KAPATIRAN vs.

CALLEJA
Facts: The petitioner, Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division seeks a review
of the resolution of public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, dismissing its appeal from the Order of the MedArbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah ordering a certification election to be conducted
among the regular daily paid rank and file employees/workers of Universal
Robina Corporation-Meat and Canning Division to determine which of the
contending unions: a) Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division TUPAS Local
Chapter No. 1027; b) Meat and Canning Division New Employees and
Workers United Labor Organization (or NEW ULO for brevity); c) No union,
shall be the bargaining unit of the daily wage rank and file employees in the
Meat and Canning Division of the company.
From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning Division of the
Universal Robina Corporation, with a 3-year collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) which was to expire on November 15, 1987. Within the freedom period
of 60 days prior to the expiration of its CBA, TUPAS filed an amended notice
of strike on September 28, 1987 as a means of pressuring the company to
extend, renew, or negotiate a new CBA with it.
The NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to the IGLESIA NI
KRISTO sect, registered as a labor union. On October 12, 1987, the TUPAS
staged a strike. ROBINA obtained an injunction against the strike, resulting in
an agreement to return to work and for the parties to negotiate a new CBA.
The next day, October 13, 1987, NEW ULO, claiming that it has the majority
of the daily wage rank and file employees numbering 191, filed a petition
for a certification election at the Bureau of Labor Relations. TUPAS moved to
dismiss the petition for being defective in form and that the members of the
NEW ULO were mostly members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which three (3)
years previous refused to affiliate with any labor union. It also accused the
company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS bargaining rights. On
November 17, 1987, the Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification
election within 20 days. TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR). In the meantime, it was able to negotiate a new 3-year CBA with
ROBINA, which was signed on December 3, 1987 and to expire on November
15, 1990. On January 27, 1988, respondent BLR Director Calleja dismissed
the appeal. TUPAS motion for reconsideration was denied on March 17,
1988. On April 30, 1988, it filed this petition alleging that the public
respondent acted in excess of her jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiters order for a certification election.
Issue: WON public respondent acted in excess of her jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiters order for a
certification election? NO

Ratio: The public respondent did not err in dismissing the petitioners appeal.
This Courts decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,
upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a
labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the
members of that sect from forming their own union. The public respondent
correctly observed that the recognition of the tenets of the sect x x x
should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by
the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation. The
fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the
rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS claim to majority status, by filing
a timely petition for certification election before TUPAS old CBA expired and
before it signed a new CBA with the company. As pointed out by Med-Arbiter
Abdullah, a certification election is the best forum in ascertaining
the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers
themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative thru
secret ballot. Since it has not been shown that this order is tainted with
unfairness, this Court will not thwart the holding of a certification election.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP vs. LAGUESMA
Facts: Petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) is
engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber products, with principal
place of operations at Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. It has over 9,0005
employees, 9446 of whom are supervisory and technical staff employees.
More or less 487 of these supervisory and technical staff employees are
signatory members of the private respondent PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and
Technical Staff Employees Union (PBSTSEU). PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for
Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes. In a Notice, the initial hearing of the
petition was set on August 18, 1989 but it was reset to August 25, 1989, at
the instance of PICOP, as it requested a fifteen (15) day period within which
to file its comments and/or position paper. But PICOP failed to file any
comment or position paper.
Private respondents Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and Associated Labor
Union (ALU) filed their respective petitions for intervention. Med-Arbiter
Arturo L. Gamolo issued an Order granting the petitions for interventions of
the FFW and ALU. Another order issued on the same day set the holding of a
certification election among PICOPs supervisory and technical staff
employees in Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, with four (4) choices, namely: (1)
PBSTSEU; (2) FFW; (3) ALU; and (4) no union. PICOP appealed the Order
which set the holding of the certification election contending that the MedArbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case without

