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G.R. No.

180282

April 11, 2011

CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO


PE BENITO, Petitioners,
vs.
PATROCINIO L. MARCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated January 31, 2007
and Resolution2 dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85471. The assailed
Decision reversed and set aside the July 15, 2005 decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 12581-14; while the assailed
Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners Crispin Dichoso,
Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie Dichoso Pe Benito.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way4 against
respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31219; while respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. As
petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed to
have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent,
however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners have been
granted another passageway by the spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses
Arce), the owners of another adjacent lot, designated as Lot No. 21559-B, the former
instituted the complaint before the RTC and prayed that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be
rendered:

Instead of filing an Answer, respondent moved 6 for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of lack of cause of action and noncompliance with the requisite certificate
of non-forum shopping.
During the hearing on respondents motion to dismiss, the parties agreed that an
ocular inspection of the subject properties be conducted. After the inspection, the RTC
directed the parties to submit their respective position papers.
In a resolution7 dated May 12, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss
and required the latter to answer petitioners complaint.
In his Answer,8 respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as
passageway. He stated that petitioners claim of right of way is only due to expediency
and not necessity. He also maintained that there is an existing easement of right of
way available to petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to
establish another easement over respondents property.
In an Order9 dated July 6, 2005, the RTC declared that respondents answer failed to
tender an issue, and opted to render judgment on the pleadings and thus deemed the
case submitted for decision.
On July 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision 10 in favor of petitioners, the dispositive
portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. granting plaintiffs a right of way over an area of 54 square meters more or
less over Lot 01 owned by defendant Patrocinio L. [Marcos] appearing in the
Laoag City Assessors sketch (Annex A) found on page 28 of the record of
the case;
2. ordering plaintiffs to pay defendant the amount of P54,000.00 as proper
indemnity; and
3. ordering the Register of Deeds of Laoag City to duly annotate this right of
way on defendants title to the property.

1. Granting the plaintiffs right of way over an area of 54 square meters more
or less of Lot 01 by paying the defendant the amount of P54,000.00, and that
the right be annotated on defendants title;

SO ORDERED.11

2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as


damages for attorneys fees and costs of suit;

The RTC found that petitioners adequately established the requisites to justify an
easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.
The trial court likewise declared petitioners in good faith as they expressed their
willingness to pay proper indemnity.12

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise sought.5

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and consequently
dismissed petitioners complaint. Considering that a right of way had already been
granted by the (other) servient estate, designated as Lot No. 21559-B and owned by
the Spouses Arce, the appellate court concluded that there is no need to establish an
easement over respondents property. The CA explained that, while the alternative
route through the property of the Spouses Arce is longer and circuitous, said access
road is adequate. It emphasized that the convenience of the dominant estate is never
the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. Thus, the opening of another
passageway is unjustified.13
Aggrieved, petitioners come before this Court, raising the following issues:
I.
CAN PETITIONERS BE ENTITLED TO A GRANT OF LEGAL EASEMENT
OF RIGHT OF WAY FROM THEIR LANDLOCKED PROPERTY THROUGH
THE PROPERTY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHICH IS THE SHORTEST
ROUTE IN GOING TO AND FROM THEIR PROPERTY TO THE PUBLIC
STREET AND WHERE THEY USED TO PASS?
II.
CAN RESPONDENT REFUSE TO GRANT A RIGHT OF WAY ON THE
DESIRED PASSAGEWAY WHICH HE CLOSED SINCE THERE IS
ANOTHER PASSAGEWAY WHICH IS MORE CIRCUITOUS AND
BURDENSOME AND IS BELATEDLY OFFERED UNTO PETITIONERS?

(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;


(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when, in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.15
The present case falls under the 7th exception, as the RTC and the CA arrived at
conflicting findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way is governed by Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code, quoted below for easy reference:16

III.
CAN PETITIONERS BE COMPELLED TO AVAIL OF A LEGAL EASEMENT
OF RIGHT OF WAY THROUGH THE PROPERTY OF ARCE WHICH WAS
BELATEDLY OFFERED BUT HAS BEEN FORECLOSED BY THE BANK
AND WHEREIN THE LATTER IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE?14
The petition is without merit.
It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before
it from the CA by virtue of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of
law. Findings of fact of the CA are conclusive upon this Court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons
and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous
for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the
estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient
estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the
damages caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietors own acts.

Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.17
Petitioners may be correct in the theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code, but they nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the
above-enumerated requirements.18
It must be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the
obligations imposed on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal
restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or
encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant
estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the
preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be
granted.19 Petitioners failed in this regard.
Admittedly, petitioners had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot
owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet in going to
and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and from the
public road.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to
pass through other lots owned by different owners before they could get to the
highway. We find petitioners concept of what is "adequate outlet" a complete disregard
of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of
right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of
setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.20
We quote with approval the CAs observations in this wise:

As it shows, [petitioners] had been granted a right of way through the adjacent estate
of Spouses Arce before the complaint below was even filed. [Respondent] alleged that
this right of way is being used by the other estates which are similarly situated as
[petitioners]. [Petitioners] do not dispute this fact. There is also a reason to believe that
this right of way is Spouses Arces outlet to a public road since their property, as it
appears from the Sketch Map, is also surrounded by other estates. The fact that
Spouses Arce are not insisting on a right of way through respondents property,
although an opening on the latters property is undoubtedly the most direct and
shortest distance to P. Gomez St. from the formers property, bolsters our conviction
that they have adequate outlet to the highway which they are now likewise making
available to [petitioners].
The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way.1wphi1 To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal
right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one
reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely
unjustified.21
Thus, in Cristobal v. CA,22 the Court disallowed the easement prayed for because an
outlet already exists which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners property
and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The
private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street, which is about 2.5 meters wide, and
finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the Court to be sufficient for
the needs of the dominant estate.
Also in Floro v. Llenado, 23 we refused to impose a right of way over petitioners
property although private respondents alternative route was admittedly inconvenient
because he had to traverse several ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different
persons, not to mention that said passage is impassable during the rainy season.
And in Ramos v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., 24 this Court refused to grant the easement
prayed for even if petitioner had to pass through lots belonging to other owners, as
temporary ingress and egress, which lots were grassy, cogonal, and greatly
inconvenient due to flood and mud because such grant would run counter to the
prevailing jurisprudence that mere convenience for the dominant estate does not
suffice to serve as basis for the easement.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated January 31, 2007 and Resolution dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85471 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

However, the he CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision ruling that a right of way
had already been granted by the sevient estate. Thus, there is no need to establish an
easement over the respondents property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a grant of legal easement of right
of way from their landlocked property through the property of private respondent which
is the shortest route in going to and from their property to the public street.
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient
owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is
incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of
way may be granted.
G.R. No. 180282 : April 11, 2011
CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO
PE BENITO, Petitioners,
v.
PATROCINIO L. MARCOS, Respondent.

To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:


first, the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; second, there is payment of proper indemnity; third, the
isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and fourth, the
right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.

NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against
respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag City; while respondent
is the owner of Lot No. 1. As petitioners had no access to a public road to and from
their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road
since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand.
Though petitioners have been granted another passageway by the spouses Benjamin
and Sylvia Arce (Spouses Arce), the owners of another adjacent lot, the former
instituted the complaint before the RTC and prayed that they be granted a right of way
over an area of 54 sqm of Lot 01 by paying the defendant the amount of P54,000.00,
and that the right be annotated on defendants title. In addition to that, the defendant
will pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as damages for attorneys fees and costs
of suit.
In the defendants answer, he denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as
passageway. Moreover, he stated that petitioners claim of right of way is only due to
expediency and not necessity for there already is an existing easement of right of way
available to petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to
establish another easement over respondents property.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners by finding that they had
adequately established the requisites to justify an easement of right of way in
accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. Also, the trial court declared
petitioners in good faith as they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity.

In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy
the above-enumerated requirements. Admittedly, they had been granted a right of way
through the other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners
use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there is an
existing outlet to and from the public road.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to
pass through other lots owned by different owners before they could get to the
highway. We find petitioners concept of what is adequate outlet a complete disregard
of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of
right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of
setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is
adequacy. Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one
reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely
unjustified.
Therefore, the petition is denied.
The Court affirms the ruling of the CA.

