What Is Political Theory/Philosophy?

Author(s): Mark E. Warren

Source: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 606-612
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Features

What Is Political
Theory/Philosophy?
MarkE. Warren
Georgetown University

The subdisciplineof politicaltheory and

political philosophycontinues to suffer
some misunderstandingwithin political
science as a whole. Notwithstandingits
renaissance in the last decade, political
theory/philosophyis stilltoo often characterized in terms that obscure its roles and
functions within the discipline. Political
theory/philosophyis often referred to as
"normativetheory" as a way of distinguishingits concernswith values from the
"empiricaltheory" and researchof political science proper. Where the concernsof
political theory/philosophyare not just
normative,politicalscientistsoften characterize it as "speculativetheory" to distinguish it from "empiricaltheory" that can
be confirmedor refuted by reference to
observabledata. The terms of such a distinction suggest, of course, that theories
grounded in certaintiescan and ought to
replacethe speculativeapproachesof tra-

MARK
E.WARREN
606

ditional political thought. And because

politicaltheory/philosophyreliesheavilyon
the historyof politicalthought,manysee it
as part of history and the humanities
rather than political science--interesting
and necessary for any culturallyliterate
person, but fundamentallydistinct from
contemporarypoliticalresearch.
Terminologicaldistinctionssuch as these
solidifiedin an era in which behavioralist
agendas shaped subdisciplinaryboundaries, and they reflect the influencethat
neo-positivistviews of explanationonce
had withinthe discipline.Since that time,
however, we have developed more
sophisticated understandings of how
theory and philosophyrelate to empirical
research. These developments have in
turn affected the way we understandthe
explanatoryconcerns of politicalscience,
while also expandingpoliticaltheory/philosophy beyond its traditionalboundaries.
New assessments of the relation between theory/philosophyand explanation
have in part been stimulatedby close attention to philosophyof science over the
last couple of decades. The behavioralist
agenda deserves some credit for this attention, since it soughtcriteriaof scientific
authority in positivisteplstemology-that
is, the view that explanatory meaning
depends entirelyon reference to observables. Positivism,however, has long been
superseded by other accountsof explanation. Whatever their many differences,all
schoolsof philosophyof scienceagree that
explanatory meanings are underdetermined by observables. Explanation
depends to a much greater extent than
the positivistsappreciatedon conceptual
relations and assumptions internal to
theory, and thus on the kindof systematic
conceptualanalysistraditionallypracticed
by political theory/philosophy. For this
reason politicaltheories and philosophies
have what I shallcalla meoning-constitutive
functionwithinall explanations.Thisfunction is increasingly
recognizedwithinpolitical science,andthisis no doubt one reason
why the post-behavioralera has coincided
with a resurgenceof interest in political
theory/philosophy.
At the same time, politicaltheory/philosophy has changed dramaticallyin the
last couple of decades. Whereasit used to
PS: PoliticalScience & Politics

What Is Political Theory/Philosophy?

be mostly the history of politicalthought,
today it includesa mixture of conceptual,
linguistic,and normativeanalysis,"grand"
theories of society and politics(whichare

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comingbackto life in new forms), and philosophy of social science. As a subdiscipline, it is broader, more eclectic, more
sophisticated, and more sensitive to explanatory concerns than it was just two
decades ago. But we have been less successful in developing alternatives to the
neo-positivistterms we use to characterize the relationsbetween politicaltheory/
philosophyand explanation,and thus the
role of politicaltheory/philosophywithin
politicalscience. Our failureleaves us subject to the tacit blindersof terminological
distinctions.The distinctionsIoffer here as
alternativesto those with a neo-positivist
genesis suggestone way of more accurately depicting the functions of political
theory/philosophy.They also suggest why
explanationsof the politicalworld necessarily involve the diversity of theoretical
and philosophicalconcerns that we are
now seeing withinthe discipline.
Political Theory
To beginwith, it is usefulto recalla prepositivist distinction between theoretical
and philosophical problems: although
closely interrelated,we need to recognize
their differencesso as not to confusephilosophical issues with those of explanatory
theory. In the way I shall use the terms
here, theoriesare about thingsthat empirically exist, even if these things are themselves ideas, values, and theories that are
part of the political world. Philosophical
concerns have to do with conceptualpresuppositionsand judgmentsthat are embedded in explanatorytheories. Although
philosophicalanalysisis not directlyexplanSeptember 1989