giving PICOP the opportunity to file its comments/answer, and that PBSTSEU
had no personality to file the petition for certification election. After PBSTSEU
filed its comments to petitioners appeal, the Secretary of the Labor issued a
resolution which upheld the Med-Arbiters order, with modification allowing
the supervising and staff employees in Cebu, Davao and Iligan City to
participate in the certification election. During the pre-election PICOP
questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section heads and
supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were reclassified
as managerial employees in the light of the reorganization effected by it.
Under the Revised Organizational Structure of the PICOP, the company was
divided into four (4) main business groups, namely: Paper Products Business,
Timber Products Business, Forest Resource Business and Support Services
Business. A vice-president or assistant vice-president heads each of these
business groups. A division manager heads the divisions comprising each
business group. A department manager heads the departments comprising
each division. Section heads and supervisors, now called section managers
and unit managers, head the sections and independent units, respectively,
comprising each department. PICOP advanced the view that considering the
alleged present authority of these section managers and unit managers to
hire and fire, they are classified as managerial employees, and hence,
ineligible to form or join any labor organization. Following the submission by
the parties of their respective position papers and evidence on this issue,
Med-Arbiter Phibun D. Pura issued an order, holding that supervisors and
section heads of the petitioner are managerial employees and therefore
excluded from the list of voters for purposes of certification election.
PBSTSEU appealed the order of the Med-Arbiter to the Office of the
Secretary, DOLE. ALU likewise appealed. Public respondent Bienvenido E.
Laguesma, acting as the then Undersecretary of Labor, issued the assailed
order setting aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and declaring that the
subject supervisors and section heads are supervisory employees eligible to
vote in the certification election. PICOP sought reconsideration of the order
dated. However, public respondent denied PICOPs motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: WON the public respondent HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, acted in excess of his
jurisdiction? NO
Ratio: PICOPs main thesis is that the positions Section Heads and
Supervisors, who have been designated as Section Managers and Unit
Managers, as the case maybe, were converted to managerial employees
under the decentralization and reorganization program it implemented in
1989. Being managerial employees, with alleged authority to hire and fire
employees, they are ineligible for union membership under Article 245 of the
Labor Code. Furthermore, PICOP contends that no malice should be imputed
against it for implementing its decentralization program only after the

petition for certification election was filed inasmuch as the same is a valid
exercise of its management prerogative, and that said program has long
been in the drawing boards of the company, which was realized only in 1989
and fully implemented in 1991. PICOP emphatically stresses that it could not
have conceptualized the decentralization program only for the purpose of
thwarting the right of the concerned employees to self-organization.
The petition, not being meritorious, must fail and the same should
be as it is hereby dismissed. In United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union
(UPSU) v. Laguesma, we had occasion to elucidate on the term managerial
employees. Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers,
Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers
have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and
operational policies while the task of First-Line Managers is simply
to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file
employees of an organization. Under this distinction, managerial
employees therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely, the managers per
se composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the supervisors composed
of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere fact that an employee is
designated manager does not ipso facto make him one.
Designation should be reconciled the actual job description of the
employee, for it is the job description that determines the nature of
employment.
In the petition before us, a thorough dissection of the job
description of the concerned supervisory employees and section
heads indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but
only supervisory employees since they do not lay down company
policies. PICOPs contention that the subject section heads and unit
managers exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite
misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not supreme but
merely advisory in character. Theirs is not a final determination of the
company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative
to hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of employees is
still subject to confirmation and approval by their respective superior. Thus,
where such power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is subject
to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other
higher executives of the company, the same, although present, is not
effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.
Further no denial of due process can be ascribed to public respondent
Undersecretary Laguesma for the latters denial to allow PICOP to present
additional evidence on the implementation of its program inasmuch as in the
appeal before the said public respondent, PICOP even then had already
submitted voluminous supporting documents. The record of the case is
replete with position papers and exhibits that dealt with the main thesis it

