Manantan vs.

CA
FACTS: Accused George Manantan, driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the National Highway of Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations
and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by
him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the
said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his
civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan
civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.

ISSUES: Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability. Whether or not the CA
placed Manantan in double jeopardy upon finding him liable for indemnity and damages.
HELD: Manantans claim is misplaced. While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly
imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to
review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is
"for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the
civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding
cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily,
different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of
Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.

People vs. Feliciano

FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD: It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same effect as
an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the competency and quality of the
testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution. A discharge, if
granted at the stage where jeopardy has already attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further
prosecution would be tantamount to the state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally
placing the state witness in double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance
where the discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his co-accused,
the benefit of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the same offense.

Merciales vs. CA
FACTS: That on or about December 1, 1992, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Province of
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
a public officer, being then the Governor of the Province of Oriental Mindoro, while in the performance of his
official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, and taking advantage of his official position,
acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the Province of Oriental Mindoro, and at the same time give
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to one Cresente Umbao, a candidate who ran and lost in the
1992 election, by then and there appointing said Cresente Umbao as Sangguniang Bayan member of Pola,
Oriental Mindoro, within the prohibitive period of one (1) year after an election, in flagrant violation of Sec. 6,
Art IX B of the Constitution, to the damage and prejudice of the Province of Oriental Mindoro and to the
government as a whole.
Upon arraignment on April 13, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
On March 24, 2003, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts, to wit:
1. Mr. Rodolfo G. Valencia, had been the Governor of the Province of Oriental Mindoro, for having won in the
gobernatorial race in the May 1992 local and provincial election;
2. During the 1992 election, Mr. Cresente Umbao of Pola, Oriental, Mindoro also ran for the position of
councilor in the Municipality of Pola, Oriental Mindoro but he lost;
3. On October 17, 1992, Councilor Antonio Mercene, Jr. of Pola, Oriental, Mindoro died thus creating a
permanent vacancy in the membership position of Sanguniang Bayan of Pola, Oriental Mindoro.
4. On December 1, 1992 then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia of Oriental, Mindoro, appointed Cresente Umbao
to the position of a councilor in the Municipal Council of Pola, Oriental Mindoro on the vacancy left by the
death of Councilor Mercene.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reopening of the criminal case will violate the accuseds right to double jeopardy.
HELD: The petition does not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that
double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur:
1. the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction;
2. the court has jurisdiction;
3. the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and
4. they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent.
Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in double
jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any
ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.
The dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due
process. In rendering the judgment of dismissal, the trial judge in this case acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, for a judgment which is void for lack of due process is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Indeed, jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing.
Lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts.[19] Hence, the remedy taken by petitioner before the
Court of Appeals was correct.

Cuison vs. CA
FACTS: Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase and sale of newsprint, bond paper and
scrap.

Valiant Investment Associates delivered various kinds of paper products to a certain Tan. The deliveries were
made by Valiant pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiac who was then employed in the Binondo office of
petitioner. Upon delivery, Tan paid for the merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash at the
specific request of Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9) postdated checks to Valiant as payment for the paper
products. Unfortunately, sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank.
Thereafter, Valiant made several demands upon petitioner to pay for the merchandise in question, claiming that
Tiac was duly authorized by petitioner as the manager of his Binondo office, to enter into the questioned
transactions with Valiant and Tan. Petitioner denied any involvement in the transaction entered into by Tiac
and refused to pay Valiant.
Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the collection of sum of money
representing the price of the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against
petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect
reversed by the CA. CA ordered petitioner to pay Valiant with the sum plus interest, AF and costs.
ISSUE: Whether the writs of certiorari and mandamus were properly issued by the Court of Appeals, and
whether petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated.
HELD: To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:
1. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
2. the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
3. the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof
(citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in
such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court
promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the
promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge
rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12,
1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court
void.[ Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence,
double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.

