Int J Philos Relig (2014) 76:335338

DOI 10.1007/s11153-014-9462-5
BOOK REVIEW

J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister, and Khaldoun A. Sweis,

eds., Debating Christian Theism
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, $125.00 (hb), $35.00 (pb.)
Daryl L. Hale

Received: 11 May 2014 / Accepted: 13 May 2014 / Published online: 11 June 2014
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

After one has read for a while in the history of Western thought, one becomes cognizant of how many great intellects, believers and non-believers alike, have presented
compelling examinations of Christian theism. And until recently, religious skeptics,
following in the wake of David Hume, assumed that the ship of Christian philosophy
of religion was too damaged to sail again. However, something unexpectedly emerged
recently from the weathered ship, even after many pilots advised cautious hugging the
shores, especially in light of the death of God storms of the 1960s. Many abandoned
the ancient mother ship, some escaping on rafts, lifeboats, or flotsam, transferring to
modern vessels, such as SS Darwin, Freud, Marx, or Nietzsche. Still, a number of
sailors stayed on board the ancient craft, and responded to the latter secularist fleet,
honing their skills as navigators, first mates, and lookouts, so as to safeguard the
ancient ship from secularist vessel forays.
The anthology under review is impressive in several ways: it comprises a unique
set of readings on a diversity of topics from a variety of distinguished contributors
perspectives. The editors judiciously placed these topics in the timely context of a set
of debates between a predominant naturalist position and that of a resurgent Christian
theism in philosophy of religion. One might have expected, after the bold announcement of Gods demise in the 1960s, that secularist philosophy of religion would
emerge unscathed and unchallenged. So naturalists hoped, and theists feared. Insofar
as this collection counts as representative of recent work in the field, perhaps such
hopes and fears were premature. The brief introduction notes a modern secularist
lament for the trend of Christian realists populating philosophy departments at various institutional settings. Perhaps one sign of vitality is that some recent versions of

D. L. Hale (B)
Western Carolina University, Stillwell 230, Cullowhee, NC 28723, USA
e-mail: dhale@wcu.edu

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Christianity incorporate anti-realist insights, but one can also now find pious pagans
revisiting Christian virtues for a culture in which etsi deus non daretur (God is not
given). Perhaps both of these endeavors count as modes of trying to fit old wine into
new wineskins.
This collection is outstanding in presenting current debates in the field. We are
given an impressive array of theistic arguments and naturalistic rebuttalskalam cosmological arguments, fine-tuning principle arguments, moral arguments, origins of
consciousness arguments, evolutionary arguments, and human nature arguments. And
there are a diversity of specific Christian beliefs, paired with naturalist responsesthe
question of miracles, modern science and Christian faith, Trinitarian, incarnational, and
atonement claims, historical reliability of New Testament, Jesus of history vs. Christ
of faith controversy, credibility of resurrection narratives, exclusivism vs. inclusivism,
and the souls mortality vs. its immortality. So in this respect, the volume constitutes
a very comprehensive and inclusive collection.
Moreover, the level on which the debates are conducted is quite sophisticated.
Theists present atheistic arguments from evil in a reasoned fashion, as does Chad
Meister, for example, before offering non-evidentialist grounds for Gods existence,
thus hoping to shift the burden for explaining evil onto naturalist accounts. Still, one
might think there are limits to what a secularist can imagine. Consider, for example,
the science versus religion contest, the most tired debate of our time, Julian Baggini
proposes. His essay initially goes beyond the old inevitable conflict model pressed
by New Atheists, creationists, and the media. Yet, his invective expressed at fellow
atheist Stephen Jay Gould for advocating an Independence model for resolving Howbased questions in sciences and Why-based questions in religion and morality is too
dismissive. He raises good critical questions about just how often one can invoke this
distinction without crossing such artificial lines. However, he ardently airs his ire at the
anthropic principle oft invoked in defense of divine origins of the universe: he begins
modestly enough by mentioning Paul Davies Goldilocks enigmaconditions had
to be just right for life to have evolved, so that we could be here at alland he confesses
there is no generally accepted scientific explanation for either how or why this is so.
So far, so good. This supports his point that that artificial distinction rarely gains
any ground. However, when he offers Polkinghornes solution (the Why-question is
answered in claiming that life-enabling laws of nature are graciously provided by
the creator), he then reduces Polkinghornes answer to the How-question by saying
the universe must have come about by divine fiat. But that account hardly captures
the critical realism and process theism thought behind Polkinghornes view, simply
reducing it to a nave divine command theory. And Baggini then concludes that since
divine fiat cannot explain the mechanism by which God intervened, nor test the
hypothesis that he did so, it is no substitute for a proper scientific answer (pp. 31617). While true, his impatience with theism show how he falls into the same atheistic
naivet or intolerance of Dawkins and Hitchens.
Bagginis essay is followed by one from Keith Ward, who defends an evolutionary theism with modest pretensions, a helpful set of prefatory provisos, and a limited
conception of God. First, the modest introduction: Ward concedes that ancient JudeoChristian thought was limited by its origins, but he argues that a revised version of
Christianity is not only compatible with modern science, but also complements sci-

