I.

THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT

A. ELEMENTS
BARREDO V GARCIA
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
FACTS
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by
Fausto Barredo
- May 3, 1936 in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis
thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers
- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved
- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanillas negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed
> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing (sel ection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been
caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding
> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wr ongful act or negligent acts or
omissions punishable by law
- Barredos defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held
responsible
ISSUE
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as employer
of Fontanilla
HELD
YES
- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages
arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein
as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The
parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than
Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence.
Obiter
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
1) crimes public interest; quasi-delict only private interest
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes
NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility
e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt
4) crime guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil mere preponderance of evidence
- Presumptions:
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both
2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family
- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias
- motor accidents need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles
ELCANO V HILL
77 SCRA 98
BARREDO; May 26, 1977
FACTS
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was
acquitted for lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.
- Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it.
ISSUES
1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithst anding the fact that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married
HELD
1. NO
-The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
-Barredo v Garcia (dual charactercivil and criminal of fault or negligence as a source of obligation):
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of
the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject
of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued."
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his neg ligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for
which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
-Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
-ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
"ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
- According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict,
of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal

negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound
and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but
for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery,"
- Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same ar gument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be obs erved in applying the same. And
considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, its "more congruent with the
spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and volunt ary or negligent.
- Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores , and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
2. YES (but)
- Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.)
- While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Ar ticle 397, emancipation takes
place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of
his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian ."
- Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also f or those of persons for
whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. T he father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
- In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his fath er and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation whic h is not unusual.
- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage t o third persons.
- On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
CINCO V CANONOY
90 SCRA 369
Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979
FACTS
- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
- Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident.
- At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit.
- The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioners MFR having been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the
CFI Cebu., which in turn dismissed the petition.
Plaintiffs claims:
- it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision.
- Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision
- There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Respondents Comments:
- They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.
ISSUE
WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action
HELD
YES
- Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177
of the Civil Code.
- The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases prvided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines, an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the cri minal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
- Petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad that in
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between damage to persons on the one hand and
damage to property on the other. The word damage is used in two concepts: the harm done and reparation for the harm done. And with
respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since harm is not limited to personal but also to property injuries.
DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.
BAKSH V CA (Gonzales)
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE, JR; Feb.19, 1993
FACTS
- Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married.
**MGs allegations in the complaint:
- That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral character and respected reputation in her community.
- That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan, and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan.
- That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They later agreed to get
married at the end of the school semester. Petitioner had visited MGs parents to secure their approval of the marriage. Baks h later forced MG to live

with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment,
she sustained injuries. A day before the filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45,000 plus additional costs.
- Baksh answered with a counterclaim, admitting only the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the allegations.
He claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married; neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced h er to live in his apt.; did
not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and passport. He also prayed for 25,000
as moral damages plus misc. expenses.
- The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20,000 as moral damages and 3,000
pesos attys. fees plus litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed this decision to respondent CA, contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the
case for lack of factual and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral damages, attys fees, etc.
- Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial courts ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari,
raising the single issue of WON Art. 21 applies to this case.
ISSUE
WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art.21 of the Civil Code
HELD
1. YES
Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction, Art. 21 may be applied.
Reasoning
- Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Art.21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
- In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it
was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but
because of moral seduction. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art.337 or A rt.338 of the RPC because
the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the seduction.
- Moreover, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unles s the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both
the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case.
**Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on th e Proposed Civil Code,
from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men...
- This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specific ally enumerate and punish
in the statute books.
- As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible th at there are countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually s uffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above 18 yrs of ag e. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and although the girl and
her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the pr oposed article, she and
her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
- Art.2176 CC, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known
in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than
culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, f alse imprisonment and deceit.
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are t o be covered by Art.2176
CC. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Art.21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Art.21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Art.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it
has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
DULAY VS CA
243 SCRA 220
GARCIA V FLORIDO
52 SCRA 420
ANTONIO; AUGUST 31, 1973
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners' action f or damages against
respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the
criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS
- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garci a, and Ester
Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of
chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City.
- At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc.
and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their
medical treatment and hospitalization.
- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a
reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU
car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and
the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971,
or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court
of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid cri minal case, no civil action could
be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant t o Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore,
the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has
been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to
the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants,
the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case
2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be
tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint askin g the Court to declare the
defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a
complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro
Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandon ed their right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action.
Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly
reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has
disappeared.
- As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or c reate an action for quasidelict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had
its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may
proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, " the proviso in Section 2 of
Rule 111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted
. . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may
also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
required in the proviso."
- But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that
should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by
the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their
right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the
Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict.
Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are
present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the
collision of the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
Reasoning
- The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless,
grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not
detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merel y descriptive of the failure of
said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indic ation of negligence. Since the same
negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by
petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized
that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs.
Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).
- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases
provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct fr om the civil action, may be

instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should
be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.
SEPARATE OPINION
BARREDO [concur]
- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised
Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I
cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my
considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate,
and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature
superseding the Rules of 1940.
- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there being no showing that prejudice could be caused
by doing so.
- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the
limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is
entitled exclusively to the bigger one.
ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette, Inc)
191 SCRA 195
FERNAN; November 6, 1990
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS
- Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to
that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
- Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and
eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunc tion against respondent
corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land.
- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. And
later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.The
decision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising f rom the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action."
- Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
- On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed b y petitioners was denied by
the Appellate Court .
ISSUE
WON a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case
HELD
Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33
and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result
of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the
clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
Reasoning
- A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff.
- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion
of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
- In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that " any person who without due
authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causin g loss and damages to a
third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for
loss and damages to the injured party.
- While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact
remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission
of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between th e act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
- It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoi ning landowners
have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
1
- Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or neglig ence.
- Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, wh ether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
1

damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.
2
- The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision
though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual"
or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individu ality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or cr eate an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC
16 PHIL 8
CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David
Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average
boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provis or,
for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniatur e engine. Finding on
inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusu al interest which both seem
to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.
- After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some t wenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive
power. they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while
Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys
proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand
burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as
to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
- The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when
the boys found them.
- No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises
unattended, when they felt disposed so to do.
- The trial court's decision, awarding damages to the plaintiff, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903,
and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to r epair the damage so
done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons
for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have
been placed in a safe and proper place.
- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of
the defendant company under the provisions of these articles.
ISSUE
WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries
HELD
NO
- We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.
- We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action
such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
- These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the
particular facts developed in the case under consideration.
- It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their
owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have b een injured had he not, for his
own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant,