The case arose from a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents
against Anacleto and Resurreccion Obra, Donato and Lucena Bucasas, and Paulino
and Crisanta Badua in Civil Case No. 5033 entitled Sps. Victoriano Badua and Myrna
Badua, et al. v. Sps. Anacleto Obra and Resurreccion Obra, et al. before the RTC.
Defendant Anacleto Obra was the husband of petitioner. Respondents alleged that
their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned by them and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 93-01900281 under Cadastral Lot No. 5518 situated in Galongen,
Bacnotan, La Union, were located west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and
Baduas. Their only access to the national highway was a pathway traversing the
northern portion of petitioners property and the southern portion of the properties of
the Bucasases and Baduas. The pathway was more than one meter wide and sixteen
meters long. They claimed that this pathway had been established as early as 1955. In
1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed a fence on the northern boundary of their
property; thus, blocking respondents access to the national highway. Respondents
demanded the demolition of the fence, but petitioner refused.

G.R. No. 149125

August 9, 2007

RESURRECCION OBRA, Petitioner,


vs.
SPS. VICTORIANO BADUA & MYRNA BADUA, SPS. JUANITO BALTORES &
FLORDELIZA BALTORES, SPS. ISABELO BADUA & PRESCILA BADUA, SPS.
JOSE BALANON & SHIRLEY BALANON, SPS. ORLANDO BADUA & MARITA
BADUA and SPS. LEONCIO BADUA & JUVY BADUA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
An order of execution must conform to the terms of the dispositive portion of the
decision. A court that issues an order of execution in contravention of its final judgment
exceeds its jurisdiction and renders its order invalid.
The Case
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the annulment of
the March 20, 20011 and June 20, 20012 Orders of the San Fernando City, La Union
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29 in Civil Case No. 5033, directing petitioner Obra
to demolish the fence she constructed on the southern portion of her property which
blocked a portion of respondents right-of-way.
The Facts

In her Answer, petitioner averred that respondents had not established any easement
of right-of-way either by law or agreement. She claimed that respondents failed to
satisfy the requisites provided in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code in order to
establish an easement of right-of-way on the northern portion of her property.
Moreover, she alleged that respondents had another access as ingress and egress to
the public road other than the one traversing her property.
The spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to file an answer; consequently, they were
declared in default.
On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC rendered a Decision 3 dismissing the complaint. It
held that respondents "were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim
of an easement of right of way." 4 It observed that when petitioner fenced the northern
portion of her property, respondents were able to use another pathway as ingress and
egress to the highway. It stated further that "the new pathway is more than
adequate"5 for respondents use. Thus, the applied easement of right-of-way on the
northern portion of petitioners property was not allowed. The said Decision became
final and executory.
It must be noted that the "new" pathway used by respondents, however, traversed the
southern portion of petitioners property. Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed a
fence on this portion of her lot, which again restricted the use of respondents "new"
pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioners action, respondents filed on March
6, 2001 a Motion to Enforce6 the July 7, 2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged that
the Decision of the RTC dismissing the case was based on the existence of a new
pathway which they had been using since 1995. Thus, they asserted that petitioner
was prohibited from closing said passage.
On March 20, 2001, the RTC granted the said motion. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was rejected in the trial courts June 20, 2001 Order.

Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its March 20, 2001 Order, held
that the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioners representation that she
was allowing respondents to use the southern portion of her property as an alternative
pathway. Since the southern portion was an "agreed pathway," 7 petitioner could not
reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to remove the fence blocking
the passage.
Hence, we have this petition.
The Issue
Petitioner assigns a lone issue for the consideration of the Court:
Whether or not the Court can motu proprio declare a compulsory right of way on a
property not the subject of a pending case (particularly Civil Case No. 5033).8
Essentially, petitioner questions the propriety of the trial courts issuance of an order
clarifying its final and executory decision and effectively establishing an easement on
petitioners property without proper adjudication.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
Dispositive Portion of a Decision Controlling
The controversy of this petition stemmed from the alleged conflict between the body of
the trial courts July 7, 2000 Decision and its dispositive portion. Respondents aver
that notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5033, the body of the Decision
evidently established an easement on the southern portion of petitioners property. On
the other hand, petitioner maintains that the trial courts reference to the "new"
pathway was merely a declaration of its existence and not necessarily a creation of an
easement of right-of-way.
We agree with petitioners postulation.
The resolution of the court in a given issue embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a
decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. 9 Thus,
where there is a conflict between the fallo and the ratio decidendi or body of the
decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order
while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. 10 The rule applies
when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear, and unequivocal,
and can wholly be given effect without need of interpretation or construction.11

