Achmad Anggawirya Alimin

Chemical Engineering
1406564912

Summary Safety Engineering in Hydrocarbons

Processing Industry: Introduction
Day 1 Introduction to Safety Engineering
1. Introduction
Objective: Safety Engineering aims to achieve safe facility design by means of
reducing the risk of each identified hazard to an acceptable level.
safety of personnel;
protection of the environment;
protection of assets;
minimization of damage to company image

SAFETY ENGINEERING FUNDAMENTALS

Avoid hazardous incidents
Prevent fluid Release
Prevent Ignition
Mitigate the consequences
Escape, Evacuation & Rescue (E.E.R.)

2. Preliminary Hazards Analysis

IDENTIFY
o HAZID (Hazard Identification) Assess hazards, their causes and effects, and how these
interact with the design
o External Hazards
o Facility Hazards
o Health Hazards
CONSEQUENCES
Area:
o Restricted Aream, The restricted area is the area within the boundaries of the installation
and hence under the control of COMPANY
o Impacted Area, The impacted area is the area that extends beyond the boundaries of the
installation but which is nevertheless affected up to some extend either permanently by
normal operation of the facility (noise, radiations, etc
HOW OFTEN
PREVENTION
RULES
COST
SELECTION OFPREVENTION
3. Preliminary Risks Analysis
Project development scheme
o Risk related to project phasing
o Risk related to natural environment conditions
o Risk related to start-up conditions

Simultaneous and current operation

o
o

SIMOPS
COMOPS

4. Process related Hazards

Depending on
The Hydrocarbons inventory within each individually isolable section
The fluids characteristics (toxicity, volatility, flammability)
The process conditions at which the fluid is processed and stored(pressure, temperature)
The presence of polluants (salts, sands, mercury, multiphases,hydrates)
5. Plot plan review
Purpose
The purpose is to provide guidelines to select the best lay-out taking into account the fact that is a
compromise that must satisfy safety requirements but also address other issues such as cost,logistics,
security, and possibly field development scheme.
Objective
o Containment Hydrocarbon
o Prevent Ignition
o Mitigation
o Escape, Evacuation & Rescue (E.E.R.)
Methodology
o Location of the installation.
o Units sorting and general arrangement. (Fire zone, Fire Number and partitioning between
single fire zone)
o Equipment location within units. (Technical room, Control room, Laboratories, workshop
and ware houses,office, living quarter)
6. Optimisation with regards to SIMOPS

GENERAL ON SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS (SIMOPS)

CASE STUDY: SOUTH PARS PHASES 2 & 3 INITIALSTART-UP
CASE STUDY: BALHAF LNG INITIAL START-UP

Day 2 Layout Optimisation

7. Fundamentals of safety engineering
General
o Main issues
Safety to life (Personnel (COMPANY and CONTRACTORS), Public
Protection of the environment
Assets ( Damages to the FACILITIES and Damages to surroundings (domino
effects) and public infrastructures
Business continuity (Companys image and reputation )
o Definitions
Hazard Vs Risk
Hazard, Potential source of physical injury or damage to the health of people, or
damage to property or the environment (ISO guide 51)
Risk, Two-dimensional entity (P, C) characterizing an unwanted event by its
probability of occurrence P and the severity of consequences C arising from the
occurrence of this event (from ISO) FUNDAMENTALS
Deterministic approach (Hazid, Hazop, API RP 14J and Probabilistic approach
(QRA method)

Orders of magnitude

Probabilistic Approach (Outline)

Deterministic Approach
o Hazard Identification (HAZID)
o Consequence Analysis
o Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP)
o Design practices (API RP 14J)
o Safety concept
o PTR (project technical review)

8. Installation layout / Fire zones

Introduction (objective)
o Protection of personnel and public
o Protection of installation and environment
o Optimisation of plant layout to
o Defenitions (Fire zones, Restricted area, Impacted area)
Historical case (Feyzin France )
Methodology
o Deterministic approach which consists in those different steps
o Objective : Confirm and optimize layout (iteration work)
o Deliverable: OPTIMISED LAYOUT (fire zone, restricted area, impacted area)
o Scenario = Bleve, Tank Fire, Jet Fire, Over Pressure.
Criteria
o Flammable gas concentration
o Toxic gas concentration
o Radiation
o Explosion overpressure
o Noise where relevant
o Flammable gas consentration
Method limitations and constraints
o No absolute guarantee that scenarios taken into account withthis method are
representative in a real situation
o Safety distances are for some cases difficult to apply
o However, alternate physical means of separation can be contemplated when safety
distances cannot be implemented
Fire zone specifics
o Fire and blast wall
o Storage protection
o Heat shielding
Approach benefits
9. Consequences analysis
Gas
Liquid
Fire (jet fire, pool, bleve)
Explosion
10. Offshore FPSO general layout
Day 3 Quantitative Risk Assessment Technics