People vs. Almario

FACTS: At about 7 o'clock in the morning of April 20, 1986, Rogelio Lebano, accompanied by appellant and a
certain Ariel Acosta, was talking with Daniel Libres at the latter's yard situated at Barangay Cabidianan, New
Corella, Davao, regarding a chainsaw which Lebano was selling to Libres. Libres wanted to get the chainsaw
on the same day, but Lebano objected because he could get the chainsaw only the next day . The following
morning, Libres asked permission from his wife, prosecution witness Olimpia Libres, to get the chainsaw from
Limbaan, also in New Corella, Davao. Since Libres was proceeding to Sitio Tagaytay, Barrio Cabidianan,
New Corella, Olimpia and her father-in-law Eliodoro Libres, rode with Libres on a motorcycle driven by the
latter . Upon reaching Sitio Tagaytay, Olimpia and her father-in-law disembarked to wait for a vehicle coming
from Sunlon, while Libres waited for appellant and Lebano. A vehicle arrived which had no passenger yet.
Olimpia and her father-in-law boarded the vehicle which returned to Barrio Cabidianan to get more
passengers. Libres remained at Sitio Tagaytay .When the vehicle where Olimpia and her father-in-law were
riding was already on its way to Tagum, Davao, it overtook at Suwawon the motorcycle driven by Libres, with
appellant and Lebano as passengers . Thereafter, on that same day, Libres was found dead at Barrio Limbaan,
New Corella, Davao, while appellant and Lebano were already missing . The body of Libres was taken to
Funeraria Padilla at National Highway, Tagum, Davao, where Dr. Alfredo Manungas, Municipal Health
Officer of New Corella, conducted the postmortem examination. The result of the examination and the death
certification of Libres showed that the immediate cause of death was shock; the antecedent cause was
hemorrhage; and the underlying causes were: (1) multiple stab wounds, chest, 6 in number, 4 inches deep each
below left clavicle; below right clavicle; right clavicle; right breast; left para-sternal, left axilla, (2) slash
wound, anterior neck; 3 inches deep, 4 inches wide. On November 14, 1986, or about seven (7) months after
Libres was killed, Police Officer 3 Raul D. Bangoy, then assigned at the Provincial Headquarters, Tagum,
Davao, together with Senior Police Officer 1 Manteca, Warrant Officer of New Corella Police Station and
three (3) teams of 40 Infantry Batallion, were sent to Sitio Cogonan, Trento, Agusan del Sur, to effect the arrest
of appellant and Lebano. The mission was, however, unsuccessful as appellant and Lebano were able to leave
the hut they were staying at the said sitio just before the police officers and military men arrived Sometime in
the second week of July 1992, appellant, while drunk, disclosed to Antonio Paner, an Alsa Masa leader of Sitio
Saro, Tugbok, Davao City, that he had killed a person. Because of this disclosure, prosecution witness Antonio
Paner made a surveillance on appellant until he came across an informant who relayed to him the misdeeds of
appellant in New Corella..Paner then prepared a hand-written report which he submitted to the Tugbok Police
Station and was later forwarded to New Corella. A warrant for the arrest of appellant was issued by virtue of
which he was apprehended and turned over to the Tugbok Police Station
ISSUE: Whether, in petitioner's cases, double jeopardy had set in so that petitioner's constitutional right
against such jeopardy had been violated.
HELD:Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had leaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
x

Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment,
(4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon
motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the
trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made
with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to
speedy trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in
violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.

Potot vs People
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the February 1, 2000 order as the Decision
had become final, and that the said order would place the accused in double jeopardy.
HELD:
We agree with the petitioner that the assailed orders would violate his constitutional right against
double jeopardy. Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has
previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at
rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge
against him for the same offense.
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the
charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was charged with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was
arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the
corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be
prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the first offense charged.

People vs. Astudillo

FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second decision of the trial court on July 10, 1998 infringed the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.
HELD:
Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a motion for reconsideration
of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with the consent of the
accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7, a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only
upon motion of the accused. These provisions changed the previous rulings of the Court to the effect that such
modification may be made upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before a judgment has
become final or an appeal has been perfected. The requisite consent of the accused to such motion for
reconsideration or modification is intended to protect the latter from having to defend himself anew from more
serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked. Accordingly, once the
judgment has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial
error, even if unwittingly committed by the trial court through oversight or an initially erroneous
comprehension, can be made only with the consent or upon the instance of the accused. Errors in the decision
cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves for reconsideration of, or appeals
from, the decision.
It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be
waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not
to be placed therein by filing such motion. His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to
reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable with the statute
applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. The raison detre is to afford the court a chance to
correct its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being taken. In effect, a motion for
reconsideration or modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for the
review of the trial court without, however, conducting further proceedings, such as the taking of additional
proof.
Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court which aspects of the judgment of
conviction should be reviewed. Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or
in the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide, appellants waived the defense of double
jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial open for the review of the trial court.