atory, allexplanatorytheories involve,and

are partly determined by, the philosophical presuppositionsthat are essential to
their explanatory power-an issue to
which I shall return.
Accordingly,I suggest that we reserve
the term politicaltheory (in contrast to
for those dimensionsof
politicalphilosophy)
conceptual schemes that select and organize informationabout the politicalworld
for explanatory purposes-for example,
neo-marxist theories of the state or
rationalchoice models of decisionmaking.
Politicalscientistshave alwaysappreciated
that theories such as these suggest significant problems and hypotheses, as well as
provide common languagesand conceptual tools. What has changed in the postbehavioralera is our appreciationof the
functionsof theories.
meaning-constitutive
It is now an accepted tenet of the philosophy of social science that explanatory
meanings of terms are interdependent
within a body of theory. There are, of
course, many different versions of how
this occurs and what its implicationsare.

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At the very least, however, the point implies that in addition to care in specifying empiricalreferents (a legacy of behavioralism), political scientists need to
develop a greater awareness of how their
theories constitute their problems and
even their findings.Explanation,as always,
requiresthat we distinguishempiricalfrom
theoretical questions-something positivists rightly insisted upon. But it also requiresus to interrelateboth dimensionsof
607

Features
meaning-a task positivistsfailedto recognize as a problem because they held that
the meaningsof theoretical terms are reducibleto their empiricalreferents.

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A first step in recognizingthe relative

autonomy of theory is to notice that we
rarely use theories as representational
"maps" of the politicalworld at all, even
thoughthis metaphor dominatescommon
understandings.More often, the explanatory powers of theories are indirectin a
way that provides them with a meaningconstitutive dimension: we use them as
limiting cases and counterfactuals to
reduce the complexity of the political
world so it mightbecome a discreteobject
of study. We decide to reduce complexity
inone way ratherthananotherfor reasons
that are, more often than not, normative.
This is the way it should be, since this is
how we characterizecertaindimensionsof
the world as problematic-say, its efficiency, justice, distributionof power, or
violence-and thus worthy of further investigation.Modelsof democracywork in
this way, as do rational choice models,
models of organizational structure,
theories of development, conflict, world
systems, and so on. The normativecomponent of limitingcases and counterfactuals is a problemonly if one uses them as
if theories were representational maps
decisions
ratherthan meaning-constitutive
of a communityof politicalscientists.One
can avoid these mistakes only by making
the theories themselves into objects of
study. Only then can one defend the constitutive meaningsand normative implications that inevitablyfollow from them.
A second role of politicaltheory in ex608

planationwhose importanceis increasingly

recognizedis that it deals with the conceptual coherence of interpretativeschemes
that (empirically)enter into political actions through actors' understandingsand
uses of the terms of politicaldiscourse.Exampleswould be analysesof politicalideologies, cultures, rhetoric, diplomaticdocuments, as well as everyday discourses as
they come to bear on the politicalworld.
To take a simple example, the act of voting is caused in part by the way actors
understandthe normativesignificanceand
politicalfunctionof voting withina democraticsystem. Forthis reason, the intelligibility of voting requires something more
than observation: it requires (conceptual)
interpretation of an empirically-existing
universeof discoursein whichare embedded understandingsabout democraticrepresentation-or indeed, whatever other
discourse happens to impact on voting.
These "textual" elements of politics are
an intrinsic part of the political world
because they conceptuallyorient individuals toward collective decisionmaking.
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They have a causalforce that is irreducible