In the case at bench, the decretal portion of the July 7, 2000 Decision is plain and
clear"[w]herefore, in view of the foregoing, this case is hereby dismissed." When a
court rules that the case or complaint is dismissed, then it is concluded that the cause
of action embodied in the allegations of the initiatory pleading has no merit or basis,
and the prayer is consequently denied.
The amended complaint filed by respondents in Civil Case No. 5033 revealed that
their cause of action was the recognition of their easement of right-of-way of "more
than one (1) meter wide and more than sixteen (16) meters in length [which] traversed
the northern portion of the property of defendants spouses Anacleto Obra and
Resurreccion Obra."12 As prayer, respondents asked for the demolition of the concrete
fence constructed by petitioner and her spouse, Anacleto, that closed the pathway on
the northern portion of Obras lot; the declaration of right-of-way over said area in favor
of respondents; and the payment of damages and attorneys fees. When the RTC
dismissed the case in its July 7, 2000 Decision, it ruled that respondents had no cause
of action against petitioner and her husband, Anacleto, because they failed to satisfy
one of the four requisites for the entitlement of a right-of-way, namelythat the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to
a public highway. The trial court took note of the fact that the new pathway which
incidentally traversed the southern portion of petitioners lot is an adequate outlet to a
public highway. While its body mentioned the existence of an alternative pathway
located south of petitioners lot, such was made only to emphasize that respondents
failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right-of-way. As held by the trial
court:
The insistence of the plaintiffs to open up the old pathway is therefore without basis
considering that there is another outlet adequate enough as an access route for them
in their passage to the public highway and the alleged inconvenience cannot be a
ground for the opening of said old pathway.
xxxx
In fine, plaintiffs were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim of an
easement of right of way; failing to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway.13
Apparently, no pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and legality of this
"new" pathway; therefore, no easement was established by the Court on petitioners
property in Civil Case No. 5033. Thus, their claim for a right-of-way on the southern
portion had no basis.
The parties and even the trial court were confined to the averments of the complaint,
and the answer and the issues joined by the major pleadings. It could not be disputed
by respondents that there was no mention at all of any right-of-way on the southern
portion of petitioners lot in the complaint nor any claim or prayer for the declaration of
respondents entitlement to a right-of-way over the said area. Thus, there was no

joinder of issue on this matter and, therefore, the dismissal of the case cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, be construed to encompass any grant of right-of-way to
respondents relating to the southern portion owned by petitioner.
More importantly, the case was dismissed by the RTC, meaning no relief was granted
by the court to respondents. Granting arguendo that the issue on the entitlement to
respondents of a right-of-way over the southern portion was likewise raised and was
implicit from the pleadings; nevertheless, respondents, by the dismissal of the case,
were not granted any affirmative relief by the trial court. As such, the trial court clearly
erred in issuing the March 20, 2001 Order which granted a relief not found in the fallo
of the decision.
Moreover, the construction of the fence on the southern portion was done by petitioner
after the rendition and finality of the July 7, 2000 Decision dismissing the case. It is
plain to see that such act of constructing the fence was subsequent to the Decision
and could not have been covered by said judgment. The dispute that arose from the
blockade of the pathway on the southern portion could be the subject matter of
another complaint but definitely was not an issue in Civil Case No. 5033. In the new
case, respondents are obliged to prove all the essential elements of the easement of
right-of-waya requirement which they failed to satisfy in Civil Case No. 5033.
Lastly, the assailed March 20, 2001 Order directing the demolition of the concrete
fence was in the nature of an execution of a final judgment. It is settled that what can
be enforced by a writ of execution under Rule 39 are the dispositions in the decretal
portion of the decision or the fallo. Since the case was dismissed, there was nothing to
enforce or implement.

