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ARCETA V MANGROBANG

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152895. June 15, 2004]

OFELIA
V. ARCETA, petitioner,
vs. The
Honorable
MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG,
Presiding
Judge,
Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro
Manila, respondent.

[G.R. No. 153151. June 15, 2004]

GLORIA S. DY, petitioner, vs. The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO,


Presiding Judge, Branch 53, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City,respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For resolution are two consolidated petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary
restraining order. Both assail the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law,
also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
[1]

In G.R. No. 152895, petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta prays that we order the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas, Metro Manila, Branch 54, to cease
and desist from hearing Criminal Case No. 1599-CR for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
and then dismiss the case against her. In G.R. No. 153151, petitioner Gloria
S. Dy also prays that this Court order the MeTC of Caloocan City to cease and
desist from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 212183, and subsequently
dismiss the case against her. In fine, however, we find that what both petitioners
seek is that the Court should revisit and abandon the doctrine laid down
in Lozano v. Martinez, which upheld the validity of the Bouncing Checks Law.
[2]

The facts of these cases are not in dispute.


1. G.R. No. 152895

The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with
violating B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 1599-CR. The accusatory portion of said Information reads:

Thatonoraboutthe16thdayofSeptember1998,inNavotas,MetroManila,
andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,
didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslymakeordrawandissue
toOSCARR.CASTRO,toapplyonaccountorforvaluethecheckdescribed
below:
CheckNo:00082270
DrawnAgainst:TheRegionBank
IntheAmountof:P740,000.00
Date:December21,1998
Payableto:Cash
saidaccusedwellknowingthatatthetimeofissueOfeliaV.Arcetadidnot
havesufficientfundsorcreditwiththedraweebankforthepayment,which
checkwhenpresentedforpaymentwithinninety(90)daysfromthedate
thereofwassubsequentlydishonoredbythedraweebankforreasonDRAWN
AGAINSTINSUFFICIENTFUNDS,anddespitereceiptofnoticeofsuch
dishonor,theaccusedfailedtopaysaidpayeewiththefaceamountofsaid
checkortomakearrangementforfullpaymentthereofwithinfive(5)banking
daysafterreceivingnotice.
CONTRARYTOLAW.

[3]

Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the
Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. She
reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be
an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her
motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence.
On October 21, 2002, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should be without
prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to
suspend proceedings in the trial court.
[4]

Arceta then filed the instant petition.

2. G.R. No. 153151


The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against
Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed by the MeTC of
Caloocan City as Criminal Case No. 212183. Dy allegedly committed the offense
in this wise:

ThatonoraboutthemonthofJanuary2000inCaloocanCity,MetroManila,
PhilippinesandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabove
namedaccused,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslymake
andissueCheckNo.0000329230drawnagainstPRUDENTIALBANKinthe
amountofP2,500,000.00datedJanuary19,2000toapplyforvalueinfavorof
ANITACHUAwellknowingatthetimeofissuethatshehasnosufficient
fundsinorcreditwiththedraweebankforthepaymentofsuchcheckinfull
uponitspresentmentwhichcheckwassubsequentlydishonoredforthereason
ACCOUNTCLOSEDandwithintenttodefraudfailedandstillfailstopaythe
saidcomplainanttheamountofP2,500,000.00despitereceiptofnoticefromthe
draweebankthatsaidcheckhasbeendishonoredandhadnotbeenpaid.
ContrarytoLaw.

[5]

Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the
ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move
on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said ground
would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with this Court
invoking its power of judicial review to have the said law voided for Constitutional
infirmity.
Both Arceta and Dy raise the following identical issues for our resolution:

[a]Doessection1reallypenalizetheactofissuingachecksubsequently
dishonoredbythebankforlackoffunds?
[b]Whatistheeffectifthedishonoredcheckisnotpaidpursuanttosection2
ofBP22?
[c]Whatistheeffectifitissopaid?
[d]Doessection2makeBP22adebtcollectinglawunderthreatof
imprisonment?
[e]DoesBP22violatetheconstitutionalproscriptionagainstimprisonmentfor
nonpaymentofdebt?

[f]IsBP22avalidexerciseofthepolicepowerofthestate?

[6]

After minute scrutiny of petitioners submissions, we find that the basic issue
being raised in these special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise
put, the petitions constitute an oblique attack on the constitutionality of the
Bouncing Checks Law, a matter already passed upon by the Court through
Justice (later Chief Justice) Pedro Yap almost two decades ago. Petitioners add,
however, among the pertinent issues one based on the observable but
worrisome transformation of certain metropolitan trial courts into seeming
collection agencies of creditors whose complaints now clog the court dockets.
But let us return to basics. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a
legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an
actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when these
requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of
unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to
counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to agree that
the abovecited requisites have been adequately met.
[7]

Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule
65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In a special civil action of
certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Yet nowhere in these petitions is there any allegation that the respondent
judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of
discretion is manifested.
[8]

[9]

[10]

Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any


attachments or annexes in the form of a copy of an order, decision, or resolution
issued by the respondent judges so as to place them understandably within the
ambit of Rule 65. What are appended to the petitions are only copies of the
Informations in the respective cases, nothing else. Evidently, these petitions for a
writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and
appropriate cases contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise
of this Courts power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their
faces petitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action.
Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before
the horse, figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the hierarchy of
courts outlined in Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean
immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity means that
[11]

the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been


immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners
should have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the
cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of
B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in
the proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could not entertain
questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically
raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Taking into account the early
stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature.
[12]

Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the


very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative. We have examined the contentions of the
petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself
or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the
thesis of petitioner Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a
basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but
scant consideration. As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times
that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in
the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as
currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and
financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be
burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to
the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of
dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
[13]

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo,
Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.

[1]

Per Resolution of the Court En Banc dated 15 October 2002.

[2]

No. L-63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323.

[3]

Rollo, G.R. No. 152895, p. 61.

[4]

Id. at 76.

[5]

Rollo, G.R. No. 153151, p. 58.

[6]

Rollo, G.R. No. 152895, pp. 8-9; Rollo, G.R. No. 153151, p. 8.

[7]

Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, 19 August 1994, 235 SCRA
506, 518-519 citing Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 86889, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51, 58; Dumlao v. COMELEC, No. L-52245, 22
January 1980, 95 SCRA 392, 400; People v. Vera, No. 45685, 16 November 1937, 65
Phil. 56, 86-89.

[8]

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46.
[9]

II FERIA AND NOCHE, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 456 (2001 Ed.).

[10]

Jalandoni v. Drilon, G.R. Nos. 115239-40, 2 March 2000, 327 SCRA 107, 121.

[11]

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed
in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no
case exceeding 15 days.
[12]

Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118233, 10 December 1999, 378 Phil. 232, 240 citing City
of Baguio, Reforestation Administration v. Hon. Marcos, G.R. No. L-26100, 28 February
1969, 136 Phil. 569, 579.

[13]

Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, 20 January 1999, 361 Phil. 251, 263.

LAGMAY V CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84929 July 23, 1991

JULIO F. LAGMAY, ILUSTRE BASCONCILLO and BLAS PINGGAN represented by his


Son WINIFREDO PINGGAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ADELA TUASON, respondents.
Salvador V. Lopez for petitioners.
Ulysses T. Sevilla for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision and the
resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12761 entitled "Julio Lagmay, et al. vs.
Adela Tuason" which dismissed for lack of merit herein petitioners' appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116 at Pasay City 2 in Civil Case No. 3087 dismissing petitioners'
complaint for enforcement of a lessee's preemptive right to purchase a leased land under
Presidential Decree No. 1517.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Adela Tuason was the registered owner of a 300-square meter lot situated in F.B. Harrison
Street corner Col. Doro, Pasay City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3134. For
more than twenty years (20), she leased a total of 164 square meters of the lot of the
following: Julio Lagmay (67 sq.m.); Ilustre Basconvillo (50 sq.m.); and Blas Pinggan (47
sq.m.); These lessees built residential houses in their respective areas.
On September 15, 1980, Atty. Jose T. Molina, counsel for Adela Tuason, sent the said
lessees a letter notifying them of her intention to sell the premises they were occupying in
view of her need for money to cover her medical expenses. She gave the lessees first
preference to buy the lot they were respectively renting and allowed them three months
within which to decide whether or not they wanted to exercise the option and for how much
(Rollo, p. 34). As the lessees did not make any reply to said letter, starting May, 1983, Adela
Tuason stopped collecting rentals. The lessees did not bother to pay or even to offer to pay
said rentals.
In April, 1985, Remedios Tuason Uichanco and Pacita Tuason Principe wrote the lessees a
letter reminding them that although their sister, Adela, who had been ailing, had decided to
sell the land, she refrained from doing so and even allowed them to stay for two years
without paying rentals. The sisters requested the lessees to leave the premises to enable
their sister to sell the lots to meet her financial obligations (Exhibit "2"; Rollo, p. 35).
Instead of leaving the premises, on June 7, 1985, the lessees sent Adela Tuason a letter
offering to buy the land and "asserting positively their individual priority legal rights under
Presidential Decree No. 1517 (Sec. 6) otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform Law, to
purchase or buy the said land for whatever valuable consideration or price but consistent
with the authorized prevailing fair market value" (Exhibit "L"; Rollo, p. 36). Adela Tuason did
not make a reply to this letter nor did she make another offer to sell the land to the lessees.
On August 5, 1985, the lessees filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
the enforcement of their preemptive right under P.D. No. 1517 with prayer for damages and

the issuance of a restraining order. The lower court issued a restraining order on September
27, 1985 upon the lessees' posting of a P1,000.00 bond. The restraining order was
converted into a preliminary injunction on October 8, 1985.
Subsequently, the lessees, through another letter (Exhibit "M"), offered to buy the premises
involved at P800.00 per square meter. Adela Tuason once again did not make any reply to
said letter.
On August 27, 1986, the lower court dismissed the complaint and lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction it has issued. It ruled that before the lessee can exercise his "right of first refusal to
purchase" the leased land under Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1517, the following preconditions
enunciated in Sections 8 and 9 thereof, must be complied with: (a) the lessor's proposal to
sell must be duly accepted by the lessee; (b) the terms and conditions of the said proposal
must be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee;
and (c) the said proposal must be declared to the Ministry of Human Settlements. The lower
court held that these conditions had not been met in this case. It added that the letter of
Adela Tuason's sisters to the lessees was a polite demand to vacate and not an offer to sell.
The lessees elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, in its decision of May 10, 1988,
dismissed their appeal mainly on the ground that the lessees could not properly exercise
their preemptive right to purchase the property because their leased lots were not included in
the 244 urban sites proclaimed as urban land reform areas under Proclamation No. 1967,
which amended Proclamation No. 1893 (declaring the entire Metro Manila as Urban Land
Reform Zone). The Court of Appeals added that assuming that the area involved was
covered by the proclamation, the lessees waived their preemptive right by their failure to
reply to Adela Tuason's offer to sell the land. Moreover, the lessees had failed to comply with
the prerequisites for the exercise of their preemptive right.
The lessees filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. They assailed the
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1967 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and not
uniformly applied "to all tenants wherever they are." (Rollo, p. 38). They also contended that
they did not waive their rights to purchase the land and that Adela Tuason had not
abandoned her offer to sell the leased land.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution of September 2,
1988 stating that it was improper to assail the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1967 in
the said motion as it was not raised in the trial on the merits. It considered the lessees' other
arguments as a mere rehash.
Hence, the lessees filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising as issues the
following: (a) whether or not Proclamation No. 1967 is unconstitutional for being "utterly
discriminatory" and not uniform in application; (b) whether or not Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1517 is
self-executing for all qualified tenants who intend to buy, on cash basis, their leased areas;
and (c) whether or not Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 1517 applies only to qualified tenants who intend to
purchase leased lands on an installment basis (Rollo, p. 12).
After the private respondent 3 had filed her comment on the petition and the petitioners their
reply thereto, on April 25, 1990, the Court resolved to: (a) dispense with private respondent's
rejoinder to said reply; (b) give due course to the petition; and (c) consider the case submitted for
decision (Rollo, p. 65).

The issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or proclamation must be the


very lis mota presented in a case. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is
necessary to its determination (Filipinas Marble Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
142 SCRA 180 [1986]; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
Although the Court may deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional issue
considering that numerous persons are affected by the questioned proclamation (Tropical
Homes, Inc. v. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]), there are other grounds
by which this case may be resolved on a non-constitutional determination (Alger Electric, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 37 [1985]).
In this case, the resolution of the issue of whether or not Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1517 is "selfexecuting" will determine the legality of petitioners' claim for the preemptive right provided for
in said section. Petitioners assert their entitlement to said right but even a cursory reading of
said section points to a contrary conclusion. Said section states:
SECTION 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the
Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or
more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have legally
occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not
be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to
purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under
terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and
Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.
(Emphasis supplied).
Clearly then, under said provision, the terms and conditions of the sale in exercise of the
lessee's right of first refusal to purchase shag be determined by the Urban Zone
Expropriation and Land Management Committee. Hence, the lower court rightfully ruled that
certain prerequisites must be complied with by anyone who wishes to avail himself of the
benefits of the decree.
Section 6 should not be isolated from the other provisions of the decree. After all, the rule is
that all the provisions of a law, even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand
and be given effect by reconciling them if necessary (Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709
[1956]). The intention of the lawmaker must be ascertained not from a consideration of a
single word or a particular phrase of the law, but from the context of the whole law or from a
portion thereof, as compared with the whole (Lopez and Javelona vs. El Hogar Filipino, 47
Phil. 249 [1925]).
Premised on the fact, among others, that "the traditional concept of land-ownership has
aggravated the problem arising from urbanization such as the proliferation of blighted areas
and the worsening of the plight of the urban poor," P.D. No. 1517 outlines the machinery by
which its objective of urban land reform shall be realized. Thus, Section 4 of the decree
empowers the President to "proclaim specific parcels of urban and urbanizable lands as
Urban Land Reform Zone."
Accordingly, on September 11, 1979, the President issued Proclamation No. 1893 (75 O.G.
No. 38, p. 7499) declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area, including Pasay City, as an
urban land reform zone and exhorting all landowners therein "to register their existing rights,

development proposals, proposed improvements, and proposals to sell, lease or encumber


lands with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission" pursuant to Sections 4, 9, 12
and 15 of P.D. No. 1517. Said proclamation was amended on May 14, 1980 by Proclamation
No. 1967 (78 O.G. No. 49, p. 6807) which specifies 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as areas
for priority and urban land reform zones to which provisions of P.D. No. 1517 and other
pertinent decrees shall apply.
These presidential proclamations are but examples of the fact that P.D. No. 1517, including
Section 6 thereof, is not "self-executing" as further executive acts like the organization of the
committees provided for by the decree, must be done for the implementation of the
objectives of the decree. The inapplicability of P.D. No. 1517 to their case notwithstanding,
petitioners had the opportunity to own their leased lots when the late Adela Tuason gave
them the option co buy them through her letter of September 13, 1980. They lost the chance
by their own failure to exercise the option within the 3 month period stipulated in said letter.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Ricardo F. Francisco and Alfredo L. Benipayo.
2 Presided by Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano.
3 Adela Tuason died on June 11, 1986 but her counsel did not manifest as to
who shall substitute her as private respondent herein (Rollo, p. 46).

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