FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 157219. May 28, 2004]

NATIVIDAD E. BAUTISTA, CLEMENTE E. BAUTISTA and SOCORRO L.

ANGELES,petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, MANILA PAPERMILLS, INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC. and SPOUSES RODOLFO
JAVELLANA and NELLY JAVELLANA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72307
dated February 17, 2003.
[1]

The facts are not in dispute.

On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and
Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills,
International, Inc., before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case
No. 1948-99, for quieting of title. This complaint was later amended to implead
respondents Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly Javellana.
[2]

[3]

Petitioners alleged in their Amended Complaint that they have been in actual and
uninterrupted possession of Lot 5753 of the Imus Estate; that they discovered that the
land was covered by a reconstituted title in the name of respondents; and that the said
title and the derivatives thereof are spurious.Hence, they prayed that they be declared
the absolute owners of the land in dispute.
After several delays spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for
trial.However, on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to
cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to
the case was in the United States attending to an important matter.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for postponement and considered them as
having waived the presentation of their evidence.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Petitioners filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

72307.On February 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for
certiorari and dismissed the same.
Hence, this petition on the following assignment of errors:

1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the partiality and
prejudice of the trial court against the petitioners since the inception of the case
thereby depriving the petitioners of their constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process (Padua vs. Ericta, 161 SCRA 458);
2. As a consequence, the respondent appellate court denied the petitioners of their
chance to present evidence even after satisfactorily explaining the failure of
petitioners counsel to attend the scheduled hearing the due process guarantee was
violated (Continental Leaf Tobacco [Phil.]), Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
140 SCRA 269).
[4]

Petitioners claim that the arbitrary acts of the trial court have resulted in the denial
of their right to due process, and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged Orders.
Petitioners further aver that the trial judge displayed noticeable partiality and
prejudice in dealing with their case, by granting several continuances to respondents
while denying petitioners Urgent Motion for Postponement. They cite four instances
wherein respondents were granted extensions to file responsive pleadings and two
instances wherein respondents requests for postponement were similarly granted. An
extension to file a responsive pleading is clearly different from a request for a
postponement of trial. The former is less likely to waste the time of the court, the
litigants, their counsels and witnesses who may have already prepared for the trial and
traveled to the courthouse to attend the hearing. More specifically, out of the two
postponements prayed for by respondents, one was for the cancellation of a court date
unilaterally requested by petitioners which has not been approved by the trial court.
[5]

[6]

[7]

On the other hand, the trial court, in its Order dated July 2, 2002, clearly stated that
petitioners motions for postponement on three previous occasions were granted. This
was never refuted by petitioners. Petitioners last motion for postponement was,
however, denied because it was filed on the very date of the hearing sought to be
rescheduled.
[8]

[9]

In Gohu v. Spouses Gohu, we ruled that, far from being tainted with bias and
prejudice, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for
performing dilatory actions upholds the courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite
the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.
[10]

[11]

Petitioners contention that they were denied due process is not well- taken. Where
a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so,
he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as
the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.
[12]

Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of

right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Action thereon will not be
disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion
resulting in a denial of substantial justice. In other words, we cannot make a finding of
grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a
case rather than postpone the hearing to another day, because of the absence of a
party. That the absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present
evidence and cross-examine the opponents witnesses is firmly supported by
jurisprudence. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by
arbitrariness or capriciousness.
[13]

[14]

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals
did not err in finding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in
denying petitioners motion for postponement and declaring them as having waived their
right to present evidence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72307 which dismissed the special civil action for
certiorari, is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.

[1]

Rollo, p. 28. Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Justices Sergio L. Pestao and
Amelita G. Tolentino.

[2]

CA Rollo, p. 24.

[3]

Rollo, p. 40.

[4]

Id., p. 17.

[5]

Rollo, p. 19.

[6]

Id., p. 11.

[7]

Id., p. 66.

[8]

Id.

[9]

Id., p. 59.

[10]

G.R. No. 128230, 13 October 2000, 343 SCRA 114.

[11]

Id.

[12]

Tiomico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122539, 4 March 1999, 304 SCRA 216. (Citations omitted)

[13]

Id.

[14]

Adorable v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119466, 25 November 1999, 319 SCRA 200, 209.

G.R. No. L-10280

September 30, 1963

QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY aliasDEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN,
CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T. Oben for petitioners-appellants.
Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 20037)
denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, andmandamus filed by
Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim
Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows:.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before
the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without

the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted
the same to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Paoalias Jose Chua, and Basilio
King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments
(Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of
the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S.
dollars.1
Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by
the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and
cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty.
On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented
against them in the Deportation Board for the reason, among others, that the same do not constitute
legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to
entertain such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of the Board of
February 9, 1953, petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or
prohibition, which petition was given due course in our resolution of July 7, 1953, but made
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The case was docketed in the
lower court as Special Proceeding No. 20037.
At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing
Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas
corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among
others, that the Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges
filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee
Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he was found in the same
decision of the trial court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the United States Air Force
in order that the latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the investigation of the
purchase of $130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was involved.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding the validity of the
delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the
purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security,
welfare and interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to
issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of
charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the
arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present appeal. .
It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released on bail, but before the
charges filed against them were actually investigated, petitioners-appellant raised the question of
jurisdiction of the Deportation Board, first before said body, then in the Court of First Instance, and
now before us. Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and,
consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate, on the
ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the power to
deport to be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was
empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of
this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to
deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its Section 52, it provides:.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry
of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom,
with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven
which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:.
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in
the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated
to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action
is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of
his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."
While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the
President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of
Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed
should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the
President can deport an alien-which provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing
effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a
ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. And the, exercise of
this power by the chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions. 2
Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected
in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board
of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that the President is invested with power to deport,
still he may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
and on no other, as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be
deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the
Chief Executive. This contention is not without merit, considering that whenever the legislature
believes a certain act or conduct to be a just cause for deportation, it invariably enacts a law to that
effect. Thus, in a number of amendatory acts, grounds have been added to those originally
contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as justifying deportation of an alien, as well
as other laws which provide deportation as part of the penalty imposed on aliens committing
violation thereof.
Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering,
hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations an

economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503
amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore order
the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act
charged.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is
clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." The first
executive order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26, 1934),
constituting a board to take action on complaints against foreigners, to conduct investigations and
thereafter make recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936,
President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens
charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein provided, and make the corresponding
recommendation. 3Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the
authorized agent of the President.
This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct
investigation, i.e., whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien
complained of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same
may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.
1awphl.nt

Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No.
613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority, among others, to
make arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific power to be exercised in connection
with such investigation. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the first time, saw it
necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947, providing
For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation Board
created under Executive Order No. 37, dated January 4, 1947, and facilitating the execution
of the order of deportation whenever the President decides the case against the respondent.
I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,
do hereby order that all respondents in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the
Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and containing such conditions as he may
prescribe. .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien
under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent.
It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue
of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of
formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien
complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his
provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the
Chairman of the Board.