passage, effectively created a right-of-way on petitioners property in favor of


respondents allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement between the parties. This
directive was in contravention of its July 7, 2000 Decision; thus, it was null and void for
having been issued outside of the courts jurisdiction.
Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary easement of right-of-way,
subject of the assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper, relevant, and material to the
issue of right-of-way as averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. 5033, still, the
conclusion that there was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way had no
basis. The records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal any agreement executed by
the parties on the claimed right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the
arrangement were not agreed upon by the parties, more particularly, the payment of
the proper indemnity. The evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion that
there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the southern portion.1avvphi1
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it
should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate,
and ordinarily must be in writing. 16 No written instrument on this agreement was
adduced by respondents.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the assailed March 20, 2001 and June 20,
2001 Orders are null, void, and without any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 20, 2001 and March 20, 2001
Orders of the San Fernando City, La Union RTC, Branch 29 in Civil Case No. 5033 are
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.

No Voluntary Easement of Right-of-Way

No costs.

The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine the legality of an easement of
right-of-way over the pathway located south of petitioners property, nevertheless,
concluded that the said passage was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way
which petitioner should respect.

SO ORDERED.

The trial court was in error.


It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final, becomes immutable and
unalterable.14 Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter a final
judgment and is left only with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. Any
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose.15
To recapitulate, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5033 meant that no easement was
ever established on petitioners property. However, the trial court, by issuing its March
20, 2001 Order directing petitioner to remove the fence that limited respondents

OBRA vs SPS. BADUA et al


G.R. No. 149125
August 9, 2007

FACTS: Respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly
owned by them situated in La Union, were located west of the properties of the Obras,
Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the national highway was a pathway
traversing the northern portion of petitioners property and the southern portion of the
properties of the Bucasases and Baduas. The pathway was more than one meter wide
and sixteen meters long. They claimed that this pathway had been established as
early as 1955.In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed a fence on the northern
boundary of their property; thus, blocking respondents access to the national highway.
Respondents demanded the demolition of the fence, but petitioner refused. (The
spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to file an answer; consequently, they were
declared in default.)

On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint. It
held that respondents were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim
of an easement of right of way. It observed that when petitioner fenced the northern
portion of her property, respondents were able to use another pathway as ingress and
egress to the highway. It stated further that the new pathway is more than adequate for
respondents use .Thus, the applied easement of right-of-way on the northern portion
of petitioners property was not allowed. The said Decision became final and executory.

It must be noted that the new pathway used by respondents, however, traversed the
southern portion of petitioners property. Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed a
fence on this portion of her lot, which again restricted the use of respondents new
pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioners action, respondents filed a Motion to
Enforce the July 7, 2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged that the Decision of the
RTC dismissing the case was based on the existence of a new pathway which they
had been using since 1995. Thus, they asserted that petitioner was prohibited from
closing said passage.

On March 20, 2001, the RTC granted the said motion. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was rejected by the trial courts.

Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its March 20, 2001 Order, held
that the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioners representation that she
was allowing respondents to use the southern portion of her property as an
alternative pathway. Since the southern portion was an agreed pathway, petitioner
could not reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to remove the fence
blocking the passage.

Hence, we have this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

ISSUE:
1. WON the Court can motu proprio declare a compulsory right of way on a property
not the subject of a pending case.

2. WON there was a voluntary easement over the southern portion of Obras property

HELD: the petition is GRANTED.The June 20, 2001 and March 20, 2001 Orders of the
RTC are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.

1. NO; essentially, petitioner questions the propriety of the trial courts issuance of an
order clarifying its final and executory decision and effectively establishing an
easement on petitioners property without proper adjudication.

An order of execution must conform to the terms of the dispositive portion of the
decision.

[A court that issues an order of execution in contravention of its final judgment exceeds
its jurisdiction and renders its order invalid.

The resolution of the court in a given issue embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a
decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Thus,
where there is a conflict between thefallo and the ratio decidendi or body of the
decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order
while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. The rule applies
when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear, and unequivocal,
and can wholly be given effect without need of interpretation or construction.

