Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The public prosecutor filed, on 24 March 2000, a motion for reconsideration. Instead of deciding
the pending motion, respondent Judge deferred its resolution until after the arraignment of the
accused and the pretrial of the case would have been had. 2

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1430

September 8, 2003

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ROMEO B. SENSON, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, MTCC, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, respondent.

Special Prosecutor Romeo B. Senson filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge for "Gross
Misconduct with Prayer for Preventive Suspension" asseverating that the release of the evidence had exposed
said evidence to tampering and that the deferment of the resolution of the motion for reconsideration virtually
resulted in the undue archive of the case.
In his comment, respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law under which the accused were
charged with having transgressed, did not provide for the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia pending trial and
that the prosecution still could prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt even without the
evidence being presented since it had sufficient witnesses for the purpose.

VITUG, J.:
The attempt at justification must fail.
The administrative complaint against Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan relates to an order he has issued,
authorizing, prior to the arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of a criminal case, the release of seized
evidence to movants who claim ownership thereof.
On 14 March 2000, several persons were apprehended for violation of Section 86 of Republic Act No. 8550,
also known as "The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998" 1 by members of the Philippine National Police. The
items seized from those arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net, (b) 36 units lights (300 watts), (c) 1 unit light (500
watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7 containers, (f) 7 plastic container boxes, (g) 4 styropore boxes, and (h) 10 boxes
of fish. On the same day, Criminal Case No.15019 against them was filed. Three days later, Danilo Alayon and
Norma Villarosa, asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that was used in the illegal fishing
activity, filed an "Urgent Motion for Custody of Fishing Net," alleging that the fish net which costs "no less than
P600,000.00" was left unattended at the beach exposed to the elements and movements of the sea which
could cause its early deterioration and ultimate loss. Respondent Judge, despite the vigorous objection of the
public prosecutor, granted the motion in his order of 22 March 2000, in part, to the following effect "To obviate their possible loss, destruction and/or deterioration, pending resolution of the abovecaptioned case, the apprehending officers or whoever has the custody, are ordered to cause the
immediate turn over of the following items to movants who undertake to produce the same
whenever needed in court, as they can only be properly confiscated in favor of the government
upon conviction of the accused.
"1. 1 unit fish net

As the Office of the Court Administrator has so correctly pointed out, "while it can be argued that the remedy is
judicial in nature or that the case involves an error in judgment, Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court
(however), is much too elementary to be brushed aside (and that) x x x the existence of a judicial remedy does
not (necessarily) preclude resort to an administrative remedy." Nowhere in the statute would it appear that the
seizure of the items, alleged to have been used in the illegal fishing activity, is proscribed by it. Evidently, the
seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as being an incident to a lawful arrest. Rule 127, Section
12, of the Rules of Court3 provides:
"SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."
In Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr. vs. Francisco Arca, 4 where the crew of certain fishing vessels were caught, in
flagrante, illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant
of arrest and the seizure of the vessel, as well as its equipment and the dynamites found therein, as an
incident to a lawful arrest was held to be lawful.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control
of the prosecutor.5 The seized items ordered released by respondent Judge have not yet been offered in
evidence; hence, the prosecution, not the court, could still be deemed to be in the legal custody and to have
the responsibility over such items.6 The pronouncement by the Court in Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals7 is instructive; viz:

"2. 36 units lights (300 watts)

"3. 1 unit light (500 watts)
"4. 1 unit buoy
"5. 7 containers
"6. 7 plastic container boxes
"7. 4 styropore boxes
"8. 10 boxes of fish"

"x x x The outcome of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized property. If found
to be contraband, i.e., articles the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime and the
repossession of which would subject defendant to criminal penalties and frustrate the express
policy against the possession of such objects, they will not be returned, but shall be confiscated in
favor of the State or destroyed, as the case may be. If not contraband, the property shall be
returned without undue delay to the person who appears from the evidence to be the owner or
rightful possessor."
While, verily, respondent Judge has committed a fundamental error, no proof, however, is extant or has been
proffered to also establish that he has acted with malice or in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
and he is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos with a warning that another
infraction by him will be dealt with severely.
SO ORDERED.

Davide,
Jr.,
C.J.,
Azcuna, J., abroad, on official business.

Ynares-Santiago,

and

Carpio,

JJ., concur.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George de Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo
Embile, duty frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense presented accused-appellant who
testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138881

December 18, 2000

Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident
of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on June
16, 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with
Alzheimers disease, in convalescent homes in the United States. 4
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to
fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the
traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day,
June 26, 1998.5

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, accused-appellant.

At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure
area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs,
prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives.6

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via
Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs.
Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result
of an ectopic pregnancy.7

This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City,
finding accused-appellant Leila Johnson y Reyesguilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying
"Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." ("Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.") She was
directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection. Ramirez took accusedappellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. 8

The information against accused-appellant alleged:

Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her
stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked
her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez
then turned over to Embile, outside the womens room. 9

That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, each bag weighing:
#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
#2ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and

The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance
which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." 10
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st
RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport and ticket were taken and her
luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. 11

#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, respectively,

or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding

In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she
was approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the
womens room. There, she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that
nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her
passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were taken from her, for which no receipt was
issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a certain Col. Castillo. 12

license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,3 whereupon trial was held.

After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white packages
on the table. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of
the packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken
before a fiscal for inquest.13 She claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26
until June 28, she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of
her relatives in the Philippines.14

On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: 15
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended and
hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs of suit.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibits "G", "C-2"
and "C-3") are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered
to cause the transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail of Pasay City during the
pendency of this case provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) "despite failure of the prosecution in proving
the negative allegation in the information;" (2) "despite failure of the prosecution in proving the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride;" (3) "despite violation of her constitutional rights;" and (4) "when guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt." 16
First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional
rights. She argues that the "shabu" confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced
to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance
of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu," should have been excluded from the evidence. 17
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and
used in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1)
and (3). On the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid
search made on her person.
The trial court held:

A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as "the questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in
any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the
investigator is trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule
above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being
accurate.18
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to
the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. 19 Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as
well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are . There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. 20 Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search,
they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest,
although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of
"shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had been
obtained while she was in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor
General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to
affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile and Ramirez thereon, along with their
testimony to that effect, were presented by the prosecution in proving its case.

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation
but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:

There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket, luggage,
and other personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken
from her, and her signature thereon. Rule 126, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the
search and seizure only of the following:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

Personal property to be seized. 3/4 A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:

(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(Underscoring supplied)
xxxx

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.
Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:

....

Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or Instrument Of The
Crime The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16
of Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

PROS. VELASCO So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals you have examined,
in chemical examination, what color it will register, if any?

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

WITNESS In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it will not react with the reagent, therefore it
will not dissolve. In my examination, all the specimens reacted on the re-agents, sir.

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

PROS. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in laymans term?

3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

WITNESS It is only a tawas.

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

....

5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;

COURT In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the specimen?

6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

WITNESS None, your Honor.

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or

....

8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements
as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings
conducted for the purpose.

ATTY. AGOOT I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed with
200 grams of tawas, you will submit that to qualitative examination, what will be your findings, negative or
positive, Mr. Witness?

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.

ATTY. AGOOT That is qualitative examination.

Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
for her possession of 580.2 grams of shabu.
Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a qualitative examination of the
substance contained in Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the examination conducted by the NBI
forensic chemist was a qualitative one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu, but failed to establish
its purity; hence, its exact quantity remains indeterminate and unproved.
This contention is likewise without merit.
The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted would have indicated the presence of
impurities if there were any. He testified:
PROS. VELASCO By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants or impurities, it will be
discovered by just mixing it?
WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a thin layer chromatographic examination.
PROS. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr. Witness?
WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears one spot which resembles or the same as
the Methamphetamine Hydrochloride sample

WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate.21

A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a quantitative analysis requires the
determination of the percentage combination of the components of a mixture. Hence, a qualitative
identification of a powder may reveal the presence of heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a quantitative
analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent quinine. 22
De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3.
Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a mixture. It is
particularly useful for analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently received in a crime lab. For
example, illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically any material that is at the disposal of the
drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is made available to prospective customers. Hence, the
task of identifying an illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one without the aid of chromatographic
methods to first separate the mixture into its components. 23
The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough, but also that the scientifically
correct method of obtaining an accurate representative sample had been obtained. 24 At any rate, as the
Solicitor-General has pointed out, if accused-appellant was not satisfied with the results, it would have been a
simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination of the substance by another chemist. This she did
not do.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation in the information
that she did not have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."

Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions
of Section 20 hereof.1wphi1
Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu,"a regulated
drug, is not unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the required license or prescription. She
points out that since the prosecution failed to present any certification that she is not authorized to possess or
use regulated drugs, it therefore falls short of the quantum of proof needed to sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit.
The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. Chan Toco.25 The accused in that
case was charged with smoking opium without being duly registered. He demurred to the information on the
ground that it failed to allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed
and practicing physician.
This Court denied the motion and said:
The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize generally the smoking of opium in
these Islands. But the legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited class of
smokers who smoked under the advice and by prescription of a licensed and practicing physician . . . . Hence
where one is charged with a violation of the general provisions of the Opium Law, it is more logical as well as
more practical and convenient, if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician, that he should
set up this fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution should be called upon to prove that every smoker,
charged with a violation of the law, does so without such advice or prescription. Indeed, when it is considered
that under the law any person may, in case of need and at any time, procure the advice of a physician to use
opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the nature of things no public record of prescriptions of this kind is
or can be required to be kept, it is manifest that it would be wholly impracticable and absurd to impose on the
prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium does so without the advice of a
physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in a particular case, that one using opium does so without the
advice or prescription of a physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility without the aid of the
defendant himself, while a defendant charged with the illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in
establishing the fact that he used it under the advice and on the prescription of a physician, if in fact he did
so.26
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he
may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is an easy thing for him to do, he has no one but himself to blame.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended, which requires the prosecution to present a certification that accused-appellant has
no license or permit to possess shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the
burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has a license or permit under the law to possess
the prohibited drug.
Fourth. Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to
support a finding that she is guilty of the crime charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected.
Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law
enforcers.1wphi1 When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are

inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper
motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. This Court accords great respect to
the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any palpable error or
arbitrariness in its findings.27
It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no other witness was presented in her behalf.
Her denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 28 As has been held,
denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor
for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.29
The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be validly charged with and
convicted of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, have been
complied with by the prosecution in this case. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld.
As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held that courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law.30 Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580.2) grams of shabu were confiscated
from accused-appellant, the fine imposed by the trial court may properly be reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding accused-appellant
guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is
reduced toP50,000.00. Costs against appellant.
The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet returned to the accusedappellant are hereby ordered returned to her.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.

