A.

IV. LOCAL OFFICIALS

PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ELECTIVE AND APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION
Cases:
1. Republic of the Philippines v. Rambuyong (G.R. No. 167810, 04 October 2010)
FACTS:
Alfredo Y. Chu (Chu) filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/or damages
against the National Power Corporation (NPC) docketed as Civil Case No. I-197 which
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, Branch 24;
appearing as counsel for Chu is Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong (Atty. Rambuyong) who
was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Thereafter, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under
Section 90(b), (1) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, sanggunian members are prohibited to appear as counsel before
any court wherein x x x any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party. NPC contended that being a government-owned or controlled
corporation, it is embraced within the term, instrumentality.
ISSUE:
Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such that Atty. Rambuyong, as a
Sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against it
HELD:
Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and unambiguous. It categorically
provides that the term instrumentality includes government-owned or -controlled
corporations. Hence there is no room for construction. All that has to be done is to apply
the law as called for by the circumstances of the case.
Wherefore, pursuant to Sec. 90(b) (1) of the Local Government Code, Atty. Rambuyong,
as Sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC,
which is an instrumentality of government.

2. Catu v. Rellosa (A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008)

FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo Catu is a co-owner of a lot and building erected at Malate, Manila.
With his mother and brother, contested the possession of Elizabeth Catu and Antonio
Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands to vacate the
premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
their barangay.
Respondent Atty Vicente Rellosa, as Punong Barangay summoned the parties to
conciliation meetings. But the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, thus,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Catu's mother and brother filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth
and Pastor in the MTC. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint. The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. IBP found sufficient
ground to discipline respondent.
According to IBP, Respondent admitted that as punong barangay he presided over the
conciliation proceeding, however, he represented the defendants in the ejectment case
filed against them, and by doing so he violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Furthermore, as an elective official, he contravened the prohibition under
Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. 6713 ( The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees).
"Sec. 7 Prohibited Acts and Transactions- In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public officials and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
XXX
XXX
XXX
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
XXX
XXX
XXX
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; XXX"
The IBP recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely. This was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent can represent the defendant in the ejectment case while he is an
incumbent public official.

HELD:
The SC ruled that respondent cannot be found liable for violation of rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service". Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he
committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
The SC also ruled that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A 6713 is a general law which applies to all
public officials and employees. Thus, it is not applicable to the case at bar. However,
Section 90 of R.A. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1992) governs the practice of
profession of elective local government officials. This is a special law with definite
scope, it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of R.A 6713. Accordingly, the
respondent as punong barangay was not forbidden to practice his profession. However,
he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by the civil service regulations as stated in Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing a written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules
which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Vicente Rellosa is therefore suspended from the practice of law for a period of 6
months and sternly warned that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

PROHIBITION AGAINST APPOINTMENT

3. Flores v. Drilon (G.R. No. 104732, 22June 1993)
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Paragraph (d) reads
(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman
of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority:
Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act,
the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par.,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary
power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional.
HELD:
The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
In the case at bar, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the

constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, there is no doubt to conclude that the

proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
The appointment of Gordon as Chairman of the SBMA is null. However, despite his
appointment to the said office, Gordon did not automatically forfeit his seat as Mayor of
Olongapo City.
Thus, respondent Gordon remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA
official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer who
may retain the benefits he may receive from the position he may have assumed.

B.

ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS

QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
Cases:
4. Jalosjos v. Comelec (G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 09 October 2012)
FACTS:
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner by final
judgment. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
an order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3)
days.
On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However,
because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City
Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition
for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC on October 5, 2012,
seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled
on May 13, 2013. In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said
office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his
perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in
any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in its Order which,
pursuant to Section 138 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known
as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.
The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15,
2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to
comply
with
the
voter
registration
requirement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office
had already been removed by Section 40 (a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known
as
the
"Local
Government
Code
of
1991"
(LGC).
HELD:
Decision
of
the
appellate
court
is
affirmed.
The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the

accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article

30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office.
Section 40 (a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision such as
Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for
elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner's service of his
commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for
Zamboanga
City.

5. Jalosjos v. Comelec (G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013)

FACTS:
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to
Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship.
On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with
his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1,
2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the
same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos
acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived. He applied for
registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Erasmo, the Barangay
Captain, opposed the said act. Election Registration Board approved it and included
Jalosjos name in the COMELEC voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for
the exclusion of Jalosjos name from the official voters list. MTC denied Erasmos
petition. He appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same as MTCs. On November 28, 2009
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course or
to cancel Jalosjos COC on the ground that Jalosjos made material misrepresentation in
the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the
one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled
against Jalosjos, because it failed to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement.
Jalosjos won the elections
ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement
HELD:
Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place
of his birth. His domicile was changed from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated
there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26
years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. But, when he
came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He
left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that
country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts,
Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

6. Aratea v. Comelec (G.R. No. 195229, 09 October 2012)

FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra.
Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas
certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the
term for the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate
of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he
sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the
Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained
pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea)
garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge
of Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion on
whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in
view of Lonzanidas disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and
thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take
the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary
Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases
pending before the COMELEC.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying
Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs
resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served
as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second,
Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to

imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisin correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1

day of prisin mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23
October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida
filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal.
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted
in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether
Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales.
HELD:
Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at
all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 1 of the Omnibus Election
Code are specifically enumerated.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All
the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely
nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the threeterm limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.
On the other hand, Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of
the contents of the certificate of candidacy:
1

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
2 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

10

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being
elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the
finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy.
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes.
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as
the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of
votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor.1wphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground
means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
Petition dismissed.

11

7. Japzon v. Comelec (G.R. No. 180088. 19 January 2009)

o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of 14 May 2007.
Japzon instituted before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Tys
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. He averred that:
Ty is a US citizen and had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years.
When Ty filed his COC he falsely represented therein that he was a resident
of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar (Barangay 6), for one
year before 14 May 2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship,
he never actually resided in Barangay 6 for a period of one year immediately preceding
the date of election as required under Section 39 of LGC
Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile at
Barangay 6.
He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic
Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003
Ty admits that he had indeed lost his Philippine citizenship when he was naturalized
as a US citizen. However, he alleges that prior to the election, he had successfully
reacquired his Filipino citizenship as shown by his act of executing an Oath of
Allegiance to RP and a duly notazaried Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He had
also complied with the 1-year residencey rule as shown by the following:
CTC from Barangay 6 (March 2006)
Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct 2005)
Registered voter at Brgy 6 (July 2006)
Pending this case, Ty won the elections.
COMELEC 1st Division ruled for Ty.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code.
HELD:
YES. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is,
"the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new

12

domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court already acknowledged that for an
individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA.
Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must
have necessarily abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the
USA, as his domicile of choice.
Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact
or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he
did not necessarily regain his domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence
therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall
not retroact to the time of his birth.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent when,
immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied
for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines
was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the
local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying
community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address
as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006
in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6.

13

8. Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec (G.R No. 198742, 10 August 2012)

FACTS:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on
August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." 5
The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying
that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections.
She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections
this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and
was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis M.
Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate
petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The
petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post
on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006,
she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied
with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
ISSUE:
For purposes of determining the petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether the
"sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere
pro-forma requirement.
HELD:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for naturalborn citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship 18 by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith.
In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino

14

American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the
form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in
an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an
oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign
citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to
the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and
unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be
read literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered
person or thing, that ones statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The
person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the
promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for
perjury if the testimony is false. To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is
to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere
qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and
the legislature clearly demand otherwise.

