RULE 92-97

[G. R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003]

PILAR
Y.
GOYENA, petitioner,
GUSTILO, respondent.

vs. AMPARO

LEDESMA-

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

From the Court of Appeals June 19, 2000 Decision which affirmed that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 149 in Special Proceeding
No. N-4375 appointing herein respondent Amparo Ledesma Gustilo as
guardian over the person and property of her sister Julieta Ledesma, Pilar Y.
Goyena, Julietas close friend and companion of more than 60 years, comes to
this Court on petition for review on certiorari.
On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP over the person and properties of her sister
Julieta, the pertinent allegations of which read:
[1]

2. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a
patient in the Makati Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age,
general debility, and a mini-stroke which she suffered in the United States in early
1995;
3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without
outside assistance, and she has to be moved by wheel chair;
4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and
in Western Visayas, with an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million
Pesos[;]
5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the
assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural
enterprises;

6. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely,
petitioner Amparo Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the
Religious of the Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given
their consent to the filing of this petition as shown by their signatures at the bottom of
this petition[;]
7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business management of commercial,
agricultural and corporate enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where
Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is in a position to monitor and
supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical services to Julieta Ledesma whether
in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship. She
later filed an Amended Opposition on August 15, 1996 reading in part:
2.03 The petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent
and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her
person/property. She is very able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly
evident from her letters to the petitioner. Copies of her recent letters are herewith
attached as Annexes A to E.
xxx
2.05 Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their
interests are antagonistic (Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46. 49 L.R.A. 800, as cited in vol.
V-B Francisco Revised Rules of Court, Rule 93, Section 4, p. 414).
xxx
3.01 The above captioned petition should be dismissed for utter lack of legal and/or
factual basis.
3.02 In the remote event that this Honorable Court should find that Julieta Ledesma is
incompetent and resolve that there is need to appoint a guardian over her
person and property, this Honorable Court should appoint as such guardian:
1. Oppositor Goyena;

2. Bart Lacson;
3. Fely Montelibano;
4. Jose T. Revilla; or
5. a qualified and reputable person as may be determined fit by this
Honorable Court.
By Decision of October 4, 1996, the trial court found Julieta incompetent
and incapable of taking care of herself and her property and appointed
respondent as guardian of her person and properties, ratiocinating as follows:
[2]

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age, the
youngest sister of Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90 years of age has
been the close friend and companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta was with
Oppositor when she suffered her first stroke in Makati in 1991 which was the reason
why Julieta had to give up the management of their hacienda in Bacolod. It is also not
disputed that Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in the U.S. In
short, the special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and the Oppositor cannot
be denied. Now that Julieta is unable to manage her personal life and business
concerns due to senility and vascular dementia, the oppositor wants to be appointed
her guardian or else Bart Lacson, Fely Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.
It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to the
appointment of Amparo as guardian because she thinks that the latter dislikes her.
She further added that there were a number of letters allegedly written by Julieta to
Amparo which showed Julietas sentiments regarding certain matters. Nevertheless,
not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta opposed the petition. As a matter of fact, her
sisters signified their conformity thereto. Thus, Ms. Goyenas mere conjecture that
Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition should be denied. Neither
does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of a guardian. On the
contrary, it is Ms. Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse interest to
that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julietas holdings at the Makati Medical Center
has been transferred to her as alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A.
By and large, the qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the person and
properties of Julieta has been duly established. As a sister, she can best take care of

Julietas concerns and well being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her
family should be given the opportunity to show their love and affection for her
without however denying Pilar Goyena access to her considering the special bond of
friendship between the two. Needless to say, the oppositor at 90 years of age could not
be said to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of Julieta.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Amparo Gustilo, is hereby appointed guardian over the
person and property of Julieta Ledesma, an incompetent with all the powers and duties
specified under the law.
Accordingly, let letters of guardianship issue to petitioner upon her filing of a bond in
the amount of P200,000.00 to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed
for general guardians.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts decision was, by
Order of November 4, 1996 , denied in this wise:
[3]