As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose
authority the President's power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the
power to arrest. But the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief
Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation granted
him, such as the authority to order the arrest of the foreigner charged as undesirable.
In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is
guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:.
3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of
Rights, Philippine Constitution).
As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v.
Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law
wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same
is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both
citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in
our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest
may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement "to be determined by the
judge" is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in
the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause.
Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such
determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our
Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable
cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between
warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one
suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against
him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a
violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as
then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause.
Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect
compliance of an order of contempt.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect
the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the
arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be
arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be
required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the
executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this
proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide on whether or not the President
himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive

order of deportation has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether,
conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained
of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise
of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the
curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as
the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the
intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the
existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the
discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the
authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated,
official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed,
an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the
matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a
person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give
meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of
that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The
guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky
foundation.
We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation
Board (G.R. No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated, however, that the power of arrest was not
squarely raised in that proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's proposition that
the President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against him did not
constitute ground for deportation. .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers
the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or
aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is
declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board
is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So
ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., reserved his vote.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

Footnotes
On Jan. 22. 1952, Qua Chee Gan was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the
crime of attempted bribery (Crim. Case No. 3346) in connection with the alleged offer of
P25,000.00 to Laforteza and Charak in order that the latter may refrain from filing the
corresponding charges against the former, which case was dismissed by order of the court of
1

March 20, 1952, on the ground that the aforesaid amount was tendered to Capt. Charak who
is not an officer of the Philippine Government.
In re Patterson, 1 Phil. 93; see, also In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41; Tan Tong v.
Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-7680, April 30, 1955; Ang Beng v. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-9621, January 30, 1957.
2

Amended by Executive Orders Nos. 257, dated March 12, 1940; No. 7, dated July 18, 1946;
No. 37, dated January 4, 1947.
3

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 119246. January 30, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO

CORREA y CAYTON @ BOYET, RITO GUNIDA y SESANTE @
DODONG, and LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS @ BOY
KUBA accused-appellants.

DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

The courts should not hesitate to wield the sword against drug traffickers whose
conscience has been seared by their insatiable greed for instant wealth, thus propelling
them to boldly pursue their abominable trade, utterly unconcerned of the pernicious
effects of their venomous merchandise which have destroyed the lives and shattered
the dreams of hapless victims, especially the vulnerable youth.
This the trial court did in the present case when it imposed the most severe penalty
of death and a fine of Ten Million Pesos against the three (3) appellants for delivering
and transporting more than 16 kilograms of prohibited dried marijuana flowering tops.
While the conviction of the appellants of the crime charged is proper, we find,
however, that the penalty of death imposed by the trial court is not in accordance with
the law.
On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 35), docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-137528, indicting appellants Antonio
Correa y Cayton @ Boyet, Rito Gunida y Sesante @ Dodong, and Leonardo Dulay y
Santos @ Boy Kuba for having violated Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, allegedly committed as follows:
[1]

That on or about June 18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, not being authorized by law to possess, sell, deliver, transport,
give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly deliver or transport eight
(8) bundles of dried flowering tops of MARIJUANA wrapped in pieces
of papers and plastic tapes weighing 16.1789 kilograms, a prohibited
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[2]

The Information indicated that the appellants were All Under Arrest and that No Bail
(was) Recommended.
[3]

When arraigned, the appellants pleaded NOT GUILTY.

After trial, the lower court found the appellants guilty as charged, the dispositive
portion of the decision dated 03 March 1995 reading thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing the three accused

ANTONIO CORREA y CAYTON, @ Boyet, RITO GUNIDA y SESANTE
@ Dodong, and LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS @ Boy Kuba guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of unlawful delivery and transportation of
dried marijuana flowering tops weighing 16.1789 kilograms, penalized
under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
further amended by Section 13 in relation to Section 17 of Republic Act
No. 7659, and sentencing each of the said three accused to DEATH to
be executed by the means provided by law, and to pay a fine
of P 10,000,000.00, plus the costs.
The eight (8) bundles in brick form of dried marijuana flowering tops
(Exhibits B-1 to B-8, inclusive), weighing 16.1789 kilograms are
ordered confiscated and forfeited to the Government to be disposed of
in accordance with law under the direction and supervision by the
Dangerous Drugs Board.Within ten (10) days following the
promulgation of this judgment, the Branch Clerk of this Court, is
ordered to turn over the two (2) bundles of dried marijuana flowering
tops left with this Court to the Dangerous Drugs Custodian, National
Bureau of Investigation, as appointed by the Dangerous Drugs Board,
for appropriate disposition. The other six (6) bundles of said dried
marijuana flowering tops have been left in the custody of the NBI,
Forensic Chemistry Division.
The owner-type jeep with plate No. FMR 948 used by the three
accused as a means to commit the offense is also ordered confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless it can be shown that it
is in the property of a third person not liable for the offense.
Serve a copy of this Decision on the Executive Director, Dangerous
Drugs Board, for his information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

[4]

The verdict of conviction by the trial court rested mainly on the testimony of
prosecution witness SPO3 Jesus Faller, a police officer assigned at Police Station 3,
Western Police District, City of Manila. He was among the nine-member police team of
the Drug Enforcement Unit - Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) which
arrested the three (3) appellants in the early morning of 18 June 1994. His account of
the arrest, as correctly narrated in the Appellees Brief, is as follows:
[5]

[6]