They have a causalforce that is irreducible
to perceptions, attitudes, opinions, or
norms that have been transformed into
discrete bits of data because actors are influencedby the internalcoherence of their
conceptual universe. This dimension of
politicallife is accessibleonly throughinterpretations of meaningstructures, that is,
through the methods traditionally employed in the humanities. Many political
theorists have been meetingthis challenge
by expanding their traditional concerns
with interpretation to include ordinary
languagephilosophy,semiotics, phenomePS: Political Science & Politics

What Is Political Theory/Philosophy?

nology, hermeneutics, and interpretive
sociology.A less obvious example of an interpretive approach is rational choice
theory: it views the political world as
made up of conceptuallycoherent intenrational
tions that formulateinstrumentally
action orientations.What distinguishesrationalchoicetheory from other interpretative approaches is a confusionabout the
status of its methods: it constitutesthe domain of intentions by means of axioms
ratherthan treatingintentionalityas an interpretive problem. This confusion has
allowed rationalchoice theory to inherit
positivist expectations for a definitive
"empiricaltheory" that would displace
traditionalpoliticaltheory.
Political Philosophy
We mightreserve the term politicalphilosophy(as opposed to politicaltheory)for
concernsthat are not immediatelyexplanatory. Political philosophy typically involves questions having to do with the
conceptual presuppositionsof theoretical
orientations,as well as questions of judgment about truth and value. A common
misconception in politicalscience is that
most questions of politicalphilosophyare
about normative issues; hence its overly
narrow identification with "normative
theory." Infact, the problems of political
philosophyfallinto three distinct,although
interrelated, categories of analysis and
judgment,only one of which is normative.

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Ontologicat questions: Some of these
problems are ontological.The term ontology refers to the science that investigates
September 1989

the nature and fundamentalproperties of

reality.We no longerbelieve we can carry
out such investigations because we no
longer presume intellectualaccess to reality as such. Forgood reason ontology as a
"science" has fallen out of favor. Nonetheless, the term has been resurrectedin
political philosophy for slightly different
purposes: whether reality is knowable or
not, we unavoidably make general assumptionsabout the nature of the reality
we are investigating.These mightproperly
be called ontologicalassumptionsbecause
they are logicallyprior to any explanation
and serve as its conditions of possibility.

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Although necessary, they cannot be empiricallyinvestigatedbecause they characterize general properties of the world
we seek to investigate. Most ontological
assumptionsare so fundamentalthat we
take them for granted, not understanding
how they frame, select, and limitpossibilities for explanationand judgment.All empiricalresearchpresupposesthat some set
of features of the humancondition-such
as consciousness, language,scarcity, temporality, causal determination, lawlike
regularity-defines a politicalworld as a
knowableobject of study. Decisionsto include some features of the humancondition and exclude others are not trivial:
they constitute disciplinarydomains by
definingobjects of explanation.For example, the behavioralist claim that only
observablesthat can be ordered into logical associationscount as a (knowable)part
of politicalrealityproducesone kindof disciplinarydomain. The rationalchoice presuppositionthat politicsis an effect of instrumentallyrational actions produces a
second kind of domain. The Weberian
focus on intentionalactionsmolded by dis609

Features

tinctive cultural possibilities produces a

third. Those who see social and organizational structuresas irreducibleto behavior
or intentionalaction produce stillanother
definitionof what features of the human
condition makes the politicalworld possible.