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the c ivil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
2

and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut
open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
- But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention
of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and th e accident which resulted in his injury should not
be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's neglig ence in leaving the caps
exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained
by him.
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases
known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under c ircumstances, attributable to
the negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to t he same degree of care in
regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such
strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the
same rule which governs that of adult. W hile it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from
the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and
caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."
- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. But the doctrine of the
case is controlling in our jurisdiction.
- This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or
that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight
to put in doubt.
- But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the
defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the
proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the
injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his
action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his in jury should not
be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the
Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision.
- In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of
his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself.
- True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents
of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or les s dangerous explosion might
be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his
maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be
held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when
he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate
the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the
injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, neverth eless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
TAYAG V ALCANTARA
98 SCRA 723
CONCEPCION; July 23, 1980
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for damages)
FACTS
- Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, which caused his instantaneous death.
Pending the criminal case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the compan y (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and
the driver. In turn, the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending. Judge
Alcantara granted this motion.
- In the criminal case, the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt. The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground
that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case.
ISSUE
WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for
damages based on quasi-delict
Reasoning
- Art. 31, NCC provides: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter
- Evidently, this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based on
quasi-delit, viz:
6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino, Inc., has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. Otherwise, the accident in question which resulted in the death of P edro Tayag, Sr. and
damage to his property would not have occurred;
All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present:
(1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent
(2) damage caused by the said act or omission
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and

(4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.

Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores
DISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside, case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [concur]
- I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under which ac cording to the Code Commission, "acquittal
from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana".
Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death
(Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
- Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint and
base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
- The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an
independent civil action is contrary to law.

B. DISTINCTIONS
1. QUASI-DELICT VS DELICT
BARREDO V GARCIA
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
PADILLA V CA (Vergara)
129 SCRA 558
GUTIERREZ; [date]
NATURE
Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of stalls which
were considered as nuisance per se. The stall of one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. In the process however the stock in trade
and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed.
- The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day impr isonment and ordered to
pay fines.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay
P9,600.00 as actual damages. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should have
been more appropriately charged with crime against person. Hence, the crime of grave coercion was not proved in accordance with the law.
- The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.
ISSUE
WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge
HELD
NO
- The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia, held that
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a dec laration in the final judgment that
the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. Since the
standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the court express a finding that the defendants of fenses are civil in nature.
- The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a crimin al
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that the said provision
merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal
liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground.
CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
282 SCRA 188
FRANCISCO; 1997
NATURE
Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.
FACTS
- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined
by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.
- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant
for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the
operation.
- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a
conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled.
- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr . Ercillo went out of the
operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo
came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating
room.
- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. The operating staff then went i nside the petitioner's clinic to
take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other
relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood
available in the blood bank.
- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was att ached to an oxygen
tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San
Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.
- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo

District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the
prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to
the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.
- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her
because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and p ossibly dead as her
blood pressure was already 0/0. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Her deat h certificate states "shock" as the immediate
cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.
ISSUE
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide
HELD
NO
- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3)
that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the st andard of care observed
by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science.
- For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a
matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization th at the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other phys icians in good standing
when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an
inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients,
unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking i n the case at bench.
- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of
these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injur y to the person or property
was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.
- In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient.
PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE
GR NO.147703
PANGANIBAN; April 14, 2004
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
- Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. But in the event the the
accused becoems insolvent, Phil. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. But admittedly, the accused jumped bail and remained at large.
ISSUE
WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused
HELD
NO
- The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are oth erwise arrested within 15
days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. In
the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.
- After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.
- In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the
employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
- On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment:
- Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latters insolvency.
- To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also result
in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability,
but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
PEOPLE V LIGON
152 SCRA 419
YAP; July 29, 1987
NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila
FACTS
- February 17, 1986, RTC convicted Fernando Gabat, of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killed
Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette
box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. Rogelio Ligon,the co-accused, was never apprehended and is still at large.
- October 23, 1983 - at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused, Ligon
which was coming from Espaa Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning

left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, they stopped. While waiting, Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Rosales to buy some cigarettes from
him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green,
and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial
moment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted, however, that
as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the
pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was
confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.
- Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was travel ing on the same lane in a
slightly oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped
towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Cast illo saw an ownertype jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao." The t wo men in the jeep joined
the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He
immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen
Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the
Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the r ear seat.
- The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio
Castillo, also went along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias
were released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
- December 6, 1983 - Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
- October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic,
bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."
- June 28, 1984 - Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a
Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigar ette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the
incident . These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
- prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose
the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement.
- The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box
from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. Th e court also believed
Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not
have fallen down, having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard.
- On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of
the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of
common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his pr ecious box of
cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer.
ISSUE
WON the prosecutions set of facts should be given credence
HELD
NO
- a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account,
would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reas onable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.
- While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see that justice be
done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or
mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the
trial.
- Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying approximately
one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front
end where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly
happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi,
following it at a distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony that he saw
Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus s ubject to a reasonable doubt,
specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.
- Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando G abat has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with
homicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
- However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for d amages.
- Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine
legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and
distinct from each other, One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other
is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present
(Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the
legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? I s the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide, but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz.