About a week prior to June 18, 1994, the Police Operatives from the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command (DEUWPDC) had placed under surveillance the movements and activities of
appellant Leonardo Dulay on account of confidential and intelligence
reports received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang
Street, Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive
results and confirmed Dulays illegal drug trade (TSN, Nov. 22, 1994,
pp. 16-17).
On June 17, 1994, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, the Units
Operatives, DEU-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila was alerted by a
police informant that Dulay, coming from Quezon City, would deliver
and transport that night, to Bambang Street, Manila a certain quantity
of drugs. Dulay reportedly would pass A. Bonifacio Street on board a
semi-stainless owner-type jeep with Plate No. FMR-948. Forthwith, a
nine-man team headed by SPO3 Jesus Faller was organized to pursue
and bag the suspect.Thereafter, the operatives, together with the
informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board three
vehicles. They inconspicuously parked along the side of North
Cemetery, boundary of Quezon City and Manila, at around 11:00
oclock that same evening, and waited for the suspect (Id., pp. 4; 1920).
Around 3:00 oclock in the morning of June 18, 1994, the police
informant spotted the approaching vehicle of Dulay and immediately
alerted the waiting policemen.The operatives tailed the subject jeepney,
taking care that its passengers would not notice that they were being
followed (Id., p. 5).
Upon reaching the intersection of Bambang Extension and Jose Abad
Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, the subject vehicle stopped and parked
at a corner. Thereupon, the operatives also stopped and parked their
vehicles around the suspects vehicle and accosted the passengers of
the owner-type jeepney. Appellant Antonio Correa was at the drivers
seat with appellant Leonardo Dulay sitting beside him in the front seat
and appellant Rito Gunida at the back seat (Id., p. 21). The team
inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard
(Exhibit B), about two feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the
appellants. The can contained eight bundles of suspected dried

marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic

tapes. The team seized the suspected contrabands and marked each
bundle consecutively with IDR-1 to IDR-8 (Exhibits B-1 to B-8
inclusive). The three suspects were brought to the police headquarters
at DEU-WPDC for investigation (Id., pp. 5-9; Exhs. E, F and G).
The packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation for laboratory analysis to determine their
chemical composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated stuff
were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms (TSN, Nov.
15, 1994, p. 11; Exhs. D and D-1).
[7]

The appellants, on the other hand, had a different story on their arrest. The trial
court, in its decision subject for review, has summarized the appellants version thus:

The common defense interposed by the three accused is in the nature

of alibi. The core of their contention is that they were arrested without
warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City. They also denied that they were
delivering and transporting dried marijuana flowering tops when they
were apprehended.
Also stripped of incidental details, the version of the defense is to the
effect that on June 17, 1994, at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon,
Leonardo Dulay rushed to the Metropolitan Hospital his gravely ill and
very weak six months old son Jon-Jon. He was accompanied by his coaccused Antonio Correa, who drove the owner-type jeep which they
used, and a neighbor known only as Bulik. At around 11:00 oclock the
same evening, Leonardo Dulay, Antonio Correa and Bulik went back
home to get the things of the sick child. However, when they were
already near the house of Leonardo Dulay in Camarin D, Caloocan
City, some elements of the Western Police District Command blocked
their (accused) way, and apprehended them for an alleged charge of
trafficking on shabu, and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at
U.N. Avenue, where they were detained.
x x x according to accused Rito Gunida, he was picked-up by the police
in his house at Camarin II, Area D, Caloocan City, on June 17, 1994, at
around 12:00 oclock midnight.The arresting officers rose (sic) him from

his sleep. He was also taken to the headquarters of the WPDC at U.N.
Avenue, and there placed in a cell.
In addition to their respective declarations, the three accused likewise
offered the testimonies of Marilene de la Rosa, Violeta Almugela,
Juanito Balino, Rogelio Altis and Pascual Gillego to corroborate the
claim of the defense.
[8]

Assailing the verdict of conviction, the appellants interpose the following assignment
of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED:

I

IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE, AS ALL THE

ACCUSED WERE APPREHENDED AT THEIR RESPECTIVE
RESIDENCES IN CAMARIN, KALOOKAN CITY, NOT IN MANILA
AS THE LAWMEN MADE IT APPEAR WHERE THE THREE (3)
ACCUSED ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE.
II

IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED

FROM THE ACCUSED, THE SAME BEING INADMISSIBLE
BEING THE FRUIT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH CONDUCTED
WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT.
III

IN BASING ITS DECISION OF CONVICTION OF APPELLANTS

SOLELY ON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF SPO3
JESUS FALLER OF THE WPDC DESPITE THE PARTICIPATION
OF THE OTHER EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE OPERATIVES THAT
ALLEGEDLY TOOK PART IN THE ARREST OF THE THREE (3)
ACCUSED.
IV

IN CONVICTING THE THREE (3) ACCUSED DESPITE THE

FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
[9]

The appellants submission is palpably without merit.

The first, third and fourth assigned errors aforequoted are closely interrelated and,
therefore, the same shall be discussed jointly.
The appellants plead in exculpation that their version should be believed because
the defense has indubitably established that they were arrested in their respective
residences in Camarin, Caloocan City by the police team of SPO3 Jesus Faller of the
Western Police District Command, Manila. The appellants claim that -

x x x. Witnesses Juanita Balino, Marlene dela Rosa, Violeta Almojuela

and Rogelio Altis are unanimous in their declaration that the arresting
officers were in Camarin, Kalookan City, when they arrested the three
accused. As against the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller, the positive
declaration of the foregoing witnesses for the defense should
prevail. Since SPO3 Jesus Faller belongs to the Western Police District
Command, he orchestrated his testimony to make it appear that
the arrest of the three accused and the confiscation of the alleged
marijuana took place in Bambang, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which is too
far and remote from the residences of the three accused who are all
residents of Camarin, Kalookan City. The arrest of the three accused in
Camarin, Kalookan City, were illegal and the alleged confiscation of
evidence invalid, granting that there really were evidence confiscated
from the three accused. To cure the flaw in the arrest of the accused
and the warrantless confiscation, Faller made it appear that the
accused were transporting marijuana in Bambang, Sta. Cruz,
Manilaand that they tailed the accused until Bambang Street, when in
truth and in fact, the three accused were illegally apprehended in
Camarin, Kalookan City, and they really have to pass through A.
Bonifacio Street, on their way to Western Police Headquarters at the
U.N. Avenue.
To avoid inconsistencies in their statements and oral declaration
in court, the other eight (8) members of the arresting team x x
x were not presented as witnesses and their testimonies were
withheld by the prosecution. We do not find any reason why not

one of them corroborated the testimony of SPO3 Faller.There is a

legal presumption that if an evidence is intentionally withheld
when there is opportunity to offer the same, (the said evidence) is
deemed to be adverse to the party withholding the same. Not a
single corroboration came for the said eight members of the arresting
team. (Emphasis ours)
[10]

That is all the appellants could say in assailing the credibility of prosecution star
witness SPO3 Jesus Faller. Nothing suggestion was mentioned about any
inconsistencies in the testimony of Faller.Neither was there any that Faller harbored illfeeling against the appellants.
The appellants allegations that (t)o cure the flaw in (their) arrest, SPO3 Jesus Faller
orchestrated his testimony and made it appear that the accused were transporting
marijuana in Bambang, Sta. Cruz, Manila and were arrested thereat, and that (t)o avoid
inconsistencies in their statements and oral declaration in court, the other eight (8)
members of the arresting team...were not presented as witnesses, are nothing but mere
conjectures and suspicions which have zero probative value. Conjectures and
suspicions are not evidence; ergo, they prove nothing.
Moreover, the testimonies of the other members of the apprehending team would, at
best, have been merely corroborative of Jesus Fallers testimony. Thus, the trial court
did not err in giving credence to the uncorroborated testimony of Jesus Faller and in
rejecting the appellants defense of alibi and denial.
There is no law requiring that a testimony of a witness be corroborated in order to
be believed. The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
produce a conviction. The failure to present all the eyewitnesses to an act does not
necessarily give rise to an unfavorable presumption, especially when the testimony of
the witness sought to be presented is merely corroborative. A corroborative testimony
is not necessary where the details of the crime have clearly been testified to with
sufficient clarity.
[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