The amended complaint filed by respondents revealed that their cause of action was
the recognition of their easement of right-of-way of more than one (1) meter wide and
more than sixteen (16) meters in length [which] traversed the northern portion of the
property of defendants spouses Obra.As prayer, respondents asked for the demolition
of the concrete fence constructed by petitioner and her spouse, that closed the
pathway on the northern portion of Obras lot; the declaration of right-of-way over said
area in favor of respondents; and the payment of damages and attorneys fees. When
the RTC dismissed the case in its July 7, 2000 Decision, it ruled that respondents had
no cause of action against petitioner and her husband because they failed to satisfy
one of the four requisites for the entitlement of a right-of-way, namely that the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to
a public highway. The trial court took note of the fact that the new pathway which
incidentally traversed the southern portion of petitioners lot is an adequate outlet to a
public highway. While its body mentioned the existence of an alternative pathway
located south of petitioners lot, such was made only to emphasize that respondents
failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right-of-way. As held by the trial
court:

The insistence of the plaintiffs to open up the old pathway is therefore without basis
considering that there is another outlet adequate enough as an access route for them
in their passage to the public highway and the alleged inconvenience cannot be a
ground for the opening of said old pathway.

xxxx

Apparently, no pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and legality of this
new pathway; therefore, no easement was established by the Court on petitioners
property. Thus, their claim for a right-of-way on the southern portion had no basis.

The parties and even the trial court were confined to the averments of the complaint,
and the answer and the issues joined by the major pleadings .It could not be disputed
by respondents that there was no mention at all of any right-of-way on the southern
portion of petitioners lot in the complaint nor any claim or prayer for the declaration of
respondents entitlement to a right-of-way over the said area. Thus, there was no
joinder of issue on this matter and, therefore, the dismissal of the case cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, be construed to encompass any grant of right-of-way to
respondents relating to the southern portion owned by petitioner.

Moreover, the construction of the fence on the southern portion was done by petitioner
after the rendition and finality of the July 7, 2000 Decision dismissing the case. It is
plain to see that such act of constructing the fence was subsequent to the Decision
and could not have been covered by said judgment. The dispute that arose from the
blockade of the pathway on the southern portion could be the subject matter of
another complaint but definitely was not an issue in the case. In the new case,
respondents are obliged to prove all the essential elements of the easement of rightof-way a requirement which they failed to satisfy in the prior civil case.

2. NO; The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine the legality of an
easement of right-of-way over the pathway located south of petitioners property,
nevertheless, concluded that the said passage was an agreed or voluntary easement
of right-of-way which petitioner should respect.

The trial court was in error.

It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final, becomes immutable and
unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter a final
judgment and is left only with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. Any
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose.

To recapitulate, the dismissal of the Civil Case meant that no easement was ever
established on petitioners property. However, the trial court, by issuing its March 20,
2001 Order directing petitioner to remove the fence that limited respondents passage,

effectively created a right-of-way on petitioners property in favor of respondents


allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement between the parties. This directive
was in contravention of its July 7, 2000 Decision; thus, it was null and void for having
been issued outside of the courts jurisdiction.

A parcel of land classified as residential lot, bounded on the North by Lot No. 25569,
on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on the South, by a Creek and on the West, by Lot
No. 223-A, declared under Tax Decl. No. 52820, with an area of 380 square meters,
more or less, and assessed at P 17100.00 for the current year. It is not registered
under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary easement of right-of-way,
subject of the assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper, relevant, and material to the
issue of right-of-way as averred in the complaint in the Civil Case, still, the conclusion
that there was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way had no basis. The
records of the civil case do not reveal any agreement executed by the parties on the
claimed right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not
agreed upon by the parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper indemnity.
The evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion that there was a verbal
agreement on the right-of-way over the southern portion.

The pertinent portions of the deed read:

More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it
should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate,
and ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this agreement was
adduced by respondents.

G.R. No. 175510

July 28, 2008

SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ, represented by their


Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO VALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD TABISULA, Respondents.