2. QUASI-DELICT VS BREACH OF CONTRACT

CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO
38 Phil 768
FISHER; October 14, 1918

NATURE
An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1,000 against the estate of the deceased James P.
McElroy.
FACTS
- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which
entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while
making his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach.
- On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise wit h a moderate gradient
some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches.
As the train slowed down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point
where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once roll ed from the platform and was
drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward
possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where
the accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station
for shipment to the market. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of
the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon
the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
- The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated. The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the
member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses reached the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgic al fees and for other
expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
- August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company, founding his actio n upon the
negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the CFI, the trial judge, found th e facts substantially as above
stated, and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore
precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
HELD
NO
Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, an d should be considered.
Reasoning
- The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company is
liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performanc e.
- Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their
selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations
- In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the
source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an
obligation already existing . . .."
- In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of
negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
- Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to pe rsons to whom they
are not bound by contract, such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior - but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes
upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused.
- The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence
or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the
qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence,
thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if , by reason of the negligence
of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third persons suffer damage. Article 1903 presumes negligenc e, but that presumption is
refutable.
- In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage
caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last p aragraph of article 1903 of
the Civil Code, said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision ov er him after the selection, or
both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necess arily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of
those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from these relations, other than contrac tual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding
legal duties, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duti es whether due to willful
intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists indep endently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
- The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the
platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the
injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete st op before alighting. Under the

doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon
defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should
be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
- The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Neglig ence:
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of
ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of th e passenger, would have
acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the car e which may or should
be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
- In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform
was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the
alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement platform also
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was
by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. The place was
perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could be n o uncertainty in his mind with regard
either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. It is the Courts conclusion that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was
not guilty of contributory negligence.
DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both
instances.
SEPARATE OPINION
MALCOLM, [dissent]
- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full
stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With the general ru le relative to a passenger's contributory
negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding t hese two points together, we
have the logical result - the Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the complaint, and judgment affirmed.
FORES V MIRANDA
105 PHIL 266
REYES, J.B.L.; March 4, 1959
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive
rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953.
Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was taken to the National
Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations; the first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around the
broken bones and screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint, and a third one to remove such splint. At t he time of the trial, it appears
that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm.
- The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingl y.
ISSUE
WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages
HELD
NO.
Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220
of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx
xxx
xxx
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstance, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."
Reasoning
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is
essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the description term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220
specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act. 2176 of the Code expressly
excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties."
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pro-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this
Chapter."
- In sum the rule is:
Delict (breach of contract)
Gen. Rule: no moral damages
- Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains, to some extent, the limitation
imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability
upon mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is
placed on the carrier to prove the it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768 777). Moreover,
the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees
- Exception: with moral damages if:
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
result in the death of a passenger in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the
spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased"
- The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence, compel us to
differentiate between action ex contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously
embodying an action on tort.
DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way of moral damages

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA

241 SCRA 671 VITUG; February 23, 1995
NATURE: Petition for review
FACTS
- In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at
its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna.
- In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In
cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be- to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal
card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
- On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Fil-Am, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel
Intercon Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to
the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt
embarrassed by this incident.
- In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a VP of the bank,
expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported t o our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes
the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. However, it failed to inform him about its sec urity policy. Furthermore, an
overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at
that time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident occurred).
- Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter t hat Luis was a "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William
Anthony King, F&B Manager of the Intercon, wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question." A cop y of this reply was sent to
Luis by Festejo.
- Still evidently feeling aggrieved, Luis filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC.
- On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary
damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
- On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages
HELD
NO
- In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the
contract. The Civil Code provides:
- Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
- Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of
death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed ) of the common carrier.
- Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court
and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither
could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
- Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the
negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive des ign or ill will.
- Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
- Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could
properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contract ual obligation is so deliberate
as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general
principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of
moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
- Fores vs. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not
recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which
provide as follows:
- Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
- Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, s uch
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
- By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud ( dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is
essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220
specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly
excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties."
- Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 m akes
the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to
"demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident
that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith.
We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of
the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award
moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as requir ed by Art. 2220, would be to
violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
xxx xxx xxx

- The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere c arelessness) is too
fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
- Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted.
- In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
- It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the lawm akers when in Art. 2220 they
limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice;
but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through
negligence of the carrier's employees.
- The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the
application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine,
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an
actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly:
Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionabl e tort by itself, the fact that the
parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated
solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause
of action or as an independent actionable tort.
- Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so
guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found
to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code).
- Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exempl ary damages granted by
the courts below.
- Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a
measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly:
- Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
- Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue
of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court.
DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead,
petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In all other r espects, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED.
AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)
18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966
NATURE
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. Air France, through PAL, issued plaintif f a first class round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuent o, there was a 'white man',
who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with th e
white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man; and plaintiff reluctantly
gave his 'first class' seat in the plane."
- both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it, and if such, WON the Cour t could review the questions
of fact
Substantive
2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims, as proved by written documents (tickets)
3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages, when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus, there must be an averment of fraud or
bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find
4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France, granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act
5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract
6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made by the air-carriers purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay
7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages
8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorneys fees
9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive
HELD
1. NO, NO
Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals,
contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it. is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the
evidence for the defense"."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is
not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution"; "only questions of law may be raised" in an
appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Obiter.
- Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before".xxx The
law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn.
- FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon".16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue"

- QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties
2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations
between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
Reasoning
- Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not
have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class
ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. However, CA held that
Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents
submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carriers employees attested that indeed, Carrasco was issued a first class ticket.
- If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights
is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline.
-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok, he was granted the first class seat. If there had been no s eat, and if the white man
had a better right to the seat, then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat?
3. YES
Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.
Reasoning
- There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, said contract was breached
when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and soc ial humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
- Air France did not present evidence that the white man made a prior reservation, nor proved that the white man had better right over the seat;
also, if the managers actions could be justified, they should have presented the manager to testify in court but they did not do so
- The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto
has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For,
"bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes
4. YES
- The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not. be essayed. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer.
5. YES
- Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. (note: it was held that it was a case of
quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract)
Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation.43 And is, because of the relation
which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comfor ts and I advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Reasoning
- Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae
Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
- alsoFrom a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to
be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of
the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant".
Reasoning
- Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene". The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence, as it was only hearsay.
However, the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Also, the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascosos testimony if they had presented the purser.
7. YES
Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant
should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner".
Reasoning
- The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept
8. YES
Ratio. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the court s below felt that it is
but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.\
9. NO
Ratio. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our impri matur thereto. Because,
the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.
DISPOSITION On balance, we, say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the
same. Costs against petitioner.
PSBA V CA
PADILLA; February 4, 1992
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC. It was established that his assailants were not members of
the schools academic community but were outsiders.
- The suit impleaded PSBA, its President, VP, Treasure, Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. It sought to adjudge them liable for the victims
death due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions.

- Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the
complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions, like PSBA, are beyond the ambit of that rule.
- Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. And the MFR was similarly dealt with. Petitioners the assailed the trial courts dispositions before
the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial courts ruling.
ISSUE
WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case
HELD
Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art. 2180 on quasi-delicts, it may still be liable under the law on contracts.
Reasoning
- The case should be tried on its merits. But respondent courts premise is incorrect. It is expressly mentioned in Art. 2180 t hat the liability arises from
acts done by pupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBA is not liable. But when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, the
school makes itself responsible in providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for learning. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb.
DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit
this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park)
217 SCRA 624 CAMPOS, JR.; January 27, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia familys complaint for damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Mla Memorial)
FACTS
- Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased.
- After about a month, preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the same cemetery, the concrete vault encasing
the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface, the Syquias discovered that
the vault had a hole approx 3 in. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole.
- Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Paraaque, they caused the opening of the concrete vault and discovered that:
(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding;
(b) coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above
the head and torso of the deceased;
(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled.
- SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault;
(2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art. 2176)
- Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLA MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead.
Trial Courts Ruling
- Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof.
- No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the
Syquias and Mla Memorial.
- The father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green
and that water would eventually seep through the vault.
- The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away.
- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also denied.
ISSUES
1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners,
or alternatively
2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law between them. A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is
expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v CA)
Reasoning
- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent
in the interment.
- Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides that: Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an
outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association. Pursuant to this, a concrete
vault was installed and after the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
- Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that lot may hold single or double internment underground in
sealed concrete vault."
- "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that
serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.
- "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.
2. NO
Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the c ontrary, the diligence to be
observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
Reasoning
- Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, circumstances of the case do not
show negligence. The reason for the boring of the hole was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that: When the vault was placed
on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault bec ause it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole
the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water.
- Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside th e vault which would have
resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave. Finding no evidence of negligence, there is no reason to award damages.
Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto.
CALALAS VS MENDOZA
GR 122039| 31 May 2000
FACTS

-At 10 a.m. of 23 August 1989, Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a collegefreshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University,
took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney wasfilled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by
the conductor anextension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of thevehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
Occidental, the jeepneystopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle,Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as
she was doing so, an Isuzutruck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the leftrear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured. She sustained afracture of the distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin. Closed reduction of the
fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7,
1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of 3 months and would
have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
-On 9 October 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas before the RTC of Dumaguete City (Branch 36), alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a thirdparty complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment, against Salva as third-party defendant
and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case 3490), filed
by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.
-On appeal to the Court of Appeals, and on 31 March 1991, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of action was
based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The
appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The Court ordered Calalas tro pay
Sunga (1) P50,000.00 as
actual and compensatory damages; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and (4) P1,000.00 as expenses of
litigation; and (5) to pay the costs. Calalas motion for reconsideration was denied 11 September 1995. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N The CA erred in reversing the TCs ruling?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO.
The Supreme Court affirmed the 31 March 1991 decision and the 11 September 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals, with the modification that
the award of moral damages is deleted.
1.
Res Judicata does not apply
Sunga is not bound by the ruling in Civil Case 3490, which found the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict, as she was never a party to
that case. Further, the issues in Civil Case 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue in Civil Case 3490 was whether Salva and his
driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to Calalas jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in the present case is whether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage. The
principle of res judicata, therefore, does not apply.
2.
Distinction between culpa aquiliana or culpa extracontractual, and culpa contractual Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. On the other hand, breach of contract or culpa contractual is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis
of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in
this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
3.
Common carriers presumed at fault unless they observed extraordinary diligence; Burden of proof
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Code. The provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
4.
Doctrine of proximate cause applicable only in quasi-delict, not in breach of contract
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device
for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a cas e, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Herein, it is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
5.
Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 NCC
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers
with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. Article 1733 of the Civil Code
provides that Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraor dinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according t o all the circumstances of each case. Such
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756. On the other hand, Article 1755 of the Civil Code provides
that A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very caut ious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. Article 1756 provides that In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
6.
In violation of traffic rules; Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic) Herein, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about
2 meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the RA 4136, as
amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides in Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic) that No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as
to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free
passage of other vehicles on the highway.
7.
In violation of traffic rules; Section 32(a) (Exceeding registered capacity)
Herein,the driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of Section 32(a) of the same law. Section
32 [a] (Exceeding registered capacity) provides that No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more
passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity. The fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed her in a
peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
8.
Driver of jeepney did not exercise utmost diligence of very cautious persons
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it
became the duty of Calalas to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers. The driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances as required by Article 1755. Not only was Calalas unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed
on him for the

injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
9.
Taking of Extension seat cannot be considered an implied assumption of risk Sungas taking an extension seat did not amount to an
implied assumption of risk. Otherwise, iIt is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our s eas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.