15

9. Corodora v. Comelec (GR No. 176947, 19 February 2008)

FACTS:
Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against Tambunting
asserting that Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming that he is a Natural Born Filipino and resident before the election in 2001
and 2004. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. To
disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances,
Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16
December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to
Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship
through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.
To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting
presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino
mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as
an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after
Tambuntings father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely
confirmed Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession
of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen.
Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting
has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been
educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and
devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of Paraaque.
To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambuntings
certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his
naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency
requirement is not the same as citizenship.
ISSUE:
What is the basis of disqualification -- dual citizenship or dual allegiance?
HELD:
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it
was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to
acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to
confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification
from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where

16

Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed

nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the
2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.
Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when
a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis* is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.** Such a person,
automatically and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition his active participation in the naturalization process.
Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for elective position.
Like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who
seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the Oath of Allegiance
contained therein. On the other hand, a person with dual allegiance who seeks public
office must (apart from meeting the qualifications under Philippine law) swear to an
Oath of Allegiance and execute a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship pursuant to R.A.
9225.

17

MANNER AND DATE OF ELECTION

10. Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (supra)
FACTS:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation of
ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional
elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date
of the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November
26, 2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three
years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but
sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the
synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.
Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said
enactment.
ISSUE/S:
1.
WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore
should not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the
constitution.
2.
WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the
power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during
the May 2013 elections.
HELD:
1.
No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the
synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of
the forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local
governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government and the
regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than
other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments.
Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections
held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
2.

Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there

18

is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local

governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within
the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from
the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over
the OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the
power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the
President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The
provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-incharge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the
offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly
elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the
President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the
petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

19

RULES ON SUCCESSION
11. Talaga v. Comelec (G.R. No. 196804, 09 October 2012)
FACTS:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 19951998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before
Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein
Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga
ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule.
Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for
reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two
full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.
HELD:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the
recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was
defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a
continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby
barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the
voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law.

20

12. Gamboa v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 134213, 20 July 1999)

FACTS:
In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo Gamboa and respondents
Marcelo Aguirre, Jr. and Juan Araneta were leveled Negros Occidental Governor, ViceGovernor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in August 1995, the governor
designated as Acting Governor for the duration of the former's official trip abroad until
his return. When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session, respondents
questioned the authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as
acting governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do
so. In another session, seven members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue
presiding while four others voted against it. Respondents filed before the lower court a
petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime, the governor re-assumed
his office. The trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily
legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is
the acting governor. Petitioner filed a petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gamboa, while serving as acting governor, temporarily relinquished the
powers, fictions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to
preside over the sessions of the SP
HELD:
Yes. The Local Government Code provides that the vice governor shall be the presiding
officer of the SP. In addition to such function, he becomes the governor and assumes
the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of permanent
vacancy. When the vacancy however is merely temporary, the vice governor shall
automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties
and functions of the governor.
When the vice governor exercises the powers and duties of governor, he does not
assume the latter's office. He only acts as the governor but does not become the
governor. His assumption of powers of the provincial chief executive does not create a
permanent vacancy in his position as vice governor. Thus, he does not relinquish not
abandon his position and title by merely becoming an acting governor.
A vice governor who is concurrently an acting governor is actually a quasi-governor.
This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he
is deemed considered as a non member of the SP for the time being. The offices of
provincial governor and vice governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain
members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character.
This is clear from the law when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in
the SP, which is the legislative body of the province.
The governor is not included in the SP members and thus, local executive power is
vested alone in the governor.
Art. 49(b) of the Local Government Code provides that in the event of the inability of the
regular presiding officer to toe side at the sangguniang session, the members present

21

and constituting a quorum shall elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer.
Therefore, the vice governor who became an acting governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the office, since the nature of it calls for a full-time
occupant to discharge them

22

DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
Cases:
13. Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (200 SCRA 271)
FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him
on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of
the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is
because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied
her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to
him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two
terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement
it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600-day
suspension.

23

14. Joson v. Torres (290 SCRA 279)

FACTS
Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company
of armed men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after
three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60day preventive suspension. Petitioner later Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation.
DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers substantially
complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative
proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner
the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(a) Preventive suspension is proper;
(b) Procedural due process is violated;
(c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it
is the President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;
RULING
(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any
time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who
continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging
violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of
armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are
bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a position to
influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the
province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.
(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioners right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary
conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether
they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating
Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be
conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective
local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that

24

the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.
(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The
power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining
Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate
complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the
power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to
petitioner Josons claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency which recognizes the establishment of
a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the
Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head
of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers
to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of
Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers
personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the
Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required
by law to exercise authority.

25

15. Salalima v. Guingona (257 SCRA 55)

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case which arose from the conduct of Governor salalima, VG
Azaa and some sanggunian panlalawigan members of Albay in appropriating through
a resolution the amount of 40,724,47 1.74 paid by NAPOCOR as payment of real estate
taxes without giving the various of their share in the real property tax due to them. The
NAPOCOR and Province of Albay entered into a MOA to settle its tax liabilities .
Petitioners seek to annul and set aside AO No. 153 signed on 7 October 1994 by the
President and by public respondent Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,
approving the findings of fact and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and
holding the petitioners administratively liable for the following acts or omissions:
(a) wanton disregard of law amounting to abuse of authority in O.P. Case No. 5470;
(b) grave abuse of authority under Section 60(e) of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) in O.P. Case No. 5469;
(c) oppression and abuse of authority under Section 60(c) and
(e) of R.A. No. 7160 in O.P. Case No. 5471; and
(d) abuse of authority and negligence in O.P. Case No. 5450.
The said order meted out on each of the petitioners penalties of suspension of different
durations, to be served successively but not to go beyond their respective unexpired
terms in accordance with Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
OP Case 5470
Tiwi Mayor Corral formally requested the Province through respondent Salalima, to
remit the rightful tax shares of Tiwi and certain barangays of Tiwi where NPCs
properties are located (concerned barangays) relative to the payments made by NPC
(Exh. B). Gov. Salalima denied the request for the joint session to discuss the
distribution or application of the NPC payments. The Province maintained, however, that
considering that it acquired ownership over the properties of NPC subject matter of the
auction, all the payments to be made by NPC under the MOA should accrue exclusively
to the Province.
The proceeds of the re-sale of said properties acquired by the Province must be
distributed in the same manner and proportion among the rightful beneficiaries thereof
as provided by law. The Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the Province
of Albay and Napocor cannot amend the provisions of P.D. No. 464 which specifies the
sharing scheme of the real property tax among the province, city or municipality where
the property subject to tax is situated and the National Government.
This Committee, thus, finds all the respondents guilty of abuse of authority, and
accordingly, recommends the imposition of the following penalties of suspension without
pay:
a. Respondent Salalima five (5) months; and
b. All the other four respondents (4) months each.