At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker Mylene
Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and had prosecution witness Mylene
Cabunoc recalled to be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN take the witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. 2 When she
passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a
civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, called her attention, saying "Excuse me maam, can I search you?" 3 Upon frisking SUSAN,
Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN,
pinched the package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules. 4 When
Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked
SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: "Money, money only." Mylene forthwith
reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.5

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 148825

December 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.

SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort
room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies room, Mylene touched something
in front of SUSANs sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged.
Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape,
which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them.6 The first was taken from SUSANs abdominal area; the second,
from in front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh. 7 Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4
De los Reyes.8 The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the
incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened
the same and found that they contained white crystalline substances 9 which, when submitted for laboratory
examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. 10
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that no
investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN. 11 However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the following articles
seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2)
one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock
control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles. 12 He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional
rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt. 13 Yet he told her that she had
the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. 14
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances surrounding the arrest
and search of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her person. 15

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with
the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as
amended, under an Information1 whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her
possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809)
GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or
license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch 110 of said court.

After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision 16 finding SUSAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, 17 alleging therein that the trial judge erred in (1)
giving weight to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena because it was not
presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is therefore hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a
police officer; (3) making statements which gave the impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the
accused; and (4) deliberately ignoring the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured. SUSAN also
assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized items were not
in plain view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge, SUSAN filed a motion to
inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial. 18
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellants Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial, as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued an order 19 on 26 November 2001
denying the motions. According to the trial judge (1) he explained to SUSANs counsel the effects of the filing
of a motion for reconsideration, but the latter chose to magnify the judges statement which was uttered in jest;
(2) SUSANs conviction was not based on the medical report which was not presented in court; (3) there was

no violation of SUSANs constitutional rights because she was never interrogated during her detention without
counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the airport and were
therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing to the trial court
the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the alleged existence of
probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits of the "Terry search"
doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the
records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence,
and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of
the medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in People v. Johnson. 20
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the
ladies room was constitutionally infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest
could not be said to have been made before the search because at the time of the strip search, the
arresting officers could not have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her body,
which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they could not have determined
whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore nothing but a
fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v.
Ohio,21 such stop and frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in
order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of
the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package at
her abdominal area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to
submit her to a strip search in the ladies room, she was under custodial investigation without
counsel, which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission of the medical
report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on nor
offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson 22 because of its sweeping statement
allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity of the
safety interests involved. She stresses that the pertinent case should have been Katz v. United
States,23 which upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States of America that "protects
people and not places."
In its Appellants Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was found flagrante
delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely within
the exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted
herself to the search and seizure when she allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for
further inspection by airport security personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride
seized from SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG argues that
SUSANs conviction was not solely based on the questioned document but also on the fact that she was
caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Consequently, it
supports SUSANs conviction but recommends the reduction of the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSANs conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the
arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights.

Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
Court. 24
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest.25
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this
case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSANs arrest did not precede the search. When the
metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith
made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSANs
abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and
liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."lawphi1.et
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room, the airport security
personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSANs body; hence, they did not know
yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by
the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to
be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done
incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. 26
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for weapons
under the "Terry search" doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches
a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line
with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the
person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 27
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:

SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures.
As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in
the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge.
From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to
weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in
the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further
searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by
her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages contained only money,
aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated
that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of
the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home
(as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." 28 Thus, the
strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds application to the
present case. That case involves accused-appellant Leila Johnson, who was also a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then
the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk departing passengers, employees and crew to check
for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When Olivia frisked
Leila, the former felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained
that she needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as a result of
an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to her superior,
who then directed her to take Leila to the nearest womens room for inspection. In the comfort
room, Leila was asked "to bring out the thing under her girdle." She acceded and brought out three
plastic packs which contained a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
This Court ruled that the packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" seized during the routine frisk
at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore
admissible in evidence against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her
person flagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
SUSANs reliance on Katz v. U.S. 29 is misplaced. The facts and circumstances of that case are
entirely different from the case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information by
telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted, over the accuseds objection, to

introduce evidence of accuseds end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the conviction. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United States of America reversed
the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in the instant case,
was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved. It ruled that what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth
Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and
mandates not to unsettle things which are established. When the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it
to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. 30 There being a disparity in the
factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case the ruling in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search conducted on
SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline
substances, which upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the
knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police
authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest
without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in
her person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be
invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody
interrogation."31 Custodial investigation refers to the "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." 32 This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and
that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. 33 And the right to
counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation. 34 The objective is to prohibit

"incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. 35
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial
investigation was conducted after SUSANs arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the
articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not
to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to
prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her detention and used in
evidence against her.36 Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.

As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law. For possession
of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the
net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN, the trial courts
imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the confiscation of
the following:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:

SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of the medical report on the
physical and medical examination conducted upon appellants request, which contained the following:

(a) Subject of the offense;

On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and cooperative. She related that she was an
illegitimate daughter, married, but divorced in 1995. She verbalized, "I gamble like an addict. I gambled since I
was young and I lost control of myself when I played cards. When I lost control, I want my money back. I owe
other people lots of money. I lost all the cash of my husband. This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the
money." She denied having any morbid thoughts and perceptual disturbances. (Emphasis supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document was erroneous because it was not
properly identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellants conviction will stand, as the
courts finding of guilt was not based on that document.

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
,
Clearly, the seizure of SUSANs passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the
afore-quoted provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her.37

VII. SUSANs conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be valid, we do not
hesitate to rule that that the three packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in
evidence against her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as
amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Crime.--The penalties for offenses under Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved [are] in any of the
following quantities:

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in
Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation
of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos ( P1,000,000) and the
costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellants passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be
returned to her.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a
routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down
the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did
not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of
3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked appellant
where the wires came from and appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the
high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of
the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 136292

January 15, 2002

RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision1 of respondent Court of Appeals dated September 15, 1998
which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein
petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the
resolution2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere in
the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00,

In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident of
Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his identification card
(ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger
jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in his jeepney
conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last
trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the
NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going
to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires and that the former
would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own vehicle,
its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with kakawati
leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the
job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case, he was intercepted by Sgt.
Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables, he told the police officers that the
cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he
was ordered to proceed to police headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did
not believe him and instead locked him up in jail for a week." 4
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property worthP55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2)
[YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TEN
(10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power
Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for damages on the
ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty imposed, to wit:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant
RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and
penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine (9) months
and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no costs." 6
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when
samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was engaged in
an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said defense;
and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to presumption
of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search and seizure
made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and
validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot
again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991,
it has been held that 'considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement
which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity, a warrantless search of a
moving vehicle is justified on grounds of practicability.' The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the
case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that 'automobiles because of their mobility
may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying warrantless search of a resident or
office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence
and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in
many instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836,
the Supreme Court held that a search may be made even without a warrant where the accused is
caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but are
also under obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant." 7
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely
on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court as adopted by the
appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any
evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed
inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties
against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof, which reads:

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain
exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 8 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; 9 (3) search of
moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless search; 11 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search);12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. 13
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character
of the articles procured.14
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at bar was not
authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is
admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1.nt
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity.15 Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the
years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 16 Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws,
provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines
of the State.17
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause.18 Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. 19 The required probable cause that will justify a

warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of
each case.20

Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:

"ATTY. SANTOS

One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police
checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, 21 for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies
of public order22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. 23 A checkpoint may either be a mere
routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.

Q
Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The
search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; 24 (2) simply
looks into a vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; 26 (4) where the occupants are
not subjected to a physical or body search; 27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. 29

A
Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in the
said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and searched the
load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar . The police officers did not merely conduct
a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be
considered a simple routine check.

In the case of United States vs. Pierre,30 the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of the body of an
agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a physical
intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not conduct a
search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to see and to
smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing so, his inspection went
beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either
inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area protected by the Fourth
amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of
moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana;
(2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a
confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route
where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted
the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and
other identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information
that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting
marijuana;32 (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6)
where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine
reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the
syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country. 33
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on
routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati
leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.

Q
You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became suspicious, why
did you become suspicious?
Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.

Q
When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did you do
next, if any?
A

We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir." 34

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:

"ATTY SANTOS
Q

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by kakawati
leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I
flagged him, sir."35
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search
without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused was different in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the
suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police authorities do not sufficiently
establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles,
CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over
the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x, CHUA's suspicious behavior,
i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which
CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues,
e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or the
time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior, and
suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest

exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at
Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a
drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore
bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in
the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information
that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. 37 Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where
the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.38

"WITNESS
Q

On June 28, 1989, where were you?

We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on said date
and time?
A

Yes, sir.

What is that incident?

A
While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes driving a
vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxx
Q

xxx

xxx

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were
placed in sacks39 and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to
the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a
matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that
the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.40

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves, I
became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir.

III. Consented search

A
Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and by
so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.

Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with the consent
of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that there is no
specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by
petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive
conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which
may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search,
i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence.42 The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. 43 Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on;44 (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; 45 (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. 46 It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 47
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was conducted in this
wise:

Did the vehicle stop?

Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?

Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

What was the answer of Caballes?

A
He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told him I
will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q

And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you do?

A
I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from the Cavinti
area, sir."48
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and seizure. But
in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused
and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some
instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature
and consequences of such request.49

In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, 50 the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to search
the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said search. In People
vs. Lacerna,51 the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two policemen who asked permission
to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search, the
Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was
consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs.
Cuizon,52 the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely consented to the
search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,53 it
was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag
without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his
right. In People vs. Omaweng,54 the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his
bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the policemen
asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a valid
consented search.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. 55
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of
petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged
down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and
purposes, they wereinforming, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be
searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein
petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him
that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and
granted because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of
petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was
only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the vehicle.
To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct
examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the
vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search. 56
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. In People vs. Barros,57 appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two
policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who
owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the search. The Court there
struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived
the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs.
Burgos,58 to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain
petitioner's conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused
against unreasonable search and seizure.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 136066-67

February 4, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations which read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-5071
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing more or less two (2) kilos and one (1) small plastic bag containing
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated drug, without
any authority whatsoever.

Criminal Case No. 96-5132

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22 cal. ammunitions,
without first having obtained a license or permit to possess or carry the same.

Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col.
Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. 6
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points. He testified that he
witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check around the premises of the Guess
Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel.7

Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" on arraignment.1awphi1.nt The two cases were then jointly tried.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles City. Their
testimonies can be synthesized as follows:

On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision, 8 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:

On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag
received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night
at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported that accused-appellant
distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of
Angeles City, Col. Neopito Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of Major Bernardino,
Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian assets,
with SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and the civilian informer
positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The
other group acted as their back up.