CIVIL CODE
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101)
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a)
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be
regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisi ons of Articles
1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required. (1104a)
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, thoug h foreseen, were
inevitable. (1105a)
CHAPTER 2: QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)

RPC
Title Fourteen: QUASI-OFFENSES
Sole Chapter: CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its med ium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause
some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this art icle, in which case the
court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate
nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957

II NEGLIGENCE
A. CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE
1. DEFINITION; ELEMENTS
CIVIL CODE:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are
the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

V TOLENTINO pages 506 & 507

PICART V SMITH
37 Phil 809 Street March 15, 1918
FACTS

Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank Smith the sum of Php
31,100 as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by Smith.
The incident happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La
Union.

Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge. Before he had gotten half way
across, Smith approached from the opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12 miles per hour.

Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the man was not observing rules of the road. Smith continued his
course and made two more blasts.

Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled his pony to the right side of the railing.

As the automobile approached, Smith guided the automobile to its left, that being
the proper side of the road for the machine.

Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he continued without diminution of speed.

When he learned that there was no possibility for the pony to go on the other side,
Smith drove his car to the right to avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a close proximity to the horse
that it became frightened and turned its belly across the bridge with its head towards the railing.

The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and
the limb was broken.

The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.

It showed that the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing was probably less than one half
meters.

The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done to Picart and his pony.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the amount of P200. The sum is computed to include the value of the
horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel.
In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred while the automobile was
still some distance away. From this moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run down by going to a place
for greater safety.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring his car to an immediate stop or
seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid collision.
There was an appreciable risk that a horse not acquainted with vehicles would react that way.
The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence.
The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless,blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Courts opinion would have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as a reasonable consequence of that course.

2. STANDARD OF CONDUCT
2.1. ORDINARY PRUDENT PERSON
1 Sangco, pages 7 & 8

Page

TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD

CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest
relative., the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics.

19

2.2. SPECIAL CASES

CHILDREN

20
Page

FACTS:

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of
Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the
Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly
end of the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the same time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 yrs of age.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge
of the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who had promised to make
them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some
time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw
or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space
in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some
twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of
small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of
electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves considerable
explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they
could find, hung them of a stick, of which each took one end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a
little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a
series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They
next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. They then opened one
of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap
while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.
Jessie, who, when the boys proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away,
received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the
surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.

The Defendant Companys defense that the caps were under the duty of independent contractors deserves scant
consideration since these workers have been under the supervision of one of the companys foremen.

Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of
article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that Code.
"ART. 1089.
Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by
those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs."
"ART. 1902.
Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.
"ART. 1903.
The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omission, but
also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
o "The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who alive with
them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx
xxx
xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
"ART. 1908.The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused "1.
By the explosion of machines which may not
have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substance which may not have been placed in a safe and
proper place."

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last result in the
United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.In the typical cases,
the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who
from mere idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the
railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had a good reason to suppose, children who
would likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees, one of
which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous
machine, such as a turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to
accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.

In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable.

As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84 U.S.), 657), (wherein the principal question was whether a railroad
company was liable for an injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposed of
amusement, if such injury was, under the circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on
which these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers
who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such
strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is
not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle
him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from

fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in severally state
courts, saying that (1) That the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his
wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery
naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of another can not be
predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference
between children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises. However, after an exhaustive and
critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases, both English and America, formally declared that it adhered "to the
principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout." Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of
Michigan, in the case of Powers vs. Marlow, said that: Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike
instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this,
and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to
them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they
should expect that liberty to be taken."
The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are
expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam
about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the
premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a
trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam
about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to
enter, and where the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard
the child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of
duty, a negligent omission, for which he may and should be held responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault
on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise
would be expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or
occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.

Page

JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR)

DAVIDE; December 21, 1999
FACTS

Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose
Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents
are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
nd

On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2 flr or Syvels Dept. Store. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughters
hand to sign her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter. She suddenly felt a gust of wind and heard a loud thud.

21

ISSUE
WON the defendants negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries, making the company liable
HELD
NO
Just because the kids trespassed doesnt mean that the company is not liable for anything bad that might happen to them.
However, we also have to look at the proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his negligence that contributed
to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. In the case at bar, the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a
match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that
the defendant, therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult
that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been
free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according
to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case."
As regards the maturity of the child, this has to be examined on a case-to-case basis. In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of
the accident was wellgrown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had
been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred;
and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no
room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stands, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he
was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little
girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a
match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that
he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who
was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion , the accident which resulted
in plaintiff's injury, was his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED.

22
Page

She looked behind her and saw her daughter on the floor, pinned by the gift-wrapping counter. Zhieneth was crying and screaming
for help. Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her daughter to the hospital.

She was operated on immediately at the hospital. Gonzales, a former employee of Syvels Dept Store who helped bring Zhieneth
to the hospital, heard her tell the doctor that she nothing. I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me, when
asked what did you do? She died 14 days later, on the hospital bed. She was 6 years old. The cause of her death was attributed
to the injuries she sustained.

After the burial of their daughter, the Aguilars demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills, and
wake and funeral expenses. Petitioners refused to pay. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the
payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount
for loss of income and exemplary damages.

RTC for Jarco Marketing Corp, et al. RTC mfr for the Aguilars. CA and CA mfr for the Aguilars.

- Jarco Mktg Corp, et als side: Criselda was negligent in taking care of her daughter for allowing her to roam freely. Zhieneth was
guilty of contributory negligence because she tried to climb the counter. The counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong base
and was used without incident for the past 15 years. It was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. The testimony
of two former employees, Gonzales and Guevarra, should not be believed because he might have ill feelings towards petitioners.
The testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth climbed the counter so it fell) should instead be believed.

