Milstd1629 FMEA

,_
.-..-. _....
:_
MIL-STD-1629A
24 NOVEMBER 1980
~-
SUPERSEDING
MIL-STD-1629 (SHIPS)
1 NOVEMBER 1974
MIL-STD-2070 (AS)
12 J U N E 1 9 7 7
MILITARY STANDARD
PROCEDURES FOR PERFORMING
A FAILURE MODE,
EFFECTS AND CRlTlCALliV ANALYSIS
AMSC N3074
l=SC RELI
MIL-STD-1629A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Washington, DC 20301
Procedures for performing a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality

Analysis
MIL-STD-1629A
1.
This Military Standard is approved for use by all Departments

and Agencies of the Department of Defense.
2.
Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions)

and any pertinent data which may be of use in improving this
document should be addressed to: Commanding Officer, Engineering
Specifications and Standards Department (Code 93), Naval Air
Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ 08733, by using the selfaddressed Standardization Document Improvement Proposal (DD
Form 1426) appearing at the end of this document or by letter.
ii
MTl,-STD- 1629A
FOREWORD
The failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMFCA) is an essential
I
funytion in design,from concept through development. To be effective,
the8mCA'must be iterative to correspond with the nature of the design
probess itself. The extent of effort and sophistication of approach
used in the FMECA will be dependent upon the nature and requirements of
the individual program. This makes it necessary to tailor the requirements
for an FMECA to each individual program. Tailoring requires that,
regardless of the degree of sophistication, the FMECA must contribute
meaningfully to program decision. A properly performed FMECA is invaluable
to those who are responsible for making program decisions regarding the
feasibility and adequacy of a design approach.
The usefulness of the FMECA as a design tool and in the decision making
process is dependent upon the effectiveness with which problem information
is communicated for early design attention. Probably the greatest
criticism of the FMECA has been its limited use in improving designs.
The chief causes for this have been untimeliness and the isolated performance
of the FMECA without adequate inputs to the design process. Timeliness
is perhaps the most important factor in differentiating between effective
and ineffective implementation of the FMECA. While the objective of an
FMECA is to identify all modes of failure within a system design, its
first purpose is the early identification of all catastrophic and critical
failure possibilities so they can be eliminated or minimized through
design correction at the earliest possible time. Therefore, the FMECA
should be initiated as soon as preliminary design information is available
at the higher system levels and extended to the lower levels as more
information becomes available on the items in question.
Although the FMECA is an essential reliability task, it also provides
information for other purposes. The use of the FMECA is called for in
maintainability, safety analysis, survivability and vulnerability,
logistics support analysis, maintenance plan analysis, and for failure
detection and isolation subsystem design. This coincident use must be a
consideration in planning the FMECA effort to prevent the proliferation
of requirements and the duplication of efforts within the same contractual
program.
iii
MTT,-STD- 162912
CONTENTS
Page
Paragraph
1.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.4.1
1.4.2.
1.5
SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Application .....................
Numbering system ..................
Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Method of reference .................
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2.
2.1
REFERENCED DOCUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Issues of documents .................
1
1
3.
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.1.7
3.1.7.1
3.1.7.2
3.1.8
3.1.9
3.1.10
3.1.11
3.1.12
3.1.13
3.1.13.1
3.1.13.2
3.1.13.3
3.1.14
3.1.15
3.1.16
3.1.17
3.1.17.1
3.1.17.2
3.1.18
3.1.19
3.1.20
3.1.21
DEFINITIONS _. ....................
Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contractor .....................
Corrective action ..................
Compensating provision ...............
Criticality .....................
Criticality analysis (CA) ..............
Severity ......................
Damage effects ...................
Primary damage effects ...............
Secondary damage effects ..............
Damage mode .....................
Damage mode and effects analysis (DMEA) .......
Detection mechanism .................
Environments
....................
Failure cause ....................
Failure effect ...................
Local effect ....................
Next higher level effect ..............
Endeffect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure mode ....................
......
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
FMECA-Maintainability information ..........
Indenture level ...................
Initial indenture level ...............
Other indenture levels ...............
Interfaces .....................
Single failure point ................
Threat mechanism ..................
Undetectable failure ................
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
4.
4.1
4.2
4.3
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ................

General
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Implementation
...................
FMECA planning ...................
iv
5
5
5
5
L_
M-IL-STD-1629A
CONTENTS (Continued)
Paragraph
Page
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3.
4.3.4
4.3.5
4.3.6
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.1.1
4.4.1.2
4.4.1.3
4.4.1.4
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.5
4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.2.1
4.5.2.2
Worksheet formats ..................

Ground rules and assumptions ............
Coding system
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure definitiin'
..............................
Coordination of effoit'
General procedures .................
Contributing information ..............
Technical specifications and development plans ....
Trade-off study reports
..............
Design data and drawings ..............
Reliability data ..................
FMEAprocess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Severity classification ...............
FMECAReport ....................
......................
Summary
Reliability critical item lists ...........
Category I and Category II failure mode list ....
Single failure points list .............
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
10
10
10
11
11
5.
5.1
DETAIL REQUIREMENTS .................

.......................
Tasks
11
11
Tasks
101
102
103
104
105
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ..........

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ................
FMECA-MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION ..........
DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ..........
FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PLAN.
101-l
102-L
103-L
104-l
105-l
FIGURES
Figure
Task 101
101.1
101.2
101.3
Example of a functional block diagram ........

Example of a reliability block diagram .......
Example of FMEA worksheet format ..........
101-g
101-10
101-11
Task 102
102.1
102.2
Example
of
CA
worksheet
Example of criticality matrix
...........
. . . . . . . .
format
.
102-6
102-7
MIL-STD-162912
Figure
Page
Tasklo
103.1
Example of FMECA-maintainability information

worksheet
format
.
.
...............
103-3
Example of damage mode and effects analysis format t
104-5
Task 104
104.1
APPENDIX
..........
A-l
APPENDIX A.
APPLICATION
Paragraph
10.
10.1
10.2
10.3
GENERAL ......................
Scope
Tailoring'requirements
....................................
Duplication of effort ...............
A-l
A-l
A-l
A-l
20.
REFERENCED
.......
A-l
30.
DEFINITIONS
40.
40.1
40.2
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
...............
Ordering data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data item descriptions (DID) ............
R-L
50.
50.1
50.1.1
50.1.2
50.1.3
50.2
50.3
50.4
50.5
50.6
APPLICATION CRITERIA ................

General considerations ...............
Level of detail ..................
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intended use ....................
FMEA (task 101)
CA (task 102) 1
FMECA-maintainability"i~for~ation'(task*103)
.................................
DMEA (task 104)
..................
Criticality number (C,) calculation example ....
A-2
A-2
A-2
A-2
A-3
A-3
A-3
A-4
A-4
A-4
AND
TAILORING
DOCUMENTS
(not
(not
GUIDE
applicable)
applicable)
vi
............
A-l
A-l
A-2
MIL-STD-1629A
1.
SCOPE
1.1
Scope. This standard establishes requirements and procedures
for p.erforming a failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA)
to systematically evaluate and document, by item failure mode analysis,
the potential impact of each functional or hardware failure on mission
success, personnel and system safety, system performance, maintainability,
and maintenance requirements. Each potential failure is ranked by the
severity of its effect in order that appropriate corrective actions may
be taken to eliminate or control the high risk items.
1.2
Application. This standard applies to the acquisition of
all designated DoD systems and equipment. It primarily applies to.the
program activity phases of demonstration and validation and full-scale
engineering development; e.g., design, research and development, and
test and evaluation. This standard also can be used during production
and deployment to analyze the final hardware design or any major modifications. The FMRCA tasks contained in this standard apply to all items of
equipment. This standard does not apply to software. Appendix A contains
additional application and tailoring guidelines.
1.3
Numbering system. The tasks are numbered sequentially as
they are introduced into this standard with the first task being number
101.
1.4
Revisions.
1.4.1
Standard. Any general revision of this standard which
results in a revision of sections 1, 2, 3, or 4 will be indicated by
revision letter after this standard number, together with date of revision.
1.4.2
Tasks. Any revisions of FMECA tasks are indicated by a
letter following the task. For example, for task 101, the first revision
When the basic document is
is 101A, the second revision is 101B.
revised, those requirements not affected by change retain their existing
date.
1.5
Method of reference.
referenced by specifying:
2.
The tasks contained herein shall be
a.
This standard number.
b.
Task number(s).
C.
Other data as called for in individual task.
REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
2.1
Issues of documents. The following documents of the
issue in effect on the date of invitation for bid or request for proposal,
are referenced in this standard for information and guidance.
MIL-STD-1629A
SPECIFICATIONS
Military
MIL-M-24100
Manual, Technical; Functionally Oriented Maintenancs_

Manuals for Systems and Equipment
STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-280
Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability,

Models and Related Terms
MIL-STD-470
Maintainability Program Requirements (for

Systems and Equipment)
MIL-STD-721
Definitions of Effectiveness Terms for Reliability,

Maintainability, Human Factors and Safety
MIL-STD-756
Reliability
MIL-STD-780
Work Unit Codes for Aeronautical Equipment;

Uniform Numbering System
MIL-STD-785
Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment

Development and Production
MIL-STD-882
System Safety Program Requirements
MIL-STD-1388
Logistics Support Analysis
M-IL-STD-1591
8n Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems,

Analysis/Synthesis of
MIL-STD-2072
Survivability, Aircraft; Establishment and

Conduct of Programs for
MIL-STD-2080
Maintenance Plan Analysis for Aircraft and

Ground Support Equipments
Prediction
HANDBOOKS
Military
MIL-HDBK-217
Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment
(Copies of specifications, standards, drawings, and publicalions

required by contractors in connection with specific procurement functions
should be obtained from the procuring activity or as directed by the
contracting officer.)
MTL-STD-1629h
3.
DEFINITIONS
3.1
Terms. The definitions of terms used herein are in
accordance with the'definitions in MIL-STD-280, MIL-STD-470, MlL-STD721, MIL-STD-780, MIL-STD-785, MIL-STD-882, and MIL-STD-1388, with the
exception and addition of the following:
Contractor. A private sector enterprise engaged to
3.1.1
provide services or products within agreed limits specified by a procuring
activity. As used in this standard, the term "contractor" includes
government operated activities developing or producing military systems
and equipment.
3.1.2
Corrective action. A documented design, process, procedure,
or materials change implemented and validated to correct the cause of
failure or design deficiency.
Compensating provision. Actions that are available or
3.1.3
can be taken by an operator to negate or mitigate the effect of a failure
on a system.
3 . 1 . 4 Criticality. A relative measure of the consequences of a
failure mode and its frequency of occurrences.
3.1.5
Criticality analysis (CA). A procedure by which each
potential failure mode is ranked according to the combined influence of
severity and probability of occurrence.
3.1.6
Severity. The consequences of a failure mode. Severity
considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by
the degree of injury, property damage, or system damage that could
ultimately occur.
3.1.7
Damage effects. The result(s) or consequence(s) a damage
mode has upon the operation, function, or status of a weapon system or
any Component the,reof. Damage effects are classified as primary damage
effects and secondary damage effects.
3.1.7.1
Primary damage effects. The result(s) or consequence(s)
a damage mode has directly upon a weapon system or any components thereof.
3.1.7.2
Secondary damage effects. The result(s) or consequence(s)
indirectly caused by the interaction of a damage mode with a system,
subsystem, or component thereof.
3.1.8
Damage mode. The manner by which damage is observed.
Generally describes the way the damage occurs.
MIL-STD-1629A
3.1.9
Damage mode and effects anasis (DMEA). The analysis of
a iystem or equipment conducted to determine t-he extent of damage sustained
from given levels of hostile weapon damage mechantis and the effects of
such damage modes on the continued controlled operation-and mission
completion capabilities of the system or equipment.
3.1.10
Detection mechanism. The means or method by which a
failure can be discovered by an operator under normal syt tern operation
or can be discovered by the maintenance crew by some diagnostic action.
3.1.11
Environments. The conditions, circumstances, influences,
stresses and combinations thereof, surrounding and affecting systems or
equipment during storage, handling, transportation, testing, installation,
and use in standby status and mission operation.
3.1.12
Failure cause. The physical or chemical processes,
.design defects, quality defects, part misapplication, or other processes
which are the basic reason for failure or which initiate the physical
process by which deterioration proceeds to failure.
3.1.13
Failure effect. The consequence(s) a failure mode has on
the operation, function, or status of an item. Failure effects are
classified as local effect, next higher level, and end effect.
3.1.13.1 Local effect. The consequence(s) a failure mode has on
the operation, function, or status of the specific item being analyzed.
3.1.13.2 Next higher level effect. The consequence(s) a failure
mode has on the operation, functions, or status of the items in the next
higher indenture level above the indenture level under consideration.
3.1.13.3 End effec/t. The consequence(s) a failure mode has on the
I
operation, function, or status of the highest indenture level.
3.1.14
Failure plode. The manner by which a failure is observed.
Generally describes the!way the failure occurs and its impact on equipment
operation.
3.1.15
Failure!mode and effects analysis (FMEA). A procedure by
which each potential failure mode in a system is analyzed to determine
the results or effects thereof on the system and to classify each potential
failure mode according to its severity.
3.1.16
FMECA-Maintainability information. A procedure by which
each potential failure is analyzed to determine how the failure is
detected and the actions to be taken to repair the failure.
3.1.17
Indenture levels. The item levels which,identify or
describe relative complexity of assembly or function. The levels progress
from the more complex (system) to the simpler (part) divisions.
.-
MIL-STD-1629A
3.1.17.1 Initial indentgre level. The level of the total, overall

item which is the subject of lhhe FMECA.
3.1.17.2 Other indenture levels. The succeeding indenture levels
(second, third, fourth, etc() which represent an orderly progression to
the simpler division of the item.
3.1.18
Interfaces. The systems, external to the system being
analyzed, which provide a common boundary or service and are necessary
for the system to perform its mission in an undegraded mode; for example,
systems that supply power, cooling,, heating, air services, or input
signals.
3.1.19
Single failure point. The failure of an item which would
result in failure of the system and is not compensated for by redundancy
or alternative operational procedure.
3.1.20
Threat mechanism. The means or methods which are embodied
or employed as an element of a man-made hostile environment to produce
damage effects on a weapon system and its components.
3.1.21
Undetectable failure. A postulated failure mode in the
FMEA for which there is no failure detection method by which the operator
is made aware of the failure.
4.
4.1
General. The failure mode, effects, and criticality
analysis (FMECA) shall be planned and performed in accordance with the
general requirements of this standard and the task(s) specified by the
procuring activity.
Implementation. The FMECA shall be initiated early in
4.2
the design phase to aid in the evaluation of the design and to provide a
basis for establishing corrective action priorities. The FMECA is an
analysis procedure which documents all probable failures in a system
within specified ground rules, determines by failure mode analysis the
effect of each failure on system operation, identifies single failure
points, and ranks each failure according to a severity classification of
failure effect. This procedure is the result of two steps which, when
combined, provide the FMFCA. These two steps are:
a.
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).
b.
Criticality analysis (CA).
FMECA planning. Planning the FMECA work involves the