11. Major Hazards Assessment (scenario based)

GENERAL
o The hazard potential is an intrinsic property of a system
o The hazard potential is the potential to cause damage to people, environment and/or
assets
ACCIDENT SCENARIO
o Accident scenario = sequence of events leading to the uncontrolled release to the
environment of the hazard potential contained within a system resulting in unwanted
consequences
RISK MATRICES AND ALARP PRINCIPLE
o Likelihood of occurrence of the scenarios (frequency)
SAFETY CRITICAL MEASURES/ELEMENTS
o ALARP
o HSE
ACTION OF SAFETY CRITICAL MEASURES/ELEMENTS: EXAMPLE
12. QRA (quantitative Risk Assestment)
General QRA Methodology
o Quantitative Risk Assessment: Formal and systematic approach of identifying potentially
hazardous events and estimating likelihood and consequences to people, environment
and assets, of accident developing from these events
o ALARP Principle: Principle requiring that all risks must be minimised to a level As Low
As Reasonably Practicable
The systematic QRA (step by step) approach
o Hazid, Frequency analysis, Scenario Development, Consequence Analysis, Impact
Assestment, Risk Summasion,
Assessment and improvement
13. Reduction of ignition sources
Part 1: Hazardous Areas
Intent
o Reduce to an acceptable level the probability of coincidence of a flammable atmosphere
and an ignition source,
o Exclusions
o Hazardous areas classification is linked with likelihood of presence of flammable material
at or above LFL in normal operation = a form of RISK MANAGEMENT.
Classsification, (Eliminate, Prevent, Control, Mitigate, Evacuate)
Codes and standard
o International
o ATEX
o IECEX
6 step of methodology
o Fluid Characteristic, Leaksource, Grade Release, Ventilation, Extend Hazardous zone,
Control Ignition
Part 2: Electrical Safety
General Principles
Regulations Standards
Certification Marking
Types of protection
Day 4 Process safety systems
14. Safety instrumented systems

OVERVIEW
Purpose, To carry out the following actions in a reliable and effective manner, without the need for
manual control during the sequence
The different safety systems
o Process Control System: Controls & associated (PCS) alarms linked to optimum
operating conditions
o Process Shutdown System: Trips & associated shutdown (PSS) actions through
detection of abnormal operating conditions
o High Integrity Protection System, only by exception: High reliability (HIPS) when
conventional protection (PSV+ relief system) is demonstrated as impractical
o Fire & Gas system: Detection of fire and / or gas leaks and initiate preventative actions
deluge, ESD, HVAC etc.
o Emergency Shutdown system: Emergency shutdown actions (ESD) minimise
consequences of fire or HC release and bring the installation to the lowest possible risk
level
o Ultimate Safety System: Back-up of essential ESD actions (USS)Performance objectives
Typical safety system architecture
Hips (Failure back up)

15. Pressure relief systems

Introduction, Between a high pressure HC reservoir and surface facilities we can t proceed today
without an atmospheric discharge system (Flare or Vent).
Types of devices classification
o Flares
o Chimneys
o Vents Disperser
Components with a process function
o BDV (Blow down Valve)
Components with a "safety function
o Spurious extinction
o Automatic ignition
Closed Flare System
Day 5 Detection and protection
16. Fire and gas detection system
RISK MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY
o ELIMINATE hazards at source
o PREVENT hazards from arising (robust design, inherent safetyapproach, operating
procedures..)
o CONTROL ignition (distances, detect loss of confinement as early as possible and deenergize)
o MITIGATE against consequences (detect incipient fire and toxic hazards, shutdown and
isolation, depressurisation, passive and active fire protection...)
o EVACUATE personnel from hazards (temporary refuge, EER)
Area
o Control room
o Field
Gas Detection
o Catalytic gas detector
o Infrared (IR) gas detectors
o Low temperature detectors

Toxic Gas Detection

o Toxic gas detectors are spot detectors that are selective towardsto a particular type of
gas
o The most commonly encountered toxic gas in the upstream business is H2S other toxic
gases include Sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide
Gas Sensor Locations and Placement (Methodology, Common requirement, enclosed area, open
area)
Fire detection (Flame, Smoke, Heat)
o Detector (UV/IR, IR3, Optical

17. Passive and active fire protection systems

Passive = Built into construction
Active = Dynamic system to be initiated automatically or manually
Principles of fire protection systems
o Determine Extent of potential Hydrocarbon Fire Hazards
o Determine Type of potential Hydrocarbon Fire Hazards
o Determine the duration of impact by fire (in fire risk analysis, however default values are
indicated in the table based on API 2218)
Passive
o Coating, cladding arrangements or a free standing system which in the event of fire will
provide integrity and protection to the substrate to which it is attached or to the protected
area and does so independently of a requirement from human, or mechanical or other
intervention to initiate a response.
o Example = Shielding,
Active
o Active fire protection objectives are achieved by reduction of the fire effects through:
cooling of the hydrocarbon equipment shielding against radiation fire suppression
o Active fire protection is activated by: Fire and Gas detection logic (automatically)
manually
o Example : water deluge,foam, water mist / steam, dry powder, inert gas ( Inergen), CO2,
Halon substitutes (non halogenated) Fluroketon/ Novec 1230
18. Alarm, Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Facilities
ALARM, emergency alarm system is to raise the alarm in every part of the installation by means
of specific audible and (where necessary) visual signals, so that all persons are informed to
proceed to their emergency muster stations and specific personnel warned of occurrence of
specific emergencies and so enable to take actions.
o PA/GA system, A Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) system shall remain active,
and its continued operation shall not create additional hazards.
o Visual alarms, In supplement to the PAGA system, visual alarms shall be provided
outdoors in noisy areas and along the main paths of ways and in the accommodation
public rooms.
o Safety systems architecture, Three specific safety systems have to be used to control an
offshore installation in case of emergency: the Emergency shutdown, the fire and gas,
and the alarm and public address systems.
ESCAPE, Escape routes shall be provided to enable all personnel to leave an area where they
are directly affected by an incident. In a complex of different platforms linked by bridges, the
normal escape route is to leave the platform affected by the incident by the bridge to an other
adjacent and unaffected platform.
EVACUATION SYSTEM/EER, Embarkation posts Embarkation posts are either an helideck, a
boat-landing, or an edge of the platform which allows access in the life-boats.
19. Conclusion: Human factor

Human Factor is the application of scientific knowledge about: People, Facilities, Management
Systems to improve their interaction in the workplace
Implications when Human Factors are not considered in design and operations:
o Indirect incidents from individuals that make errors
o Direct injuries / illnesses from not addressing Human Factor issues
o Lower productivity and efficiency