- The Aguilars side: While in the dept store, Criselda never let go of her daughter except to sign the credit card slip. Gonzales
testified that the gift wrapping counter was right beside the verification counter where Criselda was signing. Both Gonzales and
Guevarra testified to the structural instability and shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and inverted L, with a base
smaller than the top. The protruding part of the counter was at the costumer side. They both had informed management (while they
were still working there) that the counter should be nailed to the floor. The management did nothing.
ISSUE:
WON the incident is accident or attributable to negligence. If negligence, who was negligent?
HELD:
NEGLIGENCE.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens."
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by
any means suggested by common prudence.
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Gonzales testimony about what Zhieneth said to the doctor should be accepted because at the time she said it, she was in so
much pain and she answered right away. This means she wasnt making it up. It is axiomatic that matters relating to
declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions.
All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a
startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in
court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme
pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the
matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.
JARCO MKTG, ET AL.
Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to
discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
No contributory negligence from Zhieneth
The conclusive presumption favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In
our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that
account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may
be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine
years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one,
under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. (Sangco)
o Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury
should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth,
a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the
trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal that it was not durable after all.
Shaped like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the
customer waiting area and its base was not secured.
No contributory negligence from Criselda

23

DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

57 PHIL 478 STREET; November 5, 1932
FACTS

This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son,
Alberto, resulting from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity.

Aug 4, 1930 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on Dimas- Alang St for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the
City of Manila and its suburbs.

Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its connections smoking. One of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among
some shrubbery close to the way.

As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble, he stepped into a garage which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco to
telephone the Malabon station of MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that place.

Soco transmitted the message at 2.25 p.m. and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector.

At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted, but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao, one of the witnesses for
the defense, it is clear that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m.

At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home.

Alberto del Rosario, 9 yrs old, who was a few paces ahead of his classmates, Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina, all members
of the second grade in the public school.

As the three neared the place where the wire was down, Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it.

Jose, who happened to be the son of an electrician, knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad told him so!)- stopped
Saturnino- telling him that the wire might be charged.

Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped, but Alberto, who was somewhat ahead, said, I have for some time been in the
habit of touching wires.

Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current, but Alberto, no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the
matter, put out his index finger and touch the wire.

He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre".

The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post.

A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body. Upon being taken to St. Luke's Hospital the child
was pronounced dead.

The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire, such as is commonly used by the defendant company for the
purpose of conducting electricity for lighting.

The wire was cased in the usual covering, but this had been burned off for some distance from the point where the wire parted.

The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once
in six months, and that all of the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of
this kind. There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire.l
ISSUE:
WON Manila Electric is liable
HELD
YES
Reasoning
When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble
at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1 hours passed before anyone from MERALCO
appeared on the scene, and in the meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim.
The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of Jose (8 yrs old), doesnt alter the case.
But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, such negligence
would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. (Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.)
With respect to the amount of damages recoverable, Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with
the death and burial of the boy.
Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service.
Disposition judgment reversed
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part]
- He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death of Alberto, but dissents in so far as the decision allows the recovery of the
father of the sum of P1,250 only as damages. It should be P 2250.
- His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act.
(Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821.)
- In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is equivalent to P1,000

Page

CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later
to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At
this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at time ZHIENETH was pinned
down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners
would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything;
the counter just fell on her.
Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED

- Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons do not obtain in fixing the
amount of the damages recoverable in the present case.
- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main object sought, which is the punishment of the guilty party.
- In a civil action, the principal object is the recovery of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in this case, the defendant is
a corporation, not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the question assumes a vastly different aspect.
- There should be a distinction between the civil liability of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused the death of another;
and the civil liability of a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due
care in the prosecution of its business.
- The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when it undertakes to
promote its own business; and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should be made adequately to
compensate those who have suffered damage by its negligence.
YLARDE V AQUINO
GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS

Soriano was principal. Aquino was a teacher. The school was littered with concrete blocks. Teacher Banez started burying them.
Aquino gathered 18 male pupils to help. He ordered them to dig. Work was unfinished.

Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. Aquino continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the
loose soil. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez. Aquino told the kids not to touch the
stone.

3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. 2 were able to
escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries. 3 days later he died.

Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court dismissed and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent.
ISSUE
WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages
HELD
Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of academic school and not school of arts and trades, in line with Amadora
case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. It is only the teacher who should answer for torts committed by their students. Besides, Soriano
did not order the digging.
Based on Article 2180, Aquino can be held liable. However, petition is based on Article 2176. Did the acts/omissions of Aquino
cause the death of Ylarde? Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required adult laborers. He required the children to remain
in the pit after they finished digging. He ordered them to level the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He went to
another place and left the kids.
Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR THE CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. IN RULING THAT YLARDE WAS
IMPRUDENT, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY. A MINOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO
THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN ADULT.
Aquino also said the digging was part of Work Education. This is unacceptable. Work is too dangerous and it was not even in the
lesson plan.

EXPERTS/PROFESSIONALS

Page

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION

STREET; November 3, 1930
NATURE: Appeal from decision of the CFI
FACTS

Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline.

Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a
conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made
upon completion of the work.

The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat.
Quest had the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves
under Quest's directions.

Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith
carburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into the
carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed
on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by
a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked
from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use between the gasoline tank
and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the
operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel
supply.

It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the
carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the
flooding would disappear.

24

Art. 2187 of CC. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries
caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.