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Each of these ontological assumptions
about the nature of the political world
guides and limits what is to count as an
"explanation."For example, differentanswers to the (ontological) question, "Is
voting a behavior, an action, or a structured manifestationof social interaction?"
will dictate differenttheoreticalapproaches and criteriaof adequacy. Votingbehaviorssimplyneed to be observed and their
regularitiestheoreticallyidentified.Acts of
voting need to be observed and conceptuallyunderstood as part of a culturalsystem within which "voting" involves an
assignmentof meaningby the actor in a
way that partly accounts for the act. A
structuralanalysiswould requirethat one
postulate non-observable entities-a
"class structure"or a "state," for example-that influenceboth behavior and intentionalorientation.Ontologicaldecisions
such as these relate closelyto the explanatory status one gives to concepts. Are
there reallythings called "institutions"or
"class structures" or "culturalsystems"
or "states"-or are these simply intellectually convenient ways of specifyingdif610

ferent kinds of actions, their situations,

their effects, and their normative significance? Are linguisticstructures reducible
to the individualswho use language?Are
social regularitieslaw-like or rule-like?If
law-like, do we mean something that
possesses the necessity of physicallaws?If
rule-like,then what is their causalstatus in
politicallifegiven that rulescan be broken?
Many methodologicaldebates about the
explanatory powers of behavioralism,rationalchoice theory, structuralism,hermeneutics,and the liketurn on these kindsof
questions.
Ontological decisions determine not
only domain and criteria of explanatory
adequacy, but also the way one conceptualizes the normative possibilities of
politics.Forexample, ifone conceptualizes
the politicalworld as being made up only
of behaviors, or only of instrumentalactions, then one has excluded by ontological fiat the causalforce and transformative
possibilitiesof language and interaction.
This in turn will limitthe horizonsof political possibilitywithout analysisor justification.
Epistemologicalquestions: A second kind
of question in politicalphilosophyis epistemological.Such questions have to do with
the authorityof theories with respect to
the world they purport to explain. Answers to epistemologicalquestions often
follow from differentontologicalpositions.
Take the example of voting: if voting is a
behavior,then the authorityof a theoretical statement depends on its referencesto
observations. This is consistent with positivist epistemology. If, however, voting is
an action, then observations underdetermine explanation. One must also understand "voting" as part of an interpretive
field within which the intelligibility
of the
behavior depends in part on the actor's
understandingof democracy.This presupposes an interpretive (or "humanistic")
component to methodology, since the
politicalscientist must interpretthe interpretive field which partly constitutes the
object of explanation. From the point of
view of positivists,interpretivemethodologies are not "scientific"preciselybecause
interpretations cannot be authoritatively
PS: Political Science & Politics

What Is Political Theory/Philosophy?

verified by referring to theory-independent observations. This is why positivists

deny a (knowable)causal status to interpretive phenomena in the politicalworld,
and seek to reduce them to lawlikeregularities. In contrast, much political
philosophytoday has to do with articulatingpostpositivistaccountsof the authority
of social scientificinterpretationsof interpretative phenomena. Recent critical
theory, for example, focuses on criteriaof
authority implicit in the intersubjective
dimensionsof action.
Normative questions: It is well recognized
that politicalphilosophydeals with a third
category of questions, those havingto do
with normativejudgment. The classical
form of questioningin politicalphilosophy
occurs when problems of explanatory
judgmentcan be distinguishedfrom those
of normative judgment. Thus, assuming
that the relevant aspects of a politicaldomain are known, how are they to be
judged?What are the criteriaof judgment,
and how are they related to fundamental
human values? What modes of political
organizationwould maximizethese values?
Althoughnormativejudgmentsare logically distinct from explanatory concerns,
they are also closely related by the peculiarway that politicalscience is definedas a
discipline.Whatever other disagreements
there might be about domain, we usually
callsomething"political"if it concernscollective decisionmaking,where the question "what ought we to do?" is alwaysimplicit.Politicalscience is uniqueamong the
socialsciences in that its domainis preconstituted by normative questions. Stated
otherwise, such questions are intrinsicto
the possibilityof a politicalscience. This
logicalformulationhas an empiricalcorrelate: individualsact politicallywhen they
are normatively oriented toward collective problems. Politicalphilosophersarticulate this dimensionof politicswhen they
reconstruct and analyze the normative
dimensionof politicaldiscourse.
Normative and explanatory goals are
closely related in other ways as well. As
suggested, we often assign significanceto
politicalresearch accordingto normative
judgments. For example, studyingvoting
September 1989

presupposes that voting is problematic,

which in turn presupposes a normative
theory of liberal-democracywithin which
voting is a central and definitiveelement.
In contrast, Marxist theories downplay
voting because of the normativejudgment
that political democracy is diminishedin
value without economic democracy;this is
partly why Marxistsare interested in the
effects of economic structureson politics.