26

OP Case 5469
This refers to the administrative complaint filed against petitioners relative to the retainer
contract for legal services entered into between the Province of Albay, on the one hand,
and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the
disbursement of public fund in payment thereof to handle the case against NPC filed
with the sc. The contract provided an acceptance fee and of 50k and a contingent fee of
18% of the value of the property which is 214M.
The Committee holds that respondents committed abuse of authority under Sec. 60(e)
of the Local Government Code for the following:
1. Hiring private lawyers, in violation of Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code, to
handle the case of the Province of Albay before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87479;
2. Disbursing public money in violation of COA rules and regulations;
3. Paying the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm public money although it was only Atty.
Cornago who was the counsel of record of the Province of Albay in the Supreme Court
case;
4. Authorizing an unconscionable and grossly disadvantageous attorneys fees of P38.5
million; and
5. Additionally, as to respondent Governor, entering into a retainer agreement not only
with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Cornago, thus exceeding his
authority under Resolution No. 0 1-90 passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
After taking all the attendant circumstances into consideration, the Committee
recommends that the following penalties of suspensions without pay be meted out:
a. Respondents Salalima and Azaa six (6) months each; and
b. All the other respondents four (4) months each.
OP Case 5471
This refers to the administrative complaint filed by the Tiwi Mayor Naomi Corral for
abuse of authority and oppression under Sec. 60 (c) and (e) of R.A. No. 7160. Mayor
Corral and 7 Kagawads of Tiwi filed against respondents for abuse of authority,
misconduct in office and oppression. This administrative complaint arose from the
refusal of said respondents to remit Tiwis share in the P40,724,47 1.74 tax delinquency
payments made by NPC. Subsequently, Mayor Corral became the subject of 15
administrative and criminal complaints filed by certain individuals. The proceedings
reveal that the same were marked by haste and arbitrariness. This was evident from the
start when Mayor Corral was preventively suspended (in Adm. Case No. 05-92) even
before she could file her answer. In the other cases, respondent-members of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ruled that Mayor Corral had waived her right to adduce
evidence in her defense.
Consequently, respondents did not also fully evaluate the evidences presented to
support the charges made. As such, all the decisions of respondents suspending Mayor
Corral were ordered lifted suspended by the DILG and OP. Thus, even the cases filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman, which were based on the same incidents
complained of in the said administrative cases, were subsequently dismissed.

27

Moreover, Section 63(d) of R.A. No. 7 160 expressly states that, [a]ny abuse of the
exercise of the powers of preventive suspension shall be penalized as abuse of
authority.
All the other respondents herein are found guilty of oppression and abuse of authority
under Section 60(c) and (e) of R.A. No. 7160. Accordingly, it is recommended that each
of them be meted the penalty of four (4) months suspension without pay.
OP Case 5450
This refers to the administrative charges filed by Tabaco Mayor Antonio Demetriou
against Governor Romeo Salalima for violation of - Section 60, pars. (c) and (d) of the
Local Government Code, Section 3, par. (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the
provisions of PD No. 1594.
Tabaco Public Market was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the Province represented by
respondent Salalima and RYU Construction entered into a contract for P6,783,737.59
for said repair and rehabilitation after a public bidding. Among others, the contract
stipulated that the contracted work should be completed in 150 days. Despite the delay
on the first contract of repair, Province represented by respondent Salalima entered into
another contract (Exh. 1) for P4,304,474.00 with RYU Construction for additional repair
and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market.
since RYU Construction incurred negative slippage with respect to the repair works
under the 29 May 1991 contract as found by COA, it was anomalous for the Province
through respondent Salalima to enter into a negotiated contract with said contractor for
additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public market. Failing to comply
with the requirements of law, the 6 March 1992 contract is clearly irregular, if not illegal.
Premises considered, this Committee finds the respondent guilty of abuse of authority
and gross negligence. Accordingly, it is recommended that the penalty of suspension
without pay be meted out on respondent Salalima for five (5) months.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Office of the President act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in suspending the petitioners for periods ranging from twelve to
twenty months?
2. Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the
petitioners guilty of abuse of authority in denying the Municipality of Tiwi of its rightful
share in the P40,724,471.74 which the Province of Albay had received from the NPC
under the Memorandum of Agreement?
3. Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending in
O.P. Cases Nos. 5469 and 5450 petitioner Salalima, who was reelected on 11 May
1992, for an alleged administrative offense committed during his first term; and in
suspending in O.P. Case No. 5469 the other petitioners, some of whom were elected
and others reelected on 11 May 1992, for an alleged administrative offense committed
in 1989?

28

HELD:
1. NO, The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense
did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive
service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office
of the petitioners.
2.NO, Governor Salalima specifically included the amounts due to the municipalities of
Tiwi and Daraga in asking NPC to settle its obligations. They should have held the
shares of Tiwi and Daraga in trust pursuant to Section 309(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and not treated the P40,724,471.74 NPC payments as surplus
adjustment.
3. Yes, This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual vs.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija and Aguinaldo vs. Santos. The underlying theory is that
each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor.

29

16. Berces v. Executive Secretary (241 SCRA 539)

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against
respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter.
Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and
at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the
Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive
Secretary directed stay of execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing
the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses of
discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No.
18.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed. Stay of execution applied.
RATIO:
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an appeal shall not prevent a
decision from becoming final or executory. As worded, there is room to construe said
provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the
appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of
Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used
more direct language expressive of such intention.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express
repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

30

17. Malinao v. Reyes ( 256 SCRA 616)

31

18. The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Municipality of

Bayombong Province of Nueva Viscaya represented by Brgy. Kagawad Jose Cenen
Santos et al. v. Punong Barangay Severino Martinez

G.R. No. 170626

Marc 3, 2008
FACTS:
On December 6, 2004, Respondent Martinez, the incumbent Punong Barangay of the
said local government unit, was administratively charged with Dishonesty, Misconduct in
Office and Violation of the Anti-Gaft and Corrupt practices Act by petitioner through the
filing of a verified complaint before the Sanguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority
over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 61 of R.A. No. 7160 (Local
Government Code). In the Amended Administrative Complaint against respondent,
petitioner alleged the following acts committed by the former:
1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their
solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived
from composting;
2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable
materials taken from garbage collection;
3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for
private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this
source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected;
4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and
other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said
truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste Management
Project;
5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because
although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he,
however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to
be on seminar they saw him in the barangay; and
6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain
because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.
Sangguniang Bayan declared respondent in default for failure to file an answer to the
Amended Administrative Complaint. Pending the administrative proceddings, Martinez
was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days or until August 8, 2005.
On July 28, 2005, The Sangguinang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon
Martinez the penalty of removal from office.

32

On August 26, 2005, respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against
petitioner with the trial court.
October 20, 2005, the trial court declared the decision of the Sangguninang Bayan,
removing respondent from office, and the memorandum implementing such decision by
mayor of Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts and not the petitioner, ar
empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Sec. 60 of
the Local Government Code.
Hence, this petition to the SC.
Petitioner contended that, the administrative cases involving the elective barangay
officials may be filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panglungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan concerned, whch can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from
office and that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the
Sangguinang Panglungsod or Sangguiang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is
warranted.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove an elective local official from
office.
2. Whether it violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD:
1. No. Under Sec. 60 of the LGC, provides that an elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated by order of the proper court. The legislative
body, during the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, intended to
confine to the courts such power of removal.
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official
from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether
or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the
courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of
the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the
petitioners interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.
Petitionoers contention that the courts are merely task of issuing an order of decision
by the Sangguniang Panglungso or Sangguniang Bayan, clearly demotes the courts to
nothing more than an implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or
Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on
separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies
of local governments. The courts would be stripped of their power of review, and their
discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be
exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the

33

local elective official concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it
enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
2. No. The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it
should be applied in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal
from office of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to
defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more
impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of
the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing the
extreme penalty of dismissal.

