The Historic Dimensions of Free Trade With Mexico

MEXICO CITY - In the universal history of shortsightedness, the U.S.'s relations with Latin America deserve a
special chapter. Cuba is now only a sinking island and Nicaragua a rising democracy; both countries have ceased to
be news. But to remember the cost, the duration and the depth of the trouble they brought about only a short while
ago-Cuba was on the point of provoking a nuclear war, Nicaragua a vast subversion-is to realize that there has been
a fundamental error in the U.S. perception of the region.
Decades earlier, in books, essays and articles, Latin Americas democratic voices had clearly warned of the perils of
growing resentment against the U.S. in their countries and offered practical ways of prudently dispelling it. The
U.S. did not listen to these voices. When the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions finally broke out in 1959 and 1978,
it was too late to prevent them and even too late to redirect them.
Until recently, something similar was happening with Mexico. If there was an eruption in this volcanic country, the
U.S. paid attention; if not, it ignored us. A natural or financial earthquake, an avalanche of corruption or drug abuse,
these are the things that attracted the spotlight, If life went on peacefully, the spotlight faded. But something else
also faded: an accurate perception of the situation in Mexico, and as a result the U.S. failed to take any actions that
might encourage development within Mexico and a buildup of stronger relations between our two nations.
Yesterday's vote by the U.S. House of Representatives in favor of negotiating the Mexican-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) on fast-track signals a fundamental change in that historical perception. It acknowledges the quiet
but revolutionary changes that have taken place in Mexico in the past two years. And perhaps even the U.S. isnt
quite aware of how fundamental its recognition of those changes could be in helping to ensure a more positive
future direction for Mexico.
There are two diametrically opposed possible futures on the Mexican horizon: By the year 2000, we will look either
much more like Spain or much more like Peru.
Current probabilities, of course, point to the former.
Mexico is a country with a solid institutional structure and a profound culture. lf the populist administrations of Luis
Echeverria (1970-1976) and Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) had been a little less blessed with economic resources
or more endowed with moral and intellectual resources, oil and credit would have been channeled productively and
Mexico could have stepped into the foyer of the First World. This did not happen.
Under Presidents Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, the system's defensive and authoritarian instincts took over and
pushed the country into the Third World.
During the administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), Mexico began to correct its economic course. His
successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, has intensified the changes. President Salinas's economic performance has
been outstanding, and in many ways exemplary. He modified deeply rooted tendencies through renegotiation of the
foreign debt, control of inflation and reduction of the budget deficit. But his privatization policies (banks, the
telephone company, steel mills, airlines) and the limits that he put on the most powerful labor unions from the very
beginning have achieved something more important: overcoming statist taboos in a society of taboos.
President Salinas's social policies also have chalked up notable gains- in particular, his advancing war against drug
dealers and his implementation of effective aid programs-potable water, electrification, schools, etc.-for the poorest
Mexicans.
His political performance, on the other hand, has been much less successful. In truth, Mexico is still far from being
the "federal, representative, democratic republic" voiced by our Constitution. In many ways it is a centralist
monarchy, with a new king ascending the throne every six years.
Nevertheless, with our positive economic scenario, why should we speak of a remote possibility of a Peruvian
future, one in which hunger, war and plague outweigh any progress? The reasons are many:

Aside from the frequent natural disasters, there is an ancient tradition of violence in Mexico that in revolutionary
times (1910 to 1929) took more than a million live; there is a surviving populist temptation and a visible national
leader (Cuauhtmoc Crdenas) who represents it; there is an influential class of young university students for whom
the failure of authoritarian socialism in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. has no meaning and has provided no moral
lesson (in their judgment, the enemy is the U.S. "neoliberalism" that threatens our resources, culture and sovereignty): there is a sector of the church that works with poor communities and not only believes but also practices
liberation theology; there is a growing, justifiable Irritation with the electoral frauds committed by the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party; and there is, above all, a generalized feeling of economic oppression. These are
all elements that could lead to deterioration and backsliding.
In this context it is not an exaggeration to consider the future signing of the Free Trade Agreement as historic.
Beyond its economic logic (clear for any intellectually consistent American), its material benefits and its social
sense, the FTA will have at least two important additional advantages: It would favor the proliferation of a business
culture in Mxico, and it would have a ripple effect in Central America, a region with which Mexico -the Northern
giant- already has proposed a free-trade agreement.
Spain was, until recently, an economically backward country ruled by a dictator. Since 1975, thanks to years of
economic opening and development, Spain has become a normal, modern, European democracy that successfully
sells its products, its sun and its past-exactly the things that Mexico will be able to offer more readily if we finally
overcome our greatest creed: "Thou shall not trust Americans.
As with Spain, the vast economic forces unleashed by free trade will spur the transition to democracy. Doing
business in the private sector will become more profitable -and less risky- than doing business in the public sector.
Transparency and accountability will be the norm, not the exception. These and other changes are not utopian: They
are at hand in many areas of Mexico, and they are being demanded by growing sectors of our society.
A closed political system cannot survive long in an open economy. Chile and Spain have proved that. After the
signing of the FTA, the unfinished chapter-long-postponed democracy - is for us Mexicans to write. With solid
economic foundations, the transition will take months, not years or decades. Although he was the "caudillo of
Spain" supposedly "through the grace of God," Franco died. Mexico's undemocratic political system, with or
without the grace of God, will perish too.
Mr. Krauze is co-editor of Vuelta. Mexico's leading literary magazine. He is the author of several books on Mexican
history, including "Towards a Democracy Without Adjectives" (1986 J.