The matter of selecting and presentingwitnesses for the People is a prerogative of

the public prosecutor. Thus, the non-presentation by the prosecution of certain
witnesses is not a valid defense for the accused, neither does it work against
theprosecutions cause. Where, as here, the accused believes that the testimonies of
said witnesses are important to his cause, as when he expects them to make
declarations inconsistent with that of the principal prosecution witness, then he should
avail of them even by compulsory judicial process if necessary.
[15]

[16]

[17]

In any case, the public prosecutors choice of SPO3 Jesus Faller as the only witness
to testify on the appellants arrest was proper.Faller was the one who received from the

informant the confidential information about the illegal drug trafficking activities of
appellant Leonardo Dulay. Since the said information was so confidential, Faller
placed appellant Dulay under police surveillance with only PO3 Ebia and their informant
as his (Fallers) companions. After a week of surveillance, the informant again reported
to Faller in the evening of 17 June 1994 that the appellants would deliver illegal drugs
that night to Bambang on board a vehicle, and it was Faller who also headed the nineman police team in tailing the appellants and arresting them after finding the illegal
drugs in their possession. Thus, Faller was the bestwitness to testify on the
circumstances of the appellants arrest.
[18]

[19]

[20]

We have carefully examined the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller to determine

whether or not his testimony is a product of fabrication andwe find his testimony to be
credible. Moreover, being a law enforcer, Faller is presumed to have regularly
performed his duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. We fully agree with the
observation of the trial court when it said:
[21]

Apart from their inherently weak defense, the three accused have not
provided this Court with any other ground to warrant disbelief of the testimony
of SPO3 Jesus Faller. They have not as much as hinted that SPO3 Jesus
Faller was ill-motivated in testifying against them.This witness of the People is
a police officer. As such he is presumed to have carried out and performed
regularly his official duties, especially in the absence of any indication in the
record showing otherwise. It has not been claimed that SPO3 Jesus Faller
has a personal stake and interest in the final outcome of this case, or that he
would be benefited or some personal advantage would inure to him if the
three accused were convicted. Whatever is the result of this case he would
continue to receivehis usual remuneration as a police officer.More than these,
SPO3 Jesus Faller has been subjected to a lengthy and searching crossexamination by an able and determined defense counsel de parte, such that
any falsehood in his narration could have been easily detected and
exposed. However, he came out from the ordeal with his narration unimpaired
and maintained.
It is a familiar rule consistently applied by the Supreme Court in a long line of
cases, thereby making further citations academic, that where there appears
no evidence in the record indicating that the principal prosecution witness has
been actuated by improper motive in testifying against the accused, the
presumption is that he has not been so actuated and his testimony is entitled
to full faith and belief.

The contentions of the defense that on June 18, 1994, at about 5:00 oclock in
the afternoon, Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa rushed the gravely ill six
months old son of the former to the Metropolitan Hospital located at
Magdalena Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, according to Leonardo Dulay (TSN,
Dec. 13, 1994, p. 11), or at the corner of Masangkay and Mayhaligue Streets,
according to Antonio Correa (TSN, Dec. 19, 1994, p. 22), and that at around
11:00 oclock in the evening on the same date they returned to Camarin in
Caloocan City to get the things of the child, but they were not able to do so
because elements of the Western Police District Command, who were waiting
near the house of Leonardo Dulay, arrested them (TSN, Dec. 13, 1994, pp. 12
& 15; Id., Dec. 19, 1994, pp. 23-26), do not deserve belief by this Court.Aside
from the observed discrepancy in their testimonies about the location of the
Metropolitan Hospital, the Booking Sheets and Arrest Reports (Exhibits E and
G) conclusively reveal that as early as 4:00 oclock in the morning on June 18,
1994, they had been in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Western Police District Command at U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, undergoing
police investigation. Although objected to by the defense counsel on the
ground that Antonio Correa and Leonardo Dulay signed Exhibits E and G,
respectively, without the assistance of counsel, these documents, however,
were offered by the prosecution and admitted by the Court only for the
purpose of showing that a police investigation was conducted following the
arrest of the two accused. The signatures of the two accused on these
documents are, thus, immaterial and will not alter the fact that they were in the
Office of the DEU-WPDC at U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, from 4:00 oclock in
the morning on June 18, 1994, being investigated by the police authorities in
connection with the offense now in question.
One more thing. The clear implication of the claim of the defense is that the
sick child of Leonardo Dulay was confined in the Metropolitan Hospital,
otherwise its contention that Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa went back to
Camarin, Caloocan City to get the things of the child would bear no
sense. The hospital records of said child are, therefore, the best evidence
which would conclusively confirm their pretense. Surprisingly, however, and
for no stated reason, the defense failed to offer in the evidence those hospital
records of the son of Leonardo Dulay. The significance of this omission is fatal
to the cause of the defense. It means that there were no such hospital records
because no child of Leonardo Dulay was hospitalized on or about June 18,

1994, and that this was merely fabricated by the defense to provide some
loopholes through which these two accused may elude the law.
The alibi of Rito Gunida that he was sleeping in his house at Camarin II, Area
D, Caloocan City, on June 17, 1994, when at around midnight he was
awakened and arrested by some policemen cannot outweigh and prevail over
the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller that he and his co-police officers arrested
this accused, together with Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa, on June 18,
1994, at more or less, 3:45 oclock in the morning at Bambang Extension
corner Jose Abad Santos Avenue in Tondo, Manila, in the act of delivering and
transporting marijuana, using a motorized vehicle. In weighing conflicting
statements and declarations of opposing witnesses, the accepted rule
consistently applied by the courts is that where the testimony of the principal
witness of the prosecution regarding the commission by the accused of the
offense in question is positive, clear and trustworthy, like in the case at bar,
the latters denials and explanation cannot outweigh and prevail over such
positive, clear and trustworthy evidence of the prosecution. (People vs.
Chavez, et al., 117 SCRA 221, 227; People vs. Campana, 124 SCRA 271,
281.)
The attempt of the defense to corroborate its claim that the three accused
were arrested in Camarin, Caloocan City, and not in Bambang Extension
corner of Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, with the testimonies of
Marilene de la Rosa, Violeta Almugela, Juanita Balino, Rogelio Altisi and
Pascual Gillego, did not provide any improvement to its weak and crippled
position.
Marilene de la Rosa is the niece of Leonardo Dulay who finances her studies.
(TSN, Jan. 9, 1995, p. 4.) In view of her close relationship with her uncle and
the financial support he extends to her, it would be unnatural if she does not
feel a very strong bias in favor of her uncle and provider.
Violeta Almugela contradicted the testimonies of Leonardo Dulay and Antonio
Correa on a vital aspect of their defense. In the course of her direct
examination, she declared:
ATTY. MORALES (Defense counsel)
Madam witness, where were you on June 17, 1994, at about midnight?