34

19. Atty. Miguel M. Lingating v. Commission on Elections and Cesar B. Sulong

G.R. No. 153475
November 13, 2002
FACTS:
In 1991, during the first term of respondent Sulong, respondent was administratively
charged (AC No. 12-91) along with other individuals with various offenses, and that on
February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him
guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
On February 17, 1992, received the copy of the decision and he filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or notice of appeal the following day.
On February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan required Jim Lingating, the
complainant in the Administrative Case No. 12-91, to file a comment on Respondent
Sulongs motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal. But said complainant had
not complied therewith.
Respondent Sulong as mayor again in the May 11, 1992 and May 8, 2995 elections.
On May 3, 2001, petitioner Miguel M. Lingating running against respondent for
mayoralty, filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor in Pagadian City a petition for the
disqualification of respondent Sulong, pursuant to 40(b) of Republic Act No. 7160
(LGC), which disqualifies from running for any elective local position those removed
from office as a result of an administrative case. Petitinoer claimed that this decision
had become final and executor, and consequently the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan,
Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor vice respondent on March 3, 1992.
Respondent Sulong deinied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and
executory. He averred that the failure of the complainant, in said Administrative case, to
file a comment on his motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal, rendered his
motion pending. Respondent denied he had been removed from office by virtue of the
decision in AC No. 12-91.
After the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted before the
COMELEC for resolution. But because the COMELEC was unable to render judgment
before the elections of May 14, 2001, respondent Sulong was voted for in the elections,
receiving 4,882 votes against the 3,611 votes for petitioner. On May 16, 2001,
respondent Sulong was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of canvassers of Lapuyan
as the duly elected mayor.
On August 1, 2001, the COMELECs First Division declared respondent Cesar B. Sulong
disqualified on the basis that Sec. 40(b) of the LGC and that the decision of the
Sangguiang Panlalawigan has become final and executor, thereby depriving him of his
rights to run for public office.

35

On Appeal on April 4, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued its resolution reversing the
resolution of the First Division. It contended that the provision no longer applies for
Sulong, having won the May 1992 and 1995, despite the Sangguinang Panlalawigans
decision which was promulgated on February 4, 1992, rendered the the decision moot
and academic by virtue of SC ruling the Agunaldo v. Santos case. In effect, the reelection of respondent Sulong in the 1992 and 1995 elections would be tantamount to a
codonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision by the people of Lapuyan who
have expressed their will when they cast their votes.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner, contended that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC case in holding that it condoned respondent Sulong acts.
Petitioner further cited Reyes v. COMELEC, in which the SC held that an elective local
officer, who is removed before th expiration of the term for which he was elected, is
disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under 40(b) of the LGC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sulong is disqualified from running.
HELD:
No. The Reyes case cannot be applied. The petitioner (in the Reyes case) after being
served with decision failed to appeal, thus he was validly removed from office and
pursuant to 40(b) of the LGC, he was disqualified from running for reelection. In the
case at bar, the respondents filing of a mortion for reconsideration prevented the
decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final.
Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondents
motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent
Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially since, at the time of the elections on
May 14, 2001, the decision of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly
10 years ago.
Petition is denied.

36

20. Hon. Juan M. Hagad v. Hon. Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, Presiding Judge, Branch
XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor Alfredo M.
Ouano, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor Paterno Canete and Mancuae City Sangguniang
Panglungsod Member Rafael Mayol
G.R. no. 108072
December 12, 1995
FACTS:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor
Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by
Counsilors, and all of Mandaue City by councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O.
Bercede with the Office of the Deputy of the Ombudsman for the Visayas. The
respondents were charged for having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), as amended, Articles 170 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code and R.A.
6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting
inconspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by
increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00
without authority from the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaue City.
Councilors Dionson and Bercede also moved for the preventive suspension of the
respondent officials in a separately docketed administrative case.
On August 5, 1992, respondents opposed the motion for preventive suspension and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman
supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed
against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power
to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as
to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the
President.
In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local
Government Code of 1991 could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified
the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to
investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained
unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Mayor Ouano reiterated in his memorandum that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against any
elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city
and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there
was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman
superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments.

37

On Spetember 10, 1992, Deputy Ombudsman issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of the respondent officials,
thereby formally placing them under preventive suspension.
On September 25, 1992, respondent officials filed a petition for prohibition, with prayer
of for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with the RTC of
Mandaue City. RTC affirmed the petition and issued an order directed at petitioner and
enjoining him from enforcing him and/or implementing the questioned order of the
preventive suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 has been divested of his authority to
conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent
enactment of RA 7160.
HELD:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not
removed by LGC of 1991. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate
that it has been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisionsof the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to comple us to only uphold one and strike
down the other. Well is settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not
favored, and the courts must generally assume congruent application. The two laws
must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, every statue must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known
the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in
order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive
suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent
of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did
not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the
substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.

38

33.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole (G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995)

FACTS:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor
Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by
Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated
R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170
(falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the
Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance
No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority
from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the
administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against
said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been
vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was
filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing
suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been
divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective
official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.
HELD:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not
removed by LG Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes
on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to
compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that
repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally
assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and
a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord
with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not
to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to

39

all laws on the subject.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive
suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent
of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did
not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the
substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.

40

21. Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010)

41

22. Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008)
FACTS:
Elan Recreation, Inc. filed criminal and administrative complaints against Mayor Ramon
Talaga Jr. The complaints "alleged that petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the City of
Lucena, had unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of
bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants".
The administrative case was dismissed but the criminal charges were retained and filed
by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Three informations were filed against Talaga Jr.
in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or R.A. 3019. Later, only one of
the informations was retained which alleges that Talaga Jr. gave "unwarranted benefits
to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting to Sy Bang a local franchise to
operate bingo games in the city". The prosecution moved for the petitioner's preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan granted the motion. The petitioner, then, filed the present Petition for
Certiorari with an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner contends, among other things, that the information do not constitute
an offense. He claims that under R.A. No. 3019, the law which he allegedly violated, the
information must allege that the acts in question "caused injury to any party, whether the
government or private party."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information filed against the petitioner is complete and constitutes
the offense to which he is being charged of.
HELD:
Yes. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioner is charged, provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the law does not require that the information
must allege that the acts in question "caused injury to any party, whether the
government or private party." The presence of the word "or" clearly shows that there are
two acts which can be prosecuted under Section 3: First, causing any undue injury to
any party, including the government, and, Second, giving any private party any

42

unwarranted benefits, advantages or preference. Moreover, in Quibal v.

Sandiganbayan,30 the Court ruled that violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
requires proof of the following FACTS:
1. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.
Section 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court provides the guideline for the determination of the
validity or sufficiency of allegations in an information, to wit:
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as
to appraise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison
d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the
charges against him. The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with the City
Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act
which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits, namely, granting unto the said
Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of
existing laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.

