In this simplest case, all three
members are of equal strength. This is the
classic, but probably not the most commontype of triad. The coalitions AB, BC and CA
are equally likely, and each member strives
to enter a coalition within which he is equal
to his ally and stronger (by virtue of the
coalition) than the isolate.
T y p e 2: One member is stronger than the
other two, but not much stronger. Again,
all three members seek a coalition, since to
be isolated is unequivocally disadvantageous.
However, the three possible coalitions are no
longer of equal advantage. Consider the
position of B. If he forms a coalition with A,
he will (by virtue of the coalition) be
stronger than C, but within the coalition he
will be weaker than A. If,on the other hand,
he forms a coalition with C, he will be equal
to C within the coalition and stronger than
A by virtue of the coalition. The position of
C is identical with that of B, so that other
things being equal, the coalition BC will be
formed and the individually strongest member of the triad will ordinarily turn out to
be the weakest after the formation of the
most probable coalition.
T y p e 3: Here again, two members of the
triad are equal in strength, but this time the
third member is weaker. I t will readily be
seen that A may strengthen his position by
forming a coalition with either B or C, and
will be welcomed as an ally by either B or C.
On the other hand, if B joins C, he does not
improve his pre-coalition position of equality
with C and superiority to A. His only motive
to enter a coalition with C is to block the
coalition AC. However, C's position is identical with B and he, too, will prefer A to B
as an ally. Thus there are two probable
coalitions, AB and AC.
Type 4: I n this case, the strength of A
exceeds the combined strength of B and C.
B and C have no motive to enter a coalition
with each other. Once formed, the coalition

would still be weaker than A and they would

still be equal within it. A, on the other hand,
has no motive to form a coalition with B or C,
since he is already stronger than each of
them and is not threatened by their coalition.
No coalition will be formed, unless either B
or C can find some extraneous means of inducing A to join them.
Type 5 : In this case, no two members of
the triad are equal in strength but the combined strength of any two members exceeds
that of the third. This resembles Type 3 in
that the weakest member of the triad has a
definite advantage, being sure to be included
in whatever coalition is formed. A seeks to
join both B and C, and C seeks to join both
A and B, but B has no incentive to enter a
coalition with A and A has a very strong
incentive to enter a coalition with C. Whether
the differential strength of A and B will make
them differentially attractive to C lies outside the scope of our present assumptions.
Type 6: This is like the previous type in
that the three members of the triad are unequal, but here A is stronger than B and C
combined and has no motive to form a coalition. As in Type 4, true coalition is impossible. However, while in Type 4 both of the
weaker members seek to join the stronger
member, only C can improve his position by
finding some extraneous means of inducing
A to join him.
The most surprising conclusion which
emerges from this analysis is that the nature
of the triadic situation often favors the weak
over the strong. Thus in Type 2, by virtue
of the fact that A is stronger than B or C,
he will ordinarily become the isolate and
therefore he is functionally the weakest. In
Type 3, the formation of either of the two
probable coalitions will benefit A. Though
he is the weakest member of the triad and
will continue to be weaker than his partner
i~ either coalition, he may nevertheless be
described as the most secure of the three.
The same is again true of Type 5, where both
A and B but not C are in danger of being
isolated. The practical implications are considerable.
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE

Unfortunately, the data of the several excellent laboratory studies of interaction processes in the triad are not so arranged as to

A T H E O R Y O F C O A L I T I O N S IN THE T R I A D

permit t h e direct test of t h e hypotheses

suggested b y the foregoing analysis. Nevertheless, there is a certain amount of fragmentary evidence which suggests t h a t this
may b e a useful model with which t o approach t h e study of the coalition process.
T h e first application consists of a n example
given b y Simmel :
I t was the general custom of the Incas to
divide a newly conquered tribe in two approximately equal halves and to place a
supervisor over each of them, but to give these

49 1

two supervisors slightly different ranks. This

was indeed the most suitable means for provoking rivalry between the two heads, which
prevented any united actions against the ruler
on the part of the subjected territory. By contrast, both identical ranks and greatly different ranks would have made identification
much easier. If the two heads had had the
same rank, an equal distribution of leadership in case of action would have been more
likely than any other arrangement; and, since
there would have been need for subordination,
peers would have most probably submitted to