1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the accused is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused Binad
Sy Chua is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.9

At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived
and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying
a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as
police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline
substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which
yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag
peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud
instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22
caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP
Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.3
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline
substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the
siezed items contained shabu. 4 Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together with accused-appellant brought these items
for further laboratory examination to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After
due testing, forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive
results for shabu. The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942
kilograms of shabu.5
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the
incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his
son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front
of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the
store, he noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the
onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The
man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his
wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to
search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who
just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his
car.1awphi1.nt

Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;
B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF SHABU
ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL AND VALID MANNER;
C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CRIME CHARGED IS SUFICIENT TO
PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REAONABLE DOUBT.10
Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was
unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been under
surveillance for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which the arresting
officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant; that the police officers had sufficient information
about him and could have easily arrested him. Accused-appellant further argues that since his arrest was null
an void, the drugs that were seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-appellants argument is impressed with merit.
Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and fast one.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses
deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to
appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The only
exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case. 11

In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. An
appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty and
indemnity imposed by the trial court. 12 We are clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not
raised on appeal, if we find that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case.
Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. 13 This is in keeping with the constitutional
mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon accusedappellant, the court a quo made the following findings:
Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. x x x x
While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over
the personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
xxxxxxxxx
In the present case, the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at
the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to
secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a "stop and frisk". 14
A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial court. It confused
the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a "stop-andfrisk."
In Malacat v. Court of Appeals,15 we distinguished the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest, to wit:
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest
before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission
of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
xxxxxxxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of

himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under
the Fourth amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk". A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.16(Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting
to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on
the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. 17 Accordingly, for this exception to apply
two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.18
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that when accusedappellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway,
alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.
Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of the law, the group of
SPO2 Nulud "hurriedly accosted" 19 accused-appellant and later on "introduced themselves as police
officers."20Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in
this case was more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding
the search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed
a crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it
has been held that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.21 Hence, in People v. Aminudin,22 we ruled that "the accused-appellant was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension" (Emphasis supplied).
The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben 23 to justify the polices actions is misplaced. In the said
case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and
also on those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen
noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and
requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves.
Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the
activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.

In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the very same informant of
accused-appellants activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the arresting operatives,
admitted that their informant has been telling them about the activities of accused-appellant for two years prior
to his actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the
illegality of the arrest of accused-appellant as follows:

Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag pounced on him as you used pounced on him
in your affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the name of this chinese drug pusher?

xxxxxxxxx

A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.

Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that alleged small plastic bag, is that correct?

Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even before September 21, 1996?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box?

Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling you about the activities of this chinese
drug pusher reckoning in relation to September 21, 1996?

A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx

A. That was about two years already.

Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline substance is shabu?
Q. Nothwithstanding his two years personal knowledge which you gained from the civilian
informant that this chinese drug pusher have been engaged pushing drugs here in Angeles City,
you did not think of applying for a search warrant for this chinese drug pusher?
A. No, sir.

A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have been tailing the accused that he is
really a drug pusher.
Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long time that you are very sure that what was
brought by him was shabu?

xxxxxxxxx
A. Yes, sir.24
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually walking along the road near the Thunder
Inn Hotel, is that right?
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is the chinese drug pusher that will deliver to
him also.
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad Chua the accused in this case he alighted
with a Corolla car with plate number 999, I think, he just alighted when you saw him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked towards near the entrance of the Thunder
Inn Hotel?
A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel but he was pinpointed already by the
civilian informer.
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.
xxxxxxxxx

The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-appellant. Considering
that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to
the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant
before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed
to them hours before accused-appellants arrest was not a product of an "on-the-spot" tip which may excuse
them from obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting teams contention that their arrest of
accused-appellant was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) 25 or contraband.
The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person
who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons.26 The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. 27 It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure
should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.28
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals.29 In said
case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who
appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In
People v. Solayao,30 we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the
following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his
companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an
intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.

The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case
of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the
alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial
inquiry into accused-appellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was
carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of
accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and
suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law.
There was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellants arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to them by their
confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-appellants warrantless
arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid "stop-and frisk". For a valid "stop-and-frisk"
the search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as we have earlier
emphasized, the information about the illegal activities of accused-appellant was not unknown to the
apprehending officers. Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid
"stop-and-frisk".
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accused-appellants
possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O
juice box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
first arrested accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice
box before they were able to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu. There was
no clear showing that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried contained prohibited drugs.
Neither were the small plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22
caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited substances were not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence,
inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree.

allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their
headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory.
The governments drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not undermine
the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as
overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees
should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they
have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
own existence.35
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section
16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on
the ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody, unless he is
being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna. JJ., concur.

In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence
at hand is bereft of any such showing.1a\^/phi1.net
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more cure, the
illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption
of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. 31 In People v. Nubla,32 we clearly stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellants conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption.
Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very
same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the items
seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. 33 The items
were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro,34 we struck down with
disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where
they were seized, thus:

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENNY GO, appellant.

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at
the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On direct appeal before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in
Criminal Case No. 99-174439 finding appellant Benny Go guilty of violating Section 16, Article III in relation to
Section 2 (e-2), Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, [1] as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine ofP1,000,000.00.
The Information filed against appellant charged as follows:
That on or about June 14, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being authorized
by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) knot tied transparent plastic bag containing TWO
HUNDRED FOUR (204) grams of white crystalline substance known as Shabu containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
[3]
Subsequently, at the pre-trial conference on August 10, 1999, the parties stipulated that (1) the subject
Search Warrant is valid; and (2) the Forensic Chemist conducted only a qualitative examination on the subject
specimen.[4]
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector Edwin Zata, Forensic Chemical
Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; (2) PO2 Gerardo Abulencia (PO2 Abulencia);
(3) SPO1 Edgardo G. Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez); and (4) SPO1 Ver M. Serquea (SPO1 Ver Serquea)
whose testimonies sought to establish the following facts:
On April 28, 1999, SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and a confidential informant conducted a test buy
operation at the residence of appellant at 1480 General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila during which they
purchased from him P1,500.00 worth of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[5] The police officers did
not immediately arrest him, however. Instead, they applied for a Search Warrant for appellants residence from
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City [6] based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of
illegal drugs in his house.[7]
On June 14, 1999, a raiding team composed of SPO1 Fernandez and SPO1 Serquea, together with
PO2 Abulencia, PO3 Noel Adtu and PO2 Gerardo Jimenez, [8] proceeded to appellants above-said residence
armed with Search Warrant No. 99-0038 [9] issued by Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City commanding them to
make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of appellants residence and to seize and take
possession of METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias
and proceeds of the above crime.
Soon after the police officers arrived at appellants residence at around 6:00 in the evening, [10] they, to
enable them to gain entry to the two-storey house, sideswept (sinagi) a little appellants Toyota Corolla GLI car
which was parked outside.[11] Jack Go, appellants son and the only one present at the house at the time,
thereupon opened the door of the house and the policemen at once introduced themselves, informed him that
they had a warrant for the search of the premises, and promptly handcuffed him to a chair. SPO1 Fernandez,
SPO1 Serquea and PO2 Abulencia entered the house, while PO3 Adtu and PO2 Jimenez remained
outside. [12]
On instruction of SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea left to summon barangay officials to witness the
search. SPO1 Serquea returned five minutes later with Barangay Kagawads Gaspar Lazaro
(Kagawad Lazaro) and Emmanuel Manalo (Kagawad Manalo) who were advised by SPO1 Fernandez to be
witnesses to the search and to afterwards sign the inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search.
As instructed, the two barangay kagawads proceeded to the upper floor of appellants house with SPO1
Serquea and PO2 Abulencia. [13] While SPO1 Fernandez, who remained downstairs in the sala, [14] instructed
the handcuffed Jack Go to witness the search, the latter refused since there will be no more left in the sala of
the house anyway there is a barangay official. [15]
In the course of the search of the premises which took place from 6:00 to 11:00 in the evening,
Kagawad Lazaro and PO2 Abulencia recovered one knot tied transparent plastic bag containing white
crystalline substance[17] from the drawer of a cabinet.
[16]

Also seized from the residence of appellant were the following: (a) one plastic bag containing yellowish
substance[18] found by SPO1 Serquea; [19] (b) a weighing scale discovered by SPO1 Fernandez; (c) assorted

documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check writer; (i) several dry seals
and (j) stamp pads; [20] (k) Chinese and Philippine currency; [21] (l) and appellants Toyota Corolla GLI [22] car (the
car).
The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1 Fernandez as EGF-A1, while the plastic bag with the yellowish substance was marked as EGF-A-2. [23]
With the exception of the car, all the seized items were brought to the dining table on the ground floor of
appellants house for inventory.[24]
In the meantime, appellants wife Shi Xiu Ong and his friends Samson Go and Peter Co arrived one
after the other at the house. [25] Appellant himself arrived at 9:30 in the evening when the search was almost
through.[26]
After the inventory had been taken, SPO1 Fernandez prepared a handwritten Inventory Receipt [27] and
a document captioned Affidavit of Orderly Search,[28] the contents of which he read to appellant. On instruction
of SPO1 Fernandez, Jack Go also explained the contents of the documents to appellant who then signed
them as did kagawads Manalo and Lazaro and Jack Go as witnesses. [29]
The police officers then brought appellant, his wife, son and friends, along with the seized items, to
Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila for verification and investigation.
Appellant was detained while the others were eventually released. [30] The arresting officers jointly
prepared an Affidavit of Arrest dated June 15, 1999 [31] which, among other things, contained an enumeration of
the seized items identical to that in the handwritten Inventory Receipt. And SPO1 Fernandez prepared a
Return of Search Warrant 99-0038 dated June 18, 1999 and a referral paper 1 st Indorsement[32] with the same
enumeration of seized items.
Also on June 15, 1999, SPO1 Serquea brought the plastic bag containing the white crystalline
substance (Exhibit A) and the plastic bag containing the yellowish substance (Exhibit B) to the PNP Crime
Laboratory[33] together with a request for laboratory examination. [34] Upon examination, Exhibit A was found to
contain 204 grams of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug.[35] Exhibit B, on the other hand, was found negative for any prohibited and/or regulated drug. [36]
Meanwhile, the seized documents, passports, dry seals and stamp pads were brought to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation,[37] while the bank books were forwarded to the corresponding banks for
verification.[38]
The prosecution presented in evidence the Yamato weighing scale, [39] claimed to have been recovered
by SPO1 Fernandez from the top of appellants refrigerator, [40] although it was not among those listed in the
handwritten Inventory Receipt, Affidavit of Arrest or Return of the Search Warrant. [41] Also presented by the
prosecution, as a hostile witness, to corroborate in part the foregoing facts was Kagawad Lazaro. He claimed,
however, that the first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt submitted in evidence had been substituted
with another, asserting that he and the other witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of the
first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt which they were asked to sign whereas that submitted in court
did not bear their signatures.[42]
Kagawad Lazaro further claimed that the first entry on the first page of the Inventory Receipt, whereon
he and his co-witnesses affixed their signatures, reading Chinese Medicine had been replaced with
undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules; [43] that what was recovered from the room of Jack Go by
PO2 Abulencia was Exhibit B, the plastic bag containing the yellowish powder, and not Exhibit A, the plastic
bag containing the suspected shabu; and that Exhibit A was not even among the items seized and inventoried.
[44]