43

DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION
23. Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992)
Pertinent provision of the Local Government Code: Section 60 Grounds for
Disciplinary Actions
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent
Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89
dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been
elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a
term of four (4) years therefrom. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for
disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by
Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the
municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts
the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to
the complaint. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup
or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic
to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the complaint
of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary
suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome
of the formal investigation into the charges against him. During the hearing conducted
on the charges against petitioner, complainants presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even crossexamined the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent
Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied. Thereafter,
respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty
as charged and ordering his removal from office.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. As
petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way
for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that: the alleged act of
disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty to
the Republic.

44

HELD:
NO. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administration case pending before the Court moot and academic. It appears that
after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed
from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with
a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under
Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in
view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts
of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent
Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89,
dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is hereby REVERSED.

45

24. Salumbines, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 180917, 23 April 2010)
FACTS:
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and
Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. On May 13, 2002,
herein respondentsRicardo Agon, Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and
Agnes Fabian,all members of theSangguniang Bayanof Tagkawayan, filed withthe
Office of the Ombudsman a complaintagainst Salumbides and Glenda (hereafter
petitioners), the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino. The administrative aspect of the case
charged petitionerset al. with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission
on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. The Office of the Ombudsman
denied the prayer to place petitionerset al. under preventive suspension pending
investigation. By Order datedFebruary 1, 2005, approved onApril 11, 2005, it denied the
motion for reconsideration butdropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as
respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted the case. The
Office of the Ombudsman approved the September 9, 2005 Memorandumabsolving
Jason and Aquino, and finding petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case.
HELD:
Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
POLITICAL LAW: doctrine of condonation
The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never
remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any.It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people. Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the nonapplication of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to
equal protection of the law. The electorates condonation of the previous administrative
infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed
coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the
people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the
sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of
reappointed coterminous employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one
person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an
administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the
mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full
knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the

46

elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection.

Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be
appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if
they conspired to act negligently, their infraction becomes intentional. There can hardly
be conspiracy to commit negligence. Petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence
required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining the legal
requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and
giving their advice to their superior.
The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides
failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor
in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when
he advised the mayor to proceed with the construction of the subject projects without
prior competitive bidding. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or
illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related
to upholding the rule of law. Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a
course of action without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay person who
may approve the same because it appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of
government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal
legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering
her written objection as municipal budget officer. Aside from the lack of competitive
bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the expense, held
that the funding for the projects should have been taken from the capital outlays that
refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which
extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit.
It added that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for
the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government
operations within the fiscal year.
DENIED.

47

25. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. CA and Binay (G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November

2015
FACTS:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas
"Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other
public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al),
accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known
as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of
the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati
Parking Building).
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to
conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the
necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the Ombudsman's
directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint)
against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to
conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases
(2nd Special Panel).
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, the subject preventive suspension order,
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months
without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the
requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, finding that:
(a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and
members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the
irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record
negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official
receipts showed the release of funds; and
(b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said
charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s
respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence
possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation
relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. Consequently, the Ombudsman directed
the DILG, through Secretary Roxas, to immediately implement the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.

48

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of
the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.
The Proceedings Before the CA
On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily,
Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building
project.
In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension
order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong,
maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. In support of
his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable
right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections,
and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain
the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into
office.
On March 16, 2015, Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive
suspension order through Director Brion, who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the
Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of
entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor
of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor
Romulo V. Pea, Jr. (Pea, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor earlier that day. Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, the CA found that it
was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that
the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during
his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant
that he can no longer be administratively charged. The CA then directed the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested that the TRO did not state what act
was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been
served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, accusing Secretary Roxas,
Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately
refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
administration of justice. The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila

49

M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s

filing of the amended and supplemental petition for contempt (petition for contempt) on
March 19, 2015. Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other
respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA
against the preventive suspension order.
The Proceedings Before the Court
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the
present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which
granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to
file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504. The
Ombudsman claims that:
(a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of
RA 6770, or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could
be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence
that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction; and
(b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.
In his comment filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch
or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts
was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order
against him.
Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to have been apprised of
the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether
there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order.
In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of
the preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office,
and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges
against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a condonation of any
administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term. As regards
the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr.
submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence,
cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt
imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal
from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not
deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt.
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which
further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the
CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine,

50

citing Aguinaldo v. Santos. Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly
impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as
City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous
activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013. In this
regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed
by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4,
and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay,
Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr., and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica wherein the condonation doctrine was still
applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election,
reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed
before said re-election. To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of
Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015
Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition before this Court, arguing that
the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman
also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative
proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's
memoranda. Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of
Comment, simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the
Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its
"institutional position." In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum,
the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation
doctrine. In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
ISSUES:
W 1) Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, was the Ombudsmans plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
W 2) Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) has subject matter jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition;
W
W 3) Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;
W
W 4) Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI;
and
W 5) Whether the CAs directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.s petition for

51

contempt was improper or illegal.

HELD:
First Issue, the SC ruled that the Ombudsmans petition falls under the exceptions that
a prior motion for reconsideration must be filed, citing the case of Republic v. Bayao,
G.R. No. 179492, 5 June 2013, which held as follows: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
(Emphasis supplied on the grounds relied on by the SC in this case, in ruling that no
motion for reconsideration was needed.)
**IN FAVOR OF OMBUDSMAN
As to the Second Issue, the discussion revolved around Sec. 14 of Republic Act No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770), more particularly its 2nd
Paragraph states:
Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
The SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional
and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in the landmark case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356
Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn, held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is
void, as it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its
advice and concurrence, in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. (This
tells us that lawyers should always be wary of reading RA 6770 since case law has
affected it so much maybe its time to update it.)
Interestingly, the SC mentioned the Senate deliberations cited by the Ombudsman, in
the crafting of RA 6770. It quoted the exchanges between Senators Jovito Salonga,
Edgardo Angara, Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and Neptali Gonzales, which merely led the SC
to be suspicious on whether said Senators were talking about Sec. 14, RA 6670, or
some other provision. In other words, while the throwback was appreciated by the SC,

52

the discussions were not really useful in this case.