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Oppositor thru counsel, and
finding no merits on the ground stated therein, considering that petitioner appears to
be most qualified and suitable to act as Julieta Ledesmas guardian after taking into
consideration the qualifications of the oppositor and her other recomendees [sic],
aside from the fact that petitioners appointment as such was not objected to by any of
her nearest kin, in contrast to the hostile interest of oppositor, the same is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision on the following ratiocination:
[4]

Indeed, oppositor-appellant (Pilar) has not shown the authenticity and due execution
of the letters which purport to show the existence of a rift between Julieta and her
family and dissatisfaction as to how the businesses were managed. At any rate, while
it is correct to say that no person should be appointed guardian if his interest conflict
with those of the ward (Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil. 212), there are really no
antagonistic interests to speak of between petitioner [Amparo] and Julieta, they being

co-owners of certain properties. There is also no showing that petitioners business

decisions in the past had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta.
While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there is no sufficient
showing that petitioner is hostile to the best interests of the latter. On the contrary, it
was the petitioner who, realizing the need for the appointment of a person to guard her
sisters interests, initiated the petition for guardianship. We see no indication that
petitioner is animated by a desire to prejudice Julietas health as well as financial
interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who had initially concealed
the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta from the court. Oppositors advanced age
of 90 years also militate against her assuming the guardianship of the
incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not interested to be appointed
legal guardian (p.21[,] Appellants Brief, Rollo, p. 59). But the persons that she
points to as being better choices as Julietas guardian over the appellee have not acted,
nor even indicated, their desire to act as such. In any case, We see no cogent reason
why We should reverse the well-reasoned disquisition of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision
having been denied, she filed the present petition which proffers that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION DATED OCTOBER 4, 1996 AND IN ISSUING THE
RESOLUTIONS DATED JUNE 29, 2000 AND FEBRUARY 9, 2001.
The petition fails.
It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects
of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of

appeal is confined to questions of law. The test of whether the question is

one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a
question of law; otherwise, it is question of fact.
[5]

[6]

In the case at bar, the only issue before this Court is whether or not the
appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is not
unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of
Julieta. In support of an affirmative answer, petitioner posits as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests
between [her] and [respondent] is contrary to the evidence on record,[7]
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that there is no showing that [respondent] is
hostile to the best interest of Julieta,[8] and
3. Julieta Ledesmas appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as
her guardian.[9]

Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of petitioners position

require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the
petition at bar. This Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs
presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if
the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them superior
credit.
[10]

That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by petitioner in her
Reply dated August 30, 2001:
[11]

Although the general rule is that this Honorable Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing and revising only errors of law, it is
nonetheless subject to the following exceptions which have been laid down in a
number of decisions of this Honorable Court:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) When there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the

case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellants and appellee; (7)
When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Emphasis supplied); (Rollo,
350-351)
Petitioner claims that there is no doubt that the instant petition falls within
the above-stated exceptions because the findings of the Court of Appeals are
clearly belied by the evidence on record.
[12]

In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge

who deals directly with the parties. As this Court said:
[13]

As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting
the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action
which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless
it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.
[14]

In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts
committed any error.
Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo with respect to the
existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta. In that
case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor and mortgagee of the minorwards properties (a house and lot) is antagonistic to the interest of the wards
as mortgagors, hence, Gabriels appointment as guardian was erroneous.For
while he sought to foreclose the wards properties as creditor and mortgagee
on one hand, he had to, on the other hand, endeavor to retain them for the
wards as their guardian. Added to that was Gabriels appointment as guardian
without him informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on the
properties. Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that the
first mortgagee was the Santa Clara Monastery when it was him. None of the
said circumstances obtain in the present case.
[15]

Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim
that there existed a rift between the two which amounts to antagonistic
interests. The first letter sent by Julieta to respondent which reads:
[16]