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ence by providing a fuller understanding of the world. Second, he offers six points of
tension: place of wasteful nature in a created cosmos; human significance in a vast cosmos; role of apocalypse in a continuing physical universe; role of miracles in a modern
naturalistic story; and the idea that neurocognition seems to doom immortality of soul.
While he stresses these tensions, he explains how a modern science-friendly theology
requires redrawing, not abandoning, ancient Christian beliefs, hence replying credibly to a criticism of Baggini. Christian thinkers now talk about the compatibility of
beliefs with modern science, and this is not a trivial truth (p. 321). Rather, humans
live in a developing, emergent universe in which they play a key role as intelligent
persons, not mere material bodies, and thus we play an integral role in responsibly
guiding the cosmos toward greater awareness of truth, beauty, and goodness. And he
concludes conciliatorily by arguing that a coherent modern scientific Christianity is
not at odds with science. Rather, the real conflict is between a modern naturalist preference for materialism over a philosophy (such as personalism) that takes seriously
mind and consciousness. In this respect, perhaps Christianity has something to teach
about the moral importance and the moral dignity of the personal that materialist science is in danger of denying (p. 331). And Wards overall point is that naturalism is
incomplete; in addition to scientific explanations, one still needs personalist explanations to account for meaning, purpose, significance of human life in the vast cosmos.
One can give non-religious accounts of purpose but they also go beyond the scientific
worldview: contrary to some naturalists claims, they oft simply replace fundamentalist
God of the gaps with Nature of the gaps accounts. And thus this recognition entitles
the theist to offer his/her best explanation so far by showing how a personalism can
supplement a scientific account to give a fuller explanation, one that includes both of
these diverse aspects of reality.
A similar sort of sanding of the secularist hull has occurred. Naturalists now are
much more well-versed in specifics of Christian theism, and they turn that knowledge
against theists. If there are constraints on what atheists can imagine of theism, are
there also limits to what theists can imagine about naturalism? Certainly so: one
telling example occurs in the debate between Paul Copan and Louise Antony as to
whether ones moral values need to be theistically grounded.
In Ethics Needs God, Copan tries to show that theism is readily supported by its
most prestigious antagonists. Citing passages from Nietzsche and Dawkins, he hopes
thereby to convince naturalists that atheisms poster children agree that morality is
lost without God. Copan clearly articulates the basic theist positionIf God exists,
and is a personal Creator, then its fairly straightforward to explain human beings as
persons (since created imago Dei), and hence our moral values are objectively and
realistically grounded. However, his representation of the atheist position is not so fair
or convincing: if naturalism is true, and the universe is inherently meaningless, then
we should not expect human dignity, rights and universal benevolence to emerge
(p. 87). Far too much about the atheist position is simply assumed, the quotes
from famous atheists are proof-texting, and the argumentthat since atheists are
naturalists, and naturalists see the universe as inherently meaningless, and hence that
naturalism cannot account for moralityis just too simplistic. Had Copan shown why
personalism adds something more than theistic dogma, and thus given us a respectable
modernized version of Christianitywhich Ward does in showing theistic engagement

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with science, but Copans traditionalism fails to dothen an interesting advance in

the naturalist-theist dialogue would result.
In The Failure of Moral Arguments, Antonys explanations of morality from an
atheist perspective reveal her sealing the secularist vessel from Copans coarse artillery.
First, she points out the simplistic approach of several leading theistic positions. They
resort to reductionist strategies in presenting the atheistic view: if atheism is true,
then humans are nothing but accidental byproducts of molecules; accidental collections
of molecules are devoid of moral value; hence materialism entails that human beings
are devoid of moral value, obligations, or significance. Second, she recognizes much
subtlety that is overlooked in such nothing but analyses; a materialist can accept
a positive value in the idea that we share something with non-human animals (such
as sentience), and hence that we should care for their suffering. She also goes on to
refute typical theistic claims that mere adaptive value of beliefs will not move beyond
mere self-interest to genuine ethical values. She does so by explaining how traits with
adaptive value often come bundled with traits that do not, just as the ability to play
the flute was probably not selected for, but came bundled with digital dexterity, which
does serve an adaptive function. Similarly, parental love leads parents to invest energy
in care of offspring, though it is likely the caring behavior (not the love itself) that is
selected for. And she concludes her essay in an open and challenging way: the existence
of morality is not a good reason to believe in God, since materialism does not entail
nihilism, nor does naturalism imply lack of accountability. In fact, she claims, being
a theist should encourage theists to affirm independence of moral value from Gods
existence. That position allows both for pious pagans and a morally accountable God.
This collection is also unapologetically analytic in the best sense of that term:
clarity of concepts and definitions, careful statements of basic premises, insightful
summaries of arguments, and crisp conclusions. But these essays are very accessible,
even for undergraduates. Another virtue is a variety of depth and breadth. Attacks
and defenses of premises are argued by both sides in ways that show sophisticated
awareness of latest developments in philosophy of science, theological history, New
Testament scholarship, cognitive science studies, and a metaphysics of bodies, minds,
and nature. Gratefully, this is no shouting match between angry atheists and furious
fundamentalists. So, it is a great pedagogical resource for classes devoted to such
topics. Both theists and naturalists can be proud of these essays as representative of
the best advocates in the field of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. This
is what has been missing lately in our public intellectual debates, whether from the
Religious Rights self-righteous condemnation of all unbelievers to their supernaturalized, sensationalized Hell, or from the New Atheists smug dismissal of all religious
believers to their naturalized, secularized Absorption in the Multivoid. Perhaps this
collection sets the stage for a future anthology that envisions a Christian naturalism
or naturalist theism as a third option in Christian theism. Can shipmates reclaim its
material origins in those ways?

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