IBRAHIM VS.

COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy to run as
municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting
Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law
Department (Law Department) the names of candidates who were not registered
voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name.
Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2009
disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the municipality where he
seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of an opposition. It prompted
Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc through a
Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared that the
Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification, which was
issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita
B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the municipality where
he
seeks
to
be
elected.
On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had
not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the ViceMayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was
then
chaired
by
Buagas,
suspended
Ibrahims
proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed resolutions.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for
the position of Vice-Mayor.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions,
ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed
against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against
Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his municipality
disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an
eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the
COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance
of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration,
instead
aptly
pertains
to
one
of
its
divisions.

TYPOCO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, petitioner and private respondent
vied for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and
canvassing of votes, petitioner Jesus O. Typoco was proclaimed winner with 80,830
votes, as opposed to respondent Edgardo A. Tallados 78,287 votes.
Respondent Tallado filed before the COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest
error. He claimed that, after he reviewed and examined the figures in the Statement
of Votes by Precinct (SOVP) vis--vis the Certificate of Canvass of Votes (COC) in the
municipalities in the province, he found that, in the municipalities of Labo and Jose
Panganiban, errors were committed in the transposition of votes from the SOVP to
the COC. In Labo, the SOVP revealed that respondent Tallados votes were 13,174 but
when the figure was transferred to the COC, it was reduced to 11,490; whereas
petitioner Typocos votes were increased from 11,359 to 12,285. In Jose Panganiban,
respondent Tallados votes, per the SOVP, totaled 6,186; the same, however, was
reduced to 5,460 when transposed to the COC. Respondent contended that if the
errors were corrected, he would obtain a total of 80,697 votes and petitioner, 79,904
votes; thus, he would be the true winner in the gubernatorial race in the province.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC First Division, on April 30, 2008, rendered the
assailed Resolution granting respondent Tallados petition. It ruled that, based on
the COMELEC copies (in the custody of the Election Records and Statistics Division
[ERSD] of the Commission) of the concerned SOVPs and COCs, the votes in Labo, as
recorded in the said documents, did not correspond; while those in Jose Panganiban
actually tallied. Correcting the figures in Labo, while retaining those in the latter
municipality, led to the following results: Tallado, 79,969 votes; and Typoco, 79,904
votes.
ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its
issuances ordering: (1) the correction of the manifest error in the pertinent election
documents; (2) the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner; and (3) the
subsequent proclamation of the winning gubernatorial candidate in Camarines Norte.
RULING: The Court finds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion.
We find that the COMELEC, in ordering the correction of manifest errors in the SOVP
and COC, merely exercised its bounden duty to ascertain the true will of the
electorate of the province.
Considering that no objections have been raised against the SOVPs submitted to the
Commission, under the custody of the ERSD, and that based on the principle that
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty in the receipt,
custody and safekeeping of the SOVP with the ERSD, it is therefore reasonable to
consider that the votes of the parties as found in the ERSD copies of the contended
SOVPs shall prevail
Correspondingly, we also rule that in the light of the erroneous computation of the
votes of petitioner Tallado and private respondent Typoco, the latter was erroneously

proclaimed as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Such proclamation is, therefore,

null and void.
As stated at the outset, the appreciation of election documents involves a question
of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked
with the supervision of elections all over the country. The findings of fact of
administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and
nonreviewable by courts of justice.32ca This principle is applied with greater force
when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the poll bodycreated and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itselfon a level higher than statutory administrative organs.
The decision of the COMELECto correct the manifest errors based on its own copies
of the election documents involvedcannot be hastily set aside by this Court on
petitioners bare allegation that the COMELEC (ERSD) copies are fake or spurious and
have found their way to the COMELEC records anomalously This act of the COMELEC
enjoys the presumption of regularity.
In other words, the referral was not intended to aid the COMELEC, or to be used as
conclusive evidence in the resolution of the petition for correction of manifest error,
precisely because that issue had already been resolved and because the COMELEC
has the sole competence to determine the authenticity of the concerned election
documents.

BAYTAN VS COMELEC
FACTS:
On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998
elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio
(Ignacio for brevity), in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to
register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.
When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants in this precinct
looked unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners to return to the registration
center to study the precinct map of Barangay 18. They then realized that their
residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28.
Subsequently,
petitioners sent a letter dated August 21, 1997 to former COMELEC Assistant
Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson and furnished a copy thereof to COMELEC
Registrar Francisco Trias. In this letter, petitioners requested for advice on how to
cancel their previous registration. They also explained the reason and circumstances
of their second registration and expressed their intention to redress the error.
On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of
petitioners Voters Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.
Juanito V. Ravanzo (Ravanzo for brevity), for evaluation. Ravanzo endorsed the
matter to the Regional Director for prosecution. Eventually, the Law Department
endorsed the case to Ravanzo for resolution.
ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
1. Recommending the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite clear
and convincing evidence on record that they had no intention of committing said
election offense;
2. Not considering the letter dated August 21, 1997 addressed to the COMELEC
Assistant Director of Cavite City as substantial compliance with the requirement of
the law for cancellation of previous registration; and
3. Taking cognizance of the case in the first instance in violation of Section 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
First and Second Issues: Whether the criminal cases should be dismissed on the
ground of lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of
cancellation of previous registration.

The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to assure the people
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. This grant is an adjunct to
the COMELECs constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws. Failure
by the COMELEC to exercise this power could result in the frustration of the true will
of the people and make an idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of
the charge.
COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the
finding of probable cause. The COMELEC noted that petitioners wrote down their
address in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18 as No. 709 T. Gomez Extension St.,
Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite City. However, in Precinct No. 129-A of Barangay 28,
petitioners registered as residents of No. 709 Magcawas St., Barangay 28-Taurus,
Caridad, Cavite City. The COMELEC noted further that the affidavits submitted by
petitioners contained glaring inconsistencies. The COMELEC also pointed out that
since double registration is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to
violate the law is inconsequential.
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election
offenses rests in the COMELECs sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the
constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for
violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of
the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Section 267 of the Election Code provides that election offenses shall prescribe after
five years from the date of their commission. In this case, the offense of double
registration allegedly occurred on June 22, 1997 when petitioners registered for a
second time in a different precinct without canceling their previous registration. At
this point, the period of prescription for the alleged offense started to run. The
COMELEC initiated the complaint for double registration against petitioners motu
proprio under Sections 3,[13] 4[14] and 5,[15] Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
Third Issue: Whether the COMELEC en bancs assumption of original jurisdiction over
the case violated the Constitution.
It is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi judicial powers that the COMELEC
is mandated to hear and decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is jurisdictional.
The Solicitor General contends that the conduct of a preliminary investigation before
the filing of an information in court does not in any way adjudicate with finality the
rights and liabilities of the parties investigated. A preliminary investigation does not
make any pronouncement as to the guilt or innocence of the party involved. Hence,
a preliminary investigation cannot be considered a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding required to be heard by the Division in the first instance.
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELECs administrative powers are
found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C.[21] The 1987
Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative

powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELECs
administrative powers in the Commission on Elections, while providing that the
COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the
practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions The COMELEC
is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to prosecute
cases of violations of election laws. The prosecution of election law violators involves
the exercise of the COMELECs administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc
can directly approve the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal
information for double registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is no
constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first decided
by any of the divisions of the COMELEC.
In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not
applicable in administrative cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is
determining whether probable cause exists to charge petitioners for violation of the
provision of the Election Code prohibiting double registration.

JARAMILLA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of
the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14,
2001elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz,
proclaimed the winning candidates for the offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and eight (8)
members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
In the tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and Chairperson of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that Suyat obtained 4,779
votes and was ranked no. 9.
On June 13, 2001, respondent Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene,[3] which the latter treated as a Petition for
Correction of Manifest Error. Petitioner countered in his Answer [4] that said petition
should be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of the required
certification of non-forum shopping.
On October 24, 2002, COMELEC en banc issued the assailed resolution, proclaiming
Suyat
as
the
eighth
(8th)
Board
Member
of
Sta.
th
Cruz,Ilocos Sur. Mr. Ireneo Habon Cortez shall be declared the 7 Municipal Board
Member. The New Board shall use the Comelec copies of the election returns and
Statement of Votes pertaining to the instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC erred in dismissing the case.

RULING:
Petitioner
bewails
the
fact
that
the
COMELEC
took
cognizance
of
respondent Suyats petition for correction despite its having been filed beyond the 5day reglementary period fixed in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and its lack of
certification against forum-shopping.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the COMELEC has the discretion to suspend its
rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. (Section 4, Rule 1 of the
COMELEC Rules). The COMELEC therefore has authority to suspend
the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the requirement of certification of
non-forum shopping for that matter, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution
of the cases before it.
Petitioner next points out respondent Suyats omission to pay the prescribed filing
fees. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the COMELEC is
not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees.
The use of the word may in the aforecited provision readily shows that the COMELEC
is conferred the discretion whether to entertain the petition or not in case of nonpayment of legal fees. And even if it were not afforded such discretion, as discussed
above, it is authorized to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of
justice.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will
of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.

VILLAROSA VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa) and respondent Romulo de Mesa Festin
(Festin) were two of the four rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. On May
15, 2013, private respondent was proclaimed the victor, having garnered 20,761
votes, edging out petitioner who obtained 19,557 votes.

With a difference of only 1,204 votes, petitioner filed a Petition for Protest Ad
Cautelam before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging irregularities attending the
conduct of the elections. Specifically, petitioner brought to the attention of the court
the complaints of various voters who claimed that several ballots were pre-marked or
that the ovals appearing on the face of the ballots corresponding to the name of
petitioner were embossed or waxed to prevent them from being shaded. As a
consequence of the alleged massive electoral fraud and irregularities in the 92
clustered precincts of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, private respondent, so petitioner
claimed, was illegally proclaimed.

In his answer, private respondent Festin likewise impugned the election results in the
precincts, particularly the number of votes credited to petitioner.

With both parties raising as principal issue the accuracy of the vote count, a physical
recount of the ballots were conducted under the auspices of the RTC, Branch 46 in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. On November 7, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision
declaring the proclamation of respondent Festin void.
Without yet ruling on the motion to dismiss, the COMELEC, acting through its First
Division, on February 13, 2014, issued an Order requiring petitioner to file his answer
to the petition. Through the same Order, the COMELEC issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC from implementing its Decision during the
pendency of the case. Without waiving the grounds relied on his motion to dismiss,
petitioner timely filed his answer to the petition.

To petitioners surprise, on April 10, 2014, public respondent COMELEC granted

private respondents request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the RTC
Decisions execution pending appeal. What petitioner considered questionable was
that the injunction was issued by a newly-constituted Special First Division, which
was allegedly formed due to the absence of several COMELEC commissioners who, at
that time, were personally attending to the concerns of the overseas absentee voters
abroad. Petitioner points out that the special division was constituted only on April 8,
2014 through Resolution No. 9868 and was composed of only two members,
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Al A. Parreo, with the former
presiding.

In response to the issuance of the injunction, petitioner filed an urgent motion

praying for its quashal, which was denied by public respondent COMELEC First
Division through the assailed June 3, 2014 Order.

ISSUES: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it did
not find that the Special First Division did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction

and when it denied the urgent ex-parte motion to quash the writ of preliminary
injunction.

RULING:
The assailed Order was not issued in grave abuse of discretion. Even delving into the
merits of the case, it cannot be said that the issuance of the assailed Order was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion since public respondents actions find
sufficient constitutional basis under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. With
the foregoing discussion, it becomes indisputable that the formation of the Special
Divisions is not only sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules but also by the Constitution
no less.
No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC when
the Special First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction.
Contrary to petitioners claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special
First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of
the case between the two.Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate
Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its Divisions.
The additional term special, in this case, merely indicates that the commissioners
sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution.
The COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned
to it before the substitution was made, including SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014. This
jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent formation of the Special First Division
since this only entailed a change in the Divisions composition of magistrates.
Indeed, the case was not reassigned or re-raffled anew. If anything, it was only
petitioners naivety that misled him into interpreting the designation of the division
as a special one, meaning it is distinct from the first. Corollarily, petitioner is also
mistaken in claiming that the jurisdiction was eventually re-acquired by the First
Division from the Special First Division by ruling on the motion to quash since the
First Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with.
Petitioner raises a fuss anent the temporary or permanent shuffling of members in
the Commission when, in fact, this is not a novel practice. In instances such as this,
exigencies justify the substitution of members and the designation of special
divisions to prevent paralysis in the administration of justice. This is also resorted to
in order to ensure that the speedy disposition of cases is not impeded and that
docket systems are unclogged. Obviously, these advantages far outweigh
petitioners baseless cry of violation of due process.

HAYUDINI VS COMELEC
FACTS:
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position
of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after,
Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini's
CoC. Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false
representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC
that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in
Zamboanga City.
Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).
Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini's petition
on January 31, 2013. On that same day, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed
Omar's earlier petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC for lack of substantial evidence that
Hayudini committed false representation as to his residency.
Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered
the deletion of Hayudini's name in Barangay Bintawlan's permanent list of voters. In
view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event on
March 26, 2013.
Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision to the Court of Appeals but was
denied.
On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He
was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.On June 20, 2013, the
COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting Omars second petition to
cancel Hayudini's CoC.
Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc,
arguing that its Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course to a
belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening
event. The COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudinis Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit. The COMELEC declared Omar as the mayor. Thus, Hayudini filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC committed
in declaring Omar as the duly-elected mayor

grave

abuse

of

discretion

RULING:
Hayudini contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
admitted, and later granted, Omars petition despite failure to comply with Sections 2
and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No.
9523. Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains
the COMELECs liberal treatment of Omars petition.
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not
be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep
in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under
suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the
benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved
by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an
ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission
on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where the Court held that in
exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the
integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes.
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its
rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition
of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the
effective and efficient implementation of its objectives - ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election
contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private
and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of
dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the
tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command,
whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.
The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the necessary ground to
successfully have Hayudinis CoC struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a
certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office
when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material
fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be
prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's
qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly,
the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a
legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious:
the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government
under which he or she is running. Even the will of the people, as expressed through
the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78
must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a

malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's

qualifications for public office.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible
for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the
municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under
Section 78. It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by
the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirm in
the disapproval of Hayudini's petition for registration. This is precisely the reason
why he needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that he is
eligible for said office," Hayudini made a clear and material misrepresentation as to
his eligibility, because he was not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay
Bintawlan.

REYES VS RTC OF ORIENTAL MINDORO

FACTS:
Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the
May 11, 1992 synchronized elections.
On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground
of serious irregularity in counting in favor of petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for
"Reyes" only, considering that there was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing
the same surname. However, without resolving his petition, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the eighth winning candidate
with 7,205 votes. On May 25, 1992 petitioner took his oath of office.
On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court.
He alleged that "a vital mistake [had been] committed by the Board of Canvassers in
the mathematical computation of the total number of votes garnered by petitioner
On June 4, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss private respondent's petition on
the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of ten days from
proclamation. On June 15, 1992, however, the trial court denied his motion.
On the other hand, the Municipal Board of Canvassers file its answer in which it
admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858
votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes.

On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision annuling the proclamation of
petitioner and declaring private respondent as the eighth winning candidate for the
position of councilor of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. A copy
of the decision was served on petitioner on June 26, 1992. Petitioner filed a notice of
appeal to the COMELEC. In addition, he filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition
in the Court of Appeals, to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the
duly proclaimed member of that body and prohibit it from further recognizing private
respondent.
On August 26, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because of
petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. The appellate court cited Supreme
Court Circular 28-91 which prohibits the filing of multiple petitions involving the
same issues.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied. The appellate
court's decision became final and executory on December 10, 1992. Meanwhile, the
Sangguniang Bayan met in inaugural session on July 3, 1992, during which private
respondent was recognized as the eighth member of the body and thereafter allowed
to assume office and discharge its functions. On July 13, 1992, it informed petitioner
that it had recognized the private respondent as its member.
On the other hand, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed on January 22, 1993
petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the
prescribed period.
ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed
a grave abuse of discretion, the first, by assuming jurisdiction over the election
contest filed by private respondent despite the fact that the case was filed more than
ten days after petitioner's proclamation, and the second i.e., the COMELEC's First
Division, by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial court for late
payment of the appeal fee.
RULING:
The questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are,
therefore, not pure questions of law.
Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required
for the filing of a petition for certiorari is clear from the Constitutuion. Conformably to
these provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be
dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en
banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, sec. 7, "may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari."
The First Division of the COMELEC properly dismissed petitioner's appeal from the
decision of the trial court because of his failure to pay the appeal fee within the time
for perfecting an appeal.
Petitioner also assails the decision of the trial court as having been rendered without
jurisdiction. He contends that the election protest of private respondent was filed
more than ten days after his (petitioner's) proclamation.
Petitioner is, however, estopped to raise this question now. He did not only appeal
from the decision of the trial court to the COMELEC raising this question, but he also

filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. Having
decided on this course of action, he should not be allowed to file the present petition
just because he lost in those cases.

CAYETANO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and
private respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City.
Petitioner was proclaimed the winner thereof on May 12, 2010, receiving a total of
Ninety-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Five (95,865) votes as against the NinetyThree Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Five (93,445) votes received by private
respondent.
On May 24, 2010, private respondent filed an Election Protest against petitioner
before the COMELEC. Private respondents protest listed election frauds and
irregularities allegedly committed by petitioner, which translated to the latters
ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City. On the whole, private respondent claims that
he is the actual winner of the mayoralty elections in Taguig City.
Posthaste, petitioner filed her Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim on June
7, 2010. Petitioner raised, among others, the affirmative defense of insufficiency in
form and content of the Election Protest and prayed for the immediate dismissal
thereof.

On July 1, 2010, the COMELEC held a preliminary conference and issued an Order
granting private respondent a period within which to file the appropriate responsive
pleading to the Answer of petitioner. The COMELEC likewise stated that it will rule on
the affirmative defenses raised by petitioner.
Thereafter, on August 31, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Preliminary Conference Order relative to the denial of her affirmative defenses.
Private respondent filed a Comment and Opposition thereto. Consequently, the
COMELEC issued the second assailed Order dated September 7, 2010, denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent
for insufficiency in form and content.
RULING:
In general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can
they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only
delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and
unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without
recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved
party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the
proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. The
exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the
interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining
order without a time limit, which is the Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division
admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary
period, which is the Kho case.
This Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, that "it is the
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section 7,
Art. IX-A of the Constitution, may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari." The
exception provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho
and Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First Division in this
case are not a patent nullity. The assailed orders in this case involve the
interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the Rosal case apply
because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of
the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were already consolidated.
Plainly, from the foregoing, the Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether
final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated
otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
ABS-CBN VS COMELEC
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 98-1419 . Petitioner
asserts that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining
the petitioner or any other group from conducting exit polls during the May 11
elections.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the
May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with.

ISSUE: Is the moot and academic principle a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case?
RULING:
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to
the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of
expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic
feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with
elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that
could well crop up again in future elections.
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pao, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also
has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the
extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees."7 Since the fundamental
freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to
settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit
polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,8 when the issue involves the
principle of social justice or the protection of labor,9 when the decision or resolution
sought to be set aside is a nullity,10 or when the need for relief is extremely urgent
and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21,
1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold
of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly
enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in
time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the
Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.

GARCES VS CA
FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on
July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion,
who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Both appointments were
to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer
post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant
Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so

because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor

Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not
vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with
an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It
was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte which
Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since
Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled
his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime,
the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election
Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was
rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is
cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before the
Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of
an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto
is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters referred under the
constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections. CA affirmed
the RTCs dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
RULING:
The case is cognizable in the RTC. It is provide in Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution.
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this
Controversy.
The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled
rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective
regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational setup of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official.
Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions
that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to
exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.