[17]

x x x So if you (appellee) do not agree with me (Julieta) my decision is right to let us

divide as soon as possible, so we will have capital each of us to work, and keep the
Hda, for [sic] generation to generation.
xxx
For the last time I will repeat even if I have to kneel before you and Carlos I have no
interest anymore in any future investment due to my age and being single and alone in
life. I would like to be able to enjoy whatever monies that correspond to me. I would
like to have enough money as a reserve for any future need that I might have like
hospitalization, travel, buying whatever I like, etc. etc. (Letter to appellee; Exhibit 2)
merely shows Julietas lack of interest in future investments, not
necessarily a business disagreement, and certainly not per se amounting to
antagonistic interests between her and respondent to render the latter
unsuitable for appointment as guardian.
The second letter which reads:
[18]

My mind is still clear to tell you about Fortuna when I had my stroke I was confined
in MMC for one month. If I am not mistaken you did not visit me. One day Carlos
came to visit me and asked me this question. Do you think you will be able to
continue managing the Hda? I answered him I dont know it all depends on my
sickness. Carlos said who do you want to take your place? I said I want Cheling
Zabaljauregui. Then Carlos said O.K. He asked Pilar can you contact Cheling? Tell
him to call me or see me. The nephew of Cheling was a resident in MMC through him
Pilar was able to contact Cheling and gave him Carlos message. So I thought all the
time it was agreeable. I left for USA for treatment. To my surprise when I came
back from USA it was not Cheling, but you (appellee) took over the management
as you requested. Carlos did not tell me but decided in your favor. x x x (Letter to
appellee; Exhibit 3; emphasis supplied)
shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at
the Makati Medical Center on account of her stroke, 2) there was

disagreement as to who should run the hacienda, with Julieta favoring a

certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took over management of
the hacienda with their brother Carlos (Ledesma) supporting her. No inference
as to the existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta
can thus be made.
The third letter which reads:
[19]

x x x Carlos went to the house before I left and asked from me twenty thousand
(20,000) shares of San Carlos Milling which you gave because I wanted to sell all.xxx
If he does not sell or cannot sell, just arrange to send them back to me. Amparing
since I came here to America and Vancouver my requests have been
ignored. Everyone is suspecting that Pilar is the one ordering or commanding me that
is not true. What I asked from Julio is just to report to me or send me reports so I can
follow up from here. But up to now he has ignored my requests x x x. (Letter to
appellee Exhibit 4)
has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower courts erred in
finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian. The
letter in fact discloses, that it was Julietas nephew Julio Ledesma, and not
respondent, who ignored the request.
As for the fourth letter which reads:
[20]

I want all of you to know that whatever decision now and in the future I want to do
nobody can stop me especially regarding my properties, money, etc. I will be the only
one to dispose of it because it is mine. You said to Raul you are going to court, you are
most welcome x x x. (Letter to Connie, Exhibit 5)
it has also no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not
even addressed to respondent but to a certain Connie (a sister-in-law of
Julieta).
Petitioners assertion that respondents intent in instituting the guardianship
proceedings is to take control of Julietas properties and use them for her own
benefit is purely speculative and finds no support form the records.
[21]

The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also
lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta from the Makati Medical Center
where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily show
her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the trial court, cited in
the present petition, that Julieta was still placed under the care of
doctors after she checked out and was returned to the hospital when she
suffered another stroke.
[22]

Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1)
Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as guardian
before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked
by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for
appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner concealed the deteriorating state
of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good
faith.
[23]

[24]

Discussion of the third argument is unnecessary, the suitability of Amparo

for appointment as guardian not having been successfully contested.
ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997]

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian,

AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife,
LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:

On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen
Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of
Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared
incompetent by judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
[1]

107, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.

Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia.
Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and
estate.
[2]

[3]

Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City.
On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit
in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject
the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint
was later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through
her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
[4]

The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the
absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that
out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free;
that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced
age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for
support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian,
Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but
they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully
depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were)
enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they
** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent
** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also
alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of
first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
[5]

In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had
been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their
faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the
latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which
she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.

Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's favor,
the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Caiza P5,000.00
by way of attorney's fees.
[6]

But on appeal, the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96. By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, the RTC
held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be
resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation **
demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession
cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."
[7]

[8]

[9]

Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October
21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision promulgated on June 2,
1993, the Appellate Court affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a)
the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not
an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in
the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have
been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by
what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will,
unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the
basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire
on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to
continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's
supervening incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the
right or authority to drive the defendants out."
[10]

[11]

[12]

Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the
Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in
(a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not
an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an
alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case."
[13]

In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, the

Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful
detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been
obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises
[14]

could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never
became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against
them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been
occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen
Caiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the
holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They
conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal
guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs -- the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her
niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for
her.
[15]

[16]

Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action

is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in
dispute; (b) assuming desahucioto be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as
Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and (c) assuming an
affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may continue
to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
I

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as

which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. An inquiry into the averments of the amended
complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order.
[17]

[18]

The amended Complaint alleges:

[19]

"6. That the plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a house and lot
at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now the subject of this
complaint;
** ** **
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law, were allowed to
live temporarily in the house of plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, for free, out of her kindness;

10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the defendants, for
them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and the
defendants refused to vacate the same. **
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, made
another demand on the defendants for them to vacate the premises, before Barangay
Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2)
conferences, the result was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy of
the Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990; issued by said Barangay Captain is
attached, marked Annex "D" and made an integral part hereof;
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to vacate the
house, but they still refused to vacate the premises, and they are up to this time
residing in the said place;
13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to the defendants, by
her legal guardian -- Amparo Evangelista;
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the
house in question, they are enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent plaintiff, because, while they are saving money by not paying any rent
for the house, the plaintiff is losing much money as her house could not be rented by
others;
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so that funds
could be raised to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
treatment;
16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 Scout Tobias,
Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court
for justice, and she has to spendP10,000.00 as attorney's fees."
Its prayer is quoted below:
[20]

"WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff, Carmen Caiza,
represented by her legal guardian. Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to this

Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants
as follows:
1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and other
persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and premises at No. 61 Scout
Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the plaintiff, Carmen
Caiza: and
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. To pay the costs of the suit."
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance -- having been
"allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness;"
2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health ** (was) failing and she
** (needed) funds ** to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
treatment;"
3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the Estradas several times,
orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to Caiza, to
her continuing prejudice; and
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out.
It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that
the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
[21]

[22]

The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the

institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or

building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend
that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by
virtue of any contract, express or implied" -- they having been, to repeat,
"allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness" -in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of ** (their) right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an
action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had
"deprived (Caiza) of the possession of ** (her property) by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth."
The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to
occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right
of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary
sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less
certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning
the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court
adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The
situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but
who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is
deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the
date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is merely
tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court
of Appeals, where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant
upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill
its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand
and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession ** became illegal and the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ** (plant's owner) was its proper
remedy."
[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had
been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the
complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last
demand, the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in
the premises. Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian alleges that the
same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand
dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law
because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February
27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually
filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second (last)
written demand to vacate.
[27]

[28]

The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express
permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as
was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her
judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so.
Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a will
bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not
give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the
theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership
being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and
until the will is duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas
had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or
sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by
sufferance, that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of
possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners
is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had
allegedly been bequeathed to them -- an event which still has to take place; in
other words; prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by
them would be premature and inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the
circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e.,
possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the

proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary
action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to
possession de jure.
II

The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it
may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
"No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
[29]

[30]

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general

guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her
Letters of Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the
"guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA
with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts
necessary for the management of her properties ** " By that appointment, it
became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her
physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of
her person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right
and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property,
both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right
to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right
to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof
[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions
as may be needful for this purpose.
[35]

[36]

Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely

discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of
the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of
ward. A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and
apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable
and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such
income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber
the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the
proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance."
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the
ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve. "the issue of ownership ** only to determine the issue
of possession."
[37]

III

As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of

this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing
that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal
personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian
and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as
niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
[38]

other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by

Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
[39]

[40]

"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear
within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of
a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's
demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death;
her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal
at bar.
[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 -- affirming the Regional Trial Court's
judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari -- is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.