Documented land reforms occurred in ancient Greece in the sixth century BCE and

Republican Rome in the second century BCE. Perhaps reminding us how controversial land
reform can be if not adequately designed or explained, the brothers Gracchi successive tribunes
or leaders of the Republic, were assassinated, largely because of their support for redistributive
land reform. There is also an Old Testament reference to the requirement of land redistribution
every fiftieth year, in the year of the jubilee (Leviticus 25:23), although scholars are unsure of
the extent of actual implementation.
A major land reform was carried out around the beginning of the French Revolution (1789), after
which the reasonably satisfied French peasantry largely sat out the (mostly urban) violence and
upheaval. About the same time, a democratic and nonviolent land reform began in Denmark.
A variety of land-reform undertakings are found in nineteenth-century Europe. Notable among
them was the emancipation of the Russian serfs by Czar Alexander II (18181881) in 1861,
accompanied by a major distribution of land (however, heavy repayment obligations were
imposed on the land recipients). While President Abraham Lincoln (18091865) emancipated the
slaves in 1863 in the midst of the Civil War in the United States, this was unfortunately not
followed by redistribution to the freed slaves of the southern plantation lands on which they had
worked: Most were left socially and economically disempowered, many working as
sharecroppers with insecure tenure and paying high rents on the same lands on which they had
worked as slaves.
The twentieth century before World War II saw a number of democratic and nonviolent land
reforms, including many in European countries, as well as several violent civil upheavals that
were significantly fueled by the grievances of landless or near-landless peasants. The Mexican
peasantry supported a revolution (1910) and fought a subsequent civil war, eventually receiving
perpetual land rights beginning in the 1930s. The Russian peasantry, still land-hungry, supported
the 1917 revolution and received land, but later were forced to turn that land over to collective
farms (1930s). A weak republican government in Spain made indecisive efforts to redistribute
land in the 1930s, ultimately collapsing before the catalyzing acts of peasants who wanted land
and seized it, and large landowners and their allies who feared communism or anarchy, and
helped foment a successful military rebellion (the 19361939 Spanish Civil War).

POSTWORLD WAR II

There have been three principal waves of land reform since 1945. The first, during the decade
following World War II, occurred largely where the war had catalyzed or helped speed regime
change.
Leading examples were land-to-the-tiller programs in Japan, Taiwan, and South Koreawith
tenant farmers receiving ownership of the same land on which they had been tenantscarried
out under U.S.-supported non-communist regimes. In mainland China, the Communists
conducted a similar reform (but accompanied by antilandlord violence) when they took power in
1949, but this was followed by forced collectivization of all farmland in the mid-1950s. This
period also included involuntary collectivizations carried out by Eastern European communist
regimes that were within the Soviet sphereeven though the great majority of affected farmers
had already been individual owners. Poland was a notable holdout, maintaining its system of
small owner-operated farms.
A second wave of land-reform efforts occurred as many countries gained independence from
colonial powers from the late 1940s onward. But most of these reforms were poorly designed
and had little impact. The handful of successesmainly land-to-the-tiller programsincluded a
few Indian states (each state legislates its own land-reform rules), notably West Bengal and
Kerala in the 1970s and 1980s, and also included South Vietnam, under the threat of a
communist insurgency, during the 19701973 period.
Also of importance during this time were programs taking large estates for redistribution to farm
laborers, continuing in postwar Mexico, going forward in 1950s Bolivia, and undertaken in
1980s El Salvador, the latter again under the threat of a communist insurgency. The El Salvador
reform also included a land-to-the-tiller program for tenant farmers.
There were also many failures during this period. These included other Latin American attempts,
chiefly involving large estates, such as occurred in Brazil, Colombia, and (reversed through the
1954 U.S.-sponsored overthrow of the regime) Guatemala. Failures in Asia, mostly attempts to
redistribute tenanted land or above-ceiling land, included most Indian states, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines, among others. In Africa, where land-redistribution
efforts have centered on regions of white-owned estate land, many programs have shown slow
progress (South Africa) or gone far astray (Zimbabwe, apparently benefiting largely the
presidents cronies and militia, while evicting most farm laborers).