4.3
contractor's procedures for implementing the specified requirements of
this standard, updating the FMECA to reflect design changes, and use of
MIT,-STD-1629A
the analysis results to provide design guidance. Worksheet formats,

ground rules, analysis assumptions, identification of the lowest indenture
level of analysis, coding system description, failure definitions, and
identification of coincident use of the FMECA by the contractor's reliability
organization and other organizational elements shall be considered in
the FMECA planning.
4.3.1
Worksheet formats. The contractor's formats, which
organize and document the FMECA and other analysis methods contained
herein, shall include the information shown in the example formats.in
Figures 101.3, 102.1, 103.1 and 104.1. The initial indenture level of
analysis shall be identified (item name) on each worksheet, and each
successive indenture level shall be documented on a separate worksheet
or group of worksheets.
4.3.2
Ground rules and assumptions. The contractor shall
develop ground.rules and analysis assumptions. The ground rules shall
identify the FMECA approach (e.g., hardware, functional or combination),
the lowest indenture level to be analyzed, and include general statements
of what constitutes a failure of the item in terms of performance criteria
and allowable limits. Every effort should be made to identify and
,record all ground rules and analysis assumptions prior to initiation of
the analysis; however, ground rules and analysis assumptions may be
added for any item if requirements change. Additional ground rules and
analysis assumptions shall be documented and separately identified for
inclusion in the J?MECA report.
4.3.3
Indenture level. The indenture level applies to the
system hardware or functional level at which failures are postulated.
Unless otherwise specified, the contractor shall establish the lowest
indenture level of analysis using the following guidelines:
a.
The lowest level specified in the LSA candidate list

to assure complete inputs for each LSA candidate.
b.
The lowest indenture level at which items are assigned

a catastrophic (Category I) or critical (Category
11) severity classification category (see 4.4.3).
C.
The specified or intended maintenance and repair

level for items assigned a marginal (Category III)
or minor (Category IV) severity classification
category (see 4.4.3).
4.3.4
Coding system. For consistent identification of system
functions and equipment and for tracking failure modes, the contractor
shall adhere to a coding system based upon the hardware breakdown structure,
work unit code numbering system of MIL-STD-780, or other similar uniform
numbering system. The coding system shall be consistent with the reliability
and functional block diagram numbering system to provide complete visibility
of each failure mode and its relationship to the system.
MIT,-STD-1629A
4 . 3 . 5 Failure definition. The contractor shall develop general

statements of what constitutes a failure of the item in terms -of performance
parameters and allowable limits for each specified output. The contractor's
general statements shall not conflict with any failure definitions
specified by the procuring activity.
4.3.6
Coordination of effort. Consideration shall be given to
the requirements to perform and use the FMECA in support of a reliability
program in accordance with MIL-STD-785, maintainability program in
accordance with MIL-STD-470, safety program in accordance with MIL-STD882, survivability and vulnerability program in accordance with MIL-STD2072, logistics support analysis in accordance with MIL-STD-1388, maintenance
plan analysis (MPA) in accordance with MIL-STD-2080, fault diagnosis
analysis in general accordance with MIL-STD-1591, and other contractual
provisions. The contractor shall identify the program organization
responsible for performing the FMECA and assure that the FMECA results
will be used by other organizational elements to preclude duplication of
effort.
4.4
General procedure. The FMECA shall be performed in
accordance with the requirements specified herein to systematically
examine the system to the lowest indenture level specified by the procuring
activity. The analysis shall identify potential failure modes. When
system definitions and functional descriptions are not available to the
specified indenture level, the initial analysis shall be performed to
the lowest possible indenture level to provide optimum results. When
system definitions and functional definitions are complete, the analysis
shall be extended to the specified indenture level.
4.4.1
Contributing information. System definition requires a
review of all descriptive information available on the system to be
analyzed. The following is representative of the information and data
required for system definition and analysis.
4.4.1.1
Technical specifications and development plans. Technical
specifications and development plans generally describe what constitutes
and contributes to the various types of system failure. These will
state the system objectives and specify the design and test requirements
for operation, reliability, and maintainability. Detailed information
in the plans will provide operational aild functional block diagrams
showing the gross functions the system must perform for successful
operation. Time diagrams and charts used to describe system functional
sequence will aid in determining the time-stress as well as feasibility
of various means of failure detection and correction in the operating
system. Acceptable performance limits under specified operating and
environmental conditions will be given for the system and equipments.
Information for developing mission and environmental profiles will
describe the mission performance requirements in terms of functions
describing the tasks to be performed and related to the anticipated
environments for each mission phase and operating mode. Function-time
relationships from which the time-stress relationship of the environmental
.L
MIL-STD-1629h
conditions can be developed shall be presented. A definition of the

operational and env&ronmental stresses the system is expected to undergo,
as well as failure d,!zfinitions, will either be provided or must be
developed.
4.4.1.2
Trade-off study reports. These reports should identify
areas of marginal and state-of-the/&t design and explain any design
compromises and operating restraints agreed upon.. This information will
aid in determining the possible and most probable failure modes and
causes in the system.
4.4.1.3
Design data and drawings. Design data and drawings
identify each item and the item configuration that perform each of the
system functions. System design data and drawings will usually describe
the system's internal and inter6ace functions beginning at system level
and progressing to the lowest indenture level of the system. Design
data will usually include either functional block diagrams or schematics
that will facilitate construction of reliability block diagrams.
4.4.1.4
Reliability data. The determination of the possible and
probable failure modes requires an analysis of reliability data on the
item selected to perform each of the system internal functions. It is
always desirable to use reliability data resulting from reliability
tests run on the specific equipment to be used with the tests performed
under the identical conditions of use. When such test data are not
available, reliabil?ty data from MIL-HDBK-217 or from operational experience
and tests performed under similar use conditions on items similar to
those in the systems should be used.
4.4.2
FMEA-process. The FMEA shall be initiated as an integral
part of early design process of system functional assemblies and shall
be updated to reflect design changes. Current FMEA analysis shall be a
major consideration at each design review from preliminary through the
final design. The analysis shall be used to assess high risk items and
the activities underway to provide corrective actions. The FMEA shall
also be used to define special test considerations, quality inspection
points, preventive maintenance actions, operational constraints, useful
life, and other pertinent information and activities necessary to minimize
failure risk. All recommended actions which result from the FMEA shall
be evaluated and formally dispositioned by appropriate implementation or
documented rationale for no action. Unless otherwise specified, the
following discrete steps shall be used in performing an FMEA:
a.
Define the system to be analyzed. Complete system

definition includes identification of internal and
interface functions, expected performance at all
indenture levels, system restraints, and failure
definitions. Functional narratives of the system
should include descriptions of each mission in terms
of functions which identify tasks to be performed
MIT,-STD-162912
for each mission, mission phase, and operational

mode. Narratives should describe the environmental
profiles, expected mission times and equipment
utilization, and the functions and outputs of each
item.
b.
Construct block diagrams. Functional and reliability

block diagrams which illustrate the operation,
interrelationships, and interdependencies of functional
entities should be obtained or constructed for each
item configuration involved in the system's use.
All system interfaces shall be indicated.
C.
Identify all potential item and interface failure

modes and define their effect on the immediate
function or item, on the system, and on the mission
to be performed.
d.
Evaluate each failure mode in terms of the worst

potential consequences which may result and assign
a severity classification category (see 4.4.3).
e.
Identify failure detection methods and compensating

provisions for each failure mode.
f.
Identify corrective design or other actions required

to eliminate the failure or control the risk.
g=
Identify effects of corrective actions or other

system attributes, such as requirements for logistics
support.
h.
Document the analysis and summarize the problems

which could not be corrected by design and identify
the special contiols which are necessary to reduce
failure risk.
4.4.3
Severity classification. Severity classifications are
assigned to provide a qualitative measure of the worst potential consequences resulting from design error or item failure. A severity
classification shall be assigned to each identified failure mode and
each item analyzed in accordance with the loss statements below. Wllere
it may not be possible to identify an item or a failure mode according
to the loss statements in the four categories below, similar loss statements
based upon loss of system inputs or outputs shall be developed and
included in the FMECA ground rules for procuring activity approval.
Severity classification categories which are consistent with MIL-STD-882
severity categories are defined as follows:
MIL-STD-1629A
a.
Category I - Catastrophic - A failure which may

cause death or weapon system loss (i.e., aircraft,
tank, missile,,ship, etc.)
b.
Category II - Critical - A failure which may cause

severe injury, major property damage, or major
system damage which will result in mission loss.
c.
Category III - Marginal - A failure which may cause

minor injury, minor property damage, or minor system
damage which will result in delay or loss of availability
or mission degradation.
d.
Category IV - Minor - A failure not serious enough

to cause injury, property damage, or system damage,
but which will result in unscheduled maintenance or
repair.
FMECA Report. The results of the FMEA and other related

4.5
analyses shall be documented in a report that identifies the level of
analysis, summarizes the results, documents the data sources and techniques
used in performing the analysis, and includes the system definition
narrative, resultant analysis data, and worksheets. The worksheets
shall be organized to first display the highest indenture level of
analysis and then proceed down through decreasing indenture levels of
the system. The ground rules, analysis assumptions, and block diagrams
shall be included, as applicable, for each indenture level analyzed.
Interim reports shall be available at each design review to provide
comparisons of alternative designs and to highlight the Category I and
Category II failure modes, the potential single failure points, and the
proposed design corrections. The final report shall reflect the final
design and provide identification of the Category I and Category II
failure modes and the single failure points which could not be eliminated
from the design.
4.5.1
Summary. The report shall contain a summary which provides
the contractor's conclusions and recommendations based upon the analysis.
Contractor interpretation and comments concerning the analysis and the
initiated or recommended actions for the elimination or reduction of
failure risks shall be included. A design evaluation summary of major
problems detected during the analysis shall be provided in the final
report. A list of items omitted from the FMEA shall be included with
rationale for each item's exclusion.
4.5.2
Reliability critical item lists. Reliability critical
item lists extracted from the FMEA shall be included in the summary.
The information provided for each item listed shall include the following:
a.
Item identification and F'MEA cross-reference.
10
MIL-STD-1629A
b.
ripqion of design features which minimize the

rrence of failure for the listed item.
a.
Des ription of tests accomplished that verify design

feat4c1 res and tests planned at hardware acceptance or
dur g operations and maintenance that would detect
the ailure mode occurrence.
d.
Descrkptiq n of planned inspections to ensure hardware

is being b ilt to design requirements, and inspections
planned du ing down-time or turnaround or during
uf that could detect the failure mode or
maintenance,
evidence of conditions that could cause the failure
mode.
e.
A statement relating to the history of this particular

design or a similar design.
f.
Description of the method(s) by which the occurrence

of the failure mode is detected by the operator, and
whether a failure of a redundant or alternative
operating mode, when available, can be detected.
g*
Rationale for not eliminating the related failure

mode(s).
4.5.2.1
Category I and Category II failure mode list. A list of
all Category I (catastrophic) and Category II (critical) failure modes
shall be provided. The information described above shall be provided
for each Category I' and Category II failure mode listed such that it is
possible to identify directly the FMEA entry and its related drawings
and schematics.
Single failure points list. A separate list of all
4.5.2.2
single failure points shall be provided. The information described
above shall be provided in the sunnnary for each single failure point
listed such that it is possible to identify directly the FMEA entry and
its related drawings and schematics. The criticality classification for
each single failure point shall be included in the listing.
5.
DETAIL REQUIREMENTS
5.1
Tasks. The detail tasks for performing an FMEA and other
related analyses follow. The tasks for the related analyses supplement
and are dependent upon performing an FMEA in accordance with Task 101.
Custodians:
Army - CR
Air Force - 17
Preparing Activity
Navy - AS
(Project No. RELI-0003)
Review Activities:
Navy - SH, OS
Army - EA, AR
11
1
,
MTTrSTTb 1629/I
TASK 101
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
1.
Purpose. The purpose of the l?MEA is to study the results
or effects of item failure on system operation a&to classify each
potential failure according to its severity.
2.
Documents referenced in Task 101:
SPECIFICATIONS
Military
MIL-M-24100
Manual,ITechnical, Functionally Oriented Maintenance

Manuals] (FOMM) for Equipment and Systems
STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-756
Reliability
Prediction
M-IL-STD-780
Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability,

Models and Related Terms:
3.
Analysis approach. Variations in design complexity and
available data will generally dictate the analysis approach to be used.
One is the
There are two primary approaches for accomplishing an FMEA.
hardware approach which lists individual hardware items and analyzes
their possible failure modes. The other is the functional approach
which-recognizes that every item is designed to perform a number of
functions that can be classified as outputs. The outputs are listed and
their failure modes analyzed. For complex systems, a combination of the
functional and hardware approaches may be considered. The FMEA may be
performed as a hardware analysis, a functional analysis, or a combination
analysis and may be initiated at either the highest indenture level and
proceed through decreasing indenture levels (top-down approach) or at
the part or assembly level and proceed through increasing indenture
levels (bottom-up approach) until the FMEA for the system is complete.
Hardware approach. The hardware approach is normally
3.1
used when hardware items can be uniquely identified from schematics,
drawings, and other engineering and design data. The hardware approach
is normally utilized in a part level up fashion (bottom-up approach);
however, it can-tteinitiatedat any level of indenture and progress in
either direction. Each identified failure mode shall be assigned a
severity classification which will be utilized during design to establish
priorities for corrective actions.
.L
TASK 101
101-I
24 November 1980
M-IL-STD-1629h
Functional approach. The functional approach is normally

3.2
used when hardware items cannot be uniquely identified or when system
complexity requires analysis from the initial indenture level downward
through succeeding indenture levels. The functional approach is normally
utilized in an initial indenture level down fashion (top-down approach);

however, it can be initiated at any level of indenture and progress in
either direction. Each identified failure mode shall be assigned a
severity classification which will be utilized during design to establish
priorities for corrective actions.
Failure mode severity classification. Severity classifications
3.3
'are assigned to each failure mode and each item to provide a basis for
establishing corrective action priorities. First priority shall be
given to the elimination of the identified Category I (catastrophic) and
Category II (critical) (see General Requirements, 4.4.3) failure modes.
Where the loss of input or output at a lower indenture level is critical
to the operational success of a higher indenture level, action shall be
taken to eliminate or control the identified failure modes. When identified
Category I and Category II failure modes cannot be eliminated or controlled
to levels acceptable to the procuring activity, alternative controls and
recommendations shall be presented to the procuring activity.
Procedure. Each single item failure, as its effects are
4.
analyzed, is to be considered the only failure in the system. Where a
single item failure is non-detectable, the analysis shall be extended to
determine the effects of a second failure, which in combination with the
first undetectable failure, could result in a catastrophic or critical
failure condition. Passive and multiple failures which may result in
catastrophic or critical conditions shall also be identified. When
safety, redundant, or back-up items exist, failure assumptions shall be
broadened to include the failure conditions which resulted in the need
for the safety, redundant, or back-up item. Design changes or special
control measures shall be identified and defined for all catastrophic
(Category I) and critical (Category IT) failure modes. All single
failure points identified during the analyses shall be uniquely identified
on the FMEA worksheets to maintain visibility of these failure modes.
System definition. The first step in performing the FMEA
4.1
is to define the system to be analyzed. Functional narratives shall be
developed for each mission, mission phase, and operational mode and
include statements of primary and secondary mission objectives. The
narratives shall include system and part descriptions for each mission
phase and operational mode, expected mission times and equipment utilization,
functions and output of each item, and conditions which constitute
.- system and part failure.
Mission functions and operational modes. The system
4.1.1
definition shall include descriptions of each;mission in terms of functions
which identify the task. to be performed and the functional mode of
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-2
MIL-STD-1629A
operation for performing the specific function. Mission functions and

operational modes shall be identified starting at the highest system
level and progressing to the lowest indenture level to be analyzed.
When more than one method of performing a particular function is available,
the alternative operational modes shall be identified. All multiple
functions utilizing different equipment or groups of equipment also
shall be identified. The functions and outputs for each indenture level
also may be presented in a function-output list or in narrative form.
Environmental profiles. The environmental profiles which
4.1.2
present the anticipated environmental conditions for each mission and
mission phase shall be defined. When a system will be utilized in more
than one environment each different environmental profile shall be
described. The intended use, through time, of the system and its equipments
shall be developed from the mission time statements for each environmental
profile. The use time-environment phasing is used in determining the
time-stress relationships and the feasibility of failure detection
methods and compensating provisions in the operating system.
Mission time. A quantitative statement of system function4.1.3
time requirements shall be developed and included in the system definition.
Function-time requirements shall be developed for items which operate in
different operational modes during different mission phases and for
items which function only if required.
Block diagrams. Block diagrams which illustrate the
4.1.4
operation, interrelationships, and interdependencies of functional
entities of a system shall be constructed to provide the ability for
tracing failure mode effects through all levels of indenture. Both
functional and reliability block diagrams are required to show the
functional flow sequence and the series dependence or independence of
functions and operations. Block diagrams may be constructed in conjunction
with or after defining the system and shall present the system as a
breakdown of its major functions. More than one block diagram will
usually be required to display alternative modes of operation, depending
upon the definition established for the system. All inputs and outputs
of the item as a whole shall be shown on the diagram and clearly labeled.
Each block shall be designated by a consistent and logical item number
that reflects the functional system breakdown order. A uniform numbering
system developed in functional system breakdown order is required to
provide traceability and tracking through all levels of indenture. MILSTD-780 provides an example of a uniform numbering system for aeronautical
equipment that can be used as a guide in the development of a consistent
and logical identification code for block diagrams. Figures 101.1 and
101.2,depict examples of functional and reliability block diagrams.
Functional block diagrams. A functional block diagram
4.1.4.1
illustrates the operation and interrelationships between functional
entities of a system as defined in engineering data and schematics. A
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-3
MTL-STD-1629A
functional block diagram will provide a functional flow sequence for the
system and each indenture level of analysis and present hardware indenture
MIL-Mand can be used for both hardware and functional method FMRA's.
24100 procedures and techniques for developing major function diagrams
may be used for guidance in developing functional block diagrams.
4.1.4.2
Reliability block diagrams. A reliability block diagram
defines the series dependence or independence of all functions of a
system or functional group for each life-cycle event. The reliability
block diagram will provide identification of function interdependencies
for the system and can be used for a functional method FMEA. MIL-STD756 procedures illustrate a method which may be used to develop reliability
block diagrams.
5.
FMEA worksheet. The documentation of the FMRA is the
next step and is accomplished by completing the columns of the approved
FMRA worksheet. An example of an FMEA worksheet format is shown in
Figure 101.3.
5.1
Identification number. A serial number or other reference
designation identification number is assigned for traceability purposes
and entered on the worksheet. A uniform identification code in accordance
with General Requirements, 4.3.4, shall bz used to provide consistent
identification of system functions an equipment and provide complete
visibility of each failure mode and its relationship to the system
function identified in the applicable block diagram.
5.2
Item/functional identification. The name or nomenclature
of the item or system function being analyzed for failure mode and
effects is listed. Schematic diagram symbols or drawing numbers shall
be used to properly identify the item or function.
5.3
Function. A concise statement of the function performed
by the hardware item shall be listed. This shall include both the
inherent function of the part and its relationship to interfacing items.
5.4
Failure modes and causes. All predictable failure modes
for each indenture level analyzed shall be identified and described.
Potential failure modes shall be determined by examination of item
outputs and functional outputs identified in applicable block diagrams
and schematics. Failure modes of the individual item function shall be
postulated on the basis of the stated requirements in the system definition
narrative and the failure definitions included in the ground rules. The
most probable causes associated with the postulated failure mode shall
be identified and described. Since a failure mode may have more than
one cause, all probable independent causes for each failure mode shall
be identified and described. The failure causes within the adjacent
indenture levels shall be considered. For example, failure causes at
the third indenture level shall be considered when conducting a second
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-L
&
MTL-STD-1629h
indenture level analysis. Where functions shown on a blodk diagram are

performed by a replaceable module in the system, a separate FMJ3A shall
be performed on the internal functions of the module, viewing the module
as a system. The effects of possible failure modes in the module inputs
and outputs describe the failure modes of the module when it is viewed
as an item within the system.
To assist in assuring that a complete
analysis is performed, 'each failure mode and output function shall, as a
minimum, be examined in relation to the following typical failure conditions:
a.
Premature operation.
b.
Failure to operate at a prescribed time.
C.
Intermittent operation.
d.
Failure to cease operation at a prescribed time.
e.
Loss of output or failure during operation.
f.
Degraded output or operational capability.
go
Other unique failure conditions, as applicable,

based upon system characteristics and operational
requirements or constraints.
Mission phase/operational mode. A concise statement of

5.5
the mission phase and operational mode in which the failure occurs.
Where subphase, event, or time can be defined from the system definition
and mission profiles, the most definitive timing information should also
be entered for the assumed time of failure occurrence.
5.6
Failure effect. The consequences of each assumed failure
mode on item operation, function, or status shall be identified, evaluated,
and recorded. Failure effects shall focus on the specific block diagram
element which is affected by the failure under consideration. The
failure under consideration may impact several indenture levels in
addition to the indenture level under analysis; therefore, "local,"
"next higher level," and "end" effects shall be evaluated. Failure
effects shall also consider the mission objectives, maintenance requirements
and personnel and system safety.
5.6.1
Local effects. Local effects concentrate specifically on
the impact an assumed failure mode has on the operation and function of
the item in the indenture level under consideration. The consequences
of each postulated failure affecting the item shall be described along
with any second-order effects which result. The purpose of defining
local effects is to provide a basis for evaluating compensating provisions
and for recommending corrective actions. It is possible for the "local"
effect to be the failure mode itself.
&
TASK 101
24 Novcmbcr 1980
101-5
- ^,^_.. -.._ ..__-_ . . _ I . . . ._ .,.
MIL-STD-1629h
5.6.2
Next higher level. Next higher level effects concentrate
on the impact an assumed failure has on the operation and function of
the items in the next higher indenture level above the indenture level
under consideration. The consequences of each postulated failure affecting
the next higher indenture level shall be described.
End effects. End effects evaluate and define the total

5.6.3
effect an assumed failure has on the operation, function, or status of
the uppermost system. The end effect described may be the.result of a
double failure. For example, failure of a safety device may result in a
catastrophic end effect only in the event that both the prime function
goes beyond limit for which the safety device is set and the safety
device fails. Those end effects resulting from a double failure shall
be indicated on the FMEA worksheets.
5.7
Failure detection method. A description of the methods
by which occurrence of the failure mode is detected by the operator
shall be recorded. The failure detection means, such as visual or
audible warning devices, automatic sensing devices, sensing instrumentation, other unique indications, or none shall be identified.
5.7.1
Other indications. Descriptions of indications which are
evident to an operator that a system has malfunctioned or failed, other
than the identified warning devices, shall be recorded. Proper correlation
of a system malfunction or failure may require identification of normal
indications as well as abnormal indications. If no indication exists,
identify if the undetected failure will jeopardize the mission objectives
or personnel safety. If the undetected failure allows the system to
remain in a safe state, a second failure situation should be explored to
determine whether or not an indication will be evident to an operator.
Indications to the operator should be described as follows:
a.
Normal. An indication that is evident to an operator

when the system or equipment is operating normally.
b.
Abnormal. An indication that is evident to an

-~
operator when the system has malfunctioned or failed.
C.
Incorrect. An erroneous indication to an operator

due to the malfunction or failure of an indicator
(i.e., instruments, sensing devices, visual or
audible warning devices, etc.).
5.7.2
Isolation. Describe the most direct procedure that
allows an operator to isolate the malfunction or failure. An operator
will know only the initial symptoms until further specific action is
taken such as performing a more detailed built-in-test (BIT). The
failure being considered in the analysis may be of lesser importance or
likelihood than another failure that could produce the same symptoms and
this must be considered. Fault isolation procedures require a specific
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-6
-*
MIL-STD-1629A
action or series of actions by an operator, followed by a check or-cross
reference either to instruments, control devices, circuit breakers, or

combinations thereof. This procedure is followed until a satisfactory
course of action is determined.
5.8
Compensating provisions. The compensating provisions,
either design provisions or operator actions, which circumvent or mitigate
the effect of the failure shall be identified and evaluated. This step
is required to record the true behavior of the item in the presence of
an internal malfunction or failure.
Design provisions. Compensating provisions which are

5.8.1
features of the design at any indenture level that will nullify the
effects of a malfunction or failure, control, or deactivate system'items
to halt generation or propagation of failure effects, or activate backup
or standby items or systems shall be described. Design compensating
provisions include:
a.
Redundant items that allow continued and safe operation.
b.
Safety or relief devices such as monitoring or alarm

provisions which permit effective operation or
limits damage.
C.
Alternative modes of operation such as backup or

standby items or systems.
5.8.2
Operator actions. Compensating provisions which require
operator action to circumvent or mitigate the effect'of the postulated
failure shall be described. The compensating provision that best satisfies
the indication(s) observed by an operator when the failure occurs shall
be determined. This may require the investigation of an interface
system to determine the most correct operator action(s). The consequences
of any probable incorrect action(s) by the operator in response to an
abnormal indication should be considered and the effects recorded.
Severity classification. A severity classification
5.9
category (see 4.4.3) shall be assigned to each failure mode and item
according to the failure effect. The effect on the functional condition
of the item under analysis caused by the loss or degradation of output
shall be identified so the failure mode effect will be properly categorized.
For lower levels of indenture where effects on higher indenture levels
are unknown, a failure's effect on the indenture level under analysis
shall be described by the severity classification categories.
Remarks. Any pertinent remarks pertaining to and clarifying
5.10
any other column in the worksheet line shall be noted. Notes regarding
recommendations for design improvements shall be recorded and
.&.
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-7
MTl,-STD-1629h
further amplified in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5. This

entry also may include a notation of unusual conditions, failure effects
of redundant items, recognition of particularly critical design features
or any other remarks that amplify the line entry. Since it is improbable
that all failure modes in Category I and Category II can be designed
out, information shall be provided that other reasonable actions and
considerations are or have been accomplished to reduce occurrence of a
given failure mode and provide a qualitative basis or rationale for
acceptance of the design. The rationale for acceptance of Category I
.and Category II.faiZure modes shall address the following:
a.
Design. Those features of the design that relate to

the identified failure mode that minimize the occurrence
of the failure mode; i.e., safety factors, parts
derating criteria, etc.
b.
Test.
design
during
detect
c.
Inspection. The inspection accomplished to ensure

that the hardware is being built to the design
requirements and the inspection accomplished during
turnaround operations or maintenance that would
detect the failure mode or evidence of conditions
that could cause the failure mode.
d.
History. A statement of history relating to this

particular design or a similar design.
Those tests accomplished that verify the

features and tests at hardware acceptance or
ground turnaround or maintenance that would
the failure mode occurrence.
6.
Ordering data. The following details shall be specified
in the appropriate contractual documents:
a.
FMECA plan, if required (see Task 105).
b.
Indenture level (see General Requirements, 4.3.3).
C.
DI-R-7085 (FMECA Report should be specified when

deliverable data is desired in conjunction with
general requirements, Section 4.5).
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-8
e TEMPERATURE d PRESSURE READOUT
dl
Qj
r - - - -_--__
AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN
SIGNALS (TEMPERATURE
OIL PRkSSUREI
RELIEF
c PRESSURE a T EM P E R A
SENSOR OUTPUT
T U RE
ELECTRIC POWER
[- -44av, 3 0
-
--7
ELECTRICAL
CONTROL
-
PRESSURE
is
i
I
I --
AIR
2,
r----
=ln
5
w:!
fE
MOTOR
10
TORQUE
(3510 R/MINI
COMPRESSOR
SO
-_-I
L
J
t
Figure 101.1
Example of a functional block diagram
HIGH PRESSURE
AIR
TASK 101
24 Novemh.r l~Rfl
-1
/
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
MIL-STD-1629A
.-..
MIL-STD-1629A
Notice 2
28 November 1984
MILITARY STANDARD
A FAILURE MODE
EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
To all holders of MIL-STD-1629A
1. The following pages of MIL-STD-16299 have been revised and supersede the
pages listed:
P
Newa g e
V
Vi
A-l
A-2
A-3
A-4
Da&?
24 November
28 November
28 November
28 November
28 November
28 November
Da&?
Superseded Page
1980
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
2. Make the following pen and Ink changes:

Existing page A-3, change page number
i: Existing page A-4, Change page number
Existlng page A-5, change page number
i: Existing page A-6, change page number
Reprinted w/o change

7 June 1983
24 November 1980
V
VI
A-l
New
New
A-2
to
to
to
to
24 November 1980
A-5.
A-6.
A-7.
A-8.
3. RETAIN THIS.NOTICE AND INSERT 8EFORE TABLE OF CONTENTS.

4. Holders of MIL-STD-1629A will verify that the page changes indicated
herein have been entered. This notice will be retained as a check sheet.
This issuance Is a separate publication. Each notice is to be retained by
stocking points until the Military Standard is completely revised or canceled.
Custodians:
Army - CR
Air Force - 17
Preparing Activity
Navy - AS
(Project No. RELI-0037)
Review Activities:
Navy - SH, OS
Army - EA, AR
AMSC N3388
FSC RELI
M&T&1629h
TASK iO5
FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PLAN
1.
Purpose. The purpose of the FMECA plan is to document
the contractorl's planned activities implementing the Failure Mode,
Effects, and Criticality dialysis Tasks.
1.1
InterrelaQonship.
/
unless Task 181 is required.
The FMECA plan shall not be required
1.2.
Application. This plan is used to evaluate planned FMECA
Task efforts by a contractor prior to plan approval. When approved.by
the procuring activity, the plan is used for monitoring and evaluating
contractor implementation of the FMECA tasks. When a Reliability Program
Plan, as a selected task from ML-STD-785, has been proposed by the
procuring activity, the requirements of this Task shall be satisfied by
incorporating the FMECA plan in the Reliability Program Plan.
2.
STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-470
Maintainability, Human Factors and Safety
MIL-STD-780

MIL-STD-785
Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment

Development and Production
MIL-STD-1388
MIL-STD-1591
On Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems,

MIL-STD-?072

MIL-STD-2080

HANDBOOKS
Military
MIL-HDBK-217
-&
TASK 105
24 November 1980
105-l
MTL-STU-1629A
3.
Content.
The FMECA plan shall describe the contractor's

+procedures for .im@lementing the specified requirements of thisstandard
updating the FMECA to reflect design changes, and use of the analysis
results to provide design guidance. Sample worksheet formats, ground
rules, analysis assumptions, identification of the lowest indenture
level of analysis, coding system description, failure definitions, and
identification of coincident use of the FMECA by the contractor's reliability
organization and other organization elements shall be included in the
plan.
Worksheet formats. The contractor's formats, which
3.1
organize and document the FMECA and other analysis methods contained
herein, shall include the information shown in the example formats.in
Figures 101.3, 102.1, 103.1, 104.1. The initial indenture level of
analysis shall be identified (item name) on each worksheet, and each
successive indenture level shall be documented on a separate worksheet
or group of worksheets. A sample of the contractor's worksheet formats
shall be included with the FMECA plan.
3.2
Ground rules and assumptions. The contractor shall
develop ground rules and analysis assumptions and include them in the
FMECA plan. The ground rules shall identify the FMECA approach (e.g.,
hardware, functional, or combination), the lowest indenture level to be
analyzed, and include general statements of what constitutes a failure
of the item in terms of performance criteria and allowable limits.
Every effort should be made.to identify and record all ground rules and
analysis assumptions prior to initiation of the analysis; however,
ground rules and analysis assumptions may be added for any item if
requirements change. Addit%onal ground rules and analysis assumptions
shall be documented and separately identified for inclusion in the FMECA
report.
3.3
Indenture levell. The indenture level applies to the
system hardware or functional level at which failures are postulated.
Unless otherwise specified, the contractor shall establish the lowest
indenture level of analysis using the following guidelines:
a.
The lowest level specified in the LSA candidate list

to assure complete inputs for each LSA candidate.
b.
The lowest indenture level at which items are assigned

a catastrophic (Category I) or critical (Category
II) severity classification category (see 4.4.3).
C.
The specified or intended maintenance and repair

level for items assigned a marginal (Category III)
or minor (Category IV) severity classification
category (See 4.4.3).
TASK 105
24 November 1980
105-2
MIL-STD-1629A
3.4
Coding system. For consistent identification of system
functions and equipment and for trac ing failure modes, the contractor
shall adhere to a coding system base upon the hardware breakdown structure,
work unit code numbering system of i L-STD-780, or other similar uniform
numbering system. The coding system shall be consistent with the reliability
and functional block diagram numbering system to provide complete visibility
of each failure mode and its relationship to the system. The contractor
shall describe the coding system to be used in the FMECA plan.
3.5
Failure definition. The contractor shall develop general
statements of what constitutes a failure of the item in terms of performance
parameters and allowable limits for each specific output. Failure
definitions shall be included in the ground rules submitted with the
FMECA plan. The contractor's general statements shall not conflict with
any failure definitions specified by the procuring activity.
3.6
Coordination of effort. The coincident performance and
use of the FMECA by reliability and other porgram elements shall be
identified in the FMECA plan. Consideration shall be given to the
requirements to perform and use the FMECA in support of a reliability
program in accordance with MIL-STD-785, maintainability program in
accordance with MIL-STD-470, survivability and vulnerability program in
accordance with MIL-STD-2072, logistics support analysis in accordance
with MIL-STD-1388, maintenance plan analysis (MPA) in accordance with
MIL-STD-2080, fault diagnosis analysis in general accordance with MILSTD-1591, and other contractual provisions. The contractor shall
identify the program organization responsible for performing the FMECA
and show how the FMECA results will be used by other organizational
elements to preclude duplication of effort.
3.7
Failure rate data sources. The failure rate data source
shall be the same as that used for the other reliability and maintainability
analyses required by the contract. MIL-HDBK-217 shall be the primary
source of failure rate data for electronic parts. Failure rate data for
parts not covered by MIL-HDBK-217 shall be selected from alternative
data sources. The failure rate data sources shall be identified in the
FMECA plan and shall be approved by the procuring activity prior to use.
4.
a.
Task 101 (See 1.1 of Task 105).
b.
Other requirements as necessary for tailoring.
C.
DI-R-7086 (FMECA Plan) should be specified when

deliverable data is desired in conjunction with this
task.
x-
TASK 105
24 November 1980
105-3
MIL-STD-1629A
101-I I
TASK 101
MIL-STD-1629A
TASK 102
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
1.
Purpose. The purpose of the criticality analysis (CA) is
to rank each potential failure mode identified in the FMEA Task 101,
according to the combined influence of severity classification and its
probability of occurrence based upon the best available data.
1.1
Application. The CA, Task 102, supplements the FMEA,
Task.101, and shall not be imposed without the imposition of Task 101.
2.
HANDBOOKS
Miiitary
MIL-HDBK-217
Analysis approach. One approach from the two specified

3.
in 3.1 and 3.2 of Task 102 shall be selected. The availability of
specific parts configuration data and failure rate data will determine
the analysis approach to be used. The qualitative approach is appropriate
when specific failure rate data are not available. The failure probability
levels, when used, should be modified as the system is better defined.
As parts configuration data and failure rate data become available,
criticality numbers should be calculated and incorporated in the analysis.
Qualitative approach. Failure nodes identified in the
3.1
FMEA are assessed in terms of probability of occurrence when specific
parts configuration or failure rate data are not available. Individual
failure mode probabilities of occurrence should be grouped into distinct,
logically defined levels, which establish the qualitative failure probability
level for entry into the appropriate CA worksheet column. Probability
of occurrence levels are defined as follows:
a.
Level A - Frequent. A high probability of occurrence

during the item operating time interval. High
probability may be defined as a single failure node
probability greater than 0.20 of the overall probability
of failure during the item operating time interval.
b.
Level B - Reasonably probable. A moderate probability

of occurrence during the item operating time interval.
Probable may be defined as a single failure mode
probability of occurrence which is more than 0.10
but less than 0.20 of the overall probability of
failure during the item operating tine.
.A
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-l
MTT,-STD-1629A
C.
h.
LevelC - Occasional. An occasional probability of

occurrence during item operating time interval.
Occasional.probability may be defined as a single
failure mode probability of occurrence which is more
than 0.01 but less than 0.10 of the overall probability
of failure during the item operating time.
Level D - Remote. An unlikely probability of occurrence

during item operating time interval. Remote,probability
may be defined as a single failure mode probability
of occurrence which is more than 0.001 but less than
0.01 of the overall probability of failure during
the item operating time.
e.
Level E - Extremely Unlikely. A failure whose

probability of occurrence is essentially zero during
item operating time interval. Extremely unlikely
may be defined as a single failure mode probability
of occurrence which is less than 0.001 of the overall

probability of failure during the item operating
time.
3.2
Quantitative approach. The failure rate data source used
for the quantitative approach shall be the same as that used for the
other reliability and maintainability analyses required by contract.
When other analyses are not required by contract or a failure rate data
source has not been specified by the procuring activity, failure rates
and failure rate adjustment factors (e.g., environmental and quality Tfactors) shall be derived as follows:
a.
MIL-HDBK-217 shall be the primary source of failure

rate data for electronic parts. Both the base
failure rate and all failure rate adjustment factors
shall be identified.
b.
When parts are similar to those listed in MIL-HDBK217, base failure rates shall be selected from MILHDBK-217 and shall include other adjustment factors,
such as special quality J-factors, as may be required
to modify the MIL-HDBK-217 data for applicability to
the particular part.
C.
Failure rate data for parts not covered by MIL-HDBK217 shall be selected from alternative data sources.
3.2.1
CA worksheet. Items in this section and related subsections
apply when a quantitative approach has been specified. The calculation
of a criticality number or assignment of a probability of occurrence
level and its documentation are accomplished by completing the columns
of the approved CA worksheet. An example of a CA worksheet format is
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-2
,?
NIL-STD-16 3, 9A
i shown in Figure 102.1. Completed CA worksheets shall be included in the

FMRCA report, General Requirements, 4.5, following the FMJU worksheet
I for the same indenture level. The following information is the same as
given in the FMRA worksheet and shall be transferred to the CA worksheet:
a.
Identification
number
b.
Item/Functional identification
C.
Function
d.
Failure modes and causes
e.
Mission phase/operational mode
f.
Severity classification
3.2.1.1
Failure probability/failure rate data source. When
failure modes are assessed in terms of probability of occurrence, the
failure probability of occurrence level shall be listed. When failure
rate data are to be 'used in the calculatioti of criticality numbers, the
data source of the failure rates used in each calculation shall be
listed. When a failure probability is listed, the remaining columns are
not required and the next step will be the construction of a criticality
matrix (see 4 of Task 102).
3.2.1.2
Failure effect probability (6). The @ values are the
conditional probability that the failure effect will result in the
identified criticality classification, given that the failure mode
occurs. The B values represent the analyst's judgment as to the conditional
probability the loss will occur and should be quantified in general
accordance with the following:
Failure effect
f3 value
Actual loss
Probable loss
Possible loss
No effect
1.00
>O.lO to Cl.00
>o
to = 0.10
0
Failure mode ratio (n). The fraction of the part failure

3.2.1.3
rate (1,) related to the particular faiIure mode under consideration
shall be evaluated by the analyst and recorded. The failure mode ratio
is the probability expressed as a decimal fraction that the part or item
If all. potential failure modes of a
will fail in the identified mode.
particular part or item are listed, the sum of the cx values for that
part or item will equal one. Individual failure mode mu7tipliers may be
derived from failure rate source data or from test and operational data.
If failure mode data are not available, the u values shall represent the
analyst's judgement based upon an analysis of the item's functions.
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-3
MTL-STD-1629A
3.2.1.4
Part failure rate (A,). The Dart failure rate (A,) from
the appropriate reliability prediction or as calculated using the procedure
described in MIL-HDBK-217, shall be listed. Where appropriate, application
factors (a ), environmental factors (TK), and other T-factors as..may be
required sR all be applied to the base failure rates (lb) obtained from
handbooks or other reference material to adjust for differences in
operating stresses. Values of q-factors utilized in computing 1, shall
be listed.
3.2.1.5
Operating time (t). The operating time in hours or the
number of operating cycles of the item per mission shall be derived from
the system definition and listed on the worksheet.
3.2.1.6
Failure mode criticality number (C,,,). The value of 'the
failure mode criticality number (Cm) shall be calculated and listed on
the worksheet. Cm is the portion of the criticality number for the item
due to one of its failure modes under a particular severity classification.
For a particular severity classification and operational phase, the Cm
for a failure mode may be calculated with the following formula:
%I= BcrXpt
where:
Cm = Criticality number for failure mode.
f3= Conditional probability of mission loss
(3.2.1.2 of Task 102).
Ci= Failure mode ration (3.2.1.3 of Task 102).
x, = Part failure rate (3.2.1.4 of Task 102).
t = Duration of applicable mission phase usually
express in hours or number of operating
cycles (3.2.1.5 of Task 102).
3.2.1.7
Item criticality numbers (C,.). The second criticality
Criticality numbers
number calculation is for the item under analysis.
(Cr) for the items of the system shall be calculated and listed on
the worksheet. A criticality number for an item is the number of
system failures of a specific type expected due.to the item's failure
modes. The specific type of system failure is expressed by the
severity classification for the item's failure modes. For a particular
severity classification and mission phase, the Cr for an item is the
sum of the failure mode criticality numbers, Cm, under the severity
classification and may also be calculated using the following formula:
n = 1,2,3,-.-j
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-4
*L-STD-1629A
(
TASK 103
PMECA-MABNTILWQABILITY INFORMATION
1.
-Purpose. The purpose of the PMECA-maintainability information analysis is to provide early criteria for maintenance planning
analysis @PA), logistics support analysis (LSA), test planning,
inspection and checkout rqquirements, and to identify maintainability
design features requiring corrective action.
1.1
Application.
The FMECA-maintainability information
analysis, Task 103, supplements the PMKA, Task 101, and shall not be
imposed without imposition of Task 101.

41.2
'PliuniIi&. Planning for the PMECA-maintainability information analysis includes the contractor's procedures for assuring the
coincident use of this analysis when logistic support analysis in accordance
with MIL-STD-1388 and the maintenance planning analysis in
accordance with MIL-STD-2080 are required by contract.
2.
-Documents referenced in Task 103:
STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-2080

3.
FMECA-maintainability information worksheet. Documentation
of the maintainability information is accomplished by completing the
approved FMECA-maintainability information worksheet. An example of an
FMECA-maintainability worksheet format is shown in Figure 103.1.
Completed worksheets shall be included in &he FMECA report, General
Requirements, 4.5, following the FMEA worksheet for the same indenture
level. The following information is the same as that given in the FMEA
worksheet and shall be transferred to the FMECA-maintainability information
worksheet:
a.
Identification
number
b.
Item/functional identification
C.
Function
d.
e,
Failure effects (local, next higher level, end)
f.
TASK 103
24 Nove:nber 198(
103-l
M-IL-STD-162912
3.1
Failure predictability. Enter information on known
incipient failure indicators (e.g., operational performance variations)
which are peculiar to the item failure trends and permit predicting
failures in advance. When a failure is predictable in advance, describe
the data that must be collected, how it will be used to predict failure,
and identify any tests or inspections that may be accomplished to detect
evidence of conditions which could cause the failure mode.
3.2
Failure detection means. Identify how each failure mode
will be detected by the organizational level maintenance technician and
to what indenture level they will be localized. Describe the method by
which ambiguities are resolved when more than one failure mode causes
the same failure indication. Describe any monitoring or warning device
,that till1 provide 'a'n indication of impending failure and any planned
tests or inspections which could detect occurrence of the failure mode.
Identify to what indenture level failures can be isolated by the use of
built-in-test features and indicate when ancillary test equipment will
be required for fault isolation.
3.3
Basic maintenance actions. Describe the basic actions
which, in the analyst's judgement, must be taken by the maintenance
technician to correct the failure. Identify the special design provisions
for modular replacement and the probable adjustment and calibration
requirements following repair.
3.4
.
any other columns shall be noted. Notes regarding recommendations for
design improvement shall be recorded and further amplified in the EMECA
report, General Requirements, 4.5.
4.
a.
Task 101 (see 1.1 of Task 103).
b.
Logistic support analysis (See 1.2 of Task 103).
C.
Maintenance planning analysis (see 1.2 of Task 103).
TASK 103
24 November 1980
103-z
MIL-STD-1629A
where:
cl* = Criticality number for the item.
n = The failure modes in the items that fall under

a particular criticality classification.
j = Last failure mode in the item under the criticality
classification.
4.
Criticality matrix. The criticality matrix provides a
means of identifying and comparing each failure mode to all other failure
modes with respect to severity. The matrix is constructed by inserting
item or failure mode identification numbers in matrix locations representing
the severity classification category and either the probability of
occurrence level or the criticality number (C;) for the item's failure
j -modes. The resulting matrix display shows the distribution of criticality
of item failure modes and provides a tool for assigning corrective
action priorities. As shown in Figure 102.2, the further along the
diagonal line from the origin the failure mode is recorded, the greater
\ the criticality and the more urgent the need for implementing corrective
action. The example criticality matrix in Figure 102.2 was constructed
to show how either the criticality number (Cr) or probability of occurrence
level can be used for the vertical axis. The completed criticality
matrix shall be included in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5.
5.
a.
b.
Analysis approach (see 3 of Task 102).
C.
Failure rate data source(s) (see 3.2 of Task 102)

if quantitative approach is specified.
TASK 102
1
102-5
24 November 1980
v
.
J
<
l--
u.
0
TASK 102
24 November 1980
MIL-sTD-1629A
102-6
.3
MIL-STD-1629A
INCREASING
CRITICALITY
1 (HIGH)-
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
-.I
(LOW)
/ /
nz
III
SEVERITY
(INCREASING
LEVEL
II
CLASSIFICATION
OF
SEVERITY --+ 1
* NOTE: BOTH CRITICALITY NUMBER (C, ) AND PROBABILITY OF

OCCURRENCE LEVEL ARE SHOWN FOR CONVENIENCE.
Figure 102.2
Example of criticality matrix

TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-7
MIL-STD-1629A
MIL-STD-1629A
Page
Figure
Task 103
103.1
Example of FMECA-maintainability information

worksheet
format
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
103-3
Task 104
104.1
Example of damage mode and effects analysis format .

APPENDIX
104-S
APPENDIX A.
APPLICATION
A-l
Paragraph
10.
10.1
10.2
10.3
GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.........
Scope
Tailoring ;e,uiremen~s ................ i .....
Duplication of effort ...............
A-l
A-l
A-l
A-l
20.
REFERENCED DOCUMENTS (not applicable)
A-l
40
40.1
40.2
.GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ................ A-l

Ordering
data
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A-l
A-2
Data item descriptions (DID) ............
50.
50.1
50.1.1
50.1.2
50.1.3
50.2
50.3
50.4
50.5
50.6
50.7
APPLICATION CRITERIA ................

General considerations ...............
Level of detail ..................
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intended use ...................
FMEA (task 101) ..................
CA (task 102) ...................
FMECA-maintainability information (task 103) ....
DMEA (task 104) .............. : ...
FMECA Plan (task 105) ...............
Criticality number (0) calculation example ...
AND
TAILORING
GUIDE
..........
.......
A-2
A-2
A-2
A-2
A-3
A-3
A-3
A-3
A-4
A-4
A-4
APPENDIX A FIGURES
Figure
Al
Basic
card
entry
instructions
Vi
28 November 1984
......_....
A-2
MIL-STD-1629A
Paragraph
Page
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3
4.3.4
4.3.5
4.3.6
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.1.1
4.4.1.2
4.4.1.3
4.4.1.4
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.5
4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.2.1
4.5.2.2
Worksheet formats ..................

Ground rules and assumptions ............
Coding system ...................
Failure definition .
Coordination
of
effort
:::1 :::::::::::
General procedures .................
Contributing information ..............
Technical specifications and development plans ...
Trade-off study reports ..............
Design data and drawings ..............
Reliability data ..................
FMEA process ....................
Severity classification ...............
FMECA Report ....................
Summary ......................
Reliability critical item lists ...........
Category I and Category II failure mode list ....
Single failure points list .............
;:
10
10
11
5.
5.1
DETAIL REQUIREMENTS .................

Tasks ........................
11
11
Tasks
101
102
103
104
105
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . .

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FMECA-MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION . . . . . . i . . .
DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . .
FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PLAN.
101-l
102-l
103-l
104-l
105-l
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
FIGURES
Figure
Task 101
101.1
101.2
101.3
Example of a functional block diagram ........

Example of a reliability block diagram .......
Example of FMEA worksheet format ..........
101-9
101-10
101-11
Example of CA worksheet format ...........

Example of criticality matrix ...........
102-6
102-7
Task 102
102.1
102.2
MIL-STD-1629A
APPENDIX A
APPLICATION AND TAILORING GUIDE
10.
GENERAL
10.1
Scope. This appendix provides notes for the guidance of
the procuring activity in generating the contractual requirements for a
failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA).
.10.2
Tailoring requirements. Each provision of this standard
should be reviewed to determine the extent of applicability. Tailoring
of requirements may take the form of deletion, addition, or alteration
to the statements in Sections 3 and 4 and any specified tasks to adapt
the requirements to specific system characteristics, procuring activity
options, contractual structure, or acquisition phase. The tailoring
FMECA requirements are specified in the contractual provisions to include
input to the statement of work, contract data item list (CDRL), and
other contractual means.
10.3
Duplication of effort. It is incumbent upon the procuring
activity to review the contractual requirements to avoid duplication of
effort between the reliability program and other program efforts such as
safety, maintainability, human engineering, test and evaluation, survivability
and vulnerability, maintenance planning, and integrated logistics support.
Identification of the coincident use of FMECA results by the reliability
program and other disciplinary areas is required in the FMECA plan or
other appropriate,program documentation to avoid duplication of effort
by the procuring activity and the contractor.
20.
30.
DEFINITIONS (not applicable)
40
GENERAL REQUIREMEN'AS
. 40.1
following:
Ordering data.
The procuring activity shall specify the
a.
Title, number and date of this standard.
b.
Task number(s) required.
C.
FMECA plan (Task 105) if required.
d.
Indenture level of analysis (4.3.3) required.
e.
Steps to be used in the FMECA process (4.4.2).
f.
FMECA report (4.5) if required.
A-l
MIL-STD-1629A
40.2
Data item descriptions (DID). The following listed DIDs
provide a source of possible data it&m d&cription and format require-
ments for required data.

SOURCE
DATA REQUIREMENTS
APPLICABLE DID
Task 105
Failure Mode, Effects and

Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Plan
DI-R-7086
General
Requirements
Section 4-5.
and Task 101

Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Report
DI-R-7085
50.
APPLICATION CRITERIA
50.1
General considerations. This standard has been structured
to facilitate the tailoring of FMECA requirements based upon individual
program needs. Program variables such as system complexity, funding,
and schedule influence the level of detail and timing of the FMECA and
must be considered when tailoring the requirements. All programs do not
require the same level of detail and all programs should not wait until
full scale development to implement the FKECA requirements.
50.1.1
Level of detail. The level of detail applies to the
level of indenture at which failures are postulated. The FMECA can be
accomplished at various levels of indenture from system to part level
depending upon the information available and the needs of the program.
The lower the indenture level, the higher the level of detail since more
failure modes will be considered. The choice of the level of indenture
must be compatible with the program cost and schedule constraints and
the system reliability requirements. A less detailed analysis which is
available in time to contribute to system reliability is more valuable
than a more detailed analysis which is late and makes changes costly and
unfeasible. In general, the FMECA should not be performed below the
level necessary to identify critical items or to the level required by
the LSA candidate list,,whichever is lower. The depth and detail of the
FMECA effort must be defined in appropriate contractual and program
documentation.
50.1.2
Timing. The objective of the FMECA is to support the
decision making process. If the analysis fails to provide usable information at or before a project decision point, then it has made no contribution
and is untimely. The time-phasing of the FMECA effort is important and
should be identified in the FMECA plan to assure that analysis results
will be available to support the project decision points during system
development. Since program cost and schedule constraints require that
available resources be used where they are most cost effective, the
earliest possible availability of FMECA results is important so that the
impact on cost and schedule can be minimized.
A-2
MIL-STD-1629A
50.1.3 Intended use. The FMECA is potentially one of the most

beneficial and productive tasks in a well structured reliability program.
Since individual failure modes are listed in an orderly, organized fashion and
evaluated, the FMECA serves to verify design integrity, identify and quantify
sources of undesirable failure modes, and document the reliability risks.
FMECA results can be used to provide the rationale for changes in operating
procedures for ameliorating the effects or for detecting the incipience of the
undesirable failure modes. Although the FMECA is an essential reliability
task, it supplements and supports other engineering tasks through
identification of areas in which effort should be concentrated. The FMECA
results are not only used to provide design guidance, but they are.used
advantageously in and for maintenance planning analysrs, logistics support
analysis, survivability and vulnerability assessments, safety and hazards
This coincident use
analyses, and for fault detection and isolation design.
of the FMECA must be considered in FMECA planning and every endeavor made to
prevent duplication of effort by the program elements which utilize FMECA
results.
50.2 FMEA (Task 101). The FMEA is an essential design evaluation
procedure which should notbe limited to the phase traditionally thought of as
the design phase. The initial FMEA should be done early in the conceptual
phase when design criteria, mission requirements, and conceptual designs are
being developed to evaluate the design approach and to compare the benefits of
competing design configurations. The FMEA will provide quick visibility of
the more obvious failure modes and identify potential single failure points,
some of which can be eliminated with minimal design effort. As the mission
and design definitions become more refined, the FMEA can be expanded to
successively more detailed levels. When changes are made in system design to
remove or reduce the impact of the identified failure modes, the FMEA must be
repeated for the redesigned portions to ensure that all predictable failure
modes in the new design are considered.
50.3 CA (Task 102). The CA is a procedure for associating failure
probabilities with each failure mode. Since the CA supplements the FMEA and
is dependent upon information developed in that analysis, it should not be
The CA is probably most valuable for
imposed without imposition of the lVEA.
maintenance and logistics support oriented analyses since failure modes which
have a high probability of occurrence (high criticality numbers) require
investigation to identify changes which will reduce the potential impact on
the maintenance and logistic support requirements for the system. Since the
criticality numbers are established based upon subjective judgments, they
should only be used as indicators of relative priorities.
50.4 FMECA-maintainability information (Task 103). This analysis is an
extension of the t-MECA and IS dependent upon7MtA generated infomation;
therefore, the FMECA- maintainability information analyses should not be
im osed without imposition of the FMEA. The identification of how each
fa Plure will be detected and localized will provide information for evaluating
item testability. The failure mode listing which is included on the completed
worksheet should be utilized to provide this required data for logistics
support analyses (LSA), maintenance plan analysis (MPA), and reliability
centered maintenance (RCM).
A-3
MIl_ -STD-1629A
50.5 DMEA (Task 104). The DMEA provides essential inputs for the
vulnerability assessment of a weapon system to aid in the identification of
defic'iencies and the evaluation of designs for enhancing survivability. Since
the DMEA uti.lizes the failure mode information from the FMEA, it should not be
The DMEA, like the initial FMEA,
imposed without imposition of the fMEA.
should he done early in the conceptual phase to provide data related to the
capability of the conceptual weapon system design to survive the effects of
the specified hostile threats. Development of this data before weapon system
design configuration is finalized will provide significant survivability
benefits with minimal impact on cost and schedul,e.
50.6 FMECA plan (Task 105). The FMECA plan provides the contractor's
plans and activities for implementing the FMECA tasks. The plan is used by
the procuring activity to evaluate the planned FMECA task efforts, and when
approved, is used for monitoring contractor implementation of the tasks. The
plan can be required as a separate document submittal or it can be included as
part of the Reliability Program Plan. The FMECA plan includes a description
of the contractor's procedures for implementing the tasks and provides a cross
index showing the relationship of coincident performance and use of the FMEA
tasks to preclude duplication of effort. Sample contractor formats used in
performance of each FMECA task are tiicluded as a part of each task specified
in the contract statement of work.
50.7 Criticality number (C,) calculation example. Calculation of
meaningful criticality numbers requires the use of specific failure rate and
part configuration data. When part configurations are known, failure rate
data can be obtained from the appropriate reliability prediction, field data
from past systems of similar design and environmental use, or failure rate
data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217. With known failure rates, the criticality
number for an item is the number of failures of a specific type expected per
million hours due to the item's failure modes under a particular severity
classification as discussed in Task 101. A failure mode criticality number,
Cm, for a particular severity classification is given by the expression:
%ll =
(1)
Bah,t
under a particular severity classification,

The item criticality number, C
is then calculated by summing F'he Cm for each failure mode under that severity
classification. This summation is given by the expressions:
c, =
or
(Cmln
n=l
c, =
(f3aXpt
105,
(2)
n=l
7 June 1983
A-4
MIL-STD-1629A
50.1.3
Intended use. The FMECA is potentially one of the most
beneficial and productive tasks in a well structured reliability program.
Since individual failure modes are listed in an orderly, organized
fashion and evaluated, the F'MECA serves to verify design integrity,
identify and quantify sources of undesirable failure modes, and document
the reliability risks. FMECA results can be used to provide the rationale
for changes in operating procedures for ameliorating the effects or for
detecting the incipience of the undesirable failure modes. Although xhe
FMJXA is an essential reliability task, it supplements and supports
other engineering tasks through identification of areas in which effort
should be concentrated. The FMEXA results are not only used to proyide
design guidance, but they are used advantageously in and for maintenance
planning analysis, logistics support analysis, survivability and vulnerability
assessments, safety and hazards analyses, and for fault detection and
isolation design. This coincident use of the FMECA must be considered
in FMECA planning and every endeavor made to prevent duplication of
effort by the program elements which utilize FMECA results.
50.2
FMEA (task 101). The FMEA is an essential design evaluation
procedure which should not be limited to the phase traditionally thought
of as the design phase. The initial FMEA should be done early in the
conceptual phase when design criteria, mission requirements, and conceptual
designs are being developed to evaluate the design approach and to
compare the benefits of competing design configurations. The FMEA will
provide quick visibility of the more obvious failure modes and identify
potential single failure points, some of which can be eliminated with
minimal design effort. As the mission and design definitions become
more refined, the FMJZA can be expanded to successively more detailed
levels. When changes are made in system design to remove or reduce the
impact of the identified failure modes, the FMEA must be repeated for
the redesigned portions to ensure that all predictable failure modes in
the new design are considered.
50.3
CA (task 102). The CA is a procedure for associating
failure probabilities with each failure mode. Since the CA supplements
the FMEA and is dependent upon information developed in that analysis,
The CA is
it should not be imposed without imposition of the FMEA.
probably most valuable for maintenance and logistics support oriented
analyses since fa'ilure modes which have a high probability of occurrence
(high criticality numbers) require investigation to identify changes
which will reduce the potential impact on the maintenance and logistic
support requirements for the system. Since the criticality numbers are
established based upon subjective judgments, they should only be used as
indicators of relative priorities.
A-3
MTL-STD-1629A
50.4
FMECA-maintainability information (task 103). The J?MECAmaintainability information analysis is utilized to provide early design
criteria for test methods, accessibility, and repairability for the item
being analyzed. This analysis is an extension of the FMEA and is dependent
upon J!MEA generated information; therefore, the FMECA-maintainability
information analyses should not be imposed without imposition of the
FMEA. The identification of how each failure will be detected and
localized by the operational level maintenance technician will provide
information for evaluating. the effectiveness of built-in-test. Descriptions
of the basic organizational level maintenance actions required for
failure localization and correction will identify potential accessibility
problems permitting early design correction. The failure mode listing
which is included on the completed worksheets should be utilized to,
provide this required data for both the maintenance plan and logistics
support analyses.
50.5
DMEA (task 104). The DMEA provides essential inputs for
the vulnerability assessment of a weapon system to aid in the identification
of deficiencies and the evaluation of designs for enhancing survivability.
Since the DMEA utilizes the failure mode information from the FMEA, it
shou1.d not be imposed without imposition of the F'MEA. The DMEA, like
the initial FMEA, should be done early in the conceptual phase to provide
data related to the capability of the conceptual weapon system design to
survive the effects of the specified hostile threats. Development of
this data before weapon system design configuration is finalized will
provide significant survivability benefits with minimal impact on cost
and schedule.
50.6
Criticality number (Cr) calculation example. Calculation
of meaningful criticality numbers requires the use of specific failure
rate and part configuration data. When part configurations are known,
failure rate data can be obtained from the appropriate reliability
prediction, field data from past systems of similar design and environmental
use, or failure rate data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217. With known
failure rates, the criticality number for an item is the number of
failures of a specific type expected per million hours due to the item's
failure modes under a particular severity classification as discussed in
Task 101. A failure mode criticality number, Cm, for a particular
severity classification is given by the expression:
'rn
(1)
= BcfXpt
The item criticality number, Cr, under a particular severity classification,

is then calculated by summing the Cm for each failure mode under that
severity classification. This summation is given by the expressions:
c, =
(Cm>n
or
@aApt x
106) *
n=l
c,=
n = 1,2,3,.--j
n=l
A-4
(2)
MIL-STD-1629A
Where:
C, = Criticality number for the item.
cm = Criticality number for a failure mode under a particular
severity classification (see 4.4.3).
6 = Conditional probability of mission loss given that the
failure mode has occurred.

.a =
xp =
Failure mode ratio. The probability, expressed as a decimal

fraction, that the part or item will fail in the identified
mode.
Part failure rate.
It should be noted that failure rates are usually defined in terms of

failures per million hours (fxlO-h) and, for simplification purposes,
equation (1) may be multiplied by a factor of LO6 to eliminate an
unnecessary degree of arithmetic precision in worksheet entries. That
is, it is easier to enter criticality number on the worksheets as 1.08
than to enter 1.08 x 10-6 or 0.00000108. The importance of the criticality
number is in providing a relative ranking of the failures or failure
modes and not-in the absolute value of the numeric.
For example, the calculations for Cm and C, for a given mission phase
under severity classification Category II is as follows:
Given:
'b
Base failure rate

= 0.10 failures per million hours = (0.10 x 10-6)
Solve for xp using typical part failure rate model from MIL-HDBK-217.
lp. = Xb (TA x 7TE x ITC)
'rA
lP
= 1.5; TE = 40; 7rQ = 1,2

= 0.10 x 10-6 (I.5 x 40 x 1.2)
= 7.2 x 10
-6
IP
For a specific mission phase there are two (2) failure modes under
severity classification Category II and one (1) failure mode severity
classification Category IV.
al = 0.3 for first failure mode under severity classification
Category II.
:a2= 0.2 for second failure mode under severity classification
Category II.
A-5
MIL-STD-1629A
0L3 = 0.5 for failure mode under severity classification Category IV.
Find:
C, and Cr for the mission phase under severity classification
Category II.
Let
B = 0.5 and t = 1.0 hour for the mission phase.
For cq:
Cm
= (&Apt x 106) = (0.5 x 0.3) (7.2 x 10-6) (1) x lo6
Cm = 1.08
For ~2:
Cm = Ba2Xpt x 106) = (0.5 x 0.2) (7.2 x 10-6j (1) x 10

'rn = 0.72
Then:
c, =
(Cm),
n=l
c, =
= 1.08 + 0.72 = 1.80

n=l
.
or
cr = "c (&Apt
n=l
cr = (BalXpt
2
x 106)n = c (&Apt x 106)
n=l
x 106) f (Ba2Xpt x 106)
Cr = (0.5 x 7.2 x 1O-6 x 1) (0.3 + 0.2) x 10
'r
= (3.6 x lo+) (0.5) x LO6
Cr = 1.80 under severity classification Category II.
A-6
MIL-STD-1629A
1.
SCOPE
Sco e. This standard establishes requirements and procedures

1.1
for performing--+a ailure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) to
systematically evaluate and document, by item failure mode analysis, the
potential impact of each functional or hardware failure on mission success,
personnel and system safety, system performance, maintainability, and
maintenance requirements. Each potential failure is ranked by the severity of
its effect in order that appropriate corrective actions may be taken to
eliminate or control the high risk items.
This standard applies to the acquisition of all
1.2
It primarily applies to the program
designated DOD V
sys ems and equipment.
activity phases of demonstration and validation and full-scale engineerinq
development; e.g., design, research and development, and test and evaluation.
This standard also can be used during production and deployment to analyze the
final hardware design or any major modifications. The FMECA tasks contained
in this standard apply to all items of equipment. This standard does not
apply to software. Appendix A contains additional application and tailoring
guidelines.
Numbering system. The tasks are numbered sequentially as they
1.3
are introduced into this standard with the first task being number 101.
1.4
Revisions.
Standard. Any general revision of this standard which results

1.4.1
in a revision ofons 1, 2, 3, or 4 will be indicated by revision letter
after this standard number, together with date of revision.
Tasks. Any revisions of FMECA tasks are indicated by a letter
1.4.2
following the task. For example, for task 101, the first revision is lOlA,
the second revision is 101B. When the basic document is revised, those
requirements not affected by change retain their existing date.
Method of reference.
1 . 5
referenced by specifying:
2.
The tasks contained herein shall be
a.
This standard number.
b.
Task number(s).
C.
Other data as called for in individual task.
REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
Issues of documents. The following documents of the issue in

2.1
effect on the date of invitation for bid or request for proposal, are
referenced in this standard for information and guidance.
1
MIL-STD-1629A
SPECIFICATIbNS
Military
MIL-M-24100
Manual, Technical; Functionally Oriented

Maintenance Manuals for Systems and Equipment
STANDARDS
Military
MI L-STD-280
Definitions of Item Levels, Item

Exchangeability, Models and Related Terms
MIL-STD-470
Maintainability Program Requirements (for

Systems and Equipment)
MIL-STD-721
Definitions of Terms for Reliability and

Maintainabilit
MIL-STD-756
Reliability Prediction
MI I_-STD-780

MIL-STD-785
Reliability Program for Systems and

Equipment Development and Production
MIL-STD-882
System Safety Program Requirements
MI L-STD-1388
MIL-STD-1591
On Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems,

MIL-STD-2072

MIL-STD-2080
Maintenance Engineering, Planning, and

Analysis"the for Aeronautical Systems,
Subsystems, Equipment and Support Equipment
HANDBOOKS
Military
MI L-HDBK-217
Reliability Prediction of Electronic

EquipBent
MIL-HDBK-266
Application of Reliability Centered

Maintenance to Naval Aircraft, Weapon
Systems and Support Equipment
(Copies of specifications, standards, drawings, and publications required

by contractors in connection with specific procurement functions should be
obtained from the procuring activity or as directed by the contracting
officer.)
2
7 June 1983
MIL-STD-1629A
TASK 103
FMECA - MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION
FMECAmaintainability infomation supplies early criteria for
ki
tern
anning Analysis (MPA), Logistic Support Analysis (LSA), test
planning, inspection and checkout requirements, and identifies maintainability
design features that require corrective action, and supplies information for
the Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) process required by
MIL-H>BK-266(AS).
1.1
Application.
the F@A Task 101.
The FMECA maintainability information requires data from

Task 103 shall not be done without first doing Task 101.
1:2
Planning. Planning for the FMECA - maintainability information analysis
includes the contractor's procedures for assuring the coincident use of this
analysis when logistic support analysis in accordance with MIL-STD-1388,the
maintenance planning analysis in accordance with MIL-STD-2080(ASS), and
maintainability analysis in accordance with MIL-STD-470 are required by
contract.
2.
Documents Referenced in Task 103:

STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-470
MIL-STD-1388
MI L-STD-2080(AS)
Maintainability program requirements (for

systems and equipment)
Maintenance Engineering, Planning and Analysis
for Aeronautical Systems, Subsystems, Equipment
and Support Equipment
HANDBOOKS
MIL-H)BK-266(AS)
Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance

in Naval Aircraft, Weapon Systems and Support
Equipment
FMECA - Maintainability Information Worksheet. Maintainability

3.
information is documented on the approved FMECA - maintainability worksheet.
Figure 103.1 is a sample worksheet. Complete worksheets will be- included in
the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5, following the FEA worksheet for
the same indenture level. The following information can be found and copied
from the FEA worksheet:
a.
Item Identification Number
b.
Item Nomenclature
C.
Function
Task 103
7 June 1983
103-l
MIL-STD-1629A
d.
Functional Failure (Failure Mode (Task 101))
e.
Engineering Failure Mode (Failure Causes (Task 101))
f.
Failure Effects (local, next higher level, end)
9.
Severity Class
h. Mission Phase
System/Subsystem Description. Provide a concise description of the
3.1
sytem or subsystem in terms of its general function and major assemblies or
components.
Compensating provisions. This entry shall specifically address
3.2
redundancies and protectmeatures in relation to functions and functional
failures. An item is considered redundant if its purpose is to duplicate the
function of another item. Also list the protective or warning devices, or
fail-safe design, that act to mitigate serious consequences upon failure of a
critical item.
3.3 Functions. Functions and subfunctions should be transferred from Task
101 worksheets. A number shall be placed in the small column next to each
function. The first function will be numbered 1, the second 2, and so on.
Functional Failures. Record the functional failure (failure mode from
3.4
kunctional failures shall be lettered alphabetically beginning
Task 1Ul)
wi th "A". Note that a function may have more than one functional failure
(failure mode, Task 101).
l
Engineering Failure Mode. Record the engineering failure modes (failure

3.5
causes from Task 1011 . Engineering failure modes shall be numbered beginning
with "1 'I. Note that a functional failure may have more than one engineering
failure mode (failure cause, Task 1011.
Minimum Equipment List. Specify if the aircraft or end item of
3.6
equipment can be dispatched on its assigned mission with the analysis item
If the answer is "yes", specify any limitation.
inoperative.
Failure Detection Method. A description of the methods by which
3.7
occurrence of a specific functional failure (failure mode) is detected and
localized by the operator or maintainance technician shall be recorded.
Describe the warning devices, if applicable, and other indications which make
evident to the operator or technician that an item has malfunctioned or
failed. If no indication exists, state whether or not the undetected failure
will jeopardize the mission objectives or personnel safety, and if the
undetected failure allows the item to remain operational in a safe state, a
second failure situation shall be explored to determine whether or not an
indication will be evident to the operator or maintenance technician. Proper
correlation of an item malfunction or failure may require identification of
normal, abnormal and incorrect indications. Normal indications are those that
are evident to an operator or maintenance technician when the item is
operating normally. Incorrect indications are those that are evident to the
operator or maintenance technician when the item has malfunctioned or failed.
Task 103
7 June 19E3
103-2
L
i
Ei
i
-1
,.
n
c
K
L1
1
E
u
K
MIL-STD1629A
103-3
TASK 103
24 November
0
3
m
0
1980,
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS AND CRITICALIN ANALYSIS - HAINTAINABILITV INFORMATION

SYSTMlSUBSYSTM
INDENTURE
SYSTEM IDmTIFICATION NWBER
NO?tENCU.TURE
LEVEL
REFERENCE
DRAWING
MISSION
DATE:
PREPARED BY:
SHEET_OF_
APPROVED BY:
SYSTFX/SllBSYSTM
ITEM
IDW
NO.
DESCRIPTION
ITEN
NONFINCLATURFZ
FUNCTION
COXPENSATING
RONAL
_I
.TR
-
LURE
INEERING
LURE MODE.
HISSIO~
PHASE
FAI
-izzxEFFECTS
RE EFF
NEXT
HICHEA
LEVEL
PROVISH IN S
I3
END
EFFECTS
FAILURE
XTECTION
MTHOD
SFSXRITY
CLASS
HINIhlJM
EqJIPKENl
LIST
EW.XNEERINC FAIL!JRE
MODE KI'BF AND
FIGURE 103.1 Example of FMECA - maintainability information worksheet format.
REXARKS
MIL-STD-1629A
Engineering Failure Mode MTBF and Remarks. Calculate and provide MTBF
3.8
data for each engineering failure mode (failure cause) developed as part of
Task 101. Also include any remarks pertaining to and clarifying any other
columns. Notes regarding recommendations for design improvements shall be
recorded and further amplified in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5.
3.9 Ordering Data. The following details shall be specified in,,the
appropriate contractual documents:
a.
Task 101 (see 1.1 of Task 103)
b.
01 -R-7085
C.
01 -R-7086
d.
The Statement of Work
e.
Other requirements as necessary for tailoring.
103-3
Task 103
7 June 1983
MIL-STD-1629A
Paragraph
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3
4.3.4
4.3.5
4.3.6
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.1.1
4.4.1.2
4.4.1.3
4.4.1.4
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.5
4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.2.1
4.5.2.2
Worksheet formats ...............

Ground rules and assumptions .... . ....
Indenture level ................
Coding system .................
Failure definition
Coordination
of
eff% : : : : 1 : : : 1 : : :
General procedures ..............
Contributing information ...........
Technical specifications and development plans.
Trade-off study reports ............
Design data and drawings ...........
Reliability data ...............
FMEA process .................
Severity classification ............
FMECA Report .................
Summary ...................
Reliability critical item lists ........
Category I and Category II failure mode list .
Single failure points list ..........
5.
5.1
DETAIL REQUIREMENTS ..............

Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tasks
101
102
103
104
105
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . .
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fl4ECA4lAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION . . . . . . .
DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . .

FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY
ANALYSIS PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
6
6
6
6
5
5
7
8
:
8
9
;:
;:
11
11
11
101-l
102-l
103-l
104-l
w,105-l
FIGURES
Figure
Task 101
101.1
101.2
101.3
Example of a functional-block diagram . . . . .

Example of a reliability block diagram . . . .
Example of FMEA worksheet format . . . . . . .
101-9
101-10
101-11
Example
Example
102-5
102-7
Task 102
102.1
102.2
of CA worksheet format
of criticality matrix
........
.........
MIL-STD-1629A
Figure
Task 103
103.1
Example of FMECAmaintainability information

worksheet
form
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
103-4
Example of damage mode and effects analysis

format...................
104-5
Task 704
104.1
APPENDIX
APPLICATION AND TAILORING GUIDE . . . . . . , .
A-l
10.
10.1
10.2
10.3
GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tailoring requirements ............
Duplication of effort .............
A-l
A-l
A-l
A-l
20.
REFERENCED DOCUFlENTS (not applicable) .....
A-l
30.
DEFINITIONS (not applicable)
.........
A-l
4"00:1
40.2
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS .............

Ordering data .................
Data item descriptions (DID) .........
A-l
A-l
A-2
50.
50.1
50.1.1
50.1.2
50.1.3
50.2
50.3
50.4
50.5
50.6
50.7
APPLICATION CRITERIA .............

General considerations ............
Level of detail ................
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intended use .................
FMEA (task 101) ................
CA (task 102) .................
FMECA-maintainability information (task 103) .
DMEA (task 104) ................
FMECA Plan (task 105) .............
Criticality number (cr) calculation example . .
A-2
A-2
A-2
A-2
A-3
A-3
A-3
A-3
A-4
A-4
A-4
APPENDIX A.
Paragraph
vi
7 June 1983
-1
MIL-STD-1629A
APPENDIX A
APPLICATION AND TAILORING GUIDE
10.
GENERAL
10.1
Scope. This appendix provides notes for the guidance of the
procuring activity in'generating the contractual requirements for a failure
mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA).
Tailoring requirements. Each provision of this standard should
10.2
be reviewed to determine the extent of applicability. Tailoring of
requirements may take the form of deletion, addition, or alteration to the
statements in Sections 3 and 4 and any specified tasks to adapt the
requirements to specific system characteristics, procuring activity options,
contractual structure, or acquisition phase. The tailoring FMECA requirements
are specified in the contractual provisions to include input to the statement
of work, contract data item list (CDRL), and other contractual means.
Duplication of effort. It is incumbent upon the procuring
10.3
activity to review the contractual requirements to avoid duplication of effort
between the reliability program and other program efforts such as safety,
maintainability, human engineering, test and evaluation, survivability and
vulnerability, maintenance planning, and integrated logistics support.
Identification of the coincident use of FMECA results by the reliability
program and other disciplinary areas is required in the FMECA plan or other
appropriate program documentation to avoid duplication of effort by the
procuring activity and the contractor.
20.
30.
DEFINITIONS (not applicable>
40
40.1
following:
Ordering data.
The procuring activity shall specify the
a.
Title, number and date of this standard.
b.
Task number(s) required.
C.
FMECA plan (Task 105) if required.
d.
Indenture level of analysis (4.3.3) required.
e.
Steps to be used in the FMECA process (4.4.2).
f.
FMECA report (4.5) if required. Code A in block

8 of DD1423 if preliminary draft is required. An
automated LSAR output report LSA-060 or a
nonautomated LSAR report, if required. If an
automated LSAR output report is required, the
information at figure Al must be specified.
A-l
28 November 1984
MIL-STD-1629A
LSA-060, LCN Master File.
Basic Card Entry Instructions.
CARD COLUMN
INSTRUCTIONS
DESCRIPTION
Selection
(SEL IND)
2-4
Report Selection Number

(RSN)
Mandatory entry of "060" which is

report number identifying the output report requested.
Report Control Code (RCC)
Mandatory entry of an alphanumeric

code; "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", which will
uniquely identify this report
number selection. If a trailer or
option card is associated with this
report selection, it must match the
RCC on the basic slection card.
(If necessary, instructions for
trailer cards will be provided
by the requiring authority>.
Type Card (TYPE)
Mandatory entry of "A" (basic

card>. If a listing of the entire
content of the LCN Master File is
desired, no further data is
required to be entered on this
card with the exception of cc 35.
Sequence Code (SEQ CD)
Leave blank.
7
8-18
19
Mandatory entry of "S".
Indicator
Enter the LCN identifying the

first item to be included in the
It identifies the system,
report.
subsystem, or component for which
the report is desired. Data
element definitions (DED> are
contained in appendix F of
MIL-STD-1388-2A. See DED 197
for a complete definition of LCN.
Start Logistic Support

Anaiysis Control Number
(START LCN)
If the report is required for an

alternate design or maintenance
concept of an associated LCN, enter the ALC. See DED 023 for a
complete definition of ALC.
Alternate LCN Code (AL0
FIG Al Basic card entry instructions

4 ?
MIL-STD-1629A
20-30
Stop LCN
Enter the Stop LCN to indicate the

point where the LSAR ADP system
will stop extracting information
from the file. If no Stop LCN is
entered, all data from and
subordinates to the Start LCN will
be considered as applicable for
the report. See DED 197.
31-33
Useable on Code (UOC)
Enter the UOC for the model of

the equipment for which the
report is to be developed.
The UOC must match a UOC entered on the record of the
Start LCN. Data not matching
the UOC entered will be omitted from the report. A blank
UOC will result in selection
of all UOCs within the specified Start and Stop LCN
range. See DED 536 for a
complete definition of UOC.
34
Service Designation Code
Enter "A", Army; F", Air

Force; "N", Navy; "M", Marine
Corps' "O", Other and "X", all
when the output report deals
with specific task related data
to be reported and output report headers.
35
B Sheet
Option Code
Mandatory entry of "F" to

obtain the FMECA data only. An "F"
entry will always result in Header
Prints.
36
Header Print
Option (HEADER)
If the output is required to

have data element headers for
each record type, enter "X".
37
Magnetic Tape Option
Leave blank.
FIG Al (cont'd) Basic card entry instructions

A-3
28 November 1984
MIL-STD-1623A
Data item descriptions (DID). The following listed DIDs provide
40.2
a source of possible data item description and format requirements for
required data.
SOURCE
DATA REQUIREMENTS
APPLICABLE DID
Task 105

Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Plan
DI-R-70B6
General
Requirements
Section 4-5
and Task 101

Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Report
01-R-708SA
50.
APPLICATION CRITERIA
General considerations. This standard has been structured to

50.1
facilitate the tailoring of FMECA requirements based upon individual program
needs. Program variables such as system complexity, funding, and schedule
influence the level of detail and timing of the FMECA and must be considered
when tailoring the requirements. All programs do not require the same level
of detail and all programs should not wait until full scale development to
implement the FMECA requirements.
Level of detail. The level of detail applies to the ievel of
50.1.1
indenture at which failures are postulated. The FMECA can be accomplished at
various levels of indenture from system to part level depending upon the
information available and the needs of the program. The lower the indenture
level, the higher the level of detail since more failure modes will be
The choice of the level of indenture must be compatibltr with the
considered.
program cost and schedule constraints and the system reliability
A less detailed analysis which is available in time to
requirements.
contribute to system reliability is more valuable than a more detailed
analysis which is late and makes changes costly and unfeasible. In general,
the FMECA should not be performed below the level necessary to identify
critical items or to the level required by the LSA candidate list, whichever
is lower. The depth and detail of the FMECA effort must be defined in
appropriate contractual and program documentation.
Timing. The objective of the FMECA is tc support the decision
50.1.2
making process. If the analysis faiis to provide usable information at or
before a project decision point, then it has made no contribution and is
untimely. The time-phasing of the FMECA effort is important and should be
identified in the FMECA plan to assure that analysis results will be available
to support the project decision points during system development. Since
program cost and schedule constraints require that ava'lable resources be used
where they are most cost effective, the earliest possible availabiiity of
FMECA results is important so that the impact on cost and scheduie can be
minimized.
A-4
MIL-STD-1629A
TASK 104
DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
1.
Purpose. The purpose of the damage mode and effects
analysis (DMEA) is to provide early criteria for survivability and
vulnerability assessments. The DMEA provides data related to damage
caused by specified threat mechanisms and the effects on weapon system
operation and mission essential functions.
1.2
Application. The DMEA, Task 104, utilizes the results of
Task 101, and shall not be imposed without imposition of Task 101.
1.3
Planning.
Planning the DMEA includes the contractoris
procedures for assuring the timeliness of the analysis and its utilization
in the vulnerability assessments of the weapon system.
2.
Analysis approach. The DMEA is an expansion of the FMEA
to include the generation of data required for vulnerability assessments.
It is primarily applicable to new weapon system acquisitions but may be
applied to developed (existing) weapon systems where data is required to
provide criteria for a survivability enhancement program.
New weapon systems. The DMEA is an expansion of the FMEA
2.1
conducted and maintained for the weapon system design during conceptual,
validation, and full scale development. The DMEA shall consider all
failure modes and damage modes that can occur to each item and the
effect each has on the weapon system. The relationship between the
weapon system essential functions, mission capabilitiesi hostile threat
capabilities, and hostile weapon effects shall be analyi.ed to provide
design criteria for survivability enhancement.
2.2
Developed weapon systems. When specified, a DMEA is
conducted to identify all subsystems and components in a @veloped
(existing) weapon system to the level defined by the procuring agency.
The DMEA is used to provide data related to the impact of Engineering
Change Proposals (ECPs) and retrofit programs on total weaponsystem
survivability. Threats should be periodically assessed.to'determine if
the weapon system is still capable of operating effepdvely in a hostile
environment.
Procedure. The FMEA shall be expanded to provide data
3.
related to the damage caused by threat mechanisms and the effects upon
weapon system operation and mission essential functi ns. The damage
mode(s) for each essential component as caused by th 4 specified threat
mechanism(s) shall be identified and the effect on the essential function(s)
of the weapon system determined. The analysis shall include
TASK 184
24 November 1980
104-l
MIL-STD-1629A
I
t
I
all identified operation and mission essential subsystems &nd components.

'The type of'damage'&odC. that each component can experience (i.e., fire,
explosion, engine fuel ingestion, toxic fumes, smoke-corrosive materials,
etc.) and the primary and secondary damage effects to which each'component
can be exposed shall be identified. Each nonessential component also
shall be examined to determine if a hazardous environment may be created
by its sustaining the-type or level of damage identified. This shall
also include any cascading effect on other subsystems from an initial
system or component response. The essential components that may be
exposed to the hazardous environments shall be identified.
3.1
Weapon system operation and mission essential functions.
requirements for weapon system operation and mission essential
shall be determined for each mission phase and included in the
narrative developed in 4. of Task 101. The weapon system
eration and mission essential functions shall be established down to
e indenture level that individual subsystems and major components
perform the function can be identified.
3.2
Identification of critical components. Using the system
schematic or functional block diagram, the assigned severity codes, and
thel established weapon system operation and mission essential functions,
each subsystem and major bomponent required to perform each mission
essential function shall be identified. The reliability block diagram
shall be used to identify subsystem and function redundancies. A critical
components listing shall be included with the functional narrative and
with the DMEA worksheets in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5.
DMEA worksheet. Documentation of the DMEA is accomplished
4.
by completing the columns of the approved DMEA worksheet. An example of
a DMEA worksheet format-is shown in Figure 104.1. Completed DMEA worksheets shall be included in the FMECA report, General Requirement, 4.5,
following the FMEA worksheet for the same indenture level. The following
information is the same as given in the FMEA worksheet and shall be
transferred to the DMEA worksheet:
a.
Identification number
b.
Item/functional
C.
Function
d.
e.
Mission phase/operational mode
f.
identification
TASK 104
24 November 1980
104-2
MIT,-STD-162911
I
4\1
Damage modes. All possible damage modes which could
resultifrom exposure to the specified threat mechanism(s) shall be
determi\ped through analysis of each subsystem, component, or part. The
analysib shall include both primary and secondary damage effects.
Damage modes of individual item functions shall be postulated on the
basis of the stated mission requirements, specified threats, and system
descriptions. The effects of the possible damage mode shall include
performance degradation as well as total item failure. To assist in
assuring that a corn lete damage mode analysis is performed, each damage
mode and function s xall, as a minimum, be examined in relation to the
following typical damage conditions.
a.
Penetration
b.
Severed
C.
Shattered, cracked
d.
Jammed
e.
Deformed
f.
Ignited, detonated
EC-
Burned out (i.e., electrical overload)
h.
Burn through (i.e., threat caused fires)
4.2
Damage effects. The consequences of each assumed damage
mode on item operation, function or status shall be identified, evaluated,
and recorded. Damage effects shall focus on the specific block diagram
element which is effected by the damage condition under consideration.
The damage mode under consideration may impact several indenture levels
in addition to the indenture level under analysis; therefore, "local,"
"next higher level," and "end" effects shall be evaluated.
4.2.1
Local effects. Local effects concentrate specifically on
the impact an assumed damage mode has on the operation and function of
the item in the indenture level under consideration. The consequences
of each postulated damage mode affecting the item shall be described
along with any second-order effects which results. Potential conditions
where the damage of one item results in a conditional failure probability
or effect of a second item which differs from the failure probability or
effect when the second item is considered independently shall be identified.
The purpose of defining local effects is to provide a basis for evaluating
compensating provisions and for recommending survivability enhancement.
It is possible for the "local" effect to be the damage mode itself.
TASK 104
104-3
24 November 1980
MTL-STD-1629h
' 4.2.2
Next higher level. Next higher level effects concentrate
on the impact an assumed damage mode has on the operation and function
of the items in the next higher indenture level above the indenture
level under consideration. The consequences of each postulated damage
mode affecting the next higher indenture level shall be described.
4.2.3
End effects. End effects evaluate and define the total
effect an assumed damage m,de
has on the operation, function, or status
4
of the uppermost system. The effect of each damage mode upon the essential
function(s) affecting weapon system operating capability and mission
completion capability shall be determined. The end effect described may
be the result of a double failure. For example, failure of a safety
device may result in a catastrophic end effect only in the event that
both the prime function goes beyond limit for which the safety device is
set and the safety device fails. Those end effects resulting from a
double failure shall be indicated on the DMEA worksheets.
4.3
any other column in the worksheet line shall be noted. Notes regarding
recommendations for design improvement shall be recorded and further
amplified in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5. This entry
also,may include a notation of unusual conditions, damage effects of
redundant items, recognition of particularly critical design features or.
any other remarks that amplify the line entry. Information shall be
provided that reasonable actions and considerations are or have'been
accomplished to enhance survivability through recommended design changes.
Information provided shall address the following:
a.
Design. Those features of the design that relate to

the identified damage mode that minimize the vulnerability
with respect to the specified threat mechanisms;
i.e., redundancy, separation of components, lines,
and structure, elimination of fire paths, integral
armor, etc.
b.
Test. Those tests recommended to verify the design

features recommended or incorporated for survivability
enhancement.
C.
History. Identification of previous testing and

analysis relating to this particular case which will
be used to support the validity.

5.
a.
b.
Threat mechanisms (see 3. of Task 104).
TASK 104
24 November 1980
104-4
.3
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MIL-STDl629A
104-5
TASK 104
24 November
980
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9
.
MIL-STD-1629A
Notice 1
7 June 1983
MILITARY STANDARD
A FAILURE MODE
EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
To all holders of MIL-STD-1629A
1. The following pages of MILSTD-1629A have been revised and supersede the
pages listed:
New Page
V
vi
:
103-l thru 1033
1034
A 3
A4
Date
24
7
24
7
7
7
7
7
November 1980
June 1983
November 1980
June 1983
June 1983
June 1983
June 1983
June 1983
Superseded Page '%
Date
24 November 1980
24 November 1980
24 November 1980
V
Vi
1
2
103-l thru 1033
New
A 3
A4
24 November 1980
24 November 1980
2. Make the following pen and ink changes:

a.
Page 105-1, aragraph 2, change title of MIL STD-2080 to "Mafntenance

Engfneering ! lanning and Analysis for Aeronautical Systems,
Subsystems, Equfpment and Support Equipment."
b.
Page 1053, paragraph 3.6, line 2, change "PORGRAM" to "PROGRAM."
C .
Page Ad, paragraph 50.7, line that starts with "For a2: add
parenthesis before B.
3. RETAIN THIS NOTICE AND INSERT BEFORE TABLE OF CONTENTS.

4. Holders of MIL -STD-1629A will verify that the
have been entered. This notice will be retained /
issuance is a separate publication. Each notice
points until the Military Standard is completely
Custodians:
Army -CR
Afr Force - 17
Review Activities:
Navy - SH, OS
AmY - EA, AR
page changes indfcated herein

as a check sheet. Thfs
is to be retafned by stockfng
revised or canceled.
Preparing Actfvfty:
Navy - AS
(Project No. RELI -0037)
STANDARDIZATION DOCUMENT IMPRO=ENT PROPOSAL

(Secinsmcctions - RpcrieSide)
DDCUMENT NJMSSR
DOCUMENT
TITLE
4. TYPE OF ORGANIZATlON
-
n. NAME OF Su6MIlTlNG O R G A N I Z A T I O N
v--J
(Mark OM)
VENDOR
USER
cl
MANUFACTURER
c!
OTHER
(Sped&):
. PROBLEM AREAS
. Pwqrgh
Numbw
and WordIn&
&Ruommuidod wortlinq:
c RuonlRdonJw for Rmommondation:
. REMARKS
a. NAME OF SUBMITTER hart. Fht. MI)- Optlord
b. WORK TELEPHONE NUM8ER ~Include Arw

C&J - Optiond
, M A I L I N G AOORESS
S. DATE OF SUSMIS%OU
(Street. Cfty. State. ZIP Coda) - Optlond
DO at;zn 1426
PREVIOUS EOITION 19 -LETE.
(YYYYDD)
INSTRUCTIONS: In a continuing effort to make our tidardization documents better, the DoD provid- this form for w in
submitting comments and suggestiona for improvements. AlI usen of military standardization documents are invited to provide
sul(qe&ions. IX form may be detached, folded along the lines indicated, taped along the loose edge (00 NOT STMLE), ad
mailed. In block 6, be y rpecific PI porrible about particular problem areas such as wording which required interpretation, too rigid, rertrictive, loose, ambiguous. or WM incompatible, and give pro-d wording changer which would alleviate the
problems. Enter in block 6 any remark not reht4 to a specific paragraph of the document. If block 7 k filled out, an
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NOTE: Thir form may not be II* to request copies of documents, nor to request waivers, deviations, or clarification of
mation requireme~ta on current contra&. Commentr submitted on this form do not
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CoNtitute or
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(Fold aton# thb 111~)
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Commanding Officer
Naval Air Engineering Center
Systems Engineering Standardization
(SESD), Code 93
Lakehurst, NJ 08733
1
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PENALTY FOR PAtVATE USE $300
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BE PAID BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THENAVY
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Procedures for performing a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality

This Military Standard is approved for use by all Departments

Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions)

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ................

Worksheet formats ..................

DETAIL REQUIREMENTS .................

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ..........

Example of a functional block diagram ........

Example of FMECA-maintainability information

Example of damage mode and effects analysis format t

APPLICATION CRITERIA ................

The tasks contained herein shall be

This standard number.

Other data as called for in individual task.

Manual, Technical; Functionally Oriented Maintenancs_

Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability,

Maintainability Program Requirements (for

Definitions of Effectiveness Terms for Reliability,

Work Unit Codes for Aeronautical Equipment;

Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment

System Safety Program Requirements

Logistics Support Analysis

8n Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems,

Survivability, Aircraft; Establishment and

Maintenance Plan Analysis for Aircraft and

Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment

(Copies of specifications, standards, drawings, and publicalions

3.1.17.1 Initial indentgre level. The level of the total, overall

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).

Criticality analysis (CA).

FMECA planning. Planning the FMECA work involves the

the analysis results to provide design guidance. Worksheet formats,

The lowest level specified in the LSA candidate list

The lowest indenture level at which items are assigned

The specified or intended maintenance and repair

4 . 3 . 5 Failure definition. The contractor shall develop general

conditions can be developed shall be presented. A definition of the

Define the system to be analyzed. Complete system

for each mission, mission phase, and operational

Construct block diagrams. Functional and reliability

Identify all potential item and interface failure

Evaluate each failure mode in terms of the worst

Identify failure detection methods and compensating

Identify corrective design or other actions required

Identify effects of corrective actions or other

Document the analysis and summarize the problems

Category I - Catastrophic - A failure which may

Category II - Critical - A failure which may cause

Category III - Marginal - A failure which may cause

Category IV - Minor - A failure not serious enough

FMECA Report. The results of the FMEA and other related

Item identification and F'MEA cross-reference.

ripqion of design features which minimize the

Des ription of tests accomplished that verify design

Descrkptiq n of planned inspections to ensure hardware

A statement relating to the history of this particular

Description of the method(s) by which the occurrence

Rationale for not eliminating the related failure

Documents referenced in Task 101:

Manual,ITechnical, Functionally Oriented Maintenance

Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability,

Functional approach. The functional approach is normally