Regardless, the SC still ruled that the remedy of Binay, Jr. the filing of petition for
certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to assail the Ombudsmans
preventive suspension order was valid, citing the cases of Office of the Ombudsman
v. Capulong, G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and Dagan v.Office of the Ombudsman ,
G.R. No. 184083, 19 November 2013. Its just sad that the sorry end of Second
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770 came as collateral damage in this case. The SC justified
its taking up this issue on its own motion, or ex mero motu, which it can rightfully do,
since it is, after all, the SC.
** INFAVOR OF BINAY: SECTION 30, ART6 OF CONSTI
The Third Issue is where it starts to become more interesting. Here, the Ombudsmans
history was discussed, citing heavily from the case of Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014 (hereinafter referred to as
Gonzales). You can imagine the Ombudsman smiling from ear to ear while reading
this portion, but this form of flattery should lead one to be suspicious.
What can be picked up from the Gonzales case is that the Office of the Ombudsmans
independence covers the following: (1) it is the creation of the Constitution; (2) it enjoys
fiscal autonomy; and (3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control. On this
basis, the SC held that the Ombudsman was meant to be protected from political
harassment and pressure, to free it from the insidious tentacles of politics. Since the
SC is apolitical, then Gonzales should not be interpreted to shield the Ombudsman from
the judicial review power of the courts.
After the Ombudsman, it is now the SCs turn to give an exhaustive recap of its own
history. Starting from the definition of Judicial Power, the SC went on the discuss its
expanded scope of judicial review enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083,
30 July 1993, then the evolution of its rule-making authority in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 361 Phil. 73 (1999). The SC pointed out that Congress, in relation to RA 6770,
has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and rules allowing the issuance of an injunction form part of the courts
inherent power, which (now, citing foreign case law) enable the judiciary to accomplish
its constitutionally mandated functions.
The SC ruled that Congress passing of the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, which
prohibits the issuance of an injunction, is an encroachment of the SCs rule-making
authority. An injunction, after all, is merely a provisional and auxiliary relief to preserve
rights in esse. However, the SC noted that it has not consented to this as it has not
issued rules of procedure through an administrative circular. Thus, pending deliberation,
the SC declared the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective, until it is
adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor.

53

Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly bruised. To sum it up: The Second
Paragraph was declared unconstitutional, and the First Paragraph was now deemed
ineffective. As such, the CA was held to have correctly issued the injunctive relief in
enjoining the preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
**IN FAVOR OF BINAY
The Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine was taken up. The SC abandoned
the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the WPI, as it did so based on good case law, considering that the abandonment
is prospective in nature.
In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was a
jurisprudential creation that originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which was decided
under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no legal precedent on the issue
at that time, and the SC resorted to American authorities. The SC stated what appears
the sole basis for the condonation doctrine in Pascual, to wit:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to
remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully
subscribe.
As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for the condonation
doctrine, except that it seems to incline towards American authorities. On this regard,
the SC made its own investigation, and found that there was really no established
weight of authorities in the United States (US). In fact, 17 States in the US have
already abandoned the condonation doctrine, as pointed out by the Ombudsman. The
SC went on to adopt the findings of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the
caveat that said cases are merely guides of interpretation.
Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is that it was able to
convince the SC not to adhere to stare decisis, thereby enriching Philippine
jurisprudence on this matter. This is important, as its effects are far-reaching, since we
now have additional basis to petition the abandonment of old ineffective case laws. For
this moment of glory, allow us to quote directly from the case, viz:
Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as
espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against
prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this
Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare
decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations
against its application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only
when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the
Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal
abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society
within which it thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, [w]hat we

54

can decide, we can undecide.'

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case
decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the
plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascuals judicious re-examination.
The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to enumerate the notable
cases that applied Pascual, which included cases issued under the 1987 Constitution.
Pascual was tested under existing laws, to see if there exists legislation to support
Pascual, e.g. 1987 Constitution, Revised Administrative Code, Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Local Government Code of 1991,
and Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The SC ruled:
"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal provisions now leads
this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is
plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local officials administrative liability for
a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned
by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses: xxx "
The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the
condonation doctrine, the SC would remove this defense oft-times used by elected
officials, of which the SC was aware of, as it made mention of the data brought forward
by the Ombudsman, to wit:
To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that for the period
of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases
from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground on condonation. Thus, in just one
and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct involving infractions
such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct were
placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsmans investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must
therefore, not evade review.
*IN FAVOR OF OMBUDSMAN (BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

55

The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to comment directed to the
Ombudsman was illegal, was refused to be resolved on the ground there are no
contempt proceedings yet. It is the claim of the Ombudsman that since she was an
impeachable officer, she could be subjected to contempt. However, no due course has
been given to the contempt action, thus, the Ombudsmans claim was premature.

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C.

APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS

Cases:

38. De Rama v. CA (G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001)

FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado
L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or
CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees.
Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said
employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja,
done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied
petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack
of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had
already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for
petitioners failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the
said appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
HELD:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only
when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus
Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that
an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the
appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the
Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the
following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil
service law, rules and regulations.

57

39. Plaza v. CA (G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008)

58

40. Atienza v. Villarosa (G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005)

FACTS:
Governor issued a memoranda concerning:
1. AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS,
EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.
2. TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOB ORDER
EMPLOYEES AND REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES
entered into by Vice-Governor Ramon M. Atienza are hereby terminated for being
unauthorized.
3. "ENFORCIBILITY (sic) OF PREVIOUS MEMORANDA ISSUED ON JUNE 20, 26
AND JULY 1, 2002.
Vice-Governor invoked the principle of separation of powers as applied to the local
government units, (Governor)-head of the executive branch, and (Vice-Governor)- head
of the legislative branch, which is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Both public officials are no longer incumbent. The VG did not seek re-election while the
Gov. did not win his candidacy.
ISSUE:
WON the Governor in issuance of his memoranda is is authorized to approve purchase
orders of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
HELD:
Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants
drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the
operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.
In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or chief of
office, the officer next-in-rank shall automatically perform his function and he shall
be fully responsible therefor.
The Governor, with respect to the appointment of the officials and employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has no such authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and
July 1, 2002 issued by respondent Governor Jose T. Villarosa are NULL AND VOID.

59

41. People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 164185, 23 July 2008)

60

42. Sales v. Carreon (G.R. No. 160791, 13 February 2007)

Doctrine:
The practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue midnight appointments,
especially after theirsuccessors have been proclaimed] does not only cause animosities
between the outgoing and the incomingofficials, but also affects efficiency in local
governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and energyin defending their
appointments instead of attending to their functions. However, not all
midnightappointments are invalid. Each appointment must be judged on the basis of
the nature, character, and merits of the individual appointment and the circumstances
surrounding the same. It is only when the appointments were made en masse by the
outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried maneuversand
under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court
has struck down midnight appointments.
FACTS:
During the May 2001 elections, then Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz of Dapitan City,
running for re-election, was defeated by respondent Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr. On June 1,
18 and 27, 2001, his last month in office, then Dapitan City Mayor Ruiz issued 83
appointments, including those of herein petitioners. On July 1, 2001, the newly elected
Mayor, Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr., herein respondent, assumed office. On July 2, 2001,
respondent issued Memorandum Orders Nos. 1 and 2 revoking the 83 appointments
signed by his predecessor on the ground that the latter violated Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 01-988 in relation to CSC Memorandum Circular No.
7, Series of 2001, imposing a ban on issuing appointments in the civil service during the
election period. Thereupon, respondent prohibited the release of the salaries and
benefits of the 83 appointees. On July 10, 2001, Patricio Sales, one of herein
petitioners, in his capacity as president of the Dapitan City Government Employees
Association, wrote the CSC Regional Office No. IX requesting its ruling on the matter.
On July 16 and August 3, 2001, respondent sent the said Office a position paper
justifying his action, contending that the questioned appointments were not only issued
in bulk but that there was no urgent need to fill those positions. On August 17, 2001, the
CSC Regional Office No. IX issued an Omnibus Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads: WHEREFORE, all premises considered: The eighty-three (83) appointments
issued by then Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, including those issued by the herein
requesting parties, are, therefore not considered mass appointments, as defined under
CSC Resolution No. 01-0988 and are thus, VALID and EFFECTIVE. Memorandum
Orders Nos. 1 and 2, Series of 2001, issued by Mayor Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr., are
hereby declared NULL and VOID, and accordingly, The LGU-Dapitan is hereby directed
to pay the salaries and other emoluments to which the 83 appointments are entitled to
pursuant to the appointments issued to them.
On appeal by respondent, the CSC En Banc, on June 17, 2002, issued Resolution No.
020828 reversing the assailed Omnibus Order of the CSC Regional Office No. IX, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Order dated August 17, 2001of the
Civil Service Commission RegionalOffice No. IX is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

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Commission hereby rules, as follows: The approval of all 83 appointments issued by

then Mayor J. Cedrick O. Ruiz is revoked for being violative of Republic Act No. 7041,
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18 s. 1988, as amended, CSC Resolution No. 963332
on its accreditation and CSC Resolution No. 01-0988.
All promoted employees are reverted to their previous position; and Memorandum
Order No. 1 and Memorandum Order No. 2 issued by incumbent Mayor Rodolfo H.
Carreon, Jr. are hereby declared null and void. The CSC En Banc held that the
positions in question were published and declared vacant prior to the existence of any
vacancy. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in Resolution
No. 030049 dated January 16, 2003 by the CSC En Banc. On February 13, 2003,
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On September 16, 2003,
the appellate court rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, sustaining the CSCs
finding that the positions to which the petitioners were appointed were already reported
and published even before they had been declared vacant, in violation of Sections 2
and 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7041;[2] and that there was no first level representative
to the Personnel Section Board who should have participated in the screening of
candidates for vacancy in the first level. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.
ISSUE:
W/N midnight appointments cause animosities between officials
HELD:
This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue
midnight appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed. It does
not only cause animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also
affects efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and
energy in defending heir appointments instead of attending to their functions. However,
not all midnight appointments are invalid. Each appointment must be judged on the
basis of the nature, character, and merits of the individual appointment and the
circumstances surrounding the same. It is only when the appointments were made en
masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried
maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and propriety
that this Court has struck down midnight appointments. It is State policy that
opportunities for government employment shall be open to all qualified citizens and
employees shall be selected on the basis of fitness to perform the duties and assume
the responsibilities of the positions. It was precisely in order to ensure transparency
and equal opportunity in the recruitment and hiring of government personnel, that
Republic Act No. 7041 was enacted. Section 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Duty of Personnel Officers. It shall be the duty of all Chief Personnel or
Administrative Officers of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and local government units, to post in three (3) conspicuous places of their
offices for a period ten (10) days a complete list of all existing vacant positions in their

62

respective offices which are authorized to be filled, and to transmit a copy of such list
and the corresponding qualification standards to the Civil Service Commission not later
than the tenth day of every month. Vacant positions shall not be filled until after
publication: Provided, however, that vacant and unfilled positions that are: a) primarily
confidential;b) policy-determining;c) highly technical;d) co-terminous with that of the
appointing authority; or e) limited to the duration of a particular project, shall be
excluded from the list required by law.
SEC. 3. Publication of Vacancies. The Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission shall publish once every quarter a complete list of all the existing vacant
positions in the Government throughout the country, including the qualification
standards required for each position and, thereafter, certify under oath to the completion
of publication. Copies of such publication shall be sold at cost to the public and
distributed free of charge to the various personnel office of the government where they
shall be available for inspection by the public:Provided, That said publication shall be
posted by the Chief Personnel or Administrative Officer of all local government units in
at least three (3) public and conspicuous places in their respective municipalities and
provinces: Provided, further, That any vacant position published therein shall be open to
any qualified person who does not necessarily belong to the same office with the
vacancy or who occupies a position next-in-rank to the vacancy: Provided, finally, That
the Civil Service Commission shall not act on any appointment to fill up a vacant
position unless the same has been reported to and published by the Commission. The
foregoing provisions are clear and need no interpretation. The CSC is required to
publish the lists of vacant positions and such publication shall be posted by the chief
personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in the designated
places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they
have been reported to the CSC as vacant and only after publication. Here, the
publication of vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually became
vacant. Clearly, respondents action violated Section 2 of R.A. No. 7041 cited earlier.
Moreover, the CSC found that there was no first-level representative appointed to the
Personnel Selection Board, which deliberated on the appointments to first-level
positions. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1988, as amended, provides
that the Personnel
Selection Board shall be composed of the following:
a. Official of department/agency directly responsible for personnel management;
b. Representative of management;
c.d. Representative of organizational unit which may be an office, department, or
division where the vacancy is;
Representative of rank-and-file employees, one (1) for the first-level and one (1) for the
second-level, who shall both be chosen by duly registered/accredited employees
association in the department or agency. The former shall sit during the screening of
candidates for vacancy in the first-level, while the latter shall participate in the screening
of candidates for vacancy in the second level. In case where there is no employees
association in the department or agency, the

63

representative shall be chosen at large by the employees through a general election to

be called for the purpose. Petitioners admitted that after the retirement on April 22, 2000
of Beltran Faconete, the first-level representative to the Personnel Selection Board, no
other first-level representative to replace him was chosen by the Dapitan City
Government Employees Association. Yet, the city government Personnel Selection
Board proceeded to deliberate and recommend theappointments of applicants to the 43
first-level positions. Petitioners contend, however, that although there was no such
representative, the action of the Board is still valid.

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43. Quirog v. Aumentado (G.R. No. 163443, 11 November 2008)

FACTS:
On May 28, 2001, Bohol Provincial Governor Rene L. Relampagos permanently
appointed3 Liza M. Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head 4 of the Office of
the Bohol Provincial Agriculture (PGDH-OPA). The appointment was confirmed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in Resolution No. 2001-199 5 on June 1, 2001. The Order
pointed out that the prohibition against the issuance of midnight appointments was
already laid down as early as February 29, 2000 in CSC Resolution No. 000550.r They
argued that the subject appointment cannot be considered a midnight appointment
because it was made days before the expiration of Relampagos term, and that Quirog
was already the acting Provincial Agriculturist a year prior to said appointment or since
June 19, 2000. Quirog had already taken her oath of office, assumed her duties and
collected her salary for the month of June, 2001, she had already acquired a legal right
to the position in question, which cannot be taken away from her either by revocation of
the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.
In a decision dated July 23, 2001, the CSCROVII denied Quirogs and Relampagos
motion for reconsideration for lack of legal personality to file such pleading, citing
Section 2, Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 40, series of 1998. Even if
Relampagos was the one who appointed Quirog, he could not file a motion for
reconsideration because his term as governor ha already expired. The CSC also
declared that the appointment of Quirog was not a midnight appointment as it was not
hurriedly issued nor did it subvert the policies of the incoming administration.
Aumentado He insisted that Quirogs appointment was a midnight appointment.
Aumentado added that the selection board which screened Quirogs qualifications was
not validly constituted and that the subject appointment was made more than six
months from the time it was published on July 23, 2000 in violation of CSC Resolution
No. 0101146[17] dated January 10, 2001. Aumentado insisted that Relampagos made
97, not 46, mass appointments on the eve of his term, 95 of which were invalidated by
the CSC Bohol Field Office and two, including that of Quirog, by the CSCROVII.
ISSUE:
W/n appointment of Quirog was a midnight appointment
HELD:
The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment. For it is
beyond dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties
concomitant with the subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment
thereto. Surely, the fact that she was only permanently appointed to the position of
PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting Provincial Agriculturist more than
adequately shows that the filling up of the position resulted from deliberate action and a
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications.
3
4
5
6
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The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the
more highlights the public need for said position to be permanently filled up. A careful
evaluation of the circumstances obtaining in the issuance of the appointment of Quirog
shows the absence of the element of hurriedness on the part of former Governor
Relampagos which characterizes a midnight appointment. There is also wanting in the
records of the case the subversion by the former governor of the policies of the
incumbent Governor Erico Aumentado as a logical consequence of the issuance of
Quirogs appointment by the latter. Both elements are the primordial considerations by
the Supreme Court when it laid down its ruling in prohibiting midnight appointments in
the landmark case of Aytona vs Castillo, et. al. In any event, respondent Governor
Aumentado, in a Memorandum7[36] dated March 4, 2003, has reinstated Quirog to the
permanent position of PGDH-OPA. Such act of respondent bespeaks of his acceptance
of the validity of Quirogs appointment and recognition that indeed, the latter is qualified
for the subject position.

