EDUARDO GAANAN vs INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT

Facts:

Atty. Tito Pintor and Manuel Montebon were in the living room of Montebons residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After
they had decided on the proposed conditions, Atty. Pintor made a telephone call to Laconico, who on the
same day called Atty. Eduardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him regarding the proposed
settlement. When Atty. Pintor called up, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to their
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Atty. Gaanan heard Atty. Pintors conditions for the withdrawal of the complaint, one of
which was money, as payment for his effort in persuading Montebon to withdraw the case. After Laconico
agreed, he was thereafter instructed to deliver the money to Atty. Pintors wife. Laconico insisted that Atty.
Pintor himself should receive it, who earlier alerted his friend Col. Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary. When Atty. Pintor received the money, he was arrested by the
agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Atty. Gaanan executed an Affidavit stating that he heard Atty.
Pintors demands which, Laconico has attached to his complaint for robbery/extortion against Atty. Pintor.
Atty. Pintor charged Atty. Gaanan and Laconico with Violation of Anti-Wiretapping Act since Atty. Gaanan
had listened to their telephone conversation without his consent.
Issue:
Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under
Republic Act No. 4200.
Held:
An extension telephone is not covered by the term device or arrangement under Republic Act No.
4200. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the cause or the use of a device or arrangement for
the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the
use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must be strictly be with the use of
the enumerated devices in R.A. No. 4200 or others of similar nature, and that an extension telephone is not
among such devices or arrangements.
Facts:

SOCORRO RAMIREZ vs COURT OF APPEALS

Socorro Ramirez filed a complaint for damages against Ester S. Garcia, wherein she was allegdel
vexed, insulted and humiliated by Ester in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to
Ramirezs dignity and personality, which is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support
of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript which civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by herself. As a result of Ramirezs recording of the event and alleging
that said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a complaint for Violation of R.A.
No. 4200 entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purpose. Ramirez filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that
the violation punished by R.A. No. 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by
one of the parties to the conversation.
Held:
Section of R.A. No. 4200 applies to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. Said provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the Statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. Consequently, as
correctly concluded by the Court of Appeals, Even a person privy to a communication who records his
private communication with another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under
this Act.
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:

Rafael S. Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez. Rafael, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence three (3)
cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons. Teresita
objected to Rafaels oral offer of evidence, however, the trial court admitted all Rafaels offered evidence,
including tape recordings of her telephone conversations with unidentified persons, which were made and
obtained when Rafael allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. Teresita filed a
motion for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, however, the same was denied.
Issue:

Whether or not the three (3) cassette tapes should be admitted as offered evidence by the trial
court.
Decision:
The three (3) cassette tapes should not be admitted as offered evidence by the trial court. Sections
1 and 4 of Republic Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence. In the case at bar, absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversation allowed the recording of the same, hence, the inadmissibility of the subject taps is mandatory
under the said Act.
In re Laureta
CECILIA ZULUETA vs COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN
Facts:

Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between
Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and
photographs, without the knowledge and consent of her husband. The documents and papers were seized
for used in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which Cecilia had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
Held:

The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. An violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose of proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one of the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is, freedom of communication, quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION vs NLRC and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO
Facts:
Catolico was hired was pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation (Waterous). Catolico received a
memorandum from Waterous Vice President-General Manager Emma Co warning her not to dispense
medicine to employees chargeable to the latter account because the same was a prohibited practice.
Moreover, she was also warned not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the
Purchasing Department as she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. Another
memorandum was issued to Catolico by Waterous Supervisor Luzminda E. Bautro warning her against the
rush delivery of medicines without proper documents. Waterous Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he
noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP), which involves the
overpricing of the medicine purchased with YSP and the check for the difference of the jack-up price which
was paid to Catolico. Catolico denied the allegations. However, upon conversation with a certain Saldana,
it was confirmed that the check was actually received by Catolico and that Catolico even asked Saldana is
she opened the envelope containing the check, which Saldana answered in affirmative. Hence, the refund
was pocketed by Catolico. Thus, Catolico was terminated from Waterous.
Issue:

Whether or not the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right of
privacy and communication, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held:

The check was not discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right of privacy and
communication, hence, admissible as evidence. As laid down in the case of People vs Marti, the Bill of
Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. In this case, Saldana, an officer of Waterous opened the envelope addressed to Catolico and

found therein a check evidencing an overprice in the purchase of medicine. Despite the lack of consent on
the part of Catolico, the check was deemed admissible as evidence.
BLAS F. OPLE vs RUBEN D. TORRES, ET.AL
Facts:

President Fidel V. Ramos issued an Administrative Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Said AO requires a computerized system in order to
properly and efficiently identify persons seeking services on social security and reduce, if not totally
eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentation. Senator Ople seeks to declare AO No. 308 as
unconstitutional and that it establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects
the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right
to privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 violates the right of privacy and is unconstitutional.
Held:

Administrative Order No. 308 violates the right of privacy, hence, unconstitutional. The essence of
privacy is the right to be alone. It is expressly recognized and enshrined in Section 3(1) of the Bill of
Rights where it states that, The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon a lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
The heart of AO No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a
common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of
Biometrics Technology and computer application designs. However, AO No. 308 does not state what
specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify
people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementers of
said AO, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of the people is not groundless. Further, said AO
does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes, nor provides clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled and
who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose, which are
essential factors to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. Hence, AO No. 308
falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our peole will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of AO No. 308
may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement. It may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination. It may paved the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities
and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of
the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.
They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of rights seeks to prevent.
In no uncertain terms, the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and
the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest to justify
such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined
standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
Facts:

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAM

President Gloria Macapagal-arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275, Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country. The body later referred as
Zearoza Commission was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the
country with a view of eliminating them before the May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently
in the future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, it released and submitted a report to the Office of the
President a confidential report, where Gamboa, who was the mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, was included
in the reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Later, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening
news program the portion of the report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining
a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was
publicly tagged as someone maintaining a PAG on the basis of the unverified information from PNP Ilocos
Norte gathered and forwarded to Zearoza commission. Hence, contending that her right to privacy was
violated and her reputation was maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a petition for a writ of habeas data
against the respondents.
Issue:

Whether or not Gamboas right to privacy was violated.

Held:
Gamboas right to privacy was not violated. The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty,
has long been recognized as a constitutional right. It is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint. However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection
established in existing laws and jurisprudence, the Court deems it necessary to caution there investigating
entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right

to privacy is the freedom from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities.
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the report but emphasized its confidential
nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach and
that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any
event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation and to
resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data is unnecessary and improper.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs RAUL M. GONZALES

Facts:

EMILIO M. R. OSMEA and PABLO P. GARCIA vs COMELEC

Emilio M. R. Osmena is a candidate for President of the Philippines while Pablo P. Garcia is a
Governor of Cebu Province, seeking re-election. They seek a re-examination of the validity of Sec. 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
Elections, which was held valid by the Supreme Court in the case of NPC vs COMELEC against claims that it
abridged freedom of speech and of the press. They contend that, said provision works to the disadvantage
of candidates who do not have enough resources to wage a campaign outside of mass media and can
hardly apply to them and that their financial ability to sustain a long drawn-out campaign, using means
other than the mass media to communicate with votes, cannot be doubted.
Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid restraint of freedom of expression.