Page

UNITED STATES V PINEDA

37 Phil 456 MALCOLM; January 22, 1918
NATURE
Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law.
FACTS

Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo, Manila.
Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other
occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription read: "clorato de
potasa - 120 gramos - en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was
prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda - Clorato potasa - 120.00 - en seis papeles Para caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had
asked for, put two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water
for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos,
thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Pea and Darjuan, of the Bureau of
Science, found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two
chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be
barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian,
performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of poisoning.
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Pea and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at
the drug store of the accused, which proved to be barium chlorate

25

The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the first part of the course, owing to the
use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine com partment and occupied
himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine.

As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a
new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment
later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the
carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. The
salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court
found, was P10,000.

CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum
from the date of the filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs.
ISSUE
WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest
HELD
YES
Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence
if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
Reasoning
The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, so that when
the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could
sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external
parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly
inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation,
which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been
due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he
was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding
of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that would
have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be
said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for
Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was
free from blame.
The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the
experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on
the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. As a rule
workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not
bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires
possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and
special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to be incompatible with the situation now under
consideration.
This action was instituted about two years after the accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be manager and had
gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. It is
sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one
where the defense of laches can be properly invoked.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.

Page

BPI V CA
216 SCRA 51 GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS

In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market placement as
evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's
Money Market Department. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's
Money Market Department, told her "trading time" was over for the day, which was a Friday, and suggested that she call again the
following week. The promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market
placement that had matured on September 24, 1981.

Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Fernando's
account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination process.

26

2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was barium chlorate and not
potassium chlorate
3. WON the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of the
Pharmacy Law, Act No. 597, section 17, as amended
HELD
1. NO
Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact,
or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not
interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to
prejudice the accused.
Reasoning
What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a
defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to
convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to
prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the
defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is
intensified and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the
frequency of accidents.
2. NO
Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary.
3. NO
Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it
too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or
mistake.
Reasoning
The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior
knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a pharmacist. As a
pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be
unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the word "fraudulent" which has given the court
trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective?
Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of
the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation;
that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a
positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in
reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known principles on the
subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly
trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without
good reason so devitalize the law.
The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length
as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone
who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the
purchaser any thing. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know
nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.
Remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their
mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine
Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot
take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all
the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the
quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is
made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation, which we are
permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with
"fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception, and injury must be present - but not scienter.
Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action
which may be instituted.

27

On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the pretermination of
the placement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the
real Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about the placement tallied with the details in "the
ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer of Philippine American Life Insurance
Company (Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who
originally handled Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the
request for pretermination.
Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value because of its pretermination, the caller insisted on the
pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one for P1,800,000.00 and the second for the
balance, and that the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the "purchase order
slip" for the requested pretermination as required by office procedure, and from his desk, the papers, following the processing
route, passed through the position analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and documentation clerk, before the two cashier's checks,
nos. 021759 and 021760 for P1,800,000.00 and P613,215.16, respectively, both payable to Eligia G. Fernando, covering the
preterminated placement, were prepared. The two cashier's checks, together with the papers consisting of the money market
placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No. 35623) to be preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro
and Celestino Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively, in BPI's Treasury Operations Department, both
authorized signatories for BPI, who signed the two checks that very morning. Thereafter, the checks went to the dispatcher for
delivery.
Later in the same morning, however, the same caller changed the delivery instructions; instead of the checks being delivered to her
office at Philamlife, she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then
told her that if it were her niece who was going to get the checks, her niece would have to being a written authorization from her to
pick up the checks. This telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece, Rosemarie
Fernando, who would pick up the checks. Thus, Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher, Bernardo Laderas, to tell him of
the new delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip, writing thereon
"Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up.
It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt. As it turned out,
the same person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. Although the checks represented the
termination proceeds of Eligia G. Fernando's placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher failed to get or to
require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that Eligia G. Fernando's
purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two
checks, both of which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando, was compared or verified with
Eligia G. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a "close
similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G. Fernando. In the afternoon of October 13, 1981, a woman who represented herself to be
Eligia G. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a current account. She was
accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have
opened, earlier that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co, a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. What Cuaso
indicated in the application form, however, was that the new client was introduced by Valentin Co, and with her initials on the form
signifying her approval, she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing. As finally proceeds, the
application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil status, nationality, occupation ("business
woman"), tax account number, and initial deposit of P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current account is indicated on the
application form by the initials of Regina G. Dy, Cashier, who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the
application form after reviewing it.
On October 14, 1981, the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy with Current
Account No. 126310-3. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the depositor's specimen signature. CBC's
guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two checks, which CBC forthwith sent to
clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day.
Two days after, withdrawals began on Current Account No. 26310-3: On October 16, 1981, by means of Check No. 240005 dated
the same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash", which the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the
counter, and Check No. 240003 dated October 15, 1981 for P48,500.00, payable to "cash" which was received through clearing
from PNB Pasay Branch; on October 19, 1981, by means of Check No. 240006 dated the same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to
"cash," which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter; on October 22, 1981, by means of
Check No. 240007 dated the same day for P370,000.00, payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashed over the
counter; and on November 4, 1981, by means of Check No. 240001 dated November 3, 1981 for P4,100.00, payable to "cash,"
which was received through clearing from Far East Bank. The last withdrawal on November 4, 1981 left Current Account No.
26310-3 with a balance of only P571.61.
On November 11, 1981, the maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement with BPI, the real Eligia G. Fernando
went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having preterminated her placement on October 12, 1981. She
executed an affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy, she never received nor endorsed them
and that her purported signature on the back of the checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original of the
promissory note (No. 35623 with maturity value of P2,462,243.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPI issued
her a new promissory note (No. 40314 with maturity date of December 23, 1981 and maturity value of P2,500.266.77) to evidence
a roll-over of the placement.
On November 12, 1981, supported by Eligia G. Fernando's affidavit, BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the
reason "Payee's endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time". These incidents led
to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee.
The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of P1,206,607.58 with interest
thereon at 12% per annum from August 12, 1983.