A: I was at the Hospital, sir.

Q: What Hospital are you referring to?
A: Infant Jesus, sir.
Q: What time did you arrive at Infant Jesus Hospital?
A: At 5:00, sir.
Q: Who were with you when you arrived?
A: I was with Boy Dulay and Josephine Dulay and a certain Antonio, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q: Where did you proceed?
A: We proceeded to Metro Hospital, sir.
Q: Where is that situated?
A: At Tayuman, Tondo, sir. (TSN, Jan. 9, 1995, pp. 12-14.)
Leonardo Dulay, on the other hand, declared under the direct examination of his counsel:
Q: Where is that Metropolitan Hospital situated?
A: In Magdalena, sir.
Q: Magdalena what?
A: At Magdalena, Sta. Cruz, Manila, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q: When did you bring your son to the Metropolitan Hospital?
A: On June 18, sir.
Q: What time?
A: 5:00 oclock, sir. (TSN, Dec. 13, 1994, pp. 11-12)
There was no mention in the testimony of Leonardo Dulay that his sick son was first taken to
the Infant Jesus Hospital at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on June 18, 1994.

Antonio Correa, testifying on the same incident, gave another version. He declared:
Q: Where is Metropolitan Hospital?
A: At Masangkay corner Mayhaligue Street.
Q: What City?
A: Manila, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q: Why did you go to Metropolitan Hospital?
A: In order to have the child of Leonardo Dulay medically attended, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q: What time did you bring the son of Dulay to the Metropolitan Hospital?
A: From 5:00 oclock in the afternoon up to past 11:00 oclock.

xxxxxxxxx
Q: Now, what time did you leave the Metropolitan Hospital?
A: Past 11:00 oclock, sir. (TSN, Dec. 19, 1994, pp. 22-23)

The discrepancies in the testimonies of defense witness Violeta

Almugela, accused Leonardo Dulay and accused Antonio Correa
cannot be lightly ignored as discrepancies in minor details, because
such alleged incident forms a major link in the defense of the accused,
and the main basis of their alibi defense.
The testimony of Juanita Balino deserves but a passing consideration
by this Court.According to her on June 17, 1994, at about midnight she
was in her house in Camarin Petchayan, Caloocan City, when Boy
Dulay, Antonio Correa, Gunida and one Violeta Almugela were taken by
armed police officers. But because after they passed by she got afraid
she went back to sleep. (TSN, Jan. 9, 1995, p. 23-24.) Her testimony
was so trivial, such that even the Assistant Prosecutor found her
unworthy for further cross-examination.

We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity

to our common knowledge, usual observation, and daily experience. To
be worthy of credence, the testimony of a witness should be so natural,
reasonable and probable in view of the event which it describes or to
which it relates, so as to make it easy for the mind to accept. In this
case, despite the startling occurrence which happened before her
eyes, which even scared her, Juanita Balino nonchalantly went back to
sleep, unconcerned with what may happen next.This is not the usual
way a person of her age, 57 years old, and status conducts himself(sic)
in the face of a shocking event.
Rogelio A. Altis, Sr., a barangay kagawad of Barangay 178, Zone 15, of
Caloocan City, had no personal knowledge of the alleged incident
which supposedly took place at about midnight on June 17, 1994. He
learned it only on June 20, 1994, when one Ursula Gunida reported it
to him. (TSN, Jan. 11, 1995, p. 3) It has not been explained why it took
Ursula Gunida until June 20, 1994 to report to the barangay authorities
the incident which allegedly happened on June 17, 1994.
The same may be said with respect to the testimony of defense
witness Pascual Gillego. He admitted that he learned of the alleged
arrest of the three accused only from his neighbors. But he took no
steps to report the matter to his superiors in the barangay. x x x. (TSN,
Jan. 11, 1995, pp. 6, 9).
The testimonies of Rogelio Altis, Sr. and Pascual Gillego are hearsay,
and as such it has no probative value and should be disregarded
whether objected to or not. If no objection is made, it becomes
evidence only by reason of want of such objection, but its admission
does not confer upon it any new attribute in point of weight. Its nature
and quality remains the same, so far as its intrinsic weakness and
incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned. (People vs. Valero,
112 SCRA 661, 675.)
[22]

We should accord great weight and respect to the findings of fact of the trial court
which is in a better position to determine questions involving the credibility of witnesses,
it having directly heard them and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
In the absence of any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial
facts which would alter the conviction of the appellants, we do not find any reason to
overturn the trial courts findings as to facts.
[23]

What is of paramount importance in the present case is the positive identification by

prosecution witness SPO3 Jesus Faller of the three (3) appellants, who were caught in
flagrante delicto transporting the subject dried marijuana flowering tops. This should
prevail over the appellants alibi and denials of having committed the crime with which
they were charged in the lower court, since as between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witness and the negative statements of the appellants, the former deserves
more credence.
[24]

In the second, and final assigned error, the appellants assail the admission of the
seized marijuana flowering tops as evidence against them, arguing that the same was
the fruit of an illegal search conducted without any search warrant.
The appellants contention is untenable.However, it would serve no useful purpose
to discuss at length this alleged error, for the following reasons:

(1) The appellants are now precluded from assailing the warrantless search
and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation
during the search and seizure. The appellants never protested when SPO3
Jesus Faller, after identifying himself as a police officer, opened the tin can
loaded in the appellants vehicle and found eight (8) bundles.[25] And when
Faller opened one of the bundles, it smelled of marijuana.[26] The NBI later
confirmed the eight (8) bundles to be positive for marijuana.[27] Again, the
appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their cargo of
drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation and
subsequent prosecution. We have ruled in a long line of cases[28] that:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it
made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
vol. I, page 631). The right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.
(2) The appellants effectively waived their constitutional right against the
search and seizure in question by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and
by participating in the trial.[29]
We agree with the trial court that the appellants conspired to commit the offense
which they knew to be unlawful:

The established circumstances of this case, considered collectively,

demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the conspiracy among the three
accused to commit the offense at bar. They were apprehended at the
same time; travelling together in a motorized vehicle from the time they
were first spotted by the arresting police officers at A. Bonifacio Street
until their actual arrest at Bambang Extension corner Jose Abad
Santos Avenue in Tondo, Manila; at an unholy hour of the night (until)
around 3:00 to 3:45 oclock in the morning on June 18,1994; with
Antonio Correa at the steering wheel, Leonardo Dulay seated in front
beside the driver and Rito Gunida seated at the back of the motor
vehicle; carrying for delivery and transportation a large quantity of dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in tightly with plastic tapes and
concealed in a big tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Oil (Exhibit B).
These factors leave the mind of this Court at ease and free from any
doubt that indeed the three accused had conspired and helped one
another in the delivery and transportation of the said contraband.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6425 provides:
Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescibed
by this Act for the commission of the offence shall be imposed in
case of any attempt or conspiracy commit the same in the
following cases:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous
drugs;
xxx xxx xxx

[30]

It was also duly established that the total weight of the dried marijuana flowering
tops involved in this case is 16.1789 kilograms as testified to by NBI Forensic Chemist
Emilia A. Rosales.
[31]

The only error committed by the trial court, as we stated in the beginning, is its
imposition of the death penalty on the appellants. Although this matter is not assigned
as an error by the appellants, however, in a criminal case, an appeal to this Court
throws the whole case open to review and it becomes our duty to correct an error as
may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether it is made the subject of
assignment of errors or not.
[32]

The trial court considered the appellants use of a motor vehicle in the commission
of the offense as an aggravating circumstance, thus raising the penalty from reclusion
perpetuawhich is the imposable penalty prescribed by law to death. Justifying the
penalty of death, the trial court made the following observation:
[33]

In view of the volume of dried marijuana flowering tops involved in this

case, and the attendance of the aggravating circumstance that the
crime was committed by means of a motor vehicle, the Court, with
deep regret and sorrow, finds no other alternative but to impose on
each of the three accused the supreme penalty of death and fine
prescribed by law. Undoubtedly the three accused used an owner-type
jeep with plate No. FMR 948 as a means to carry, deliver and transport
their illegal merchandise; to elude detection of their drug trafficking
activities by the police authorities; and to facilitate escape in case their
crime is discovered. (People vs. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400.) (Emphasis
ours)
[34]

True, Section 20, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code considers as aggravating
circumstance a situation when the crime be committed x x x by means of motor
vehicles, airships, or other similar means. However, the use by the appellants of a motor
vehicle in this case should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because
the very act of transporting the prohibited drug is what is being punished under Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended
by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 (the heinous crimes law). The said law provides:

SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation

of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any
of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved
in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death
of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed. (Emphasis ours)
The act of transporting a prohibited drug, like the one at bar, is a malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The use of a motor
[35]

vehicle is inherent in the crime of transporting the prohibited drug. It is a wrongful act
because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be
considered a wrong. As such, the merecommission of said act is constitutive of the
offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught
committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.
[36]

[37]

[38]

Admittedly, the law does not define how the act of transporting can be committed.
But, how else can one transport something to another place except by the use of a
carrier. Blacks Law Dictionary defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to
another. Under Section 4, Transportation of Prohibited Drugs is by itself an
offense. Again, Black defines transportation as the movement of goods or persons from
one place to another, by a carrier. The operative words in the definition are to carry or
convey. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the
act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of
destination is reached.
[39]

[40]

[41]

[42]

Simply stated, the motor vehicle which was used to transport prohibited drugs was
not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime since such act of
transporting constitutes the crime itself, punishable under Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. That a motor vehicle was used in committing the
crime is merely incidental to the act of transporting prohibited drugs. The use of a motor
vehicle is inherent in the crime of transporting as it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof; hence, such use is not an aggravating circumstance.
Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 7659, reads:

Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating

circumstances and of habitual delinquency. Mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for
the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with
the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime
specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a
crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account
for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
xxxxxxxxx

2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating

circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of
necessity accompany the commission thereof.
xxxxxxxxx

(Emphasis ours)
The case of People vs. Espejo cited by the trial court in support of its ruling that the
use of a motor vehicle in this case is an aggravating circumstance, is one for robbery
with homicide punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which has an entirely different
factual setting and, therefore, the ruling therein should not be applied in the case at
bench. In any event, the finding of the trial court that the appellants use of the motor
vehicle was intended to elude detection of their drug trafficking activities by the police
authorities and to facilitate escape in case their crime is discovered is baseless. The
prosecution failed to establish this matter. Such intention cannot simply be presumed
but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the crime itself.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance which attended the
commission of the offense in this case, and considering that the quantity of the subject
prohibited drug exceeded 750 grams, the proper penalty that should be imposed on
each of the appellants isreclusion perpetua and a fine of Ten Million Pesos.
[43]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, in
Criminal Case No. 94-137528 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that the accusedappellants ANTONIO CORREA y CAYTON, RITO GUNIDA y SESANTE and
LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in its
entire duration. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[1]

Otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

[2]

RTC record, p. 1.

[3]

Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[4]

Penned by Judge Ramon P. Makasiar; RTC record, pp. 131-154.

[5]

Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), hearing of 22 November 1994, p. 3.

[6]

Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[7]

Rollo, pp. 118-120.

[8]

RTC record, p. 136.

[9]

Appellants Brief, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 57-58.

[10]

Appellants Brief, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 67-68.

[11]

People vs. Marilao, 177 SCRA 271, 278.

[12]

Ibid., citing People vs. Cortez, G.R. No. L-32246, 30 June 1988; People vs. Trigo, 174 SCRA 93.

[13]

Ibid., citing People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401.

[14]

Ibid.

Ibid., citing People vs. Obenque, 147 SCRA 488; People vs. Laureta, 159 SCRA 256; People vs. Pinto,
230 SCRA 847, 857.
[15]

[16]

Ibid.

[17]

Ibid.

[18]

TSN, 22 November 1994, p. 16.

[19]

Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[20]

Ibid., pp. 17-23.

[21]

People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646.

[22]

Rollo, pp. 25-30.

[23]

People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414.

[24]

People vs. Melgar, 157 SCRA 718.

[25]

TSN, 22 November 1994, p. 21.

[26]

Ibid., p. 8.

[27]

Ibid., pp. 9-11; Exhibits D and D1.