One impetus to land reforms that has largely disappeared with the demise of militant Marxist
ideology was the threat of communist insurgency built upon the promise of land, which led both
to revolutionary land reforms (Russia, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam) and to protective,
anticommunist land reforms (South Vietnam, El Salvador). But some such insurgent movements
persist (the Naxalites in eastern India, the New Peoples Army in the Philippines), and extralegal
efforts to occupy large estates, though well short of armed insurgency, are still found in countries
like Brazil.
The latest wave of postwar land reform has involved efforts to break up the large collective
farms that existed under many communist regimes (decollectivization ) and to give ownership or
equivalent secure individual land rights to the former collective-farm workers (privatization ).
Progress has varied on these two aspects: China was the first to decollectivize (19791983) but
has only partially privatized the resulting individual farms; Vietnam has now done both, as have
most (but not all) Eastern European countries; Russia and Ukraine have formally privatized, but
the former collectives remain the major operating units, usually renting in from their workers the
individual land rights those workers have received. Finally, some countries, such as North Korea
and Cuba, have neither broken up the collectives nor given individual land rights. Where
physical breakup has occurred, it has generally affected cropland, but left grazing land as
commons lands available for joint use.

PROGRAM DESIGN
Accumulated land-reform experience indicates numerous features of program design, subject to
deliberate change, which can play an important role in determining success or failure. Three
features of continuing importance are discussed below.
First, will full-size farms, or something much smaller, be the goal? If a full-size farm by local
standards, say two to three acres, is to be allocated, then multiplying this size farm by the number
of households needing land often indicates that 20 to 40 percent of the countrys cropland will
have to be taken and redistributed. In most contemporary settings, such a program is politically
and financially impractical.
Thus, it is important that recent research in many countries, such as India, now indicates that
the benefits curve rises extremely rapidly with the first few thousand square feet of land
distributed. In particular, distributing a homestead plot of one-tenth acre or even less, to

supplement the familys existing livelihood, not only affords room to erect a small house, but
beyond that allows an area for intense cultivation and for keeping one or two animals. This
results in substantial increments to that familys nutrition, income, and status. Yet distribution of
such homestead plots to nearly all the landless may require only 1 percent or less of the countrys
cropland, changing judgments as to political and financial feasibilityas currently in Indiain a
dramatically favorable way. The disproportionately large contribution of small plots to
agricultural production has also been seen in many collective-farming systems where the workers
were permitted to haveprivate plots near their homes for personal cultivation, as well as in
thegarden plots that many of these countries have allowed urban households to maintain on
the peri-urban fringe.
Second, will the land reform be heavily publicized? Chinas program to give former collective
(now individual) farmers secure, long-term rights exemplifies the impact of publicity. An earlier,
1998 law was widely publicized, and achieved over 40 percent effective implementation by mid2001. A later, 2002 law, although providing even stronger rights to the farmers, received little
publicity, and by mid-2005 achieved only minimal additional implementation among farmers
unaware of their rights.
Finally, will beneficiaries receive support, such as technical advice and farm credit? While wide
agreement exists that this is desirable, there remains disagreement as to how vital it may be in
particular settings. It would be rare, however, that an otherwise-feasible land redistribution
should be delayed because such complementary programs were not yet available.
Still another measure might be noted, one that has stirred considerable recent debate. That is the
impact of giving confirmatory land-rights documents (titles) to those already in reasonably
uncontested possession of land (by contrast, there is little question that beneficiaries of
redistribution of land that had been privately owned by someone else, such as tenants receiving
the land of former landlords, or agricultural laborers receiving the land of former plantation
owners, should receive confirmatory documentation). The issue as to titling those in alreadyexisting uncontested, but undocumented, possession is more complex than may be immediately
evident. Some customary or traditional land rights may exist as distinct elements or layers that
may be difficult to separately describe and document; some may be held by groups rather than
individuals; and in some settings those who actually hold the rights may be preempted (through
corruption or chicanery) by false claimants when a documentation process occurs. The benefits

of giving documentation to uncontested existing possessors appear to be situational, emerging

most clearly in urban settings.

CURRENT NEEDS
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/
(httpAuxPages)/9B503BAF4856E96980256B66003E0622/$file/dp101.pdf