That for and in consideration of the sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00)


PESOS, Philippine Currencyp [sic] paid to us at our entire satisfaction by spouses
VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of
148 P. Burgos St., San Fernando, La Union, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
do hereby SELL, CONVEY and TRANSFER by way of absolute sale unto the said
spouses Victor and Joecelyn Valdez, their heirs and assigns, the TWO HUNDRED
(200) SQUARE METERS, EASTERN PORTION of the parcel of land above-described,
free from all liens and encumbrances.
That now and hereinafter, said VENDEE-SPOUSES VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic]
VALDEZ shall be the absolute owners of the said 200 sq. meters, eastern portion and
that we shall warrant and forever defend their ownership of the same against the
claims of all persons whomsoever; they shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide
road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject
property.2 Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the
deed, petitioners, through their representative, reported the matter to the barangay for
mediation and conciliation. Respondents failed to attend the conferences scheduled by
the barangay, however, drawing petitioners to file in April 1999 or more than six years
after the execution of the deed a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages3 against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando City, La Union.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject property on the
strength of respondents assurance of providing them a road right of way. They thus
prayed that respondents be ordered to provide the subject property with a 2-meter
wide easement and to remove the concrete wall blocking the same.4

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a January 11, 1993 Deed
of Absolute Sale1 (the deed) from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad
Tabisula a 200 square meter (sq.m.) portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m.
parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union, which 380 sq.m. parcel of land is
more particularly described in the deed as follows:

Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (for damages and


attorneys fees),5 averred that the 2 -meter easement should be taken from the
western portion of the subject property and not from theirs; 6 and petitioners and their
family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property, which
adjoining properties have access to two public roads or highways the bigger one
which adjoins P. Burgos St. on the north, and the smaller one which abuts an existing
barangay road on the north.7

Respondents further averred that they could not have agreed to providing petitioners
an easement "on the western side of their lot" as there exists a two-storey concrete
house on their lot where the supposed easement is to be located, which was erected
long before the subject property was sold to petitioners. 8 In support of this claim,
respondents submitted a February 20, 2003 letter from the City Engineers Office.9

II. . . . IN RULING THAT THE PROVISION OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF


SALE GRANTING A RIGHT OF WAY IS VAGUE AND OBSCURE;

Branch 26 of the RTC of San Fernando dismissed petitioners complaint and granted
respondents Counterclaim by Decision10 of March 18, 2005, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on anothers property, corporeal


and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or
to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing
or person."17 The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code which
reads:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the defendants as against the plaintiffs and hereby orders the Complaint dismissed for
being unmeritorious and plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay the defendants, the
following:
1) P100,000.00 as moral damages;

III. . . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE


RESPONDENTS.16 (Underscoring supplied)

Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable


for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant
estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.

2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;


3) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4) P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and

There are two kinds of easements according to source by law or by the will of the
owners. So Article 619 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The
former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.

5) To pay the costs.


SO ORDERED.11 (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 29,
2006,12 affirmed that of the trial court, it holding that the deed only conveyed ownership
of the subject property to petitioners, and that the reference therein to an easement in
favor of petitioners is not a definite grant-basis of a voluntary easement of right of
way.13
The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or
compulsory easement of right of way as they failed to present circumstances justifying
their entitlement to it under Article 649 of the Civil Code.14
Petitioners motion for reconsideration15 having been denied by the Court of Appeals
by Resolution of November 15, 2006, they filed the present petition for review on
certiorari faulting the trial [sic] court
I. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF WAY IS NOT PART OF THE
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE DATED JANUARY 11, 1993;

From the allegations in petitioners complaint, it is clear that what they seek to enforce
is an alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: "they shall be
provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which
is not included in this sale."
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or
disposition of real property must be in writing. 18 The stipulation harped upon by
petitioners that they "shall be provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale" is not a disposition of real
property. The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is "not included in this
sale" could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct
agreement for the purpose.19 The use of the word "shall," which is imperative or
mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely permissive
where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an
imperative meaning.20
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the
Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of
the Civil Code call for, viz:

Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the inscription or annotation of acts
and contracts relating to the ownership and other rights over immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over immovable property, which are
not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third
persons.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way. For
to be entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650
of the Civil Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons,
and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietors own acts. (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
(Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following
requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3)
the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the
right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the
extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. 21 The onus of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate,22herein petitioners.
23

As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the Sketch (Exhibit "B";
Exhibit "1") of the location of the lots of the parties and those adjoining them,
a common evidence of the parties, petitioners and their family are also the owners of
two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or
highways.24
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they
have no right to demand the grant by respondents of an easement on the "western
side of [respondents] lot."
It may not be amiss to note at this juncture that at the time the deed was executed in
1993, the barangay road-Exhibit "1-G," by which petitioners could access Burgos
Street-Exhibit "1-F," was not yet in existence; and that the Interior Street-Exhibit "1-H,"

which petitioners via this case seek access to with a right of way, was still a creek, 25as
reflected in the earlier-quoted particular description of respondents parcel of land from
which the subject property originally formed part.
Respecting the grant of damages in favor of respondents by the trial court which was
affirmed by the appellate court, the Court finds the same baseless.1avvphi1
To merit an award of moral damages, there must be proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like. It is not enough that one suffers sleepless nights, mental
anguish, serious anxiety as a result of the actuation of the other party.26 Invariably,
such actuation must be shown by clear and convincing evidence 27 to have been
willfully done in bad faith or with ill-motive.
In respondents case, they predicated their Counterclaim for damages on general
allegations of sickness, humiliation and embarrassment, without establishing bad faith,
fraud or ill-motive on petitioners part.28
More importantly, respondents are precluded from filing any counterclaim in light of
Article 199 of Rule XXVI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 reading:
ARTICLE 199. Penalty for Refusal or Failure of Any Party or Witness to Appear before
the Lupon or Pangkat. Refusal or willful failure of any party or witness to appear
before the lupon or pangkat in compliance with summons issued pursuant to this Rule
may be punished by the city or municipal court as for indirect contempt of court upon
application filed therewith by the lupon chairman, the pangkat chairman, or by any of
the contending parties. Such refusal or willful failure to appear shall be reflected in the
records of the lupon secretary or in the minutes of the pangkat secretary and shall bar
the complainant who fails to appear, from seeking judicial recourse for the same
course of action, and the respondent who refuses to appear, from filing any
counterclaim arising out of, or necessarily connected with the complaint.
While respondent Caridad Tabisula claimed that she always appeared, when
summoned, before the barangay lupon,29 the following Certificate to File Action 30 belies
the claim.
This is to certify that respondents failed to appear for (2) Mediation Proceeding before
our Punong Barangay thusthe corresponding complaint may now be filed in court.
Issued this 24th day of November 1998 at the Multi Purpose Hall, Barangay 1 City of
San Fernando (LU).
The award for moral damages being thus baseless, that for exemplary damages must
too be baseless.

As for the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, respondents have not
shown their entitlement thereto in accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the May 29, 2006 Decision and November 15, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the grant of the Counterclaim of respondents,
Spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula, is reversed and set aside. In all
other respects, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ and JOCELYN VALDEZ


v.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA and CARIDAD TABISULA
560 SCRA 332 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
The requisites provided in conferment of a legal easement of right of way under
the Civil Law must be complied and such existence be proven.
FACTS: Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez bought from Spouses Francisco and
Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union. The absolute
sale indicated a right of way.
Spouses Tabisula subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject
property. Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the
deed, Spouses Valdez opposed such act. Conciliation was then initiated. Spouses
Tabisula failed to attend the conferences scheduled. This prompted Spouses Valdez to
file, after more than six years of execution of the deed, a complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages.
Spouses Valdez contended that they purchased the subject property on the assurance
of providing them a road right of way. On the other hand, spouses Tabisula averred
that the 2-meter easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject
property and not theirs.
The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal.
ISSUES: Whether or not Spouses Valdez are entitled to the right of way as indicated in
the absolute sale
HELD: Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale
or disposition of real property must be in writing. The stipulation harped upon by
Spouses Valdez that they shall be provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale is not a disposition of real
property. The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is not included in this sale
could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct
agreement for the purpose. The use of the word shall, which is imperative or
mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely permissive
where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an
imperative meaning.
As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the Sketch of the location
of the lots of the parties and those adjoining them, a common evidence of the parties,
Spouses Valdez and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the
subject property which have access to two public roads or highways.
To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following
requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables

and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3)
the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the
right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servant estate; and (5) to the
extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein the spouses Valdez.

Since Spouses Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two public roads,
they have no right to demand the grant by spouses Tabisula of an easement on the
western side of Spouses Tabisulas lot.

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