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Somewhat less obvious is the way that
differentnormative tendencies and possibilities follow from ontological decisions
that select for some kinds of applications
and exclude others. For example, if one
constitutes the politicaluniverse as made
up of behaviors, the form of knowledge
one produces will lack connections to intentional and linguisticphenomena. Lacking these connections, it will be relatively
useless-or at best insufficient-for increasingindividualcapacitiesfor choice and
self-direction. What behavioral research
can be used for is behavior modification
as, for example, in campaignuse of opinion survey researchto tailor media images
for desired responses. But such applications are technocratic rather than democratic. Becausebehavioralforms of knowledge can be more easily put to such uses
(rather than, say, locating conditions of
public discourse) they produce a bias
toward technocracy and away from
democracy
611

Features
The aim of politicalphilosophyhere, of
course, is to make such normative judgments into problems that one can treat
systematically.At the same time, awareness about the interrelationsbetween normative orientations and research can
guard against"scientistic"politicalscience
-that is, research that tacitly confuses
politicalor value problems with scientific
findings,
History of Political Thought
Finally,a comment may be usefulabout
why political theory/philosophydoes so
much of its work by means of the history
of politicalthought. Classicalsystems of
politicalthought-from Platoand Aristotle
to Marx and Weber-exemplify different
kinds of answers to many of the above
questions, answers that express central
strains in our political culture. Political
scientistsinevitablyrely on the conceptual
and linguistictools providedby their political culture-indeed, if only so that they can
take the communicationand significanceof
their researchfor granted.Culturalawareness is no doubt valuablefor its own sake:
how else could we know who the we is
that is defined by a tradition of political
discourse?But, in addition, studyingrelatively comprehensiveand discrete systems
of thoughtis an invaluablemeans of developing an awareness about our own presuppositions and values. The canon of
politicalthought is close enoughso we can
recognize our own assumptionswithin it,
but distant enough so we can recognize
discrete sets of values, problems, presuppositions,and mistakes.It is never simplya
question of learningand borrowingfrom
past masters, but also one of seeing them
as exemplars of the interdependence of
philosophy,theory, and explanation,such

612

that we mightunderstandthe powers and

limits of different possibilities,and gain a
criticalawareness of our own
Conclusion
The resurgence of politicaltheory and
philosophyis, in my view, part of the discipline's recovery from self-imposed misunderstandingsabout the nature of the
politicalworld, and about how it is possible to know and judge it. The disciplineis
healthier today because these questions
are no longermarginalizedby an exclusively behavioralagenda. But it is now time to
do away with the terminologicaldistinctions inheritedfrom the behavioralera as
well. These terms suggest indefensible
roles for politicaltheory/philosophy,and
they continue to confuse us about what
roles, exactly, politicaltheory/philosophy
does playwithinthe discipline.The distinctions and interrelationsI offer here-between theory and philosophy, and between ontological, epistemological, and
normativequestions-provide one way of
replacingthese terms and explainingthese
roles. They also advocate my own view
that the current renaissance of political
theory/philosophyreflects a growingrigor
and depth in our understandingof political
life
About the Author
MarkE. Warrenis AssistantProfessorof
He is
Governmentat GeorgetownUniversity.
authorof Nietzscheand Political
Thought
(MIT
Press,1988),andcurrently
workingon a book
entitled Democracyand the Self which will
examinerelationsbetween language,political
interaction,and subjectivityin democratic
theory.

PS: Political Science & Politics