7
66

44. Montuerto v. Ty (G.R. No. 177736, 06 October 2008)

FACTS:
On March 17, 1992, petitioner was issued an appointment as Municipal Budget Officer
by the thenMayor Supremo T. Sabitsana of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran. On
March 24, 1992, her appointment was approved as permanent by Gerardo Corder,
Acting Civil Service Commission Field Officer.On January 14, 2002, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Almeria, Biliran passed Sangguniang Bayan (SB)Resolution No. 01-S-2002
entitled "A Resolution Requesting the Civil Service Commission Regional Office,to
Revoke the Appointment of Mrs. Melanie P. Montuerto, Municipal Budget Officer of the
Municipality ofAlmeria, Biliran for Failure to Secure the Required Concurrence from the
Sangguniang Bayan."
Consequently, the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran submitted the 201 file of petitioner to
Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VIII (CSCRO No. VIII) which showed that
petitioner's appointment lacked the required concurrence of the local sanggunian. On
the other hand, petitioner submitted to the same office a Joint-Affidavit executed on
March 6, 2002, by the majority of the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan
ofAlmeria, Biliran, that only verbal concurrence on the appointment and also there is no
record to show that there is an appointment of Mrs Melanie P. Montuerto as Municipal
Bidget Officer of Almeria. On March 11, 2002, CSCRO No. VIII issued an Order of
recalled on the grounds that it lacks the required concurrence of the majority of all the
members of the Sanguninang Bayan and On July 11, 2005, theMunicipal Mayor issued
a Memorandum terminating the services of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer
pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 050756.Petitioner filed a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA, which denied it for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer, without the written
concurrence of the Sanggunian, but duly approved by the CSC and after the appointee
had served as such for almost ten years without interruption, can still be revoked by the
Commission.
HELD:
We resolve to deny the Petition. The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of
Republic ActNo. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the head of a department or
office in the municipal government,such as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be
appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang Bayan
members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. Per records, the
appointment of petitioner was never submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for its
concurrence or, even if so submitted, no such concurrence was obtained. Such factual
finding of quasi-judicial agencies, especially if adopted and affirmed by the CA, is
deemed final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. This
Court is not a trier of facts and generally, does not weigh anew evidence already passed
upon by the CA. Absent a showing that this case falls under any of the exceptions to

67

this general rule, this Court will refrain from disturbing the findings of fact of the tribunals
below.Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence
allegedly given by the Sanggunian,as postulated by the petitioner, is not the
concurrence required and envisioned under R.A. No. 7160. The Sanggunian, as a body,
acts through a resolution or an ordinance. Absent such resolution of concurrence,the
appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section
443(a) and (d) ofR.A. No. 7160. Without a valid appointment, petitioner acquired no
legal title to the Office of MunicipalBudget Officer, even if she had served as such for ten
years. Accordingly, the CSC has the authority to recall the appointment of the petitioner.

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V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
45. MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 170656, 15 August 2007)
FACTS:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA
in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic
by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares
and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC
gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They
alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to direct operators to abandon their
terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs
power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public
Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court.
In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to
whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to
direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing
bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is
consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus
operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should
they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the
constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its
Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police
power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not
include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals;
and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no
justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the
E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter
or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan
to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government
property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation
created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials,
but not between third persons.
ISSUES:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?

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2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional? HELD: Yes to both. Petition

dismissed.
HELD:
1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for
judicial determination
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The
closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from
the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation
of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the
case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the
E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a
law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury
as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents.
2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and
private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and
communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the
DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179
ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the
policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically
pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its

70

exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated
differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public,
not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the
contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the
bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to
say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the
safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of
vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs
to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the
flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart
from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the LTFRB)was empowered to
"impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or
operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving
any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the LTFRB to require any public service to
establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing
facilities.

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46. MMDA v. Garin (G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005)

FACTS:
One day, Respondent, Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt
(TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara
Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs
validity (which is 48 hours from date of apprehension), the respondent addressed a
letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his drivers
license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. Since there was
no reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction in
Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on 12 September 1995,
contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of
their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation,
thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further
contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out
that the powers granted to it bySec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing,
collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are
legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity
of the penalty imposed. The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila
Council, the governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to
formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. ActNo. 7924 and directed the
courts attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April
1995which authorizes confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance of a TVR.
Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular
No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro ManilaCouncil in the
absence of a quorum.On 23 October 1995, the RTC granted the preliminary mandatory
injunction which ordered the MMDA to return the respondent's drivers license. On 14
August 1997, the RTC rendered the decision in favor of the respondent.Meanwhile, on
12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
MemorandumCircular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the
Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued
an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer
confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All
motorists within redeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of
implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle
platesAlthough this case was considered as moot and academic by the implementation
of Memorandum Circular No. 04,Series of 2004, the Supreme Court believed that it was
but proper to address the current issue for the proper implementation of the petitioner's
future programs.
ISSUE:

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Whether or not Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924, which created the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), authorizes the MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations?
HELD:
By virtue of the doctrine promulgated in the case of Metro Manila Development Authority
v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with
police power, let alone legislative power, and that all of its functions are administrative in
nature.Police power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Thus, as
held in the aforementioned case, . . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision
in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and
these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:..Although petitioner is not
precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as
the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs, it still needs a valid law, or
ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source. This is consistent with the
ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which
may enforce, but not enact, ordinances. Hence, the power of MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, is
an unauthorized exercise of police power.

73

47. Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 129546, 13 December 2005)
FACTS:
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of
President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened. A temporary restraining order
was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question that the project was not
consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into
consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump sites permanent
closure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality
of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..
HELD:
The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the
provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10
October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations before a
program shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval of the
Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Pao, Section 2 (c), requiring
consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national
government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular
community implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary
restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force
declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required
consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at
the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop
dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would
oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, enact

74

ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code. These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of
logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and
fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section
447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the
jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the
municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent
provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the
approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations;
establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the
construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in
accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the
basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
addition to said services and facilities, ...providing for the establishment, maintenance,
protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,
greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects ....and, subject to
existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source
of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of
hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water
supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one
hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or
watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption,
use or wastage of water.[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

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