The defense, which adopted the testimony of Kagawad Lazaro, presented appellant, his son Jack Go,
and Kagawad Manalo whose version of the facts of the case follows:
In November 1998, while appellant was walking along Gen. Luna Street, he was accosted by SPO1
Serquea and another police officer who accused him of manufacturing shabu and divested him of money
amounting to more than P5,000.00. He was later released as the policemen could not charge him with
anything.[45]
On July 14, 1999 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Jack Go opened the door of their house after hearing
somebody shout that the car had been bumped. Five armed policemen then entered the house, one of whom
handcuffed him while two went up to the upper floor of the house and searched for about thirty (30) minutes. [46]
At past 6:00 p.m., as the two kagawads entered the house which was already in disarray, SPO1
Fernandez formed two groups to conduct the search at the second floor: (1) that of PO2 Abulencia,

with Kagawad Lazaro to serve as witness, and (2) that of SPO1 Serquea, with Kagawad Manalo to serve as
witness.[47]
PO2 Abulencia, together with Kagawad Lazaro, searched the room of Jack Go. SPO1 Serquea,
accompanied by Kagawad Manalo, searched the study room where he seized documents, passports and
assorted papers.
SPO1 Serquea and Kagawad Manalo then proceeded to the room of appellant followed by PO2
Abulencia and Kagawad Lazaro. From the room of appellant, the policemen seized documents, passports,
bankbooks and money.[48]
After the search, the policemen and barangay kagawads went down with three boxes containing
passports, money and assorted Chinese medicine.[49]
When appellants wife arrived at around 7:30 p.m., [50] SPO1 Fernandez ordered her to open the safe
(kaha de yero) inside appellants room where the police officers seized money, passports, bankbooks, Chinese
currency and pieces of jewelry.[51]
The seized items were placed on appellants table on the first floor of the house where they were
inventoried by SPO1 Fernandez [52] during which the barangay kagawads did not see either Exhibit A, the
plastic bag containing the suspected shabu, or the weighing scale.[53]
After SPO1 Fernandez prepared a two-page Inventory Receipt and Affidavit of Orderly Search, he
asked Jack Go to sign the receipt. While Jack Go initially refused, he eventually did sign both documents
without having read them completely after he was hit by the policemen. The two barangay kagawads also
signed both pages of the Inventory Receipt as witnesses. [54]
When appellant arrived at around 8:30 p.m., he was handcuffed and likewise made to sign the
Inventory Receipt without having been able to read its contents. [55] Jack Go was prevented from explaining its
contents to him.[56]
The first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt presented in court, which includes an undetermined
quantity of white crystalline granules placed inside a transparent plastic envelope as among those seized from
the residence of appellant, does not bear the signatures of appellant, the kagawads and Jack Go, hence, it is
not the same first page of the handwritten Inventory Report on which they affixed their signatures. [57] In fact the
policemen did not leave a copy of this Inventory Receipt with either appellant or the barangay kagawads.[58]
The policemen continued to search appellants residence until around 11:00 p.m. when they brought
appellant, Jack Go, Shi Xiu Ong, Samson Go and Peter Co, together with the seized items, to Bicutan. [59]
On the way to Bicutan, PO2 Abulencia, who boarded the same vehicle as appellant, told the latter that
the policemen wanted P10,000,000.00 from him or he would be charged with possession of illegal drugs. The
amount demanded was later reduced to P5,000,000.00, then to P2,000,000.00, and finally to P500,000.00.
Appellant refused, however, to heed the policemens demands since he did not commit any crime. [60]
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court rendered the appealed Decision on June 7, 2000, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ordered rendered finding the accused Benny Go guilty of the offense
charged in the information and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition, upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.[61]

[63]

His Motion for Reconsideration [62] of the decision having been denied by Order of July 24, 2000,
appellant lodged the present appeal. In his Brief,[64] he assigns the following errors:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING THE POLICE OFFICERS THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE SEARCH WARRANT BASED
ON THEIR TESTIMONIES, THERE BEING CONVINCING PROOFS TO THE CONTRARY.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 204 GRAMS OF SHABU WAS RECOVERED FROM THE
HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON JUNE 14, 1999 BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF PO1 GERARDO
ABULENCIA AND THE SUPPORTING INVENTORY RECEIPT, BOTH OF WHICH WERE COMPLETELY
CONTRADICTED BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESS BARANGAY KAGAWAD GASPAR LAZARO AS WELL
AS BY DEFENSE WITNESSES.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204) GRAMS OF SHABU AS CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE (sic) PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA
AND A FINE OF ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[65] (Emphasis supplied)
During the pendency of the appeal, appellant filed a verified Motion for Return of Personal Documents,
Vehicle and Paraphernalia dated September 10, 2001 [66] praying for the release of the following seized
properties:
a. several pcs. transparent plastic envelopes
b. one (1) unit Toyota Corolla GLI with PN UTT 658
c. Cash amounting to Fifty Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P52,760.00) in different
denominations
d. Twenty-Five Thousand Chinese Yuan (CY25,000.00)
e. Sixty-Seven (67) pieces of Chinese passports
f. Twenty-Eight (28) pieces of assorted bankbooks
g. Two Hundred Eighty Five (285) pieces of assorted checks
h. Fifty-Three (53) pcs. rubber stamp and related paraphernalia
i. One (1) piece Underwood typewriter with SN 9861952
j. One (1) piece check writer
k. Two (2) pieces of dry seal
m. Five (5) boxes of assorted documents
n. Three (3) bags of assorted documents [67]
This Court is thus called upon to determine (1) whether appellants guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of Personal
Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia, which items are allegedly not among those particularly described in
Search Warrant No. 99-0038, should be returned to him.These issues shall be resolved in seriatim.
Illegal Possession of 204 Grams of Shabu
As appellant questions the legality of the search of his residence, the actions of the police officers, as
agents of the State, must be carefully considered in light of appellants right against unreasonable searches
and seizures guaranteed by Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution. [68]
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question
determinable from a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the purpose of the search, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. [69]
Since no presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer to justify an encroachment of rights
secured by the Constitution,[70] courts must cautiously weigh the evidence before them. As early as in the 1937
case of People v. Veloso,[71] this Court held:
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has
rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to law, the

execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling
in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrant will always be construed strictly
without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity
are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it .[72] (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

A Its really heard (sic) to enter the house. Before the door, there was a still (sic) supporting the
door and they will not allow us to enter because they dont know us. Then, in order that
we could enter the house, we side swept (sinagi) a little the vehicle that was parked
in front of their house. And their neighbor knocked at the house of the subject and
thats the time that we were able to enter.[79] (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules authorizing search and
seizure is required, and strict compliance therewith is demanded because:

Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and
authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior
notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of
appellants car was unreasonable and unjustified.

x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness
than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers
from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.[73]
In arriving at the appealed decision, the trial court placed greater weight on the testimony of the police
officers to whom it accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, viz:
Coming to the first issue raised, the Court gives credence to the testimonies of the police officers and
accords them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. The Court has observed
the demeanor of the witnesses and finds the prosecution witnesses more credible than the defense
witnesses. x x x
On the other hand, there is no showing that the police officers had ill motive when they applied for and
secured the Search Warrant, raided the house of the accused and arrested him. Accused is a Chinese
national who appeared to have no quarrel with the arresting police officers and thus the police officers had no
reason to fabricate or trump up charges against him. Hence, there appears to be no reason the police
officers should not be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. As held
by the Supreme Court, (L)aw enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty, in the
absence of the evidence to the contrary. x x x We see no valid obstacle to the application of the ruling in
People vs. Capulong, (160 SCRA 533 {1988}) that credence is accorded to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly performed
their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary .The appellant has not shown that the
prosecution witnesses were motivated by any improper motive other than that of accomplishing their mission.
(People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. Said Sariol Y Muhamading, accused-appellant, 174 SCRA
238).[74] (Emphasis supplied)

Also by PO2 Abulencias own account, upon entry to appellants residence, he immediately handcuffed
Jack Go to a chair. Justifying his action, PO2 Abulencia explained that not only was he unfamiliar with Jack Go
and unsure of how the latter would react, but it was a standard operating procedure:
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, what happened on June 14, 1999 at 6:00 p.m. when you were armed with the Search
Warrant issued by Judge Lilia Lopez?
A We entered inside the house of the subject and we were able to see (nadatnan naming) Jack
Go, the son of Benny Go, sir.
xxx
Q And what was the reaction of Jack Go, if any?
A We introduced ourselves as police officers and we have a Search Warrant to conduct a search
to the above subject place and also we handcuffed Jack Go to the chair, sir.
Q Why did you do that, Mr. witness?
A Hindi naming kakilala iyong mga tao, sir kaya ganoon ang ginawa namin para hindi
kami maano, eh hindi naming kabisado iyong ugali, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
And is that an (sic) standard operating procedure Mr. witness, when you are serving a
search warrant?
A Yes, sir.[80] (Emphasis supplied)

At the same time, the trial court based its finding that the search of appellants residence was proper
and valid on the so-called Affidavit of Orderly Search.

There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack

appellants residence. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm and
confronted under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all
his continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo
restraint.

On the second issue raised, the validity of the Search Warrant is clearly shown by the Affidavit of
Orderly Search signed by the accused and his son Jack Go and his witnesses Salvador Manalo and
Gaspar Lazaro. Such Affidavit of Orderly Search coupled with the testimonies of the police officers
have clearly established the propriety and validity of the search.[75] (Emphasis supplied)

While Search Warrant No. 99-99-0038 authorized the immediate search of appellants residence to
seize METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and
proceeds of the above crime, the policemen, by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, seized numerous other items,
which are clearly unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug paraphernalia:

The rule that a trial courts findings are accorded the highest degree of respect, it being in a position to
observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses, [76] is not absolute and does not apply when a
careful review of the records and a meticulous evaluation of the evidence reveal vital facts and circumstances
which the trial court overlooked or misapprehended and which if taken into account would alter the result of
the case.[77]
In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several
irregularities in the manner by which the search of appellants residence was conducted.
By PO2 Abulencias own account, in order to enter the premises to be searched, the police officers
deliberately side-swiped appellants car which was parked alongside the road, instead of following the regular
knock and announce procedure as outlined in Section 7 (formerly Section 6), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
[78]

Q Mr. Witness, how did you enter the house of Benny Go?

Go when the policemen entered

fear produced in one suddenly
the more was unjustified as was
had arrived to justify his forcible

Q In the presence of the barangay officials, what are those items which you seized or your
raiding team seized, if any?
A With the permission of the Honorable Court, Your Honor, can I take a look at my notes.
Court
Proceed.
Witness
Thank you very much.
A Seized or confiscated form the said residence are: (1) undetermined quantity of white
crystalline granules placed inside the transparent plastic envelope, (2) undetermined
quantity of yellowish powder placed inside the transparent plastic envelope; (3) several

pieces of transparent plastic envelopes; (4) one unit Toyota Corolla GLI with Plate No.
UPT-658; (5) P52,760.00 in different denominations; (6) 25,000.00 Chinese Yuan; (7) 67
pieces of Chinese passports; (8) 28 pieces of assorted bank book; (9) 285 pieces of
assorted checks; (10) 53 pieces rubber stamps and related paraphernalia; (11) one piece
Underwood typewriter with Serial No. 9861952; (12) one piece checkwriter; (13) two
pieces dry seals; (14) 5 boxes of assorted documents; (15) 3 bags of assorted
documents; and I will add another one Your Honor, a weighing scale. [81]
While an inventory of the seized items was prepared, also by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, it did not
contain a detailed list of all the items seized, particularly the voluminous documents:
Q Why is it that you did not make a detailed inventory or receipt of the passports? Why did you
not give any detailed receipt or inventory on the passports.
A There were lots of documents during the time on the table, voluminous documents that
I was not able to make a listing of the said passports.
Q And it was only this October 8, 1999 or four months after that you made a detailed
receipt of those seized items, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
xxx

What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and that he may
refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to give a written statement
unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this effect. However, he
was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from
him by signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana
leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts which in effect
are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be
made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same
who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of
appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without
informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in
evidence.[89] (Emphasis supplied)
The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellants
custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team
conducted the search of appellants residence.
At the same time, it is unclear whether appellant was furnished a copy of the Inventory Receipt as
mandated by Sec. 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[90]

Q Is it your standard operating procedure that when there are voluminous seized items
you will not (sic) longer made (sic) an inventory report, am I right?

Q Now, while you were making an inventory of that, am I right, that you did not give a copy to
Benny Go, am I right?

A Its not an SOP.

A I gave them a xerox copy. I remember I gave them a xerox copy.

Q Why did you not make a detailed inventory or receipt?

Q Is there any proof that they received an inventory report?

A As Ive said earlier, its voluminous. [82] (Emphasis supplied)

A Nothing, sir.[91]

In Asian Surety And Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera,[83] this Court stressed the necessity for
a detailed receipt of the items seized in order to adequately safeguard the constitutional rights of the person
searched:
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of
the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts(Annexes B
B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4 of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire
registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders;
bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and
kind of documents contained in the folders of which there were about a thousand of them that were
seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the
respondents took away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not
remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by
respondent Judge as their passport. [84] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to appellant for his
signature[85] without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt and to the
assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him. Faced
with similar circumstances, this Court in People v. Gesmundo[86]stated:
It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana was found in
her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled PAGPATUNAY previously prepared
by the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in
violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. The
records show that the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document;
neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may
be used as evidence against her.[87] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
In People v. Policarpio,[88] this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for
property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to
remain silent, viz:

Moreover, an examination of Exhibit Z, the Return of Search Warrant No. 99-0038 submitted by SPO1
Fernandez to Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City was not verified under oath, [92] as required by Section 12 (a)
(formerly Section 12), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. [93]
The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate
inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by
interested parties.[94] Under Section 12 of Rule 126, [95] the judge which issued the search warrant is mandated
to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received,
(2) delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items
seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court.
Given the foregoing deviations from the normal and prescribed manner of conducting a search, as
disclosed by the members of the raiding team themselves, the reliance by the trial court on the disputable
presumption that the police officers regularly performed their official duty was evidently misplaced.
The Affidavit of Orderly Search is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the search. Not having
been executed under oath, it is not actually an affidavit, but a pre-prepared form which the raiding team
brought with them. It was filled up after the search by team leader SPO1 Fernandez who then instructed
appellant to sign it as he did instruct Jack Go, KagawadManalo and Kagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses.
More importantly, since the Affidavit of Orderly Search purports to have been executed by appellant, the
same cannot establish the propriety and validity of the search of his residence for he was admittedly not
present when the search took place, he having arrived only when it was almost through.
Q And while your officers and the barangay kagawad were searching the house Mr. Benny Go is
not yet present in that house, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you made to sign Benny Go in the inventory receipt when the search was already over,
am I right?
A He was already present when I was making the inventory. He arrived at around 9:30.
Q Yes, and the search was already finished, am I right?

A Almost through.[96]
In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged Affidavit of Orderly
Search, prepared without the aid of counsel and by the very police officers who searched his residence and
eventually arrested him, provides no proof of the regularity and propriety of the search in question.
On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellants residence failed to
comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search of a house,
room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality. (Underscoring supplied)
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of the
upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place
in the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go
(who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor).Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by
law are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit
and letter of the law:
Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened by the
manner in which the search was conducted by the police authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at
the sala together with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered ito na. Apparently, the
search of the accused-appellants house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court which specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search
warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a procedure, wherein
members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as
the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the
other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter
of the law.[97] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second floor is
of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose
presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search
should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality only in the
absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of
appellants residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time.
The police officers were without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the
law.
The claim of SPO1 Fernandez and PO2 Abulencia that Jack Go voluntarily waived his right to witness
the search, allegedly because there would be no one left in the sala and anyway barangay officials were
present, cannot be accepted. To be valid, a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
[98]
Furthermore, the presumption is always against the waiver of a constitutionally protected right. [99]
While Jack Go was present from the time the raiding team entered the premises until after the search
was completed, he was, however, handcuffed to a chair in the sala. [100] All alone and confronted by five police
officers who had deprived him of his liberty, he cannot thus be considered to have voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to witness the search of the house. Consent given under such intimidating,
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.[101]
The search conducted by the police officers of appellants residence is essentially no different from that
in People v. Del Rosario[102] where this Court observed:
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized or
confiscated at the residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers
conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the

residence of accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying down and they immediately
arrested and detained him in the living room while they searched the other parts of the
house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in only
after the policemen had already entered accused-appellants residence (pp. 22-23, tsn, December 11,
1991), and, therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to the
Constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved (Sec. 14 (2), Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in
order to convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis
consistent with his innocence (People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653
[1964]; People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 [1986]). The facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that
accused-appellant is innocent.[103] (Emphasis supplied)
The raiding teams departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, taken together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of appellants residence,
tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule
and declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence. This must necessarily be so since it is this Courts
solemn duty to be ever watchful for the constitutional rights of the people, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon.[104]In the oft-quoted language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege . In earlier
times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no
longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.[105] (Emphasis supplied)
In all prosecutions for violation of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of the dangerous drug is a
condition sine qua non for conviction since the dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime.[106] With
the exclusion of Exhibit A, the plastic bag containing the shabu allegedly recovered from appellants residence
by the raiding team, the decision of the trial court must necessarily be reversed and appellant acquitted.
What is more, a thorough evaluation of the testimonies and evidence given before the trial court fails to
provide the moral certainty necessary to sustain the conviction of appellant.
In particular, Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo, the two witnesses to the search chosen by the
police officers in substitution of Jack Go, both categorically testified under oath that no shabu was recovered
from appellants residence by the police. Thus, Kagawad Lazaro testified that the plastic bag containing white
crystalline granules, later found positive forshabu, was not recovered from the room of Jack Go:
Atty. Reyes:
You were shown a while ago by the prosecution of (sic) an Inventory Receipt allegedly prepared
by Officer Fernandez which includes the list of the items seized from the premises of
Benny Go, now, you said that theres no white crystalline granules included in that list
which you signed during the inventory?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you recall what was the first item included in that list which you signed in the first page?
A Chinese medicine, sir.
Q Now, you also testified that you were with Officer Abulencia when you conducted the search
inside the room of Jack Go, now, did you recover anything from the room of Jack Go?
A PO2 Abulencia recovered one small plastic in the drawer of Jack Go and Naphthalene balls,
sir.
xxx
Atty. Reyes:
If that small plastic will be shown to you, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
I have here a plastic which contained yellowish powder. Could you go over this and tell us if this
was the one recovered from the room of Jack Go?
A This is the one, sir.
Q I have here another plastic containing white crystalline substance marked by the
prosecution as Exh. A. Will you tell us if this is also recovered from the room of
Jack Go?
A No, this was not recovered from the room of Jack Go, sir.
Q During the preparation of the inventory of the seized items, was this also included?
A I did not see that, sir.[107] (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Kagawad Manalo testified that neither the plastic bag of shabu nor the weighing scale was
among the seized items inventoried by the raiding team:
Q You said that you were present during the time when SPO1 Fernandez was preparing the
inventory of all the items taken from the premises of Benny Go, can you recall what are
these items?
A Yes sir, assorted Chinese medicines, assorted documents, papers, passports, stamp pad,
bankbooks and checks and it was placed in five (5) boxes and three (3) ladies bag.
Q What about a weighing scale? Is there a weighing scale, Mr. Witness?
A I did not see any weighing scale, sir.
Q How about drugs or shabu contained in a plastic pack?
A I did not see any also.[108] (Emphasis supplied)
On rebuttal, SPO1 Fernandez alleged that the two barangay kagawads were lying when they claimed
that no shabu was recovered from appellants residence, and implied that they had been asked to falsify their
testimonies in court:
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. witness, when Salvador Manalo testified before this Honorable Court when he was
confronted with Exh. B which is the inventory receipt the said witness denied that the first
page of Exh. B" was genuine on the fact that his signature and likewise [that of] his cocolleague did not appear on the first page of the said inventory receipt, what can you say
to that statement made by Salvador Manalo?
A Well, it has not been our practice to let the witness sign on the first page of the 2-page
inventory receipt and with regards to the said inventory receipt that he signed on June 4,
it is the same inventory receipt that I prepared, sir.
xxx
Q Likewise, Mr. witness, the said witness Salvador Manalo also denied that the shabu which
is the subject of this case has never been recovered by them, what can you say to
that?
A Well, its a lie, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because when the illegal drug was found by PO2 Abulencia, he was accompanied by
Gaspar Lazaro at that time. Then he called my attention and he also called the
attention of SPO2 Serquea as well as the attention of Mr. Salvador Manalo. When I
went upstairs, they were already inside the said room so the five of us saw the
illegal drugs, sir.
xxx
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. witness, when Salvador Manalo testified here on cross-examination, he mentioned that after
the search of the house of Benny Go, a certain investigator, a policeman pretended that
he is making a follow-up with respect to the search made by you and your team, will you
please tell us if immediately after the incident or after the investigation conducted by the
City Prosecutors Office when you had an occasion to meet Salvador Manalo after that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened to that meeting with Salvador Manalo after the preliminary
investigation?
Witness:
Because during the preliminary investigation, we were surprised why our witness has
taken side, it is on the side of the accused Benny Go so I decided to pay him a visit
that day after that confrontation on June 23 and I asked him what happened,
tinanong ko siya kung ano ang nangyari bakit mukhang nakampi na siya roon sa
kabila. Ang sagot niya sa akin ang sabi sa amin ni Atty. Galing kakausapin ka rin
niya. That is the exact words.
Atty. Reyes:
We will object to that for being hearsay. May we move that the latter portion be stricken off the
record.
Court:
Let it remain
Pros. Rebagay:
And will you please tell us exactly when this incident occur (sic), Mr. witness?
A That was after June 23, sir.
Q Where?
A At his store in A. Linao Street, Paco, sir.
Q And what was your response after you heard that answer from Salvador Manalo, if any,
Mr. witness?
Witness:

Siyempre nagtaka ako, bakit ganoon ibig sabihin implied baka nagka-aregluhan na, iyan
ang iniisip ko, sir.[109] (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, no further evidence, aside from the foregoing allegations and suspicions of SPO1
Fernandez, was ever presented to substantiate the claim that the two kagawads had deliberately falsified their
testimonies. On the contrary, it appears that the police officers did not actively pursue their complaint for
obstruction of justice against the two kagawads with the Department of Justice. Moreover, to completely
discount the testimonies of kagawads Lazaro and Manalo would be tantamount to having no witnesses to the
search of appellants residence at all except the police officers themselves, a situation clearly contrary to the
tenor and spirit of Section 8 of Rule 126.
The prosecutions attempt to introduce the weighing scale, supposedly seized during the search, only
casts more doubt on its case. Said weighing scale was conspicuously absent from the enumeration of seized
items in the handwritten Inventory Receipt, the Return of the Search Warrant and the Affidavit of Arrest
prepared by the police officers. SPO1 Fernandezs claim that the omission was an honest mistake, to wit:
Pros. Rebagay
Q Mr. Witness, a while ago you added another item which was not included in the inventory list
and this was the weighing scale. Please tell us, why is it only now that you are adding it
to the list of those items that you seized?
A Well, with all honesty Your Honor, I cannot offer any alibi except to say that I committed an
honest mistake when I did not include that weighing scale in the inventory receipts. [110]
does not inspire credence. Neither does SPO1 Serqueas explanation:
Q What was the search warrant all about? It commands you to search and seize what items?
A Regarding drugs, drug paraphernalias and proceeds of the crime, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
What else?
A Weighing scale, sir.
Q Weighing scale is included in the search warrant. So the warrant specifically commands you
to seize drugs, drug paraphernalias and weighing scale?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you read this Affidavit of Arrest before you signed this. Did you notice that the weighing
scale is not included here?
A Yes, sir. Now I noticed.
Q No, during the time that you signed this?
A No, sir.
Q You did not notice that?
A No, sir.
Q As well as the time when Officer Fernandez was preparing this Inventory, you did not call his
attention that there are some items missing in that Inventory?
A I did not call his attention. Honestly speaking (unfinished)
xxx
A Honestly speaking, we confiscated so many evidence including papers, boxes, voluminous
quantity of evidence recovered and only one officer is conducting the Inventory. We
cannot conduct Inventory two at a time or three at a time, only one. Because maybe, you
see, hes only one. Maybe he did not list it because of that so many evidence confiscated.
Atty. Reyes:
But the weighing scale is not a small item, is that correct? Its a big item?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you want to tell us that you missed that item?
A I was not the one who missed it, sir.
Q How about your Affidavit of Arrest?
A Officer Fernandez prepared that Affidavit, sir.
Q So you are not the one who prepared this? You merely signed it?
A I signed it in their presence, sir.[111]
The foregoing explanations are improbable and far from persuasive. Considering that a weighing scale
was among the items particularly described in Search Warrant No. 99-0038, it would be expected that the
police officers would be actively searching for it and, if found, they would take care to include it in the inventory
and the return of the search warrant. But while numerous seals, stamps, checks and documents not described
in the search warrant were seized and carefully inventoried by the raiding team, none of the five police officers
bothered to point out that the weighing scale had not been included in the inventory.
The implausibility of the story put forward by the police officers leads to no other conclusion than that
the weighing scale was introduced as an afterthought in order to bolster the case against appellant.

With the persistence of nagging doubts surrounding the alleged discovery and seizure of the shabu, it
is evident that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof and overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. It is thus not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, this Courts
constitutional duty to acquit him. [112] Apropos is the ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[113] viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of
the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said I think it is less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself. [114]
Return of Seized Property Not Described in the Search Warrant
Turning now to the Motion for Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia, the general
rule is that only the personal properties particularly described in the search warrant may be seized by the
authorities. Thus, in Tambasen v. People,[115] this Court held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of
the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in
the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they
should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not
be committed (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]; Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
[1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]).[116](Emphasis supplied)
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained
through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under the following circumstances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[117]
To be valid, therefore, the seizure of the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of Personal
Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia must fall within the ambit of Search Warrant No. 99-0038 or under any
of the foregoing recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement.
In this regard, the raiding team sought to justify the seizure of the car, the Fifty Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Sixty Pesos (P52,760.00) in different denominations, and the Twenty Five Thousand Chinese Yuan
(CY25,000.00) as either proceeds of the offense or means of committing an offense within the purview of the
warrant. Thus PO2 Abulencia testified:
Q And how about the money, Mr. witness? Why did you confiscate the money?
A Its considered as proceed of the crime, sir.
Q How about the vehicle, Mr. witness? Why did you took (sic) custody of the vehicle when it was
not listed in the search warrant?
A This is part and parcel of the evidence, sir. Because its being used in transporting drugs, sir.
[118]

Similarly, with respect to the car, SPO1 Fernandez stated:

Q This vehicle, Toyota Corolla GLI with Plate No. PNU-TT-658, where was it during the time that
you. . . (unfinished)
A It was parked in front of the house of Benny Go.
Q And you seized it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Because during the surveillance operation we saw some known pusher riding in that car?
Q Who are these drug pushers?

A One of those guys is Mr. Peter Co, also a subject of our investigation.
Q Which (sic) you released after the arrest, after he was invited for investigation in your office on
June 14, 1999?
A Yes, sir.[119]
The foregoing rationalizations are unacceptable. Admittedly, neither the money nor the car was
particularly described in the search warrant. In seizing the said items then, the police officers were exercising
their own discretion and determining for themselves which items in appellants residence they believed were
proceeds of the crime or means of committing the offense. This is absolutely impermissible. It bears reiterating
that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the
warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize . A search
warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. [120]
At the same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports,
bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as seizure of evidence in plain view. [121]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. [122] This Court had the
opportunity to summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the recent case of People v. Doria, supra,
to wit:
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure . The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
(Underscoring supplied; citations omitted)[123]
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the passports,
bankbooks, checks, typewriter, check writer, dry seals and stamp pads and other assorted documents does
not fall within the plain view exception. The assertions of the police officers that said objects were inadvertently
seized within their plain view are mere legal conclusions which are not supported by any clear narration of the
factual circumstances leading to their discovery. PO2 Abulencia could not even accurately describe how the
raiding team came across these items:
Q This Box A marked as Exhibit G, in what part of the room did you recover this?
A We recovered all the evidence within our plain view, sir. The evidence were scattered in his
house. I cannot remember whether Box A or Box B, but all the evidence were within our
plain view thats why we confiscated them, sir.
Q What do you mean by plain view?
A Nakikita namin, sir. Yung kitang-kita namin.
Q Where in the premises of Benny Go did you see all these documents?
A Ground floor and upstairs but mostly in the ground floor, on the table and on the floor, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
This Box A marked as Exh. G contains what documents again?
A Can I see my notes, sir?
Atty. Reyes:
Go ahead.
A Box A contains different bundle of pieces of document, NBI and BI clearances, Application of
Chinese National, different papers, sir.
Q Can you remember where in particular did you recover these documents?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q All of these documents were recovered primarily on the ground floor and on the second floor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where in particular at the second floor, there are three to four rooms there?
A Sir, nandoon sa mesa lahat iyan eh don sa taas rin may mesa din doon at saka doon naming
nakuha ang ibang mga dokumento.
Q Is (sic) that room belongs (sic) to Jack Go?
A I dont know, sir, but all these (sic) evidence were recovered from the house of Benny Go. [124]
SPO1 Fernandezs account of how he came across the dry seals, rubber stamps and papers is just as
opaque:
Q For how long have you been inside the house of Benny Go when you noticed these dry seals?

A I think more than an hour, I dont exactly remember the time.

Q But during the time you have not yet noticed the documents which you brought to this Court,
what call (sic) your attention was these dry seals first?
A Well, actually the dry seals and the rubber stamps were all placed atop the table and as well
as the documents because the box where the documents were placed are half
opened. They are opened actually thats why I saw them.
Q So, you first saw the rubber stamps and the dry seals, is that correct? Because they are atop
the table?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then later on you also saw the documents?
A Yes, sir its beside the table.
Q Contained in a box half opened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which did you touch first, the rubber stamps, the dry seals or the documents?
A I did not touch anything, I only inventoried that when the searching team were through with
what they are doing. Now, all the evidence were placed atop the dining table, located also
at the sala of the house or at the dining area. Then, thats when I asked some of my comembers to place all those document and the other confiscated items atop the table also.
[125]

The foregoing testimonies are clearly evasive and do not establish how the police officers became
aware of the seized items which were allegedly within their plain view.
Finally, it appears from the testimony of SPO1 Fernandez that the supposed illegal character of the
items claimed to have been seized within the plain view of the policemen was not readily and immediately
apparent. Rather, the suspicions of the policemen appear to have been aroused by the presence of the
numerous passports and immigration documents which they discovered in the course of their search. After
they confirmed that appellant was not operating a travel agency, they concluded that his possession of said
documents and passports was illegal even though they could not identify the alleged law supposedly violated .
[126]

To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against appellant for alleged possession of instruments
or implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised
Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellants residence. [127]
However, the illegal character of said dry seals and stamp pads cannot be said to have been
immediately apparent. For SPO1 Fernandez had to first make an impression of the dry seal on paper before
he could determine that it purported to be the seal of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. [128] The
counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been turned over to
the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible
that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a plain view of the items from his vantage point in
the sala.
In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the plain view
doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant
not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be ordered returned
to him.[129]
Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been
certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, [130] they may not be returned and are
hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to law. [131] Moreover, the various
bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant
proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.[132]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, convicting appellant
Benny Go of violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2) Article I of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Benny Go is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is hereby ordered immediately
RELEASED from confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith IMPLEMENT this Decision and to
INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement.

Appellants Motion For Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia is GRANTED IN
PART, and the trial court is hereby ordered to return to him those items seized from the subject premises
which belong to him as listed in said Motion.
The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby directed to
deliver and/or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
The two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation are likewise ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Acting Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to
confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano
on 3 March 1986.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 104768

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano
and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the
name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the
possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.

July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first
Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the
remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to
complete the presentation of its evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates . EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish
and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito
R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. 2

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at
Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That
respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay
Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That
on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4)
attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is
supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her
house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an
intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were
it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos,
Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the
Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it
was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant
part of the Resolution reads:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of
RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 3

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No.
1379") 4against Ramas.

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La
Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327
square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended
Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and
Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as codefendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986.
On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned
as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint
further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his
public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos." 5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to
believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. 6 The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the
forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house
at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and
other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications
equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the
office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no further
evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within
which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would
constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. 9 The Court held in
Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of
mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as
to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.
SO ORDERED.

After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and
the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18
April 1989.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which
petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the delinquent
properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x
x."8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners presentation of
evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file
the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the amended complaint
was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the
time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted
against Ramas and Dimaano.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial
because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated
its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to change the averments to
show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its
many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact
the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its
additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Giving
petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence,
the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting
was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under the circumstances.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS
EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO
SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR
AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO

NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED

AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission
from time to time.
x x x.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY

THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v.
MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are
clearly not applicable to this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was
cured and/or waived by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with
counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were
filed after commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and
even before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND
THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND
TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE. 12
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of
a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired. 15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings. 16 The
PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to
conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order."
EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following
matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP
personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by
being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their
public office or using their powers, influence x x x; 17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and
corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. 18
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas
case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over
him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his
position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled
him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former
President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO
No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is used in
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.
Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the
term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both
here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees have any interest or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only
to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs.
Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO
No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the
administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General 19 does
not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its
amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former
President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former
President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with
former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former
President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that
unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the
investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is
a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and
corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the same AFP Board
Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the
following recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of
RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 20
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to
petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers
must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the properties
Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his commander-inchief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these
properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without showing that Ramas
amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that
the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close
association with former President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines
did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or
his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be
read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in
the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14a;21(Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was
accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No.
122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say
that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under
Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten
wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the
foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise,
jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating
agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and
his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not
falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on
or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General. 27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No.
6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file
forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986. 28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a
prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed
with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents
since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP
Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379.
Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct
the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private
respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding
with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of
law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by
submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place.
The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are
specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover
the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. 29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot
claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute their
cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino.
This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to
Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any
stage of the proceeding. 30 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is
vested by law and not by the parties to an action.31

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No.
1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan. 32 The right
of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or
estoppel.33
Second
Issue:
Propriety
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

of

Dismissal

of

Case

Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents.
This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against
private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation
of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself
to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four
years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and
only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence.
However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing
numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its
evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. 34 The motion sought
"to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to
forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since petitioner did
not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation
of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to
prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house
as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners
case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will
not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in
evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant captioned
"Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos
cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with
other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle
with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash
consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure "on
March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution." 39 Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and
Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people." 40 Petitioner
asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which
guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been
ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to
produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of
the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the
fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one
beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now
faced with a situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a fivemonth pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic. 35

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2
February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill
of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government
may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at
the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on the
unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379. 36 The PCGG prayed for an
additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request and
scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner
failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again,
the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to
inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x." 37 Still on the date set,
petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended
Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for years would revert to its
preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended
long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more
disposition of the case.

the
the
the
the

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to
individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However,
we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect
during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the
1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno: 42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or
state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's
book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a
community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the
"people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a people to
cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions
by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making
power lies with the people of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform
and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution."
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes;
in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can
be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her control of
the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the
departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where
the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would
render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government ("PCGG")
before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even
the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due
process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because
there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution,
the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom
Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 43 petitioner
Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity
of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its
Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly
recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of
sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and
the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already
mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact

"measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders
and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or
freezing of assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include
specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the
present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,
of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is
doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major
portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in
the end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be
allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The
answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for
protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say
grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give
the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional
normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of
Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a
temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that
would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that
is "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks for
extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress
may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is asking
for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that
they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be
an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very
disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated
verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even
discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction
block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us
and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The
hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights,
specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively revolving
about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom

captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values
enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the
committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG
has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that what the PCGG has been
doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to
go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable
option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another
Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the
devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our
nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting sequestration
orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section
26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent
Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a
constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all
sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the
Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights 45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant,
the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 46 Thus, the revolutionary government was
also obligated under international law to observe the rights 47 of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of
the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not
repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure
government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders
of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such
directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid
abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioners
witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the
weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles,
sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do
you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they also
brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other jewelries were
contained in attach cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3) vaults or steel
safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open these
containers only to find out that they contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this money
instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the
money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they
might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the Municipal
Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.

xxx

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the
name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

AJ AMORES
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries.
Why did you seize the jewelries?

A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and
other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not
really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because they might get
lost if they will just leave this behind.

A. Yes, your Honor.

xxx
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or contraband
which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be contained in
attach cases.1wphi1 These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered
firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also decided
to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.

A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the communications
equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search warrant considering that we
have not established concrete evidence about that. So when

Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer
Certificates of Title of lands?

Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many
ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged
Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened. 51
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did
not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding
team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, 53 and they are
not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that
such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used
as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be
returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to
the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE,
BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO
MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS
PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN
TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B.
LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO
AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT.
RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the question
whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only
the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa
(TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"
Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members
of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were
arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel;
that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in
order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of
plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at
least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza,
alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise
of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming
that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin
Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez,
Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo
Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On
November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C.
Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the
defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their

detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of
action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated
plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of
Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that
the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had
vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful
study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted.
On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit."

(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.

A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was
filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the
defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of
all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso
Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.

5. Col. Galileo Montanar

6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro

On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in
the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to
preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or
jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion
for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid
Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984,
the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the motion
to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca,
Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno,
Alan Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex
Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio
Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando
Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to
reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an
appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said
Order is now final against said plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984,
alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez,
Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to
reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs
claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order
of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had
already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion
to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the
Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit;

8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action
or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects and
refers to defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3,
1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and
modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the
respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9,
1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those
sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee to the law of force rather than
the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and
cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must
prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to
reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the
community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him
who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of
Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of
sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public
officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official
duties or function In support of said contention, respondents maintain that
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty
is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the
President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection
or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law
but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also
provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and
effect."

(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;

(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same
is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the
latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from
respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive
strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners
claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task force
resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures
and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that,
therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task force should be held
liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent
members of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties.
To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed
in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to shield
respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties and from
potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v.
Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of protecting the performance of
governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly or constantly
interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79
Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx

The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties
is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102
Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo,
360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d
198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his
call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from
Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases
invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the
ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General
had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances
justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he
cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts
are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or
interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive
authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the
purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding
to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27,
1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by
any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which
all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their
mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the
left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and
imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to
unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms.
The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the
struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the
suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry
into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is
indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same
claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for
release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e.
override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of
altering the title of their action."

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in
P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict)
arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention
and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not
and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation
of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and
lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot
and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of respondent
superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The
doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master
and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of
the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added
meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his
duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen.
Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando
Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt.
Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major
Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone

'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of
the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of
action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical
violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in
any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among
others
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;

It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs,
through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido;
Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel
for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino,
counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And
this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on
the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez,
Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon
Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.

2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs'
constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by
defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of
cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and
illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular,
improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where
they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman,
degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains
a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of
all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in
behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party
concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to
take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the
complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed
by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived
technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the
plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity
cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated
November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be
remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and GrioAquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well
established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of
the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the
complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The
complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient
to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs
Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth ProtacioMarcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a
motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to
dismiss?

Padilla, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and
ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO
GOLEZ,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 seeks to nullify the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 17 September 2003 and
Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael
Pulido ("petitioners") on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor
Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo
(PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees").
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay ("Gen. Cabuay"), Chief of the Intelligence Service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"), who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen.
Narciso Abaya ("Gen. Abaya"), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP"), Secretary of National Defense and National Security Adviser,
because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and
took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"), an upscale apartment complex, located
in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted
explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet
members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier
planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place
while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government
prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial
court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV
("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the
military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior
officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003,
the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of the writ on
Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals
for RAFFLEamong the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision thereon, after which
a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from promulgation of the decision. 3
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a return
of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the
scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a
Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ and
Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing.
After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition
submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Nonetheless, the
appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations
Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court
regarding visiting hours and the detainees right to exercise for two hours a day.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are
already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this
case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and
petitioners do not even question.

The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality
of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the
constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty. The
appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable
under the circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of
his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The
violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in
open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two hours a day. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is
hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the detainees in
accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of the
detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day.
SO ORDERED.4
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE
REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE
DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS DETENTION.5
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already
foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition.
Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the Court referred to the
Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers detention. Had the Court ruled for the
detainees release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The
Court would have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the
hearing of the petition.6 The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his
detention.7 However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters
covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not
an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of
the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the

writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found
that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals,
petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of
their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the
detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy
ofhabeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. 8 The purpose of the writ
is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. 9 If the inquiry reveals that the
detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then
the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of
error.10 Neither can it substitute for an appeal. 11
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a
persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary.12
However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the
scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. 13 Whatever
situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be
sufficient to void the entire proceedings.14
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees. Neither do they
dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the
regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from
seeing the detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the
detainees right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 ("RA 7438"). 15 Petitioners claim that the
regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to
privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt.
Milo Maestrecampo ("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees
right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having
contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron
grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. 16 However, the fact that the
detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public. 17 RA 7438, which specifies the
rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer
to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.
Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate
family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of
the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4)
years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any
detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)

True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a detainee client "at any
hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night." However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes
the express qualification that "notwithstanding" the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the
power to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and
prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a
detainees confinement must be "reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape."
Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the governments objective of securing the safety and
preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to "undertake such
reasonable measures" or regulations.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to effective representation when
petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the
detainees rights entitle them to be released from detention.
Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the
detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from detention. The
ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the
regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees.
American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement are
permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,18 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably related
to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a
restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless. 19 However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from
skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court
commanded the courts to afford administrators "wide-ranging deference" in implementing policies to maintain
institutional security.21
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in
detention centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees
safety and prevent his escape." In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the
detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the
escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-toface meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right
to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break
at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain
clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent
cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the
visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to
confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in
the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, 22 petitioners were given time to confer with the
detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit. 23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to
counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron
grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress
us.Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in
accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainees desire to live
comfortably.24The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live
comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment. 25 It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and
purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. 26 Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction
seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that
purpose.27 Jail officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure. 28 They must only
refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves. 29

We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the "essential
objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees presence at trial." While this interest undoubtedly
justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept respondents
argument that the Governments interest in ensuring a detainees presence at trial is the only objective that
may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. "If the government
could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their
presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention." The
Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual
is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require administrative measures that go beyond those
that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the
Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the institution and make certain no
weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institutions interest in
maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are
discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while
awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests
that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition
to ensuring the detainees presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the
individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial
detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment. 30

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability,"
and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. 31 Punishment also requires that the harm or disability
be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement. 32
Block v. Rutherford,33 which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this
practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if
they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and
may have prior criminal conviction. 34 Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail
staff hostage to effect escapes. 35 Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons,
drugs, and other contraband. 36 The restriction on contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as
they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons. 37 The security consideration in
the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees. 38

risk detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples Army ("NPA") member and two
suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes
and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a
sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens privacy rights unless
authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of
convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated
escapes.41 Even in the absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening and inspecting
mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of "civil deaths." 42 Inmates were deemed to have no
right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was
that the right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications between
the inmate and his lawyer.43
Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received respect. 44 The
confidential correspondences could not be censored. 45 The infringement of such privileged communication
was held to be a violation of the inmates First Amendment rights. 46 A prisoner has a right to consult with his
attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the
administration of the institution. 47 Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten
prison security.48
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted inmates
and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono 49 recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike
convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail
addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be
inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be
inspected or read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,50 involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates.
However, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:

Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal
of internal security.39 This case reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of
judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in
deference to administrative expertise.40

The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from attorneys to
inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The prison regulation under challenge
provided that (a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no exception was made for
attorney-prisoner mail. x x x

In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron
bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors
prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited
physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict noncontact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with
visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.

Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend that they
may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The narrow issue
thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison
authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection
techniques fail to indicate contraband.
xxx

The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This
measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and
weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within
the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and
do not constitute punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center are
not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo
Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well
and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to
the conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with detainees. The Court of
Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-

x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an attorney before
opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be imposed. We think it entirely
appropriate that the State require any such communications to be specially marked as originating from an
attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to receive special treatment. It would also
certainly be permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first
identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters marked privileged are actually
from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way
constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the
inmates presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail. The possibility that contraband will be
enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials opening the letters.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals that this should only be done in appropriate circumstances. Since a

flexible test, besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible
constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a rule whereby the
inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and perhaps even more, than the
Constitution requires.51
In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of
privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of
the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that
imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These constraints on
inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system." The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to
accommodate a myriad of "institutional needs and objectives" of prison facilities, chief among which is internal
security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our
system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction.53
The later case of State v. Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made
no distinction as to the detainees limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence
in the United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government
interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then
the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and
continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We
are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoners expectation of privacy always yield to what must be
considered a paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society that
"[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement."
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has been
blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security risk
than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases
be individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a
greater risk of escape than convicted inmates. 55 Valencia v. Wiggins56 further held that "it is impractical to
draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security."
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail poses a
genuine threat to jail security.57 Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged
mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. 58 A pre-trial detainee has
no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail. 59 However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates
enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not
read the contents without violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer. 60 The inspection of
privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. 61

privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have
a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the
constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts "balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators." 63 The deferential review of such regulations
stems from the principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously
hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration.64
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup
detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.65 The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible
leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial
district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of
War.66
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus,
we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining
the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate
regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the
military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from
petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison
facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a
case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners
subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement.67 The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration
of confinement.68
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
78545.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the
present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed
envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening
of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection
in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights 62 is a guarantee
that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155282

January 17, 2005

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner,

vs.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as
amended, filed by petitioner Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) against ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) and former Senator Loren Legarda, respondents, assailing
the (a) Decision dated November 18, 1997, 1 and (b) Order dated August 26, 2002 2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-93-16052.
The facts are undisputed.
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired " Prosti-tuition," an episode of the
television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program,
student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Womens

University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building
at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode.

Story" and other similar programs, they being public affairs programs which can be equated to
newspapers; and

The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman,
Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed lettercomplaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the
PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students.

3. MAKING PERMANENT the Injunction against Respondents or all persons acting in their behalf.

Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB
Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not submit " The Inside Story" to
petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 7 4 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and Section 3,6 Chapter III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB
Rules and Regulations.8
In their answer,9 respondents explained that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and
jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties memoranda, the MTRCB Investigating
Committee rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the respondents are ordered to pay the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for non-submission of the program, subject of this case for review and
approval of the MTRCB.
Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Channel
2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing; otherwise the
Board will act accordingly."101awphi1.nt
On appeal, the Office of Atty. Henrietta S. Mendez, Chairman of the MTRCB, issued a Decision dated March
12, 1993 affirming the above ruling of its Investigating Committee. 11 Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated April 14, 1993. 12

SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 24
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including
"public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials," are subject to petitioners power of
review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Courts ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of
Appeals ;25second, television programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal
regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former; third, petitioners power to review television programs under
Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;" and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986
does not violate respondents constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.
Respondents take the opposite stance.
The issue for our resolution is whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the " The Inside Story"
prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The present controversy brings into focus the provisions of Section 3 of P. D. No. 1986, partly reproduced as
follows:
"SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
xxxxxx

Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77,
Quezon City. It seeks to: (1) declare as unconstitutional Sections 3(b), 13 3(c),14 3(d),15 4,16 7,17 and 1118 of P. D.
No. 1986 and Sections 3,19 7,20 and 2821 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations; 22 (2) (in the alternative)
exclude the "The Inside Story" from the coverage of the above cited provisions; and (3) annul and set aside
the MTRCB Decision dated March 12, 1993 and Resolution dated April 14, 1993 . Respondents averred that
the above-cited provisions constitute "prior restraint" on respondents exercise of freedom of expression and of
the press, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Furthermore, the above cited provisions do not apply to the " The
Inside Story" because it falls under the category of "public affairs program, news documentary, or sociopolitical editorials" governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers.
On November 18, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision 23 in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the assailed Decision and Resolution of MTRCB dated
March 12, 1993;
2. DECLARING AND DECREEING that Sections 3 (b), (c), and (d), 4, 7, and 11 of P.D. No. 1986
and Sections 3, 7, 28 (a) of its Implementing Rules do not cover the TV Program " The Inside

b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including
publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity
materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing,
imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for
export.1a\^/phi1.net
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the
BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its
people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such
as but not limited to:
xxx
d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the importation, exportation, production,
copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end and that no such pictures, programs and materials as are

determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be imported,
exported, produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;
x x x x x x."
Vis-a-vis the foregoing provisions, our task is to decide whether or not petitioner has the power to review the
television program "The Inside Story." The task is not Herculean because it merely resurrects this Court En
Bancs ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals.26 There, the Iglesia ni Cristo sought exception from
petitioners review power contending that the term "television programs" under Sec. 3 (b) does not include
"religious programs" which are protected under Section 5, Article III of the Constitution. 27 This Court, through
Justice Reynato Puno, categorically ruled that P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner "the power to screen, review and
examine "all television programs," emphasizing the phrase "all television programs," thus:
"The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television programs. By the
clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition
and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x. The law also directs the Board to apply
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard to determine those which are objectionable for being
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime."
Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not
except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. 28 Ubi lex non
distinguit nec distinguere debemos. Thus, when the law says "all television programs," the word "all" covers all
television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. 29 The principle assumes that the
legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or expression. 30
It then follows that since "The Inside Story" is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB
over which it has power of review.
Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the term "television programs" on the ground that
the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial" protected
under Section 4,31 Article III of the Constitution. Albeit, respondents basis is not freedom of religion, as
in Iglesia ni Cristo,32 but freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo applies squarely
to the instant issue. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion
has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x
x." Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not
exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the
Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of
petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which,
according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the
press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D.
No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. Thus:

"SEC. 7. Unauthorized showing or exhibition. It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or
cause to be exhibited in any moviehouse, theatre, or public place or by television within the Philippines any
motion picture, television program or publicity material, including trailers, and stills for lobby displays in
connection with motion pictures, not duly authorized by the owner or his assignee and passed by the BOARD;
or to print or cause to be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater or public place or by
television a label or notice showing the same to have been officially passed by the BOARD when the same
has not been previously authorized, except motion pictures, television programs or publicity material
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and
newsreels."
Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents contend that the " The Inside Story" falls under the
category of newsreels.
Their contention is unpersuasive.
P. D. No. 1986 does not define "newsreels." Websters dictionary defines newsreels as short motion picture
films portraying or dealing with current events.33 A glance at actual samples of newsreels shows that they are
mostly reenactments of events that had already happened. Some concrete examples are those of Dziga
Vertovs Russian Kino-Pravda newsreel series (Kino-Pravda means literally "film-truth," a term that was later
translated literally into the French cinema verite) and Frank Capras Why We Fight series.34 Apparently,
newsreels are straight presentation of events. They are depiction of "actualities." Correspondingly, the
MTRCB Rules and Regulations 35 implementing P. D. No. 1986 define newsreels as "straight news reporting,
as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are
not considered newsreels."36 Clearly, the "The Inside Story" cannot be considered a newsreel. It is more of a
public affairs program which is described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news
and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. 37 Certainly, such kind of program is
within petitioners review power.
It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has authority to review " The Inside
Story." Clearly, we are not called upon to determine whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
oppression or the press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program. Neither did it cancel
respondents permit. Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner " The Inside
Story" for its review and approval. Therefore, we need not resolve whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986
and the MTRCB Rules and Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution.
Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTCs ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and
Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional. It is settled that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question
must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.38
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.l^vvphi1.net The assailed RTC Decision dated November 18,
1997 and Order dated August 26, 2002 are hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated March 12, 1993 of
petitioner MTRCB is AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.