relied upon. What the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard.
PICOP has long harped on its contentions and these were dealt upon and
resolved in detail by public respondent Laguesma. We see no reason or
justification to deviate from his assailed resolutions for the reason that law
and jurisprudence aptly support them. Finally, considering all the foregoing,
the fact that PICOP voiced out its objection to the holding of certification
election, despite numerous opportunities to ventilate the same, only after
respondent Undersecretary of Labor affirmed the holding thereof, simply
bolstered the public respondents conclusion that PICOP raised the issue
merely to prevent and thwart the concerned section heads and supervisory
employees from exercising a right granted them by law. Needless to stress,
no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a
statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
BATANGAS- I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE vs. YOUNG
Facts:
G.R. No. 62386
Batangas-I Electric Cooperative Union filed with the DOLE, at San Pablo City,
a petition for certification election. The UNION alleged that it is a legitimate
labor organization; that the Batangas-I Electric Cooperative Inc. (BATELEC)
has 150 employees, more or less; that the UNION desires to represent the
regular rank and file employees of BATELEC for purposes of collective
bargaining; that there is no other union existing in BATELEC except the
UNION; that there is no certified collective bargaining agreement in the said
cooperative; and that there has been no certification election conducted in
BATELEC during the last twelve (12) months preceding the filing of the
petition. Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap issued a resolution which gave due
course to the petition and ordered the holding of a certification election.
BATELEC filed a motion for reconsideration of the Med-Arbiter's resolution
contending that there was a legal impediment to the holding of a
certification election considering that the formation of a union in a
cooperative is illegal and invalid, the officers and members of the union
being the owners thereof. On November 27, 1981, a resolution was issued by
Romeo A. Young, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, granting the
appeal and revoking the Med-Arbiter's order mandating the holding of a
certification election. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the
UNION filed the instant petition contending that the respondent Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations committed a palpable error of law and/or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of and/or in excess of jurisdiction in
finding and concluding that employees of an electric cooperative who are at
the same time members of the cooperative are not allowed to form or join a
labor union in the electric cooperative for purposes of collective bargaining,
and in revoking and setting aside the resolution dated August 20, 1981 of

the Med-Arbiter directing the holding of a certification election among the

rank and file employees of BATELEC.
G.R. No. 70880
The Federation of Free Workers (FFW) filed with the DOLE, at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a petition for certification election. The petition alleged, that the
FFW is a legitimate labor organization; that the Bulacan II Electric
Cooperative Inc. (BECO II) is engaged in the service and supply of electric
current and, therefore, an employer under the provisions of the Labor Code;
that the FFW seeks to be certified as the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the regular rank and file employees and workers
of BECO II for purposes of collective bargaining; that there are more or less
140 regular rank and file employees and workers of BECO II; that there is no
other union existing in BECO II except the FFW, and that there is no certified
collective bargaining agreement in said establishment; and that there has
been no certification election conducted in BECO II during the last twelve
(12) months preceding the filing of the petition. BECO II filed its answer
contending that the petition does not comply with the 30% jurisdictional
requirement considering that it has a total of 143 employees, 24 of whom
are members of the cooperative, 28 are managerial employees, 3 are
confidential employees, 23 are contractual employees and 28 are casual
employees, thereby leaving only 37 employees belonging to the rank and
file; and that to grant the petition would be violative of Article 244 (now
Article 243) of the Labor Code and Section 35 of PD 269. Later, the FFW filed
its position paper contending that it has complied substantially with the 30%
jurisdictional requirement with the 73 signatures it submitted and that there
is nothing in the law that prohibits or restricts cooperative members from
joining labor organizations. On the other hand, BECO II, through its position
paper contended that it is not among those covered by Article 244 of the
Labor Code, as amended by BP 70, as it is not a commercial, industrial or
agricultural enterprise and neither is it a religious, charitable, medical or
educational institution; that since electric cooperatives are subject to the
supervision and control of the National Electrification Administration
pursuant to PD 269, as amended by PD 1645, BECO II in effect is a
government institution; and that there is no representation issue as there is
no other labor organization involved except the FFW. Eliseo A. Peaflor, Chief
Med-Arbiter issued an order directing the holding of a certification election
among the rank and file employees and workers of BECO II. BECO II appealed
from this Order to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Director Cresenciano
Trajano of the said bureau dismissed the appeal and affirming the questioned
order. BECO II filed the instant petition contending that the public
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that under Article
244 (now Article 243) of the Labor Code, members and part owners of
electric cooperatives are eligible to form, join or assist labor organizations for
purposes of collective bargaining. A temporary restraining order was issued