Page

Page

However, upon CBCs motion for reconsideration, the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's
decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1,206,607.58.

BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but modified the award by
including a provision for attorneys fees in favor of CBC, among others.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUES
1. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the
checks
2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged, WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the
collecting bank which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were cleared
HELD
1. NO
BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped
at the back of the checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. Under this
premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank, respondent CBC, had an unquestioned liability when it turned
out that the payee's signature on the checks were forged. With these circumstances, petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of
relative negligence become totally irrelevant.
In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior
endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK
OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks. No amount of
legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is
liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.
Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally
suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of
presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to
ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it
has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof, it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. However, the point
that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery.
The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative",
and payment made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. The exception to this rule
is when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. In this jurisdiction we
recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule.
In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged. Following the general rule, the checks are "wholly inoperative"
and of no effect. However, the underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. The
issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities the determination of the
rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks.
The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent
resulting in the encashment of the forged checks.
The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of
the pre-termination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this
wise: a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call, which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia
G. Fernando, a vice-president of Philamlife; b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. Fernando's account did not do anything
about the account's pre-termination; c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G. Fernando's purported
signature on the letter requesting the pre-termination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks, yet, her signature
was in BPI's file; and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud, but which BPI neglected to take, was requiring before the two
checks in controversy were delivered, the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was
supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee, however, belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of
respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who
impersonated Eligia G. Fernando.
The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that these withdrawals, without any further showing that the CBC employees had
actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts (Sec. 56, Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in
accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same amounted to bad faith cannot be considered as
basis for holding CBC liable.
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and
trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious
reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
In the present case, there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. The
Arbitration Committee, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however disagree in the evaluation of the degree of
negligence of the banks. While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver, the PCHC Board of
Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. To the extent that the degree of negligence is
equated to the proximate cause of the loss, we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how
many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising
extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
2. NO
The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor.
Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case.
Under this doctrine, where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous, the person who has the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.

28

Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. CBC
had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market
placement. Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Fernando with that of
the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud. Hence,
respondent CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge,
actual or implied, of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI.
BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous
sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred." Petitioner BPI anchors its
argument on its stance that there was "a gap, a hiatus, an interval between the issuance and delivery of said checks by petitioner
BPI to the impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the impostor. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that
elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. At this stage,
according to petitioner BPI, there was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing the same plan
and could have held to the checks without negotiating them.
Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and
delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an
account and depositing the same with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk
of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees, the impostor would complete her deception by
encashing the forged checks. There is therefore, greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged
checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule that
petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of P2,413,215.16, the total amount of the two (2) forged checks. Due care on the part of
CBC could have prevented any loss.
The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-thecounter withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. The opening of the account itself was accompanied by
inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case,
still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI. They let the opportunity slip by
when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it.
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by
an impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss. While
it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, respondent CBC's negligence contributed
equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances, we apply
Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation
by the courts.
Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of
the loss of P2,413,215.16

Page

29

INTOXICATION
E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO.
28 Phil 122 MORELAND; October 1, 1914
NATURE
An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident
FACTS

Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway

Plaintiffs residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendants tracks run. To enter his premises from the street,
plaintiff must cross defendants tracks.

One night, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and, in crossing the tracks to enter his premises, the horse stumbled, leaped forward,
and fell, throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries

At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks, the rails were above-gruond, and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from
one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the
street.

It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that
he was so intoxicated, and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident

Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintiffs negligence was not as great as defendants, awarded plaintiff
P1,000.
ISSUE
WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the principal occurrence or only to his own injury. (If the former, he cannot recover; if
the latter, the trial court was correct in apportioning damages)
HELD
NO
Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove
negligence.
Reasoning
Intoxication in itself is not negligence, and no facts, other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated, are stated which warrant the
conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not
warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the
conditions described.

A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of
the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw
a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not
have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.
DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff.

INSANITY

Page

US V BAGGAY
20 PHIL 142 TORRES; September 1, 1911
NATURE
Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28, 1910, whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was
obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined
in an institution for the insane until further order of the court.
FACTS

About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia, Abra,
Province of Ilocos Sur, for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom, when he, the nonChristian Baggay, without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head
from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named
Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan.

For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur, dated February 15, charging the non-Christian
Baggay, jr., with murder, because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted separately from the other,
No. 1109, for lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the judge on April 28 rendered
the judgment cited above, whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court.
ISSUE
WON an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable
HELD
YES
Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for
reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable,
although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability.
Reasoning
Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his
deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though they be
performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is
necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when
he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary
for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune
to suffer the consequences of his acts.
Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable.
Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced, subject to the following:

30

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official
to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable
with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.

In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age,
or over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have them under their authority,
legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics,
imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance
with the civil law.
DISPOSITION Therefore, the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law, affirmation thereof is proper, and it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

III NEGLIGENCE
B. DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
CIVIL CODE
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Page

31

MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION

99 PHIL 48 BENGZON; June 30, 1956
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC
FACTS
- A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging to Marinduque, turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro
Mamador and injury to the other laborers.
- Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. He has paid nothing, however, to the
latter.
- Deceaseds wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer.
ISSUE
1. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque
2. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employers prohibition to ride haulage trucks
HELD
1. YES
- Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a
third person, thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability.
- The criminal case, however, was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they
have not received the indemnity ordered by the court.
- At any rate, even if the case was against a third person, the court already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the
"other person" does not affect the liability of the employer.
- Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against
the employer because she has already elected one of the remedies.
- This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for
damages.
2. NO
- Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, because transportation by truck is
not dangerous per se.
- Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks, its violation does not constitute negligence per se, but it
may be an evidence of negligence.
- Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety
of the riders.
- Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to consequences", "pursuing a
course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury".
Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed