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Vercide v.

Hernandez | ema
April 06, 2000
VALENCIDES VERCIDE, complainant, vs.
JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, FIFTH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, CLARIN & TUDELA, MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, respondent.
Mendoza, J.:
SUMMARY: Spouses Vercide, who resided in Dipolog, filed a case against Galleros, who resided in Tudela, Misamis
Occidental. The case stemmed from a dispute over real property located in Tudela. Galleros countered that the case
should be dismissed for non-referral to the lupong tagapamayapa. MCTC Judge Hernandez sided with Galleros,
dismissing the case on the ground of PD15083. The Vercides filed an MR on the basis of LGC 408(f), in relation to
LGC 409(c), which was denied on the ground that they failed to appreciate the requirement in the Katarungang
Pambarangay IRR in their argument. The Vercides then filed an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority
and ignorance of the law against Judge Hernandez, arguing that she was mistaken in dismissing the case. OCA
recommended dismissal on the ground that the issue was purely judicial and should thus be resolved by the courts;
and because there was no allegation of bad faith on the part of Justice Hernandez. SC held Judge Hernandez
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined her 2,000 pesos. As a judge, she should exhibit high
standards of legal competence and probity. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat is especially applicable to judges given
the standards of conduct imposed on them by the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Hernandez failed in this respect,
because she obstinately refused to reverse her incorrect order and even quoted the IRR out of context just to support
her ruling. The case should have been allowed to proceed because the Katarungang Pambarangay Law as
embodied in the LGC does not include within its jurisdiction disputes between parties who do not reside in the same
municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. The LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay IRR are both explicit on
the matter. This is the established rule in jurisprudence interpreting PD 1508 and its successor law, the LGC. The
proviso in PD 15083 relied upon by Judge Hernandez is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such. The
operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary the operation of
the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.
DOCTRINE: Recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the
same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. A judge who dismisses a case on such ground will be held liable
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
PD15082 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the
disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the same city or
municipality." At the same time, PD 15083 while reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same
barangay" or in "different barangays within the same city or municipality", unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall
have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other. The phrase stating that disputes which involve real
property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated." is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such.
NATURE: Administrative complaint against a Municipal Circuit Court judge, for grave abuse of authority and
ignorance of the law
FACTS:

Valencides VERCIDE and his wife had filed a case against Daria Lagas GALLEROS for recovery of
possession of a piece of land.
o The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis Occidental.
o Galleros is a resident of Tudela, while the spouses Vercide are residents of Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte.
o Because of this fact, the case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

Galleros raised the non-referral as an affirmative defense

Jul. 15, 1997 Municipal Circuit Court JUDGE Priscilla HERNANDEZ thus dismissed the case without
prejudice to the filing of Galleros counterclaim, citing PD 150831.

The spouses Vercide filed an MR, arguing that barangay conciliation is not required, claiming that under
LGC 408(f), in relation to LGC 409(c), where the parties to a dispute involving realty or any interest therein
are not actual residents of the same city/municipality or of adjoining barangays.

Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of
said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. (Emphasis added)

Sep. 9, 1997 Judge Hernandez denied the motion on the ground that the Vercides failed to correlate LGC
408 and 409; and to consider the IRRs of the LGC, specifically Rule VI, 3(c), which states that: Dispute
involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the Barangay where the real property or larger
portion thereof is situated.
Vercide filed the present complaint against Judge Hernandez, accusing her of:
o grave abuse of authority for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, in dismissing the case;
o gross ignorance of the law
o grave disobedience to the precedent laid down by the Supreme Court
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
issue is purely judicial and should be settled by a court of competent jurisdiction. Even of Judge Hernandez
were wrong, she should not be held administratively liable since there was no allegation of bad faith.

ISSUE (HELD): W/N Judge Hernandez was guilty of grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the law in dismissing
the Vercides complaint (IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, BUT NOT GRAVE ABUSE)
RATIO
TAVORA RULING STILL APPLICABLE

SC has already ruled in Tavora v. Veloso that submission to the Lupong Tagapamayapa is not required
where the parties to a dispute involving realty do not live in the same city/municipality or in adjoining
barangays.

[PD15082] specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring
together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the
same city or municipality." At the same time, [PD 15083] while reiterating that the disputants must be
"actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different barangays within the same city or municipality"
unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who
actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each
other.

The law expressly stated the jurisdiction of the Lupon Tagapamayapa and this does not include disputes
where the parties are not actual residents of the same city/municipality, except where they are actual
residents of adjoining barangays.

SC, in Tavora, further stated: It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall
take cognizance of a given dispute, [PD 15083] adds: "However, all disputes which involve real property or
any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such. The
operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary the
operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the
contrary.

Tavora applies to the Vercides case because the rules in PD 1508 are now found in LGC 408 and 409.

The Tavora ruling should be known to lawyers and judges. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat is especially
applicable to judges who, under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.

Bacar v. de Guzman: When the law violated is basic, the failure to observe such law is gross ignorance

Almeron v. Sardido: Disregard of an established legal rule amounts to gross ignorance of the law and makes
the judge subject to disciplinary action.
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY RULES DEFEAT JUDGE HERNANDEZ POSITION

Contrary to Judge Hernandez interpretation, it is clear even from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that
recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the same
municipality or city or in adjoining barangays.

Rule VI, 2 provides in part: Subject matters for settlement. All disputes may be the subject of proceedings
for amicable settlement under these rules except the following enumerated cases:
o (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto to agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
JUDGE HERNANDEZ GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

CAB: Judge Hernandez showed patent ignorance of the relevant jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of the
Lupong Tagapamayapa.
o Judges cannot be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision, but if the
mistake is so gross or patent they should be held administratively liable.

Judge Hernandez insisted on using PD1508 as basis even after being notified that it has been
repealed by the LGC. In her obstinate adherence, she quoted the Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules out of context.
o Such misquotation violates Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provide that "In every
case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by
partisan interest, public opinion or fear of criticism."
The provisions in issue, which are also found in P.D. No. 1508, have already been authoritatively interpreted
by the SC, and the duty of Judge Hernandez was to follow the rulings of this Court.
Her insistence on her own interpretation of the law can only be due either to an ignorance of this Courts
ruling or to an utter disregard thereof.
SC choose to believe that her failure to apply the jurisprudence to case before her was simply due to gross
ignorance which, nevertheless, is inexcusable. (BAKIT HAHAHA)
Penalty: Fine of P2,000, in accordance with Ting v. Atal
o

DISPOSITION: Judge Hernandez found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and ordered to pay a FINE of P2,000.00
with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

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