492

AMERICAN SOCIOI

such a technical necessity. If the two heads

had had very different ranks, the leadership
of one would have found no opposition. The
slight difference in rank least of all allows an
organic and satisfactory arrangement in the
unification feared, since the one would doubtless have claimed unconditional prerogative
because of his superiority, which, on the other
hand, was not significant enough to suggest
the same claim to the other."
When these two alternative arrangements
are translated into the language of our
model, we see that the first alternative
would correspond to Type 2.3 I n place of
the original explanation, we may say that
the slightly unequal ranks are a device for
converting Type 2 to Type 5. I t a t once
appears that, whereas in Type 2 only the
"rebellious" coalition BC is probable, in
Type 5 the "loyal" coalition AC is equally
probable under our assumptions. Whether
it would be equally probable in the real
life situation depends upon other factors,
such as the distances among A, B and C,
but regardless of these other factors, some
of the elements of the basic situation are
likely to make themselves felt as the real
situation unfolds. For example, it is clear
that in a situation of Type 5 , C can extract
concessions from B in return for entering
the coalition BC, despite the fact that B is
stronger.
I n Mills' first study of power relations in
three-person groups, attention is focused
upon the relationship between the most active member and the next most active member, as measured by the number of acts
scored according to Bales' method of interaction process analysis. If the two most
active members show a mutually supportive
pattern, then their relationship is characterized as solidary. Otherwise it is described
as conflicting, dominant, or contending.
Rlills concludes that '(medians of support
rate exchanged between three members in a
series of 48 problem solving sessions con"urt
H. Wolff (translator and editor), The
Sociology o f Georg Simmel, Glencoe: The Free
Press, 1950, pp. 165-166.
"ecause
the coalition is feared in the future
situation where successful rebellion would be possible, we must assume A<(B+C) even though in
the immediate situation where the division is made,
just after the conquest, A may still be stronger
than B and C combined.

REVIEW
firm Simmel's proposition that the primary
tendency in the threesome is segregation into
a pair and an other: the more active members
form a solidary bond and the least active
member is isolated." The last part of this
conclusion is not completely supported by
his data. They show that the solidary relationship was established in the first phase
of the experiment in 15 out of 48 groups and
in the last phase of the experiment in 1 7
out of 48 groups, so that the probability of
a solidary relationship between the two most
active members of the experimental triads
was about
Unfortunately, the rate of
activity cannot be regarded as an independent
measure of power in this case, because the
measurements of activity were made over
the same interval as the measurement of
support, and the power distribution must
have corresponded to the post-coalition condition rather than the pre-coalition condition
to which our model refers.
The original data in Strodtbeck's study
of the family as a three-person group might
permit direct test of our hypotheses. The
published tables do not show father, mother,
and son-which may be thought of as the
pre-coalition power positions-but only first,
second, and third ranks in activity rate,
which represent the post-coalition distribution of power.
~ o r r a n c e ,too, has published a paper on
decision making in three-men air combat
crews composed of pilot, navigator and
gunner. These conform, in general, to Type
5. There are scattered indications throughout
the report of this study which seem to relate
to our hypotheses, for example, that "according to self reports, the pilots and gunners
made less effort to influence the crew's decision than the navigators (significant a t the
.O1 level of confidence). Very few of the
navigators, however, feel that they influence
the decision greatly. (Difference in percentages between pilots and navigators sig-

s.

4Theodore M. Mills, "Power Relations in

Three-Person Groups,') American Sociological Review, 18 (August, 1953), p. 355. I n the same
volume see also Robert F. Bales and Edgar F. Borgatta, "Size of Group as a Factor in the Interaction
Profile," pp. 396-413.
Fred L. Strodtbeck, "The Family as a ThreePerson Group," American Sociological Review, 19
(February, 1934), pp. 23-29.