by this Court enjoining the respondents from enforcing the questioned

orders.
G.R. No. 74560
The Federation of Free Workers (FFW) ALECO I Chapter filed a petition for
certification election, alleging, that it is a legitimate labor organization; that
the Albay Electric Cooperative I (ALECO I) is an electric cooperative servicing
electricity in the Province of Albay; that ALECO I has 160 employees, more or
less, majority of whom are FFW members; that there is no other union
existing nor a collective bargaining agreement existing in the cooperative;
that no certification election has been held for the past twelve (12) months
prior to the filing of the petition. The FFW submitted 63 signatures in support
of the petition for certification election. Counsel for ALECO I employees for a
"NO-UNION STAND" intervened and submitted a copy of the ALECO I 1985
budget showing that the said cooperative has a total of 141 rank and file
employees. The FFW filed its position paper contending that the ALECO I is
covered by the Labor Code: that it has a right to organize and be represented
by a union; that there is no legal impediment to the holding of a certification
election considering that out of the 141 rank and file employees, 63
supported the petition. ALECO I filed its position paper seeking the dismissal
of the petition on the allegation that FFW failed to comply with 30%
requirement considering that 112 rank and file employees have manifested
in a "declaration" they that do not desire to be represented by any union. As
intervenor (ALECO I employees for a "NO-UNION STAND") filed its position
paper seeking the dismissal of the petition, alleging that the 30% written
consent requirement has not been complied with. It alleged that of the 63
signatories to the petition, 51 are not qualified to join the union as they are
members-consumers of the ALECO I and are considered joint owners of the
cooperative pursuant to PD 269, and Art. II Sec. I of the revised bylaws of
ALECO I. FFW, in its reply argued that the 51 disputed signatories to the
petition are regular rank and file employees and workers of ALECO I and are
entitled to self organization under Article 244 (now Article 243) of the Labor
Code. The Med-Arbiter, finding that there was compliance with the 30%
subscription requirement, issued an order calling for a certification election.
ALECO I appealed from this order to the Bureau of Labor Relations. In the
meantime, the Association of Democratic Labor Organization (ADLO) moved
to intervene in the petition claiming that it has a legal interest to protect.
Cresenciano B. Trajano, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, rendered a
decision dismissing ALECO I's appeal for lack of merit, claiming that there
was a "clear proof of compliance with the 30% subscription requirement,
coupled with the finding that the subscribers to the petition who are
members/owners of the respondent cooperative can validly be eligible for
union membership."
Issue: WON employees of electric cooperatives are qualified to form or join
labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining? NO

Ratio: In Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Pura Ferrer-Calleja,
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, it was held that an employee of a
cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right
to collective bargaining. The decision in the case, inter alia, stated: x x x "A
cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an ordinary
business concern being run either by persons, partnerships, or
corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and
operate the business while the others are its employees. As above
stated, irrespective of the name of shares owned by its member they are
entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the affair of the cooperative.
Their share capital earn limited interests. They enjoy special privileges such
as exemption from income tax and sales taxes, preferential right to supply
their products to State agencies and even exemption from the minimum
wage laws. An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a
member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective
bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his
co-owners. The Solicitor General he correctly opined that employees of
cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative have
no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective
bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the cooperative.
However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not
members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to
exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining,
negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing
laws of the country." x x x Petitioner UNION admitted in its petition that its
officers and members are also members-consumers of the cooperative. Such
being the case, the employees belonging to petitioner UNION are not
qualified to form a labor organization and bargain collectively.
Employees of a cooperative who are not members thereof are entitled to
exercise the rights of all workers to form, join or assist labor organizations for
purposes of collective bargaining. Compliance with the jurisdictional
requirement makes it mandatory on the part of the Bureau of Labor Relations
to order the holding of a certification election in order to determine the
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees. With such, the Bureau is left
without any discretion but to order the holding of a certification election.