People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 113474, 13 December 1994, 239 SCRA 174, 184; People vs. Ramos,
et al., G.R. Nos. 101804-07, 25 May 1993, 222 SCRA 557, 575; People vs. Tabar, G.R. No. 101124, 17
May 1993, 222 SCRA 144; People vs. Malasugui, No. 44335, 30 July 1936, 63 Phil. 221: Vda de
Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938]; People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 [1991]; People vs. Rodrigueza,
205 SCRA 791 [1992]; People vs. Omaweng, G. R. No. 99050, 02 September 1992, 213 SCRA 462-463.
[28]

[29]

People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 306, 315 [1994], citing People vs. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990].

[30]

RTC Decision, pp 21-22; Rollo, pp 33-34.

[31]

TSN, 15 November 1994, pp. 9-10.

[32]

People vs. Olfindo, et al., 47 Phil. 1; People vs.Borbano, 76 Phil. 702, 708.

Sec. 4, Art. II, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 7659, in relation to Sec. 20, Art.
IV, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Sec. 17, R.A. No. 7659.
[33]

[34]

Decision, p. 23; Rollo, p. 35.

[35]

People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et.al.,G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 122, 130.

[36]

Ibid.

[37]

Ibid.

[38]

Ibid.

[39]

1979 edition, p. 1344.

[40]

Ibid. (Emphasis ours).

[41]

People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al., supra.

[42]

Ibid.

Sec. 4, Art. II, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 7659, in relation to Sec. 20, Art.
IV, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Sec. 17, R.A. No. 7659.
[43]

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005]

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD

(MTRCB),petitioner,
vs. ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING
CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA,respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Court, as amended, filed by petitioner Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) against ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN)
and former Senator Loren Legarda, respondents, assailing the (a)Decision dated

November 18, 1997,[1] and (b)Order dated August 26, 2002 [2] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-93-16052.
The facts are undisputed.
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired Prostituition, an episode of the television (TV) program The Inside Story produced and hosted
by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to
enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student
prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The
Philippine Womens University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students
involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served
as the background of the episode.
The showing of The Inside Story caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia
P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and
Teachers Association filed letter-complaints [3] with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants
alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the
harassment of some of its female students.
Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal
complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that
respondents (1) did not submit The Inside Story to petitioner for its review
and (2) exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 7 [4] of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986[5] and Section 3,[6] Chapter III and Section 7,
[7]
Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations.[8]
In their answer,[9] respondents explained that the The Inside Story is a public affairs
program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, the airing of which
is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the
press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any
form of prior restraint upon respondents.
On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties memoranda, the
MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the respondents are ordered to pay the
sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for non-submission of the
program, subject of this case for review and approval of the MTRCB.

Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other programs of
the ABS-CBN Channel 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of
Review and Approval before showing; otherwise the Board will act accordingly.[10]
On appeal, the Office of Atty. Henrietta S. Mendez, Chairman of the MTRCB, issued
a Decision dated March 12, 1993 affirming the above ruling of its Investigating
Committee.[11] Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a
Resolution dated April 14, 1993. [12]
Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City. It seeks to: (1)declare as unconstitutional
Sections 3(b),[13]3(c),[14] 3(d),[15] 4,[16] 7,[17] and 11[18] of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, [19] 7,
[20]
and 28[21] (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations; [22] (2) (in the alternative) exclude
the The Inside Story from the coverage of the above cited provisions; and (3) annul and
set aside the MTRCB Decision dated March 12, 1993 and Resolution dated April 14,
1993. Respondents averred that the above-cited provisions constitute prior restraint on
respondents exercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and, therefore,
unconstitutional. Furthermore, the above cited provisions do not apply to the The Inside
Storybecause it falls under the category of public affairs program, news documentary, or
socio-political editorials governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers.
On November 18, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision [23] in favor of respondents,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the assailed Decision and Resolution of
MTRCB dated March 12, 1993;
2. DECLARING AND DECREEING that Sections 3 (b), (c), and (d), 4, 7, and 11 of
P.D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7, 28 (a) of its Implementing Rules do not cover the TV
Program The Inside Story and other similar programs, they being public affairs
programs which can be equated to newspapers; and
3. MAKING PERMANENT the Injunction against Respondents or all persons acting
in their behalf.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. [24]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all
television programs, including public affairs programs, news documentaries, or sociopolitical editorials, are subject to petitioners power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D.
No. 1986 and pursuant to this Courts ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals;
[25]
second, television programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers,
thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former; third, petitioners
power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not
amount to prior restraint; and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate
respondents constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.
Respondents take the opposite stance.
The issue for our resolution is whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to
review the The Inside Story prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The present controversy brings into focus the provisions of Section 3 of P. D. No.
1986, partly reproduced as follows:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:
xxxxxx
b) To screen, review and examine allmotion pictures as herein defined,television
programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills,
whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or nontheatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or
produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing
or for export.
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the
importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease exhibition
and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD
applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for
being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency
to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not
limited to:

xxx
d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the importation,
exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television
broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the
end and that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the
BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be
imported, exported, produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited
and/or broadcast by television;
x x x x x x.
Vis-a-vis the foregoing provisions, our task is to decide whether or not petitioner has
the power to review the television program The Inside Story. The task is not Herculean
because it merely resurrects this Court En Bancs ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of
Appeals.[26]There, the Iglesia ni Cristo sought exception from petitioners review power
contending that the term television programs under Sec. 3 (b) does not include religious
programs which are protected under Section 5, Article III of the Constitution. [27] This
Court, through Justice Reynato Puno, categorically ruled that P.D. No. 1986 gives
petitioner the power to screen, review and examine all television programs,emphasizing
the phrase all television programs, thus:

The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine alltelevision
programs. By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to approve, delete x
x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x television
programs x x x. The law also directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard to determine those which are objectionable for being
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of
the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.
Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling
reason apparent in the law to justify it.[28] Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos.
Thus, when the law says all television programs, the wordall covers all television
programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. [29] The principle
assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or
expression.[30]
It then follows that since The Inside Story is a television program, it is within the
jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.

Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the term television
programson the ground that the The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial protected under Section 4, [31] Article III of the
Constitution. Albeit, respondents basis is not freedom of religion, as in Iglesia ni Cristo,
[32]
but freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling inIglesia ni Cristo applies
squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court
declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred statusby the framers of
our fundamental laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x. Yet
despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this
Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristosreligious program from petitioners review
power.
Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has
been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression
and of the press has apreferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the
jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no
justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to respondents, is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a
freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1)television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels. Thus:

SEC. 7. Unauthorized showing or exhibition. It shall be unlawful for any person or

entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in any moviehouse, theatre, or public place or
by television within the Philippines any motion picture, television program or
publicity material, including trailers, and stills for lobby displays in connection with
motion pictures, not duly authorized by the owner or his assignee and passed by the
BOARD; or to print or cause to be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in
any theater or public place or by television a label or notice showing the same to have
been officially passed by the BOARD when the same has not been previously
authorized, except motion pictures, television programs or publicity material
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and
agencies, and newsreels.

Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents contend that the The

Inside Storyfalls under the category of newsreels.
Their contention is unpersuasive.
P. D. No. 1986 does not define newsreels. Websters dictionary defines newsreels
as short motion picture films portraying or dealing with current events. [33] A glance at
actual samples of newsreels shows that they are mostly reenactments of events that
had already happened. Some concrete examples are those of Dziga Vertovs
Russian Kino-Pravda newsreel series (Kino-Pravda means literally film-truth, a term that
was later translated literally into the French cinema verite) and Frank Capras Why We
Fight series.[34] Apparently, newsreels are straight presentation of events. They are
depiction
of
actualities.
Correspondingly,
the
MTRCB
Rules
and
Regulations[35] implementing P. D. No. 1986 define newsreels as straight news
reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk
shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels.[36] Clearly, the The Inside
Storycannot be considered a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs program which is
described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and
news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. [37] Certainly, such
kind of program is within petitioners review power.
It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has
authority to review The Inside Story. Clearly, we are not called upon to determine
whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution
providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or
the press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program. Neither did
it cancel respondents permit. Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to
submit to petitioner The Inside Storyfor its review and approval. Therefore, we need not
resolve whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution.
Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTCs ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11
of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations
are unconstitutional. It is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity
of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question
must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or
controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.[38]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Decision dated
November 18, 1997 and Order dated August 26, 2002 are hereby REVERSED. The

Decision dated March 12, 1993 of petitioner MTRCB is AFFIRMED. Costs against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1]

Penned by Judge Normandie B. Pizarro, Rollo at 73-81.

[2]

Id. at 86-91.

[3]

Dated October 28, 1991

[4]

SECTION 7. Unauthorized showing or exhibition. It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or cause to
be exhibited in any moviehouse, theater or public place or television within the Philippines any motion
picture, television program or publicity material, including trailers, and stills for lobby displays in connection
with motion pictures, not duly authorized by the owner or is assignee and passed by the BOARD; or to print
or cause to be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater or public place or by television a
label or notice showing the same to have been officially passed by the BOARD when the same has not been
previously authorized, except motion pictures, television programs or publicity material imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels.

[5]

Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board.

[6]

SECTION 3. MATTERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW All motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, as
defined in Chapter 1 hereof, whether these be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for television
broadcast or general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they
be for local viewing or for export, shall be subject to review by the BOARD before they are exported,
imported, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcast by television;

[7]

SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW No motion picture, television program or related publicity
material shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcast by
television without prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture, television program or
publicity material.

[8]

Approved on July 27, 1993.

[9]

Dated November 18, 1991.

[10]

Annex D at 1, Petition, Rollo at 92.

[11]

Rollo at 92-99.

[12]

Id. at 100-106.

[13]

b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including
publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity
materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing,
imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for
export;

[14]

c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portionsfrom and/or prohibit the importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the
board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or
its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime,
such as but not limited to:

[15]

d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the importation, exportation, production,
copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be imported,
exported, produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;

[16]

SECTION 4. Decision. The decision of the BOARD eitherapproving or disapproving for exhibition in the
Philippines a motion picture, television program, still and other pictorial advertisement submitted to it for
examination and review must be rendered within a period of ten (10) days which shall be counted from the
date of receipt by the BOARD of an application for the purpose, together with motion picture, television
program, still or other pictorial advertisement to be reviewed.

[17]

Supra.

[18]

SECTION 11. Penalty. Any person who violates the provisions of this Decree and/or the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the BOARD, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a mandatory penalty of three (3)
months and one day to one (1) year imprisonment plus a fine of not less than fifty thousand pesos. The
penalty shall apply whether the person shall have committed the violation either as principal, accomplice or
accessory. If the offender is an alien, he shall be deported immediately. The license to operate the
moviehouse, theater, or television station shall also be revoked. Should the offense be committed by a
juridical person, the chairman, the president, secretary, treasurer, or the partner responsible therefore, shall
be the persons penalized.

[19]

Supra.

[20]

SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. No motion picture, television program or related publicity
material shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcast by
television without prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture, television program or
publicity material.

[21]

SECTION 28. OFFENSES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES Without prejudice to the institution of appropriate
criminal action, violations of the laws and rules governing motion pictures, television programs, and related
publicity materials shall be administratively penalized with suspension or cancellation of permits and
licenses issued by the BOARD, depending on the gravity of the offense or in lieu thereof, the Chairman of
the BOARD or the Hearing and Adjudication Committee, in his or its discretion, allow the payment of an
administrative fine by the guilty party. The imposition of the administrative penalties for violation of
Presidential Decree 1986 of its rules shall be in accordance with the table of penalties duly promulgated by
the BOARD.

[22]

Approved on December 19, 1985.

[23]

Rollo at 73-81.

[24]

RTC Order dated August 26, 2002, Rollo at 82-85.

[25]

G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529.

[26]

Supra.

[27]

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.

[28]

Tolentino vs. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948).

[29]

See Olfato vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741.

[30]

Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Third Edition, 1995, at 153.

[31]

SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.

[32]

Supra.

[33]

Merriam Websters Third New International Dictionary(1993 Phil. Copyright).

[34]

Documentary Film, Wikipedia Encyclopedia, December 21, 2004, http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Documentary_film.

The newsreel tradition is an important tradition in documentary film; newsreels were also
sometimes staged but were usually reenactments of events that had already happened, not attempts to
steer events as they were in the process of happening. For instance, much of the battle footage from the
early 20th century was staged the cameramen would usually arrive on site after a major battle and reenact
scenes to film them.
In the Kino-Pravda series, Vertov focused on everyday experiences, eschewing bourgeois
concerns and filming marketplaces, bars, and schools instead, sometimes with a hidden camera, without
asking permission first. The stories were typically descriptive, not narrative, and included vignettes and
exposes, showing for instance the renovation of a trolley system, the organization of farmers into
communes, and the trial of Social Revolutionaries; one story shows starvation in the nascent Marxist state.
Vertovs driving vision was to capture film-truth that is, fragments of actuality, which when organized together,
have a deeper truth that cannot be seen with the naked eye. (Dziga Vertov, Wikipedia Encyclopedia,
December 21, 2004, http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dziga-Vertov.)

[35]

Promulgated on August 22, 1993.

[36]

Section 1(m), Chapter I, 1993 Implementing Rules and Regulations.

[37]

TSN, September 2, 1994 at 13-14; see Rollo at 159.

[38]

Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, G. R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236.