A FACTOR AXALYSIS OF SIXTEEN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

nificant a t the .01 level of confidence)."
This is pretty much what we would expect
from the disadvantageous position of B with
respect to potential coalitions in Type 5 . But
it
more-of a straw in the wind than real
evidence.
,4 more direct test is found in Mills' second
published study. I n this experiment, two members of each task triad were collaborators,
acting out predetermined instructions. The
third member was a naive subiect. The triads
were arranged in such a way that each naive
subject was of definitely higher or lower
status than his fellow members. I n other
words, each triad corresponded either to
Type 2 or Type 3. The first major hypothesis was "that the coalition would be more
apt to persist when the isolate is of higher
status relative to others in the group than
when he is of lower status. [This involves
the assumption that] the controlling resources of the high status member are less
6 E . Paul Torrance, "Some Consequences of
Power Differences on Decision Making in Permanent
and Temporary Three-Man Groups," in A. Paul
Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, Robert F. Bales (editors), Small Goups: Studies i n Social Interaction,
New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1955, pp. 488-489.

493

contingent upon actual support from others,

and, consequently, that both the value and
the loss of the ally is less for him than for
the low status member. With superior resources following rejection, he is expected
to stand against the coalition, while the
isolate of fewer resources is expected to
submit." The findings, although not statistically significant, were directly contrary to
the hypothesis. I t was found that "the low
status persons is less apt to conform to the
majority opinion than the high status isolate"
and that "the low status isolate offers more
resistance to the coalition than the high
status member."
T o the extent that the conditions of Type
2 were reproduced with the high-status subjects and of Type 3 with the low-status subjects in these experiments, this finding is
consistent with the model. We would except
less resistance to the "inevitable" coalition
of BC in Type 2 than to the improbable
and therefore unstable coalition of BC in
Type 3.
Theodore M . Mills, "The Coalition Pattern in
Three Person Groups," American Sociological R e view, 19 (December, 1954), p. 663.
8 Ibid., pp. 664-665.

A FACTOR ANALYSIS O F SIXTEEN PRIMITIVE

SOCIETIES *

KARLF. SCHUESSLER
A ND HAROLD
DRIVER

Indiana University
HIS paper discusses the utility of factor
analysis in cultural sociology. A factor
analysis of sixteen primitive societies
is here r e ~ o r t e dnot so much for its sociological interest but rather to project into
the open certain methodological issues which
are likely to arise in this type of study. I n
a sense the study is a continuation of
efforts to arrive a t a more refined understanding of these groups and their interrelations by correlational procedures.
I n 1939 Kroeber constructed a classification of tribes by arranging correlation indexes (Yule's Q) in a matrix so that tribes

Expanded version of a paper read at the American Sociological Society meetings, September, 1955.
This research was supported by a grant-in-aid from
the Indiana University Graduate School.

with relatively high coefficients inter se were

alongside one an0ther.l Recently in an effort
to validate cluster analysis and to explore
its power Clements applied this technique to
the same coefficients which Kroeber had
previously clustered by i n s p e c t i ~ n .His
~ results agreed closely with those obtained by
Kroeber, and the agreement was viewed as
a validation of cluster analysis. The question
of whether factor analysis would yield information about intergroup connections
Alfred L. Kroeber, "Local Ethnographic and
Methodological Inferences," in Harold E. Driver,
Culture Element Distributions X : Northwest California, University of. California Anthropological
Records, 1 (1939), pp. 425-429.
2 Forrest E. Clements, "The Use of Cluster
Analysis with Anthropological Data," Alnerican

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A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad
Theodore Caplow
American Sociological Review, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Aug., 1956), pp. 489-493.
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[Footnotes]
4

Power Relations in Three-Person Groups

Theodore M. Mills
American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 4. (Aug., 1953), pp. 351-357.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28195308%2918%3A4%3C351%3APRITG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9
5

The Family as a Three-Person Group

Fred L. Strodtbeck
American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Feb., 1954), pp. 23-29.
Stable URL:
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7

The Coalition Pattern in Three Person Groups

Theodore M. Mills
American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 6. (Dec., 1954), pp. 657-667.
Stable URL:
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8

The Coalition Pattern in Three Person Groups

Theodore M. Mills
American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 6. (Dec., 1954), pp. 657-667.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28195412%2919%3A6%3C657%3ATCPITP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.