Held:
Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid restraint of freedom of expression. In this case, there is no
total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. The provision in question
involves no suppression of political ads. It only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to
candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass media or allocation,
free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or
the commercial time or radio and TV stations and allocates this to candidates. Hence, what is involved
here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass
media, the law provides allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and air time to give all candidates
equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The main purpose of Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental,
and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose or promoting equality of opportunity in the use
of mass media for political advertising. The restriction of speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as
to time and as to scope.
Facts:

BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs COMELEC

The Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No. 2347. Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial
candidate assailed the constitutionality of said Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, as provided under Section 15(a) and
Section 21(f) of the same resolution. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition he believes that with the
ban on radio, television, and print political advertisements, he being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition knowing that posting of decals and
stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate and that he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the
entire country as to the location of the supposed COMELEC Poster Areas.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds.
Held:

The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens fundamental right of free speech enshrined in
Sec. 4 of the Bill of Rights. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest
threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizens right of free speech
and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
ones mouth or a writing instrument. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed b the questioned
prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom
of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with
him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the owner of the car agrees to have it placed on
hi private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own car and not of
anybody else. The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and poor candidate equal opportunity to

inform the electorate as regards their candidacies is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars
and other private vehicles. Hence, the prohibition on posting decals and stickers on mobile places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
Facts:

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs COMELEC

The petitioners consists of representatives of the mass media, which are prevented from selling or
donating space and time or political advertisements, two candidates for national and provincial offices, and
taxpayers and voters, who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed. Principally, the petitioners argued that Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression, and that the
prohibition imposed by said provision amounts to censorship because it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. They also asserted that
the prohibition is in derogation of medias role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, they contend that said provision
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or
political propaganda except those appearing in the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on COMELEC
time of radio and television broadcast, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume
of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of
voters to information and opinion.
Issue:

Whether or not Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 has gone beyond permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press.
Held:
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods. The character and extent of the limitations
resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press are
essential considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and
freedom of the press of Section 11(b) is circumscribed by certain limitations. First, it is limited in the
duration of its applicability and enforceability. It is limited in its applicability in time of election periods.
Secondly and more importantly, it is limited in its scope of application. It applies only to the purchase and
sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air time or campaign or
other political purposed.It does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government. Moreover, said provision does not reach commentaries and
expression of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in
respect of candidates, their qualifications and programs and so forth, so long at least s such comments,
opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, it is
not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid
for by candidates for political office. Section 11(b) is designed to cover only paid political advertisements
of particular candidates.
Section 11(b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
Constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C)(4) and Article II(26) of the Constitution for it is precisely in
the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Hence, the limiting impact of Section 11(b) upon
the right to free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not duly repressive or
unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11(b) to prevent media reporting of and
commentary on pronouncements, activities, and written statements of the candidates themselves. All
other forms remain accessible to candidates, even for political advertisements. The requisite of fairness
and equal opportunity are, after all, designed to benefit the candidates themselves.
PABLITO SANIDAD vs COMELEC
Facts:
Republic Act No. 6766, entitled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces of
Benguet, Abra, Mt. Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the autonomous region shall take
part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27, 1989 but was reset to January 30, 1990
specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said act. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of which
provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers.- During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues. PABLITO V. SANIDAD who is a columnist (OVERVIEW) for the Baguio Midland Courier, a
weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, filed a petition for Prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 2167. Petitioner claims that the

said provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of expression and of the press and it also
constitutes a prior restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate the same.
The Supreme Court then issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from enforcing
Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167. Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment and moved for
the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167 does not absolutely bar
the petitioner from expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881, he may still express
his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.
Issue:
Whether or not the Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is violative of the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press, hence, null and void.
Held:

The COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press, hence, null and void. What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the
COMELEC is the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is
the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of
advertising time and space. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator or announcer is required
to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate. HOWEVER,
NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B), 2ND PAR. OF RA 6646 CAN BE
CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND
REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO EXPRESSION
DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during the
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in a
plebiscite.
While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or against the
Organic Act, said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of Section 19, Comelec Resolution No.
2167. This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY
EXPRESS HIS VIEW. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The peoples right to
be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to
an unabridged discussion of the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people affected by the issues
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. vs COMELEC
Facts:

Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Kamahalan Publishing Corporation seeks to enjoin the COMELEC
from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act) which provides that, surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before the election. SWS states that it wishes to conduct
an election survey throughout the perios of the election and surveys both at the national and local levels
and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan Publishing,
on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of elections.
Thus, they argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint. Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the
results of election surveys which are relatively objective. COMELEC justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A.
No. 9006 as necessary to prevent manipulation and corruption of the electoral process b unscrupulous and
erroneous surveys just before the election and that the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal,
the restriction being limited both in duration and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but
only require timeliness.
Issue:
Whether or not 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
speech, expression, and the press.
Held:
5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression,
and the press. 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the
publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days
immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local election. Because of the
preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is
vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the
Supreme Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
The case of United States vs Obrien provides the kind of test which determines the constitutional
validity of 5.4: (A) government regulation is sufficiently justified, (1) if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; (3) if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the incidental

restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than an essential to the furtherance of that
interest. First, Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion 3 of the Obrien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest make such interest not unrelated to the suppression of
free of expression. By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that
such publication might undermine the integrity of the elections, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnist, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorist, and other opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows a
bias for a particular subject matter, of not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results.
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that the government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. The inhibition of speech
should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few unprotected categories. Nor is there
justification for the prior restraint which 5.4 lays on protected speech. Thus, the prohibition imposed by 5.4
cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition
may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial.
It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a
period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a
local election. Second, even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the
suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to
meet criterion (4) that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest.
Although 5.4 aims of the regulation might be a praiseworthy, it cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the
fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued b punishing unlawful acts,
rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
Therefore, 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression; (2) it
is a direct and total suppression of category of expression even though such suppression is only limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved b means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. & CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
vs HON. CAESAR G. DY, ET.AL
Facts:
Bombo Radyo Philippines (Bombo Radyo) operates several radio stations under the AM and FM
band throughout the Philippines. These stations are operated by corporations organized and incorporated
by Bombo Radyo, particularly petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and
Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS). Among the stations run by Newsounds is Bombo Radyo
DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station operating out of Cauayan City, Isabela. CBS, in turn,
runs Star FM DWIT Cauayan (Star FM), also operating out of Cauayan City, airing on the FM band.
Newsounds relocate its broadcasting stations, management office and transmitters on a property owned
by CBS Development Corporation (CDC), an affiliate corporation under the Bombo Radyo. As when the said
property was certified as commercial property in a Zoning Decision of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), a commercial structure was consequently erected thereat wherein DZNC and
Star FM operates their radio stations. Both stations successfully secured all necessary operating
documents including mayor permits from 1997 to 2001 until they applied for the renewal of mayors
permit on the year 2002 when the City Zoning Administrator Bagnos Maximo required the petitioners to
submit either an approved land conversion papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing
that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land or an approved resolution
from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of the property
from agricultural to commercial land. Due to refusal of Maxinmo to issue zoning clearance, petitioners were
unable to secure a mayors permit. Meanwhile, petitioners sought to obtain from the DAR Region II Office a
formal recognition of the conversion of the CDC property from agricultural to commercial which then
granted the application and issued an Order that stated that there remains no doubt on the part of this
Office of the non-agricultural classification of subject land before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Consequently, the DAR Region II
Office ordered the waiver of any requirement for formal clearance of the conversion of the subject land
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. Petitioners filed again their applications for renewal of mayors
permit for the year 2003, attaching therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved but Felicisimo
Meer, Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR Order was
spurious or void, as the Regional Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI)
supposedly reported that it did not have any record of the DAR Order. The controversy continued until
2004. Petitioners filed again their respective applications for their 2004 mayors permit, attaching the
same DAR order, in which a zonal clearance was issued in their favor. However, Meer claim that no record
existed of DAR Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002 with the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR or with
the RCLUPPI, thus, there was no basis for the issuance in their favor of the requisite zoning clearance
needed for the issuance of the mayors permit. Meer reminded petitioners of the need to submit the
certifications from the DAR or the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that the property had been duly converted
for commercial use and even extended twice the period for application of the mayors permit, however,
petitioners failed to comply. Hence, Meer and the City Legal Officer of Cauayan City closed the radio
station. Petitioners filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking enforcement of the Omnibus Election Code
which prohibits the closure of radio stations during the then-pendency of the election period. The COMELEC
then issued an order allowing the operation of the radio stations but within hours after, Mayor Caesar Dy
issued a Closure Order stating that since petitioners did not have the requisite permits, it means that the
stations were not in fact allowed to operate. The radio stations continued their operations until the end of
the election period, afterwhich, the closure proved to be more permanent.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations is an act of prior
restraint against speech, expression or of the press.
Held:
The acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations is an act of prior restraint
against speech, expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the
press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. In this case, the acts
imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who
happen to be members of the press is clear enough. Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio
stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning
in 2002, respondents in their official capacities have taken actions, whatever may be the motive, that have
impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These actions have ranged
from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal
authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of government has since bore
down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school child with a basic
understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates these cases. For the year 2004,
petitioners had duly complied with the requirements for the issuance of the same mayors permit they had
obtained without issue in years prior. There was no basis for respondents to have withheld the zoning
clearances, and consequently the mayors permit, thereby depriving petitioners of the right to broadcast
as certified by the Constitution and their particular legislative franchise.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ISAAC PEREZ
MANUEL L. LAGUNZAD vs MARIA SOTTO VDA. DE GONZLES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled The Moises Padilla
Story. The movie was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez,
Jr., of which, the rights was purchased. The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of
Moises Padilla. Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were
portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal of his mother, Maria Sotto Vda.
De Gonzales and his girlfriend. The movie was already scheduled for a premier showing when Lagunzad
received a telephone call from Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises, objecting to the filming of the movie and
the exploitation of his life notwithstanding Lagunzads explanation that the movie was supervised by Atty.
Rodriguez. Hence, they demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie in
which Lagunzad acceded into as he had to meet the scheduled target of the premier showing. After some
bargaining as to the amount to be paid, Lagunzad and Vda. De Gonzales executed a licensing agreement.
Lagunzad said he was pressured into signing the Agreement because of private respondents demand,
otherwise, she would call a press conference declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud, and a hoax and
would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television and that they were going to Court to stop
the picture. Lagunzad partially paid Vda. De Gonzales but after the movie was completed and the premier
showing was held which subsequently, was shown in different theatres, he refused to pay any additional
amount pursuant to the Agreement. Hence, Vda. De Gonzales filed a suit against Lagunzad.
Issue:

Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press.
Held:

The Licensing Agreement does not infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of
the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaper, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the
public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a
preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, without limitations. The prevailing
doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible
limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies., is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle i requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation. In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and
the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those
interests, the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to
be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches
upon matters of essentially private concern.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs COMELEC
Facts:
Commission on Elections en banc issued Resolution No. 98-1419 wherein the poll body RESOLVED
to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representative from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the
same. The Resolution was issued by the COMELEC allegedly upon information from (a) reliable source
that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections xxx and to make (an) exit survey of the xxx vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be (broadcast) immediately. The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the

unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Issue:

Whether or not the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid
exercises of the freedom of speeches and of the press.
Held:

The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the
freedom of speeches and of the press. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by
confidentiality asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have
officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass
media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the
electorate voted. Moreover, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls.
The Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an
exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against
its validity. And its respondents burden to overthrow such presumption. Any act of restrains speech should
be greeted with furrowed brows, so it has been said. To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial
government interest must be clearly shown. Hence, even though the governments purpose are legitimate
and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means of broadly, stifle fundamental personal liberties, when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be
upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to
the equally vital right of suffrage. In the case at bar, the COMELEC justifies that the Resolution was issued
pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election and
that the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral
process. However, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any
purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters answer
to the survey questions will be forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is retrained,
candidates, researchers, social scientist, and the electorae in general would be deprived of studies on the
impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters choice. Hence, absolute ban
imposed by the COMELEC cannot therefore be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of
communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there
are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the COMELEC end of avoiding or minimizing
disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys. Therefore, the interest of the State in
reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
the media and the electorate.